S A V E Z M Z A V O D ZA PRIVREDNO PLANIRANJE

RA Z V O JA

PRIVREDNOG

U r Branko Horvai Danfika Nikollc Pjvle Sicherl

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DUGOROCNOU

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1001. ELEMENTI MHTOUOLOGIJE

Pl.ANIRANJA

ELEMENTI METODOLOGIJE PLANIRANJA DUGOROCNOG PRIVREDNOG RAZVOJA

Beograd, septembar 1964.

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SAVEZNI ZAVOD ZA PRIVREDNO PLANIRANJE

Dr Branko Horvat Danilka Nikolid Pavle Sicherl

Materijal za plan 19641070.

( ELEMENTI METODOLOGIJE PLANIRANJA DUGOROCNOG PRIVREDNOG RAZVOJA

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Beograd, septembar 1964.

Studije

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, S A D R Z A J Strana PREDGOVOR U V 0 D I. . . VI 1

OPSTI PRISTUP METODOLOGIJI PLANIRANJA DUGOROCNOG PRIVREDNOG RAZVOJA Dancika Nikolic, Savezni zavod za privredno plani: rtnje 1. Pojam i sadrzaj metodologije planiranja dugorocnog privrednog riazvoja 2. Potreba i zadatak izrade adekvatne metodologije za planiranje dugorocnog privrednog razvoja

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II. METODE I REZULTATI ANALIZE I PLANIRANJA DUGOROC-NOG PRIVREDNOG RAZVOJA NA BAZI NETO-AGREGATA PROIZVODNJE 1. MODEL PRIVREDNOG RAZVOJA JUGOSLAVIJE U PERIODTJ 1958-1980. - Dr Branko Horvat, Jugoslovenski institut za ekonomska istrazivanja I. Teorijska osnovica za jednu koncepciju privrednog razvoja II. Dugorocni program: model 1 III. Dugorocni program: model 1.1 2. KONSTRUKCIJA PROIZVODNO-KAPITALNOG EKONOMETRIJSKOG MODELA ZA DUGOROdNI PRIVREDNI RAZVOJ JUGOSLAVIJE - Dancika Nikolic, Savezni zavod za privredno planiranje} Pavle Sicherl, Jugoslovenski institut za ekonomska istrazivanja . I. Pristupna razmatranja II. Konstrukcija i resenja matematickog proizvodno-kapitalnog modela

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IV Strana III. Konstrukcija dva odgovarajuca analiticka proizvodno-kapitalna ekonometrijska modela IV. Varijante projekeija za planski razvoj privrede Jugoslaviae V. Zakljucna analiza i ocena Rezime na engleskom jeziku . . Rezime na ruskom jeziku Rezime na srpsko-hrvatskom jeziku 3. TEORIJSKA KONSTRUKCIJA PRQIZVODNO-POTROSNOG EKONOMSKOG MODELA ZA DUGOROCNO PLANIRANJE Dancika Nikolic, Savezni zavod za privredno planiranj e , I. Pristupna razmatranja II. Konstrukcija i resenja matematickog proizvodno-pptrosnog .modela III. Neka analiticka razmatranja Rezime na srpsko-hrvatskom jeziku Rezime na ruskom. jeziku Rezime na engleskom jeziku III. METODE I REZULTATI ANALIZE I PLANIRANJA DUGOROCNOG PRIVBEDNOG RAZVOJA NA BAZI j BRUT-Q^AGBEGATA PROIZVODNJE 1. KONSTRUKCIJA JEDNOG EKONOMETRTJSKOG MODELA ZA DUGOROCNI RAZVOJ INDUSTRIJE JTJGOSLAVIJE - Dancika Nikolic, Savezni zavod za privre dno planiranje I. Pristup probleznu II. Konstrukcija matematickog modela III. 0sta resenja matematickog modela IV. Konstrukcija ekonometrijskog modela za razvoj industrije i rudarstva V. Projekcije za period 196 O-I98O. . . .

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Strana VI. Dopunska i zakljucna razmatranja Rezime na srpsko-hrvatskom jeziku Rezime na ruskom jeziku Rezime na engleskom jeziku 2. KONSTRUKCIJA INVERZNOG EKONOMETRIJSKOG MODELA SA NETO I BRUTO-ASPEKTIMA AGREGATA PROIZVODNJE ZA DUGOROCNI PRIVREDNI RAZVOJ JTJGOSLAVIJE - Dancika Nikolic, Savezni zavod za privredno planiranje I. Konstrukcija inverznog matematickog modela II. Opsta resenja inverznog matematickog modela III. Konstrukcija inverznog ekonometrijskog modela za privredni razvoj Ju goslavia e ) IV. Cetiri varijante projekcija privrednog razvoja Jugoslavije za period 1963- 1980. V. Zakljucna analiza varijanata i mode la Rezime na srpsko-hrvatskom jeziku Rezime na ruskom jeziku Rezime na engleskom jeziku 3. PRIMENA KOMBINOVANOG VISESEKTORSKOG MODE LA ZA SEDMOGODISNJI PRIVREDNI RAZVOJ JUGOSLAVIJE - Dancika Nikolic, Savezni zavod za privredno planiranje B I B L I O G R A F I J A 149 155 158

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U vezi sa izradom Sedmogodisnjeg plana razvoja Jugo slav! jel964~1970 9 Savezni zavod za privredno planiranje po*= krenuo je aktivnost da se u pojedinim naucnim ustanovama i institucijama studijski obradjuju pojedine grupe problema, koje mogu da budu relevantae za razne aspekte analize i oce; ne prilikont pripreme i razrade kako studijskih osnova, tako i prednacrta Sedmogodisnjeg plana. Moze se reci da su na liniji I ove aktivnosti prakticno angazovani svi ekonomski instituti u J Jugoslaviji i to'kako oni opste ekonomske orijentacije, tako i ! oni koji su specijalizovani za pojedine specificne problems. |Pored toga, u ovoj aktivnosti ucestvuje i niz grupa i pojedi;naca sa ekonomskih fakulteta,raaiflih aavoda i drugih institu; dija. Namera Saveznog zavoda bila je da se u okviru ove ak= ; tivnosti okupe sve raspolozive kadrovske snage i kapaciteti odgovarajucih naucnih ustanova,. kako bi se obiman i slozen rad i na izradi Sedmogodisnjeg plana obaVio sto kvalitetnije i svrsi!shodnije. Studije koje se u okviru ove aktivnosti obradjuju i ikoje su jednim delom vec zavrsene, pokrivaju sirok krug pro~ blema i to kako sa podrucja problematike privrednog razvoja, razvoja drugih delatnosti i faktora razvoja, tako i sa podruc: ja problematike privrednog sist-ema. Is to tako razradjuju se i ;neke studije u kojima se tretiraju pretezno metodoloski aspek*= ;ti pojedinih problema. Finansiranje ovih studija obavlja se iz specijalnog fonda koji je za tu svrhu formiran pri. Saveznom zavodu za pri-= fvredno planiran.je i Saveznom fondu za naucni rad. Teme odobra~ va posebna komisija, u kojoj su zastupljeni predstavnici Saveznog zavoda za privredno planiranje,Saveznog saveta za koordinaciju naucnoistrazivackog rada i Saveznog fonda za naucni rad. Prema tome i studija koje se ugovaraju i rade sa specijalnom svrhom da posluze prilikom razrade Sedmogodisnjeg plana, komi=

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sija u pojedinim slucajevima odobrava i takve teme koje su vec 1 zapocete i delom obradjene od strane ekonomskih instituta ili I drugih institucija i pojedinaca, a koje po svome karakteru mo- | gu biti od interesa za razne aspekte razrade Sedmogodisnjeg pla-3 na. Objavljujuci ove radove u edieiji "Studije11 /Materi= jali za plan 196^-1970/, Savezni zavod za privredno planiranje zeli da one doprinesu boljem sagledavanju problema i tako pomognu ne samo saradnicima Saveznog.zavoda prilikom razrade Sed= mogodisnjeg plana, vec isto tako i republickim i drugim zavodi-jj ma, institucijama i pojedincima koji se na ovaj ili onaj nacin| bave planiranjem, ekonomskom analizom i ekonomskom politikom- 1 Stavovi ko.ji su zastupl.jeni u ovim studi.i ama, ocene i f resen.ja ne obavezu.ju Savezni zavod za privredno planiranje, vec I predstavl.ja.ju misl.jen.ja instituci.ja odnosno autora po.iedinihj studija, ko.ja ce Zavod povezano sa drugim materi.jalima ko.ji sef priprema.ju koristiti u toku dal.jeg rada na Sedmogodisn.iem planul

Beograd, 12 decembra 19^3

GENERALNI DIREKTOE Nikola Mincev

ELEMENTI METODOLOGIJE PLANIRANJA DUGOROCNOG FRIVREDNOG RAZVOJA U V 0 D Elementi metodologije planiranja dugorocriog privrednog razvoja predstavljaju samo prikupljeni neuskladjeni materijal iz oblasti metodologije dugorocno^- planiranja, koji je bio obradjivan i prezentiran u raznim piiblikaci jama Saveznog zavoda za priv redno planiranje. Ovi elementi treba da posluze kao osnova za di~V skusiju i pripremu izrade jedne xielovite opste metodologije dugorocnog planiranja, koja bi predstavljala uskladjenu i sire razradjenu dopunu.metodologije kratkorocnog i srednjorochog planiranja uopste, a posebno metodologije planiranja primenjene u Sedmogodisnjem planu privrednog razvoja 1964-1970. godine. Prezentirani materijal netpredstavlja zaokrugljenu celinu i ne oTauhvata sve dosadasnje radove iz podrucja. metodologije dugorocnog plandranja. U opstem. pristupu /odeljak 1 / u najkracim crtama obradjeni su, pored pojma i sadrzaja metodologije dugorocnog planira nja, i potreba i-.zad-a.tak izrade ovakve adekvatne metodologije. U stvari, tu su samo istaknuti neki momenti po kojima se metodologija dugorocnog razlikuje od metodologije kratkorocnog i srednjorocnog planiranja. U odeljku /II/,u kome s u .dati jneki metodi i rezultati analize i planiranja .dugorocnog privrednog razvoja na bazi neto-agregata proizvodn.ie,data su tri posebna rada, koji na izvestan nacin predstavljaju pocetak i dalji razvoj u izradi i primeni ovak ve metodolagije.k.od.xiaso Prvi rad. predstavlja opsti sestosektorski proizvodno-dLnvesticioni model prxvrednog .razvoja Jugoslavije u periodu 1958 -1980 . godine u prvoj aproksimaciji kao jjocetak rada na koncepciji dugorocnog privrednog programa. Drugi rad predstav lja kohstrukciju globalnog proizvodno-kapitalnog analitickog i

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planskog modela za privrednl razvoj Jugoslav!je u periodu 1952 1960 . .i I963-I98O 0 godine kao pokusaj daljeg unapredjivanja u konstruisanju fleksibilnijih modela na bazi neto-agregata pro izvodnje. Treci rad predstavlja samo teorijsku skicu konstrukcije globalnog proizvodno-potrosnog ekonomskog modela za analizu i planiranje dugorocnog privrednag razvoja kao nastojanje da se zahvati problematika proizvodne /investicione/ i neproizvodae potrosnje, produktivnosti rada, nagradjivanja prema radu i.izijrotnog standarda.

T pdeljku /III/, u komei su dati neki metodi i rezultaJ ; ti analize' i planiranja dugorocnog privrednag razvoja n . bazi a bruto , neto-agregata proizvodn.je, data su takodje tri povezana i rada, kbgi. na poseban nacin predstavljaju pocetak i dalji razvoj u izradi i primeni ovakve kompleksne metodologije kod nas. Prvi rad predstavlja konstrukciju jednog ekonometrijskog modela sa bruto i neto-aspektima a^regata proizvodnje za razvoj industrije Jugoslav!jeu periodu?1960-1980 godine kao pocetak rada na kompleksnom ukljucivanju bruto i neto-aspekta u koncepciji dugorocnog privrednog programa. Drugi rad predstavlja konstrukciju globalnog inverznog. ekonometrijskog modela sa bruto i netoaspektima agregata proizvodnje za privredni razvoj Jugoslav! j e ' j u periodu I963-I98O 0 godine kao pokusaj ne samo da se poveca fleksibilnost modela na bazi bruto i neto-agregata proizvodnje^ vec i da se omoguci kombinovanje dva ili vise modela u jedins- 1 tven, povezan i uskladjen sistem ekonomskih modela. Treci rad predstavlja samo sazet opis primene kombinovanog visesektorskog modela za sedmogfldisnji privredni razvoj Jugoslav!je kao ilustrativan primer, koji u metodoloskom pogledu u potpunosti moze da posluzii za dugoroeno planiranje u okvirima koncepcije dugoroc nog privrednog programa.

Treba dodati da oba treca rada u oba odeljka /II predsta?!jaju samo. delove opseznijih radova, koji su jos u tokui koji ce naknadno takodje biti objavljeni. Posebno treba istaci da ce pkr-alelp 0 ;sa ovom. knjigbm Elemehata biti publikovana jos . . ;j.edna knjiga, kbja ce predstavljati metodoloske pristupe.i rezultate: dugonociog planiranja nekih sektora Saveznog zavoda za privredno pVaniranje. Posto je u prvoj knjizi vise naglasak na metodolbskim aspektima, a u .drugoj na sektorskim rezultatima du gorocnog planiranja, obe knjige se uzajamno nadopunjuju i u tom

_ 3 smislu predstavljaju bar donekle izvesnu celinu. .

Na kraju je data manje-vise iscrpna literatura, na koju se autori pozivaju, kao i ona kojom su se sluzili*

j i Beograd, 20.VIII 196^.

Sektor za dugorocne projekcife

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OPSTI PRISTUP METODOLOGIJI PLANIRANJA DUGOROCNOG PRIVREDNOG RAZVOJA

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Dancika NIKOLlfi

OPSTI PRISTUP METODOLOGIji PLANIRANJA DUGOROCNOG PRIVREDNOG RAZVOJA 1. Po.lam i sadrza.1 metodologi.1e planiran.ja dug.orocnog privrednog razvpja Metodologija planiranja dugorocnog privrednog razvoja, kao posebna vrsta metbdplpgije planiranja uppste, sastoji se kao i ova od metoda analize, metoda projiciranja i drugih postupaka koji se primenjuju u procesu izradjivanja i ostvarivauja plana, tj. u svim fazama planiranja. Zbog toga je i ova posebna vrsta metodologije planiranja, kao i ona za kratkorocni i srednjorocniprivredni razvoj, sastavni deo i jedan od osnovnih upctpunjujucih i prosirujucih elemenata kompleksno razvijenog sistema priv rednog planiranja uopste. Posmatrana u celini, ova posebna vrsta metodologije planiranja treba da obuhvati sva ona osnovna podrucja kao i metodologija kratkorocnog i srednjorocnog planiranjaV. Medjutim, ova poaebna vrsta metodologije u svim tim podrucjima ima svoje specificnosti i izrazite karakteristike, kojih ili nema ili ima samo u manjoj meri kod metodologije kratkorocnog i srednjoroSnog planiranja. Ovde ce se navesti samo neke od tih specificnosti i karakteristika, koje su u toku istrazivaSkog rada bile uocene i koje su u manjoj ili vecoj meri bile uzete u obzir u prezentiranim radovima. Ono sto predstavlja izrazitu specificnost metodologije dugorocnog planiranja, jeste cinjenica da, dok je kod kratkoroc-B nog pa donekle i kod srednjorpcnpg planiranja mpzda i mpgao, ili 1/ 0 tim psnpvnim podrucjima, kap i drugim karakteristikama metpdplpgije kratkprpcnpg i srednjorpcnpg planiranja, videtis"Gradja za elemente metpdplpgije planiranja u uzem smislu u Sedmpgpdisnjem planu privrednpg razvpja 19o4-1970.gpd.", SZPP, Bepgrad, marta 1964, str. 2-3.

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sasvim bez ill sa dosta jednostavnim ekonomskim modelima, da se izradi plan sa odgovarajucim projekcijama, kod dugorocnog plani ranja nije moguce ni zamisliti izradu plana sa odgovarajucim projekcijama bez izrazitog modelskog pristupa. Medjutim, i sam modelski pristup za dugorocno planiranje ima neke svoje posebne karakteristikeo Naime, ovde ne samo da se ne moze prihvatiti metodoloska kdncepcija tzv. neutralnog i nezavisnog projiciranja,vec ne moze da zadovolji ni tzv. prosto ali modelsko projiciranje po= mocu. eks.trap.olacije j.edinstvenog .ekonometrijskog modela i za protekli i za buduci period. Ispostavlja se kao-nuzna potreba da se konstruise poseban analiticki ekonometri.jski -.model za protekli period radi same verifikacije i analize, a poseban planski ekonometri.jski model za buduci period radi izvrsenja samog dugorocnog projiciranja. Ali ni ovom potrebom za izdvajanje posebnpg globalnog modela za protekli period i posebnog globalnog modela za bu duci razvoj nije dovol'jno istaknuta osobenost dugorocnog planiranja. Potreba za dezagregiranjem ovih globalnih modela ispoljava se u znatno vecoj meri, pri ce&u ovo dezagregiranje treba shvati.t u visestrukom znacenju. Pre svega, ai strukturnom dezagregira.i nju po sektorima i granama privrede, ali isto tako i po raznim aspektima i parcijalnim kompleksima privrede. Prvo dezagregiranje iziskuje konstrukci.ju visesektorskih modela, dok drugo dezagregi ranje zahteva konstrukci.ju kompleksnog sistema raznih kombinovanih i med.jusobno usklad.jenih ekonomskih modela. Pored ovih glavnih modelskih osobenosti metodologije dugorocnog planiranja, svakako, da ima i citav niz maiije ili vise znacajnih karakteristika, koje su iuherentne samim tim modelima ili citavom sistemu povezanih modela. Jednu od ovib. karakteristika ipak treba posebno istacie Vsc v. izradi ekonomskih modela za srednjorocne periode, bilo analiticltiLh ili planskih, osetila se tu i tamo izvesna potreba za dinamiziran.jem nekih konstantnih modelskih parametara /tinvarijanti, t 7'< kao sto bus koeficijenti u cesca, kapitalni koeficijenti, koeficijenti efektivnosti, koefi= cijenti produktivnosti, koeficijenti potrosnje, stope rasta i dr. Dok se u:konstrukciji modela za s.rednjorocne periode razvoja mozda donekle i moglo zadovoljiti koastantnim prosecnim vrednostima ovih modelskih parametara, kod konstrukcije modela za dugorocne periode to vec ne bi mogao biti slucaj. Prema tome, potrebu za dinamiziran.jem odred.jenih strukturaih modelskih parametara treba smatrati kao posebno vaznu karakteristiku metodologi je za analizu i-planiranje dugorocnog privrednog razvoja.

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~ Pogresno bi bilo misliti da se metodologija dugoroSnog razlikuje od kratkorocnog i srednjorocnog planiranja samo po modelskim osobenostima i karakteristikama, a da problematika kon cepci je i drustveno-ekonomskog sistema ostaje sasvim ili bar uglavnom ista. Modelske osobenosti se samo jasnije uocavaju i u toku procesa dugorocnog planiranja nekako odmah namecu same od sebe. Istini za volju!, koncepcijske i sistemske osobenosti i karakteristike teze se uooavaju, pogotovu ako se dugorocnom planiranju pristupi sematski i formalisticki, ali zato su one utoliko vaznije i znacajnije. Koncepcije dugorocnog p^aniranja moraju se metodoloski postaviti znatno sire i dublje. Pored jasno postavljenih ciljeva, koji treba ili mogu da se ostvare, potrebno je;i tacno opredeliti instrumente koji su u skladu sa subjektivnim i objektivnim mogucnostima, a posebno sa institucionalnim okvirima drustveno-ekonomskog sistema, kao i njihovim neizbeznim ili svesno zahtevanim promenamac. 0ve okolnosti ukazuju na to da pri iz radi metodologije dugorocnog planiranja narocito treba voditi raeuna o strukturhim i kvalitativnim promenama, koje su u dugoroc nom periodu ne samo moguce vec i potrebne, pa cak i neizbezne, kako u subjektivnom tako i objektivnom smislu. Svi ovi momenti . zahtevaju koncepcijski sire i dublje sagledavanje metodoloske problematike analize i planiranja dugorocnog privrednog razvoja. Razume se da ove okolnosti u znatnoj meri otezavaju adekvatno, dugorocno planiranje i zalxtevaju ne samo neprekidno usavrsavan.je metodologi.ie-, vec i stalno pracen.ie i korigovan.j-e vec izradjenih pro.1 ekci.ja i utvrd.j-enih parametara u modelima dugorocnog razvoja. S druge strane, ove okolnosti ne samo da daju pravo, nego i pruzaju mogucnost da se u toku dugorocnog planskog razvoja na vreme preduzmu neophodne regulativne i svesno usmerava.juee mere radi aktivxra.juceg mobilisan.ja raspolozivih uslova i rezervi u ostvaren.ju odred.jenih ciljeva, koji su u skladu i odgovaraju postojecim mogucnostima i potrebama drustvene zajednice, kao i njenoj svesnoj teznji za stalnim progresivnim razvojem. 2. Potreba i zadatak izrade ade kvatne metodologije za planiran.je dugorocnog privreditog razvo.ja

s .

Da bi se bolje mogli sagledati i oceniti mesto, uloga i znacaj kratkorocnog i srednjorocnog perioda privrednog razvoja kao sastavnog dela ili etape u odredjenom dugbrocnom periodu pri-

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. ;

vrednog razvoja, proizilazi potreba za izradom i odgovarajuce adekvatne metodologije za analizu i planiranje dugorocnog privred nog razvoja. Ova potreba proizilazi i iz specificnosti, osobenosti i karakteristika kojima se ova metodologija razlikuje od one : za analizu i planiranje kratkorocnog i srednjorocnog privrednog razvoja. Osim toga, razvitak ove metodologije je i u svetskim razmerama tek u svojim zacecima i formiranju. Medjutim, zbog specificnosti nasih drustveno-ekonomskih uslova i razvoja ne mogu se ni ovi oskudni izvori upotrebljavati bez neophodne odgovarajuce kriticke prerade, razrade i prethodnog proveravanja. Aktuelna i konkretna potreba za izradom ovakve adekvatne metodologije, u istvari, najtesnje je povezana sa izradom Sedmogodisnjeg plana,ko ji se svakako realnije, potpunije i celishodnije moze postaviti i izraditi ako se posmatra i Baglejdavac,kapisagd5avnivd;ea ili?,etapa Utiokvirima makar samo i skiciranog plana za dugorocniji period haseg privrednog razvoja. Sve ove okolnosti zajedno imperativno ukazu.ju na posto.jan.ie zaista velike potrebe da se u nasim sadasnjim uslovima i za nase specificne razvojne puteve organizovano i solidno pristupi izradi nase odgovarajuce adekvatne metodologi je za analizu i planiranje dugorocnog privrednog razvoja. Iz samoga pojma i sadrzaja metodologije za analizu i ' planiranje dugorocnog privrednog razvoja, kao i iz njene ne samo opste i koncepcijske vec i aktuelne i konkretne potrebe, proizilaze i odredjeni zadaci izrade ovakve adekvatne metodologije.Ovi zadaci su uglavnom isti kao i pri izradi metodologije za kratkorocno i srednjorocno planiranje, ali svakako da i tu ima izvesnih razlika i osobenosti2/. Ovde ce se ukratko navesti samo neki od tih osnovnih i osobenih zadataka.

Glavni i osnovni zadatak izrade adekvatne metodologije za analizu i planiranje dugorocnog privrednog razvoja sastoji se u izboru i prilagodjavanju metodskih postupaka, kako analize ta ko i planiranja, uslovima, mogucnostima i zahtevima postojeceg drustveno-ekonomskog sistema i dostignutom stepenu razvoja proizvodnih snaga; ali isto tako i neprekidnim i kvalitativnim promenama, kako drustveno-ekonomskog sistema tako i proizvodnih snaga. Zadatak izbora adekvatnih metodskih postupaka nikako nije toliko 2/ 0 tim zadacima izrade metodologije za kratkorocno i srednjorocno planiranje videti: "Gradja za elemente metodologije planira nja u uzem smislu u Sedmogodisnjem planu privrednog razvoja 1964-1970.god. , SZPP, Beograd, marta 1964, str. 3-10.. 1

5
tezak, koliko na prvi pogled. izgleda<> Ne toliko zbog toga sto 10 .eda-.inec postoje obilni gotovi izvorni materijali ili literatura.. metodologiji dugorocnog planiranja, vec vise zbog "ftogacsto^::. stvarana adekvatna metodologija dugorocnog planiranja nuzno tre ba da se konstituise i sastoji iz elementarnih metodskih postupaka, koji se vel'ikim delom vec nalaze i u metodologiji kratkoroc nog i srednjorocnog planiranja, te ih ima zaista u izobilju. Glavna teskoca izbora lezi u nuznom proveravan.ju, a posebno u nepreth dnom prilagodjavan.ju i usavrsavan.ju svih tih izabranih i proverenih metodskih postupaka, koji kao celina treba da budu obuhvaceni adekvatnom metodologijom dugorocnog planiranja. Posebnu teskocu predstavlja zadatak prilagodjavan.ja metodskih postupaka kvalitativnim promenama, kako u drustveno-ekonomskom sistemu tako i u proizvodnim snagama. Ova okolnost zahteva znatno sira koncepcijska sagledavanja, koja se moraju oslanjati na opseznija teorijska i prakticna istrazivanja, ali pre svega na razrad.jene opste -politicke smernice u nasem drustvenom privredno-politickom razvoJUo Jedan od prvih i neposrednih posebnih zadataka u izradi adekvatne metodologije dugorocnog planiranja svakako predstav lja izrada posebnih analitickih ekonometri.jskih modela za protek li period razvo.ja, kao i posebnih planskih ekonometri.iskih modela za buduci period razvo.ia< S jedne strane,^.ovim se stvara moguc> nost za veci izbor odgovarajncih vari jan&Sa.,kako za analizu pro teklog tako i za planiranje buduceg razvoja, a s druge s.trane, ovim se omogucuje posebno prilagodjavanje modela proteklim stvarnim razvojnim tendencijama, a posebno prilagodjavanje svim promenama u buducem razvoju tih tendencija, bez obzira da li se radi o kvantitativnim- ili kvalitativnim promenama, kako u drustveno-ekonomskom sistemu tako i u proizvodnim snagama. Dalji poseban zadatak u izradi ove adekvatne metodologije sastoji se u konstrukciji ne samo globalnih, vec i dezagregiranih ekonometrijskih modela.o Ovde u prvom redu treba izraditi odgovara.jijce visesektorske models po delatnostima i granama. Me djutim, shvata.juci dezagregiran.je u sirem smislu, postavl.ja se i zadatak konstrukci.je celovitog sistema kombinovanih i med.jusobno uskladjenih ekonometri.iskih m o d e l a o Pri. tome bi svaki parcijalni model obuhvatao pojedine vazae i izdvojene aspekte, delove i komplekse privrede. Tako bi posebno trebalo konstruisati niz modela kao sto sus proizvodno-materijalni, proizvodno-kapitalni, proizvodno-investicioni, proizvodno=potrosni, regionalni, izvoza i uvoza, kao i drugi parcijalni modelio

. ;
l

| ; ; |

I \ \

; !
\

! | t

-.,10 6 ' !

Kao poseban zadatak u izradi celovitog sistema odgova- rajucih ekonometrijskih modela treba smatrati solidno utvrdjivanje i postavljanje osnovnog tipa i oblika ekonometri.jskog mode la, koji f e imati tu osobinu da moze da posluzi kao temelj na i koji ce se nadogradjivati ostali parcijalni ekonometrijski modefeg li, ali koji ce isto tako imati osobinu da moze da posluzi kao amalgam koji ce sve te parcijalne i posebne ekonometrijske modele uskladjeno povezati u jednu potpuno konzistentnu celinu. Ocigledno je da takav tip osnovnog ekonometrijskog modela treba da bude sa bruto i neto-aspektima agregata proizvodn.je, jer samo ta kav tip modela pruza najsire mogucnosti kombinovanja, dezagregiranja#ilikompleksno-strukturnog povezivanja i konzistentnog uskladjivanja najraznovrsnijih tipova peircijalnih i posebnih modela, Dosadasnja istrazivanja u tome pravcu ukazuju na to, da je u tu svrhu vrlo korisno i operativno konstruisati sve ove modele, a pre svega osnovni, u n.jihovom inverznom obliku. Naime, pokazalo se da upravo ovaj oblik otvara siroke mogucnosti za uskiadjeno kombinovanje najraznovrsni jih modela, ukljucujuci tu i dinqirn' ziran.je i obuhvatan.je med.jusektorskog modela, sto je od posebnog znacaja za resavanje problematike strukturnih i'regionalnih protnena. Kao karakteristican zadatak u izradi raznih odgovaraju5ih ekonometri jskih modela treba smatrati utvrd.jivan.ie najraznovrsni.jih parametara, bilo objektivno datih ili instrumentalno opredeljenih, koji karakterisu kako zakonomernosti naseg drustve no-ekonomskog razvoja, tako i svesno postavljene i demokratski usvojene drustveno-politicke smernice u daljoj izgradnji nase socijalisticke drustvene zajednice. Medjutim, ove i ekonomske j politicke parametre ne treba shvatiti kao neke konstantne velicine ili kao neke degmatski nepromenljive odnose. Ove parametre treba dinamizirati u skladu sa stvarnim tendencijama u promenama zako nomernosti, koju karakterisu odgovarajuci objektivn'o dati egzogeni parametri. Isto tako, njih treba dinamizirati u skladu sa svesno predvidjenim i usvojenim promenama u drustveno-politickim amernicama, koje karakterisu odgovarajuci instrumentalno odredjivani egzogeni parametri, Zadatak se sastoji u tome da se svi ovi parametri dinamizira.ju na t . nacin, da verno odrazava.ju dinamicaj l u zakonitost i smernice u nasem dugorocnom drustveno-ekonomskom c razvo.ju, ukljucujuci pri tome isto tako drustveno-svesne odluke, kao i realisticka predvidjanja koja se zasnivaju na naucno spoznatoj zakonitosti u tom razvoju.

- 1$ 7 Zadatak kome se mora posvetiti posebna paznja u izradi ove metodologi je, predstavlja ukl.jucivan.je strukturnog i regionalnog aspekta ne samo u izradu kompleksnog modelskog sistema, vec i u istrazivanje i formiranje osnovnih postavki kako za dugorocnu koncepciju u planiranju, tako i za svesno usmeravan du gorocni razvoj drustveno-ekonomskog sistema. Promene u drustvenoeko'nomskoj strukturi predstavljaju dugorocni faktor, koji je isto toliko zakonit i nuzan, koliko i potreban i progresivan. Ove promene su u najtesnjoj vezi sa razvojem i jacanjem drustvenih proizvodnih odnosa i snaga., Zbog toga koncepcija dugorocnog pla niranja ima za zadatak da sve ove nuzne i moguce, kao i usmerene i progresivne promene svestrano i duboko sagleda, uzme u obzir i da se na njima zasnuje. Razume se da ova koncepci.ja mora da bude povezana i u skladu sa svim nuznim i svesnim promenama u razvoju drustveno-ekonomskog sistema. U istoj, ako ne i veco;j0 meri, ova razmatranja se odnose i na aspekt regionalnih odnosa i promena u zadatku izrade metodologije za analizu i planiranje dugorocno^ privrednog razvoja. Naime, adekvatna metodologija dugorocnog planirarija tek.sa resavan.jem proolematlke neravnomernog ali usklad.jenog regionalnog razvo.ia nalaai svoju osnovnu svrhu i dobija svoju punu vrednosto Iz ovoga proizlazi nuzan aadatak izrade ne samo strukturnih, vec i odgovara.jucih regionalnih modela, kao i njihovo konzistentno ukljucivanje u kompleksan i celovit sistem kombinovanih i uskladjenih parcijalnih i posebnih ekonometrijskih modela za analizu i planiranje dugorocnog privrednog razvoja.
Kao poseban, ali isto tako i imperativan zadatak u izradi adekvatne metodologije za analizu i planiranje dugorocnog privrednog razvoja, predstavlja obuhvatanje t koncepcijsko, sistemsko i modeisko - problematike izvoza i uvoza. Ova problemati ka je vec sada vrlo aktuelna, a sa dal.jim i dugorocnim razvo.iem nase industri.je ona ce sve vise dobi.jati u svome znacaju. Posebni aspekti ove problematike, kao sto je Sto brze ukljucivanje u medjunarodnu podelu rada, odredjivanje osnovnih pravaca daljeg usmeravanja nase spoljnotrgovinske razmene, razvijanje integracionih grupacija u pojedinim svetskim regijama, razvijanje konkurentskih sposobnosti na svetskom trzistu za pojedine grane, otklanjanje deficita u reprodukcionom materijalu i drugi, jasno govore o njenom rastucem znacaju. Zbog toga se namece kao neophodan pose ban zadatak konstrukci.ja i odgovara.juceg ekonometri.jskog modela za izvoz i uvoz, koji bi koncepcijski uzimao u obzir i moguce i predvidljive promene kako u raziroju unutrasnjih i spoljasnjih

- 12 8 :
institucionalnih okvira i uslova, tako isto i u razvoju unutrasnjih i spoljasnjih proizvodnih snaga. Jasno je d4 bi i ovaj poseban model morao biti ukljucen u kompleks celovxtog sistema kombinovanih i uskladjenih modela za analizu i planiranje dugorocnog privrednog razvoja. . . Ono sto zahteva veliku i posebnu paznju, svakako pred stavl ja problematika potrosnje shvacene u sirem smislu. Naime,ova problematika obuhvata reprodukcionu,proizvodnu /in^esticionu/ i neproizvodnu potrosnju, kao i njihove medjusobne odnose. Ako se ova problematika jos vise prosiri na taj nacih, da se poveze sa isto tako paznje vrednom problematikom proizvodnosti radne snage i stanovnistva, onda se izdvaja privredni kompleks koji je i ak- ; tuelan, i od velikog dugorocnog znacaja. Ocigledno je da ovaj privredni kompleks u sebi nuzno sadrzi i problematiku socijalistickog nagradjivanja prema radu, odnosno, povecavan.ja toga nagrad.jivan.ja u zavisnosti od proizvodnosti radne snage i celog stanovnistva. Sve ovo, gledano iz perspektive dugorocnog drustveno-eko nomskog razvoja, njegove analize i planiranja, istice i kao potrebu i kao zadatak da se konstruise poseban i prdsiren odgovara.juci proizvodno-potrosni ekonometrijski model, koji bi obuhvatio celu ovu problematiku. Ova j . bi model morao biti ijskladjen ne sa mo sa kompleksnim i celovitim sistemom kombinovanih odgovarajucih ekonometrijskih modela, vec i sa potrebama i zahtevima opste koncepcije i politickih smernica, kao i u skladu sa-mogucnostima ko je mogu da pruze kako dugorocne promene u institucionalnim i sistemskim okvirima i odnosima, tako i dugorocne promene u progresiv^ nom razvoju i jacanju drustvenih proizvodnih snaga. Na kraju, iscrpljujuci bar donekle seri'ju osnovnih i : osobenih zadataka izrade nase adekvatne metodologije, za analizu i planiranje dugorocnog privrednog razvoja, neophodno je jos uzeti u razmatranje uvek aktuelan i vodeci zadatak ianalazen.ja i utvrd.jivan.ia optimalnih resen.ja u okvirima metodologi.je planiranja dugorocnog drustveno-ekonomskog razvoja. Ovaj zadatak na nivou metodologije dugorocnog planiranja svakako je daleko slozeniji, ali su i mogucnosti za njegovo potpunije resavanje srazmerno vece. Izbor i utvrd.iivan.je kriteri.juma za optimalizaci.ju svakako predstavl.ja osnovnu teskocu, imajuci u vidu da taj kriterijum uvek pored objektivnih zakonitosti i uslova sadrzi i subjektivne drustveno-svesne norme i zahteve. Dok su one prve komponente uvek da te i objektivno odredjene, dotle su ove druge u svakom slucaju viseznacne i samo odlukom, dogovorom ili konvenci-jom odredive.Samo

- 13 9
kod jednog modela problem optimuma je sv&kako lakse resiv, a kod sistema od vise modela ovaj problem nuzno nailazi na znatno vece poteskoce, ali to nikako ne znaci da nije makar priblizno ili samo u prakticnoj aproksimaciji resiv. Naime, svaki od kombinovawi h modela u celovitom sistemu modela moze da ima svoj kriterijum optimalnosti, ali ti kriterijumi nisu i ne moraju biti uskladjer..ni, a osim toga mogu biti razlicitog redosleda i po postupku u resavanju i utvrdjivanju, kao i po svojoj vaznosti i znacaju.Ako se u tom postupku vec mora poci od nekog kriterijuma ili ako neki od tih kriterijuma treba uzeti.za osnovni, onda bi to trebalo da bude kriteri.jum maksiatalizaci.1 e potrosn.je, kako one proizvodne /investicione/ tako i one neproizvodne. Dvostrana realizaciria ovog kriterijuma dovodi do optimalne proizvodnje i stope njenoga rasta, s jedne, a omogucuje optimalnu licnu, zajednicku i opstedrustvenu potrosnju, s druge.strane. Medjutim, ovaj osnovni kriterijum treba da se prosiri i da ispuni i uslove opsteg kriteri,juma, koji bi obuhvatio i ostale parcijalne i posebne kriterijume kao sto sus maksimalna zaposlenost i koriscenje raspolozivih kapaciteta i rezervi, maksimalan izvoz i platoi bilans, maksimal na proizvodnost rada i licna primanja i drugi. Samo obuhvatanje i svesno i celishodno usklad.jivan.je svih tih kriterijuma moze da dovede do odgovara.juceg opsteg kriteri.juma, koji ce na prakticno zadovoljavajuci nacin omoguciti adekvatno metodolosko resenje za optimalno planiranje dugorocnog drustveno-ekonomskog razvoja.Ako se na kraju postavi i problem bas tog svesnog i celishodnog uskladjivanja svih relevantnih kriterijuma, onda se kao zavrsna faza u procesu resavanja kompleksnog problema optimalnosti dolazi do opste i sustinske definici.je optimalnosti -dugorocnog drustveno-ekonomskog razvoja. Naime, utvrdjivanje optimeilnog resenja zavrsava se iznalazenjem najbolje i najcelishodnije uskladjenosti nasih licnih i drustvenih potreba sa nasim subjektivnim i objektivnim mogucnostima, kao rezultat svesne i progresivne aktivnosti i saradnje svih drustveno-politickih i naucnoistrazivackih snaga nsise socijalisticke drustvene zajednice.

II
METODE I REZULTATI ANALIZE I PLANIRANJA DUGOROCNOG PRIVREDNOG RAZVOJA NA BAZI NETO-AGREGATA PROIZVODNJE

- 15 -

Dr Branko HORVAT

MODEL PRIVREDNOG RAZVOJA JUGOSLAVIJE U PERIODU 1958-19801/ I. Teori.jska osnovica za jednu koncepci.ju privrednog razvoja 1. Zadatak dugorocnog programa moze se definisati kao "maksimiranje potrosnje u toku jedne generacije". S obzirom na brzo povecavanje stepena neizvjesnosti s porastom razdoblja predvidjanja, 20 godina mogu se uzeti kao dobra aproksimacija za rje~ savanje postavljenog zadatka. . 2. Buduci da se sa svakim novorodjenim clanom zajednice horizont generacije pomice unaprijed, rjesenje zadatka pod 1. prakticki znaci maksimiranje stope porasta zivotnog standarda stanovnistva za sve generacije, tj. apsolutni maksimum.

3, U tom smislu kao teoretska osnovica programa mog da posluze prilozena kritika Tinbergera i studija o optimalnoj stopi investiranja. Rezultati do kojih ti radovi dolaze, svode se u osnovnom na slijedece:
> -------

1/ Model privrednog razvoja 'A Jugoslav!je u ovoj publikaciji pred stavlja pocetak rada na koncepciji dugorocnog privrednog pro grama. Model je diskutirala i korigirala Komisija sastavljena od drugova V.Guzine, N.Cobeljica, B.Jelica, V.Trickovica i Be Horvata na sastancima od 8. do 22. decembra 1958. Za zavrsavanje prvog modela potrebno je jos izraditi strukturu potros nje, strukturu proizvodnje i demografske projekcije. Pored to ga, preostaje da se potanko teoretski i empiricko-statisticki obradi problematika kapitalnog koeficijenta i aktivizacionog perioda.

- 16 2 .
.

a/ Postoji fizicka granica ekonomicnosti investiranja, Ta je granica dostignuta kad marginalna proizvodnost investicija padne na nulu. . b/ U stvarnoj privredi ta se granica postize vrlo brzo. Ona je bila predjena u toku prvog petogodisnjeg plana s rezultirajucom negativnom. marginalnom proizvodnoscu investicija. U sadasnjem periodu izg^'eda da se investicije upravo nalaze na toj gra- nici ili vrlo blizu nje. c/ Koliko je pretpostavka pod b/ tacna, onda je maksimiranje proizvodnje u toku jedne generacije prakticki jednako maksimiranju potrosnje. Prema tome, analiza se moze ograniciti na problem maksimiranja proizvodnje, jer rjesavanjem tog problema automatski rjesavamo zadatak maksimiranja potrosnje0 d/ Dosadasnja iskustva u SSSR-u i kod nas pokazuju da se na dugi rok moze racunati sa stopom porasta proizvodnje /i po-i trosnje/ od oko 10 % ili vise godisnje. ^ e/ Govoreci veoma uprosteno, osnovno usko grlo u priv- ; rednom razvoju predstavljaju kadrovi. Prema tome, zasicenje sta- ; novnistva strucnim obrazovanjem - uzevsi u cjbzir i svu onu sociolosku problematiku u vezi s radnim navikama - predstavlja polaz-s nu tacku programiranja. ; f/ Nakon sto je utvrdjena granica maksimalnog podizanja obrazovnog nivoa stanovnistva, svi ostali elementi programa izvo-i de se iz tog podatka i karakteristika privredne strukture zemlje# Na taj nacin dobiva se jedan konzistentan sistem,koji proizvodi optimalna rjesenja. j Teoretsko rjesenje rezimirano u tacki 3 ne moze se na ; prikladan nacin ostvariti direktno. Moze se, medjutim, primi.jeni-: ti indirektan postupak, koji dovodi do istih rezultata0 Pretpostavljamo da se ucesce investicija u proizvodnji vise bitno ne moze mijenjati nagore, a model konstruiramo na bazi odredjenih pretpostavki o ekspanziji pojedinih privrednih oblasti. kao i pretr postavki o mijenjanju kapitalnog koeficijenta.-Nakon sto opci mo- : del bude gotov, treba prici potankom ispitivanju limita maksimalne proizvodnje, \

- 17 3

II. Dugorocni program: model 1

1. Ovaj model predstavlja maksimalno koncepcijsko po-?: jednostavljenje modela srednjorocnog programiranja konstruiranog u studiji "A Simple Model for the Preparatory Stage of the Medium Term Economic Planing. Zbog toga za ova metodoloska i koncepcijska objasnjenja, kao i za rigorozne dokaze, vidi citiranu studi^ dU* . ^ 2 . Osnovna simplifici'f juca pretpostavka jeste, da je a privreda u 1958 . potpuno stabilizirana, da je privredna struktu}0 uskladjena i da ce se privreda ubuduce razvijati harmonicki i 'istim tempom. U tom slucaju investicije u dvjema autonomnim oblastima - industrij|i: poljoprivredi -^bvecavat ce se istim tem i pom kao i bruto-prpizvod tih oblasti.
\

3 Kao aproksimacija utvrdjuje se sadasnji, a prema to me i buduci, tempojporasta bruto-proizvoda: a/ kod industrije s 1 1 % , a b/ kod poljoprivrede sa sumarstvom 5 % godisnje.

4. Struktura ukupnog bruto-proizvoda i ukupnih bru investicija u osnovna sredstva /obrtha sredstva nisu uzeta u obzir da se sacuva uporedivost sa studijom citiranom pod. L/u 1958 . gddini izgleda ovako: Tabela 1 Brtf/fco-proizvod i bruto-investici.i e u osnovna sredstva 1958 . BP mrd. Industrija Poljoprivreda, sumarstvo i vodoprivreda Saobracaj
%

BI mrd. 206 26,9 7,8

io

896
558

42,4 25,1 21,7

160

122 105

if i

4
BP
mrd. Trgovina i ugostiteljstvo Zanatstvo Gradjevinarstvo Ukupno. Investicije u obrtna sredstva Ucesce u BI i BP % 10,9 5,3 5,8

.
mrd. 27 9

BI
%

225 120 2.068

109

100,0

16

485

100,0

5,6 1,9 3,3

90 18 .5 , 23,4 %

5 Na osnovu pretpostavki pod 2. i 3. i na osnovu pocetne privredne strukture dane u tabeli 1 , treba konstruirati ; prix^ednu situaciju na koncu dugorocnog programa tj. u 1980.Pret-; : postavljeni godisnji porast industrijske proizvodnje od 11% zna- ci, da ce se u toku 22 godine bruto-proizvod industrije povecati 3 10 puta /tacno 9,932 puta/. Godisnja stopa porasta poljoprivred- \ ne proizvodnje od 5 % znaci ukupno povecanje od 3 puta.y/tapno^ 2,93 puta/. Ostsili elementi strukture izvedeni su prema sledecoj tablici: . Tabela 2 .

22 -godisn.ji program
BP '
1958

BI

a/ Industrija b/ Poljoprivreda c/ Saobracaj d/ Zanatstvo e/ Trgovina f/ Gradjevinarstvo Ukupno Ucesce BI u BP Gpdisnja stopa porasta

1980 % 43,3 x 10 = 433 56,8 26,9 x 3 = 8l 10,7 7 ,8 x 10 = 78 10,3

1958 7&,0 592 5,3 x 7,6= 40 3,3 x 7 ,6= 632 10,9 x 7,5= 82 5,8 x 8 = 46 5,3

1980

> J

42,4 X 10 = 424 25,1 X 3 = 75 21,7 X 10 = 217

53,1 9,4 27,1

10,8 6 ,1 100,0 x 7 ,6= 760 100,0 100,0 x

s = 23 r = 9,7 %

7 1 ? x . ,6= 14 91,1 X 8 = 730 5,6 x 7,5= 42 3,3 x 8 = 26 -0 v>

OO I I OO

1 8
5,3 3,3

100,0

r = 9,9 %

- 19 5

a/ BP i BI rastu po stop! od 11 % godisnje u odnosu na baznu godinu. b/ BP i BI rastu po stopi od 5 % godisnje u odnosu na baznu godinu. c/ BP saobracaja slijedi BP industrije. BI saobracaja rastu po istoj stopi. d/ BP zanatstva slijedi ukupan BP, kao aproksimacija ukupnog BP uzeta je suma BP industrije, poljoprivrede i saobraca ja, koji daju 78 % ukupnog bruto-proizvoda. e/ BP trgovine slijedi ukupnu potrosnju, koja je. definisana kao ukupni BP minus ukupne BI. Potrebni parametri mogu se dobiti na slijedeci nacin: . ; BP = 100,G x 7,6 = 760 BI = 23,4 x 8 = 187 UP =

76,6 X 7,5 = 573

BI trgovine u normalnim uvjetima vjerojatno zaostaju za BP trgovine.:Medjutim, buduci da jos uvijek predstoji znatna izgradnja i modernizacija trgovacke mreze, moze se uzeti da se kapitalni koeficijent kod trgovine nece poboljsavati.
f / : BP i BI gradjevinarstva prate ukupne investicije sto, . uz pretpostavku da se neprivredne investicije povecavaju istim tempom kao i privredne, znaci da ce se u toku 22 godine povecati 8 puta.

6. Analiza tabele pokazuje da se pod navedenim pretpostavkama struktura privrede ne mijenja znatno osim kod odnosa industrija - poljoprivreda. Buduci da ukupne investicije rastu nesto brze od ukupnog bruto-proizvoda, kapitalni koeficijent se nesto malo pogorsava i ucesce BI u BP nesto malo raste /od 23,4 % na 24,6 %/. Tome je razlog relativno povecanje znacenja saobracaja - koji ima izrazito los kapitalni.koeficijent - u strukturi privrede. Medjutim, veoma je vjerojatno da je saobracaj ispao nesto malo predimenzioniran, tako da se taj utjecaj moze zanemariti.
BP trgovine i zanatstva takodjer su vjerojatno nesto malo predimenzionirani, a s druge strane investicije u poljopriv-

20

6
redu, sumarstvo i vodoprivredu vjerojatno su ne'sto potcenjene.Ukoliko je posljednja pretpostavka tacna, kapitalni koeficijent u poljoprivredi pogorsavat c e se, sto ce u istom ; . smislu utjecati i n a u k u p n i kapitalni koeficijent. Ve6a sigurnost' u davanju ocjena u vezi s ovim pitanjima bit ce moguca nakon sto budu potanko ispitani strukturni odnosi u privredama onih zemalja Roje su danas na stepenu razvoja koji ce nasa zemlja postici u 1980. godini. * 7. Pored pitanja 0 vrednosti privredne strukture ko-^a proizlazi iz modela, najvaznije pltan^e koje nas zanimaj jeste realno6t opce etope porasta proizvodnje, koja iznosi blizu 10 % godisnje* Na to pitanje tnoze se odgovoriti analizom impliciranoga kapitalnog koefiqijenta.
, ' '

8. Uzmi slijedecu notaciju: I Y s r = investicije = proizvod = ucesce inveeticija u proizvodu AYt = stopa porasta proizvoda, r = ~--t-1
.

r. = istodobha stopa porasta proizvoda, r. = ^ 1 . 1 k = kapitalni koeficijent, k = I tm + "t

k, = istodobni kapitalni koeficijent, k^ = t m = aktivizacioni /maturizacioni/ period,

i razmotri slijedece odnose: sY k. r . Y , 6 Nadalje = ki ri* . / 2/

ri = 1^7 = lt^97 = 88^

21 ;

na pocet-V l u perioda do s = 24,6 % na kraju perioda. Uzmimo zato kao prose iek s = 0,24. Uvrstivsi dobivene numericke velicine u formulu /l/ dobivamo: k - r = o r i f e - 2 -72
a

U c e s c e investicija u proizvodu krece se od s = 23,4 %y

.v

Qinos izmedju istodobnog i aktivizacionog kapitalnog koeficijenta je slijedeci: k i = k m /l+r/m . /3/

Uzmimo da ce se aktivizacioni period emanjiti od 4 na 3 godine, tj. m=3. Tada k = ' ~ = 2f7^ = = 2,05/l+r/ 1.097 3 1,55 /3.1/

Postavlja se pitanje kak'av amiaao imaju dobiveni kapitalni koeficijenti.

8. U studiji' "A Simple Model etc" v^titlstiial*. Appe dobiveni su slijedeci kapitalni koeficijenti za jugoslovensku privredu: ^ A,/ w // \ BI 1950/52 P 9 ~ BP 1 9 5 V 5 7 '

/b/ k^ = 2,4, kao. rezultat modela za 1957-61, / /, . - . Oan.sredstva 1952 /c/ k prosjecna = ---- p 19^ --- = 3,2 , /d/ k^ = 4,13 za period 1948-55 /e/ k = 3.5^ model za 1,957-61

Vidi se jaeno da kapitalni koefxeijenti dobiveni u /l.l/ i /3.1/ predstavljaju znatno snizenje u odnosu na ostvarene kapitalne koeficijente do 1957. godine. iBtodobni k^ pada od 4,13 za period 1948-55* na 3*5^ u modelu petogodisnjeg plana i na 2,72 u modelu dvadesetogodisnjeg programa. Buduci da razvoj privrede od 1956 - kada je radjen model petogodisnjeg plana - pa

- Z3i 8 do danas sugerira da je efikasnost investicija u modelu /koji je pretpostavio da se posljednji i najpovoljniji kapitalni koefifcij jent k^ = 2,7, vidi /a/, nece vise mijenjati/ biti potci jenjena,.
. . . . . .

tj. nastavilo se smanjivanje kapitalnog koeficijenta, moze se uzeti da ce u sadasnjem petogodisnjem planu k^ biti manji od 3,54, i da je vjerojatno da ce u iducih 20 godina'/uzevsi u obzir1da klanjanje postojecih privrednih disproporcija brzo i znatno pop - j ravlja k^/ biti postignut k^ od 2,72, Kapitalni koeficijent racunat na bazi aktivizacionog perioda smanjuje se od 55 u 1947-50/1951-54na 2,7 u 1950-53/ 1954-57, na 2,4 u modelu petogodisnjeg plana i na 2 ,0 5 u modelu dvadesetogodisnjeg programa. Vrijedi isto rezoniranje. 9. Realnost kapitalnog koeficijenta moze se, nadalje, ocijeniti u poredjenjima s inostranim privredama, Pri tome treba; prije svega eliminirati metodoloske razlike u izracunavanju k. /a/ Racunat prema zapadnoj koncepciji, jugoslovenski BP je oko 15 % visi. /b/ Investicije u obrtna sredstva iznosile su u 1957* godini a u 19582' godini l8 % investicija u osnovna

sredstva. Uzet cemo da investicije u osnovna sredstva treba pove^ cati za 25 % da bi se dobile ukupne privredne investicije. /c/ Na koncu treba dodati jos 33 % neprivrednih investicija /1957- g . 5,8 %, 1958. g. 2 9 ,8/. S navedenim korekturama dobivamo slijedece kapital-i ne koeficijente: , 272 + 0,58 x 272 _ 272 18 _ 4^0 _ i 100 + 0,15 x 100 ~ 100 + 15 " 115 = 2,8. , * / , f

kj =

/3*2/

Nadalje, prosjecni kapitalni koeficijent naveden u tacki 8 /c/ bio je u 1 9 5 3 * g 14 % nizi od marginalnog k racunatog na bruto-bazi za citav period oko 1 9 5 3 g* /k . v . = 3,2 * prosjecm

2}

kmarg 3,72/* Ako za isti Pr ocenat smanjimo

^ p r o s j e c n i = 0,86 x 2 8 = 2 , 4 l *

u /3.2/, dobicemo
/^/

^ 10. D amerjikoj privredi marginalni k /koji se po metodi izracunavanja nalazi izmedju k. i k _ u /l.2/ i /3 2//u eodi nama pune zaposlenosti u razdoblju 190 ?. do 1929. krece se izmedju 2,6 1 3,5, sto znaci da je povoljniji od koeficijenta koii proizlazi iz Modelai J : V ' americkoj privredi prosjeni k /koji odgovara k * u formuli W / k r e c e se u godinama pune zaposlenosti u razdobl

.dj 1903. 1^1949. od 2,22 do 2 , 89, H o p r a d e ta v lja okvire u H~jiz u r s e n a la z i z k i z Models /v.R.A.Gordon; Population Growth
Housing and Capital Coefficient, American Economic Review

s. 309/

' yyi

1956

p ita ln a k o e f i o l j . n t i i z Modela r e a l i e t i 5 n i , a l i s u po?rebna mn 0

realni111^ Pr ^Gi zn^-ja ispitivanja da se utvrdi da Ji eu oni i

UPredJenJa 8 americkom privredom pokazuju da su ka-

Mrnl. D k 86 ta isPitivaaja ne izvr9 , m 02 e se pobtici sigurnija onjent a c i j a razmatranjem slijedecih pretpostavki. . a/ Pretpostavimo da istodobni k. = 3 ,5 4 iz tack* f i /e/ nece pasti^sve do koeficijenta Modela k ^ 2,72 u formuli /l.l/, vec da ce se zaustaviti negdje n a ^ p & l a puta, recimo kod

ll?b LTh%rtig ie 3 la iie 4

Primjenom
A

sk ? Pretpostavimo da ce doci do blagog ali sistematskog lntenziviranja m v e s t i c i j a u narednih 20 godina, recimo povecanjem ucesca privrednih investicija za oko 1/2 % godisnje da

o ** d

A V
A . V

formule / l / dobivamos

ri = \

= 3Tl = 9,46 /2/.

vise od stope istodobnog porasta iz formule

Preracunavanjem istodobne stope na uobicajeriu konsekutivnu stopu dobivamos 1 . |

> * '101t5 10 I * ' /2-x/

Proizlazi da je sada stopa porasta ukupne proizvodnje oko 10 % godisnje.

13. Zakl.jucaks Konstrukcija modela dozvoljava da se razmotre dvije varijante buduceg razvoja* a/ da ce ucesce investicija i implicirani povoljniji kapitalni koeficijent ostati nepromjenjen; b/ da ce kapitalni koeficijent biti nepovoljniji,a~ li da ce ujedno doci do- blagog intenfciviranja investieija* U oba slucaja stopa privredne ekspanzije iznosi oko . Buduci da se ucesce investicija mnogo ne mijenja, ukupna potrosnja raste gotovo istom stopom kao i ukupna proizvod-* nja. Ukupna, potrosnja sastoji se od; 10 % . /a/ licne potroshje , /b/ neproizvodnih investicija, /c/ adrainistrativnih rashoda i armije.

Moze se ocekivati da ce /b/ rasti nesto brze, a /c/i sporije od opceg privrednog prosjeka, te ce tako stopa porasta ^ licne potrosnje takodjer iznositi oko 10 % godisnje. Na taj nacin dobiva se vrlo korisna orijentacija u daljnjem radu na programu. "

Proizlazi da je veoma vjerojatno da moguca stopa privrednog razvoja t narednih 20 godina nije manja od 10 % , te i prema tome stopa od 10 % moze da se uzme kao pocetna osnovica programa. Kako citav niz privrednih kretanja - energetska potro-J snja, potrosnja celika, cestovni saobracaj itd. - usko korelira | s kretanjem ukupnog drustvenog proizvoda i kako se iz volumena licne potrosnje da izvesti i njena struktura, to se utvrdjivanjetf

- '25 -

. . . ' 11 gtope privredne ekspanzije dp.je osriovna orijentacija za' sektorsko programiranje. Prema tome, ono sto u daljem radu treba ispitati, jeste da li je moguce postici agregatnu stopu razvoja i vecu od 10 i koja je apsolutna granica stope privredne ekspanzije u jugoslovenskim uvjetima. Rjesavanju tog problema moze se pristupiti kroz ispitivanje mogucnosti da . a/ industrija ostvari stopu porasta vecu od 11 % i. da b/ poljoprivreda. ostvari stopu porasta vecu od 5 %, a da pri tome ne dodje do znatnijeg pogorsanja efikasnosti investiranja.

III. Dugorocni program: model 1,1 Bevizija modela 1. Revizija modela 1 na osnovu diskusije na sastancima 11.i 12.11 daje ovu sliku: . . Tabela 3 22-godisn.ji program /ci.jene 1958/ _Bruto-proizvod
1958 mrd. a/ Industrija . b/ Poljoprivreda i sumars.tvo/> c/ Saobracaj d/ Zanatstvo e/ Trgovina i ugostiteljstvo f/ Gradj evinarstvo Ukupno .
%

'

, 1980 mrd*

..

896 160
649

41,4 x 10 =** 8,960 30,1 x 3 = 1.9^7 7,4 x 8 ,1 = . 1,296 392 5,1 x 3,6= 10,4 x 7,5= 5,6 x 8 ,9= 1.685

58,4 12,7 8,4

109

2,6
.1 1 ,0 6,9 100,0

225 120 ;, 2.159 .

1.068

100 ,Ox/[?-0%! --15.348 d

- 2 6 '12
Bruto^-investici.i e 1958 1980 mrd. % 42,4 X 10 =

.mrd. a/ Industrija b/ Poljoprivreda i sumarstvo c/ Saobracaj d/ Zanatstvo . e/ Trgovina i ugostiteljstvo f / Gradjevinarstvo Ukupno . ; Neprivredne investicije Ukupno Investicije u obrtna sredstva Sveukupne investicije Ucesce privrednih BI u osnov.sred.u BP, s = Godisnja stopa porasta r = . . BP , 206

%
5 1,8
16,9 2i,4

2.060 67O
850 32

122
105 9

25,1 X /5,5/= 21,7 X 8 ,1 = 1,9 X 2 ,6 = 5,6 X 7,5 = = 3,3 X 10 00 r o I I H O O ' O X 30,3 3C / X /8,9/= 18,5 48,8 X / 9 ,2/= 22,5 % 9,3 % BI osn.sred. BI neprivr. BI sveukupno Potrosnja

0,8
.5,1 4,0 '

16

27 .

203 160
3.975

485 147

100,0
42,0

1.680
5.655 994 6.649

632
. 90

722

25,0 167,0
2-5,9 %

10,0 11,7 10,6 8,5

% % % %

/a/ BP i BI ostaju nepromenjeni, tj. rastu po stopi od;

11

% godisnje.

/b/ Buduci da je 1958* bila losa godina, zakljuceno. ' e jj da se strukturni koeficijent poljoprivrednog BP izracuna kao pro^ sjek koeficijenata 1957:1958. Ucesce BP poljoprivrede i sumarstv u ukupnom BP bilo je,1957 godine 33,3 % , 1958. godine 26,9 %,st{ za svrhe modela daje prosjek od 30,1 % . Tom pretpostavkom poveca va se ostvareni poljoprivredni i ukupni BP u 1958. za 91 mrd.din /v.tabelu 1 u "Modelu 1 "/%

558 + x = 0,301 /2.068 + x/,

Nadalje, zakljuceno je da je vjerojatno da ce se BI poIjoprivrede1/sumarstva i vodoprivrede/ povecavati brze od BP poIjoprivrede, te da ce njihovo ucesce iznositi u 1980 . godini oko l6 % umjesto 9*4 % iz modela 1. Model 1 /v.tabelu 2/ pretpostavIja slijedece apsolutne iznose BI u cijenaina 1958. i 1980.godine: BI poljoprivrede 122 x 3 = 366 mrd. , BI ukupne 485 x 8 =3.880 mrd> Mijenjanjem pretpostavki te se investicije povecavaju za oko 303 mrd.din..i .

366 + x = 0,16 / 3 .88O + x/, 620 - 366 _ ,

x . w - i s f c 303 mrdProizlazi da uz porast BP poljoprivrede i sumarstva od 5 % godisnje BI poljoprivrede, sumarstva i vodoprivrede rastu ra stu nesto brze od 8 % godisnje.. . /c/ Vjerojatno je da ce saobracaj ekspandirati nesto sporije nego industrijska proizvodnja, te je primjenjena stopa od 1 J % umjesto ranijih 11 % , BP i BI rastu po istoj stopi. C / d/ Vjerojatno je da ce ubuduce zanatstvo ekspandira.ti lakse. ukupnog drustvenog proizvoda. Primijenjena je stopa od od 6 % umjesto ranijih 97 % BI slijede BP. . /e/ Apsolutni iznosi ostaju kod trgovine i ugostiteljrstva nepromjenjeni, medjutim, strukturni odnosi mijenjaju se zbog drugih promjena u modelu. ,

. /f/ Pretpostavljeno je da zbog potrebe modernizacije u gradjevinarstvu BI. rastu brze od BP /uzeta je stopa od 11 %/.Izracunavanjem BI gradjevinarstva dobiven je i poslednji potrebni elemenat za izracunavanje ukupnih privrednih bruto-investicija. Kako, medjutim, BP gradjevinarstva prati. sveukupne privredne i neprivredne investicije u osnovna sredstva, to je potrebno prethodno utvrditi neprivredne investicije u 1980.. godini.

- 28 -

Ik

Dogovor'eno je da se kao realisticka stopa neprivrednih investicija u I98O. godini uzme ucesce s 25 % u ukupnim investi-; cijama u osnovna i obrtna sredstva. Obicno se uzima da je za ne-j smetanofunkcioniranje privrede potrebno raspolagati svim vrsta-; ma zaliha u visini sestomjesecne proizvodnje. Uz kapitalni koefi cijent k=2 to znaci da.privredne BI u osnovna sredstva treba povecati za 25 % Ako to licinimo i pretp.ostavimo da neprivredne i i n vesticije iznose 25 % sveukupnih investicija, tada one iznose privrednih BI u osnovna sredstva: x = 0,25 /125 + x/,

x =

= te .

Primjenom procenta kZ % dobiva se apsolutni iznos ne-privrednih investicija u 1980. u visini od 1.680 mrd. Dodavanjem tog iznosa dobivaju se sveukupne investicije, a zatim koeficijen povecanja sveukupnih investicija za 22 godine /8,9 puta/, sto je ujedno koeficijent povecanja BP gradjevinarstva. S obzirom na danasnje stanje gradjevinarstva, zadatak povecanja gradjevinskih radova oko 9 puta u 22 godp.ne toliko je ozbiljan, da zahtjeva isto takvo pazljivo i kompleksno rjesavanje kao i problem poljSprivrede. .

Kapitalni koefici.jenti

2. Iz revidiranog modela 1.1 proizlaze novi k koeficijenti, koji su nesto veci nego ranije u modelu 1. Upotrebom formule /2/ iz "Modela 1" izvodimo istodobnu stopu porasta i /ri/ iz konsekutivne stope /r/ dane u tabeli 3 1 + r Time je dobiven potrebni elemenat za izracunavanje] istodobnog kapitalnog koeficijenta k^: . ki = 2 8 8 * A * 17 I

- 29 15

Ucesce BI u BP /s/ uzet je kao prosjek ucesca na pocetku /22,5%/ i na kraju / 259 % / perioda iz tabele 3 ciji je pros jek sioiaodrio ocijenjen s 24j % . Dobiveni kapitalni koeficijent za 6 % veci je od ranijeg / 2 ,72/. Istodobni k. moze se izracunati i na drugi nacin. Tre1 1980 ba staviti u odnos sumu investicija u 22 godine, BI , s po1959 vecanjem proizvodnje u is tom periodu, ABP = BP^gQ-BP^^g, Pret.

postavit cemo da se investicije ravnomjerno povecavaju po stopi od 10 % godisnje /u stvari, stopa ce vjerojatno isprva biti nesto manja, a kasnije nesto veca, tako da u ovom racunu suma inve sticija izlazi nesto precijenjena/. Tada zbir koeficijenata /ba za 1958=100/ za 22 godine iznosi: 22 I I B I = 1,1 22 = 111 78,65. /5/

Mnozenjem apsolutnog iznosa baznih investicija tako dobivenim zbirnim koeficijentom dobiva se apsolutni iznos BI za pe riod 1959-1980:

1980
BI = 485 x 78,65 = 38,150 mrd. 1959 Porast BP vidljiv je iz tabele 3 i iznosi t

/5*l/

ABP = 15.348 - 2.159 = 13.189 mrd.

Prema tome, kapitalni koeficijent bit ce:

> _ ?JI i ABP 58.150 ? oQ 13i189 2 , & 9 , ' /c /

isti je kao i onaj dobiven izrazom /l.l/, kako i treba da bu-

de.
, 3 Primjenom formula /3/ iz "Modela 1M izvodi se teh.noloski kapitalni koeficijent s aktivizacionim pomakom od m=3

-5 . -

16

km = m /l+r/

= - ^ 3 1,093

= H i = 2 2 * 1,31

V 3 * 17

Taj koeficijent veci je od ranijeg za 7^ % j ' ' ' . Na slican nacin kao i u /6/ mogli bismo izcaSunati^k : putem ukupnih iznosa umjes.to pomocu stopa. U tom slucaju forum-; la ce izgledati ovako: : 1977 : ____ i m ________, * * - BP1980 - BP1960 k a rezultat mora biti isti kao i u /3l/

K BI

/7/ 7 . '

: :

' 4. Na ovom mjestu mogli bismo opet izvesti jedno uporedjenje. Poljski 15-godisnji plan predvidja ukupne /neto?/ proizvodne investicije u periodu 1960-1975* u iznosu od 260 mrd. zlotih, a povecanje dohotka u istom periodu u iznosu od 130 mrd. zldtih. Prema;'tome, istodobni kapitalni koeficijent na neto-osno| vici iznosi: ,n 260 _ i = 130 = 2 * /o/ //

/M.Rakovski: Efikasnost tehnickog napretka u perspektivnom raz- 1 voju privrede, Ekonomista 1/1958, prevedeno u: Jugoslovenska investiciona banka, Prevodi 4, str.28/. ' | 4 U proteklih jedanaest godina proizvodnja i investi-| cije u Jugoslaviji kretale su se ovako: /vidi tabelu na sledecoj

strani/.

1948 -1958 .
'

Istodobni k. na bruto i neto-osnovici za period . iznose: . 1 1958

. k. = 1

1948

BI
' 551

BP1958 ' 19^7

- 31 ' Tabela 4 Proizvod i privredne investici.je 1948-1958. . /cijene iz 1956/ 17

,BP
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1.245 1*349 1.240 1*353

\> v i A .<;m 96

nd

BI .294 321 307 334 337 375 359 376 342 381 464 3.890 1.666 2.224

1.18 6

108 107 12 1 120

137 159 176

1.149 1.241

1 .13 2 1.2 3 3
1.066

1.417

1.528 1.630 1.6 6 1

1.280
1.369 1.454 1.473 1.742 1.750
_

1.953 1.993

188 2 11
24? 1.666

Am

BP
1958 1947

ND
1.750 968 782

Ni

1.052

1.993 941

Izvori: 1/ Za BP i ND Zavod. 2/ Za BI u privredne osnovne fondove 1948-1955* Vesnik Jug.invest.banke, 9/l957 s.38. 3/Za BI 1956-1958. Zavod. . 1958 NI wn _
i ~ ND

1948______

_ 2.224

/t f
^ /

1958

ND

1947

302

^8 ?

*^ /

Za naredni period 1959-1980. k^ je dan izrazom /6/, a

n

treba izracunati. Uz pretpostavku da amortizacija iznosi 1.0%

BPt ND u 1980. godini iznosi 15*348 x 0,9 = 13*813 mrd. ,.v a: porast

18.
AND = 13.813 - 1.750 = 12.063 mrd. Buduci da je ucesce BI u BP 2 k j '% , a amortizacije 10

to neto-investicije predstavljaju]

= 59,2 % BI ili ukupno /v0/5.l// 38.150 x 0,592 = 22.650. osi: Prema tome k^ iz modela iznosi:

1980

NI = f H H = 1 88# 5 Z8 -2/

k 3 wn 1939 Tr vn 1 198 O 1958

sto izgleda pretpostavlja vecu efikasnost investicija od one koju predvidjaju Poljaci. Medjutim, ovo izracunavanje treba prih vatiti s rezervom zbog /a/ nepoznate statisticke vrijednosti poljskih podataka i /b/ metodoloskog efekta uslijed kojeg kod visokih stopa porasta parametri racunati na bazi ND postaju vrlc nesigurni /v.studiju "A.Simple Model etc.", Mathematical Appen dix/. Najsigurnija orijentacija dobila bi se izracunavanjem ten dbncije mijenjanja kapitalnih koeficijenata u Jugoslaviji na ba> zi novih investicija, a dok to ne postane izvodivo, na bazi bru: to-investicija. Uzgred napominjem da bi u toku godine trebalo rezervirati dovoljno vremena, da se ozbiljno prouci problem star tistike investicija i da se u zajednici s bankom i statistikom utvrdi definitivna metodologija i nakon cega treba nekome povjeriti rekonstruiranje uporedivih serija. Ako se to ne bi uradiloj dolazilo bi i dalje do pojmovne zbrke u evidenciji, podaci bi ostali problematicni i ne bi pastojala mogucnost da se pridje konstruiranju slozenijih modela privrede.

Izracunavan.je stope porg.sta ako su dani ucesce s i kapitalni koeficijenti ----------------- ai m k --- ; na bruto-osnovici k. .

5. Opca je praksa da se stopa porasta BP izv tim dijeljenjem ucesca BI u BP s kapitalnim koeficijentom. To j medjutim, pogresno, i kod visokih stopa porasta moze dostici do znacajnih pogresaka. Pravilan postupak je slijedeci:
/a/ Ako je dan istodobni kapitalni koeficijent k^:,

- 33 -

19
eIt = ki rYt-l>

SYt - l /1+r/ = ki rYt - l

r _ _s _
l+r k. * x

r = E ~
1 1
-

H
~

V
x -

/9/

Ako je npr. s=30 %, k^ = 3 vrijednost korekcionog faktora iznosi 1,11, sto znaci da je konsekutivna stopa porasta za 11# veca od istodobne. /b/ Ako je dan kapitalni koeficijent s maturizacionim pomakom: sY sY t-m t-1 = k m rY. t-1 , . /10/

/l+r/1 m = k rY > m t-1

r /l+r/11 = | 1"1

Ako je m=3 izraz /9/ sadrzi kubnu jednadzbu koja je veoma neprikladna za rjesavanje. Zbog toga je spretnije raditi formulom /8/, pa prema potrebi km izvoditi iz k^ i stope porasta. Medjutim, i korekcije /a/ i /b/ jos uvijek su samo aproksimacije /iako dovoljne za prakticno racunanje/. Za rigorozni izvod vidi "A.Simple Model etc.", Mathematical Appendix. Licna i ope a potrosn.ja 6, tsioho/:
f r,

Struktura potrosnje u 1958. je slijedec&V'/oriij.e

35

20
Licna potrosnja 1.097 mrd. Drzavna administracija 68 " Armija 131 H Standard 6l ' * Ukupno 1.357 mrd. 80,7 5,2 9,6 4,5 100,0

Dobivene procente treba primjeniti na potrosnju koja ; rezultira iz revidiranog BP za 1958. godinu da bi se dobili baz-; ni apsolutni iznosi. Iz njih tada treba izvesti strukturu u 1980 godini. ' ! Tab ela 5 Licna i opca potrosn.ja /cijene 1958/

. j

mrd. Bruto-proizvod Ukupne investicije Potrosnja a/ b/ c/ d/ Drzavna administracija Armija Standard Licna potrosnja 2.159

722

1958______________1980 f-t .fmrd. % f l U5.348 *6.6^9

.

1.437 73 138

65 1.16 1

100 ,0?^// ,p/=8.699 5 ,2 x 2,4 = 175 9,6 x 3,6 = 497

4,5 xll,4 80,7 x/6,3/ = 741 =7.286

100 ,0 2 ,0
5, 7 8 ,5 83, 8

' 3 /a/ Dogovoreno je da se pretpostavi da ce materijalni| rashodi drzavne administracije rasti po stopi od b% godishje, | sto daje ukupno povecanje u 22 godine od 2,4 puta* | /b/ Na slican nacin pretpostavijeno je da ce se mate-f rijalni rashodi narodne odbrane povecavati po stopi od 6 % go- $ disnje, sto daje ukupno povecanje od 3,6 puta. 1

/c/ Pretpostavljeno je da ce se materijalni rashodi n| drustveni standard povecavati po istoj s.tppi -ikao i neprivredne | investicije tj* 11,7 % godisnje ili 11,4 puta ukupno.

21
^ ^ Lich&^potrosnja, izvedena kao reziduum, poveca va se ukupno 6,3 puta ili po stopi od 8,7 % godisnje.

. 7. Uslijed kretanja navedenih u tabeli 5, struktura po trosnje se poboljsava. Udio licne potrosnje raste od 80,7 na 83*8 a zajednicki udio licne potrosnje i standarda raste od 85*2 n . 92,3 %i cime se djelimicno kompenzira negativni utjecaj a brzeg porasta ukupnih investicija u odnosu na bruto-proizvod. U stvarnosti realni zivotni nivo stanovnistva raste'jos brze, buduci da se investicije u drustveni standard povecavaju znatno brze od privrednih investicija. Uzgred napominjem da bi bilo veoma korisno izraditi metodu izracunavanja ovog efekta.

- 37 ~

DanSika NIKOLIC Pavle SICHERL KONSTRUKCIJA FROIZVODNO "KAPITALNOG- EKONOMETRUSKOG1 MODELA ZA PRIVREDNI RAZVOJ JUGOSLAVIJE

I. Pristupm razm t n a a. ra .i
Metod ekonomskog modela predstavlja modno i teorijsko i aplikativno orudje u reSavanju mnogih slozenih ekonomskih problema, pa i sloSene problematike teorijskog i aplikativnog odredjivanja proizvodne funkcije. On se pojavio kao suprotnost izolovanog posmatrahja samo jedne, jednaSinom definisane zavisnosti - u ovom sluSaju proizvodne funkcije - izmedju &ve ili vise skonomskih kategorija. Ono Sto pretezno karakteriSe sadaSjiju fazu kompleksnomodelskog pristupa u resavanju sloBene problematike teorijskog i naroSito aplikativno^sodred.iivan.ia -proizvodne funkcije sastoji se u potrebi i nastojanju da se pomo5u Sto jednostavnijih. proizvodnih ekonomskih modela, koji ne zahtevaju mnogo podataka, vremena, kadrova i.sredstava, ostvari zadovoljave,ju<5e egsaktno i operativno resavanje aktuelne problenjatike^ianalisiranja i planiranja privrednog razvoja. Razloga za ovakvu orijentaciju ima na pretek, tako da se sa punom opravdanoSSu za sadasnje uslove i potrebe teziste istrazivanja kreSe linijom, nazcrvimo je - prvog razvojnog puta (proizvodnja se objasnjava jednom eksplikativnom ekonomskom kategorijom). Prenosenje teSista istraSivanja na liniju - drugog raavojnog puta. (proizvodnja se objasnjava sa dve ili viSe ekonomskih kategorija)- mo6i ce se izvrsiti uspesno tek poSto se, pored ostvarenja odredjenih pretpostavki, obezbede ve6e koliSine neophodnih podataka i ovlada Sirim mogufinostima primene moderns tehnike izraSunavanja. ' Razloziza ovakvu orijentaciju ne leSe uvek samo u oskudici vremena, kadrova, sredstava i podataka, vefl i u raznim drugim okolnostima. Na primer, nenfoj^M ^neeelishodnost i neefikasnost verifici& ranja'ili regulativnog ostvarivanja odredjenih pretpostavki, na kojima sloSeniji ekonomski modeli poSivaju, Sine ove ne samo manje zadovoljavajufiim/ ve6 Sesto i potpuno iluzomim ili prakticno neupotrebljivim.
(

Primena modelskog pristupa dala je, s obzirom na izolovanu relaoiju, osetna poboljsanja i unapredjenja kako u teorijskom, tako i u aplikativnom pravcu. Kao eklatantan primer za ovo u prvom pravcu mo5e da posluSi toliko poznat i toliko upotrebljavan ekonomski model Harrod-Domar-Mahalonobisal>. Isto tako i na drugom razvojnom putu doSlo je do primene modelskog pristupa. Izrazit primer predstavl ja nedavna modelska razrada viSefaktorske proizvodne ftinkcije Cobb-Douglasa, koju je u jos ne tolikoj poan&toj disertaciji izvrlio Leif Johansen^). U razradi ekoncmakih modela Harrod-Domar-Mahalanobisa kao i njima sliKgih modela na prvom razvojnom putu, posebna paSnja bila je posvefiena kapitalaim i njima sliSnim koeficijentima). Ove razrade dovele su do znatnog teorijskog mpretka, ali ne i do odgovaraju6eg aplikativnog uspeha. Naime, praktiSna primena proizvrodnih ekonomskih modela zafipteva i ooenjivanje o&govarajudih kapitalnih i njima sliSnih koefioijernta. Medjutim, pokazalo se da odgovaraju^e proizvodne funkeije, kod kojih investioije imaju ulogu direktne eksplikativne ekonomske kategorije, ne pokazuju zadovoljavajufiu korelaoiju* pa onda ni sami odgovaraju6i koefioijenti ne pruSaju u dovoljnoj meri praktiSno zadovoljavajuiu pouz&anost. PokuSaji da se izbegne direlptnb objaSnjavanje i odredjivan^e proizvodnje pomodu inveatioija dali su takodje vrlo dobre teorijske rezuitate, ali su za prakti5nu primenu uveli dalje i nove te&kods, koje se sastoje u utvrdjivanju proseSnog perioda zaostajanja u dejstvu, kao i proseSnog vekatrajanja * r. -

l) Jakov SirotkoviiS, Problem! -privrednog -planiran.ia u Jugoalavi.1l* Napred, Zagreb, 1961. str. 136-154 Branko Horvat, Ekonomski moduli, Ekonomski institut NR Hrvatake, Zagreb, I960* str* 9-21 P.C# Mahalanobis, prevodilae D. Nikolii, Planiran.1e u Indi.ii* Jugoslovenaki institut za ekonomska istraSivanja, Prevodi 2, drugo izdanje, Beograd, sept* 1965. str. 114-142 8) Leif Johansen, A Multi-Seotoral Study of Boonomio Growth. North . Hol&ia^- Publishing Company, Amsterdam 1960* str* 24-37 5) Branko Horvat, Ekonomski modeli. Ekonomski institut M Hrvatske, Zagreb, 1962. str* 52-56

- 39 3
osnovnih sredstava Zato je bilo sasvim razumljivo, 5to su se uzimiale u obzir i druge ekonomske kategorije kao jedine eksplikativne ili determinirajude nezavisne promenljiveveliSine u proizvodnoj funkciji. MoS&a su najvefiu paznju i najjaSi teorijskiinteres izazvala osnovna sredstva, kao jedina eksplikativna ili determinirajufia ekonomska kategorija u proizvodnoj funkciji*^/. Ali, i tu je aplikativni aspekt nosio sa sobom ogromne teskoce zbog oskudice u podacima o nabavnoj vrednosti osnovnih sredstava u stalnim cenama. U ovome radu usredsredjena je paSnja i interes kako u teorijskom, tako joS i u vefioj meri u aplikativnom smislu, upravo na nabavnu vrednost osnovnih sredstava kao direktnn eksplikativnu ili determinirajufiu ekonomskii kategoriju u proizvodnoj funkciji, koja je posluSila kao jezgro u konstrukciji jednog proizvodno-kapitalnog ekonomskog modela za privredni razvoj Jugosla,vije. Razloga za ovu paSnju i interes svakako je bilo vi5e, te 6e se navesti samo najbitniji i najvaSniji. Pre svega, nasuprot dosadasnjoj situaciji u tom pogledu kod nas, od skora se raspolaSe vrlo dobrim podacima o nabavnoj vrednosti osnovnih sredstava u proizvodnom i neproizvodnom delu .privrede u stalnim cenamaS). Zatim, poSto je nabavna vrednost osnovnih sredstava u stalnim cenama vrlo pogodna mera kapaciteta, to se moglo oSekivati da 6e u uslovima punog ili proseSno; ustaljenog koriSdenja kapaciteta korelaciom zavisnost izmedju proizvodnje i odgovarajufiih osnovnih sredstava biti do te mere velika, da f e ocena odgovarajuceg i koeficijenta efektivnosti imati zadovoljavajudu pouzdanost, Sto bi samom modelu dalo neophodnu aplikativnost. Isto tako, pomofiu godisnjih priraStaja osnovnih sredstava mogu se definisati opredmefiene investicije u odgovarajuda osnovna sredstva, sto bi moglo da posluSi kao pogodna podloga za ka.snije resavanje problema ocene ne samo aktivizacionog perioda investicija i veka trajanja osnovnih sredsta va, v f i odredjivanja odgovarajudih potrebrdh ukupnih investicija. ei

4) Evsey p.Domar, Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth. Oxford University Press, New York, 1957. str. 154-194. Branko Horvat, Ekonomska teori.ia planske privrede. Kultura, Beograd, 1961. str. 179-223 : 5) Jan Tinbergen, Hendricus C.Bos, Mathematical Models of Economic Growth. Me Graw-Hill Book Company, Inc. New York, 1962. str.15-31. 6) Ivo Vinski, Proc.iena rasta fiksnih fondova Jugoslavi.ie od 1946. do I960*. Ekonomski institut NR Hrvatske, Zagreb, 1962.

40 4
Najzad, ovako konstruisan proizvodno-kapitalni ekonomski model mogao bi postati vaSna i nu5na karika u poveaanom lancu sire rasradjenog sistema ekonomskih modela za aplikativnu i operativnu analizu . pla i niranje naSeg srednjorodnog i dugorocnog privrednog razvoja. Neposredan oilj rada je da se prethodno izlozi teori jska konstrtikeija matematidkog proizvodno-kapitalnog modela kako u njegovom diferencijalnom i neresenom, tako i u njegovom opstem i resenom obliku. Posle toga de se izvrsiti konstrukoija dva odgovarajuda proizvodno-kapitalna ekonametri jska modela za privredni razvoj Jugoslayxje, a na osnovu njih izraSunade se po dve odgovarajude varijahte projekcija kako za bududi sedmogodiSnji period planskog razvoja, tako i za dugoroSni period do 1980. godine.- Na kraju, u radu de se dati neophodna objasnjenja i .izvrsiti zakljuSna analiza sa odgovarajudom ocenonu II. Konstrukci.ia i resen.ia matematidkog proizvodno-kapitalnog modela Konstruisanje matematiSkog ekonomskog modela obuhvata, pored odredjivanja njegove ekonomske sadrSine, utvrdjivanje i njegovog maiematiSkog oblika. Odredjivanje ekonomske sadrSine modela . s^tpji s e u izboru relevantnih ekonomskih kategorija, koje.de u f njemu igrati ulogu promenljivih velidinaj a utvrdjivanje matematiSkog oblika modela sasioji se u izboru sistema jednadina. . Oslanjajudi se na izvrseni izbor relevantnih. promenljivih velidina, konstrukcija matematiSkog proizvodno-kapitalnog modela ostvarena je izborom odgovarajudeg sistema diferencijalnih jednadina, koji se moze predstaviti u slededsm diferencijalno neresenom obliku:
ap(.t) dt dK(tI_ , at

jgti

-Kt).

{1)

; (t) = f(t) D (t) + q (t).

- kl -

.
znaSenja:

5
Upotrebljene oznake u sistemu jednaSina (l) imaju sledeSa , . . .. . I Endogene promenljive veliSine .. . . a) Promenljive veliSine cilja. . (l) D (t) = vrednost dru^tvenog proizvoda b) iWoSne promenljive veliSine (1) K (f / = proseSna godisnja nabavna vrednost osnovc ' nih sredstava . (2) I (t) = marginalna proseSna godisnja vrednost noviii opredmeSenih. investicija u osnovnim , . sredstvima '

II Egzogene promenljive veliSine . . . . a) Insti'umentalne- promenjive veliSirie (1) f(t) = proiavoljna funkcija vremeaa (2) q(t) = " " " b) Objektivno date promenljive veliSine . (l) a = marginalni koeficijent efektivnosti osnovnih sredstava. Oznaka t predstavlja redni brpj godisnjeg perioda i praktiSno uzima vrednosti celih brojeva, ali teorijski mo5e imati i vrednosti svih realnih brojeva. ... Sistem jednaSina (l) definise zakonitosti i uslove kojima se simultano podvrgavaju obuhvaSene osnovne ekonomske kategorije: drustveni proizvod (d ), osnovaa sredstva (k ) i marginalrie nove opredmedene investicije (i). Te zakonistosti i uslove izraSava svaka 6d jednaSina sistema. Zbog toga one imaju odredjena ekonpmska znacenja, (l) Prva jednaSina sistema izrazava objektivan zakonit privredno-tehnoloski odnos izmedju proizvodnje i osnovnih sredstava, odnosno, predstavlja proizvodnu funkciju u svom diferencijalno najopsiijem : : obliku. Ta jednaSina sistema izrazava kvantitativnu merui stalnost odnosa izmedju marginalnog godisnjeg prirastaja drustvenog proizvoda i odgovarajuSeg marginalnog godisnjeg prirastaja osnavnih sredstava. Sam marginalni koeficijent efikasnosti osnovnih sredstava a u ovoj . . jednaSini pokazuje za koliko se jedinica poveSa drustveni proizvod v . ; kada se osncrvna sredstva povefiaju za jednu jedinicu. (2) Druga jedna Sina sistema u suStini ima definicioni karakter, te odredjuje jednakost ekonomske kategorije marginalnih novih opredmeSenih. investicija U osnovnim sredstvima kao zavrsne faze novSanog toka investicija i

- 42 6 ,

marginalnog priraStaja osnovnih sredstava* Ta jednaSina sistema iz- razava odnos- jednakosti izmedju marginalnog godisnjeg prirastaja osnovnih aredstava i marginalnih novih opredme<5ertih' investicija u odgovarajuSim osnovnim sredstvima. Ova jednaSina definiSe pojam i odredjuje veliSinu onih novih investicija, koje su se opredmetile i pretvorile u osnovna sredstva, bez obzira da li su se stvarno aktivirale, odnosno, da li se tako opredmecene u potpunosti ili samo delimiSno koriste kao osnovna sredstva. (3) TreSa jednaSina sistema izraSava vezu izmedju marginalnih novih opredmeSenih investicija i drustvenog proizvoda, pri 5emu ova veza za proteleLi period moze imati bihevioristiSki karakter,. dok za bududi period ima instrumentalni karakter svesnog planiranja i regulativnog usmeravanja. Ta jednaSina sistema izraSava pretpostavku ili zahtev da marginalne nove opredmeiene in vesticije budu linearna funkcija drustvenog proizvoda, Siji ce koeficijenti f(t) i q.(t) u najopStijem sluSaju biti takodje odredjene ili proizvoljne funkcije vremena. U specijalnim slucajevima ovi koeficijenti mogu biti i proizvoljne konstantne veliSine, pa, prema tome, i veliSihe koje su ravne nuli. Primena ovako konstruisanog matematiSkog modela, razume se, zahteva da se sve njegove pretpostavke zakonitosti, uslovi i zahtevi - provere, verifikuju i opravdaju na konkretnim empiriSkim podacima. A to znaSi da aplikativna upotreba konstruisanog matematiSkog modela zahteva prethodno konstruisanje odgovaraju6eg ekonometrijskog modela sa zadovoljavajudim stepenom prilagodjenosti i pouzdanosti. Medjutim, konstrukcija odgovarajufieg ekonometrijskog modela vrsi se na osnovu reSenog oblika konstruisanog matematiSkog modela. Zbog to ga je neophodno da se prethodno konstruisani matematiSki model dovede na svoj opSti i reSeni oblik, odnosno da se izvede opste resavanje sistema diferencijalnih jednacina (l). Sistem jednaSina (l) reside se na taj naSin Sto ce se tri endogeno primenjive veliSine: D(t), K(t) i l(t) izraziti kao odre djene funkcije vremena i odgovaraju6eg broja parametara, koji na izvestan naSin karakterisu konstruisani matematiSki model. Pri tome ove odredjene funkcije vremena u svom resenom obliku nefie vise biti diferencijalnog karaktera, a svi parametri koji se pojavljuju bide potpuno odredjenog znaoen jai vrednosti. Geo postupak resavanja sis tema diferencijalnih jednacina (l) bice ovde samo najsazetije skiciran.

- k3 -

U resavanju 6e se podi od druge i trece jednaSine sistema (l) na taj nacin sto 6e se iz njih eliminisati veliSina l(t), tako da se dobije sledefia jednaSina:

D(t)+ 4(t).

<2)

Ako se sada iz jednaSine (2) i prve jednaSine sistema (l) eliminise veliSina K(t), onda se dobija sledefia diferencijalna jednaSina: - af(t)D(t) - a q(t) = 0. (3)

Ova jednacina (3) predstavlja potpunu linearnu diforencijalnu jednaSinu sa funkcionalno proaenljivim koeficijentima^ ).

(7) Uadi resavanja jednaSine pcdesno je uvesti slede6u smenu:

- *>'*#'

gde oznake D(t) i Z(t) predstavljaju staru i novu funkcionalnu promenlgivu veliSinu, a oznake D*(t) i 2*(t) njihove prve izvode po vremenu t* Re5avaju6i diferencijalnu jednaSinu smene (4), u kojoj su promenljive veliSine razdvojene, dobija se sledefie pomodiio reSenje:
r.
.

D(t) = Z(t) ea;/f(t)dt.

(5)

Ako se smena (4) uvede u je&naSinu (S), onda ova dobija slededi oblik:

(6>

koji takodje ima razdvojene prosaenljive. Resavajuci transforms anu jednaoinu (6) i koristedi pomoSni pezultai \i>jednaSini (5), dolazi se do slededeg rezultata: / .
.

Z(t) = C

+ af f (t) e " a;f( )^tdt, f c

J

(7)

- 44 8
# V . . Opste resenje ove jednaSine ima sledeci sazeti oblik:
D(t) = \Ci*X(t) + ()

gde novouvedene funkcionalno promenljive veliSine \(t) i p.(t) imaju sledede opste vrednosti:

X(t) = 8 ^(t) = a o
I

,ft)

(9)

Najzad, posto u baznom godisnjem periodu za t = 6 vaze uslovi D(t) = = D(o), \(t) = X(o) i fi(t) = fi(o), pomoSu kojih se moze odrediti proizvoljna konstanta C,, to se jednacina (8) mo*5e; konaSno napisati u obliku sledeSeg odgovarajuceg partikularnog resenja:

D(t) = ^ f i o ) ^ 0) x (t) +

(t)>

(10)

gde oznaka D(o) predstavlja vrednost drustvenog proizvoda u baznom godisnjem periodu, a oznake X(o) i p (o) odgovarajude vrednosti uve. denih funkcionalno promenljivih velicina takodje u baznom godisnjem periodu.

U nastavku resavanja sistema jednacina (l) poci ce se od izvedene jednaSine (2), koja se moze napisati u sledecem obliku:
cL^(t) = [f(t) D(t) + q(t)]dt. (11)

Integracijom jednaSine (ll) dobija se sledede opste resenje:

K(t) = C2

+J[f(t)

D(t) + q(t) ]dt,

(12)

gde oznaka C* predstavlja proizvoljnu integracionu konstahtu. Posto u baznom godisnjem periodu za t = o vaze uslovi K(t) = K(o), D(t) = = D(o), f(t) = f(o). i q(t) = q(o), pomocu kojih se moze odrediti
' gde oznaka Ci predstavlja proizvoljnu integracionu konstantu. Ako se sada rezultat iz jednacine (7) smeni u pomocno resenje jednaSine (5), onda se konacno za linearnu diferencijalnu jednaSinu (3) dobija traSeno opste resenje.

9
proizvoljna konstanta C2, to se jednaSina (12) moze konaSno napisati; u oibliku sledeSeg odgovarajuSeg partikularnog resenja: K(t)=K(0)+ J[
f (t)\(t)-ff(t)

(i(t) + q(t)]dt,

(13)

pri cemu je bilo iskorisSeno i prvo partikularno resenje dato jednacinom (lo)f U jednaSini (13) nova oznaka K(o) predstavlja vrednost osnovnih sredstava u baznom godisnjem periodn, dok nave oznake f (o) i q(o) predstavljaju odgovarajuSe vrednosti proizvoljnih instrumentalnih funkcija vremena takodje u baznom godisnjem periodu. Zavrsavajuci resavanje, a na osnovu prvog partikularnog re senja datog jednacinom (lO), treSa jednacina sistema (l) moze se ko naSno napisati u obliku slededeg izvedenog odgovarajuceg partikular nog resenja: '
I(t)

mA()(y ( c )

f(t)

+ f(t)

+ a(t)>

(14)

gde su sve upotrebljene oznake ved ranije objasnjene. Od posebnog je interesa izolovano reSavanje prve jednacine sistema (l). Naime, ova jednaSina se mo5e napisati i u slededem obliku:
<5D(t) = adX(t). (15)

ReSavajuSi diferencijalnu jednacinu (15) dobija se slededi oblik odgovarajuSeg partikularnog resenja:
D(t) = aK(t) + D(o ) - aK (o), (16)

koje je potpuno ekvivalentno onome u jednaSini (lo). ZnaSaj ovog ob lika, odgovarajuSeg partikularnog resenja sastoji se u tome to je on pogodan za konkretno ocenjivanje parametara a na bazi empiriSkih podataka, koristeSi se pri tome metodom regresije.

AkqpSlj sada jednaSine (10)>(13) i (14) povezu u jedan sistem simultanih jednaSina, onda se dobija konstruisani matematieki proizvodno-kapitalni model u sledeSem opstem, a li partikularno resenom obliku:

D(t). m

G ) r i o) x(t) + ^

K(t)=K(0) +
0

*00 + f 0 0 ^ 0 ) + q(t)]dt, .... '

(17) .
i

i(t) = DC o ^ y C Q ) .f( x(t) + f(t) fi(t) + q(t), t)

; . |

gde su sve upotrebljene oznake ve6 ranije objasnjene.

ReSeni oblik sistema jednaSina (17) oslobodjen je diferenoir*: jalnih elemenata, ali on sadr5i fuaksije izrazene u obliku odredjenog integrala. Medjutim, ovaj funkeionalni oblik odredjenog integrala mo ze se vrlo lako svesti na oblik obione funkoije Sim se proizvoljnim I funkoijama f(t) i q(t) daju odredjeni matematiSki oblici. Ovo ce se | uSiniti u sledeeoj fazi konstrukaije, u kojoj de opsti i partikularno reseni oblik konstruisanog matematiSkog proizvodno-kapitalnog modela (17) posluSiti kao osnova za konstruisanje konkretno odredjenih odgovarajucih ekonometrijskih modsla. III. Konstrukci.ia dva ofeovara.iuda -proizvodno-kapitalna ekonometri.iska modsla Konstruisanje odgovarajuceg ekonometrijskog modela na osnovu nekog matematickog ekonomskog modela obuh.va.ta konkretno odredjivanje svih neodredjenih parametara, kao i eventualnih proizvoljnib funkciji'. sto se pojavljuju u matematiSki resenom obliku konstru isanog matematiSkog ekonomskog modela. Posto se ovo odredjivanje vrsi na osnovu empiriSkih podataka, to se u tu svrhu mora uzeti u razmatranje i obradu neki odredjen konkretan slucaj. Ovde ce se uzeti u obradu i resavanje konkretan problem globalnog privrqdnog razvoja Jugoslavije. Osnovni statisticki podaci, koji su posluzili kao empiriSka osnova za konstruisanje dva odgovarajuSa analiticka proizvodno-kapitalna ekonometrijska modela, prikazani su pragledno u priloSenoj tabeli 1. U ovoj tabeli, pored podataka o ukupnom drustevnom proizvodu, iskazane su dve vrste podataka o osnovnim sredstvima u.celokupnoj privredi. Jedni se odnose na ukupna osnovna sredstva u proizvodnom i neproizvodnom delu celokupne privrede, dok se drugi odnose na osnovna sredstva samo u proizvodnom delu celokupne privrede. Ha osno vu ove dve vrste podataka o osnovnim sredstvima u celokupnoj privredi.

Tabela 1
Osnovni podaci za konstrukci.iu modela mrd.din. 1 cene 1956. ,

Godisnji period

Redni broj godisnjeg perioda t

Drustveni proxzvod Dt

Osnovna sredstva Jd proizvod- samo u proiznom i nepro- voduom delu izvodnom de- privrede lu privrede *2t 4 9.223,9 9.525,8 9.870,9 10.238,2 10.606,9 11.013,7 11.487,7 12.034,3 12.682,1 5 5.204,1 5,452,6 5,717,6 5.997,1 6.277,6 6.569,9 6.892,0 7.264,9 7.710,0

1 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
rp t

3 1.165 1.389 1.434 1.617 1.612 1.982 2.025 2.373 2.513

kao i odgovaraju6ih podataka o ukupnom drustvenom proizvodu, u stva. ri, konstruisana su dva razliSita odgovarajua analiticka proizvodnokapitalna ekonometrijska modela '. 8) Jediaise u kojima su izrazene vrednosti promenljivih veliSina u tabeli 1 su milijarde dinara. Radi homogeaiteta promenljivih veli3ina, s^e njihove vrednosti izraliene su u cenama 1956. godine. Xzvor statistiekih podataka za druStveni proizvod je SGJ-62. str. 93. Xz vor podataka za osnovna sredstvas Ivo Vinski, Proc.iena ra3ta fiksnih -fondova Jagoslavi.ie od 1946. do I960. Ekonomski institut N . Hrvatske, E Zagreb, 1962, tabela 26, str.50. U toj publikaoiji podaci o novoj (nabavnoj) vrednosti osnovnih sredstava odnose se na stanje krajem godine* Medjutim, ovde su upotrebljeni podaci o prosecnom stanju tih osnovnih sredstava u toku godine, do kojih se doslo linearncm interpolacijom.

- 48 12 ' -V : .

Kao prvi korak u konstruisanju prvog od bvk- dva odgovarajuda analitioka proizvodno-kapitalna ekonometrijska modela odredice se proizvoljne funkcije fi(t) i q (t), njihove vrednosti u baznom j godisnjem periodu f, (o)i qi (o), msirginalni koeficijent efektivnosti (efikasnosti)osnovnih sredstava a i i vrednost drustvenog proizvoda . u baznom godisnjem periodu Di(o), kao neophodni element! za konkretr b odredjivanje prve jednaSine u opstem i partikularno resenom oblii ku sistema simultardh jednaSina (17). Ovo odredjivanje izvrside se na taj naSin sto de se metodama matematicke statistike na osnovu tabele 1 izvesti i dopunski podaci, koji de zajedno sa onima u samoj tabeli 1 posluziti kao osnova za ocenu potret>nih parametara modela. Ovako . izvedeni dopunski podaci pregledno su iskazani u tabeli 2. IzraSunavanje ovih dopunskih podataka izvrseno je na osnovu podataka u tabeli 1*
"

Podaci u koloni (5) tabele 2 izraSunkti^su na osnovu poda taka u koloni (3) tabele 1 pomocu trenda koji je konstruisan metodom najmanjih kvadrata. Ovaj trend ima slededi opsti i konkretan eksponencijalni oblik: D(t) = D(0) eP* = 1198,5 e>0929t# ( i8)

Sto se tice podataka u kolonama (4) i (5) tabele 2, oni; suv.takodje izraSunati na osnbvu podataka u kolonama. (4) i (5) ta'bele ' l: ''pomo2u od^ovarajud^-trendc^^^kQji- ^u konslr^sa^^metgl^^^najmanj ih kvadrata i potoS-fl^T^e^ti^ll" po Ovi^ jfgre&cirani trendovi, koji predstavljaju funkcije odgovaraijudih marginalnih godisnjih prirastaja osnovnih sredstava, imaju sledede opste i konkretne eksponencijalne oblike: &(t) = ,(o) . p e i = 9122,7 . 0,03957 e03957t , .fp^ iz(t) = l(0) p^epa* = 5188^0 . 0,0483 e>0483t . (9) 1 (20)

U stvari, ovi marginalni godisnji prirastaji osnovnih sredstava, prema uvedenoj definiciji drugom jednacinom sistema (l), predstav ljaju marginalne proseSne godisnje vrednosti novih opredmecenih in vesticija u osnovnim sredstvima, Proizvoljne funkcije vremena f1(t) i 9.1 (t), kao instrumentalne promenjive veliSine u prvom od dva odgovarajuda analitiSka pro, izvodno-kapitalna ekonpmetrijska modela, odredjene su nataj nacin

- 49 13
Tabela 2 Izvedeni dopuns^ pnflaci za ocehu parametara mrd*din., cene 1956. Marginalni prirastaj osn.sred. u proizvodnom samo u proizvod i neproizvod- nom delu privre nom delu pri- de vrede . 4 5 36Q, 97 375,54 390,71 406,47 422,87 438,93 457,70 476,17 495,40. 250,57 262,97 275,98 289,64 303,97 519,01 334,80 351,36 368,75

Godisnji period

Redid broj godiSnjeg perioda t 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8

Izracunati drustveni proizvod

1 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960

3 1.198,5 1.215,2 1.443,3 1.583,9 1.738,1 1.907,4 2.093,1 2.296,9 '2.520,6

sto je pretpostavljen specijalan slaSaj u kome te funkcije imaju konstantnu vrednost, pa je potom metodom najmanjih kvadrata odredjena regresiona linearna zavisnost izmedju marginalnih godisnjih pri-\ rastaja osnovnih sredstava datih u koloni (4) tabele 2 i empiriSldh ' godisnjih podataka drustvenog proizvoda datih u koloni (3) tabele 1. Ova regresiona linearna zavisnost ima slededi opsti i konkretni oblik: I, (t)=f1(t)D1(t)+q,(t)=o^D1(t)+aJ = 0,0985 , (t)+248,7. (21)

Sto ; tiSe vrednosti ovih proizvoljnih funkcija vremena u baznom gose diSnjem periodu, zbog uSinjene pretpostavke o njihovoj konstantnosti, . one su odredjene slede6im opstim i koakretnim jednakostima: f,(t) = f,(o) = c, = 0,0985, <i(t) = qt (0) = d, = 248,7. l (22);; (23)

9) Ovde nisu bili upotrebljeni teorijski izraSunati godisnji podaci

- 50 Ik

Za odredjivanje vrednosti marginalnog koeficijenta efikasnosti osnovrdh sredstava a4 kori<5eni su osnovni podaci u tabeli 1. Na osnovu ovih empiriSkih podataka metbdom najmanjih kvadrata izracunata je linearna regresiona zavisnost izmedju drustvenog proizvoda D< (t) i osnovnih sredstava (t). Ova zavisnost ima slededi opsti i konkretan oblik: D,(t) = a*Ki (t) + b, = 0, 38988 K, (t) - 2398,33. (24)

Posto je jednacim (24) samo konkretan ekvivalenat opste jednacine (16), postoji i slededa konkretna i korisna veza: Di (0) = aiKt(o) + b, s 1158,43, . (25)

koja moze posluSiti za konkretno odredjivanje poSetnih uslova, odnosno vrednosti ehdogenih promenljivih veliSina u baznom godisnjem pe * riodu. Ovde je u jednacini (25) odredjena vrednost drustvenog proiz voda u baznom godisnjem periodu (1952) na osnovu izvedenog dopunskog podatka o osnovnim sredstvima na osnovu jednacine (19). Uzimajudi u obzir do sada pretpostavljene i konkretno utvr- djene vrednosti parametara;i funkcionalhih veliSina u jednacinama (9),1 (19), (21), (22), (23), (24) i (25), moae se pristupiti izvodjenju | opsteg i konkretno reenog oblika prve jednacine sistema opstih ali f partikularno resenih jednaSina (17). Naime, na osnovu jednacine (9) f i jednaSina (22) i (23) moSe se prva jednaSina sistema (17) napisati I u slededem opStem i resenom obliku: j D,(t) = Df(0) e ^ 81^ + -3*. (eai^ 1) (26) ' ' ' ' ' C1 * ' - 'f Ako se sada uzmu u obzir utvrdjene i izracunate vrednosti u jednaci- | naraa (19), (21), (22), (23), (24)^i (25), onda se jednacina (26) mo- | ze konaSno napisati u slede6em konkretno resencm obliku: | D, (t) = 3683,0
e 0 3 8 4 ,t

. 2^24,6.

(27)

Kao drugi korak u konstruisanju prvog od dva odgovarajuda j analiticka proizvodno-kapitalna ekonometrijska modela, pored do sada i

druStvenog proizvoda u koloni 3 tabele 2 , jer je eksperimentalno proveravanje pokazalo da se u tom sluSaju dobija nesto slabija p rilagodjenost modela empirigkim podacima.

- 51 ' . . 1 . . !5

odredjenih parametara i fukoionalnih veliSina, odredi6e se joS vrednost osnovnih sredstava u baznom godisnjem periodu ^ (o), kao takodje neophodni element za konkretno odredjivanje druge jednaSine u opstem i partikularno resenom. obliku sistema simultanih jedhacina (17). Ovo odredjivanje izvrseno je-pomocu izvedenih dopunskih podataka tabele 2, Naime, vrednost osnovnih sredstava u baznom godisnjem periodu Ki (o) ovde nije odredjena kao empiricka vrednost Ki 0= 9223,9 u tabeli 1, ve6 kao regresijom ocenjena reprezentativna vrednost & (o), koja na osnovu jednacine (19) ima sledeSu konkretnu velicinu: ' K, (o) = t, (o) = 9122,7. (28)

Eazlog za ovakav postupak le z i u cinjenici da su osnovna sredstva u baznom godisnjem periodu jedina nezavisna konstantna vrednost endogenih promenljivih veliSina, kojom je zajedno sa egzogenim veliSinama ekonometri j ski model jednoznaSno odredjen. Zbog toga je bilo potrebno da se ova veliSina [Kj(o)] odredi tako, da sto bolje odrazava i reprezentuje zskonomerni razvoj, sto je primenom metoda trenda i ucinjeno. -.
Uzimajuci u obzir do sada pretpostavljene i konkretno utvrdjene vrednosti parametara i funkcionalnih veliSina u jednaSinama (9), (19), (21), (23), (24), (25) i (28) moze se pristupiti izvodjenju opstih ali partikularno resenih jednaSina (17). Naime, na osnovu jedna cina (9) i jednaSina (22) i (23), kao i jednaSine (25), moze se druga jednaSina sistema (l7) napisati u slededem opstem i resenom obliku: K ,(t) =K,(o)

6a , C , t +

( ^ + ^ - 5; ) (e a ,0 ,t -

1 ).

(29)

Ako se sada uzmu u obzir utvrdjene i izraSunate vrednosti u jednaSinama (19), (21), (22), (23), (24) i (28), onda se jednacina (29) mo5e konaSno napisati u sledeSem konkretno resenom obliku: K,(t) = 9446,6 e,0384t- 323,9. (30)

Kao tre6i korak u konstruisanju prvog od dva odgovarajuSa analitiSka proizvodno-kapitalna ekonometrijska modela, pored do sada odredjenih parametara i funkcionalnih velicina, odredice se jos marginalna vrednost novih opredmeSenih investicija u osnovnim sredstvima. u baznom godisnjem periodu Ii(o) kao takodje neophodni element za kon kretno odredjivanje treSe jednaSine u opstem i partikularno resenom

52 -

16
obliku sistema simultanih jednaSina (17). Ovo odredjivanje izvrseno je takodje pomodu izvedenih dopunskih podataka tabele 2, ali i empiriSkih podataka tabele 1* Naime, marginalna vrednost novih opredmeSem V investicija u 'i .haznGm godiSnjem periodu Xi (o)odredjena je na osno- 1 vu jednaSine (2l), ali na taj naSin sto je za vrednost (o) uzeta vre| dnost odredjena jednaSinom (25). Na taj se naSin za vrednost novih opredmeSenih opredmefienih investicija u osnovnim sredstvima u baznom. godisnjem periodu dobila sledeSa konkretna veliSina: If (o) = CfDi(o) + d* = 362,8 (31)

Obrazlolenje za ovakav postupak potpuno je analogno onome koje je dato| za velicinu Kj(o) u jednaSini (28). . . UzimajuSi u obzir dosada pretpostavijene i konkretno utvrdj ne vrednosti parametara i funkcionalnih veliSina u jednaSinama (9), . (21), (22), (23), (25) i (3l), mo2e se pristupiti izvodjenju opsteg i konkretno reSenog oblika treSe jednacine sistema opstih ali partikularno reSenih jednaSina (17). Naime, na osnovu jednaSine (9 ) i jed-: naSina (22) i (23), kao i jednaSine (25), moSe se treSa jednaSina sistema (17) napisati u sledeSem opstem i resenom obliku:
I,(t) 1,(0) e3*0*

(32)

Ako se sada uzm u obzir utvrdjene i izraSunate vrednosti u jednaSiu nam (2l), (25) i (3l), ohda se jednaSina (32) moSe konaSno napisati fl. u sledeSem konkretno resenom obliku:
I,(t) = 362,8 e0384t% (33)

Ako se najzad jednacine (27), (30) i (33) pove5u u jedan sistem, onda se dobija prvi konstruisani analitiSki proizvodno-kapitalni ekonometrijski modiel za privredni razvoj1Jugoslavije za pro tekli period (1952-196o) u svom konkretno resenom obliku: D,(t) = 3683,0 e0384t _ 2524,6* K, (t) = 9446,6 e0,0384t - 323,9, (34) I,(t) = 362,8 e0,0384t/ gde svi parametri imaju odredjene numeriSke vrednosti i utvrdjena

- 53 17
ekonomska znaSenja. Drugi odgovarajuSi analitiSki proizv.odno-kapitalni ekonome trijski model za privredni razvoj Jugoslavije za isti protekli peri od, koji se od prvog razlikuje samo po tome Sto se ne zasniva na podacima o ukupnim osnovnim sredstvima u proizvodnom i heproizvodriom delu privrede, ve na podacima o osnovnim sredstvima samo - proizvodnoin u delu privrede, konstruisan je metodoloSki na potpuno analogaaF.-naSin# Postupak za konstruisanje i ovog drugog modela neSe se ovde izvoditi zbog saSimanja samoga rada, ali 6e se dati svi neophodni rezultati kao i analitiSki element!. Ovaj drugi odgovarajuSianalitiSki ekono metrijski model mo5e se napisati u sledeSem konkretno resenom obliku: D2 (t) = 2911,5 e,04675t - 1744,4, Ka(t) = 5398,0 g004675* . 210,0, I2(t) = 252,4 e0,04675t/ gde svi parametri imaju odredjene numeriSke vrednosti i utvrdjena fkr* ........ onomifca znaSenja. .. Na osnovu sistema jednaSina (34) i (35) izraSunavaju se od govarajuSe vrednosti endogenih promenljivih veliSina za oba analitiSka ekonometrijska modela na taj naSin sto se parametru t daju konvencijom utvrdjene vrednosti celih brojeva. Vrednosti celih brojeva od 0 do 8 odgovaraju proteklom periodn 1952-196o. Na primer, vrednost drustvenog proizvoda u 1952. godini izraSunava se iz prve jednaSine sistema (34) stavljajuSi t = o, tako da se dobije rezultat D*(o)=1158,4. Na isti naSin izraSunavaju se i sve ostale odgovarajuSe vrednosti endogenih promenljivih veliSina za oba analitiSka ekonometrijska modela iz jednaSina (34) i (35). Sve tako izraSunate odgovarajude vred nosti endogenih promenljivih veliSina prema konstruisanim modelima prikazane su u tabeli 3. T ovoj tabeli su umesto marginalnih date J intervalne godiSnje vrednosti novih. opredmeSenih investicija kao godiSnji priraStaji osnovnih sredstava, da bi se mogLo izvrsiti adekvatno uporedjivanje svih izraSunatih endogenih promenljivih veliSina 3a odgovarajuSim empiriSkim osnovnim podacima u tabeli 1. Uporedjivanje izmedju izraSunatih vrednosti promenljivih . veliSina prema konstruisanim modelima, datih u tabeli 3,i odgovara- ; . ' (35)

- 54 18
Tabela 3 Endogene promenl.iive veliSine prema analitiSkim modelima GodiSnji period Drustveni proizv. za prvi model 1 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 2 1.158,4 1.302,8 1,452,3 1.608,1 1.769,8 1.938,1 2,112,7 2.294,3 2.482,9 za drugi model 3 1.167,1 1.306,4 1.452,4 1.605,4 1.765,7 1.933,8 2.109,8 2.294,3 2,487,6 Osnovna sredstva Nove opredmeSene investici.ie za prvi za drugi za prvi za drugi model model model model 4 9.122,7 9.493,0 9.876,5 10.276,1 10.690,9 11.122,6 11.570,3 12.036,1 12.519,7 5 5.188,0 5.446,2 5.717,1 6.000,7 6.297,9 6.609,5 6.935,8 7.277,8 7.636,2 6 358,0 370,3 383,5 399,6 414,8 431,7 447,7 465,8 483,6 7 246,6 258,2 ^270,9 283,6 297,2 311,6 326,3 342,0 358,4

judih empiriSkih podataka istih promenljivih veliSina, datih u tabeli 1, omoguduje davanje ocene o stepenu prilagodjenosti samih modela proteklom stvamom ekonomskom kretanju. Pre nego sto 6e se pristupiti konkretnom izraSunavanju ovih cena, daSe se grafiSki prikazi tih uporedjivanja. Ovi prikazi, koji komparativno objedinjuju i ilustruju tabele 1 i 5 dati su u grafikonima 1 i 2.

Kod pr$o odgovarajuSeg analitiSkog ekonometrijskog modela grafiSki prikaz (grafikon l) empiriSkih i izraSunatih vrednosti omoguSuje pored grubog uporedjivanja i izvesnu orijentacionu ocenu prilagodjenosti modelskih vrednosti empiriSkim. podacima. Ovo uporejljivanje i ocena olakSani su time to je upotrebljen polulogaritamski grafikon, tako da je omoguSeno uporedjivanje agregata sa vrlo razlicitim nivoima, a saSuvani su relativni odnosi kao bitni z , analizu. U grafikoa nu 1 jasno se zapaSa da relativne razlike izmedju izraSunatih vred nosti prema modelu (neprekidno izvuSene linije) i empiriSkih podataka (isprekidano izvuSene linije) u celini posmatrane nisu velike. Medjutim, endogene promenljive veliSine znatno se razlikuju izmedju sebe u pogledu 'stepena prilagodjenosti empiriSkim podacima. Dok se druStveni proij^od [D*(t)] prilagodjava umereno i u zadovoljavajuSoj

- 55 19
. : Grafikon 1 .

EmpiriSke i izraSunate vrednosti endogenih promenljivih veliSina Protekli period 1952-1960f Prvi. analitiSki model | - 1 - I I I I r 2. 000 --- r _ | ~ 10.000 9.000
8.000

^ - -

TzraSunate vrednosti EmpiriSke vrednosti

7.000
6 .0 0 0

K^t) = 9447 e0,0584t - 324

-1------1------J---- I

3. 000

2 .000

1.000

700 600 500 400 300

200

O' 1 1952 53

2 54

3 55

4 56

5 57

6 58

7 8 59 1960

- 56-

2.0

meri, a osnovna sredstva [K, (t)] Sak neuobiSajeno i u znatno ve6oj meri, dotle nove opredmefiene investicije [I* (t) i e i ne pokazuju neku ] rf' ubedljiviju prilagod-jenost. Ova zapaSanja na bsnovu samog grafikona u potpunosti se potvrdjuju izraSunatim koeficijentima varijacije kao odgovarajuSim merama stepena prilagodjenosti izraSunatih vrednosti empiriSkim podacima (V^ = 4,14$, V_ = 0,79% i V=Y = 17,16$). Za Vi "I -1 L koeficijent varijacije, koji se odnosi na nove opredmeSene investici je, ne samo da se mo5e reSi dane ukazuje na neku ubedljiviju prila godjenosti, veS bi se moglo Sak tvrditi da je ona vrlo slaba. Medju tim, ovakav delimiSno hbgativan utisak u velikoj meri se menja posle detaljnije analize, koja 6e se dati u zakljuSnom poglavlju. Kod drugog odgovarajufieg ekonometrijskog modela grafiSki prikaz (grafikon 2) empiriSkih i izraSunatih vrednosti omogiiSuje i dovodi do vrlo sliSne ocene o prilagodjenosti kao i kod prvog odgovarajuSeg ekonometrijskog modela* Ove ocene, takodje, u potpunosti se potvrdjuju izraSunatim koeficijentima varijacije kao odgovarajuSim merama stepena prilagodjenosti izraSunatih vrednosti empiriSkim po dacima* (^Da = 4,05$, = 0,53 = 10,79 %). UporedjujuSi ove koeficijente varijacije u oba modela, vidi se da je ovaj drugi model primetno bblje prilagodjen, sto naroSito vaSfc^za treSu endogenu promenljivu veliSinu novih opredmeSenih investicija* Sigledno je da postoji p.otreba za uzajamnimuporedjivanjem oba odgovarajufia analitiSka ekonometrijska modela, jer se same na taj naSin mo5e dati potpunija i pouzdanija analiza kao i ocenjivanje. Medjutim, ovo uporedjivanje treba da se zasniva kako na odredjenim rezultatima, tako i na odredjenim elementima, koji su karakteristiSni za oba modela* Zbog toga su svi relevantni rezultati i elementi za oba modela iskazani u, za uporedjivanje i analizu pogodnoj tabeli 4* Ova analitiSka tabela obuhvata sve vaznije rezultate i elemente za analizu i ocenjivanje, ;a odnosi s e na oba modela i na posmatrani . protekli period* U zaglavlju tabele nalaze se oba odgovarajuSa analiV tiSka ekonometrijska modela, prvi sa osnovnim sredstvima u celokupnoj privredi, a drugi sa osnovnim sredstvima samo u proizvodnom delu privrede. U pretkoloni tabele oznaSeni su samo vazniji osnovni rezultati i analitiSki elementi* U prvom redu iskazaxti su indeksi porasta izraSunatih vrednpsti endogenih promenljivih veliSina u procentima za protekli posmatrani period (1952-1960), U drugom redu iskazane su odgovarajuSe intervalne stope rasta endogenih promenijivih veliSina u procentima. U treSem redu iskazani su koeficijenti varijacije empi riSkih podataka oko izraSunatih modelskih vrednosti za endogene pro-

- 57 _ Grafikon 2 21

Empiricke i izracunate vrednosti endogenih promenljivih . velicina = . Protekli period 19521960. Drugi analiticki model

0 1952

1 53

2 54

3 55

4 56

5 57

6 58

7 59

8 1960

- 58 ..f_ . ; 'Or V .
r. '/ v I.

22
Tabela 4 AnalitiSka tabela rezultata i elemenata Protekli period 1952-1960 Oba analitiSka modela Red. br* 1 1* Vrsta rezultata i elemenata Oznaka veliSine 3 2 Indeksi porasta izraSunatih vrednosti en Sc dogenih promenljivih veliSina 4 Intervalne stope ras rD ta endogenih. promen rK ljivih veliSina Koeficijenti varijacije empiriSkih podataka 7 ako izraSunatih a Egzogeni, objektivno dati narametri modela l x Egzogeni, instrumental c no odredjeni parametri d modela Koeficijenti korelacije regresionih zavis rDK nosti rID Intervalni koeficijen ti uSesSa novih opredmeSenih investici.ia a Nezavisne vrednosti osnovnih sredstava u K(o) Ekonometri.iski modeli prvi model drugi model 4 214,3 137,2 135,1 5 213.1 147.2 145.3

2. 3. 4. 5.

[11,9 8,4. [12,5 i 8,2 C 4 ,1 } 4 ,0 ; [ 5,0 5 4,9] 3,8 4,8 4,14 0,79 17,16 0,38988 -2398.3 0,09851 248.7 0,987866 0,98539 4,05 0,53 10,79 0,539356 -1631.1 0,08668 151.2 0,987097 0,9861

6. 7*

("0.309:0*1951 9122,7

f0.211: 0.1441 5188,0

8.

objektivno dati parametri: marginalni koeficijent efektivnosti (e fikasnosti) osnovnih sredstava (a) i dopunski koeficijent u regresionoj. zavisnosti izmedju druStvenog proizvoda i osnovnih sredstava (b). U petom redu iskazani su egzogeni instrumentalno odredjeni parametri: marginalni koeficijent uSeSSa novih opredmeSenih investicija u druStvenom proizvodu (c) i dopunski fcpeficijent u regresionoj zavisnosti izmedju mayginalnih novih opredmeSenih investicija i drustvenog pro-

- 59 : -

23

izvoda (d). U lestom redu iskazani su koeficijenti korelacije: izmedju drustvenog proizvoda i osnovnih sredstava (r), kao i izmedju marginalnih novih opredmeSenih investicija i drusxYenog proizvoda (rjjj)* U sedmom redu iskazani su intervalni (proseSni) koeficijenti u5eSa novih opredme<5enih investicija u drustvenom proizvodu (s), Najzad, u osmom redu kao jedine nezavisne konstantne vredaosti endogenih promenljivih veliSina u modelima, iskazane su veliSine osnovnih sredstava u baznom godisnjem periodu [K(o)} Analiza i ocena rezultata i elemenata kako onih u tabeli 3, tako i drugih, izvrSide se u zakljuSnom poglavlju paralelno sa rezultatima i elementima projekcija za bududi period* Sijem f e se i izraSunavanju i prikazivanju pristupiti u slesLedem ppglavlju . Ovakva kompleksna analiza i ocena ne samo da omoguduje saSetije izlaganje, veS pruSa i neophodne preduslove za svestranaju analizu i pouzdaniju ocenu#

17, Vari.jante pro.iekci.ia za planski razvo.i T>rivrede Jugoslavia

Kao osnova za izraSunavanje i izbor varijanata projekcija za planski razvoj privrede Jugoslavije u periodu 1962-1970, kao i u dugoro&nom periodu do 1980, godine, upotrebide se ve konstruisana dva odgovarajuda aJSSSEitiSka ekonometrijska modela na bazi empiriSkih podataka za protekli period 1952-1860. Medjutim, izraSunavanje i iz bor varijanata projekcija ovde se nefie vrSiti pomoSu proste modelske _ ekstrapolacije endogenih promenljivih veliSina u ve6 konstruisana dva ^odgovaraju6a analitiSka ekonometrijska modela, nego"'tfe se H a osno vu hjih i odgovarajude analize mogunosti i potreba naseg daljeg pri vrednog razvoja konstruisati dva nova odgovarajua planska ekonomet rijska modela* PomoSu ovako konstraisana dva modela za planiranje buduSeg razvoja izraSunade se i izabrade se po dve varijante projek cija endogenih promenljivih velicina za svaki model, U stvari, ceo postupak konstrukcije novih planskih modela, kao i izraSunavanje . i izbor varijanata projekcija, da5e se samo za prvu varijantu prvog modela radi saSetijeg izlaganja. Medjutim, svi neophodni rezultati i elementi za oba modela i za sve Setiri varijante projekcija prikazade ae preglednim iskaznim i analitiSkim tabelama, kao i odgovaraju6im grafikonima planskih projekeija privrednog razvoja, Sto Se omogu6iti ne samo bolji uvid, veS i potpuniju i pouzdaniju analizu

- 60 24

i ocenuo

^adi konstruisanja prve varijante prvog. odgovarajufieg plan- . skog modela, koji se bazira na empiriSlcLni podacima o ukupnim osnovnim sredstvima u proizvodnom i neproisvodnom delu privrsde, polazi se od opsteg i partikularno resenog oblika sistema jednaSina (17)* Kao kod analitiSkog modela za protekli period, ovde f e se i kod planskog mpi dela za budufii period uvest-i iste, ali i neke dodatne pretpostavke, koje f e u izvesnoj meri uprostiti model i uSiniti ga realistiSnijim ; i i operativnijim. Umesto onih pretpostavki, koje su date jednacinama (22) i (23) kod prvog analitickog modela, ovde f e se kod prve varijani te prvog planskog modela za vrednost.1 proizvoljnih fuakcija vremena fi*(t) i q.ii(t)^) usvojiti pretposbavke koje su odradjene sledefiim opstim i konkretnim jednakostima: fnCfc),= ^11 (&, = il = 0,24,
<.1 31 ) = 9 1 (c) - 'in = 0 .1

(36)
(37)

Ove pretpostavke su u potpuaosti dopustene, jer se radi o egzogenim instrumentalnim promenljivim veliSinasia, koje se u planskom modelu mogu birati proizvoljnote(u r . u o i m granicama) Sam izbor ovih kona^rii kratnih vrednosti bifie analiziran i ocanjen u zakljuSnom poglavlju Sto se tiSe ostalih egaogenih promenljivih veiiSina, one kao objektivno date ostaju neproaenjene i iste 5ak za obe varijante prvog planskog modela, Prema tome, sa osnovu jednaSine (24) za prvi analitiSki model mole ae i za prvi vorijantu prvog planskog modela napisati potpuno analogna jednaclna, koja ima sledefii opsti i .konkret an oblik: (t)-2398,33, (38) Na osnovu ove jednaSine (38) meSe se po analogiji sa jednaSinom (25) 10) Prvi broj u dvolrfojnom indeksu oznaSava redni broj odgovarajufieg modela, a drugi oznaSava redid, broj odgovarajufie varijante* il("^) =
1

+ ^ 11 = 0,38988

25
napisati i slededa konkretna i korisna veza: Dn(o) = a, ,(()) + . . (39)

= 3243,4,

koja moSe posluSiti za konkretno odredjivanje poSetnih. uslova, odnos no vrednosti endogenih promenljivih veliSina u baznom godisnjem .peri- odu. Medjutim, ovde je u jednaSini (39) odredjena vrednost drustvenog proizvoda u planskom baznom periodu (1962) na oshovu izvedenog dopunskog podatka o proseSnim godiSnjim osnbvnim sredstvima, koristeci s e i odgovarajudim poznatim empiriSkim podacima za 1961* i 1962* godinu kao i linearnom interpolacijom* Prema tome, vrednost osnovnih sredstava u baznom godisnjem periodu i kod planskog modela predstavl ja nezavisnu egzogenu konstantnu veliSinu, samo se .ona ovde ne odnosi na 1952* godinu, ved na 1962* Uzimajudi u obzir do sada pretpostavljene i .konkretno utvr-. djene vrednosti parametara i funkcionalnih veliSina u jednaSinama ' (9), ( 2 6 ( 3 6 ) , (37) i (38), mo2e se pristupiti izvodjenju opSteg . ' i konlq?etrio resenog oblika prve jednaSine sistema opStih ili partikul arno reSenih jednaSina (17)* Naime, na osnovu jednacina (9), (26), (36) i (37), mo2e se prva jednaSina sistema (17) napisati u slededem opStem i relenom obliku; > D(t) = D(o) (40)

Ako se sada uzmu u cbzir utvrdjene i izraSunate vrednosti u jednaSi-.; nama (36), (37) i (38), onda se jednaSina (40), kao prva jednaSina prve varijante prvog planskog ekonometrijskog modela, moze k'onaSno napisati u slededem konkretno resenom obliku: D^(t) = 3143,4 e09357 ^ : (4l)

Ead-i izvodjenja opsteg i konkretno resenog oblika druge . jednaSine prve varijante prvog planskog ekonometrijskog modela, pored do sada odredjenih parametara i funkcionalnih veliSina, odredide se jos vrednost osnovnih sredstava u baznom godisnjem periodu Kf*(0 ) kao takodje neophodni elemenat za konkretno odredjivanje druge jed naSine u opstem i partikularno reSenom obliku sistema simultanih jedriaSxha^iy^^.Ovb odredjivanje izvrseno je na osnovu poznatih empiriSkih vrednosti osnovnih sredstava u godisnjifti periodima 1961* i 1962* godine* Naime, pomodu linearne interpolacije izraSunata je proseSna vrednost osnovnih sredstava u baznom godisnjem periodu (1962),

- 62 -

26

'

:y

koja i na osnovu jednaSine (39). ima sledeSu konkretnu veliSinu:. Efi(0) = 14213,9
*

,
. .

.
.

...
-

(42)

Ovakav postupak mogao se primeniti zbog toga.3to su osnovna sredstva u baznom godiSnjem periodu jedina nezavisna konstahtna vrednost endp-, genih proven!jivih veliSina, kojom zajedno sa egzogenim veliSinama ovaj planski ekonometrijski model jednoznaSno odredjen. Osijn toga, ovakav pogtupa^: opravdava i Sinjenica da baS osnovna sredstva najbolje odrSavaju i reprezentuju zakonomerhi razvoj privrede, sto je naroSito va5no za inaSe netipiSnu 1962. godinu kao bazni godiSnji period planskog ekonometrijskog modela. .. . . UzimajuSi u obzir do sada pretpostavijene i konkretno utvrdjene vrednosti parametara i funkcionalniK veliSina u jednaSinama (9), (29), (36), (37), (38) i (42), mo5e se pristupiti izvodjenju opSteg i konkretno reSenog oblika druge jednaSine sistema opstih ali partiknlamo resenih jednaSina (17). Naime, na osnovu jednacina (9), (29), ' (36), (37) i (38), moze se druga jednacina sistema (17) napisati. u;. sledeSem opstem i resenom obliku:

K.< (t) = [Kit(c) , c11 *

11

()

Ako se sada uzmu u obzir utvrdjene i izracunate vrednosti u jednacinama (36), (37), (38), (39) i (42), onda se jednaSina (43), kao druga jednaSina .prve varijante prvog planskog ekonometrijskog modela, moze konaSno napisati u sledeSem konkretno resenom obliku: Ki,(t) = 8062,5 e 09357t + 6151,4. (44)

Najzad radi izvodjenja opSteg i konkretno resenog oblika tre6e jednaSine prve varijajate prvog planskog ekonometrijskog mode la, pored do sada odredjenih parametara i funkcionalnih velicina, odrediSe se jos vrednost marginalnih novih opredmecenih investicija u osnovnim sredstvima u baznom godisnjem periodu In(o) kao takodje neophodni elemenat za konkretno odredjivanje trece jednacine u opstem i partikularno resenom obliku sistema simultanih jednaSina (l7). Ovo odredjivanje izvrsepo je na osnovu pretpostavki u jednaSinama (36) i (37) u opstem i neresenom sistemu simultanih jednacina (l). Naime, marginalna vrednost novih opredmeSenih investicija u baznom godisnjem periodu In (0 ) odredjena je kao sledeSa konkretna velieina: -

- 63 2? .

I1 1 (0) = o^DnCo) + d,, = 754,4,

; ;

'

(45)

pri 5emu je za vrednost Dj* (o) uzeta vrednost odredjena- jednaSihom (39)* TJzimajufii u obzir do sacLa pretpostavljene i konkretno utvrdjene vrednosti parametara i funkcionalnih veliSina u jednacinama (9), (32), (37), (36), (38) i (45) moSe se pristupiti izvodjenju opsteg i konkretno resenogoblika trefie jednaSine sistema opstih ali partiku larno resenih jednaSina (17). Naime, na osnovu jednaSina (9), (32), (36), (37) i (38) moSe se tfefia jednaSina sistema (17) napisati u sle-

defiem opstem i resenom obliku

I(t) = 1^(0)

e^11 11 V

(46)

Ako se sada uzmu u obzir utvrdjene i izraSunate vrednosti u jednaSinama (36), (37), (38) i (45), onda s e jednaSina (46) mo2e konaSno napi f sati u sledefiem konkretno resenom obliku: , T IJ \ = r cA A . e 0,09357 t . u 7 Iii(t) 754,4 9
/A n \ (47)

Ako se sada jednaSine (41), (44) i (47) poVeSu u jedan sistem, onda se dobija prva varijanta prvogkonstruisanog- planskog proizvodnokapitalnog ekonometrijskog modela za privtedni razvoj Jugoslavije za budufii period (1962-19BQ) u; svom konkretno resenom obliku: n (j \ n 117 . . Dn(t) = 3143^4 e0,09357t , * . K,,(t) = 8062,5 . e0*09357t + 6151,4, IM (t) = 754,4 . e0,09357t, . (48) .

gde 1 svi paraaetri' imaju odredjene numeriSke vrednosti i utvrdjenja ekonomska znaSenja. .. , .
: Druga varijanta, prvog odgovarajufieg planskog ekonometrijskog modela, kao ibb.ee-v.arijante drugog odgovarajufieg planskog ekono- : metrijskog modela, koje se od.prve dve varijante razlikuju samo p ' . o: tome 5to se ne zasnivaju na podacima o ukupnim osnovnim sredstvima u proizvodnom i neproizv'odnom delu privredej vef a podacima o osnovnim i i sredstvijnia samo u proizvodnom delu privrede, konstruisane-'su metodolbSki na potpuno analogan.naSin.. Postupci za konstruisanje i ove tri varijante planskih. ekonometrijskih. aodela nefie se ovde izvoditi zbog

6k

saSimanja samoga rada, al'i! 6e se dati svi neophodni rezultati kao i analitiSkL element!. Druga varijahta prvog odgovarajudeg planskog eko*. nometrijskog modela moSe se napisati u slededem konkretno relenom obliku:
D1a(t) 3143,4 . e0,083824rt, K,a(t) = 8062,5 . eo83824t +6151,4, (49)

T' 0 I |2 ( t) = 675,8 . e0,083824t . *

Prva varijanta drugog odgovarajudeg planskog ekonometrijskog modela moSe se napisati u slededem konkretno reSenom obliku: . D,i(t) = 3059,3 . e0*097084* Eal(t) = 5672,1 . e0,097084rt + 3024,2, Ia(t) = 550,7 . e 0,097084t ' (50)

a druga varijanta drugog odgovarajudeg planskog ekonometri j skog modela moSe se napisat! u slededem konkretno reSenom oblika:
D2a(t) = 3059,3 . e*086297t, K2a(t) =5672,1 . e086297t + 3024,2, I22(t) = 489,5 . 0O,O86297t Svi parametri u modelima (49), (50) i (51) imaju odredjene numeriSke vrednosti i utvrdjena ekonomska znaSenja. . Na osnovu sistema jednaSina (48) i (49) izraSunate su odgovarajude vrednost! endogenih promenljivih veliSina za obe konstruisane yarijante prvog planskog ekonometrijskog modela i prikazane u tabeli 5. U ovoj tabeli, kao i za odgovarajufie analitiSke ekonometrijske modele, date su umeato marginalnih intervalne godiSnje vrednosti novih opredmedenih investicija (T) kao godiSnji priraStaji osnovnih sredstava [I = A K(t)], da bi se moglo izvrsiti adekvatno uporedjivanje svih izraSunatih endogenih-promenljivih veliSina sa odgovarajudim empiriSkim i prema analitiSkim i prema planskim modelima izraSumtim vredno3tima, koje su date u tabelama 1, 3 i 5. (51)

65

29
Tabela 5

Endoaene promenl.iive veliSine prema prvom planskom modelu

Osnovna sredstva Nove opred.invest. Godisnji Drustveni proizvod period za drugu za prvu za drugu za prvu za drugu za prvu varijan. varijantu varijan. yarijaru varijan.1varijantu 1 2 3 4 5 6 ; 7 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1980 3.143,4 3.451,8 3.790,3 4.162,1 4.570,4 5*018,7 5.510,9 6.051,5 6.645,1 :6.938,4 1 3,143,4 3.418,2 3.717,1 4.042,2 4.395,6 4.779,9 5.197,9 5.652,4 6.146,6 14.212,6 14.213,9 15.004,8 15.373,5 16.826,7 17.873,9 19.023,8 20.286,4 21.672,8 23.195,5 49.596,6 14.213,9 14.918,8 15.685,5 16.519,1 17.425,6 18.411,5 19.483,4 20.649,1 21.916,7 42.605,3 720,3 648,3 790,9 1 704,9 868,3 766,7 953,6 : 833,6 1.047,2 906,5 1.149,9 985,9 1.071,9 1.262,6 1.386,4 1.165,7 1.522,7 1.267,6 3.880,8 2.931,1

Isto tako, na osnovu sistema jednaSina (50) i (5l) izraSunate su odgovarajuSe vrednosti endogenih promenljivih veliSina za obe konstruisane varijante drugog planskog ekonometrijskog modela i prikazane u tabeli 6* U ovoj tabeli, kao i u prethodnom sluSaju, date su umesto marginalnih (i) intervalne godisnje vredripsti novih opredmeSenih investicija (I) kao godiSnji priraStaji osnovnih sredstava [I = AK(t)], da bi se moglo izvrsiti adekvatno uporedjivanje svih izraSunatih endogenih promenljivih veliSina sa odgovarajuSim i prema analitiSkim i prema planskim modelima izraSunatim vrednostima, koje su date u tabelama 1, 3 i 5. Radi dobijanja vizuelne i neposrednije predstave o projekoijama endogenih promenljivih veliSina za obe varijante pryog plans kog ekonometrijskog modela, kao i radi njihovog medjusobnog uporedjivanja, sve izraSunate vrednosti u .tabeli 5 grafiSki su prikazane na grafikonu . * VeS i samo grafiSko uporedjivanje prikazanih projekcija 3 dve varijante prvog planskog ekonometrijskog modela, dbvoljno jasno pokazuje da su projekcije prve varijante primetno iznad odgovaraju6ih projekcija druge varijante* Ova okaLnost moSe da opravda za prvu

-6 6 30
Grafikon 3 IzraSunate vrednosti projekcija endogenih promenljivih veliSina Planski period. 1962-1970. D, K, I JaSa varijanta ---- ELaSa varijanta 0,0936t
20.000

'Prvi planski model'

30,000

^g(t) = 8063 e,0858t + 6151 10.000 6 .0 0 0 5.000 4.000 3.000 1.500 D ( t ) = 3143 e0838t
x4

Di L ; (t) = 3143 e956t

^ ( t ) = 720 e09S6t
1.000 900 800 700

l 600 _ r - I r t )-V S 4 8 e0838t I I I I 6 1962 1 2 63 64 3 65 4 5 66 67

. I

. - - II I 6 7 8 68 69 1970

- 67. .

31:.
Tabela 6

Endogene promenl.iive veliSine prema drugom planskom modelu

Drugtveni proizvod God. peri od 1 za prvu vari.ian. 2 za drugu vari.ian. 3

Osnovna sredstva za prvu vari.ian. .4 8.696,3 9.274,5 9.911,8 10,614,0 11.387,8 12.24Q,6 13.180,2 14.215,6 15.356,6 35.583,9

Nove opredmed.investic. za prvu za drugu vari.ian;: vari.iantu 6 .... : 7 , ' . 524,8 469,0 578,2 511,2 637,3 557,3 702,2 607,4 773,8 662,6 852,8 , 721,8 939,6 ' ; 787,1 858,0 1.035,4 1.141,0 935,3 3.012,3 2.216,6

za drugu vari.ian. 5 8.696,3 9.207,5 9.764,8 10.372,2 11.034,8 11.756,6 12.543,7 13.401,7 14.337,0 29.837,2

3,059,3 3.059,3 1962 3.335,0 1963 3.371,2 3.714,9. 3.635,6 1964 1965 3.963,2 4.093,6 4.511,0 1966 4.320,6 4.709,9 1967 4.971,0 1968 5.477,7 5.134,4 1969 6.036,2 5.597,2 1970 6.651,6 6.101,7 1980 17.561,3 14.461,8

naziv "jaSe", a za ' drugu naziv'^blale varijante. KarakteristiSno je da u baznom godiSnjem periodu (i962) i druStveni proizvod i osnovna sredstva imaju iste nivoe za obe varijante, dok za nove opredme<5ene investicije to ve6 nije sluJaj. Ova jednakost nivoa druStvenog proiz voda i osnovnih sredstava ukazuje na zajedniSko poreklo obe varijante prvog planskog ekonometrijskog modela. Sto se tiSe nejednakosti nivoa novih opredmedenih investicija u baanom godisnjem periodu, ona. je posledica nejednakosti koeficijenta u5es6a kod ove dve varijante. .Isto tako, radi dobijanja vizuelne i nepbsrednije predstave o projekcijama endogenih promenljivih veliSina za. obe varijante drugog planskog ekonometrijskog modela, kao i radi njihovog medjusobnog uporedjivanja, sve izraSunate vrednosti u tabeli 6.- grafiSki su prikazane na grafikonu 4. I ovde grafiSko uporedjivanje prikazanih projekeija dve varijante drugog' planskog ekonometrijskog modela dovoljno jasno pokazuje da su projekcije prve varijante takodje primetho iznad odgovaraju<5ih projekcija druge varijante.' I ovde ova okolnost mo5e da opravda za.prvu^haziv "jaSe", a za drugu naziv "blaSe" varijante. Na isti nacia1ovdei karakteristiSno da u baznom godisnjem periodu i <je

68

32

Grafikon 4 IzraSunate vrednosti projekcija endogenih promenljivih veliSina Planski period 1962-1970* D, K, I " ' JaSa varijanta - BlaSa varijanta 20,000 ^ ( t ) = 5672 e0,0971t + 3024 . Drugi planski model

10.000
.8,000 Kgg(t) = 5672 e0,971t + 3024 ,

5.000 4*000 3.000

Dgi(t) = 3059 e0,0971t

D ( t ) = 3059 e0,0971t
aa .

1*000 900 800 700

600 500

Ia (t) = 525 e0971t

= 469 e0971t

- 69 ' 33

drustveni proizvod i osnovna sredstva imaju iste nivoe za obe varijan te, dok za nove apredmeSene investicije to ve6 nije sluSaj, Ova jednakost nivoa drustvenog proizvoda i osnovnih sredstava ukazuje takodje na zajednicko poreklp obe varijante drugog planskog ekonometrijskog modela. Nejednakost nivoa novih opredmedenih investicija u baznom go disnjem periodu takodje je posledica nejednakosti koeficijenta uSeS6a i kod ove dve varijante, I u ovom sluSaju oSigledno je da postoji potreba za uzajamnim uporedjivanjem oba planska modela, kao i njihovih varijanata, ne ' .samo medjusobno, ve6 i sa oba analitiSka modela za protekli period, jer se samo na taj naSin mo5e dati potpunija i pouzdanija analiza kao i ocenjivanje, Medjutim, i ovo uporedjivanje treba da se zasniva kako na odredjenim rezultatima, tako i na odredjenim elementima koji su karakteristiSni za oba modela i njihove cetiri varijante. Zbog toga su svi relevantni rezultati i elementi za sve Setiri varijante oba planska modela iskazani u tabeli 7 pogodnoj za uporedjivanje i analizu. Ova analitiSka tabela obuhvata sve vaznije rezultate i elemente za analizu i ocenjivanje, a odnosi se na sve Setiri varijante oba planska modela i na posmatrani buduSi period, U zaglavlju tabele nalaze se i odgovarajuSe varijante oba planska modela, prvi sa osnovnim sredstvima u celokupnoj privredi a drugi sa osnovnim sredstvima samo u proizvodnom delu, privrede, U pretkoloni ove tabele oznaceni su samo neophodni vazniji osnovni reziiltati i analitiSki elementi. U prvom redu iskazani su indeksi porasta izraSunatih vrednosti endogenih promenljivih velicina u procentima za posmatrani devetogodisnji period 1962-1970. U drugom redu ponovo su iskasani indeksi porasta izracunatih vrednosti endogenih promenljivih veliSina u procentima, ali za. buduSi osmogodiSnji period 1962-1970 (sedmogodisnji planski period). Ovo dvostruko iskazivanje izvrse.no je da se omogu6i uporedjivanje sa proteklim devetogodisnjim periodom i da se dobije odredjenija predstava o sedmogodisnjem planskom periodu (1963-1970). U trefiem redu iskazani su indeksi porasta izraSunatih vrednosti endogenih promen ljivih veliSina u procentima za posmatrani dugoroSni period 1962-1980. t Setvrtom redu iskazane su odgovarajuSe intervalne stope rasta endo T genih promenljivih veliSina u procentima, koje vaze i za sedmogodis nji planski period, U petom redu iskazane su odgovarajuSe intervalne stope rasta endogenih promenljivih velicina u procentima, koje vaze za dugoroSni period 1962-1980. U sestom redu iskazani su egzogeni, objektivno dati parametri: marginalni koeficijent efektivnosti (efikasnosti) osnovnih sredstava (a) i dopunski koeficijent u regresionoj zavisnosti izmedju druStvenog proizvoda i osnovnih sredstava (b), koji

- 70 34 , Tabela 7 Analiticka tabela rezultata i elemenata Planski period 1962-1970. Oba planska modela Red. Vrsta rezultata br. i elemenata Rkonometri.jski modeli .~~ prvi model drug! model I variII vari- I variII vari.ianta .janta .ianta ,ianta 195.5 154,2 195.5 179>8 146,9 179,8 452.1 299,7 452.1 8,7? [5,0;6,l] 87 8,7 [5,0;7,4] 0,38988 -2398.3 0,215 0 0,9879 199.4 164,9 199.4 197.3 183.0 165,6 155,7 197.3 183.0 574.0 472-7 409,2 343,1 574.0 472,7 10,2 9.0 [6,6;8,0] [5,957,0] 10,2 9.0 . 10,2 9,0 [6,6;9,2] [5,9*8,0] 10,2 __9.0 0,539356 0,539356 -1631.1 -1631.1 0,18 0,16 0 0 0,9871 0,9871 217.4 176,6 217.4

211.4 163,2 211.4 2. Indeks porasta en 192.5 dogenih velicina 154.6 za period 1963-1970. 192,5 3. ; v v&iin/.38,8 . . $0'genih v s * 3 4 8 , 8 period* 196S$&9@ i 538,8 9.8 4* Intervalne stope.raD . sta en^ogenih veil.[5,6;7,0] cina sa period 1963-70: 9.8 5. Intervalne stope ras- r n . 9,8 [5,6;8,5] 9*8 ______ _ XV 6. Egzogeni, objektivno a 0,38988 dati para.metri . . b -2398.3 7. Egzogeni, instrumenc 0,24 talno odredjeni para- * 0 metri 8. Koeficijenti korelacije regresionih zavisnosti

1. Indeks porasta endogenih velicina za period 1962-1970.

&t7

IE
C TD

0,9879

9. Intervals! koeficijenti ucesda noyih s X 0,229 ?v> opredmefienih investici.ia____ . 10. Nezavisne vrednosti osnovnih sredstava K(o) 14213,9 u baznom periodu.

0,206

0,176

.0,153

14213,9

8696,3

8696,3

su jednaki za odgovarajude analitidke i planske modele. U sedmom redu iskazani su egzogeni, instrumentalno odredjeni parametri: margijaTni koeficijent uSeffiatnovih opredmedenih investicija u drustvenom proizvodu (c) i dppunski koeficijent ulinearrioj zavisnosti izmedju marginalnih riovih opredmedenih investicija i drustyenog proizvoda (d), koji je ovde uzet kao jednak nuli. U osmom redu iskazani su koeficijenti korelacije: izmedju drustvenog proizvoda i osnovnih sredstava ( rDK), kao i izmedju marginalnih novih opredmecenih investicija i drustvenog proizvoda ( ID). Prvi koeficijenti korelacije su isti kao i kod odgovarajudih analitickih modela, dok su drugi ex ante jednaki jedinici, posto se pretpostavlja i zahteva funkcionalna linearna (homogena) zavisnost, ali ex post r e moze se navesti neka odredjena vred i nost. U devetom redu iskazani su intervalhi (prosecni) koeficijenti ucesca novih opredmecenih investicija u drustvenom proizvodu (s), koji su ovde takodje konstantni, nasuprot onima kod analitidkih modela. Najzad, u desetom redu kab jedine nezavisne konstantne vrednosti endo genih promenljivih velicina u modelima, iskazane su velicine osnovnih sredstava u baznom godisnjem periodu [K (o)] . Kao analiza i oceria rezultata i elemenata kod odgovarajudih analitickih modela, u zakljucnom poglavl ju izvrfide se uporedna anali za i ocena rezultata i elemenata i kod odgovarajudih plansldLh modela. Ovakva uporedna i celovita analiza i ocena kako analitiSkih, tako i svih varijanata odgovarajudih planskih raodela, ne samo da omoguduje sazetije izlaganje ved pruza i odredjene neophodne preduslove za potpuniju analizu i zasnovaniju ocenu. V. Zakl.jucna analiza i ocena Pristupajuci zakljucnoj analizi i oceni odredjenog teorijskog i aplikativriog modelskog pristupa u analizi i planiranju privrednog razvoja Jugoslavije, prethpdno Se se utvrditi neke bitne karakteristike teorijski konstruisanog proizvodno-kapitalnog ekonomskog mode la kao osnove za aplikativno konstruisanje odgovarajudih analitickih i planskih ekonometrijskih modela. Potom de se analiticki osvetliti i oceniti aplikativno konstruisanje sa rezultatima dva odgovarajuca proizvodno-kapitalna analiticka ekonometr'ijska modela za privredni razvoj u proteklom periodu (1952-1960) kao neophodne prethodne faze za fundiran i uspesan pristup konstruisanju odgovarajudih planskih ekonomet rijskih modela i njihovih izabranih varijanata. Zatim de se, isto ta ko, analiticki osvetliti i oceniti aplikativno konstruisanje sa rezul tatima sve cetiri izabrane varijante projekoija dva odgovarajuca proizvodno-kapitalna planska ekonometrijska modela za privredni razvoj u

- 72 .

36

buducem periodu (1962-1970), kao-i budufiem dngorocnom periodu (1962 -1980). Na kraju, dade se kompleksna uporedna i celovita analiza i ocena svih konstrnisanih mod#la: i odgovarajudih varijanata kao jednog povezanog sistema i metodaLoskog orudja u konkretnoj analizi i planiranju naseg privrednog razvoja. Kao podloga i materijal za ovakvu sveobuhvatnu zakljucnu analizu i ocenu, posluzide ne samo obe analiticke tabele rezultata i elemenata (4 i 7) ved i sve ostale tabele i grafikoni, kao 1 relevaiitne jednacine i numericke vrednosti.

0sn,dvni kostur. ovog agregatnog modela privrednog razvoja Jugoslavije Sine proizvodna funkcija, u kojoj je kao eksplikativna i promenljiva velioina upotrebljena. nova (nabavna) vrednost osnovnih ? sredstava. I f a se utisak da bi se ostale alternative, uzimajudi u jtp obzir, pre svega, postojanje i pouzdanost podataka i studija o tim 1 relacijama u privredi, pokazale manje zadovoljavajucim* Podaci o radnoj snazi su manje sredjjeni, pogotovo je problem kako tretirati j zaposlenost u poljoprivredi, a pored toga su i manje podesni za samo planiranje. Potpuno je jasno da iz istog razloga, na koji se mozda 1 nadodaje jos problem multikolinearnosti, ni slozenija funkcija, npr. j Cobb-Douglasavog tipa, ne dolazi u obzir. Sto se tice raznih modela ? na bazi investicija, ovi obicno daju mnogo manju pouzdanost, mnogo j su osetljiviji na autonomne, nepovezane varijacije investicija i d u rstvenog proizvoda, a da se i he spominje neistrazeni problem aktivi-i zacionog perioda. 1
' Yd

Sto se tice izbora agregata osnovnih sredstava, kao rele- 1 vantna kategorija uzeta je nova vrednost osnovnih sredstava, jer se i smatra da ona najadekvatnij e odraSava kapacitet, a od kapaciteta u najvedej meri zavisi ostvarena kao i potencijalna proizvodnja. Medju tim, podaci koji stoje na raspolaganju, a od kojih su podaci Vinskoga o novoj vrednosti osnovnih sredstava u stalnim cenama upotrebljeni uj ovom radu, ne dozvoljavaju da se da ocena po opstem misljenju anali|| ticki ispravne kategorije nerve vrednosti aktiviranih (tj. upotreblja-, vanih, odnosno, za proizvodnju sposobnih) osnovnih sredstava. Podaoi|] Vinskoga daju opredmedene investicije, u kojima su sadrzane i neak- 3 tivirane opredmedene nove investicije* No, ukoliko bi ove neaktivi- % rane a opredmedene nove irnresticije bile kroz ceo period neki kon- J stantan deo ukupne, kod Vinskoga date, nave vrednosti osnavnih sred-1 stava, a ovaj bi se moSda mogao oceniti pomodu podataka iz drugih -j izvora, onda sama dinamika odnosa ne bi bila pogodjena tim nedostat-^ kom. Jedino bi apsolutna vrednost koeficijenta efektivnosti osnovnihj sredstava bila poteenjena u odnosu na koeficijent*, koji bi o d g o v a r a o l pozeljnijoj kategoriji aktiviranih osnovnih sredstava* %

- 73 ' . 37 .

U ovom radu data su dva razlicita ekonometrijska modela, kojima je zajednicki opsti matematicki model i, sto je ovde interesantno, promenljiva velicina drustvenog proizvoda. -Ako se ova posebnost pogleda najpre na hivou proizvodnih funkcija, onda ovde postoje dve posebne proizvodne funkcije, u kojima se jedan te isti drustveni proizvod u prvom slucaju vezuje sa agregatom osnovnih sredstava u proiz vodnom i neproizvodnom delu privrede, odnosno, sa ukupnim nacionalnim. bogatstvom (ako ga definisemo po ovoj, za nacionalno bogatstvo inace . uskoj koncepciji); dok se u drugom slucaju on vezuje sa agregatom osnovnih sredstava samo u proizvodiiom delu privrede* Cinjenica da se kod nas drustveni proizvod izracunava samo iz proizvodnih delatnosti, mogla bi a priori rezoniranjem dovesti do toga da se prvi slucaj pro izvodne funkcije odbaci ili bar smatra vidno inferiornijim u odnosu na drugi. Medjutim, empiricki podaci za Jugoslaviju za period 1952 -1960. pokazuju da je korelaciona veza u obe proizvodne funkcije praktiSno ista i veoma visoka (koeficijent korelacije 0,9879 i 0,9871, respektivno) Stoga je korisno da se ta Sinjenica iskoristi i prosiri polje analizib uzimanjem obe proizvodne funkcije kao osnove za dva paralelna, ali samostalna proizvodno-kapitalna modela. Naime, proizvodn s zavisi i od osnovnih sredstava u neproizvodnom delu privrede, pa ji je i informacija o toj zavisnosti korisna; pored toga, upotreba dva . modela omogucava medjusobnu kontrolu preko drustvenog proizvoda. Samostalnost oba modela ogleda se u tome sto se, iako su osnovna sred stva u proizvodnom delu privrede subagregat ukupnih osnovnih sredsta va, bez dodatnih pretpostavki o odnosu i promeni odnosa izmedju osnovnih sredstava u proizvodnom i neproizvodnom delu privrede drugi mocLel ne moze izvesti iz prvoga* Dolazi se do zakLjucka da su, zbog svojih specificnosti, obe relacije vazne za analisu i planiranje, te ih je potrebno podjedanko i paralelno uzimati u obzir.
Ako se pogledaju ove empiriSke .proizvodne funkcije, zapaza se da je u oba slucaja linearni oblik najadekvatnija forma opisivanja zavisnosti dvaju agregata. Pored toga, zapaza se da - za razliku od modela Harrod-sDomarovog tipa gde se pretpostavl ja homogena linearna zavisnost izmedju drustvenog proizvoda i osnovnih sredstava, odnosno njihovih prirastaja - ovi modeli sadrze proizvodne f.unkcije, koje su isto tako lineame ali nehomogene. Ovo oslobadja od vrlo cesto nerealisticke pretpostavke, na kojoj je zasnovan HarrodrDomarov model, da obe promenijive velicine rastu po istoj konstantnoj stopi. Ove proizvodne funkcije imaju konstantne marginalne koeficijente efektivnosti osnovnih sredstava, dok se prosecni koeficijenti efektivnosti osnovnih sredstava menjaju. U posmatranim slucajevima drustveni

- 74 -

38

proizvod raste brze od osnovnih sredstava, te prosecni koeficijent efektivnosti osnovnih sredstava raste. Pomodu ovog svojstva obe proiz-JI vodne funkcije vernije opisuju empiriSke kategorije za protekli period! ne samo u pogledu tendencija kretanja nego i u pogledu numeriSkih va- r f rijacija. . Promenljiva veliSina osnovnih sredstava predstavlja prosecndl stanje osnovnih sredstava u toj gbdini, te prosecni koeficijent efek-i tivnosti osnovnih sredstava, kao koeficijent.intervalnog podatka i ' proseka momentnih podataka, pokazuje godisnju karakteristiku odnosa : obe promenljive velicine. Da bi promenljiva veliSina stanja osnovnih . sredstava bila adekvatna eksplikativna kategorija, stepen iskorisca- ! vanja kapaciteta ne sme se osetnije menjati. Kako kod nas ne postoje 1 potrebni podaci o variranju stepena iskoriscavanja kapaciteta, to nema mogucnosti da se da precizna ocena koliko to utiSe na rezultate mo dela. Medjutim, m osnovu vrlo visokih koeficijenata korelacije proiz^l vodnih funkcija, moze se tvrditi da eventualno postojeSe varijacije nisu bitno uticale aa pouzdanost rezultata modela. Posto se definisala i utvrdila proizvodna funkcija za model,| bilo je potrebno da se drugom jednaSinom izrazi kretanje instrumental-! ne promenljive veliSine, a sam reseni oblik modela da opise kretanje endogenih promenljivih veliSina - drustvenog proizvoda i osnovnih sredji stava. Instrumentalna promenljiva veliSina u ovom modelu u sustini je,| koeficijent uSesSa novih opredmecenih investicija u drustvenom proiz-;l vodu, s tim sto mu se ovde daje nesto modificirana ekonomska interpre^l. tacija. Naime, taj koeficijent tteba da odrzava realan rast osnovnih ;| sredstava kao proizvodnog faktora, cije je formiranje, s druge strane,;! ipak u zavisnosti od realnih mogucnosti drustva, koje ovde predstavljal veliSina ostvarenog drustvenog proizvoda. Svrha modela je da izrazi proizvodne mogucnosti u zavisnosti od koeficijenta ucesda, kao instru-| mentalne promenljive velicine, i proizvodne funkcije, kao objektivno date zavisnostij dok se problem efektivne traznje, koji je glavna pre-j okupacija nekih kejnezijanskih modela razvoja, ovde izostavlja. Naime,I uzima se u obzir da jedna socijalistiSka zemlja sa planski usmereva- nom privredom uvek ima mogucnosti da promenom u strukturi raspodele i potrosnje obezbedi efektivnu traznju za ostvareni drustveni proizvod, a da njeno prvo i najozbiljnije ograniSenje predstavljaju proizvodne snage. Sustinska razlika u razlicitom naglasavanju ova dva aspekta povezana je sa cinjenicom da institucionalni okviri u socijalistiSkoj = zemlji omogucavaju fleksibilnost za resavanje problema efektivne traz-j nje, dok nemaju direktan uticaj na tehnoloske relacije kao vazan fak- | tor proizvodnih snaga.

Potrebno jeistaci jos neke sustinske razlike u interpretaciji koeficijenta uceSda investicija u drustvenom proizvodu kao egzogene instrumentalne promenijive veliaine u planskim i neplanskim privredama. U ovim poslednjim koeficijent ucesca je instrument bilb: ga pracenje, bilo za prognoziranje privrednog ponasanja (bihevioristiSki pristup); dok; on u planskim privredama, gledano unazad za protekli period, predstavija ispoljeno ponasanje, koje ukljucuje odstupanje od njegove planirane i instrumentima privrednog sistema regulisane veli5ine, a gledano unapred za planski period, on nema samo karakter realne prognoze ved predstavija i svesnu odluku drustva, koje regulativno . obezbedjuje njegovo ostvarenje. Polaaedi bd pretpostavke da je ova odXuka zavisna od realnih mogudnosti, instrumentalna promenijiva velici na uSesca izrazena je linearnom relacijom izmedju opredmecenih invest: ticija i drustvenog proiavoda, tj. iredom jednacinom u sistemu (l). Medjutim, ucesce moze.dosta varirati oko neke prosecne vred nosti, ali ono mo2e imati i neki jaoe naglasen trend. Ovim modelom i ova je mogucnost bila uzeta u obzir napustanjem, kao i kod proseSnog koeficijenta efektivnosti, pretposiavke o stalnosti koeficijenta ucesda. Da bi se izbegle nepotrebne kompiikacije u matmat"ickom resavanju modela, pretpostavilGVse da instrumentalno proizvoljne funkcije vremena u tredoj jednacini sistema (l) imaju konstantne vrednosti, ali uprkos tome saSuvana je mogudnost da se u model uvede karakteristika rastudeg ili pp&c&juceg uoesda (ovo poslednje je slucaj u mode lima za protekli period). . ' Mo5da je potrebno naglasiti da koeficijenti uSesda opredmedenih investicija u oshovnim sredstvizoa u ovom modelu nisu istovetni sa onima koji proizilaze is uporedjenja originalnih podataka o novim investicijama kod Yinskoga i drusbvencg proisrsroda. Ova razlika proi zilazi iz slededa dva razlogaj pr^ro, Icakoi marginalne opredmedene in vesticije (i). tako i interralne opredmodene investicije (i) racunate su za prosecno stanje, odnosno, kao raalika proseonih stanja u godini; drugo, marginalne opredmedene investicije su kod eksponencijalno rastudih osnovnih. sredstava uvek vede od odgovarajucih intervalnih oppedmedenih investicija. Posto ih uporedjujemo sa istim drustvenim proizvodom, koeficijent. ticesca marginalnih investicija uvek nadmasuje koeficijent ucesca intervalnog prirastaja osnovhih sredstava. .
Ako se sada predje na verifieiranje aplikativnosti modela Ha podacima za protekli period, potrebno je najpre istadi i uporediti opSte karakteristike promeni.jivih velicina, izrazene u modelima, i njihova konkretna kretanja unutar posmatranog proteklog periods,.

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76

Kretanja drustvenog proizvoda i osnovhih sredstava u proteklom peri- i odu mozemo najbolje aproksimirati eksponencijalnim trendovima (jedna cine 18, 19 i 20). Ovo pogotovo vazi za osnovna sredstva kojasu tom trendu vanredno lepo prilagodjena, posto koeficijent varijacije empirickih podataka oko vrednosti trenda iznosi za prvi model svega 0,7852 (a za drugi 0,52$). Prema tome, ako se jednom karakteristikam opiSe protekli period* osnovna sredstva kretala su s . po intervalnoj stopi e od 4,0% u prvom slucaju i 4,9fo u proizvodnom delu privrede, tj. u drugom slucaju. Potrebno je, medjutim, sagledati odmah i konsekvence izi bora monotone eksponencijalne funkcije kao reprezentanta kretanja os-; novnih sredstava. . , ' ' ' ~ i ' ' :7 Investicije - kako marginalne tako i intervalne - kao kate- gorija izvedena iz osnovnih sredstava postaju time odredjene i one se krecu eksponencionalno po istoj konstantnoj stopi. Ovo nije bio slu- : caj sa investicijama u proteklom perioduj one su u oba slucaja najprei padale, stagnirale u sredini perioda i odjednom veoma brzo porasle ^ krajem perioda. Takvabi se tendencija kretanja mogla bolje opisati J nekim parabolicnim trendom, ako bi se one samostalno posmatrale. Kakoi je u mod&lu naglasak na osnovnim sredstvima, investicije figuriraju l samo kao njihov prirastaj, pa je neravnomerno kretanje investicija ^ aproksimirano ravnomernim rastom, sto dovodi do velikog koeficijenta ^ varijacije izmedju empirijskih i modelskih vrednosti investicija. No kao sto 6e se videti, to skoro i ne utice na stepen prilagodjenosti | modelskih vrednosti drustvenog proizvoda i osnovnih sredstava empirij!skim vrednostima u proteklom periodu. Investicije su, naime, u modelu' za protekli period upotrebljene samo kao pomod za odredjivanje stope ucesca i uzete su kao marginalne investicije, tj. izvedene su direk- j| tno iz trenda osnovnih sredstava i kao takve nemaju vise u sebi neravnomernosti empirickih vrednosti. ' Dalje reperkusije postupka pokazuju se u tome sto koefici jent ucesda u modelu opada kroz ceo period. Naime, kada se u ocenji- J vanju parametara za treSu jednaSinu sistema (l) uporede monotono ra- ;| j stuce marginalne investicije sa brze rastu6im drustvenim proizvodom, njihov se kolicnik stalno smanjuje. Kada se ovakve relacije uvedu u model, onda to dovodi do smanjivanja stope rasta drustvenog proizvoda i osnovnih sredstava (vidi tabelu 4j* Naime, reseni oblik modela nema .-vise homogen eksponencijalni oblik (vidi sistem 34). Ovo poka zuje da bi prosta ekstrapolacija svih karakteristika modela tj. ekstrapolacija modela (34) preko granica proteklog perioda, davala sve manje zadovoljavajude rezultate, jer bi se pretpostavke ugradjene u

model verovatno sve vise i vise udaljvale od stvarnosti, ukoliko bi

ge t sve vise i vise povecavalo preko vrednosti t = 8. Zbog toga su kasnije u planskim modelima projekcija uzete u obzir druge pretpostav ke o instrumentalnim promenljivim velicinama, a kod proveravanja aplikativnosti i pouzdanosti modela na podacima za protekli period moraju se ocenjivati i instrumentalne promenljive velicine. Tako su zapravo najvede poteskoce i odstupanja od empirickih vrednosti za pojedine godine (visoki koeficijenti varijacija investicija i koeficijenta ucesda) u modelima za protekli period proizasle iz poteskoca da se matematicki, konzistentno ostalim jednacinama mod^la, izrazi kretanje instrumentalne promenljive velicine u proteklom periodu. Za projekcije to naravno ne predstavlja nikakav problem, jer se tu prate efekti u endogenim promenljivim velicinama, koji su posledica razlicitih vrednosti instrumentalne promenljive. Model za protekli period treba da sluzi kao baza za ocenjivanje upotrebljivosti i pouzdanosti modela, kao i za uocavanje tendencije i mogudnosti u razvoju, a za takav sud odludujuda je njegova prilagodjenost u endogenim promenljivim velidi. nama, a ne u instrumentalnim. Ako se uporede modelske i empiriSke vrednosti osnovnih sred stava, koeficijent .varijacije iznosi kod prvog modela 0,79$, a kod drugog modela 0,53$. To znaci da sa modelske vrednosti veoma dobro prilagodjene i u istoj meri kao sto je prilagodjen eksponencijalni trend izolovano. Slicno je i sa indeksima porasta: indeks porasta empiridkih yrednosti osnovnih sredstava iznosi 157,5 za prvi i 148,2 za drugi mo del, dok su odgovarajude modelske vrednosti pokazale indekse od 137,2 i 147,2, respektivno. Sto se tice drustvenog proizvoda, njegovo je kretanje u proteklom periodu neravnomernije od kretanja osnovnih sred stava. Glavni uzrok tome su oscilacije u poljoprivrednoj proizvodnji. Tako njegov eksponencijalni trend sa intervalnom stopom rasta od 9,7$ ima koeficijent varijacije 3,71$, sto zapravo i nije mnogo kad se uzme u obzir da su se stope rasta za pojedine 'godine kretale u intervalu od -0,3$ do 23,0$. Modelske vrednosti pokazuju u prvom analitickom modelu koeficijent varijacije 4,14$, a u drugom 4,05$. Modeli se mogu, cLakle, smatrati zadovoljavajudim posto su odstupanja od empirickih >* vrednosti kod osnovnih sredstava podjednako velika, a kod drustvenog proizvoda samo nesto veda, kao kada se uzmu izolovani trendovi, koji su za analizu ocigledno inferiorniji, jer ne uzimaju u obzir medjusobne zavisnosti pojedinih kategorija i efekte promena instrumentalne ; promenljive velidine.
\

Eanije se konstatovalo da je korelaciona veza u obe proizI vodne funkcije ovih modela praktiSno ista i veoma vis oka. Sada se

- 78 42 / . ; .. f H
'M -

mogu,-ppsto je prpmenljiva veliSina drustvenog proi^oda zajedJiiSia , a oba modela, pqsm&trati razlike izmedju ova dva siajnpstalna mpdela. ; z ; Razlike u efektu kod druStvenog proizvoda su .zanemarljive, naime, o- . sim u baznoj gpdini? uvek su manje od 0,3^ drustvenog proizvoda. Slic- . ' , no sa indeksima porasta, ovi iznose 214a3 u prvom modelu, 213,1 u ' drugont'f;a kod empirljskih vrednosti 215,7. Stoga sledi da i prosedje pa dinamUca dobro prikazana* Razlike se javljaju jedino u stepenu pri-. letgpdjenosti, nai#e# prema koefioijentiiaa vr.rijacije-dnigi''v m0.d^iippkia^^ jprilagodjeaosfy' st.p je i logicno, jer je feksplikativna pro*. ' . menljiva veii^ijia - osnoyna Srestvr, u prolzvodnpm deiuf privrede - ho- .V mogenija-* ' . . . . . .: . . . Pri izracunaV.anju projt^ija^u planslcim jEpdeiima nije se po- slo' od proste ekstrapolacije arialitickih elconometrijskih toodela, nego su se pored op.steg matematickog modela zadrzali jos samo parametri proizvodnih. funkpija. Pptrebno j . stoga istadi koje s& ekonomske pretpose .tavke'unose'M planske modele prihvatanjem linearnih 'nehomogenih proiz- vodnih funkcija ocenjenih na osnoyu perioda 1952-1980. S tim je, naime,;. implicirano i dalje povedjavanje efektivnosti osnovhih sredstava, sto ; je plauzibilna pretpostavka, ako se pr.edvidja bolje iskorisSavanje kapabiteta.i aktiviranje rezervi u privredi, sto se pogotovo u posl'ednje vreme iskristalizovalo kao vazan element privredne politike u slededim . godinama. Ostali elementi planskih modela nisu vezani za protekli peri--, od* Tako je pocetna vrednost osnovnih sredstava kao jedina nezavisna f " ?, konstantna vrednosti endogenih promenljivih uzeta kao empiricka vred-. nost 1962, godine, a ne kao teoretska vrednost tren&a, Ovo ima i dobre i lose strajie; osloba&ja od potrebe za poznavanjem krbtahja pojedinih . promenljivih velicina u proteklom periodu, posto se za projekcije iz protelcLog perioda zadrzava'jjS^samo parametri^jproizvodnih funkcijaj a ! sa druge strane, postoji opasnost da se da suvise. veliki ponder kon- . kretnoj Vrednbsti u haznoj godini. U ovom kpnk;re,tncm slucaj.u se# uporedjujuci 1960. i 1962. godinu> zapaza da su osnovna sredstva rasla po vedoj stopi od prosecne, a drustveni proizvod po manjoj od prosec-. ne. To znaci da je mpdelska vrednpst drustvenog proizvoda u 1962. godini ve6a pd stvarne vrednosti* sto bi moglo indicirati da su mogud. nosti, date planskim modelima, precenjene* No, to i ne,mora biti tako, ako se stane na stanoviste da je relativno niska stopa, rasta (4 do 5 o /) u te .dve godine samo prolazna pojava, pa ce se oyo usporavanje kompen^t'; sirati kasnijiia brzim ra^tom na bazi ranijeg porasta osnovnih sredsta--; va, sto ni- malo ne izgleda nemoguee (u protelclorn periodu u 1854, 1956, i 1958, gpdini zabeleaena j e jos niza stppa\>?^ta^.&Uj'pviii). . . '

- 79 . 43

Za instrumentalne promenljive velicine uzeta je pretpostavka da 6e koeficijent uces<5a biti konstantan kroz ceo planski period. Njegova numericka vrednost uzeta je take da prve varijante u oba plaiiska modela baziraju na koeficijentima uces6a koji izrazavaju prosecne empirieke karakteristike proteklog periods, a druge varijante u oba modela na najnizim empirickim koeficijentima uces6a zabelezenim u proteklom periodu. Konsekvenca pretpostayke o konstantnim koeficijentima uSesca ogleda se u tome sto drustveni proizvod i investicije rastu po istoj konstantnoj stopi, a stopa rasta osnovnih sredstava povecava se tokom perioda, jer je stopa rasta novih investicija u planskim mode lima visa od stope rasta osnovnih sredstava. Sto se ti5e analize efekata promene u koeficijentu uSesda, kao instrumentalnoj promenljivoj velicini, ona bazira na tabelama 5 i 6, kao i tabeli 7, a uporedjivanje se vrsi unntar pojedinih modela. Analiza uporedjivanjem oba models, ne donosi nista bitno novo sa tog aspekta, jer je koli&aik koeficijenta ucesda prve i druge varijante u oba modela jednak. Opsti zakljucak sledi iz jednaSina (40), (43) i (46), naime, stopa rasta drustvenog proizvoda i novih investicija je kod datog marginalnog koeficijenta efekbivnosti osnovnih sredstava proporcionalm, a stopa rasts, osno"nlh sredstava samo priblizno proporcioaalna koeficijentu uaes<5a. Ic konkretno znaci, uz pretpostavku 0 rastu5oj efektivnosti osnOTrdh sredstava, da raslika u koeficijentu ucesca, kakva je b.ila izmedju prose&aog i najnizeg u proteklom peri odu, prouzrokuje razliku od nes'bo vise od jednog poena u stopi rasta dru^tvenog prcizvoda, sto u 1970. godini znaci razliku od oko'17 indeksnih poena. Naravno, isto vasi i za investicije. Ili, uporedjuju6i apsolutne vrednosti u 1970. godini., drustveni proizvod je sa ako 8-9$ manji, osnorma sredstva za oko 6,7$ manja, a investicije su za oko 20-22$ manje kod "blaze varijante m g o kod "jace" var5_jante (priblizr e vrednosti su date interv&Lima. d . bi obuhvatile razlike efekata u a oba modela). Medjutim, siri pristup sa dva samostalna modela omogudava; 1 drugi tip analize uporedjivanjem posebno prvih varijanata oba mode .la i posebno drugih vari janata. Naime, svaki par odgovara samostalnoj celini, koja je analogna onoj kod analitiSkih modela za protekli peri . od. Iz ranije navedenih razloga ovde se ne uporedjuje efekat promena u instrumentalnoj promenljivoj velicini, vec,se vrsi medjusobna kontro: la kao i ocena pouzdanosti i aplikativnosti. Prvo sto se zapaSa jeste dosta velika razlika u poSetnoj vrednosti drustvenog proizvoda, ocenjenog na osnovu dve razlicite proizvodne funkcije (neSto manje od 3$).

Noj ove se razlike sve vise smanjuju, i u 1970. godini drustveni pro- I izvod je prakticno isti za pojedine varijante u oba modela (razlika f ; iznosi manje od 0 ,1 % za prve dve varijante i marije od 0,8% za druge t dve varijante). Iz toga sledi da je razlika z , konkretni planski pe- | a riod samo u nacinu. na koji se dolazi do iste vrednosti drustvenog , | proizvoda,' Naime, prvi model startuje od vedeg drustvenog proizvoda J , u baznoj godini, koji proizilazi iz njegove proizvodne funkcije, i ^ ima nizu stopu rasta od drugog modela. Ako bi ipak rangirali oba mo- | dela, onda model na bazi osnovnih sredstava u proizvodnom delu priv- > rede, tj* takozvani drugi model, ima odredjene prednosti. S jedne st- \ rane je kao analiticki model za protekli period pctkazao manju varija- z ciju u odnosu na empiricke vrednosti, a sa druge strane, realisiicni- ; je u datoj situaciji pokazuje plan'ske zadatke i mogu&nosti. Naime, . ; zbog usporenog rasta u 1961. i 1962. godini empiricka vrednost drustvenog proizvoda u baznoj 1962. godini manja je od onih koje proizi- v la2e iz produkcionih funkcija, pa je drugi model zbog te konkretne ' situacije blizi stvarnosti iz dva razloga. Prvo, dok s jedne strane r isto kao i prvi model uzima stvarnu vrednost osnovnih sredstava u = bazrioj:godini, s druge strane, izvedena vrednost drustvenog proizvoda. bliza je nizoj stvarnoj vrednosti drustvenog proizvoda. Drugo, ono sto je ocigledno, tj. da je potrebna visa stopa rasta da bi se nado- : knadila niSa: poo etna vrednost drustvenog proissroeLaj u drugom modelu ; je i numeriSki izrazena, . . y Kara se uporede analiticki i planski modeli - uporedjivanje ; l. numerickih vrednosti ima naravno smisla samo kod prvih varijanata plan? skih modela - zapaza se da su indeksi porasta drustvenog proizvoda za r oba osmogodisnja perioda prakticno isti, dok su indeksi porasta osnov nih sredstava i investicija osetno visi u planskim nego u analitickim modelima. Ovo znaci da procecni koeficijent efektivnosti osnovnih sreddstava sve sporije raste, sto dalje znac.i da je za isti relativni poras.t drustvenog proizvoda. sada potreban veci relativni porast osnov- . nih sredstava, odnosno investicija, nego ranije. Analitickim i planskim modelima zajednicke su proizvodne funkcije, pa stSga, uzimajuci v; i obzir njihov konkretni oblik, svi pokazuju rastuci prosecni koeficijeAt efektivnosti osnovnih sredstava. Instrumentalna promenljiva velicina I data je razlicito u analitickim i planskim modelima da bi se prikazale bar dve mogu&nosti. opsteg ma^ematiekog modelaj u prvim je prosecni': koeficijent ucesda promenljiva, a u drugim konstantna velicina. . U planskim modelima su, pored procena za period 1963-1970, date orijentaciono i procene za 1980. godinu. I za period 1970-1980* j model pretpostavlja da 6e se prosecni koeficijent efektivnosti dalje |

- 81 k5 smanjivati, ali usporenim tempom, sto povlaci za sobom porast stope rasta osnovnih sredstava u svim varijantama. Sto se tice vrednosti drustvenog proizvoda u 1980. godini, oba modela daju sliSne ocene (razlike iznose 3,7/2 kod jacih, a 1,6$ kod blazih varijanata). Razlike unutar pojedinih modela izmedju "jace"i "blaze" varijante pokaziiju da : visi koeficijent ucesca investicija daje veci drustveni proizvod za 19-21$, osnovna sredstva za 16-19f), a investicije su ve6e za 32-36$, Medjutim, sto je duzi period to je i veca verovatnoca pomeranja proizvodne funkcije, sto ovakav globalni model ne uzima u obzir, pa su i ocene nepouzdanije* Mozda je potrebno i korisno da se obradi i konkretan prelaz 'pd analitickog na planski model. Naime, uporedjujuci tabele 4 i 7, moglo bi se na osncrvu dosta velikih razlika u stopama rasta osno vnih sredstava', a pogatovo investicija, analitickih i planskih mode la do<5i do zakljucka da je takav skok odjednom u privredi neizvodljiv. Da bi se dokazala aplikativnost ovih modela, potrebno je pokazati da u ovim konkretnim sluSajevima takav zakljuSak ne bi bio na mestu, po sto su razlike samo prividne. U tu svrhu je potrebho analizirati konkretne godisnje vrednosti krajem proteklog perioda, jer stope u tabeli 4 pokazuju samo opste karakteristike celog perioda u okviru ranije navedenih pretpostavki. Kao sto se moze videti iz grafikona 1 i 2, u poslednje tri godine posmatranog perioda investicije su poSele da rastu veoma brzo, stope rasta investicija za sve te godine za oba modela kre6u se u intervalu od 10-19$. Ili, ako se uporede apsolutne vrednosti na grafikoniina 1 i 3, te 2 i 4, onda se vidi da je nivo potrebnih investicija u 1962. godini za blaze" varijante bezmalo do stignut ve6 u 1960. godini; a kako stopa rasta osnovnih sredstava u sledede dve godine nije pala, ove su investicije i dalje rasle. Slicno je sa osnovnim sredstvima: stopa rasta je u I960, godini iznosila 5,4$ u proizvodnom i neproizvodnom delu privrede zajedno, a 6,1$ u proizvodnom delu, sto . e za oba modela vefi vise nego sto je potrebna j stopa rasta u 1962. godini prema drugoj varijanti. Stoga se moze zakljuciti da je, osim kod drustvenog proizvoda, cija je problematika ve6 ranije uzeta u obzir, prelas obezbedjen i tako sacuvana operativna vrednost modela. Ukratko, ovaj proizvodno-kapitalni model privrednog razvoja bazira se na nehomogenoj linearnoj proizvodnoj funkciji, gde kao eksplikativna promenljiva veliSina figariraju osnovna sredstva, te omogucava izracunavanje vrednosti osnovnih sredstava, drustvenog proiz voda i *marginalnih novih investicija u osnovna sredstva kao endogenih

promeniji^ih' veliSina u zavisnosti od koeficijenta uSes&a investicija; u drustvenom proizvodu. kao instrumentalne promeoljive velicine* t J svom opstem matematickom obliku ovaj model omogucava uzimanje u obziiv kombinacija rastufieg, konstantnog ili opadaju6eg koeficijenta prosec-. ne. efektivnosti osnovnih sredstava sa rastudim, konstahtnim ili opa- ; dajudim koeficijentom ucesda margihalnih novih investicija u drustve-1 nom proizvodu. Ove osobine obezbedjuju vecu fleksibilnost u odnosu .! na rani je primenjene modele, a visok stepeh korelacije proizvodne fui koije sa osnovnim sredstvima osnova je njegove ve6e operativnosti t.^ t t J odnosu na investicione modele, gde su relacije i parametri za sada .| jos manje utvrdjeni i pouzdani. Dalje poboljSanje i usavrsavanje po- & trebno je traziti na nivou proizvodne funkcije, s jedne strane u is- I trazivanju faktora koji je odredjuju, a sa druge strane u dezagregi-|| ranju u visesektorski model i u strukturnoj analizi, jer globalni model moze zadovoljiti potrebe analize i planiranja samo kao prva | aproksimacija. Najzad, ovako konstruisan proizvodno-kapitalni ekono- j i a r - model mogao bi postati vazna i nuSna karika u povezanom lancu v| nl? sire razradjenog sistema ekonomskih modela za aplikativnu i opera* tivnu analizu i planiranje naseg srednjorocnog i dugorocnog privrednog razvoja. J

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DanSika NIKOLIC Pavle SICHERL

AN OUTPUT-CAPITAL MODEL FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH OF JUGOSLAVIA (Summary)

The model is "based on a nonhomogeneous^ linear production function, undepretiated value of fixed assets being the independent vari-:able* The paper deals with theoretical and applicative problems in determining the production function. The characteristical feature in the present phase of using the model approach to solve these pro blems is, especially on the applicative side, the need. and. attempt to accomplish a Satisfactory .exact as well as operative solution for the actual problems in analyzing and planning economic develop ment by means of simple economic models which do not demand too . many data, and trained specialists, and too much time and money,. Besides, the impossibility and inefficiency of verification and/or regulative realization of certain assumptions upon which more com plicated models rely, renders them less satisfactory and often prac tically inapplicable. ' . . In constructing-; the corresponding analitical and planning output-capital econometric models the authors start from theoretical assumptions upon which the anon^tluat'ion of the output-capital model in its general mathematical form as a system of simultaneous equati ons (l) was based* The system of equations (l) as a mathematical e conomic model defines the relationships between the relevant econo mic categories: social product (D), fixed capital (K), and marginal new investment (i). The solution of the system of equation (l) re* suits in a construction of mathematical output-capital model as a system of simultaneous equations in a general form which represents a particular solution (17). This system of equations (17) serves as a base for the construction of corresponding econometric models. First of all, two analitical output-capital econometric models for the past period 1952-1960 were constructed. They differ in the coverage of data for the fixed capital, the independent

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48
variable in the first model being represented by fixed assets in both the productive and unproductive sectors of the economy, while in the second model only fixed capital in the productive part of the^economy is taken into account. The basic data in constant 1956 prices are given in table 1. The parameters were estimated by the leiast squares method and on the basis of the system (17), the two corresponding anaiitical models for l952-6o period were given its final numerical form as systems (34) and (35). The results as well as the elements for the two models are given in table 3, in graphs 1 and 2, arid for the sake of comparison, a number of elements is given in the anaiitical table 4.

| f |
f

I : |

On the basis of the past experience and taking into acco- v unt the needs and possibilities of the economic growth in the coming decade, the instrumental variable in th^wo planning models, each ^ of which has two variants, was asigned new values. The first plann- f; ing model for the 1962-197o period was constructed by taking the f values of the exogenous, objectively given parameters ( & n and b*v the first subscript indicates the model, the second the variant) '% from the first anaiitical model* new values being assumed for the 4 instrumental parameters (on - 0,24 and dn = 0). On the basis of f, the latter assumptions which represent the arithmetic mean for the past period, the authors constructed the first variant of the first > > planning output-capital econometric model for the economic develop- r ment of Yugoslavia in the concrete form of system of equations. The * process of solutionfgiv&n reffers to the first variant of the first model, the solution being system (48). In the same way, system (49) r for the second variant# is obtained. In an analogous way the two variants of the second, planning model result in systems (5o) and % (5l). The results of the projections as well as the elements for all the four variants^ of the two models are given in tables 5 and ; 6, shown in graphs 3 and 4, and presented in the anaiitical table For the purpose of ilusirat'ion the results of extrapolation for -i ; 198o are given. The purpose of the models and their variants is to d f n ' : eie. the production possibilities as function of the share of investment ' ^ in the^social product as instrumental variable, on one hand, and :y . as function of the production function as an objectively given rela tion, on the other. The problem of effective demand which is main preoccupation of some Keynesian development models being left out. Namely, it is maintained that a socialist country with planned ecp-j

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85

^9

nomy always has the possibility to provide for an effective demand for the realized social product within its flexible and consciously set up institutional framework through changes in the structure of distribution and consumption, its first and most serious limitation being the production forces. In its general mathematical form this model allows for the combination of the increasing, constant or de creasing output-capital ratio with increasing, constant or decrea sing coefficients of share of marginal hew investments in social pro duct* These features provide for a higher flexibility as compared to previously applied models, where as the high degree of correlation of production function with the fixed assets in respective economic models represents a solid basis for higher operativity as compared to the production-investment models, where the relations and para meters have so far been less reliable. Further improvements should be sought at the level of production function: in examining the factors determining it, on one hand, and in disaggregating in a multisecto ral model as well as in a structural analysis, on the other; the global model being able to satisfy the requirements of analyzing . and planning as a first approximation only.

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npHBeneH hjih cpaBHeHHH b aHajiMTzqecKOH. TaSjinne Ho. 4 . IIpHHHMaH BO BHHMaHKe TpetfOBaHHH H BO 3M 03KH0 CTH 3KOHOMHqecKoro p a 3BHTHH b cnenyiomefi seKase, aBTopti najiH hoBBie 3HaqeHHH o n ep a T o p a /onepaijHOHHoii nepeMeHHoii/ b otfenx njiaHOBHx MOflenHx, H3 KOTopiix KajK^aH HMeeT flBa BapnaHTa.. Hjih n e p B o S MonejiH ( 5hjih B 3HTbi 3HaqeHHH 3 K 3 o r e H H H X 0 6 e K thbho BHpasceHHHX n a p a MeTpoB / a ^ h b ^ , npuqeM n e p - B o e bbip a sc e H n e othochtch k MojjejiH a BTopoe k BapnaHTy/ H 3 nepBofi a H a j i H T n q e c K o f i M O fle n w ; n p n b t o m hjih o n e p a T o p o B / c ^ j, = 0 , 2 4 h = 0/ ( 5hjih B 3HTH hob t i e 3HaqeHHH. H a 0 CH0 B e 3thx n p e f l nocHJioK, npeflCTaBjiHioimix cpeflHee apH^MeTHqecKoe 3a hctck' mHH n e p w o f l , aBTopH nocTpoHJiH nepBHH BapnaHT nepBoii nnaHO_ *_> U f| ff

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I I o c T p o e H H e Bbim eonH caH H H x M O f le j ie S h h x B apsiaH TO B cjiyacHT b j i h D n p e n e jie H H H b o 3M 03K H 0C T efi n p 0 H 3 B 0 f l c . T B a b BHfle | yneJiBHoro seca KannTajioBjiqsceHHH b 0<5mecTBeHH0M Iff n p o j i y K T e K a K onepaiiHOHHOH n e p e M e H H o S c o b h o h c t o p o h m , h -p i KSLK npOHSBOBCTBeHHOH B B H fle O eKTHBHO . Ml o $ o p M J i e H H o r o copTHonieHHH c a p y r o H c t o p o h h . n p o t f j i e i u a 3 $ $ e K # I t h b h o t o c n p o c a , H r p a w m a n B e c b M a 3H aT m T ejib H yio p o j i b b H e K o - j I I TOPHX KeHHCHaHCKHX MOfleJIHX SKOHOMHUeCKOrO p a 3B H T H H , B HaH-| h om cjiy^ae He (5BiJia npuHHTa b o BHHMaime. B c b h 3 h c . s t h m aB*||| T o p a n p e ^ n a r a e M o S p atfo T H y T E e p s c n a io T , u t o b c o n H a jiH C T H u e fi~ # l k o h c T p a H e c miaHOBHM x o 3 h h c t b o m B c e r j j a c y m e c T B y e T B03- . Iff MOSCHOCTb O tfeC n etlH T B 3$$eK T H B H H H C n p O C Ha B e c b H eficT B H T ejlB -H r h h h o ( 5 eM o ( 5 m e c T B e H H o r o n p o n y K T a t f j i a r o f l a p n sjiacT H ^ H O C T H : I ee COOTBeTCTByiomHM C n 0 C 0 ( 5 0 M 0 $ 0 pMJieHH 0 H HHCTHTyiJHOHaJIbHOfi | C T p y K T y p u ; n p n s t o m iie JiB H O C T n r a e T a n n y T e M n p e o < 5 p a 3 0 B a n n a f: b cH C T ein e p a c n p e f l e j i e H M H h n o T p e f r f i e t i H H , a r j i a B H u u u o r p a H H - J l i

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DanSika NIKOLlfi Pavle SICHERL

KONSTRUKCIJA PROIZVODNO-KAPITALNO G EKONOMETRIJSKOG- MODELA ZA PRIVREDNI RAZVOJ JU&OSLAVIJE

Rad u suStini obradjuje jo uvek aktuelnu problematiku te orijskog i aplikativnog odredjivanja proizvodne funkcije, sluzeSi se pr^&ome savremenim metodama modelskog pristupa, koji se u svome razvoju pokazao kao mofino i teorijsko i aplikativno orudje u reSavanju mnogih sloSenih ekonomskih problema, pa i sloSene problematike teorijskog i aplikativnog odredjivanja proizvodnunkcije. U kratkom osvrtu na dosadaSnji razvoj uoSavaju se i izdvajaju, uglavnom, dva razvojna puta u reSavanju metodoloske i koncepcijske problemati ke proizvodne funkcije, Prvi razvojni put predstavija nastojanje da se proizv-odnja izrazi i odredi samo jednom eksplikativnom ili determinirajuSom ekonomskom kategorijom, dok drugi razvojni put odgovara nastojanju da se to potpunije postigne pomo6u dve ili vise odgovara^ ju6ih ekonomskih kategorija. Sa nekoliko ilustrativnih primera pokazano je da u dosadasnjem razvoju ni jedan ni drugi put nisu mogli u potpunosti da zadovolje sa gledista sadaSnjih potreba i nastojanja da se pomofiu Sto jednostavnijih proizvodnih ekonomskih modela, koji ne zahtevaju: mnogo podataka, vremena, kadrova i sredstava, ostvari zadovoljavajuSe egzaktno i operativno resavanje aktuelne problemati ke analiziranja i planiranja privrednog razvoja, U ovom radu se upravo nasioji da se kao doprinos uSini prvi neophodan korak, koji 6e omoguiiti uspeSno priblizavanje zadovol javanju tih aktuelnih i operativnih potreba u analiziranju i planiranju privrednog razvoja, U iavodjenju kostrukcije odgovarajuSih analitiSkih i planskih proizvodno-kapitalnih ekonometrijskih modela za privredni raz voj Jugoslavije poSlo se od prethodnog izlaganja teorijske konstrukcije opSteg matematiSkog proizvodno-kapitalnog modela kao sistema od tri simultane diferencijalne jednaSine u svom neresenom obliku (l), Ovaj sistem jednaSina (l) kao matematiSki ekonomski model definise zakonitosti i uslove kojima se simultano podvrgavaju obuhvaSene osnovne ekonomske kategorije: drustveni proizvod (D), osnovna sredstva ( ) k i marginalne nove opredmeiene investicije (i), Te zakonitosti 4 uslo-

- 90 54

ve izrazava svaka od jednacina sistema (l). Zbog toga one imaju odredjena ekonomska znaSenja. Koncizno izloSeno resavanje sistema jednaeina (l) dovodi do konstrukcije matematickog proizvodno-kapitalnog me dela kao sistema simultanih jednaSina u opstem, ali partikularno re senom obliku (l7)* Ovaj sistem jednaSina (17) slu5i kao osnova za konstruisanje konkretno odredjenih odgovarajudih ekonometrijskih modela,

Uzimajudi u obradu i reSavanje konkretan problem globalnog privrednog razvoja Jugoslav!je, prethodno su bila konstruisana dva odgovarajuda analitiSka proizvodno-kapitalna ekonometrijska modela za protekli period 1952-1960, Osnovni podaci u stalnim cenama (1956) / za ovo konstruisanje dati su u tabeli 1, Izvor statistiSkih podataka za druStveni proizvod je SGJ - 62, str, 93. Izvor podataka za osnovna sredstva je: Ivo Vinskiy lYodjena rasta fiksnih fondova Jugoslav!je od 1946, do 1960, Ekonomski institut NR Hrvatske, Zagreb 1962, ta bela 26, str, 50, Ova dva odgovarajuda analitiSka ekonometrijska mode-i la razlikujuftse po.tome Sto je prvi model konstruisan na bazi podata ka o osnovnim sredstvima u proizvodnom i neproizvodnom delu privrede, dok je drugi mod.el konstruisan na bazi podataka o osnovnim sredstvima | samo u proizvodnom delu privrede, Ocenjujudi parametre metodom najmanj| ih kvadrata na osnovu ved konstruisanog matematiSkog proizvodno-kapi- | talnog modela u obliku opSteg al i partikularno resenog oblika sistema simultanih jednaSina (17), konstruisana su dva odgovarajuda anali- | tiSka proizvodno-kapitalna ekonometrijska modela za privredni razvoj M Jugoslavije u proteklom periodu (1952-1960) u obliku sistema simulta- | nih i konkretno resenih jednaSina (34) i (35), IzraSunati rezultati f i elementi za oba modela dati su u tabeli 3, prikazani u grafikonima t 1 1 2 , kao i pregledno iskazani u analitiSkoj tabeli 4,

Kao osnova za izraSunavanje i izbor varijanata projekcija za planski razvoj privrede Jugoslavije u.periodu 1962-1980, upotrebIjavaju se ve<5 konstruisana dva odgovarajuda analitiSka ekonometrijska modela na bazi empiriSkih podataka za protekli period 1952-1960, a koji su dati sistemima jednaSina (34) i (35). Medjutim, izraSunaya-,; nje i izb or vari janata projekcija ovde nisu bili izvrseni pomodu pro-r ste modelske ekstrapolacije endogenih promenljivih veliSina u ved k J - | oi. struisana dva odgovarajuda analiticka ekonometrijska modela, nego su na osnovu njih i odgovarajude anJ.ii^feoguSnostiii?po'trebaVfl&Sgg^:da<- : M p Ijeg privrednog razvoja bila konstruisana dva nova odgovarajuda plan- j ska ekonometrijska modeia. Pomodu ovako konstruisana dva, modela za J : planiranje bududeg razvoja bile su izraSunate i izabrane po dve vari jante projekcija endogenih promenljivih veliSina za svaki model, Kon-

91 55
gtrukcija prve varijante prvog odgovarajufieg planskog ekonometrijskog modela bila je izvrsena preuzimanjem iz prvog analitickog mode la istih vrednosti egzogenih, objektivno datih parametara i b^ ), a uvodjenjem novih pretpostavki i vrednosti za egzogene, instrumen talno odredjene parametre (c22 = 0*24 i d-^ = 0). Na bazi ovih pret= postavki i vrednosti, koje odgovaraju ravnomernom, proporeipnalnom i proseSnojn toku u proteklom razvoju, konstruisana je prva varijanta prvog odgovarajuSeg planskog proizvodno-kapitalnog ekonometrijskog modela za privredni razvoj Jugoslavije za bu&uiSi planski period. 1962-1980. u konkretno resenom obliku sistema jednaSina (48), Na isti naSin konstruisaha je i druga varijanta prvog modela u konkretno reSenom obliku sistema jednacina (49). Na potpuno analogan nacin bile su kpnstruisane i dve varijante za drugi odgovaraju<5i model u konkret no reSenim oblicima sistema jednacina (50) i (51). IzraSunati rezulta ti prpjekcija i.element! za sve Setiri varijante oba modela dati su u tabelama . i 6, prikazani u grafikonima 3 i 4, kao i pregledno iskaza5 ni u analitiSkoj tabeli 7. Svrha konstruisanih modela i njihovih varijanata je da se izraze proizvodne moguSnosti u zavisnosti od koeficijenta uSesSa, kao instrumentalne promenijive velicine, i proizvodne funkcije, kao objek tivno date zavisnosti} dok se problem efektivne traznje, koji je glavna preokupacija nekih kejnezijanskih modela razvoja, ovde izostavl ja. Naime, uzima se u obzir da socijalisticka zemlja sa planski usmeravanom privredom uvek ima mogufinosti da u svojim fleksibilnim i svesno . postavljanim instituoionalnim okvirima, putem promene u strukturi raspodele i potrosnje, obezbedi efektivnu traznju za ostvareni drus tveni proizvodj a da njeno prvo i najozbiljnije ogranicenje predstav . ljaju proizvodne snage. U svom opstem matematickom obliku ovaj model omogu6ava uzimanje u obzir kombinacija rastu6eg, konstantnog ili opadajuSeg koeficijenta proseSne efektivnosti osnovnih sredstava sa rastuSim, konstantnim ili opadajuSim koeficijentom uces6a marginal ,nih novih opredjnefienih investicija u drustvenom proizvodu., Ove osobine obezbedjuju ve6u fleksibilnost u odnosu na ranije primenjene modeI f a visoki stepen korelacije proizvodne funkcije sa osnovnim sredf, = stvima u odgovarajuim ekonometrijskim modelima predstavija solidnu ^ OBnovu z , vefiu operativnost u odnosu na proizvodno-investicione modele, a gde su relacije i parametri za sada manje utvrdj.eni i pouzdani, Dalje poboljSavanje i usavrsavanje je potrebno traSiti na modelskom nivou .proizvodne xunkcije, s jedne strane u istra2ivanju faktora koji je iodredjuju, a sa druge strane u dezagregiranju u visesektorski model

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- 92 56

i u strukturnoj analizi, jer globalni model moze zadovoljiti potrebe analize i planiranja samo -kao prva aproksimacija. J -

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;?.

DanSika NIKOLlfi

TEORIJSKA KONSTEDKCUA EROIZVODNO-POTE.OSNOG EKONOMSKOG MODELA. ZA DUGOROCNO PLANIRANJE *) I* Pristupna razmatran.ia . U procesu druStvene reprodukcije uzajamno se uslovljavaju dva osnovna aspekta tog neprekldnog ekonomskog kretanja, Naime, aspekti proizvodnje i potrosnje naizmeniSno se smenjuju i:mdovezuju,. uzajamno se povezuju i isprepli<5u. U ovoin Sivom lanSanom spletu toko va Sovek ne samo da predstavlja glavnog nosioca i najsnaSniju polugu tog razvoja, ve6 on jedini svesno odredjuje i opredeljuje pravce i svrhu. u tom neprekidnom druStveno-ekonomskom kretanju* DruStvena svest Soveka jasno i iiuSno sagledava u potroSnji svrhu i cilj tog procesa reprodukcije kao objektivnom i prirodnom preduslovu opstanka, daljeg razvoja i neprekidnog progresa, U tom svetJLu aspekt proizvodnje pojavljuje se ne kao cilj, ve6 samo kao potrebno i neizbeSno sredstvo, koje treba da sluSi svom objektivao i druStveno opredel jenom oil ju i svrsi, Stavljaju6i sasvim opravdano u centar drustveno-ekonomskog zbivanja samog Soveka kao individualnog i drustvenog proizvodjaca i potrosaca, ocigledno je da se aspektu potrosnje mora posvetiti odgovaraju6a paSnja, koja ni u kom 3lu<5aju ne moze biti manja od one, koja se sasvim opravdano i obiiato posveiuje aspektu proizvodnje, Pristupajuii teorijskoj konstrukciji ekonomskog modela za ' dugoroSno planiranje, ovakav pristup procesu drustvene reprodukcije ukazuje na potrebu konstrukcije odgovaraju6eg proizvodno-potroSnog modela,. Na potrebu konstrukcije upravo ovakvog modela ukazuju i koncepcijske smernice za izradu naseg Sedmogodisnjeg plana, OSigledno je da ovakva potreba mora samo jos vise porasti i dobiti u znaSaju, kada se u razmatranje. uzme n 2 dugoroSni planski razvoj. Sva ova razmatraas nja u potpunosti dpravdavaju postavljanje zadatka konstrukcije proiz'Ideju za konstimisanje proizvodno-potrolsnog ekonomskog modela . a z dugoroSno planiranje dao je Vuko Medenica*

- 94 2

vodno-potronog ekonomskog modela za dugoroSno planiranje* Kao prvi kbrak u reSavanju ovog aktuelnog zadatka, ovde 6e se dati samo teorijska skica konstrukcije globalnog proizvodno-potrosnog ekonomskog modela za analizu i planiranje dugoroSnog privrednog razvoja. Pre riggo Sto bi se otpoSslo sa neposrednom teorijskom konstrukcijom ovog modela, potrebno je ukazati na izvesna ograni.5e.nja, koja su uslovljena izbor'om i definicijama ekonomskih kategorija upotrebljenih za konstrukciju modela. , , Kao ekonomska kategorija proizvodnje ovde nije bio upotrebljen bruto-aspekt agregata proizvodnje, vefi samo neto-aspekt tog agregata* U stvari, na taj naSin nije bio zavha6an ceo obim druStvene reprodukeije, ali je zato bila obuhva6ena njena eelbkupna novostvorena, vrednost* Ovo ograniSenje utiSe i ima odraza na ekonomsku kategoriju potroSnje* Naime, celokupna potrosnja, shvaiena u sirem smisiu, ima . sledefie tri osnovne komponente ; neproi.zvodnu, proisvcdnu i reprcdukcionu potrosnju. PoStc se u ovoj teorijskoj konstrulcciji ograniSilo samo na neto-aspekt agregata proizvodnje, to se u tome smislu mora . ograniSiti i agregat potroSnje samo na neproizvodnu i proizvodnu komponentu potroSaje,. dok je komponenta reprodukaiorie potrosnje u ovom modelu neobuhva<5ena. S obzirom da je reprodukciona potrosnja odredje-, na objektivnom tehnoloSkom zakonitos<5u, a da samo odnos izmedju ne- . proizvodne i proizvodne potrosnje iiaa autonoman karakter, za ovaj . . proizvodno-potroSni model kao i njsgovu svrhu to ne<5s predstavljati . . neko ozbiljnije ograniSenje i nedcstatak. Uostalom, i ovo se moze u . potpunosti otkloniti kombinovanjem sa drugim, pogodno izabranim modelom. Poto je svrha modela da se, pored neproizvodne i proizvodne potrosnje, zahvati i prdblematika proizvodnosti radne snage i stahovnistva, nagradjivanja prama radu i livotnog standarda, to se on mora dal je proSiriti uvodjenjein odgovaraju<5ih ekonomskih kate gorija. Pored kategorije radne snage i stanovnistva neophodno je uvesti i kategoriju liSne potrosnje kao odredjeriog ekvivalenta nagradjivanja prema radu. Medjutim, posto Sivotni standard Soveka ne zavisi samo od liSne potrosnje ve<5 posredno i od drustvene potrosnje, to je neophodno i ovu kategoriju posebno uvesti u model. Isto tako, radi upotpunjavanja ekonomske kategorije raspoloSivih sredstava za finalnu potroSnju, potrebno je uvesti i dopunsku kategoriju ostale potrosnje, koja obuhvata delatnost drustvenih i drlavnih organa, i sluSbx, kao i razne ostale sitnije vidove potroSnje. Najzad, poSto se model ogra-

niSava na sluSaj zatvorene privrede, u njegovoj konstrukciji se ne ixzimaju u obzir kategorije uvoza i izvoza. Ovo ograniSenje i nedost-" atak mogu se otkloniti takodje kombinovanjem sa drugim, pogodno izabranim modelom. Na kraju, uzimajudi u obzir dinamiSki i kvalitativno promenljiv karakter dugorocnog druStveno-ekonomskog razvoja, u ovom ekonomskom modelu potrebno je uvesti takve parametre, koji 6e na odgovarajuii naSin odraSavati tu dinamiku i te kvalitativne promene* Ove dinamiSke kvalitativne promene ukljucujiirazne vrste sada jo5 neiskori36enih iliu buclnJSiost'i novootkrivenih rezervi. Ove rezerve uglavnom se sastoje u boljem kori26enju kapaciteta, bdjoj organizaciji rada, pove6avanju struSnosti i proizvodnosti radne snage, nauSno-tehniSkom napretku i usavrSavanju proizvodnje, kao i u raznim drugim vrstama aadaSnjih i buduSih rezervi. U cilju Sto adekvatnijeg odraSavanja dinamiSkih kvalitativnih promena, koje nastaju koriSfienjem raznih vrsta rezervi, do sada uobiSajene proseSne i konstantne parametre u sliSnim modelima treba na odgovaraju6i naSin dinaxnizirati* Ovo dinamiziranje u ovde konstruisanom modelu izvrsiSe se upotrebom marginalnih vrednosti odredjenih parametara, kao i njihovim izraSavanjem u obliku odgovarajuSih funkcija vremena. II* Konstrukci.ja i resen.ia matematiS'ikog proizvodno-riotroshog modela 0slanjaju6i se na ve6 izvrSen iz]}or relevantnih ekonomskih kategorija kao osnovnih promenljivih veliSina, a imaj.u6i u vidu skLciranu sadrzinu i postavljeni cilj teorijskog ekonomskog modeia za planiranje dugoroSnog privrednog razvoja, konstrukcija matematiS kog proizvodno-potrosnog modela ostvarena je izbarom odgovarajuSeg sistema diferencijalnih jednaSina, koji se mo5e predstaviti u sledefiem diferencijalno nereSenom obliku: D(t) = l(t) + L(t) + Z(t) + 0(t), iCt) . = k(t) = k(o)

D(t) I Ct)= s(t) = s(o) D (t) .

i i

- 964

L |t j _

1 (t) = 1 (o) e >

, (l)
..

Zjft) _z (t) = a ( r f) D(t) -

0 (t) _o (t) = o (o f c P o V )

pvf|T _ p (t) = p (o) ePp^ ,

R (t) " _ . I (:) = q (o) ePqt , ; .

Upotrebljene oznake u sistemu. je&naSina (l) imaju slede6a znaSenja: I* Endogene promenljive veliSine a) Proxaenljive veliSine c ilja (1) D (t) = vrednost drultve'aog proizvoda shvaSenog kao raspo. loSiva sredstva u aatvorenoj privredi . b) PomoSne p2*omanljive veliSine CD I (t) = vrednoat proizvodne (iavesticione) potroSnje shva6one kao privredne investicije u osnovne i obrtne ..... fondove
(2) L (t) = vrodnost liSne potrolnje sh.vaSe.ue kao osnovne kompo-

nen^e Sivotnog 3tandarda

(3 ) Z (t) = vrednost zajedniSke (druSivene) potroSnje shvaiene kao neprivre&ne iravesticije i tekuSi materijalni rashodi u di'ii5tvenom standardu
(4) 0

(t) = vrednost ostale (rezidualne) potroSnje shvaSene kao delatnosi drustvenih i drSavnih organa, i sluSbi, koja obuhvata odgovarajuSe neprivredne investicije i tekaie materijalne rashode, kao i ostale vrste potroSnje

-9 7 -

(5)1 (t (6) S (t (7) k (t

veliSina radne snage shvaSene kao ukupan broj proseSno zaposlenih u toku. godine u zeinlji veliSina stanovniStva shvaSena kao ukupan proseSan broj Sivih stanovnika u toku godine u zemlji promenljiva veliSina marginalne vrednosti kapitalnog koeficijenta kao objektivno odredjene funkcije vremenaft, promenljiva velicina koeficijenta u2eS6B-privrednih investicija u drustvenom proizvodu kao instrumenta lno odredjene funkcije vremena promenljiva veliSina koeficijenta uSesSa licne potroSnje u drustvenom proizvodu kao instrumentalno odredjene funkcije vremena , promenljiva veliSina koeficijenta uSesSa zajedniSke (drustvene) potroSnje u drustvenom proizvodu kao instrumentalno odredjene funkcije vremena promenljiva veliSina koeficijenta uSesSa ostale (rezidualne) potrosnje u drustvenom proizvodu kao instrumentalno odredjene funkcije vremena promenljiva veliSina prosecne vrednosti koeficijenta proizvodnosti radne snage kao objektivno odre djene funkcije vremena promenljiva veliSina proseSne vrednosti koeficijen ta proizvodnosti stanovnika kao objektivno odredje ne funkcije vremena

(8) s (t

(9) 1 (t

(10) z(t

(11) o(t

(12) p(t

(13) q(t

II, Egzogene promenljive veliSine a) Instrumentalne promenljive veliSine (l) p = . marginal na stopa rasta koeficijenta uSeSSa privrednih investicija u drustvenom proizvodu marginalna stopa rasta koeficijenta uSeSSa liSne potrosnje u drustvenom proizvodu marginalna stopa rasta koeficijenta uSesSa zajedniSke (druStvene) potrosnje u druStvenom proizvodu marginalna stopa rasta koeficijenta uSesSa ostale (rezidualne) potrosnje u druStvenom proizvodu

(2 )
(3> Ps = M P

- 98 -

b) Ob jektivno date promenljive velicine (1) p = , marginalna stopa rasta marginalnog kapitalnog koef icijenta '. . . ' .

(2) p = . marginalna stopa rasta proseSnog koeficijenta pro^ izvodnosti radne snage (3 ) p = ^ marginalna stopa rasta proseSnog koeficijenta proizvodnosti stanovnika

(4) k(o) = vrednost marginalnog kapitalnog koeficijenta u baznom godiSnjem periodu .

(5) s(o) = vrednost koeficijenta ucesfia privrednih investi-

cija u druStvenom proizvodu u baznom godisnjem periodu (6) l(o) = vrednost koeficijenta ucesSa liSne. potrosnje u . druStvenom proizvodu u baznom godisnjem periodu (7) 2 ( 0 ) = vrednost koeficijenta uSeSSa zajedniSke (drustvene) potroSnje u drustvenom proizvodu u baznom go. diihjem periodu . (8) 0 ( 0 ) = vrednost koeficijenta uSeSSa ostale (rezidualne) ' potrosnje u drustvenom proizvodu u baznom godis... njem periodu (9) p(o) = vrednost proseSnog koeficijenta proizvodnosti radne snage u baznom godisnjem periodu . (10) q(o) = vrednost proseSnog koeficijenta proizvodnosti stanovnika u^.haznom godisnjem periodu .Oznaka t predstavlja redni broj godisnjeg perioda i praktiSno uzima vrednosti celih brojeva, ali teorijski moze imati i vrednosti svih realnih brojeva. . V Sistem jednaSina (l) u saSetom i neresenom obliku definise zakonotosti i uslove, kojima se simultano podvrgavaju obuhvaSene eko nomske kategarije. Zbog kratkoSe ovaj sistem napisan je u obliku osam jednacina, ali on, u stvari, sadrSi i sedam definicionih jednacina. Sve ove jednacine (8 + 7 = 15) konstituisu matematiSld. proizvodnopotrosni ekonomski .aodel, koji je dat u svom opstfem diferencijalnom i matematiSki neresencan. obiiku. Za potrebe aplikacije ovaj model se mora dati i u svom opstem, ali partikularno resenom obliku, kako bi

- 99 7

se moglo pristupiti i konstrukciji odgovarajuSih ekonometrijskih. juodela. . ResavajuSi sistem jednaSina (l), dobija se matematiSki proizvodno-potroSni ekonomski model u sledefiem opstem, ali partiku larno reSenom obliku; D (t) = D (o) ef^ I (t) L (t) = I (o) ePs* +"*<$ = L (o) e ? !* +

Z (t) '.J Z (o) ePz* + 0 (t) = 0 (o) ePo* + *<*) H (t) = R (o) ePp* + S (t) = S (o) ePq* + gde zbog saSetijeg pisanja upotrebljena oznaka f (t) ima jj&edeSe znaSenje: *

(2)

(S)
Sistemu jednaSina (2 ) treba dodati i 7 dsfinicionih jedna Sina, koje su saSetim oznaSavanjem sadrSane u reSenom obliku vefi u . sistemu jednaSina (l) Sistem jednaSina (2 ), ukljuSujuSi i 7 dodatih definicionih jednaSina iz sistema (l), sadrli 14 resenih jednaSina za 14 endogenih promenljivih velicina. Medjutim, sistem jednaSina (l) ima 15 jednaSina. To ovde znaSi da je jedna od tih jednacina posledioa ostalih, te nije nezavisna* Ova okolnost ima takodje za posledicu da je jedna od egzogenih vrednosti u baznom godiSnjem periodu D)(o), I(o), z(o).i o( o;] zavisna. Naime, va2i sledeSa jednakost: D(o) = l(o) + l(o) + Z(o) + 0(0). (4)

Isto tako, izmedju odredjenih egzogenih parametara [s (o), 1 (o), 2 ( ) i 0 (0 )] postoji zavisnost, jer vaXi i sledeSa jednakost: 0 s (o) + 1 (o) + z (o) + 0 (0 ) = 1 .
(5)

- 100 8

Najzad, od Setiri instrumentalna parametra (ps P _ pz i p0).samo su ] tri potpuno nezavisna, dok je Setyrii odredjen sledefiom jednakcSSu: s(o) ePs + l(o) e Pi + 2 (0 ) ePz + 0 (0 ) eP = 1> . . (6)

I I
% %

Ptoizilazi da partikularno reSeni sistem jednaSina (2 ), upo~ trebljen. sa 7 definicionih jednaSina sadrSanih. u sistemu (l)j kao i sa' 1 jednaSinama (4), (5) i (6), sadr2i ukupno 35 promenljivih veliSina, | medju kojima ima 14 endogenih. promenljivih veliSina [ Dft), ift), a L(t), Z(t), 0(t), E(t), S(t)i k(t), s(t), l(t), z(t), o(t), p(t), I q(t)J, a 21 egzogena promenljiva velioina [pg, p1> p2, pc; pfcf-pp* 1
Pa*

k(o), s(o), l(o), 3 (0 ), 0 (0 ), p(o), q(o)} D(o), l(o), L(o), Z(0),-| 0(o), E.(o), S(o)] Hedju egzogsnim promenljivim velicinama ima 4 instr-i umentalno promenljive veliSine (ps, , pz, 0^ i ;-a 17 objektivno da- ^ p :>. tih veliSin#!^ Pp, pqi k(o), 3 (0 ), l(o), z(o), 0 (0 ), p(o), q(o)j D(c), l(o), L(o')V Z(o), 0 (0 ), B.(o), S(o)] Od Setiri instrumentalne promenljiye^ yelicine samo se 3 mogu nezavisno i proizvdjno birati i menjati, 4 veliSine uzajamno povezane jednakoS6u (6^* Na sliSan naSin, od 4 objektivno date veliSine - s(o), l(o), 2 (0 ), i 0 (0 ), samo se 3 veliSine mogu nezavisno i objektivno odrediti, poSto se Setvrta veliSina zavisno ocfre&juje iz jednakosti (5), i a potT puno isti naSin, od 5 objekfcivno cuatih veliSina - D(o), l(o), I>(o^, Z(p) i 0(o), samp se 4 veliSirie mogu nezavisno i objektivno odrediti, , posto se peta veliSina zavisno cdredjuje iz jednakosti (4), Prema to me, teorijski konstruisan proizvodno-potroSni model moSe se kao ekonometrijski model konkretno, potpuno i jednoznaSno odrediti, ako se proizvoljno-planski odrede samo 3 instrumentalne promenljive veliSi- . ne i ako se nezavisno i empiriSki utvrde samo 19 objektivno datih. veliSina, III, Neka analitiSka razmatran^a Teorijski konstruisan proizvodno-potrosni ekonomski model i.pored izveanih ograniSavajaSnli pretpostavki ima neke pozitivne karakteristike i osobine, kcje mu omoguSavaju da u praktiSnoj primeni na zadovoljavajuSi i operativan naSin udovolji postavljenoj svrsio Ovde Se se u najkraSim potez.ima navesti samo neke od njegovih najvaSnijih karakfeeristika osobina. i Osnovna osobina ovde konstruisanog proizvodno-potrosnog modela saatoji se u tome, Sto je on.pomoSu izvrsenog prosirenja zah-

- 101 9

vatio Sitav jedan privredni kompleks, koji je usko pcvezan sa osnovnom problematikom proizvodnje i potrosnje. Naime, ovaj model je u svom prosirenom oblika povezao problematiku proizvodnje i potrosnje sa proizvodnos6u radne snage i stanovniltva, sa nagradjivanjem prema radu, kao i sa Sivotnim standardom uopSfce. Ova kompleksna povezanost f . i uslovljenost u dugoroSnom privrednom razvoju predstavlja glavnu osobinu teorijski konstruisanog modela, koji u svom primenjenom i konkretnom ekonometrijskom obliku daje znaSajne moguSnosti ne samo za analizu razvoja ovog privrednog kompleksa u proteklom periodu, ve6 i za njegovo dugoroSno planiranje i usmeravanje. Ya5na karakteristika ovog modela sastoji se u njegovom kontinuiranom obliku, koji ukljuSuje opstost partikularnih resenja diferencijalnih jednaSina, kao i upotrebu marginalnih vrednosti parametara modela. Kontinuirani oblik modela daje ovome snaSsjnu fleksibilnost, koja se naroSito postize pomoSu marginalnih vrednosti izvesnih . koeficijenata i stopa. Naime, pomofiu marginalnih vrednosti lcoeficijenata, kao konstantnih velicina, postiSe se da proseSne vrednosti tih koeficijenata budu, ipak, promenljive, to daje znaSajne moguS- . nosti za prilagodjavanje modela promenljivoj dinamici stvarnog dugo roSnog razvoja. SliSan je sluoaj i sa marginalnim stopama rasta, ko je predstavljaju vaiae parametre konstruisanog dinamiSkog modela0 Ova fleksibilnost i sposobnost dinamiSkog prilagodjavanja modela za dugoroSni privredni razvoj daju mu i vazan operativan karakter, koji je naroSito znaSajan za aktuelne potrebe dugoroSnog privrednog plani ranja, kao i odgovarajufie analize dugoroSnog privrednog razvoja. Posebnu karakteristiku ovog modela predstavlja dinamiSki karakter njegovih strukturnih parametare., koji su obiSno kon3tantnog karaktera u sliSnim ekonomskim modelima. Kao sto je u prethodnom pasusu veS istaknuto, izvesno dinamiziranje nekih parametara u modelu. postignuto je pomoSu hjihovih marginalnih vrednosti, ali pored toga u model su ukljuSena i dinamiziranja nekih parametara pomoSu upotrebe odgovarajuSih funkoija vremena, koje samo jos u veSoj meri poveSavaju fleksibilnost modela, a time i njegovu sposobnost za potpunije prilagodjavanje promenljivoj dinamioi dugoroSnog privrednog razvoja. Kao primer za ovo najbolje sluai marginalni kapitalni koeficijent, koji f e kao eksponencijalna funkcija vremena menja prema konstantnoj e marginalnoj stopi rasta. Na sliSan naSin u modelu su dinamizirani i proseSni koeficijenti uSesSa kao sto je to sluSaj sa proseSnim koeficijentom uSesSa proizvodne (investioione) potrosnje u drustvenom proizvodu i ostalim komplementarnim proseSnim koeficijentima ucesSa.

Na isti naSin su dinamizirani i proseSni koeficijenti proizvodnosti | radne snage i stanovnistva* Ovo dinamiziranje strukturnih parametara | u modelu od posebnog je znaSaja ne samo za analizu i planiranje dugoroSnog privrednog razvoja, ve6 i za uspeSno resavanje nekih akrfcuelnih I problema u nasem daljem privrednom razvoju.

NaS drustvenc-ekonomski razvoj dostigao je stepen, na kome | se problematika proizvodne (investicione) i neproizvodne potrosnje istifie na prvo mesto uporedo sa zahtevom za njenim odredjenim i eg* zaktnim resavanjem. Naime, u dosadaSnjem razvoju planiran^a' meglo se oslanjati na jednostavnije ekonomske modele, koji su pretpostavljali . konstantnost kapitalnih i drugih koeficijenata, jer su zahtevi i mo- A gufinosti ubrzanog razvoja proizvodnje sasvim opravdano imali prevagu r nad potrebama i mogufinostima odgovarajufieg ubraavanja potrosnje. Me- djutim, sada se ne samo opravdano zahteva i postoje realne mogufinost-i za odgovarajufie ubrzaaje potrosnjs, ve i ono istovremeno postaje i ne- f ophodan preduslov i snaSna poluga za dalji ubrzani razvoj proizvodnje.; U stvari, tu se postavlja problem odnosa izmedju proizvodne (investicione) i neproizvodne potrosnje, koji zahteva neko odredjeno optima- ' lno resenje. :

Prema do sada upotrebljavanim ekonomskim modelima kod nas proseSni i marginalni kapitalni koeficijenti bili su konstantni, te se problem ubrzanog razvoja proizvodnje i potroSnje mogao resavati samo alternativno. Naime, ubrzavanje proizvodnje moglo se ostvariti samo po cenu ubrzanja proizvodne (investicione) potrosnje., a odgcrva- . rajufieg usporenja neproizvodne potrosnje, kao i obratno. Medjutim, sada se postavlja problem pomirenja i prevazilaSenja ta dva suprotna altemativna reenja. Preciznije fonnulisano, postavlja se problem . iznalaSenja takvog resenja, .koje omogufiava jednovremeno i paralelno ubrzavanje i neproizvodn#:; proizvodne (investicione) potrosnje, pa i; prema tome, i same proizvodnje. Na pitanje da li je takva vrsta optimalnog reSenja uopste mog- <a i da li 36 moze dati, potvrdan odgovor u5 . . pruSa zapravo konstrukcija ovog proizvodno-potrosnog modela kao rezultat izvrsenog dinamiziranja marginalnog kapitalnog koeficijenfca pomofiu odgovarajude eksponencijalne funkcije vremena, u Sem suStia.u ski i leSi poenta ovog modela. IznalaSenje odredjenih vrsta optimalnih resenja za paralelno ubrzavanje i proizvodnp i neproizvodnd. potroSnje pomofiu ovoga modela samo je stvar odredjene procedure i tehnike izraSunavanja. ^esavanje ove aktuelne problematike simultanog ubrzanja rasta potrosnje, investicija i proizvodnje daje ovom modelu poseban znaSaj za naS dalji i dugoroSni progresivan drustveno-eko-

nomski razvoj i napredak. Na kraju, treba ista6i d . ovaj model..ima istotako vaznu e osobinu da mole da se kombinuje i aa drugim vrstama ekonomskih mode la, sto omogufiuju da se njegova ograniSenja ili sasvim otklone ili u znatnoj meri ublaSe, a da se pri tome saSuvaju sve njegove pozitivne karakteristike i osobine. Istini za volju, ovo kombinovanje sa drugim modelima mole se izvrsiti tek kada se ovaj model konstruise u njegovom inverznom obliku, sto svakako ne pravi neke naroSite te5ko6e. UkljuSivanje ovog modela u jedan celovit i kompleksan sistem kombinovanih i medjusobno uskladjenih, ptocijalnih i posebnih eko nomskih modela svakako f e znatno doprineti upotpunjavanju i usavrSai vanju nase metodologije za analizu i planiranje dugoroSnog privrednog razvoja* ,

DanSika NIKOLlfi

- ' TEORIJSKA KONSTRUKGIJA , FR0IZ70DN0-P0TR0SN0G EKONOMSKOG- MODELA ZA DUGOROCNO . ELANIRANJE

;. . . ;

1 1 1

' ' ' ' 1 " " $ ' .......... '= '| U radu je data teorijska skica konstrukcije globalnog pro- J | izvodno-potrosnog ekonomskog modela za analizu i planiranje dugoroS- I nog privrednog razvoja kao nastojanje da se zahvati problematika pro-. 2 izvodne (investicione) i neproizvodne potrosnje, produktivnosti radne snage. i stanovniStva, nagradjivanja prema radu i zivotnog standards. r Posto je prethodno izvrsen izbor relevantnih ekonomskih kategorija kao osnovnih promenljivih veliSina, a uzimajufii u obzir skiciranu aa^-# drSinu i postavljeni cilj ovog teorijskog ekonomskog modela, izvrsena je konstrukcija matematiSkog proizvodno-potrosnog modela izborom . ? odgovarajufieg sistema diferenoijalrdh jednaSina, koji je predstavljen # u diferencijalno neresenom obliku (l). Opsti i partikularno reseni v f oblik ovog matematiSkog proizvodno-potrosnog ekonomskog modela odre- 1 d,ien je sistemom jednaSina (2 ) kao i jednakostima (3), (4), (5 ) i ( ) , 6. Sam model sadrSi ukupno 35 promeriLjivih veliSina, medju kojima ima 14 endogenih i 21 egzogena pronenljiva veliSina. ( e teorijski konstruJo isan proizvodno-potrosni model moze se kao ekonometrijski model kon- kretnc, potpuno i jednoznaSno odrediti, ako se proizvoljno-planski odrede samo 3 instrumentalne promenljive veliSine i ako se nezavisno i empiriSki utvrde samo 15 objektivno datih veliSina.

X pored izvesnih ograniSavajufiih pretpostavki, koje se kombinovanjem sa drugim modelima mogu ili sasvim otkloniti ili u znatnoj meri ublaSiti, ovaj model ima positivne karakteristike i osobine, koje; mu omogufiavaju da u praktiSnoj primeni na zadovoljavajufii i operativan; naSin odgovara postavljenom cilju. Od svih tih karakteristika i 030bina najvefiu paznju privlaSi ona koja mu daje sposobnost za fleksibllno i dinamiSko.prilagodjavanje stvarnom dugoroSnom razvoju, sto je od naroSitog znaSaja za aktuslne potrebe dugoroSnog privrednog planira- :. nja, kao i odgovarajufie analize dugoroSnog privrednog razvoja. Naime, pored dinajniziranja nekih parametara pomofiu njihovih marginalnih vred nosti, u model su ukljuSena i dinamiziranja nekih parametara pomofiu

- 105

13

opotrebe odgovaraju<5ih funkcija vremena* Ovo dinamiziranje strukturj i parametara u modelu omogudava iznalaSenje takve vrste optimalnog jh relenja, koje o'bez'bedjuje jednovremeno i paralelno ubrzavanje i neproizvodne i proizvodne (investicione) potroSnje, pa prema tome i same proizvodnje. 3avanje Ove aktuelne problematike simultanog i optimal nog ubrzanja rasta potroSnje, investicija i proizvodnje daje ovom models poseban znaSaj za na dalji i dugoroSni progresivan drustveno-ekonomski razvoj i napredak.

:7is

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- 107 15
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- io8 16

THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION OP PRODUCTIVE - CONSUPTIVE. ECONOMIC MODEL FOR LONG-TERM PLANNING. By- DanSika Nikoli<5

'

This paper contains theoretical draft of construction of the total productive - consumptive economic model for analysis and planning of long-term economic development in order to comprise the problems of productive (investment) and non productive consumption, productivity of man-power and of population, remuneration according^ to work and of standard of living. Since there was previously/ effec ted the selection of relevant economic categories as* the'^ybasic vari ables, and considering the drafted content and the set up aim of this theoretical economic model, there was constructed mathematical produ ctive-consumption model by selection of corresponding system of diffe rential equations. This model is presented in differentially unsol ved form (l). The general and particularly solved form o : this mathe f matical productive-consumptive economic model is determined by a sys tem of equations (2), and of equalities (3),. (4), (5) and (6 ). The model; consists of 35 variables, whereof 14 are endogenous and 21 are exogenous ones* The whole theoretically constructed productive-consum ptive model, as econometric model, can be, concretely,completely and uniformly computed if only 3 instrumental variables are determined op tionally and according to plan and if 15 objectively given magnitudes are Cal'culatecl.independently and empirically.

Besides cetain limiting suppositions which, combined with other models, can be either completely prevented or considerably mitigated, this model has positive characteristics which enable it to serve the established aim in practical application in a sastisfying and operative way. The most conspicuous of those characteristics is that one which gives the model ability for flexible and dynamic acco modation to real long-term development what is of particular importan ce for actual requirements of long-term economic planning, and also corresponding analyses of long-term economic development. Naimly, be-

- 109 17
aides dynamization of some parameters by aid .of their marginal values, the model includes also dynamizations of some parameters using corres ponding time functions. This dynamization of structural parameters in the model enables the finding out of such kind of optimal solution which secures simultaneous and parallel acceleration both of non-pro ductive and productive (investment) consumption, and accordingly of the very ^production. The solution of actual problems of simultaneous a n d optimal acceleration of kinds of consumption, investments and pro duction gives to this model a particular significance.'for our further a n d long-term progressive social-economic development and prosperity.

METODE I REZULTATI ANALIZE I PLANIRANJA DUGOROCNOG PRIVREDNOG RAZVOJA NA BAZI BRtTTO^AGREGATA PROIZVODNJE

DanSika NIKOLld
KONSTRDKCIJA JEDNO& EKONOMETEIJSKOG- MODEM ZA DUGOROCKI EAZ70J INDUSTRIJE JUGOSLAV!JE*) I, Pristup probiemu Ako se ekonomska kategorija vrednosti materijalnih troskova proizvodnje obeleSi sa X, ekonomska kategorija vrednosti druStvenog proizvoda (nacionalni dohodak sa amortizacijom) sa Y, a ekonomska kategorija vrednosti druStvenog bruto-proizvoda sa Z, onda na osnovu definicije ovih kategorija za svaki odredjeni period vremena va2i jednakost, kojoj se u opstem sluSaju mo5e dati oblik Z(t) = X(t) + Y(t), (1)

gde simbol t oznaSava vreme (redni broj godisnjeg perioda) od koga zavise tri ekonomske kategorije, Uvodjenjem promenljive veliSine t istaknut je dinamiSM. i opsti karakter jednakosti (l). %ime, sve

*) vaj rad predstavlja pokusaj da se na jednom mestu i postupno ialoSe sve faze u konstraisanju i primeni jednog ekonometrijskog modela, imaju6i pri tome u vidn ne sajao osnovni istraSivacki zadatak, ve6 i potrebu da se ovakvoj vrsti rada posveti i odgovarajuda metodoloSka i pedagoska paSnja, sto je aSinjeno delom u tekstu a delom u napomenama. Kao istra2iva5ki zadatak ovde je izvrseno ispitivanje mogunosti da se pomodu minimalnog broja ekonomskih kategorija i sa skromnim ekonometrijskim metodama konstruise model, koji bi obuhyatao i bruto i neto-aspekte agregata proizvodnje, te na taj naSin omogudavao opisivanje i utvrdjivanje izvesne strukturne zakonomernosti u privrednom razvoju, sto moSe da posluzi i kao dobra podloga za privredno planiranje putem projiciranja* Za konkretnu oblast ekonomskog istraSivanja i metodoloske ilustracije uzet je razvoj industrije i rudarstva Jugoslavije kako u proteklom periodu od 1947* do 1959. godine, tako i u dugoroSnom planskom periodu od 196o..do 198o. godine* U primeni konstruisanog ekonometrijskog modela za dugoroSno pri vredno planiranje date su - od velikog broja drugih mogudih varijanata - dve varijante projekoija osnovnih promenljivih velioina. Zbog toga ove dve varijante projekoija treba smatrati samo kao orijenta-

tri uvedene veliSine neprekidno se menjaju u toku i kao odredjene fun kcije vremena, ali tako da se ma koja od njih mo5e jednoznacno izraSunati kada su odredjene i poznate druge dve za proizvoljan ali isti vremenski period, Prema^tome, problem se u ovom sluSaju svodi na jednostavno matematiSko reSavanje postavljene definicione jednakosti

(l).
Problem se ovde, medjutim, moze postaviti i u nesto Sirem i sloSenijem obliku, Naime, mole se postaviti pitanje da li se bilo koje dve veliSine mogu jednoznaSno odrediti i izraSunati kada je odredjena i poanata samo trefia velicina i - ako je to mogufie - kojim se postupkom ddlazi do resenja, Na prvi pogled izgleda kao da takvog resenja uopste nema, jer se zaista Sisto matematiSkim putem to ne moSe izvesti, posto jednakost (l) omoguSuje izraSunavanje samo jedne veliSine kada su poznate druge dve, Ovako sire postavljen problem mogao bi se matematiSki resiti sajno u sluSaju kada bi pored jednak osti (l) postojala jo5 jedna druga jednakost, koja bi izrazavala neku zavisnost izmedju bar dve od tri posmatrane promenljive veli- Sine, Medjutim, u okvirima Siste matematike takva se jednakost ne mo5e izvesti; njeno postojanje mole se samo proizvoljno pretpostaviti, A pretpostavka o postojanju ovatore druge jednakosti opravdana je . jedino ako postoje neke druge metode, koje svakako ne mogu biti u u2em smislu Sisto matematiSke, a koje omogufiuju izvodjenje konretno odredjene jednakosti na bazi empiriSkih podataka. Cinjenica je da, upravo, takve druge metode pruza matematicka statistika-*-'. Zahvaljujufii ajoj pod odredjenim uslovima, Sije J ) cione intervale mogufiih varijacija, a ne kao konkretne predloge L. projekoija za planiranje buduSeg stvamog privrednog razvoja. . Ideju o potrebi konstruisanja ekonomskog modela sa bruto i neto-a spektima agregata proizvodzije dao je dr JakoV SirotkoviS, dok programsko usmeravanje istrazivaSkog rada potice od dr Branka Horvata.
l) Tu se misli na metode korelacione i regresione analize, koje omogufiuju da se pomofiu empiriSkih podataka konstruise najbolje prilagodjena kriva liaija, imaju^i pri tome za bazU princip najmanjih kvadratnih odstupanja.

- 113 . .

se postojanje ili nepostojanje u svakom konkretnom sluSaju moSe taSno utvrditi, moguSe je izvesti i konstruisati potrebnu drugu jednakost. PoSto Se se u kasnijem izlaganju za posmatrani konkretan sluSaj izvesti takva konstrukcija potrebne jednakosti i pokazati da su neophodni uslovi za njenu primenu zadovoljeni, provizorno se mo5e raditi sa pretpostavkom da takva jednakost ve6 postoji. Neka ona ima funkoionalni oblik .
Z(t) = fx [Z(t)],

(2)

gde velieina Z(t) (materijalni troSkovi) ima ulogu nezavisno promen-, ljive, a veliSina Z(t) (bruto druStveni proizvod) ima ulogu funkeionalno promenljive veliSine. . Pojavom i druge jednakosti u obliku (2) Sire postavljeni problem postao je i Sisto matematiSki potpuno raiv, poSto u opStem sluSaju dve jednakosti omoguSuju odredjivanje dve nepoznate veliSine kao funkoije tre<5e veliSine za koju se mora pretpostaviti da je poznata funkoija vremena. I ova pretpostavka, zahvaljujuSi matematiSkoj statistic!, takodje se moSe opravdati, te se u opStem sluSaju moSe staviti da postoji i sledeSa jednakost; X(t) = f2(t), (3)

gde oznaka f2(t) predstavlja neku proizvoljno datu funkciju. Ova fun koija moSe s odrediti na bazi empiriSkih. podataka, ali i kao pogodna instrumentalna promenljiva za analizu i planiranje privrednog razvoja. Sve ove jednakosti od (l) do (3), ako se pove5u u jedan sistem jednaSina, predstavljaju matematiSki ekonomski model, koji se moSe napisati u sledeSem opltem obliku: Z(t) = l(t) + Y(t), Z(t) = f2 [X(t)J, X(t) = f2(t). Medjutim, ako se sistem jednaSina (4) reSi po promenljivim veliSinama Z(t), T(t) i Z(t), onda se konstruisani opSti matematiSki model moSe napisati u sledeSem resenom obliku: (4)

4
v ' ; ' - ! ; ' ' C : r , : . *
= ti

Y(t) = fx [fgCtj] - fgCt) , X<t) = f^(t)v v

(5)

PolazeSi od matematiSki sasvim jednostavnog problema, u b pristupu pokazalo se da prosirenje tog problema moSe da dov6de do" jed- I t nog matematiSkog ekonomskog modela, koji je ovde dat u svom najopsti- % jem i provizorno jos neodredjenom obliku. Na bazi ovako uopstenog mo- | dela moSe se pristupiti konstrukciji matematiSkog modela u njegovom % odredjenom obliku. ' , . .: % II. Konstrukcija matematiSkog modela ..... ?

Konstruisati matematiSki ekonomski model u odredjenom obliku znaci odrediti pored njegove ekonomske sadrSine i njegov matematiSki oblik. A to znaSi da,- pored toga sto treba izabrati koje 6e ekonom- I ske kategorije u modelu igrati ulogu promenljivih velicina, treba ' odrediti i oblik sistema jednacina, koje odredjuju zavisnost izmedju " tih promenljivih veliSina. Posto je izbor ekonomskih kategorija kao , promenljivih veliSina bio izvrsen veS u toku postavljanja i prosirenja polaznog matematiSkog problema, to samo ostaje jos da se izabere i bliSe odredi matematiSki oblik sistema jednaSina, koje konstituisu sam model. . , U novije vreme sve viSe preovladava tendencija da se sistem ' jednaSina ko ji konst-ituise ekonomski model izrazava u diferencijalnom obliku. A to znaSi da se obiSno bar neka od jednaSina u modelu izrazava u obliku diferencijalne jednaSine..

Ova tendencija i&a opravdanje, pre svega, u tome Sto dif cijalni oblik jednaSina ukljucuje najopstiji oblik moguSih resenja. Zatim, pomodu diferencijalnog oblika podesnije se izrazava i jaSe istiSe dinamiSki karakter konstruisanog modela. Isto tako, u diferencijalnom obliku saSetije i sads*2ajnije se definiSu zavisnosti, koje karakterisu sistem jednaSina i sam ekonomski model. Najzad, diferencijalni oblik primenjuje kontinuirano promenljive velicine, sto pruza saSet elegantan izgled i omoguSuje uspesnu primenu matematicke anali.ze. Nedostatak-6vog oblika mogao bi biti u tome,= sto on zahteva pozna'-' vanje osnova'ie orije diferencijalnih jednaSina. Medjutim, davanjem matematiSkog ekonomskog modela za praktiSnu primenu i u reSenom obliku ovaj se nedostatak moSe sasvim ublaziti. Zbog svih navedenih prednosti

- 115 .

ova novija tendencija ovde se takodje usvaja, ali de se dati i detaljnija resenja konstruisanog matematickog ekonomskog modela koja neSe sadrzati difereneijalne elemente. Prva jednaSina u sistemu (4), koji konstituise model u najopstijem obliku, ima Sisto definicioni karakter, te 6e se zbog toga bez ikakve izmene i dalje zadrSati. Drugoj jednakosti sistema (4), medjutim, dade se slededi odredjeniji difereneijalni oblik:

dt

~a

at

(s)

gde a predstavlja odredjenu konstantu i gde sepojavljuju prvi izvodi promenljivih veliSina X(t) i Z(t) po vremenu t. Da bi se utvrfl.ilo ekonomsko znaSenje konstante a prethodno Se se odrediti ekonomsko znaSenje prvih izvoda i jednacina ( ) napisati u slede<5em transformi6 sanom obliku: dZ(t) .= dX(t) dt

az.OQ = a. dX(t)

(7)

2) Prvi izvod dX(t) predstavlja marginalnu (graniSnu) vrednost prirastaja dt materijalnih troSkova u jediniSnom periodu vremena, a prvi izvod cLZ(t) predstavlja marginalnu vrednost priras. dt taja bruto drustvenog proizvoda takodje u jediniSnom periodu vreme na* ZnaSenje konstante a, imajudi u vidu i jednaSinu (7), sada nije tesko utvrditi. Naime, ona pokazuje veliSinu stalnog odnosa, koji se neprekidno odrlava izmedju prirastaja bruto drustvenog proizvoda ujediniSom periodu vremena i odgovarajudeg prirastaja materijalnih ^ troSkova takodje u jediniSnom periodu vremena. Drugim reSima i saSetije reeeno, konstanta a pokazuje veliSinu prirastaja bruto drustve nog proizvoda koji odgovara jediniSnom prirastaju materijalnih trolkova. Po analogiji sa srodnim koeficijentima, konstanta a moze se nazvati marginalnim koeficijentom efektivnosti' ' (produktivnosti)
2) R.G.D. Allen, Mathematical Analysis for Economists, 9th ed., (London, Macmillan and Co. Ltd.m 196o), strana 153. 3. J.Tinbergen, On the Theory of Econqpic Policy, Contributions to Economic Analysis, and ed., (Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing . Company, 1955J, strana 53.

-116 6
materijalnih troskova, jer,' u stvari, pokazuje za koliko se jeiiibica' povefia bruto druStveni proizvod kada se inaterijalni troskovi povedaju za jednu jedinicu. J '
TreSoj jednaSini sistema (4) daSe se takodje ovaj podesan i odredjeniji diferencijalni oblik

. dt gde #(t) predstavlja neku proizvoljnu funkoiju vremena, koja u specijalnom slucaju mo5e biti ravna i nekoj konstanti, Ekonomsko znaSanje jednaSine (8) sastoji se u tome, sto ona pokazuje da marginalna vred nost prirastaja materijalnih troSkova u jediniSnofli periodu vremena ' nije neka stalna veliSina, ,ve promenljiva veliSina kao proizvoljna funkcija vremena* To znaci, da se materi jalni troskovi u toku vreme-' na ne menjaju ravnomerno, ve u jednakim razmaciaa imaju nejednake prirastaje, sto odgovara proizvoljno ubrsanom ili usporenom (krivolinijskom) razvoju, Samo u specijalnom sluSaju. kada je proizvoljna funkcija ravna nekoj konstanti, jednaSina (8) predstavlja ravnomeran: (pravolinijski) razvdj (rast) materijalnih. troskova* Ako se sada jednaSine (^), (6) i (8) poveSu u jedan sistem jednaSina, onda se time ostvasruje konstrukeija matematiSkog ekonomskog modela, koji se mole napisati u sledeSem opstem all diferencijalno odredjenom obliku: .
Z(t) = Z(t) + Y(t), . W

: :

(a)

dt . . dt

= a Mi), dt

'. : '

gde sve oznake imajux veS ranije utvrdjena znaSenja, HesavajuSi o a j v. sistem jednacina (9), dobiSe se konstruisani matematiSki ekonomski model u matematiSki resenom obliku i bez diferencijalnih elemenata, III, Oplta resenja matematiSkog modela .

e5iti siatem jednaSina (9) znaci naSi tri promenljive ve licine X(t), X(t) i Z(t) kao odredjene funkcije-vremena i odgovaraju-

- 117 . 7

6eg broja parametara, koji na izvestan naSin karakterisu konstruisani matematiSki ekonomski model. Pri tome, ove odredjene funkcije- vre* mena u svom relenom obliku nede vise biti difereneijalnog karaktera, a svi parametri koji sepojavljuju biSe potpuno odredjenog znaSenja i vrednosti* Ceo postupak resavanja sistema jednaSina (9) izlozide se sa dovoljno potrebnih detalja tako, da se mo2e lako i sa razumevanjem pratiti.

PoSto sistem jednaSina (9) sadrzi diferencijalne elemente, to se prethodno oni moraju na neki naSin eliminisati ili otkloniti* To znaSi da u tom sistemu treba poSeti resavanje sa drugom i treSom jednaSinom, koje su izraSene u diferencijalnom obliku. ^eSavanje Se se otpoSeti sa treSoin jednaSinom sistema (9), poSto je ona jednostavnija od druge jednaSine. Naime, treSa jednaSi na ima sledeSi jednostavan oblik: .
& L \ jL=4> (t),

( ) 10

dt koji se moSe lako transformisati na oblik u kome su promenljive veliSine razdvojene dX(t) =^(t)dt. (11)

UzimajuSi integral leve i desne strane jednaSine (ll), dobija se promenljiva veliSina X(t) kao funkcija vremena t u obliku neodredjeriog integrala* X(t) = (t) dt + Gj

(12)

gde se pojavljuje proizvoljna integraciona konstanta C, koja se moze odrediti iz uslova u baznom godiSnjem periodu* Naime. neks u baznom godiSnjem periodu za t=o va2e uslovi X(t)=X(o) i^(t)=^(o), tada se jednaSina ( ) moze napisatir u obliku 12 X(o) = (o)dt + C* . (13)

Iz uslovne jednaSine (13) odredjuje se integraeiona konstanta C, ko ja dobija sledeSu vrednost: C = X(o) (14)

- .118 8
Ako se odredjena vrednost integracione konstante C iz je&naSins (14) zamerd u jgdnaSinn. (12 ), onda ona dobija oblik X(t) t)dt + X(o) (o)dt# (15)

Spajanjem jednakih integrala za dva razliSita perioda vremena (baznog i tekuSeg) u jedan odredjeni integral, jednaSina ( ), odnosno 12 (l5)j konaSno se moSe napisati ] slede6em odredjenom obliku: g X(t) = X(o) + J $ (t) dt. o (16)

Druga jednaSina sistema (9), koja je takodje izraSena pomoSu diferencijalnih elemenata, ima sledeSi nesto sloSeniji oblik:
'

ft7)

Da bi se i u ovoj jednaSini oslobodili diferencijalnih elemenata| zamenifie se vrednost za diferancijalni izrag dX(t) iz jednaSine (iq) u jednaSinu (17), koja tada dobija sledeSi dt oblik: Mil=a^(t). dt (18)

Ovako- dobijen oblik jednaSine potpuno je slican onome kod jednaSine (lo)* te se analognim postupkom^) i za jednaSinu (17), odnosno (18/, izvodi konaSno reSe&je koje se mo5e napisati u sledeSem odre djenom obliku: 4) ^dgovarajuSi postupak ima sledeSi redosled jednaSina: dZ(t) = Z(t) =a,4 (t)dt + C, / Z(o) Z(t) (c)dt + C,
( t)dt +^Z(o) -a/,2 (o)dt,

C = Z(o) -a/.# (o)dt, Z(t) = Z(o) + a | < (t)dt# f >

-1 1 9 .
t Z(t) = Z(o) + a I < (t) dt. f > o (19)
.

Medjutim, u reSavanju difereneijalne jednaSine (18) moSe se postupiti i na jedan drugi naSin. Ovaj naSin ovde 6e se takodje izIoSiti da bi se pored ostalog L pokazala saglasnost konstruisanog ma tematiSkog modela, odnosno, jednoznaSnost dobijenih opStih reSenja. Naime, ako se jednaSina (17) pomnoSi diferenoijalnim elementom dt, onda ona dobija diferencijalni oblik dZ(t) = adX(t), (2o)

u kojem su promenljive razdvojene* UzimajuSi integral leve i desne strane jednaSine (20), dobija se promehljiva veliSina Z(t) kao funkoija sa proizvoljnom integraoionom konstantom C Z(t) = aX(t) + C. (21)

Prema analognom postupku kao pri resavanju diferencijalne jednaSine (10), nalazi se da integraciona konstanta C u jednaSini (21) ima vrednost G = Z(o) - aX(o)# (22)

ZamenjujuSi vrednost konstante C is jednaSine (22) u jednaSinu (2 1 ), dobija se sledeSi odredjen oblik resenja: Z(t) = aX(t) + Z(o) - aX(o), (23)

koji se mo5e svesti na oblik resenja dat jednaSinom (19). Naime, ako se odredjena vrednost promenljive veliSine X(t) iz jednaSine (16) zameni u jednaSinu (23), onda ona dobija oblik 5) Ovaj drugi naSin reSavanja dovodi do takvog oblika resenja diferenqijalne jednaSine, koji je pogodan za konkretno odredjivanje parametra a na bazi empiriSkih podataka, koristeSi se pri tome metodom regresije.

- 120 lo

Z(t) = a[X(o) + J

4>(t)at] + Z(o) - aX(o).

(24)

PoSto se veliSine aX(o) sa suprotnim predznacima potiru, jednaSina (24) konaSno dobija oblik Z(t) = Z(o) + a

JQ <$>..'(t) 'dt, V; '

'

,(25)

koji je identiSan sa oblikom resenja ddtim jednaSinom (19) Prema . tome, ovim je. potvrdjena saglasnost kostruisanog matematiSkog modela , kao I jednoznaSnost njegovih resenja* ' , Kad su na ovaj naSin jednaSinama (16) i (l9) dobijena odredjena funkcionalna reSenja za dve promenljive veliSine X(t) i Z(t), onda se ,za tredu promenl jivu T(t) lako nalazi odgovaraju&e resenje iz prve jednacine sistema (9), koja kad definiciona jednaSina ima jednostavan nediferencijalni oblik Z(t) = X(t) + Y(t). (26)

Uaime, kada se vrednosti promenl ji^ih veliSina za X(t) i Z(t) ia . ' jednaSina (16) i (19) zamene u je&naSizm (26), onda se za promenljivu veliSirui Y(i) dobija odgova2 a u 5e veien je u sle&edem odredjenom *j< . obliku: * . . Y(t) = Z(o) - X(o) + (a-l)

J <(t)dt*
o

(27)

Ako se sada u jednaSini (27) za basal godisnji period stavi.t=o, onda se za vrednost druStvenog.proizvoda Y(o) u baznom periodu do ;bija ' . . Y(o) = Z(o) - X(o), (28) _

Sto predsta-jUja samo specijalan sluSaj jednaSine (26). Zamenjujudi vrednost za Y,(o) iz jednaSine (28) u jednaSina (27), konaSno se za promenljivu veliSinu Y(t) dobija odgovarajude reSenje u slededem odredjenom obliku:

- 121
t Y(t) = Y(o) + (a-l) J o Na kraju, ako se jednaSine (16), (19) i (29) pove5u u jedan sistem jednaSina, onda se dobija konstruisani matematiSki ekonom ski model u sledeSem opstem ali matematiSki resenom obliku: t X(t) = X(o) + <(t)dt, <(t)dt. (29)

11

J
o '

t Z(t) = Z(o) + a f o
t

$(t)dt,

(30)

Y(t) = Y(o) + (a-l) j <(t)dt, o EeSeni oblik sistema jednaSina (30) oslobodjen je diferencijalnih ele menata, ali on sadrSi funkcije' izraSene u obliku odredjenog integrala. Medjutim, funkcionalni oblik odredjenog integrala mo5e se vrlo lako svesti na oblik obiSne funkcije Sim se proizvoljnoj fuhkciji $(t) da odredjen matematiSki oblik. Ovo Se se uSiniti u sledeSoj fazi u kojoj 6e reSeni oblik konstruisanpg matematiSkog ekonomskog modela (30) posluSiti kao osnova za konstrukciju konkretno odredjenog ekonometrij skog modela. ' IV. Konstrukcija ekonometrijskog modela za razvoj industrije i rudarstva

. ,

Konstruisati ekonometrijski model na bazi nekog matematiS kog ekonomskog modela znaSi konkretrio odrediti sve neodredjene parametre, kSto i eyentualne proizvoljne funkcije, koji se pojavljuju u matematiSki reSenom obliku konstruisanog matematiSkog modela. Posto se ovo odredjivarije vrsi na osnovu empiriSkih podataka, to se u tu

svrhu mora uzeti u razmatranje i obradu neki odredjen konkretan slu3aj. '
,

Ovde f e se uzeti u reSavanje konkretan problem razvoja indui strije i rudarstva Jugoslavije. Ova privredna delatnost ima kljucni karakter za celokupnu privredu, te je od interesa da se.bas ona uzme za ilustraciju konstruisanog ekonomskog modela. Razlog vise, za ovu privrednu delatnost raspolaSe se najpouzdanijim statistiSkim podacima. Osnovni statistiSki podaci, ,koji su posluSili kao empiriSka osnova za konstrukciju ekonometrijskog modela, prikazani su pregledno u prilozenoj tabeli 1. Jedinice u kojima su izrazene vrednosti promenljivih veliSina su milijarde. Radi homogeaiiieta promenljivih veliSina, sve njihove vrednosti izrazene su u cenama 1956. godine0 Izvor statistiSkih podataka. evidencija Sektora industrije Saveznog je zavoda za privredno planiranje. : Osnovni podaci za konstrukci.iu modela Redni broj GodiSnji period Redni br. godilsnjeg perioda x . Materijalni troskovi xt 263,2' 335,8 378,2 . 395,7 396,8 380,5 451,4 502,3 587,5 663,5 787,2 880,2 979,7 342,1 . 432,6 473,7 478,6 452,3 438,0 482,8 552,4 644,7 712,6 824,5 929,2 1.015,6 DruStveni proizvod Bruto druStverd proiavod v 605',3 768,4 851,9 874,3 849,1 818,5 934,2 1.055,2 1.232,2 1.376,1 1.611,7 1.809,4 1.995,3 Tabela 1

1947 1948 3 1949 4 1950 5 1951 6 1952 1953 7 8 1954 ' '9: 1955,. " o * . 1956 lV-. 1 1 1957 1958 12 13 1959

1 2

0 1 2
3 4 5

6
7

8
9

10 11 12

Kao prvi korak u konstruisanju ovog ekonometrijskog modela, odredifie se proizvoljna funkcija $(t) sa odgovarajufiim parametrima u prvoj jednaSini sistema (30), koja ima sledefii opsti i matematiSki

- 123 13
resen oblik:
*

x(t) = x(0) + < <p(t) at. J L

(3 1 )

Ovo odredjfvanje izvrlsiSe se na taj naSin, sto 6e se metodama matematiSke statistike konstruisati trend ) promenljive veliSine X(t) kao najbolje prilagodjena kriva linija konkretnim empiriSkim podacima u tabeli 1. Taj trend ima sledeSi konkretan matematiSki oblik: X(t) = a , . (32)

6) PoSLo se od pretpostavke da odgovarajuSi trend treba da bude rav' nomerno ubrzano rastuSa funkcija sledeSeg matematiSkog oblika: . ._ z = a e^ . (a) -Ako se uzme prirodan logaritam jednaSine (a), onda onaudobija slede6i linearni oblik po lnx: . lnx = pt + 1 m . (b) Na osnovu prineipa najmanjih. Icvadrata za jednacinu (b) mogu se postaviti .tzv. normalne jednacine pstg + (laa)n = Slnx, p2t + (lm)St = St lnx. (c)

Iz sistema jednaSina (c) pomofiu metode determinanata za parametre p i lna dobijaju se sledeSa reSenja: |Slnx n | Stlnx St^ Stglnx - nStlnx _ p = si r.fc-r ^ r r n (Stf - nSt 2 St2| St sts| ; = 0,100278, St Sim: 1 lna = (d)

2 Stlnxl StStlnx - Strains (St)2 - nSt2

Vrednost parametra a izraSunava se pomoSu antilogaritamovanja jedna Sine (e) na slede6i naSin:

- 12k 14

gde je parametar a = 275,575, a parametar p = 0,100278, Ovde treba napomenuti da su u tabeli 1 za posmatrane promenljive velicine kao qznake upotrebljena mala slova x, y, z, da bi se istakao empiriSki karakter ovih vrednosti za razliku od ocenjenih vrednosti istih promenljivihyveliSina, koje su oznaSene velikim slovima X, Y i Z, koja. se upotrebljavaju u modelu. . Posto je jednaSina (32), u stvari, ekonometrijski ekvivalenat jednaSine (31) matematickog ekonomskog modela, to se pomofiu te ekvivalencije lako moSe odrediti vrednost parametra X(o) i proizvoljna .funkcija $(t), koji figurisu u jednaSini (3l) Naime, ako se u je-, dnaSini (32) za bazni godiSnji period stavi t=o, onda se za parametar X(o) dobija sledeSa konkretna vrednost: X(o) = a e = a = 273,575. (33) JednaSinom (33) ne samo da je odredjena vrednost parametra X(o) u jednaSini (31), veS je istovremeno odredjeno ekonomsko znaSenje para metra a u jednaSini (32), naime,. on predstavlja ocenjenu vrednost ma terijalnih troSkova u baznom periodu. . Proizvoljna funkcija (j>(t) odrediSe se na taj naSin, Sto Se se izjednaSiti desne strane ekvivalentnih jednaSina (3l) i (32) tako da se dobije sledeSa jednacinas ;
.

+ ^|^(t)dt = a ePt .

. .

(34)
.

o : ' . ' UzimajuSi pri tom izvod leve i desne strane jednaSine (34), konacno se dobija funkcija <>t) u slededem konkretno odredjenom obliku; j(

t>t = a p f()

. .

(35)

Ostaje jos da se odredi ekonomsko znaSenje parametra 3, koji se kao konkretno utvrdjea|.fvrednost pojavljuje u jednaSinama (32), (34) i (35). Naime, parametar ( predstavlja marginalnu vrednost relativne 3 stop koaatfnuiranog porasta U materijalnih troskcrca u toku vremena. 6), = //log e l m V= 273,575. . ( 10)___ ... = //0,434194 a 5,611584 =

(f)

7) Odredjivanje marginalne vrednosti. relativne stope kontinuiranog porasta, oznaSujudi je sa p, u ovom konkretnom sluSaju vrsi se na sledeSi naSin:

- 125 15
Ova marginalna vrednost obicno se izrazava u procentima, Sto ; postie 2e jednostavnim mnoSenjem sa 100 . . Kao drugi korak u konstrukciji ovog ekonometrijskog modela, odrediSe se jo neodredjeni parametri u drugoj jednaSini sistema (30), koja ima sledeSi opsti i matematiSki reSen oblik: t Z(t) = Z(o) + a

J $(t).&t.

(36)

oOdredjiyanje parametara Z(o) i a izvrSifie se pomofiu jednaSine (23), koja ima sledeSi linearni oblik: Z(t) = a X(t) + Z(o) - a X(o), (37)

koji je - kao sto.Vga^okazalo - potpuno ekvivalentan jednaSini (36). Naime, linearna zavisnost izmedju promenljivih veliSina Z(t) i X(t) od rediSe se na taj naSin* sto 6e se metodama matematiSke statistike konstruisati regresiona zavisnost kao najbolje prilagodjena linija) konkretnim podacima datim u tabeli 1. Ova regresiona zavisnost ima

= p = 0,100278, 3 6 . > gde oznaka Xv^)pi*edstavl ja izvod po vremenu

(a)

x '(t ). = i j j & i

a. P

(t)

8) Ova ekvivalencija jednaSina (56) i (37) dokazana je izvodjenjem,

koje je prikazano u I H odeljku. rada jednaSinama od rednog broja (20) do (25). 9) Poslo se od pretpostavke da odgovarajuSa regresiona zavisnost treba da bude funkcija sledeSeg oblika: Z = YX + 8 (a) Za odredjivanje parametara *f i 5 umesto normalnih jednaSina koriSSena je jedna ekvivalentna formula, koja daje jednaSinu regresione zavisnosti u sledeSem obliku: Z - ? f L (x . J). (t)

- 126 16

3lede6i konkretan oblik: Z(t) =

y

X(t) +6,
y

(38)

g l je vrednost parametra ee | = 94,58665,

= 1,935326, a vrednost parametra

PoSto je jednaSina (38), u stvari, ekonometrijski ekvivales a jednaSine (37), odnosno jednaSine (36), to se moSe napisati sle at deSa ekvivalentna jednaSina: . Z(t) - yX(t) + 6 = aX(t) + Z(o) - aX(o). (39)

Iz jednaSine (39), ako se za bazni godiSnji period stavi t=o, a imaju^i u vidu i jednaSinu (33), dobija se da je

Koeficijent korelacije izraSunat je na slede6i naSin:

r
zz

. . - / O _ 0,999294. ! (x t

(c)

2 S(a-a)ffS x-x)a (

'

'sWti

Standardne devijacije izraSunate su prema formulam a

s= riCz - z)s = 418,90616, < = S(x - x)a = r 4 n : ' N n

= 216,30048;
a aritmetiSke sredine prema formulama 5 =

(d)

= 1137,05, x =^ ~ = 538,65.

(e)

iz jeana&ina od (a) do (e) sledi da parametar y i^ia vrednost Y = r= 1,935526, (f)

a da pa^anietar: 6 ima vrednost

~ 127 -

17
. t _ Z(o) = YX(o) + 8 = . + 8 = 624,04346. (40)

Isto tako, uzimaju6i . izvod po promenljivoj veliSini X(t), iz jedna Sine (39) dobija se da je = V = a = 1,935326. dX(t) JednaSinama (40 ) i (4l) konkretno su odredjene numeriSke vrednosti parametara z(o) i a u jednaSini (36), odnosno u jednaSini (37). JednaSina (36) sada se moSe, uzimajudi u obzir jednaSine (35), (40), napisati u slededem konkretno resenom obliku;
..

(4l)

Z(t) = ay + 5 + a p y

*G

dt.

(42)

* o JecWaSisia (42) moze se osloboditi integralnog oblika i napisati 11 jednostavnijem obliku. Naime, posle izraSunavanja odredjenog integra la i svodjenja 10 ) ona se konaoao mole napisati u slededem 'konkretno reSenom obliku j . Z(t) = 8 + a y ' * (43) gde jo2 ostaje da se odrede ekonomska znaSenja za parametre y i 8 Prema jednaSinama (41) i (?) parametar Y predstavlja napred ve5

10) Odgovaraju^i postupak ima slede^i toks

E -

_
Q-b t=t

P
rg.--; ;

-to J=
-7

u > = a y + 8 + a f Y jj-

ft i

C St - a Y + S + aY" - a y

= 6 + a

e!

L_

- 128 18

definisani marginalni koeficijent efektivnosti materijainih troSkova 1 u o&nosu na bruto drustveni proizvod. Parametar 8 predstavlja asimpto-f tsku vrednost bruto drustvenog proizvoda, koja odgovara graniSnom slu-, 1 Saju kada t - o , odrxosno kada Z(t) o o. To znaSi da parametar 8 pred| stavlja onu vrednost bruto drustvenog proizvoda, koja prema modelu .WM postoji Sak i kad nema nikakvnih.materijalnih troskova! Ova okolnost nesumnjivo ukazuje na to da moguSnosti ekstrapolac.ije modela nisu Jj| neogranicene. Uostalom, to vazi u manjoj ili veSoj meri za sve ekono- >|j | metrijske modele. . ' iffa Kao tredi korak u konstrukciji ovog ekonometrijskog modela, ostaje jos da se supstituisu konkretno odredjeni parametri u treSoj jednaSini-sistema (30), koja ima slede&L opsti i matematiSki resen oblik: j ,

i *

:5
j
1

Y(t) = Y(o) + (a - 1)

r* <>t) dt. f(

(44)

o U stTari, u jednaSini (44) treba konkretno da se odredi vrednost pa-.. : rametra Y(o).*i Naime, zamenjuju6i konkretne vrednosti za parametre ' IZ(o) i X(o) iz jednaSina (40)i (33) u jednaSinu (28), dobija se da je .. . . . Y(o) = a y + 8 - a = 350,46846. (45)

.Aka sada u jednaSinu (44) zamenimo vrednosti parametara Y(o) i a, kao i vrednost funkoije $(t), koje su konkretno ddredjene jednaSinama (45), (4l) i (35), onda ona dobija sledeSi konkretno odredjen oblik: Y(t) = a v + 5 - a + (y

J a

^ e^dt.

(46)

Medjutxm, posle izraSunavanja odredjenog integrala i svodjenja^*)* jednaS5jaa (46J moSe se konaSno napisati u slede6em konkretno reSenom

1 1 j OdgovarajaSi postupak ima sledeSi

Y(t) r a Y + 5 - a +! ( - l) : y : =av+S**i+(Y-l)j[ct. ja p ~ e^u **a]

t=t

= a (y - l ) + 8 + <(y - l ) e^ 0 - c,(y - l ) x j = 5 + a (y - l)e^

- 129 19

obliku: Y(t) = 8 + a (y - l)e^ , (47)

gde' svi parametri koji se po javJLjuju imaju ve ranije odredjene numeriSke vrednosti i utvrdjena ekonomska znaSenja.
Ako se na kraju jednaSine (32),f (43) i (47) poveSu u * jedan sistem, onda se dobija konstruisani ekonometrijski model ra zvoja industrije i rudarstva u svom konkretnom i matematiSki resenom obliku

X(t) = a ept,
Z(t) = 8 +

e^ *

(48)

Y(t) = 8 + a (y - l) e^, gde svi parametri koji se pojavljuju imaju ve ranije odredjene numeriSke vrednosti i utvrdjena ekonomska znaSenja. . Izvrsena konstrukcija ekonometrijskog modela za razvoj industrije i rudarstva u Jugoslaviji posluziSe kao osnova za daljS- . fazu konkretne primene u oblasti privrednog planiranja. Naime, na bazi ovog konkretnog modela izvrSifie se ekstrapolacija promenljivih veliSina, odnosno, izracunaSe se njihove projekcije za odredjen budui period* V. Projekcije za period 1960-1980* Ovde Se se izvrSiti projekcije za dugoroSni period plani ranja, p . Se se na taj naSin obuhvatiti kako srednjoroSni, tako i a kratkoroSni periodi planiranja sa istim zajedniSkim uslcwima. Prema tome, moze se smatrati da je u ovu svrhu dovoljno ako se izvrse pro jekcije za period 1960-1980. U stvari, ovde^Se se projekcije izvrsiti pomoSu ekstrapolacije promenljive veliSine materijalnih troskova na bazi anrpiri,Skih podataka za period 1947-1959. Medjutim, posto je razvoj u ovom periodu bio u velikoj meri neujednaSen, to Se se pored ove znatno blaze varijante uzet-i u obzir i jedna jaSa varijanta, koja Se se izraditi na bazi empiriSkih podataka za period 1952-1959, koji veS pokazuje izrazit i stabilan rast. Na kraju, pokazaSe se da je ova druga varijanta ne samo povaLjnija, vefi i realistiSnija, dakle, da je prihvatljivija.

- 130 20

Kao baza za izradu predvidjezdh dugoroSnih projekcija prema prvoj varijanti ekonometrijskog modela sluSi veS konstruisan sistem i jednaSina (48), koji se mo5e napisati u slede6em konkretnom numsriS- . / kom oblika:

X(t) * 275,575 e 100278 * ,

Z(t) = 94,58665 + 275,575 . 1,935326 e0*10q)278t, T(t) = 94,58665 + 273,575(1,935526 - l)e0 ,1 0278 V Posle izvrsenja oznaSenih numeriSkih izraSunavanja, sistem jednaSi na (49) moSe se napisati u slede^em konaSnom oblika: X(t) = 275,575 e100278 t, Z(t) - 94,58665 + 529,45681 e100278 t^ Y(t) = 94,58665 + 255,88181 e>100278 t^ Na osnovu sistema jednaSina (50) israSimavaju se vrednosti projekoija za svaku pojedinu godisns na taj naS.in, sto se parametru t daju odgovarajuSe vrednosti celih brojeva* Yrednosti celih brojeva od 0 do 12 odgovaraju proteklom periodu 1947-1959 (videti tabelu 2), dok vred- nosti celila brojeva od 1535 odgovas'aju planskom periodu 1960-1980 (videti tabelu 3)* Na primer, vrednost materijalnih. troSkova u 1947* godini izraSunava ae is prve jedn&Sine sistema (50) stavljajuSi t=o, tako da se dobije resultat X(o) ~ 275,575* Za vrednost t=l, koja odgovara 1948. godini, dobija se raaultat X(l) = 502,455 itd* Na isti naSin iaraSunavaju se i vradnosti drustvenog proizvoda kao i bruto drustvenog proizvoda iz druge i tre<5e jednaSine sistema (50)* Sve tako izraSunate vrednosti promenljivih veliSina prema konstruisanom ekonometrijskom modelu (prva var.ijanta) za protekli period (1947^-1959) prikazane su u tabeli 2. . Na isti naSin kao za proiekli period (1947-1959) izraSuna(49)

vaju se vrednosti projekeija promenljivih veliSina na osnovu sistema jednaSina (50) za dugoroSni planski period (1960-1980)* Na primer,
projektovana vrednost ma;berijalnih troskova u,196o. , godini izraSu' nava se iz prve jednaSine s5.stema (50) stavljajuSi t=15, tako da se dobije resultat X(l5) = l,007,5o Sve tako izraSunate vrednosti projekcija promenljivih veliSim prema konstruisanom .ekonometrijskom modelu (prva varijanta) za dugoroSl-JL. plansJrf. period (l96o-1980) prikazane su u tabeli 5*

Tabela 2
Promenljive VeliSine prema konstruisanom modelu Protekli period 1947-1959. Eedni broj GodiSnji .period Redni broj godiSnjeg perioda t Materijalni troSkovi X(t) 273,6 302,4 334,3 >,369,6 408,6 451,7 499,3 552,0 610,2 674,6 745,7 824,7 911,3 Varijanta I DruStveni proizvod ?(t) 350,4 377,5 407,3 440,3 476,7 517,0 561,6 610,9 665,3 725,5 792,1 865,7 947,0 Bruto ' drustveni proizvod Z(t) 624,0 679,9 741,6 809,9 885,3 968,7 1.060,9 1.162,9 1.275,5 1.400,1 1.537,8 1.690,1 1.858,3

1 2
3 4 5

6
7

8
9

10 11 12
13

1947 1948 1949 1950 1951. 1952 1953 1954 19551956 1957 1958 1959

0 1 2
3 4 5

6
' 7

8
9

10 11 12

Ako se sada izvrsi uporedjivanje izmedju empiriSkih podataka promenljivih veliSina, &atih\u;tabeli 1 , i izracunatih vrednosti promenljivih veliSina prema konstruisanom modelu (vari janta I), datih u tabeli 2 , onda se moSe dati ocena stepena prila godjenosti samog modela protekiom stvarnom ekonomskom kretanju* Ova ocena mole, u stvari, da posluSi kao dobra indikacija i za pouzda- . nost kao i realistiSnost izracunatih vrednosti projekcija dugoroSnog planskog perioda, datih u tabeli 3* Pre nego sto 6e se pristupiti konkretnom izraSunavanju ovih ocena, da6e se grafiSki prikaz uporedjivanja izmedju empiriSkih podataka i izraSunatih.vrednosti prema konstruisanom modelu za protekli period (1947'tSL-959). Ovaj prikaz, koji komparativno objedinjuje i ilustruje tabelu 1 i tabelu 2, dat je u grafikonu 1 . Premda ovaj grafiSki prikaz omoguSuje samo grubu ocenu i analizu, ipak se ve<5 iz njega moSe dobiti izvesna orijentacija.

- 132 -

22

Orafikon 1 UoplriJko i izraSunate vrednosti jronenljivih valiiin* Varijanta I

Protekli period 19^7-1959.

- 133 23 Tabela 3
Fro.1efcei.ie promepl.iivih vellSina prema konstmsanom modelu
Dugorocni planskx period 1960-1980. . Varijanta I

Redni broj

GodiSnji period

Redni broj godiSnjeg perioda t

13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Haterijalni troSkovi
x(t) 1.007,5 1.113,7 1.231,2 1.361,1 1.504,6 1.663,3 1.838,8 2.032,7 2.247,2 2.484,2 2.746,2 3.035,9 3.356,1 5.710,0 4.101,4 4.554,0 5.012,2 5.540,9 6,125,4 6.771,4 7.485,7

Drustveni proizvod Y(t)

Bruto drustveni proizvod z(t)

2.044,4 2.250,0 2.477,4 2*728,7 3.006,5 3.313,7 3*653,2 4.028,6 4*445,6 4.902,5 5.409,4 5*970,0 6.589,7 7.274,6 8.032,1 8.869,4 9.794,8 10.818,0 11* 949,3 13*199,4 14*581,8

1 2
3 4 5 -

6
7

8
9

10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

20 21 22
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

1*056,9 1.156,5 1.246,2 1.567,6 1.501,9 1*650,4 1.814,4 1.995,9 2.296,4 2.418,1 2.665,2 2.934,1 3.235,6 5.564,6 3.930,7 4.335,4 4.782,6 5.277,1 5.823,9 6.428,0 7*096,1

Naime, jasno sefezapaSa da su razlike izmedju empiriSkih ppdataka (crtiSasto izvuSene linije) i izraSunatih vrednosti prema modelu (neprekidno izvuSene linije) znatno ve6e u prvoj paLovini posmatranog proteKLog perioda nego u drugoj poloyini. Specijalno, te razlike su najve6e u 1952. godini(za -b=5) i iznose: 2(5) - X - = 451,7 j - 580*5 = 71,2 ^(5) - Y_ = 517,0 - 438,0 = 79,0, Z(5) - z_ = 968,? ^8L895 = 150,2* Medjutim* uporedivost i bolja ocena

0 ih apsolutnih *7

24
razlika dobija se ako se one izraze u relativnom obliku pomo6u procenata, uzimajuSi za bazu odgovaraju6e izraSunate vrednosti prema modelu* Naime, te relativne razlike u procentima iznose . *(5) 100 = 15,76$, 100 = 15,28$, Y(5) 2(5) Z(5) - z 5 100 = 15,51 $* Kada se ima u vidu da su sve ostale z'elatiivne razlike dosta manje, onda se ve<5 moSe re6i da .je prilagodjenost -modela stvarnim podacima uglavnom zadovoljavaju6a. . Ipak, za precizniju ocenu stepena prilagodjenosti modela stvarnosti potrebno je izraSunati neku pogodnu mera disperzije empiriSkih 'podataka oko izracunatih vrecLnosti* Kao pogodna mera disperzije ovde 6e se upotrebiti relativna standardna devijacija ili koeficijent varij a c ije^^)empiriSkih podataka oko izraSunatih vrednosti* Odgovarajufii koeficijenti' vari jacije za sve tri promenljive veliSine izraSunavaju se na slede6i na5in: .. . = 8,01 $, - 7' 5

^(t)

= 8,82 %, T

(51)

Z(t)* _ gde upotrebljene oznake x('t) i Z(t) predstavljaju odgcrvarajufie aritmetiSke sredine: 12) Ova

-1 -

= 8,39 $,

mera disperzije pogodna je zbog,toga Sto se m izraSunati oSe U procentima i Sto omogufiuje uporedivost*

25

X(t) = y--

\ ?:(t) = 535,21, t=o

12
................ .

Y (t) = -JL.

= 595,18,

(52)

13 L
Z(t) = i

t=o 12
^ Z ( t ) = 1130,38.
.

t=o

IzraSunati rezultati. proseSnih ralaijivmh odstupanja u sve tri jednaSine (51) dovoljno ubedljivo pokazuju da je prilagodjenost izraSunatih vrednosti na osnova modela prema sivarnim podacima zais,ta priliSno zadovoljavajufia, te da se moSe oSekivati da 6e i prilagodjenost ekstrapolacijom projektovaaih vrednosti biti isto tako , dovoljno zadovoljavaju6a. Kao baza za izradu predvidjenih dugoroSnih. projekcija pre ma drugoj varijanti ekonometrijskog modela sluli sistem jednaSina, koji je analogan sistemu (50) i koji ima sledeSi konkretan numericki oblik: '
X(t) = 196,220 e>136022 Z(t) = 56,597 + 389,223 e0*136022 tJ Y(t) = 56,597 + 193,003 e0*136022 Sistem jednaSina (53) odredjen je istim postupkom kao i sistem (50), ssuno.su. se -za period 1952-1959. koristili osnovni empiriSki podaci iz tabele 1 * Na osnovu sistema jednacina (53) izraSunate su vrednos ti promenljivih veliSina za protekli period (1952-1959) i prikazane u tabeli 4* Na isti nacin kao za protekli period (1952-1959) izraSu nate su vrednosti projekcija promenljivih veliSina na osnovu siste ma jednaSina (53) za dugoroSni planski period (1960-1980 ), Sve < tako izraSunate vrednosti projekcija promenljivih veliSina prema (53 )

- 136 26

T abela 4
Promenl.iive veliSine prema konatruisanom modelu ' ' ' '. ' Protekli period 1952-1959* Varijanta II
Redni "broj GodiSnji period Redni broj godiSnjeg perioda t 5 Materijalni troSkovi " x(t) 387,4 443,8 508,5 582,6 667,4 764,7 876,1 1*003,7 DruStveni pro izvod Y(t) 437,6 493,1 556,7 629,6 713,1 808,7 918,3 1,043,9 Bruto druStveni proizvod Z(t) 825,0 936,9 1*065,2 1 *212,2 1*380,5 1*573,4 1*794,4 2*047,6

1 2
3 4 5

6
7

1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959

6
7

8
9 10 11 12

konstruisanom ekonometrijskom modelu (druga varijanta) za dugoroSni plansld. period (l9601980) prikazane su u tabeli 5* Ovde 5e se takodje izvrSiti uporedjivanje izmedju odgovaraju^ih empiriSkih podataka promenljivih veliSina, datih u tabeli 1 , i izraSunatih vredttosti promenl jiviJi veliSina premia konstruisanom modelu (varijanta II), datih u tabeli 4, kako hi se mogla dati ooena atepena prilagodj enosti samoga modela proteklom stvarnom ekonomskom kretanju* U tu svrhu prethodnp se daje grafiSki prikaz uporedjivanja izmedju empirlSklh. podataka i izraSunatih vrednosti prema konstruisanom modelu za protekli period (1952-1959)* Ovaj prikaz, koji komparativno objdinjuje i ilustrije odgovaraju6i deo tabele 1 i tabelu 4, dat je u grafikonu 2* " Ve6 na prvi pogled iz ovog grafikona jasno se zapaSa da su ra alike izmedju empiriSkih podataka (ortiSasto izvuSene linije) i izraSunatih vrednosti prema modelu (neprekidno izvuSene linije) relativno vrlo male, U svakom sluSaju, uporedjivanjem sa grafikonom 1 , odmah se zapaSa da su te razlike izrazito i znatno manje. Ulustraoije radi navode se procentualne vrednosti relativnih razlika u 1959* godini za t=12, kada su te razlike bile najvefie u i

- 137 27
Grafikon 2 EapirUke 1 izraiunate Trednosti promenl jivih veliSina Protekli period 1952-1959. X,T,Z Varijanta II Z/t/

200 100 _

1953.

195^.

1955.

9 1956.

TO----- U ----- Ef 1957. 1958. 1959.

- 138 28

Tabfela 5 Pro.jekci.je promenl.jivih veliSina prema konstruisanom modelu DugoroSni planski period 1960-1980. Redni "broj GodiSnji period Redni.'broj godisnjeg -perioda t 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Materijalni trofkovi X(t) 1.150,0 1.317,6 1.509,5 1.729,5 1.981,5 2.270,3 2.601,0 2.980,0 3.414,2 3.911,7 4.481,6 5.134,7 5.882,8 6.739,9 7.721,8 8.847,2 10.136,3 11.613,2 13.305,4 15.243,9 17.465,1 Varijanta H Drustven; proizvod Y(t) 1.187,8 1.352,5 1.541,4 I,257,8 2.005,6 2.289,6 2.615,0 2.987,7 3.414,8 .3.904,1 4.464,7 5.107,1 5.843,0 6.686,0 7.652,0 8.758,7 10.026,8 11.479,5 13.143,9 15.050,5 17.235,4 Bruto dru stveni , jproizvod ?(t) 2.337.8 2.670.1 3.050.9 3.487.3 3.987.1 4.559.9 5.216.0 5.967.7 6.829.0 7.815.8 8.946.3 10.241.8 11.725.8 13.425.9 15.373.8 17.605.9 20.163,1 23.092,7 26.449.3 30.294.4 34.700.5

1 2
3 4 5

6
7

8
9

10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 :

20 21

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 '1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

20 21 22
23 24 25 26 27 28
76

30 31 32 33

posmatranom periodu. Ove razlike, sa odgovarajuSim najveSim raalikama X(l2 ) x, varijante I u zagradi, dmaju sledeSe vrednosti: x2 Z(l2^ - i*39 ^ ^ 15*76 ' ^ s , . 100 = 2,71 $(15,28% ), 100 = 2,55 % (1 Hedjutim, jos odredjenija ocena stepena prilagodjenosti dot>i6e se ako se izraSunaju odgovara-

- 139 29

jui koeficijenti varijacije empiriSkih podataka oko izraSunatih. vrednosti. Ovi koeficijenti vari jacije-^7, sa odgovaraju6inr"kpefioijentima varijante I u zagradi, imaju slede^e vrednosti: V = 1,9392 (8,01$), V = 1,97 $ (8,82 $), V = 1,85 $ (8,39 $). 'Uporedjivanjem ovih vredn^sti koeficijen^ta vanjacije sa odgovaraju6im vrednostima u zagradama bez daljega se moSe zakljuSiti da druga varijanta modela m daleko ve5i stepen prilagodjenosti stvarnim empiriSkim podacima ia u posmatraaom proteklom periodu od stepena prilagodjenosti prve vari jante modela. Ovo svakako govori u prilog ve6e realisticnosti samo druge varijante, -^0 razume se, pod pretpostavkom da 6e se zakpnite tendencije razvoja u posmatranom periodu bez ve6ih promena projektovati i u buduinosti. Da bi se procenilo koja je varijanta kao celina povoljnija i prihvatljivija, potrebno je uzeti u razmatranje i odgovaraju<5e projekcije dugoroSnog planskog perioda (1960-1980). Medjutim,pri tome Se se dugoroSni planski period sukcesivno podeliti na dva petogodiSnja i jedan diesetogodisnji potperiod, (sto ne iskljuSuje i neku drugu podelu). Radi olakSavanja ovog razmatranja za prvi petogodiSnji planski potperiod (1960-1965) dade se grafiSki prikaz projekcija obe varijante na grafikonu 3, za drugi petogodisnji planski potperi od (1965-1970) na grafikonu 4, a za desetogodisnji planski potperiod (1970-1980) na grafikonu 5* Svald. od ova tri sokcesivna planska.potperioda obuhvata i prethodni godiSnji period kao i svoj bazni godisnji period, Sto omogufiuje i posebno razmatranje i analizu svakog planskog potperioda kao relativno nezavisne celine. Sva tri grafiSka prikaza za ove sukeesivne planske potperiode komparativno objedinjuju i ilustruju odgovaraju6e delove tabele 3 i tabele 5. 13) Vrednosti ovih koeficijenata varijacije izracunati su prema istim onira formulama, koje su primenjene u jednaSinama (51) i (52). 14) Ovde treba imati u vidu da je pouzdanost ocene za drugu varijantu ipak nesto umanjena u odnosu na ocenu za prvu varijantu, jer su posmatrani periodi ovih varijanata razliSite duzine, sto proizilazi iz teorije ocenjivanja na osnovu uzorka, Za isti stepen pouzdanosti, medjutim, ocena za drugu varijantu jos uvek imaju daleko manji interval moguSih varijacija, a to znaci da imaju daleko ve6u taSnost.

30

- 140 Qraflkon 3 Izraiunata vrodnoati prejekeij* prooealjivih vsllliia

Varijanta I i II

Planski potperiod 1960-1965*

X ,Y ,Z

- Ibl 31

U sva tri ova grafikona (3, 4 1 5 ) projekcije materijalnih troskova za obe varijante [X^(t) i Z^(t)] oznaSene su neprekidno izvucenim linijama, projekcije druStvenog proizvoda za obe varijante tYl(t) i Ta(t)] ozna&ene su crtiSasto isprekidanim linijama, a pro jekcije bruto drustvenog proizvoda za obe varijante [Z. (t) i Zg(t)] oznacene su naizmeniSno crtiSastim i taSkastim \Linijama* Iz grafikona 3 za prvi petogodiSnji planski potperiod (1960-1965) jasno se zapaSa da je varijanta II, nazvana "jaSa", osetno povoljnija od "blaSe" varijante I, jer pokazujene samo visi nivo odgovarajudih projekcija promenljivih veliSina, ve6 i brSi tempo njihovog rasta. Sam porast u procentima u ovom potperiodu, uzimaju6i 1960. godinu za baznu i stavljaju6i odgovaraju6e procente za varijantu I u zagrade, iznosi prema varijanti H za materijalne troskove: X (18) - X_(13) 1 _ )-,J\ = 97,42% (65,09%)* za drustveni proizvod: 2 Y2(18) - Y (13) , ^ -2 * 100 = 92,76% (59,17%), a za Z fl3^ " J V - L5;
a

^ bruto druStvefii; .proizvod:

Z (1.8)

. 100 = 95,05 %

(62,09). Prema tome, razlike u proceritima porasta odgovaraju6ih projekcija promenljivih velicina i kvantitativno potvrdjuju da je varijanta II u ovom petogodisnjem potperiQdu zaista osetno povoljnija. Iz grafikona 4 za drugi potogodiSnji planski pot-period (1965-1970) takodje se jasno zapaSa da je varijanta II joS u ve6oj meri povoljnija od varijante I, jer pokazuje ne samo izrazito visi nivo odgovaraju^ih projekcija promenljivih velicina, ve6 i dalje brzi tempo njihovog rasta. Sam porast u procentima u ovom potperiodu, uzimaju6i 1965. godinu za bazu i stavljajufii odgovaraju6e procente za varijantu I u zagrade, iznosi prema varijanti II za materijalne troskove: X9(23) - X (l8) - * 100 = 97,40 ^ C65*1 1 #)* za ^ustve X (18) , . . Y (23) - Y J 1 8 ) ni proizvod: _ 2 - ^ ^ 2 --^ 100 _ 95>00 ^ (61^37 f0)f a za

1^4-2 "
promonljivih velicina Varijwita I i II

32
Iura&ujiat* vrodBMti projekcija PIanski potperiod 1965-1970. 9.00C

Offko ^ rtlo

8.500
8.000

7.500 7 . 000.

6.500 6 .0 0 0

5.500

5.000

4.500

4.000

3.500

3.000
2.500
2.000

1.500

- 3A3 33
bruto drustveni proizvod: Z9(23) - Zp(l8) ^ ---- j f lOO = 96,20 % Zgllo;

(63,24 $). Prema tome, i ove razlike u procentima porasta odgovarajuc b. projekcija promenljivih velieina kvantitativno potvrdjuju da je v,.; i varijanta II u ovom petogodilnjem potperiodu vrlo osetno povoljnija. Najzad, iz grafikofta 5 za desetogodiinji planski potperiod (1970-1980) isto tako se jasno zapaza da je varijanta II ponovo jos u vecoj meri povoljnija. od varijante I* jer poka;zuje ne samo vrlo iz~ : raaito vrsi nivo odgovarajucih projekcija promenljivih velicina, vec i dalje brzi tempo njihovog rasta. Sam porast u procentima u ovom pot periodu, usimajuci 1970. godinu za basu i ostavljajuci odgcrvarajuce proaente za varijantu I u zagrade, iznosi prema varijanti II za

materijalne troSkoves

Z (33) - 2^(23) ---- x (25)

* 'L00 =

$ *
=

, (172,58 % ) , za drustveni proizvod;

V 33) - 2V)---2?) ^ ( 3
2j '

= 286,04 % (166,45 % ) , a za bruto driiStveni proizvod; Z (35) - 2L(23) ^ ^ _ ' ' 1 * 100 = 287,88 % (169,56 % ) , Prema tome, 1 ovde pono
2 *

vo ra&Like u procentima porasta odgovarajudih projekoija promenljivih veliSiaa kvaatitativno potvrdjuj? da je varijanta II u ovom desetogodisnjem potperiodu i dalje vrlo osetao povoljnija. Ako se sada ova tri potperioda posmatraju kao jedan celovit dugoroSai planski period (1960-1980), onda i s dosadasnjeg izlaganja jasno proizilazi zakljucak da je druga varijanta i kao celina izrazito vrlo osetno povoljsaitfa, od prve varijante kako po nivou odgovaraju6ih projekcija pramenljivih veliSina, tako i po tempu njihovog rasta. Sam porast u procentima u celom dugorocnom planskom periodu, uzimaju6i 1960. godinu za bazu i st.avljajudi odgovarajude proceate za prvu varijantu u zagrade, , iznosi prema drugoj varijanti materijalne

troSkove:

X ^33^ X ("^3 )

* 100 = 1.418,70 % (643,00 % ) , =

3 a drustveni proizvod; 5

"y (iS^*"" * 2 * -

^ (584,36 f o ) $

3k

- lV f -
Orafikon 5 IsraSunate vrednoeti projekcija promenljivih veliiina Planski potperiod 1970-1980.
Varijanta I i II

3 6 .0 0 0

34.000
3 2 .0 0 0 3 0 .0 0 0

28.000
2 6 .0 0 0

24.000 22.000
20.000 18 .0 0 0 16 .0 0 0

14.000
12.000 10.000

8.000

6J 000
4.000
2.000

"i

-1^5 -

35 Z (33) - Z (13)
a za bruto drustveni proizvod: - Zg(l3) " 100 = 1*384,32 $

(613,26 $). Prema tome, razlike u procentima porasta odgovarajucih projekeija promenljivih veliSina i kvantitativno nesumnjivo potvrdju-# ju da je druga varijanta i u celom dugorocnom(dvadesetogodisnjem) planskom periodu zaista i vrlo osetno povoljnija. Naime, dok prva va rijanta do kraja celog dugoroSnog planskog perioda (1960-1980) omogucuje povecanje nivoa vrednosti projekcija promenijivih veliSina za oko sest puta u odnosu na pocetni (bazni) godiSnji period (i960), dotle druga varijanta omoguduje odgovaraj < 9 povecanje za oko cetrnau5 est puta, dakle, osetno vise nego dvostruko. Na kraju, treta istaci da bi jedna varijanta bila prihvatIjiva od neke druge.kao osnova ili kao orijentacija za privredno planiranje, potrebno je ne samo da ona bude osetno povoljnija, ve<5 i da bude u dovoljnoj meri realistiSna. U ovom konkretnom slucaju, odgovor na pitanje o dovoljnoj i vedoj realisticnosti jedne od varijanata ne daju samo projekcije za dugorocni planski period, ved odnos odgovara judih izracunatih vrednosti i empirickih. podataka u proteklom periodu, na osnovu 3ije zakonomsirnosti razvoja je bio konstruisan sam ekonome trijski model. Medjutim, u prethodnom izlaganju (str. 21-29) vec je izvrseno uporedjivanje izmedju odgovaraju.cih Izraounatih vrednosti i empirickih podataka, te je na nesumn.jiv naSin utvrdjeno da je druga varijanta anatno reali&tionija od prve, posto su njene izracunate vrednosti znatno b d je prilagodjene odgovarajudim empiriekim podacima. Zbog toga sada ostaje jos. da se utvrdi da li je ta realistienost dru ge Varijante i sama po sebi zadovoljavajuca. Da bi se doneo sud o tome, da li je druga varijanta dovoljno realistiSaa, odnosno da li su izracunate vrednosti ha osnovu modela dovoljno prilagodjene empiriSkiin podacima, potrebno je prethodno izabrati jedan odredjen kriterijum. Ovde de se usvojiti, kriterijum, koji se u praksi kao zadovoljavajuci najcesde primenjuje, a prema kome se izracunate (ocenjene) vrednosti smatraju kao dovoljno prilagodjene empiriSkim podacima ako velieina dve (relativne) standardne greske ne iznosi (bar ne osetno) vise od 5$, uzimajudi ocenjene (izrafiunate) vrednosti promenljivih veliSina za 100$. Posto izracunate vrednosti odgovarajudih koeficijenata varijacije empirickih podataka oko iaraSunatih vrednosti promenljivih velicina: = 1,97$ i = = 1,85$ (str* 29), u stvari, predstavljaju prosecne relativne greske ocena promenljivih veliSina, to se ove izraSunate ocene promenljivih

velicina, f>rema drugoj varijanti modela zaista mogu smatrati voljavajude p^ilagodjejiS?;! dovoljnG realisticne. Prema tome, ne projekcije za dugoroSni planski period (1960-1980 ) pomocu rijante ekonometrijskog modela trebalo bi isto tako smatrati voljavajude i prihvatljive.

kao sadoi izvrsedruge va-, kao zado-

Medjutim, pri tcme se moraju imati u vidu i odredjene pretpostavke u pogledu zakonomernosti razvoja u naSoj i svetskoj privredi, Naime, mora 3e pretpostaviti da je u posmatranom periodu (1952-1959) nasa privreda imala dovoljno stabilizovanu i jednoobraznu (homogerm) zakonomernost u raavoju, koja ce te razvojne tendencije zadrzati'i sa uspehom se odupreti ili prilagoditi eventualnim (nepozeljnim ili objek tivno nametnutim) bilo spoljasnjim bilo unutrasnjim smetnjama ili poremecajima. Nepostojanje ovih pretpostavki i uslova, razume se, moglo bi samo negativno uticati kako m realisticnost i prihvatljivost, tako i na ostvarljivost dugoroSnih projekcija druge varijante. Imajuci u vidu ovaj momenat uslovljenosti, kao i neke druge relevanine osobine modela i iavrsenih projekcija, pre-nego sto bi se pristupilo zakljuSnim, potrebno je izvrsiti i izvesna dopunska raarcatranja.

71. Dopunska i zakljucna razmatranja Izvrsene projeckije promenljivih veliSina za dugorocai plan ski period (1960-1980) pomodu ekonomskog modela - koji je konstruisan na bazi empiriSkih podataka za odredjeni protekli period uz pretpostav ku da je u r jemu privreda dovoljno stabilisovana, tako da se tendeneii je jednoobra&ne zakonomernosti u razvoju nede bitno menjati lli narusavati - pored ved utvrdjenih osnovnnh osobina imaju i neke specificne osobine, koje isto tako treba uzeti u razmatranje. Naime, detaljnim dopunskim razmatrahjem mogu se bolje sagledati ne sarao bitne karakte- : ; ristike izvrsenih projekcija, ved se dobija i avid u sustinu konstruisanog ekonometrij.skog modela. Osim toga, ovim doptmskm raamatranjima svakalco 63 se bolje pripremiti pristup i samim. zakljucnim raamatranjima, koja bar dose&ie treba da omogiide oeenu teorijske ili prakticne vrednosti i daljih potencijalnili mogudaosti samog modela kao instmmenta za analizu i planiranje privrednog razvoja. Ako se posmatraju grafikoai 1 i 2, koji pokazuju odnose iz medju odgovarajudih empiricMh i i^raStmatih. promenljivih veliSina' za protekli period, onda se lako moze aapaziti da se razlike izmedju odgovarajudih nivoa drustvenog proisvoda i materijalnih troskova za obe varijante postepeno i sve vise smanjuju. Posmatranjem ovih grafikona

- ib7 37

dobija se utisak da se ove razlike nivoa brSe smanjuju kod prve nego kod druge varijante. U daljem razmatranju ovaj utisak ce dobiti realnu potvrdu. Prema tome, i kod prve i kod druge varijante ispoljava se tendencija brzeg porasta materijalnih. troskova nego drustvenog proizvo da. Kao nuzna posledica ove razvojne tendencije, moze se ocekivati da 6e kod obe varijante, pre ili kasnije, nivo materijalnih troskova dostidi pa i pres tiSi. nivo drustvenog proizvoda. Izracunate projekcije promenljivih velicina za dugorocni planski period (1960-1980) samo su potvrdiie ovo ocekivanje. Ako se sada posmatraju izracunate velicine za prvi petogodisnji planski potperiod (1960-1965) u grafikonu 3, onda se jasno za paza da prema prvoj varijanti dolazi do izjednaaenja nivoa drustevnog proizvoda sa riivoom materijalnih troskova u 1964. godini, da bi ved u 19650 godini nivo materijalnih troskova bio iznad nivoa drustvenog. proigvoda. Sto se tice odgovarajucih projekoija prema drugoj varijanti, vidi:se da je nivo drustvenog proizvoda jos uvek iznad nivoa materi jalnih troskova, ali da razlika izmedju tih nivoa i dalje postaje sve manja. Prema tome, ovim se potvrdjuje raniji utisak iz grafikona 1 i 2, da se razlike odgovarajucih nivoa brze smanjuju kod prve nego kod druge varijante, kao i samo zapazanje, da se kod obe varijante uopste razlike izmedju odgovaraju6ih nivoa postepeno i sve vise smanjuju. Ovaj zakljuSak samo se jo vise potvrdjuje ako se posma traju odgovarajude projekcije za drugi petogodisnji planski potperi od (1965-1970) u grafikonu 4. Naime, u ovom potperiodu dolazi do iz jednacenja nivoa drustvenog proizvoda sa nivoom materijalnih trosko va nalazi iznad nivoa drustvenog proizvoda. Medjutim, dok se razlike odgovarajucih nivoa do njihovog izjednacenja postepeno i sve vise sma njuju, dotle se razlike tih nivoa posle njihovog izjednacavanja po stepeno i sve vise povecavaju. Prema tome, raniji zakljucak o odnosu izmedju nivoa drustvenog proizvoda i nivoa materijalnih troskova tre ba upotpuniti i razvojnom tendencijom, koja se na osnovu izracunatih projekcija pomocu modela moze oSekivati posle izjednacenja odgovaraju6ih nivoa. Ovako upotpunjen zakljucak sasvim se potvrdjuje ako se po smatraju odgovaraju6e projekcije za desetogodisnji .potperiod (1970 1980) u grafikonu 5. Medjutim, ovde treba imati u vidu da se ceo ovaj zakljucak odnosi na apsolutne vrednosti odgovarajucih nivoa i njihovih razlika. U protivnom slucaju, mo&Lo bi se doci do pogresnog utiska, pa cak i shvatanja, kao da drustveni proizvod ima usporenu relativnu

j c

- 148 38
stopu rasta, odnosno, kao da materijalni troskovi imaju ubrzanu relativnu stopu rasta. U stvari, moze se dokazati bas obratno, naime, da-5x se relativna stopa rasta drustvenog proizvoda iz godine u godinu pave'-H (Sava, dok kod materijalnih troskova ostaje bez promene.

Da bi se ovaj dokaz izveo, dovoljno je da se izracunaju od- f govarajuce relativne stope rasta. Prethodno ce se izracunati marginal- J ne relativne stope rasta za obe varijante, posto je to u skladu sa koai tinuiranim pristupom u konstrukciji ovog modela. Ili de_se potom isra-cunati i odgovarajuce intervalne relativne stope rasta sto j . u e skladu sa uobiSajenim diskretnim pristupom u opisivanju i istraziva- 4 nju ekonomskih pojava. U okviru ovih izracunavanja, izmedju ove dve s vrste stope utvrdi.de se matematiSka veza, koja omogucuje preraounavav| nje prve vrste stope u drugu kao i obratno. ; Erema definiciji, marginalna relativna stopa rasta materi-jalnih troskova za prvu varijantu, ozaacavajudi je sa p^, izracunava se na slededi nacin: . . 0.100278 . 275.575 e>100278 t ^ * = ^TtT = 273,575 *--------- 0,100278, . , . (54)

a koja (mnozenjem sa 100) u prouentiraa ima vrednost 10,03$o Osnacavajudi marginalnu relativnu stopu rasta materijalnih troskova za drugu varijantu sa a*, na isti nacin se iaraounava: X^(t) * g,!36022 . 196.220 e156022 t _ 196,2 o 7 '136022 , . (55)

sto u procsntima iznosi 13,60$. Radi izraounavanja i odgovarajudih intervalnih relativnih stopa rasta materijalnih troSkova koristide se matematicka veza, koja postoji izmedju ove dve vrste stope i koja ima slededi opsti oblik:

15) Ovde je uveden naziv "intervalna relativna stopa rasta" za pojam, koji je potpuno analogan pojmu "marginalne relativne stope rasta", pri Semu prvi pojam odgovara diskretnom a drugi kontinuiranom pristupu.

1 *4-9

39

r = eP - 1 = // p log e - 1,

(56)

gde ozaaka r predstavlja odgovarajucu intervalnu, a oznaka p marginalnu stopu ra sta.-*--' Prema formuli (56) intervalna relativna stopa rasta materijalnih troskova za prvu varijantu, r, ima sledecu vrednost: r =p/ p log e - 1 = 0,1055 = 1 0 ,5 5 % , a odgovarajuda stopa za drugu varijantu, (57) / ima slededu vr'ednost:

log e - 1 = 0,1457 = 14,57$. (58) ' . . ! Kao sto se vidi, intervalne relativne stope vece su od odgovarajucih marginalnifa relativnih stopa. Ovo hastaje zbog razlike u duzini vremenskog intervala u kcme se vrsi obraSunavanje porasta, Naime, dok se kod ove intervalne relativne stope obracunavanje vrsi u godisnjim vremenskim intervalima, dotle se kod odgovarajude marginalne relativ ne stope vrsi U beskonaono malim vremenskim intervalima. Medjutim, obe relativne stope imaju konstantnu vrednost, sto dokazuje da se re lativna stopa rasta materijalnih troskova ne povedava, a sto proizilazi i iz osobine eksponencijalnog trenda konstruisanog na bazi empiriekih podataka. , 16) U izvodjenju ove matematicke veze polazi se od zahteva da za celobrojne vrednosti vremena t(l,2,3, ) diskretna eksponencijalna funkcija X;=XQ(l+r) i kontiauirana eksponencijalna funkcija X^t^ i X^ofeiP 'treba da budu jednake, Medjutim, da bi vazela jedz nakost , x XQ + r) = X(o) e P , (t=l,2,3, ...), (1 (a) posto za t=o iz jednakosti (a) sledi da je X =X(o), to mora vaSiti i sledeca jednakost:

1 + r = eP. v (b) i . j6d n ^ 0Sti'v z" (b^sledi, , l .ia .iMisiwaIha/relativ^'r ca Bt;bga r ,odredj$je:;pom&iu ddgcrvgr^jude marginalne relativne:. stope p formulom r = eP - 1 = pj p log e - 1 , ........ (c) kao i obratno, da se marginalna relativna stopa podredjuje pomodu intervalne relativne stope r formulom

- 150 4o
Izracunavanje marginalne relativne stope rasta drustvenog proizvoda za prvu varijantu, p, daje slededi rezultati / _ Yl ^ = 0100278 . 255.88181 e0100278 * _ PX ?~(t) ^gggffs + 255,88181 e100278 t = [0,075149; 0,098941], .

sto u procentima iznosi [7,51$; 9,89$]. Sam rezultat je izrazen u obliku zatvorenog intervala u kome se menja stopa p dok se vreme t i. menja u poluzatvorenom intervalu (0; 33] Isto taEd',- izracunavanje odgovarajude stope za drugu varijantu, p^, daje slededi rezultat: *2^ 0.156022 . 195.005 e t1 3 6 0 2 2 * = V = 59, 597 + 195#003 ,136022 t = [6,128410; 0,1555751,
1 1

_ =

sto u procentima iznosi [12,04$; 13,56$]. I ovde je rezultat izrazen u obliku zatvorenog intervala u kome se menja stopa p . dok se vreme ^, t menja u poluzatvorenom intervals (5j 33]. Radi izracunavanja i odgovarajudih intervalnih relativnih stopa rasta drustvenog pr&Lsvoda koristiiSe se formula (f) u napomeni broj (16). Prema to j formuli izracunavanje intervalne stope rasta drustvenog proizvoda za prvu vari^aatn, r ., daje slededi rezultat: ^ S'l = [0,077340; 0,103936] = [7,73$; , 10,39$] (61)

pri cemu vazi slededa numerieka jednakosts log e = 0,4342944819. (e)

Sana intervalna relativna stopa r odredjuje se slededom alternativaom f ormulom:

= Xo *t-l

(f)

- 151 41
a izracunavanje odgovara juce stope za drugu varijantu, r",. .daje .. l se dedi rezultat: ....... . ; Z9(t) r" = 2 . ' * 1 = [0,126828; 0,1451713 = [12,$8$ * 14,52^i] (62)

I ovde su rezultati izrazeni u obliku zatvorenih. intervala u kojima se menjaju odgovarajude stope r',-ftiok se vreme t menja u odgovarajudim Tpolusatvorenim iniervalima *0; 33] i (5; 33] c Kao sto se vidi iz dobivenih. rezultata, i ovde kod drustve nog proizvoda intervalne relativne stope rasta vece su od odgovaraju dih marginalnih relativnih stopa. Medjutim, ovde relativne stope za obe varijante nem&ju vise konstantnu vrednost u posmatranim vremenskim intssTvaliraa. Naime, odgovar&jude relativne .stope stalno se povecavaju, ali primetno usporavajudim tempom, tako da asimptotski teze odgovarajucim konstantnim vrednostima ralativnih stopa rasta materijal nih troskova. Ovim je ne sarao dckazano da drustveni proizvod ima rastudu relativnu stopu rasta, ved je i ot>jasnjeno zasto nivo materijal nih troskoya,ipak dostize i prestize nivo drustvenog proizvoda kod obe varijante Potpuno analogno kao za clrustveni proizvod mogu se izracuna ti i odgcivarajude relativne stope rasta bruto drustvenog proizvoda za obe vari jante o Tako isracunavarije marginalne relativne stope rastr\ bruto 'drustvenog T>roisvo&a za prvu varijantu, ojL*: -;daje slededi rezul* tat: 1 p/ =
Z

= 0*100278 .. 52 9 , 4 5 S81 ^^ 0Q278 ^ . ZjXt) 94p58665 + 529945681 e0*-*-00278 t = [0,086327; 0,099327;]*

(63)

sto u procentima iznosi [8,63; 9,96$]; a izrad'inavanje marginalne re lativne stope rasta bruto drustvssiog proisvoda za drugu varijantu, p", daje slededi rezultat: 17) U detaljnije ekonomsko objasnjavanje same tendencije dostizanja i prestizanja nivoa drustvenog proisvoda od strane materijalnih . troskova ovde se necs ulaziti, posto bi to zahtevalo razmatranje i faktora, koji nisu obuhvaceni ovde konstruisanim ekonomskim modelom.

a _

_ 0.156022 . 589.225 e156022 t ^ Z2 (t)

PZ

94.^597 + 389,223 e136022 t

= [0,122824; 0,1356S2{j,

(64)

sto u procentima iznosi [12,28$; 13,57$]. Na isti naein, izraeunavanje intervalne relativne stope rasta bruto drustvenog proizvoda za prvu va rijantu, r', daje slededi rezultat: Z(t) rz = ~ ' ^ (tll) 1 = [0>089583; 0,104732] = [8,96; 10,47$], (65)

a izracunavanje odgovarajude stope za drugu varijantu, r", daje sle dedi rezultat. Zo(t) rZ = Z (tfl)' 1 = [>1S5636; 0,145443] = [13,56$; 14,54$]. 2 ' (66)

Kao kod drustvenog proizvoda, zbog promenljivosti odgovarajudih rela tivnih stopa, sami rezultati takodje su izrazeni u obliku zatvorenih intervala u kojima se menjaju odgovarajude stope (p', p r ' i r^), dok se vreme t menja u odgovarajudim poluzatvorenim int&rvafima (0; 33] i (5; 33]. Izracunate relativne stope rasta bruto drustvenog proizvoda za obe varijante takodje se stalno povedavaju, ali primetno usporavajudim tempom, tako da asimptotski teze odgovarajudim konstantnim vrednostima relativnih stopa rasta materijalnih troskova. Prema tome, moze se izvesti i opsti zakljucak, relativne stope rasta materi jalnih troskova imaju konstantnu i stalno vedu vrednost od odgovarajucih stopa drustvenog i bruto drustvenog proizvoda, cije se vredno sti menjaju i stalno povedavaju, ali primetno usporavajudim tempom, tako da asimptomatski teze odgovarajudim konstantnim vrednostima rela tivnih stopa rasta materijalnih troskova. Izradunate relativne stope rasta nesumnjivo su upotpunile sliku razvoja prema konstruisanim dvema varijantama ekonometrijskog modela razvoja industrije i rudarstva. Medjutim, ovde treba imati u vidu da ovaj razvoj, pored preovladjujude; icuistkntiiQStl relevantnih preduslova, pretpostavija i odredjeni razvoj egzogene promenljive velicine materijalnih troskova. Zbog toga se namece i problem korisdenja ovog modela za slucaj da se vrednosti stvarnih materijalnih tro skova ne podudaraju u nekim godinama sa odgovarajudim vrednostima pro-

- 153 43
jekcije samog modela. U stvari* ovaj model se i u tim slucajevima mo ze koristiti za izracunavanje odgovarajudih vrednosti endogenih pro menl jivih veliSina - drustvenog i bruto drustvenog proizvoda. Naime, tada treba uzeti u obzir redukovan oblik ovog modela, koji se sastoji samo iz jednacine (l) i (38). Pri tome se na osnovu Tposaatih vred nosti materijalnih troskova za pojedine godiSnje periode iz:ove dve s jednacine lako izracunavaju odgovarajuce vrednosti endogenih promen1jivih velicina. Ova mogudnost trajnog prilagodjavanja modela svakoj prakticnoj varijanti nesumnjivo predstavlja i za analizu i za praksu privrednog planiranja vrlo pozitivnu osobinu. DdLja pozitivna osobina ovog modela sastoji se u tome, sto ima jednu egzogenu promenljivu veliSinu, koja se kao instrumentalnapromenjiva velicina moze proizvoljno odredjivati. Pri tome, za svaku odredjenu (empiricku ili plansku) vrednost instrumentalne promenljive velicine uvek se mogti lzracunati odgovarajude vrednosti endogenih promenl jivih velicina. Medjutim, ta odredjena vrednost ne mora se obavezno odnositi na instrumentalnu promenljivu velidinu materijalnih troskova; ona se moze odnositi i na bilo koju od dve endogene promen ljive velicine. Ovde je od posebnog interesa, svakako, da drustveni;^,proizvod ima odredjene vrednosti kao promenl jiva velicina sa konstantnom relativnom stopom rasta. Ova osobina modela ne samo da mu daje veliku fleksibilnost, vec i omoguduje njegovo prosirivanje novim pro menl jivim velicinama, kao i kombinovanje sa nekim drugim modelima. Sam model nesumnjivo ima znacajne analiticke kvalitete. On omogucuje ne samo staticku, vec i dinamicku analizu minimnmft osnovnih ekonomskih agregata, objedinjavajudi pri tome podjednako vazan neto kao i bruto-aspekt. Pomocu ovog modela na lak i jednostavan nacin mo ze se opisati ekonomski razvoj u proteklom periodu, sto omoguduje uspesnu analizu ispoljene zakonomernosti kako u samam kretanju, tako i u strukturnoj zavisnosti osnovnih ekonomskih kategorija. Ovde izvrsana analiza pomocu relativnih stopa rasta osnovnih promenljivih veliSina mcrze -posluziti za -bo kao pogodna ilustracija. Medjutim, izvrsene dugorocne projekcije pomocu ovog modela pokazuju svojim stepenom realistifinosti i pouzdanosti da se u njemu kriju i znatne moguSnosti za privredno planiranje. Stepen cvrstine u privrednom planiranju pomodu nekog mode la odredjen je svojstvima instrumentalnih .promenljivih velicina,; odnosno, institucionalnim okvirima privrednog sistema. Za instrumentalnu promenljivu velicinu u ovom modelu, agregat materijalnih troskova, ne moze se tvrditi da je narocito pogodna za neko Svrsce planiranje.

- ;i5k Mf ' Svakako da u tome pogledu instrumentalna promenljiva velicina investicionih ulaganja ima daleko vece prednosti. Medjutim, agregat investicionih ulaganja kao instrumeiitalna promenljiva '-I -', velicina nem.a izrazito uzrocxii karakter, kao sto je to slucaj s 'a instrumentalnom promenljivom velicinom materijalnih troskova. Naime, da . i instrumentalna promenljiva .velicina investicionih: b : ulaganja imala .potpuno uzrocni karakter, potrebno je pored ne= . promenl jivosti tehnoloskog nivoa da koriscenje kapaciteta bude puno .ili bar konstantno, sto mahom nije slucaj. Zbog toga ovaj = model, iako u . analizi proteklog privrednog razvoja ima izrazit kauzalno-objasnjavajuci karakter, u samom privrednom planiranju ima vise karakter realne pr.ognoze, sto takodje predstavlja ogranicenje svoje vrste. Ukratko, potencijalna snaga konstruisa nog modela je vise u opisivanju, objasnjavanju i predvidjanju, a manje u cvrstom.planiranju privrednog razvoja. Kada s e .ima u vidu ogranicenost ovog modela u pogle du cyrstinte planiranja, onda ocena njegove vrednosti svakako .zavisi od toga da li i u kojoj meri se moze ova ogranicenost otkloni; Sudeci po'svemu, posto je izgledi da se na bazi vec uocene fleksibilnosti i drugih osobina ovoga modela moze izvrsiti takvo pr.osir.ivanje i kombinovanje sa nekim drugim modelom, koje bi ukljucivalo i instrumentalnu promenljivu velicinu investicionih ulaganja, sto bi ako ne u potpunosti otklonilo, a oao bar u znatnoj meri ublazilo ovu ogranicenost Ovi izgledi,' svakako, iziskuju ne samo posvecivanje vece paznje ovome mode lu, vec zahtevaju i dalje ulaganje truda u istrazivackom radu, koji. bi doveo do svrsishodnog i uspesnog, prosirenog i kombino= vanog modelao Na kraju, moze se slobodno reci da ovaj model vec kao takav ima pril'icnu vrednost kako za analizu proteklog, ta ko i za planiranje buduceg privrednog razvoja, a da kao osnova za prosiren, komplementaran i kombinovan ekonomski model, on, cak, ima i znacajnu potencijalnu vrednost

- 155 -

^5

DanSika NIKOLlS

KONSTB.UKCIJA JEDNOG- EKONOMETRIJSKOG MODELA Z . A DUGOROCNI RAZ70J INDUSTHIJE JUGOSLAVIJE U ovom radu uSinjqn je pokusaj da se izloze sve faze u kongtruisanju i primeni jednog dinamickog ekonometrijskog modela. Poslo se od samog nastanka jednog matematiSkog ekonomskog modela kao resenja jednog jednostavnog matematickog problema, koji je samo postavljen u nesto sirem i slozenijem obliku. Ovaj matematiSki ekonomski model dat je prethodno u svom najopstijem obliku, obuhvatajuSi kao osnovne promenljive velicine sledeSe ekonomske kategorije: materijalne troskove (X), drustveni proizvod (Y) i bruto drustveni proizvod (z) Potom se pristupilo konstrukciji matematickog modela u njegovom matemaItiSki odredjenom obliku.- Ovaj matematicki model, kao sistem od tri jednacine (9)5 dat je u'.diferencijalnom obliku* Medjutim, detaljno su izvedena i opsta resenja matematickog modela.

Radi ilustracije primene konstruisanog matematickog ekonom skog modela u obzir je uzet primer razvoja' industrije i rudarstva Ju goslavije. Na bazi empiriSkih statistiSkih. podataka za protekli peri od 1947-1959, datih u tabeli 1, ccenjeni su parametri u resenom obli ku matematickog ekonomskog modela, te je tako konstruisan odgovaraju6i konkretno odredjen ekonometrijski model, koji je predstavljen sistemom jednacina (5o). Ocenjivanje strukturnih parametara bilo je izvrseno pomodu metoda korelacije i regresije, koje se zasnivaju na principu najmanjih kvadratnih. cdstupanja. . Ovako konstruisani ekonometrijski model upotrebljen je kao baza za izraSunavanje projekcija osnovnih promenljivih velicina za dugoroSni planski period 1960 - 1980, cije su vrednosti date u tabsli 3> Medjutim, pored ove prve varijante ekonometrijskog modela i od < govarajudih projekcija data je i jedna druga, "jaca" varijanta, kqja |se bazira na empiriSkim statistiSkim podacima za protekli period "1952-1959, sadrSanim u ve6 pomenutoj tabeli 1. Ekonometrijski model [po ovoj drugoj varijnati predstavljen je sistemom jedhaSina (53)s a odgovarajuSe izraSunate vrednosti projekcija osnovnih promenljivih veliSina za dugoroSni planski period 1960-1980. date su u tabeli 5.

- 156 46
Sadi ocene realisticnosti obe varijante izvrseno je uporedjivanje .. empiriSkih statistlKUi podataka u tabeli 1 sa odgovaraju6im prema modelima izracunatim vrednostima osnovnih promenljivih velicina, koje su date u tabeli 2 i tabeli 4. Isto takvo uporedjenje izvrseno je i pomodu grafikona 1 i grafikona 2. Pored ove tabelarne i grafiSke analize realistiSnosti izracunatih vrednosti za obe varijante, ovde su primenljene i metode matematicke statistike za merenje stepena prilagodjenosti modela empiriSkim statistiSkim podacima. U tu svrhu izvrSeno je izraSunavanje, kako najvedih odstupanja u procen tima, tako ir.'arelativnih standardnih devijacija, kao mera disperzije empiriSkih podataka oka odgovarjudih vrednosti modela. Zajedno sa 'ovom, izvrsena je i analiza izracunatih vrednosti projekcija za dugorocni planski period 1960-1980, koji je radi lakse i bolje anali ze podeljen u dva petogodisnja i . jedan desetogodisnji potperiod. Izr racunate projekcije prema obe varijante za sva tri sukcesivna potperioda prikazane su u grafikonima sa rednim brojevima 3, 4 i 5. Ova analiza je pokazala ne samo da su projekcije druge varijante znatno realistiSnije o L projekcija prve, ved i da su projekcije druge vari-* c jante same po sebi zadovoljavajude realistiSne, te da i u i prihvats ljivijej ali se pri tome ne smeju izgubiti iz vida o'granidavajude pretpostavke, da nasa privreda u posmatranom periodu ima dov.oljno stabilizovanu zakonomernost tt.Tazvoju, te da de ove razvojne tendencije zadrzati i sa uspehom se odupreti ili prilagoditi eventualnim bilo spoljaSnjim bilo unutrasnjim smetnjama ili poremedajima. U zavrsnoj analizi kretanja samih projekcija prema obe va rijante, kao i celog modela, prethodno je utvrdjeno da se razlike izmedju odgovarajudih nivoa drustvenog proizvoda i materijalnih tro skova postepeno i sve vi5e smanjuju, da se ti .nivoi ubrzo izjednacuju i da se onda razlike nivoa povedavaju, ali da su sada nivoi ma terijalnih troskova vedi od nivoa drustvenog proizvoda. Zatim^se dokazuje da se ovde ne radi o smanjiv-anju relativne stope rasta. drus tvenog proizvoda, ved o njenom povedanju i asimptotskom priblizavanju konstantnoj vrednosti relativne stope rasta materijalnih iroskova. Ovaj dokaz je izvrsen pomodu izraSunavanja relativnih stopa rasta za sve projekcije osnovnih promenljivih velicina. Same rela tivne stope rasta za dbe varijante^izradunate su ns^lunoAtfi>svonL*mar ginalnom. ved i u svom intervalnom obliku0 Pri tome je izvedena for mula (56) za preracunavanje vrednosti marginalnih oblika na interValni i obratno0 Na kraju, poSto, su istaknute joS neke pozitivne osobine

- 157 k?

ovog ekonbmskog modela, koje iziskuju ne samo da mu se posveti ve<5a paznja, ve i zahtevaju i dal je. ulaganje istrazivaSkog rada, koji bi mogao da dovede do uspesnog proSirenja i kombinovanja ovog osnovnog modela, data je zakljucna ocena, Prema toj oceni, ovaj mo del ve6 kao takav ima priliSnu vrednost kako za analizu proteklog, tako i za planiranje budueg privrednog razvoja, a kao osnova za prosiren, komplementaran i kombinovan ekonomski model on ima Sak i znaSajnu potencijalnu vrednost.

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- 159 ^9
nJiaHOBHH n e p n o f l c I 9 6 0 n o 1 9 8 0 r o H , c t o h m o c t b k o t o p h x j a H a b T a t f j i i m e 3 . M eatfly T e t i , H ap H B y c stm m nepBHM B a p w a H ^ TOM 3KOHOMHKO MET eMaTHireCKOM MOHeJIH H COOTBeTbTByiOmHX n p o e K m i i i n a e T C H h B p y r o M , (5 o jie e c h j i b h h S " . B a p n a H T , o c h o BHBaromHHCH H a 3M irap H u ecK M X h s h k h x 3 a H C T e K r a S n e p w o B o t 1 9 5 2 HO 1959 r . r . , noKt3LHHHX b BHmeynoMHHyTOH T a t f j m i j e 1 . M aT e M aT H ^ ec K aH M O ffejit n o 3 T 0 M y B T o p o M y -B a p n a H T y H 3 0 (5 p a a c e Ha CHCTeMoft 3rpaBHeHHS /53/s a cooTBeTByiomaH BtraHCJieHHaH CTOHMOCTB npoeKfctHH OCHOBHHX nepeM eH H H X BeJIHtlHH 3 a B O JirO cpo^HHH nnaHOBBiH nepxiofl c 19BQ-ri980 r.r. BaeTCH b TafijiHiie 5 *IT0 6 h OIjeHHTB peajIHCTHUHOCTB 0(50HX BapwaHTOB, conocTaBjiHioTCH SMnHpimecKHe Baane TatfjinijH 1 c BBmHcneHHOH no MOflenHM cootbetcTByroineh ctohmoctbio o c h obhhx nepeMeHhhx BejiH'iHH5 - flaHHHX b T a :5jiHijax. 2 h 4-o H a p n n y c TatfjinqHBiM . ( H rpa$H^eCKHM anaJIHSOM peaUHCTIHIHOCTH. BBHIHCJieHHO.H CTOHMOCTH OtiOHX BapHaHTOB, IipWM'eHHIOT'CH H MeTOfla MaTeMaTH^eCKOH CTaTHCTHKH B31H H3Me p e H H H CTeneHH npHCnOCO^JieHKOCTH MOfleJIH
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- 160 50
B o K O H q a T e n b H O H 'iacTH a H a j i H 3 a B B H 3 K e H H H c a M H X n p o - . e n m i H n o o 6 o h m B a p w a H T a M , K a K h MOBejiH b itenoM, npeflB ap H T e n b H o y T B e p s m a e T C H , u t o p a 3 J i H U H H Mexfly c o o T B e T C T B y i o mH M H y p o B H H M H o S m e c T B e H H o r o n p o n y K T a h MaTepwajibHux 3aTp a T n o c T e n e H H o B e e 6oitee c o K p a m a r o T C H , u t o s t h y p o B H H B C K o p e n p i i p a B H H B a i O T C H h u t o T o r a a p a 3 J i H U H H Mexfly y p o B H H - m h yBenHU H B a i O T C H , ho uto , n p n s t o m , y p o B H H M a TepwajibHux 3 a T p a T Btime y p o B H H oCJme ci 'B eH Hor o npo;n;yKTa. IIotom H O K a 3 H B a e T C H , u t o p e u t HfleT H e o c o K p a m e H H H o T H o c H T e n b H o r o c p e B H e r o p o c T a o t f m e c T B e H H o r o n p o j i y K T a , a o e r o yBeitinieHHH H I I O C T O H H H O M IipH tflLHXeHHH K K O H C T a H T H O H C T O H M O C T H O T H O C H T e n b H o r o c p e f l H e r o p o c T a M a T e p n a i t b H H X 3 a T p a T . 3 t o E 0K a3i iB a e T C H n p n n o M o m u HcmiciLeHHH o T H O C H T e n b H o r o c p e n p e r o po C T a bjih B c e x n p o e n m i H o c h o b h h x n e p e M e H H u x BejiH^iHH O t h o CHTeitbHiie c pe flHne npwpocTH hjih otfoex B a p w a H T O B H c m i c J i e H H H e TOJibKO B CBOefi M a p r H H a j I b H O H , H O H B C B O e S H H T e p B a J I b H O H $ o p M e . IIpn s t o m B M B o f l H T C H $ o p M y j i a / 5 6 / flJin n e p e p a c u e T a c t o h m o c t h M a p r H H a n b H o S $ o p m h H a H HTepBaiLbHyio, h Ha o f io po T.
H a K O H e ij, n o c n e T o r o K a K o T M e q e H ii e m e H e K O T o p n e n o jioscH TeitbH H e c T o p o H H 3 t o h 3 K 0 H 0 M H u e c K 0 H MOBeJiH, T p e tfy io im ie He TOJibKO y f l e n H T b e f i e m e 6 o J i b m e e BHHMaHHe, h o -h BJioscHTb HajiHbHeSinyK) H C C JieflO B aT en b C K yK ) p a t f o T y , K O T o p a n M o r n a 6u \ n p H B e c T H k y c n e m H O M y p a c m n p e H H io h KO-MtfmmpoBaHUK) 3 t o h oc-^ HOBHOH MOfleJIH, fla e T C H 3aKILK)^HTeILbHaH, O n e H K a . i l o 3TOH OIjeH K e , yn oM H H yT aH M o a e n b K a K T a K O B a a n p n o t f p e T a e T y s c e B o c T a - _ T o u H o e 3 H a u e H H e K a K h j i h a H a n H 3 a H C T e k i u e r o , T a K h h j i h -niEaHupoBaHHH ^ y n y m e r o p a 3 B H T H H , a , HMeHHo, b K a u e c T B e o c h o b m flJIH paCIUHpeHHOH, KOMnJieMeTapHOH H KOM6HHHpOBaHHOH 3KOHO -

MHqecKofi MOflenH, HMeeT nasce h 3HamiTejibHoe noTeHmianbHoe

3H aqeH H e.

- 161 51

CONSTRUCTION OF AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL FOR THE LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUGOSLAV MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY .

By DanSika NikOli6

The paper attempts to expose all the phases of construction and application of the econometric model* The autor starts from the veiy beginning of a mathematical economic model as the solution of a mathematical problem, layed out in a somwhat wider and more complicated form* The mathematical economic model has at first been given in it3 most general formj the'following economic cathegories being its basic variablesmaterialexpenditures (z), social product (Y) and gross national product (z)* The next step consists in Construc ting the mathematical model in its mathematically determined f b i * irn This mathematical model, a system of 'three equations (9), is given in a differential form* Nowever, the general solutions of the mathemati cal model have: been derived. ' The application of the constructed mathematical model has been illustrated on the example of the development of the Yugoslav manufacturing indstry* On the basis of empirical data referring to the period between 1947 and 1959, given in ^able 1, the structural parameters in a solved form of the mathematical economic model have been estimated; so it has been constructed a corresponding precisely defined econometric model, presented in a system of equations (5o)* The estimation of the structural parameters is carried out by aid of the correlation and regression methods, based on the principle of minimal squared deviations. The so constructed econometric model is used as a basis for calculating projections of the basic variables for the long-term plan ning period 196o-198o, the values of which are given in Table 3. How ever, beside this first varient of the econometric model and the corr esponding projection the autor gives also an additional, "stronger" varient, based on empiiioal statistical data riferring to the period between. 1952 and 1959, contained in the already mentioned Table 1. The econometric model of the second varient is presented by a sistem of equations (53) and the corresponding calculated values of the projections of the basic variables for the long-term planning period 196o-198o* are given in Table 5

16 2 -

52

In order to evaluate the realism of the two varient, a compa^fll rison of the empirical data in Table 1 with the corresponding, accor ding to the model, calculated values of the basic variables, given in : % Table 2 and Table 4, has been carried out. A similar comparison is ~ : done by the aid of Chart 1 and Chart 2 Beside this tabular and grafic analysis of the realism of the arrived at in the two varients data, . the mathods of mathematical statistics for measuring the degree of fitness of the model to the empirical data were also applied# To that end there Jxas been carried out a calculation of the greatest diviations in percentages, as well as of the relative standard deviations, ' as mesures of the dispersion of the empiriced. data about the corres ponding values of the model. Together with this, an analysis of the projection values for the long-term planning period lS6o-198o, which is for practical purposes devided in two five-year and one ten-year subperiods, has been carried out. The calculated projections, accor- . . ding to the given varients for all the three successive periods, are . graphically illustrated in the sharts under the numbers 3,4* and 5. This analysis shows out not only that the projections of the second varient are considerably more realistic than the ones of the first, but also that the projections of the secondvarient by themselves are sufficiently realistic, and consequently more acceptablej however, one should not lose sight of the limiting assumption that our eco nomy in the observed period has had sufficiently stabilized regula rity of development, and consequently, these development tendencies ' will keep out successfully and opose or get adapted either to foreign or internal obstacles or distrubances.. ' In the final analysis of the movements of the projections themselves,ccording to the two varients, as well as according to the . a model as a whole, it has been previously found aut that the differen ces between the corresponding levels of social product and material expenditures are gradually decreasing, so that they soon become equal and then the differences in the levels start increasing, but now the levels of the material expenditures are higher than the le vels of the social product. It is then being proved that it is here not a question of decrease of the relative rate of growth of the so cial product, but of its increase and asimptotic convergence toverds the constant value of the relative rate of growth of the material expenditures. This proof is arrived at by calculating the relative rates of growth for all the projections of the basic variables. The relative rate of growth for the two varients are calculated not only in their marginal, but olso in their interval form. hen doing that, the autor derives the formula (56) for calculating the values of the

16 ?

marginal form by means of the interval form values and inversely. \ At, the end, g , e r setting off some more positive features of ft: the economic model, features that not only demand a more adequate at-? itantion to be paid to the model, but also requares additional efforts,; future research work, which would bring about a successful enin .larging and combining of the model, the autor gives his conclusive 'i Revaluation. According to it, this model by itseif has a considerable : ; value for the analysis of the past period, as well as for the planni ng of the future economic development; moreover, as a basis for an ^ enlarged, complementary and combined economic model, it has even an important potential value.

-1 6 5 -

DanSika NIKOLIC

KONSTRUKG IJA INVERZNOG EKONOMETRIJSKOG MODELA SA NETO I BRUTO-ASPEKTIMA. AGREGATA PROIZVODNJE ZA DUGOROCNI PRIVREDNI RAZVOJ JUGOSLAVIJE I* Konstrukci.ia inverznog matematiSkog modela U ovom radu poSlo se od ranije teorijski konstruisanog osnovnoe matematiSkog modela sa neto i bruto-aspektima agregata pro izvodnje '* Ovaj osnovni toatematiSki model mo2e se predstaviti u sledeSem opStem obliku: Z(t) = X(t) + Y(t), -dZCt L a dX(tJ, . / l/

Upotrebljene oznake u sistemu jednaSina /L/ imaju sledeSa znaSenja: I* Endogene promenljive veliSine a/ Promenljive veliSine cilja / l / Y = vrednosti drustvenog proizvoda
/2 /

Z = vrednosti bruto druStvenog proizvoda

1/ Videti autorov rad: "Konstrukcija jednog ekonometrijskog modela za_razvoj industrije", Savezni zavod za privredno planiranje Sektor za ekonomska istraSivanja, Dokumentaciono-analitiSki mate ri jali 9, Beograd, marta 1963. godine; isto tako Slanak sa istim naslovom u casopisu "Ekonomist", broj 2, Beograd, 1963.

b/ PomoSne promenljive veliSine . f l / X = vrednosti materijalnih troskova II* .Egzogene promenljive veliSine a/ Instrumentalne promenljive veliSine / l / $(t) = proizvoljna funkcija vremena- b/ Objektivno date promenljive veliSine . A / a = marginalni koeficijent materijalnih troskova u odnosu na bruto druStveni proizvod*
Oznaka. t predstavlja redni broj godisnjeg perioda i praktiSno i i i izma vrednost eelih brojeva, ali teorijski moSe imati i vrednosti svih realnih brojeva* .

Problem inverzije ekonomskog modela sastoji se u tome ato se u modelu podje 'od zadatih promenljivih veliSina cilj a, da bi se , odredile one instrumentalne promenljive veliSine koje su potrebne za ostvarenje ovih ekonomskih ciljeva* Ovaj problem je potpuno suprotan "tradicionalnom, prema kome s e u modelu pjolJMsj^od zadatih . instrumentalnih promenljivih veliSina, da bi se odredile one promen ljive veliSine ciljeva Sije ostvarsnje omoguSuju ovi ekonomski instrumenti* Da bi se inverzija ekonomskog modela mogla uapesno izvrsiti, potrebno je "u normaO-hom sluSaju" da broj promenljivih ve liSina ciljeva bude jednak broju instrument alnih promenljivih. Ukoliko to nije sluSaj, onda se veS pojavljuju izvesne te5ko6e, koje ponekad mogu biti skoro nesavladive. U ovom sluSaju ima dve promen ljive veliSine cilja /l i Z/, a samo jedna instrumentalna promenlji va veliSina [$(t)]* Medjutim, ove .dve promenljive veliSine cilja nisu medjusobno nezavisne, te s^jmogu smatrati kao alternativni eko nomski ciljevi. A to znaSi, u stvaM, da se samo jedna od njih moSe smatrati kao nezavisna promenljivarveliSina. cilja, dok se druga odredjuje kao zavisna promenljiva /veliSina cilja, odnosno kao endogena pomotfna promenljiva veliSina Ovde 6e se kao nB&a^lsnoj proSaaiyiya veliSina cilja. upotrebiti promenljiva velicina vrednosti drustvenog proizvoda /?/ kao pogodna mera nivoa i razvoja proizvodnih snaga u zemlji* . Inverzija osnovnog'matematiSkog modela /l/ ovde 6e se iz2/ J. Tinbergen: "On the Theroy of Economic Policy", Contributions to Economic Analysis, Nrth-Holland Publishing Company,Amsterdam 52

- 167 3

yrSiti na jedan vrlo jednostavan naSin. Naime, proizvoljna funkcija vremena $(t) izjednaSiSe se sa marginalnom vrednoSSu prirastaja druStvenog proizvoda dY/t/ dok 6e druge dve jednaSine sistema /L/ ' ' dt . ostati potpuno nepromenjene* Ovom jednostavnom izmenom postiSu se jednovremeno dye stvari, S jedne strane, suStinski se u potpunosti ostvaruje inverzija osnovnog matematiSkog modela /L/, dok s druge strane, po formi ovaj model ostaje skoro nepromenjen, polto je jedi-nS umesto veliSine X stavljena veliSina Y, Na taj naSin je nezavisna promenljiva veliSina cilja Y dobila formalno ulogu instrumentalne promehljive veliSine, 5to u suStini i odgbvara inverznom obliku osno vnog matematiSkog modela / l / Prema tome, konstrukcija inverznog ma tematiSkog modela moSe se ostvariti sistemom jednaSina u sledeSem opStem obliku: Z(t) = X(t) + Y(t), M t ) - dX(tJ, /2 /

at

at

M i l = *(t). dt Upotreljljene oznake u sistemu jednaSina /2/ imaju sledeSa znaSenja: I# Endogene promenljive veliSine a) Promenljive veliSine cilja /L/ Y = vrednosti druStvenog proizvoda t>/ PomoSne promenljive veliSine / l / Z = vrednosti bruto druStvenog proizvoda /2/ X = vrednosti materijalnih troskova II# Egzogene promenljive veliSine a) Instrumentdlne promenljive veliSine / l / $(t) = proizvoiLjna funkcija vremena b) Objektivno date promenljive veliSine /L/ a = marginalni koeficijent materijalnih. troSkova u odnosu na bruto drustveni proizvod.

Ozraka t predstavlja redni broj godiSnjeg perioda i praktiSno uzima vrednosti celih brojeva, ali teorijski moSe imati i vrednosti svih realnih brojeva.

- 168- 4
Ekonomska sustina inverznog matematiSkog modela /2/- skorb . . je istotfetjia ekonomskoj sustini osnovri'og .matematiSkog modela>/l/.- v Prva jednaSina u sistfemima'jedjmSina-/l/. i /2/ predjstg,vlja definici-;, onu jednakost, prema kojoj se sve' tri uvederie veliSine neprekidno menjaju y toku i kao odredjene funkcije vremena* .Druga jednaSina u . . sistemu jednacina /1/ i /2/ predsta~lja. stalni odnos koji postoji ; izmedju marginalnih troSkoya,'pri Semu.konstanta.a predstavlja veli-cinu tog.stalnog odnosa. Kod trede jednaSine sistema jednaSina /!/ i/2/ pored formalne postoji i susifinsia razlika*.Dok kod sistema i e d,; j ^-. naoina /L/ trefia jednaSina pokazuje da marginalna -.vredno^t prirasta-.-; ja mate^ijalnih troskova.ujediniSnom periodu vremena nije neka stalna, ved promenljiva yelicina kao proizvoljna funkcija vremenay dotle kod sistema jednaSina /2/ treda jednaSina pokazuje istu ovu osobinu, : ali koja se sada ne odnosi na endogenu pomodnu promenljivu materijal nih troskova, ved na nezavisnu endogenu promenljivu veliSinu cilja. Sistem jednaSina / 2 / 9 kojim je ostvarena konstrukcija inve rznog matematickog modela, dat je u svom opstem, ali diferencijalno potpuno odredjenom obliku, posto iruga i treda jednacina tog sistema sadrSe sasvim odredjene difereneijalne elements, Resavajudi ovaj si stem jednaSina /2/ dobide se konstruisani irrverzni matematiSki model u matematiSki reSenom obliku. i be 2 diferencijalnih elemenata* . II* OpSta resen.ia inverznog; matematiSkog modela . .

B-eSiti sistem jednaStkia /2/ znaSi nafii tri promenljive ve liSine Z/t/, T/t/ i X/t/ kac odredjene funkcije vremena i odgovara-* judeg broj a parametara, koji na iss-estan naSin karakteri^u konstruisaai im e r z n i matematiSki ekonomski model* Pri tome, ove odredjene funkoije vremaa& svom reSenom obliku nede viSe biti diferencijalnog karaktera, a svi parametri koji.se.pojavljuju bide, u opltem smislu, odredjenog znaSenja i yrednosti* Geo ovaj postupak reSavanja sistema jednaSina /2/ bide ovde . samo najkoneiznije skiciran. Post?. 3istem jednaSina /2/ sadrSi diferencijalne elemente, to se prethodno oni morajn na neki nacir?.. eliminisati ili otKLoniti* To znaSi da u tom sistemu traba poSetivr^%UE^e4ceg4 i trede jedna Sine sistema/2/, poSto je ona jednostavnija od druge jednaSine. Ako. , se ona napise u obliku . , . . dY(t) = $(t) dt, /3/ '

- 169 5

u kome su promenljive veliSine razdvojene, onda se ona lako reSava* i b reSastaa^e daje slededi rezultat: P t Y(t) = Y(o) + f $ ( t) dt, A / o gde oznaka Y/o/ predstavlja veliSinu druStvenog proizvoda u baznom godiSnjem periodu, dok oznaka r* <>(t)dt predstavlja integralni oblik
. . .

o odredjene funkcije vremena, a koja zavisi od proizvol^ne funkcije <>t>* f( Druga jednaSina sistema /2/ ima neSto sloSeniji oblik, ko ji se pomodu diferehcirane prve jednaSine istog sistema mo2e transformisati na slededi: M i l = a[ M * l at dt - Mil]., dt /s/

Ako se sada iskoristi treda jednaSina sistema /2/, onda se jednaSina /5/ mo2e dalje tranfonnisati na slededi oblik: dZ(t)*_^ . <(t)dt, /6/ a - 1 u kome su takodje promenljive veliSine razdvjojene, Sto omoguduje la ko reSavanje* Naime, reSwrajjddi diferencijalnu jednaSinu /6/ dobija se sledede reSenje: . Z(t) = Z(o) + S-j-

a l

o gde oznaka Z/o/ predstavlja veliSinu bruto drustvenog proizvoda u baznom godiSnjem periodu, dok ostale oznake imaju ved odredjena znaSenja, U reSavanju druge jednaSine sistema /2/, medjutim, mo5e se postupiti i na jedan drugi naSin, Naime, ova jednaSina moze se ^ nafiisati i u slededem obliku:

t /7/

[ <>t)dt, j(

-.1 7 0 6

dZ(t) = a dX(t),

' /& /
/9/

'

u kome su takodje promenljive veliSine razdvojene* ReSavajuSi diferenoijalnu jednaSinu /8/, dobija se reSenje u slede6em obliku: Z(t) = a X(t) + Z(o) - a X(o),

koje je potpuno ekvivalentno reSenju datom u jednaSini /7/* ZnaSaj ovog oblika reSenja sastoji se u tome, 5to je on pogodah za konkretno ocenjivanje parametra a na bazi empifeiSkih podataka, koristeSi se pri tome metodom regresije.

'

Kada su na ovaj naSin jednaSinama /7/ i /4/ dobijena odredjena funkcionalna reSenja za dve promenljive veliSine Z/t/ i Y/t/, onda se za tre6u promenljivu veliSinu X/t/ lako nalazi odgovaraju6e resenje is prve jednaSine sistema /2/. Naime, ako se odgovaraju&e . vrednosti za promenljive veliSine Z / t / i Y/t/ iz jednaSina /?/ i /4/ zamene u prvu jednaSinu sistema /2/, oncLa se ovo resenje dobija u sledeSem obliku: t J'4>(t) dt, /Lo/ = 2l(o) + r g

gde oznaka X/o/ predstavlja veliSinu materijalnih. troskova u baznom godisnjem periodu, dok ostale oznake imaju veS odredjena znaSenja*
Na kraju,.ako se jednacine /7/, /4/, i / l o / poveSu u jedan sistem jednaSina, onda se dobija konstruisani inverzni .matematiSki ekonomski model u sledeSem opStem ali matematiSki reSenom obliku: X z(t) = z(o) r <#(t)dt,
.

a -l

J
o

;(t) = Y(o) + J <j>(t) dt, Y o

/II/.

.. .

X(t) = X(o)

+ i-TT

^ o

< > t dt. /()

- 17 1 7

eSeni oblik sistema je&nacina /Ll/ oslobodjen je diferencijalnih elemenata. ali on sadrzi funkcije izrazene u obloku odredjenog integrala <> (t)dt, t

J t ov

Me&jntim*&ivaj funkcionalni oblik odredjenog integrala moze se vrlo iako svesti na oblik obiSne funkcije Sim se proizvdljnoj funkciji <p(t) da odredjen matematiSki oblik, Ovo f e se uSiniti u sledefioj i fazi konstrukcije, u kojoj f e reSeni oblik konstruisanog inverznog i matematiSkog ekonomskog modela /ll/ posluSiti kao osnova za konstrulcciju konkretno odredjenog inverznog ekonometrijskog modela, III, Konstrukci.ia inverznog ekonometri.iskog modela za privredrd. razvo.i Jugoalavi.ie Konstruisati inverzni ekonometrijski model na bazi nekog inverznog matematiSkog ekonomskog modela znaSi konkretno odrediti sve neodredjene parametre, kao i eventualne proizvoljne funkcije, koji se pojavljuju u matematiSki reSenom obliku konstruisanog incverznog matematiSkog ekonomskog modela, PoSto se ovo odredjivanje vrSi na osnovu empiriSkih podataka, to se u tu svrhu mora uzeti u razmatranje i obradu neki odredjen konkretan sluSaj, Ovde f e se uzeti u rei savanje konkretan problem privrednog razvoja Jugoslavije, ., Osnovni statistiSki podaci, koji su posluSili kao empiriSka osnova za konstrukciju inverznog ekonometrijskog modela, prikazani su pregledno u priloSenoj tabeli 1, Jedinice u kojima su izraSene vrednosti promenLjivih veliSina, jesu milijarde dinara, Radi homogeniteta promenljivih veliSina, sve njihove vrednosti izraSene su u cenama 1956, godine, Izbor statistiSkih podataka je evidencija Sektora za narodni dohodak Saveznog zavoda za privredno planiranje. Kao prvi korak u konstruisanju ovog inverznog ekonometrij skog modela odredifie se proizvoljna funkcija ^>(t) sa odgovarajufiim parametrima u matematiSki relenom obliku sistema jednaSina /ll/, Ovo odredjivanje izvrSifie se na taj naSin, Sto Se sa att ct am matematiSf od a ke st'atistike konstruisati trend promenljive veliSine Y(t) kao najbolje prilagodjena kriva linija konretnim empirjSkim podacima u tabeli 1, Taj trend ima sledefii konkretan matejnatiSki oblik:

- 1?2 8

Tabela 1 Osnovni. -podaci za konstrukci.iu modela Bedni broj 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 G-odiSnji period Materijalni Bedni broj troSkovi god.perioda t 0 1 2 * 4 5 6 1.685,1 2.054,1 2.31j.,5 2.586,4 2.886,8 3.106,2 . 3.286,8 Bt T(t) = a e * , DruStveni proizvod Ju ' . .o 1.585,5 1.929,5 1.977,8 2.338,7 2.526,7 2.673,1 2.825,0 Bruto dra%: proizyod z ' , . . C 3,270,6 3.983,4 4.289,3 4.925,1 5.413,5 5.779,5 6.111,8

, ' 19SiS

1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962

As/

gde je parametar a = 1,678,643* a parametar = 0,093926* Ovde treba napomenuti da su u tabeli 1 za posmatrane promenljive veELiSine kao oznake upotrebl jena mala slova x, y i s, da bi se istakao em piriSM karakter; ovih vrednosti za rasliku od ocenjenih vrednosti istih promenljivih veliSina* kojftv.3S^oznaS^he velikim slovima X, Y i Z, koja se upotrabljavaja u modelu* . Ha bazi ekvivalencije druge jednaSine sistema / l l / i jed nacine / 1 2 / utvrdjuje se da parametar Y/o/ ima slede6u konkretna vrednost: ' ' x . Y(o) = a e = a = 1.678,643; /l 3 /
a da funkcija $(t) ima sledefii konkretno odredjen oblik:

$(t) = a pe^6. .

A V

JednaSinom / l 3 / ne samo- da je odre&jena vrednost veliSine Y/o/ u drugoj jednaSini sistema / l l / f ,'-e6 je istovremeno odredjeno i eko7 nomsko zna&enje parametra a u jednaSiui A2/, naime, on predstavlja ocenjenu vrednost veliSine drustvenog proizvoda u baznom godisnjem periodu. Sto se tiSe ekonomskog znaSenja parametra ( , koji se kao 3

- 173 .

konkretno utvrdjena veliSina pojavljuje u jedjafSinama / 1 2 / i /L4/, on predstavlja marginalnu vrednost relativne stope kontinuiranog porasta veliSine drustvenog proizvoda u toku vremena# Kao cLrugi korak u konstrnisanju ovog inverznog ekonome trijskog modela, odredifie se jos neodredjeni parametri u prvoj jed naSini sistema /./ Za ovo odredjivanje parametra Z/o/ i p i s rametra a koristiSe se i drugo ekvivalentno resenje, koje je dato jednaSinom /9/. Naime, linearna zavisnost izmedju promenljivih veliSina Z/t/ u jednaSini /9/ mo5e se met odima regresione analize odrediti kao jed naSina najbolje prilagodjene linije konkretnim podacima datim u tabeli 1. Ova regresiona zavisnost ima sledeSi konkretni oblik: Z(t) = y X(t) + 8, A5/

gde je vrednost parametra y = 1,769901 j a vrednost parametra'8 = = 294,554. . . Ha bazi ekvivalencije prve jednaSine sistema /ll/ i jed naSine /L5/, odjaosno jednaSine /9/, utvrdjuje se da parametar Z(o) ima sledeSu konkretnu vrednost: Z(o) = ~15 = 3.476,392,
/l<o/

a da parametar a ima slededu konkretnu vrednost: = a = y = 1,769901. /L7/

Uzimaju6i sada u obzir jednaSine /l4/, /L6/ i/L7/, prva jednaSina sistema /Ll/ moze se osloboditi integralnog oblika i napisati u sledeSem konkretno reSenom obliku:

z(t)=

fz j; +

- 1),

AS/

gde jo ostaje da se odrede ekonomska znaSenja za parametre y i 8. Prema jednaSini /L7/ i drugoj jednaSini sistema /2/ para metar y predstavlja ocenu veliSine napred ve<5 definisanog marginal nog koeficijenta efektivnosti materijalnih troskova u ocLnosu na bruto drustveni proizvod. U stvari, o . u modelu igra ulogu egzogenog, n

- 17 V lo

objektivno datog strukturnog parametta, ko ji adiyazava dinamiSku zakonitost odnosa izmedju bruto drustvenog proizvoda i materijalnih tro skova. Veliku stabilnost ovog odnosa i visoki stepen uzajamne zavisnosti ubedljivo potvrdjuje konkretna vrednost odgovarajuSeg koeficijenta korelacije (r = 0,998796). Sto se tiSe parametra 8, on predxz . stavlja ocenu asimptotske vrednosti bruto druStvenog proizvoda, koja odgovara graniSnom sluSaju kada t - - 09, odnosno kada Z/t/ - 0, To * * znaSi da parametar 8 predstavlja onaj stalni deo bruto drustvenog proizvoda, koji ne zavisi od materijalnih troSkova i koji prema mo- . delu postoji 5ak i kada ovi ne postoje! Ova okolnost nesumnjivo ukazuje na to, da moguSnosti ekstrapolacije modela nisu neograniSene. Uostalom, to va2i u manjoj ili veSoj meri za sve ekonometrijske modele.
. . _ .

Kao treSi korak u konstruisanju ovog inverznog ekonometrij skog modela ostaje jos da se u tredoj jednaSini sistema /Ll/ odredi parametar Z/o/ i izvrSi supstitucija veS odredjenog parametra^; a,kao i funkcije $(t). ZamenjujuSi konkretne vrednosti za parametre Y/o/ i Z/o/ iz jednaSina /L3/ i / l & / u prvu jednaSinu sistema /2/ za vred nost vremena t=o, utvrdjuje se da parametar. X/o/ ima sledeSu konkretnu vrednost: X(o) s ,- 1,797,749, Y - 1 /L9/

UaimajuSi u obsir jednacine /L4/, / l 7 / i /L9/ treSa jednaSina sistema /Ll/ moze se takodje oslobocliti integralnog oblika i napisati u sledeSem konkretno reSenom obliku.:

7 ^ 3-

- 1 ). A>/

gde svi parametri imaju odredjene numericke vrednosti i veS utvrdjena ekonomska anaSenja, . Ako se na kraju jednaSine / l 8 / t / 1 2 / i /2o/ povezu u jedan simetriSno. napisan sistem, onda se dobije konstruisani inverzni ekonometrijski model za privredni rasvoj Jugoslav!je u svom konkretnom i matematiSki resenom obliku:

r - i y -i gde svi parametri koji se pojavljuju imaju ve ranije odredjene nu<5 meriSke vrednosti i utvrdjena ekonomska znaSenja*

IzvrSena konstrukcija inverznog ekonometrijskog modela za privredni razvoj Jugoslavije posluziSe kao osnova za dalju fazu konkretne primene u oblasti privrednog planiranja* Naime, na bazi ovog konkretnog modela izvrSiSe se ekstrapolacija endogenih promenljivih veliSina, odnosno izraSunaSe se njihove projekcije za odredjen budnSi period* IV* (5etiri vari.iante pro.iekci.ia privrednog razvo.ia Jugoslavi.ie za period 1965-1980* .

Ovde Se se izvrsiti projekcija za dugoroSni period plaiiiranja, pa se na taj naSin.obuKvatiti kako srednjoroSni, tako i kratkoroSni periodi planiranja sa istim zajedniSkim uslovima, Prema tomep moSe se smatrati da je u ovu svrhu dovoljno ako se izvrse pro jekcije aa period 1963-1980* U styari, ovde de se projekcije izvrSiti pomoSu ekstrapolacije promenljive veliSine druStvenog proizvoda na bazi empiriSkih podataka za period 1956-1962* Medjutim, zbog neujednaSenog privrednog razvoja u tom periodn, pored ove "osnovne" va rijante uzeSe se u obzir joS tri varijante, koje Se se razlikovati po veliSini perioda u kome su empiriSki podaci posluSili kao baza za ekstrapolacijiz* Tako Se se ' wblaa" varijanta bazirati na empiriSkim podacima za period 1958-1962, h "maksimalna" varijanta na empiriSkim podacima za period 1^56-1960, a"minimalna" varijanta na empiriSkLm podacima za period 1960-1962* Fostupak za izradu daSe se samo za osnovnu varijantu, dok Se se za sve Setiri varijante dati osnovni resultati sa odgovarajudim analitiSkim elementima* Kao basa za izradu predvifcjemh dugoroSnih projekcija pre ma osnovnoj varijanti inverznog ekonometrijskog modela sluzi veS konstruisani sistem jednaSina (21), koji.se moze napisati u sledeSem konkrstnom ruimeriSkom obliku; Z(t) = - 382,587 + 3858,979 e>093926t> T(t) = 1678,645 e0,093926t' ,

(22 )

- 176 12
Z/t/ = - 382,587 + 2180,336 e093926t# Na osnovu sistema jednacina /22/ izracunavaju se vrednosti projek cija za svaku pojedinu godinu na taj nacin, sto se promenljivom parametru t daju odgovarajuSe vrednosti celih brojeva. Vrednost celih brojeva od 0 do 6 odgovaraju proteklom periodu 1956-1962 /vi deti tabelu 2/, dok vrednosti celih brojeva od 7 do 24 odgovaraju planskom periodu 1963-1980 /videti tabelu 3/. Sve tako izraSunate vrednosti promenljivih veliSina X/t/ i Z/t/ prema konstruisanom inverznom ekonometrijskom modelu za protekli period /L956-1962/ prikazane su u tabeli 2. Isto tako, izracunate vrednosti projekcija promenljivih veliSiaa Z/t/, Y/t/, prema konstruisanom inverznom eko nometrijskom modelu za dugoroczd. planski period /l963-1980/ prika zane su u tabeli 3. Ako se sada izvrsi uporedjivanje izmedju empirickih poda taka promenljivih velipina datih u tabeli 1, i odgcnrarajuSih izraSunatih vrednosti promenljivih veliuina prema konstruisanom modelu Satih u tabeli 2, onda se mole dati ocena stepena prilagodjenosti samog modela proteklom stvarnom privrednom razvoju. Ova oeena mo2e, u stvari, da posluSi kao dobra indikacija za pouzdanost kao i realistiSnost izracunatih vrednosti projekcija dugoroSnog planskog pe rioda datih u tabeli 3, Medjutim, pre nego sto 6e se pristupiti kohkretnom izraSunavanju ovih ocena, dafie se grafiSki prikaz uporedjivanja izmedju empiriSkih podataka i izracunatih vrednosti prema konstruisanom modeluj; . .. Tabela 2 arena konstruisanom modelu Protekli period 1956-1962* Red.br. GodiSnji period 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 Eed.br. god.per. t 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Hater.tros. Z/t/ 1.797,8 2.012,5 2.248,3 2.5o7,4 2.792,0 3.104,7 3.448,1 Osnovna varijanta Drust. proiz. Y/t/ 1.678,6 1.843,9 2.o25,6 2.225,0 2.444,1 2.684,8 2.949,2 Bruto dru proizvod z/t/ 3.476,4 3.856,4 4.273,9 4.732,4 5.236,1 5.789,5 6.397,3

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

- 177 13
za protekli period /L956-1962/. Ovaj prikaz, koji komparativno objedinjuje i ilustruje tabelu 1 i tabelu 2, dat je u grafikonu 1. Tabela 3 Pro.iekci.ie prema konstruisanom modela DugoroSni plansi period 1963-1980. Redni broj Godisnji period Redni broj godiSnjeg perioda t 7 8 9 lo 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2o 21 22 23 24 Materijalni troSkovi X/t/ 3.825,3 4.239,7 4.694,9 5.194,9 5.744,2 6.347,5 7.olo,3 7.738,3 8.538,1 9.416,5 lo.381,6 11.441,6 12.6o6,o 13.885,1 15.29o,1 16.833,6 .18.529,0 2o.391,4 Ostnovna varijanta DruStveni proizvod Y/t/ 3.239,7 3.558,7 3.9o9,l 4.294,1 4.717,o 5.181,5 5.691,8 6.252,3 6.868,o 7.544,4 8.287,3 9.1o3,4. 9.999,9 10.984,7 12.o66,5 13.254,7 14.560,1 15.993,9 Bruto di tveni proizvoc W 7.o65,o 7.798,4 8.6o4,o 9.489,0 10.461,2 11.529,0 12.7.02,1 13.99o,6 15.4o6,l 16.96o,9 18.668,9 2o545,o 22.6o5,9 24.869,8 27.356,6 3o.o88,3 33.o89,l 36.385,3

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 lo 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

Premda ovaj grafiSki prikaz omogu^uje samo grubu ocenu i analizu, ipak se ve<5 iz njega moSe dobiti izvesna orijentacija. Naime, lako se zapaza da su razlike izmedju empirickih podataka /crtiSasto izvucene linije/ i . izraSunatih podataka prema modelu /neprekidno izvuSene linije/ primetno ve6e u drugoj polovini posmatranog perioda nego u prvoj polovini. Specijalno, te razlike su najveSe u 1962. godini /za t=6/ i iznose: X/6/ - Xg = 161,3, T/6/ - yg = 124,2 i Z/6/ - Zg = 285,5. Medjutim, uporedivost i bdlja ocena ovih

I?8

14 Grafikon 1
EmpriSke i izraSunate vrQdnosti promenljivih ..veliSina Protekli period 1956-1962,, Osnovna varijanta

- 179 15 apsolutnih razlika dobija se ako se one izraze u relativnom obliku pomoSu proeenata, uzimaju&i za bazu odgovarajuSe izraSunate vrednosti promenljivih. veliSina prema modelu. Naime, te relativne. razlike u procentima iznose: X/6/ - x ' Y/6/ , / 6 . loo = ----- . loo = 4,68 % , 2/6/ Y/6/ = 4,21 % i ^ 6/ ~ Z6 * loo = 4,46 Kada se ima u vidu da su sve z/6/ ostale relativne razlike osetno manje, onda se ve6 moze re6i da je / : prilagodjenost modela stvarnim podacima priliSno zadovoljavajuSa. Ipak, za precizniju ocenu stepena prilagodjenosti modela stvarnosti potrebno je izracunati neku pogodnu meru disperzije empiriSkih poda taka oko izraSunatih vrednosti. Kao pogodna mera disperzije ovde 6e se upotrebiti relativ na standardna. devijacija /koeficijent varijacije/ empiriSkih podataka oko izraSunatih vrednosti. IzraSunavajuSi odgovarajuSe koeficijente varijacije za .sve tri promenljive velicine, dobijaju se slede< i rezultati: 5 = 3,61 % t = 3,86 % i = 3,58 % , IzraSunati re zultati proseSni^elativnih odstupanja za sve tri promenljive veliSi ne dovoljno jasno pokazuju da je prilagodjenost izraSunatih vrednosti na osnovu modela prema stvarnim podacima zaista priliSno zadovoljavajuSa, te da se pod odredjenim pretpostavkama moSe oSldcivati da de i prilagodjenost ekstrapolacijom projiciranih vrednosti biti isto tako zadovoljavajuSa. Da bi se moglo proceniti u kojoj je meri ova osnovna va rijanta povoljna i prihvatljiva, potrebno je' uzeti u razmatranje i odgovarajuSe projekcije dugoroSnog planskog perioda /L963-1980/. Medjutim, pri tome Se se dugoroSni planski period sukcesivnb podeliti na jedan sedmogodiSnji i jedan desetogodisnji potperiod /Sto ne iskLjuSuje i neku drugu podelu/. Radi olakJsavanja ovog razmatranja, pored toga sto Se se projekcije osnovnih promenljivih veliSina pri-. kazati na grafikonu 2 za ceo dugoroSni planski period, daSe se izraSunati analitiSki elementi kako za dugoroSni planski period u celini, tako i za oba planska potperioda posebno. Svaki od ovih planskih pe rioda u razmatranju Se obuhvatiti i odgovarajuSi bazni godisnji pe riod, 5to 6e omoguSavati i posebno' razmatranje i analizu svakog planskQg potperioda kao relativno nezavisne celine. Grafikon 2 prikazuje sve navedene planske periode, Sije su projekcije obuhvaSene u tabeli 3, U ovom grafikonu projekcija materijalnih troSkova [Xg(t)] oznaSena

16

- 180 -

Grafikon 2 IzraSunate vrednosti projekcija promenljivih veliSina

V V Z2
34.000 32.000 30.000 28aooo 26*ooo 24.000 22ooo 2o*ooo t" 18ooo 16.000 14.000 12.odo \ lo.obo 8.ooo
6 000

'

'
.Osnovna varijanta

Planski period 1963-198o.

Bruto druStveni proizvod Materi jalni troskovi DruStveni proizvod

4.000
2 .0 0 0

ooo 7 1963

I I I

I,

I -L

9 lo 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2o 21 22 23 24 1965 ,1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979

- l8 l 17
je neprekidno izvuSenom linijom, projekcija drustvenog proizvoda [YgCtj] oznaSena je crtiSasto isprekidanom linijom, a projekoija bruto druStvenog proizvoda [ Z_(t) ] oznaSena je naizmeniSno crtiSast i taSkksto isprekidanom linijom. Iz grafikona 2 jasno se z p l f . da je nivo materijalnih aaff troSkcwa stalno iznad nivoa drustvenog proizvoda i da se oSito ispoljava tendencija da razlika izmedju njih stalno raste, Medjutim, da bi se dinamika osnovnih promenljivih veliSina moga uspeSnije uporedjivati i analizirati, potrebno je izraSunati i odgovarajufie stope rasta. Poto su intervalne stope rasta vile uobiSajene, to 6e se one izraSunati iz vefi utvrdjenih marginalnih stopa rasta pomoSu sledeSe formule: r = / pvloge - 1, (23)

gde r predstavlja intervalnu, a p marginalnu konstantnu stopu rasta3) Tako za druStveni proizvod osnovne varijante Yg(t) dobija se slede6a intervalna konst antna stopa raata: ry

= ft pY loge - 1 = 9*85 % , 2

(24)

PoSto druge dve osnovne promenljive veliSine nemaju konstantne sto pe rasta, to 6e se odgovarajuSe intervalne prcatenljive stope rasta izraSunati prema poznatoj formuli: Z2.t - 1 = [10,8 } 10,1#]. (25)

'***''

'

'

'

a r " T

* =

io,o#].

J 2,t-1 Na sliSan naSin, da bi se moglo vrSiti uporedjivanje i analiza raznih varijanata za oba planska potperioda, kao i za dugoroSni planski period u celini, potrebno je izraSunati i odgovaraju3) Dokaz ove formule dat je u autorovom radu, koji je naveden u napomeni pod (l). Izvodjenje dokaza nalazi se na stranama 39-40 tog rada u izdanju Saveznog zavoda za privredno planiranje.

= 182 "
18

mere ukupnog poraista u njima. Tako ukapan .porast u procentima u sedmogociignjein planskom potperiodu, -uzimaju&i 1965. godinu z , ba,zu,; a iznosi prema osnovnoj varijanti z . inaterijalne troskove: a X^v-zy?/ : ; : _ h, > " . loo = lo2,3 % 9 za druStveni proizvddi/ v

loo = 93,o % , a za .bruto druStveni proizvod; loo = 98,o isto tako, ukupaa porast u procentima tfcdesetogodisnjem planskom potperioda, uzimajudi 1970. godims za bazu, iznosi presna osnovnoj varijanti za materijalne troSkove: Xg/24/ - X^/l4/ 1oo=165,5 % ,

za druSwsni proizvod:

~ Y_/l4/

loo = 155,8 %ya. za birato

drustTeai proisvod: \ Z24/ z^fXA/ loo = 16o,l % , Najzad, ukapan

. .....

porast i prooentima u c l f i dugd^oSnom planskom periodu, uzimaju<5i . s eof 1963. godinu za bazu, iaaosi prems osnovnoj varijanti za.materi^al-: ns troska^ei:.' XV24/ . *'" . loo = 433,1 za drustveni proizvod
V 24/ - V 7/ loo = 393, 7 %, a za bruto druStveni proizvod;

Zg/24/ - Zg/7/ .loo = 415,o

77

Istim postupkom, kao sto je uradjeno za osnovnu varijantu, mogu se izracunati odgovarajudi rezultati i analiticki elementi za ostale tri predvidjene varijante projekcija. Medjutim, radi uStede uprostoru i bolje:preglednosti tih rezultata i elemenata/bez ponavljanja analognih postupaka, dae se samo odgqvaraju6i rezultati i analitiSki elementi. Svi ti rezuitati i element! za sve Setiri varijante i sve posmatrane periode i potperiode iskazani su u, za

- 183 19
uporedjivanje i analizu pogodnoj, tabeli 4. Ova analitiSka tabela obuhvata sve vaSnije rezultate i elemente za analizu, a odnosi se na sve cetiri varijante kao i na sve posmatrane periode i potperiode. U zaglavlju tabele nalaze se Setiri varijante, koje su poredjane takvim redom, da kao prva dolazi maksimalna varijanta, kao druga dolazi osnovna varijanta, kao treSa dolazi blaSa varijanta, a kao Setvrta dolazi minimalna varijanta, U pretkoloni tabele oznaSeni su samo yaSniji osnovni resultati i najneophodniji. analitiSki elementi. U prva tri reda tabele iskazane su vrednosti projekcija osnovnih promenljivih veliSina u milijardama u tri kljuSne godine dugoroSnog planskog perioda. U sledefia tri reda iskazani su porasti projekcija osnovnih promenljivih veliSina u procentima za dva planska potperio da, kao i za ceo dugoroSni planski period. U sedmom redu tabele is kazane su odgovarajufie relativne stope rasta osnovnih promenljivih veliSina u procentima za ceo dugoroSni planski period. Najzad, kao upotpunjavanje ove tabele rezultata i analitiSkih elemenata, u poslednja tri reda iskazani su odgovaraju6i koeficijenti varijacije, efektivnosti ' korelacije. i V. ZakliuSna analiza vari.ianata i modela IaraSunati rezultati i analitiSki elementi, pregledno is kazani u tabeli'4, uzimaju^i u obzir prikazane tabele i grafikone kao i neke izvedene osobine modela, omoguSuju da se izvrsi zakljuSna analiza i ocena ne samo vari janata projekcija, ve i konstruisa nog modela u eelini. ^azume se, to Se se ovde uSiniti samo u najsaSetijem obliku, ostavljajuSi dovoljno moguSnosti za dalje upotpunja-*? vanje i precizjranje ne samo kroz diskusiona razmatranja, ve<5 i kroz praktiSnu primenu i proveravanje. Apsolutne vrednosti nivoa projekcija u prva tri reda analitiSke tabele na oSigledan naSin pokazuju da je redosled varijana ta u skladu sa usvojenim nazivima za njih. Naime, sve veliSine pokazuju 3koro pravilnu. tendenciju opadanja prema usvojenom redosledu varijanata. Dve ekstremne varijante, maksimalna i minimalna, osetno ocUiflaraju od dveju srednjih i dosta bliskih varijanata. Ova Sinjenica u izvesnoj meri vefi dopusta da se mdksimalria i minimalna vari janta mogu smatrati manje verovatnim. B-azlog vise, maksimalna vari janta oslanja se na petogodiSnji period u kome su sve godine bile vrlo povoljne, a minimalna na trogodisnji period u kome su dve godi-

-184 20

Tabela .4
AnalitiSka tabela rezultata i elemenata Svi periodi i potperiodi Red. broj 1. Vrsta rezulta ta i elemenata Maksimalna varijanta II Osnovna varijanta 7*o65,o 13.99o,6 36.385,3 3.239,7 6.252,3 15.993,9 3.825,3 7.738,3 2o.391,4 98,o# 16o,l# 415,o# 93,0# 155,8# 393,7# lo2,3# 163,5# Sve varijante III . IV Blaza va- Minimalna rijanta varijanta 6,829,8 12.478,6 29.3o4,o 3.158,4 5.712,9 13.321,7 3.671,4 6,765,7 15.982,3. 82,7# 134,8# 329,1# 8o,9# ' 133,2# 321,8# 84,3# 136,5# 6.5oo,6 9.849,4 17.587,4 2.987,7 4.415,3 7.713,9 3.512,9 5.434,1 9.873,5 51,5# 78,6# 17o,6# 47, 8# 74,7# 158,2# 54,7# 81,7#

Projekcije 1963. 7.831,4 bruto druste- 1970. 17.618,2 nog proizvoda 1980. 54.953,5 Projekcije 1963. 3.587,7 drustv?nog 1970. 7.882,4 proizvoda za 1980. 24.266,1 godinu 1963. 4.243,7 Projekcije materijalnih 1970. 9.735,3 troskova za, godinu 1980. 3'o.587,4 Porast bruto drustvenog proizvoda u planskom periodu 1963 1970. 1970 1980. 1963 1980. 132,6# _ 211,9# 6ol,7# 119,7# 2o7g9# 576,: 4# 129,4# 214,2#

2.

3,

4*

*'

5. .

Porast drus-

1963 1970. 1970 1.980, 1963 1980.

6.

Porast mate-. 1963 1970. 1970 1980,

- 185 21
H Osnovna varijanta 433,1# HI BlaSa varijan. 335,3# ...IV Minimalna varijanta 181,1#

Red. Vrsta rezultabr oj ta 1 elemenata

Maksimalna varijarita

1963 1980. 62o,8#

7. Stopa rasta r [l2,4#$12,o#] [ lo,4#;lo,o#] [ 4j8|$o| [ * 9ya 5,9#] osnovnih pron ^ 9. menljivih ve- rY U '9^ liSina u peri-rT [12, 9#;12,1#] [lo,8#jlo,:i#] [9,$;8,9#][6,6#;6,1 # ' ] odu 1963-1980. 8. Koeficijenti varijacije empiriSkih podataka oko izraSunatih vrednosti V

2 > 25%

3,58# 3,86# 3,e

2,3o# 3,o2# 1,84#

0 22

,#

V / x

3,12 # 2 ,0 2 #

0,( 0,38#

9. Koeficijent efektivnosti materijalnih troskova y 10.Koeficijent korelacije za veliSine x i z

1,7820

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0,9988

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ne bile sa osteno usporenim rastom. Sto se tiSe dveju srednjih varijanata, osnovne i blale, one se mogu smatrati znatno verovatnijim ne samo zbog toga Sto su proseSnije i umerenije, veS i zbog toga Sto se prva varijanta oslanja na sedmogodiSnji period sa dve godine usporenog rasta, a cLruga na petododiSnji period, takodje sa dve godine usporenog rasta. Prema tome, osnovna varijanta mole se smatrati kao najvise verovatna i realistiSna. Medjutim, bas ta okolnost ukljuSuje i moguSnost za jednu "jaSu" varijantu kao priliSno verovatnu. Ova jaSa varijanta ovde nije prikazana viSe iz prostomih razloga, nego iz razloga neke male verovatnoSe. Iz druga tri reda analiticke tabele vide se relativni odnosi

izmedju varijanata, mereni procentalnim porastima projekcija osnov nih promenljivih. veli3ina za oba planska potperioda, kao i za sam- ' dugoroSni planski period, Ovi relativni odnosi ne samo da ne opovrgavaju zakljuSke izvedene na osnovu apsolutnih nivoa u prva tri reda analitiSke tabele, . ve<5 ih samo jos n v - . j meri potvrdjuju i upotpuedo. njuju. Kao interesantno, namede se - a projekcije osnovnih d. promenljivih velicina u osnovnoj varijanti za sedmogodisnji planski potperiod pribliSno udvostrudavaju svoje bazne vrednosti, sto prilidno utide na prihvatljivost ove varijante kao zadovoljavajude. Kao ne manje interesantno namede se i zapazanje koje vazi za sve Setiri varijante i za sva tri posmatrana planska perioda, da najvedi rela tivni porast imaju materijalni troskovi, zatim sledi bruto drustveni proizvod, a najmanji ima drustveni proizvod, Ito je posledica ispoljene zakoniiosti u rasvoju nase privrede u.celini. Najzad, namede se i .jedno sapsza^^ekoje vali ne samo aas^if-Setiri varijante. i zat sva tri posmatrana planska perioda, ved isto tako i za apsolutne vrednosti nivoa projekcija kao i njihovih relativnih porasta u pro centima. Naime, apsolutne vrednosti nivoa projekcija materijalnih troSkova, kao i njihovi relativni porasti u prooentima, -uvek su vedi od odgovarajudih apsolutnih vrednosti i relativnih porasta druStvenog proisvoda. Ova opsta osobina, o kojoj ds jo5 biti govora, -' svakako je takodje nuSaa posledica ispoljene zakonitosti u razvoju nase privrede u celini. 1 U sedmom redu analitiSke tabele iskazane relativne stope rasta za sve tri osnovne promenljive velicine u oelom dugoroSnom . planskom periodu jasno predodavaju dinamiku razvoja prema sve Setiri varijante. Ova dinasiika pokazuje odredjene osobine, koje se ovde kvantitatiynoisfrlo jasno ispoljavaja. Pre svega, dinamika projekci ja drustvenog proizvoda ima konsJ a . t u stopu rasta koja je, razume ;'in se, za razae varijante razlidita. Medjutim, dinamika projekoija bru to drustvenog proizvoda kao i materijalnih troskova ved nema konstajatnu stopu rasta, nego se ona menja i sa razvojem opada. Zbog . toga su odgovaraju6e relativne stope rasta u analitidkoj tabeli . izraSene u obliku zatvorenog brojnog intervala u kome variraju, po- . smatrajudi razvoj celog dugoroSnog planskog perioda od 1963.. do 1980. godine* Nije teSko zapaziti da relativne stope rasta materi- , jalnih troskova za sve varijante imaju vede intervale varijacije od odgovarajudih relativnih stopa rasta bruto drustvenog proizvoda. Ovde je, medjutim, neophodno uoSiti da su vrednosti relativnih sto pa rasta i materijalnih troskova i bruto drustvenog proizvoda stalno vede od odgovarajudih konsiantnih vrednosti relativnih stopa ra-

- 187 23
sta druStvenog proizvoda, ali da se sa razvojem stalno smanjuju i sve vise pribliSuju tim konstantnim vrednostima. Ovo uoSavanje do-, vodi do opSteg zakljuSka, da relativne stope rasta druStvenog proizvoda imaju konstantnu i stalno manju vrednost od odgovarajufiih stopa materijalnih troSkova i bruto drustvenog proizvoda, Sije se vrednosti menjaju i stalno smanjuju, 'ali primetno usporavajufiim tempom, tako da asimptotski tele odgovarajufiim konstantnim vrednostima relativnih stopa rasta drustvenog proizvoda. U osmom redu analitiSke tabele iskazani su koeficijenti varijacije, koji na odredjeni naSin mere stepen odstupanja empiriSkih podataka oko izraSunatih, te na taj nacin mogu posluSiti kao praktiSno zadovoljavajui analiticki elementi prilagodjenosti i re&ListiSnosti pojedinih promenljivih veliSina u odgovarajui5im ya- rijantama. Odmah pada u oSi velika prilagodjenost minimalne varijante, ali iz toga ne sledi i velika realistiSnost, posto se radi o proteklom periodu od svega tri godine* Maksimalna i blaza varijanta imaju priblizno podjedaaku prilagodjenost, ali je ova druga ipak vile realistiSna, jer obuhvata najnoviji protekli period, koji. ; pored tri povoljne ima i dve slabije godine. Osnovna varijanta, istini za volju, ima neSto slabiju prilagodjenost, premda ova raz. lika nije znaSajna, ali zato ipak pokazuje veu realistiSnost, jer , se zasniva na duSem najnovijem proteklom periodu, koji pored dye slabije ima i pet povoljnijih godina, to je od znaSaja naroSito za dugoroSno planiranje. Deveti i deseti red analitiSke tabele ubddljivo pokazuju da je ovaj inverzni ekonometrijski model konstruisah na solidnim temeljicja* Naime, koeficijenti efektivnosti materijalnih troskova za 3ve Setiri varijante pokazuju samo neznaSajna medjusobna razlikovanja, Sto jasno potvrdjuje veliku stabilnost ove objektivne invarijante naSe privrede, te je zaista pogodna za konstrukciju mode la ove vrste i namene. Eada se tome dodaju zaista visoki koefici jenti korelacije izmedju materijalnih troSkova i bruto drustvenog proizvoda, onda i poslednji ostatak kolebanja mora potpuno da isSezne. He zadrSavaju6i se na znaSajnim analitiSkim kvalitetima, koje ovaj model nesumnjivo ima, mora se istaSi da je on naroSito podesan za sredji'joroBno i dugoroSno planiranje, jer je zbog svoje stabilnosti i elastiSnosti pogodan kako za dalje proSirivanje novim promenljivim veliSinama i dezagregiranje, tako i za komplemen-

-188 24
;amb i kombinaciono povezivanje sa drugim ekonomskim modelima. Tu u prvom redii dolaze u obzir kombinacije sa ekonomskim modelima ' iarrod-Domar-Mahalanobisa 1 medjusektorskim modelom. ^rednost ovog aodela i sastoji se uJJr&vo u tome, Sto je on pogodan da posluzi kao 3olidna osnova za ovakVo prosirivanje, dezagregiranje i kombinovanje, cao i konstruisanje jedinatvenog, povezahog i uskladjenog sistema skonomskih modela* ^azume se, ova vrednost konstruisanog iriverznog nodela mora se jos uvek smatrati samo kao potencijalna i perspektivna*

- 189 25 DanSika NIKOLIC

KONSTRUKCUA INVERZNOG- EKONOMETRIJSKOG- MODELA. SA NETO I BEdTO-ASEEKTIMA. AGREGATA EROIZVODNJE ZA DUGOROCNI PRIVREDNI RAZVOJ JUGOSLAVIJE Ova,j rad predstavlja pokuSaj da se, polazeSi pd jednog ranije teorijski konstruisanog matematiSkog modela, konstruise odgo varaju6i inverzan matematiSki model, koji bi se mogao uspesno primeniti u planiranju privrednog razvoja Jugoslavije* U tu svrhu prethodno je izvrsena konstrukcija samog inverznog matematickog modela u njegovom nereSenom diferencijalnom obliku. na bazi osnovnog matematiSkog modela sa neto i bruto-aspektima agregata proizvodnje /!/. Postupak inverzije modela, koji je u radu izveden sa potrebnim objaSnjenjima, omoguSio je odgovarajuSu konstrukciju inverznog mate matiSkog modela takodje sa neto i bruto-aspektima agregata proizvod nje /2/* Da bi se moglo pristupiti i primeni ovog inverznog modela u planiranju, odnosno konstrukciji odgovarajufieg inverznog ekonome trijskog modela, dato je prethodno izvodjenje opStih resenja inverz nog matematiSkog modela sa najneophodnijim postupcima . objasnjenjii ma, Ovo izvodjenje je dovelo do opSteg ali resenog oblika inverznog matematiSkog modela /Ll/ koji je oslobodjen diferencijalnih' eleme nata i koji je podesan za aplikativnu konstrukciju odgovarajuSeg in verznog ekonometrijskog modela* . . . Za konkretnu oblast primene resenog oblika inverznog mate matiSkog modela uzet je privredni razvoj .Jugoslavije, Tako je na bazi empiriSkih podataka za protekli period 1956-1962, datih u'tabeli 1, konstruisana osnovna varijanta irrt'eranog ekonometrijskog modela /22/* Na bazi modela ove osnovne varijante izraSunate su vrednosti osnovnih promenljivih veliSina: materijalnih troSkova / l / 9 drustven og proizvoda /?/ i bruto druStvenog proizvoda /Z/. Ove vrednosti su izraSunate kako za protekli period 1956-1962 /tabela 2/, tako i kao projekcije za dugoroSni planski period 1963-1980 /tabela 3/* Isto tako, radi bolje preglednosti i lakse analize, vrednosti poda taka u tabeli 1 i tabeli 2 grafiSki su prikazane u grafikonu 1, a vrednosti podataka u tabeli 3 grafiSki su prikazane u grafikonu 2* Pored ovih rezultata za osnovnu varijantu izraSunati su i razni neop-

hodni paramet&i i analitiSki elementi, kap Sto su: koefiei jent efektivnosti materijalnih troSkova (17), koeficijent ksrelaci je(apk l|[|, intervalne relativne stope raata (str. 17),koefici jenti vat*i5 a | j eije (str. 15) i drugi. " Pored osnovne varijante, koja se bazira na empiriSkim po-1 dacima u proteklom periodu 1956-1962, u radu su uzete u obzii* joS i tri druge varijante: maksimalna varijanta, koja se bazira ne empi&jig kim podkcima u proteklom periodu 1956-196o, blaSa varijanta, koja se bazira na empiriSkim podacima_u proteklom perioda 1958-1962, kao i ; minimalna varijanta, koja se bazira na empiriSkim podacima u protefci lom periodu 196o-1962. Uzimaftjkv i obzir ovih vari janata izvrSeno 3 a na taj naSin, 5to su svi vazniji rezultati i analitiSki elementi za sve Setiri varijante iskazani u tabeli 4, koja omoguftuje preglednti".>i' uporedjivanje i analizu obhvadenih rezultata i elemenata. Na osnovuove analitiSke tabele, uzimajudi u obzir prikazane tabele g2*af*ikone kao i neke izvedene osotine modela, izvrSena je zakljuSna analizi i ocena u najsal^tijem obliku, ostavljajudi dovoljno m o g u S n o s t l z b . dalje upotpunjavanje i preciziranje ne samo kroz diskusiona razmatranja,ve6 i kroz praktiSjiu primenu i proveravanje. Prema to j ana ' lizi i oceai proizilajs*iiyl' se projekcije planskog razvoja osnovne " varijante mogu smatrati kao najverovatnije i najrealisti.3ni.je, pa " prema tome i najprihvatljivije, a da se vrednost modela potencxjal no i perspektivno sastoji u tome, sto je on pogodan da posluSi. kao solidna osnova ne samo za proSirivanje, dezagregiranje i kombinovanje sa drugim modelima, ved i za konstruisanje jedihstvenog, pasre zanog i uskladjenog sistema ekonomskih modela.

- 191 27

KOHCTTPSTKUJIH MHBEPCHOH 3K O H O M K O -MATEMATOTEG KOM MOHEJIK C HETTO H EPyTTO ACIIEKTAMH AITErATA HPOH3BOJICTBA V T Ifl JIOJirOCPOqHOrO X03flMCTBEHH0r0 PA3BHTHS MrOCJIABMH U JtaHUHKa HHKOJIHq

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jreMaTHuecKoS MOfleJiH, naeTcfi npeflBapHTejiBHoe BtmojiHeHHe o 6pHX pemeHHH HHBepCHOH MaTeMaTHqeCKO.fi MOfleJlH C CaMHMH. Heo 6 fjXOflHMHMH n O C T y n K a M H H O 6 H C H e H H H M H . 3 T 0 B H n O J I H e H H e n p H B e J l O po o^men, ho p e m e H H o S $opMH HHBepcHoS MaTeMaTHtiecKOH MOfle-

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qecKoS MOflejiH /22/. Ha 0 CH 0BaHHH MonejiH stoto ochobhoto sapnaHTa BHUHCJieHH ctohmocth ochobhhx nepeMeHHHx BeJiH^HH: MaTepnajiBHHX 3aTpaT /X/, otfmecTBeHHoro nponyKTa /y/ h Ba-

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3th c t o h m o c t h B H U H C Jie H M K a K 3a hct^ /T a t f jin iia 2 / , TaK h K a K . n p o e K ijn n 3a^ nepnon 1963- 1980 h /T a t f jm i ja 3 / . Q}aic o6o3peHHH

6onee j i e r K o r o a H a n M 3 a , e i )cth BaHHHX b Tatfjimie 1 h TatfJiHiie 2: rpa$HiiecKH n o K a 3 a * Tpa$HKe 1 , a ctohmocth naHHHX b TatfJinne 3 rpa^mieckhjI*. ca3aHii Ha rpa$HKe 2 . KpoMe s t h x -pe3yjiBTaTOB bjih ochobIc* BapnaHTa BtmHCJieHH h pa3JiH*iHHe napaMeTpu h aH ajiH T im e _ 5 3 JieMeHTBI KaK: K 0 3 $ $H IIH eH T 3$$eKTHBHOCTH M a T epHajibHHx r p a T / 1 7 / , K 03e$$H IJH eH T , KOppeJIHIJHH, HHTepBaJIB'HHH OTHOrejiBHHH cpenHHH pocT / c T p 21/, K 03 $$HiiHeHT B . a p n a m m rp. J 9 / h npoune. KpoMe ochobhoto B a p a H T a , ocHOBHBaroiiie.roc h Ha smiih^. iecKHX HaHHBix 3a HCTeKfflHH nepnoH , 1956-1962, b c T a T t e I (Ihhth bo BHHMaHHe eme Tpn BapnaHTa: MaKCHManthbih Bapjta HOBHBaromHHCH Ha SMnnpwiiecKHx naHHiix 3a HCTeKffliaS nepHo'jut;. 56- 1960, 6.ojiee yMepeHHHH BapnaHT ocHOBHBaromnMCH Ha sm pnuecKHX naHHHX 3a HCTeKBiHS nepHOB 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 6 2 , K a K h M.r. WaJlBH&IH BapnaHT OCHOBHBaiOmHHCH Ha BlinHpHtieCKHX flaHHHX;* reKmHH nepHOH 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 2 . IIpHHHTHe bo B H H M a H H e a m Bapr tob coBepmeHo TaK, qTo Bee (5ojree BascHHe pe3yjitTaTH h sF THqecKHe 3neMeHTH hjih B c e x xieTHpex BapnaHTOB n o K a 3 a H H ' b frjiHije 4- KOTopan aaeT bo3moschoctb HarjiHflHoro cpaBhehhh> , ajiH3a oxBaqeHHux pe3yjiBTaTOB h 3 JieMeHTOB Ha och o baH H H J OH aHaJIHTHqeCKOH TaCJjIHmj, npHHHMaH BO B H H M a H H e npHBeflefe e TatfjmijH h rpa$HKH KaK h HeKOTopHe n p o H 3B e se H H H e ocofj|!i cth MoneJiH, coBepmeHH 3aKJiro*iHTeJiBHHK aHajiH3 h oijeHKH b ^ MOH K p a T K O H $ 0 p M e , H a B a H HOCTaTOUHO B 0 3MO3KHOCTH HJIH H a J p
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H c npyrHMH M O H e J I H M H , H O B H 3 a H H O H H C O TJiaC O B aH H O H H H ^ H K O H C T p y K I I H H eflHHCTBeHHO" C H C T e M H S K O H O M H U e C K H X M O n e Jie S ^;

-1 9 3 29

CONSTRUCTION OP AN INVERSE ECONOMETRIC MODEL WITH.NET AND GROSS AGGREGATIVE PRODUCTION. ASPECTS FOR LONG-TERM ECONO MIC GROWTH OP YUGOSLAVIA . By DanSika Nikoli6

Starting from an econometric model theoretically construc ted earlier* one.tries to construct a corresponding, inverse mathema tical model which could he successfully applied in planning economic development of Yugoslavia. Previously, one proceeded to construct the inverse mathematical model itself in its unsolved differential form on the basis of a fundamental mathematical model with net and gross aggregative production aspects (l) The procedure of model in version, performed in the paper with nacessary explanations, permi tted the corresponding construction of inverse mathematical model with net and gross aggregative production aspects (2 ) as well* In order to approach also to application of this inverse model in plann ing of in construction of a corresponding inverse econometric model, one presents a preliminary deduction of general solutions of the inverse mathematical model with indispensable procedures and explan ations. This deduction led to a general but solved form of inverse mathematical model (ll) which, delivered from differential elements, suits best for applicative construction of a corresponding inverse econometric model* The economic development of Yugoslavia was taken as con crete application field of the solved form of inverse mathematical model. On the basis of empirical data for the period batween the years 1956-1962, shown in Table 1, one constructed the basic variant of inverse econometric model (22). On the basis of model of this basio variant, one computed the values of basic variable magnitudes: material costs (X), social product (Y) and gross social product () These magnitudes have been computed as for the past period from 1956. to 1962. (Table 2), so for projections of the long-term period from 1963 to 198o .(Table 3 ) One presents also, for the sake of clear . ness and easier analysis, the charts of the values in Table 1 and Table 2 (Chart l), and the values of Table 3 in the Chart 2. Besides these results for the basical variant, ona-computed .also various

^.194 D

ndispensable parameters and analytical elements as: e f f i c i e n c y Q . ifficienoy coefficients of material costs (l7)f correlation oef*f dents, interval relative growth rates, variation coefficients etc" Besides the basic variant founded on empirical d a t a f*or' ;he period "between the years 1956-1962, one took into c o n s i d e r a t i ^ ;hee othar variants: still: m - H f . variant based on empir i c a l data asmlT roin the period 1956-196o, a moderated variant based on d a t a from .958-1962, and a minimal variant based on data from 196o1962, One performed it by presenting in Table 4 all more important results m d analysis of results and elements covered. As a further stage , m d after taking into account the tables and charts presented, as.| rell as some, deduced,'model properties, one performed the final -ana Lysis, and evaluation in a most condensed form, letting enough, room further completing and strietifying not only through. <3.iscussio>i or lal considerations, but thraugh practical application and. rectiuPSii ' iation as well*; According to this analysis and evaluation, it folio? i s that the planned development projections of basic v a r i a n t might ? ae considered as the most probable and realistic, and consequently ' aost acceptable one, and that the potential and prosperative value-1 of the. model consists in that it suits best to serve as s o l i d basig not only for expanding, disaggregations and combining /with, other lels, but also for constructions of a uniform, interlinke d a nd harj' nonisjed systeni of economic, models. . . t-v . t . ....... .
' . ' . . ' : . . . \ ' ' -

- 195 -

DanSika NIKOLlfi
PRIMENA KOMBINOVANO & YISESEET ORSKO& MODELA ZA SEDMOGODISNJI FRIVREDNI RAZVOJ JUGOSLAVUE

U izradi prve okvirne sedmogodisnje projekcije privrddnog razvoja, globalno i za osam osnovnih privrednih. delatnosti, bio je primenjen jedan k<3mbinovan osmosektorski ekonometrijski model, koji je ranije M o samo teorijski konstruisan. Sam model kombinovan je od tri dosta razliSita modela, koji se uzajamno upotpunjuju i proveravaju. Ovde Se se u kratkim potezima dati opis ovog kombinovanog modela kao i njegove primene u izradi polaznih i okvirnih projekcija* Kao osnovni, upotrebljen je inverzni oblik dinamiSkog viSesektorskog ekonometrijskog modela sa neto i bruto-aspektima agre gata proizvodnje. Ovaj model moSe se kondenzovano i u reSenom obli ku predstaviti na sledeSi nacin: ~ $! 4 . - f T T + - -i) - 1 1 ' *1 *1 T (t) = a + a [(l + r f ~ 1 I, (=0,1,2..*,8) (l) '

Upotrebljene oznake u modelu imaju sledeSa znaSenja: I, Endogene promenljive veliSine a/ Promenljive veliSine cilja. (1) T. = druStveni proizvod po sektorima i globalno (2 ) Z. = bruto druStveni proizvod po sektarima i blobalno b/ PomoSne promenljive veliSine (l) X^ = materijalni troSkovi po sektorima i globalno

II* ^gzogene pfomenljive veliSine a/ Instrumentalni promenl jivi parametri ' i* . (l) r. = relativna stopa rasta druStvenog S proizvoda po sektorima i globalno 'f b/ Objektivno dati strukturrd. parametri (1) a. = druStveni proizvod po sektorima i glo'&alno u baznom periodu (1963) (2) Yi = marginal ni koeficijent efektiv-, , . nosti materijalnih /te*oskova po sekto*?' rima i globalno . . . . ... (3 ) 6^ = dopunski parametar strukturne zavisnosti po sektorima i globalno. :

' .

Oznaka predstavlja redni broj godiSnjeg perioda i uzima dnost t= 0,1,2,..,7, Oznaka i predstavlja indeks koji pokazuje . ni broj sektora i=l,2,*..,8, odnosno global celokupne privrede . . . . . .

Sistem jednaSina (l) koji konstitui&e osnovni model, sa>ji se iz n=3 x 9 = 27 jednaSina, koliko ima i endogenih promen.vih veliSina (X., Y. i Z .) TJkupan broj egzogenih. promenljivih iSina iznosi R= 4 x~9 = 6, a ukupan broj objektivno datih veliSiiznosi m = 3 x 9 = 27. Prema tome,'broj'stepena slobode trebalo bi bude s = N - m = 36 - 27 = 9. Medjutim, on u stvari iznosi s* = 8, 1 proizilazi iz okolnosti da je globalna relativna stopa rasta iStvenog proizvoda determinirana rezultanta odgovaraju&ih sekfcorskih ativnih stopa rasta, Sto na analogan nacin va2i i za sve ostale ibalne promenljive velicine (endogene i egzogene). Kao zakljuSak, iizila.zi da se osam instrumentalnih parametara r. (i = 1,2,...,8; ; proizvoljno (u raznim granioama) menjati i da njihovim fiksiranjem u endogene promenljive velicine postaju jednoznaSno odredjene, te pomoSu sistema jednacina (l) mogu lako i brzo izracunati. U stvari, ito se ovde radi o inverznom obliku polaznog osnovnog modela, ovi trumentalni parametri predstavljaju politiSko-ekonomske ciljeve, i treba odrediti kao radnu hipotezu za planiranje, a u skladu sa e edjenom koncepcijom o naSem drustveno-privrednom razvoju, o naSim ;rebama kao i moguSnostima. U primeni ovog modela poSlo se od tri enrpiriSke varijante

ciljeva, koji planom treba da budn ostvareni. Naime, za "osnovnu varijantu" odredjene su odgovarajude relativne stope rasta drustve nog proizvoda po sektorima na bazi empiriSkih podataka za period 1956-1962* godine. Za "maksimalnu varijantu" odgovarajude relativ ne stope rasta drustvenog proizvoda po sektorima odredjene su na ba zi empiriSkih podataka za period 19561960. Najzad, za "ublalenu ' varijantu" odgovarajude relativne stope rasta drustvenog proizvoda po sektorajna odredjene su ns&azi empiriSkih podataka za period 1958 1962* UnoSenjem u model ovako odredjenih relativnih stopa rasta pre ma navedenim varijantama, kao i ostalih odgovarajudih adekvatno iz raSunatih egzogenih veliSina, izracunate su odgovarajude endogene promenljive veliSine za sve tri varijante. Za ostvarenje postavljenih ciljeva, kao i odgovarajudih endogenih promenljivih veliSina, medjutim, potrebno je obezbediti materijalnu podlogu i uslove, pre svega, u obliku aktiviranja dovoljnih osnovnih sredstava* To konkretno znaSi da je potrebno odrediti i izvrSiti neophodna investiciona ulaganja u osnovna sredstva. Radi odredjivanja tih neophodnih investioionih ulaganja, po sektorima i globalno, bio je upotrebljen odgovarajudi investicioni model u kombinaciji sa osnovnim modelom* T ' invest.ioio.ni model bio..je takodje:. ai upotrebljen u svom inverznom obliku i kao dinamicki visesektorskL ekonometrijski model, ali samo sa neto-aspektom agregata proisvodnje* On se mole kondeaiaovano i u r-eHsenom obliku predstaviti na slededi naSin: Y(t) = a + c ^ [(1 + ii)t - 1 3, , (1=0,1,?,...,8) (2)

I.(t) =

[(i + ri)t"1-l]

Upotrebljene oznake u ovom investicionom modelu imaju slededa znaSenja: I* Endogene promenljive velicine a) Promenljive velicine cilja (l)Y^ = druStveni proizvod po sektorima i globalno b) Pomodne promenljive velicine (l) I. = privredne bruto-investicije po sektorima i globalno

II, Egzogene promenl jive veliSine a) Instrumentalni promenljivi parametri (l)

: -

= relativne stope rasta druStvenog proizvoda. po sektorima i globalno .

b) Objektivno dati strukturni parametri (1) a. = druStveni proizvod po sektorima i globalno u baznom periodu (2) k. = intervalni istodobni kapitalni koeficijent na bazi privrednih bruto-investicija po sektorima i globalno. I ovde oznaka _ predstavlja redni broj godisnjeg perioda, t ; uzima vrednost t=0,l,2, ,,, 7, a oznakfe i predstavlja indeks koe | pokazuje re'dfi^|broj sektora 3=1,2, ,,,, 8, odnosno global celokupi l privrede i=o. e f Sistem jednacina (2 ) koji konstituiSe ovaj investicioni lodel, sastoji se iz n=2x9=I8 jednaSina,koliko ima i endogenih prolenljivih veliSina (Y. i I. ) Ukupan broj egzogenih promenljivih ve.iSina iznosi N=3x9 = 27, 5 ukupan broj objekfcivno d , a till veliSina 1 = 2 x 9 = 18, Ftrema tome, broj stepena slobode trebalo bi da bude f K ' a = 27 - 18 = 9, Medjutim, on u stvari i ovde iznosi s* = 8, Sto cUi ;akodje proizilazi iz okolnosti da je globalna relativna stopa rasta LruStvenog proizvoda determinirana rezultanta odgovaraju6ih sektorsdJi relativnih stopa rasta, Sto na analogan naSin vaSi i za sve ostale 'Lobalne promenljive veliSine /endogene i egzogene/. Kao zakljuSak, jroizilasi da se i ovde istih osam instrumentalnih parametara r^ , = 1,2, ,,,,8) mogu proizvoljno ( - rasasanim granicama) me**,- i u ' ljati i da njihovim fStksiranjem sve @&dogene promenljive veliSine jostaju jednoznaSno 6dsed.je.ne, te se pomoSu sistema jednaSina (2) logu lako i brzo izraSunati. U stvari, posto se i ovde radi o inversnom obliku ovog investicionog modela, ovi instrumentalni .parametri Lsto tako predstavljaju politiSko-ekonomske oiljeve, koje treba odreliti kao radnu hipotezu za planiranje, a u skladu sa odredjenom konsepcijom o naSem druStveno-privrednom razvoju, o naSim potrebama kao L moguSnostima, . U kombinovanoj primeni ovog investicionog modela zajedno

1a polaznim osnovnim modelom poslo se od iste, ve<5 upotrebljene tri

- 199 5
empiriSke varijante ciljeva, koji planom treba da budu ostvareni. Naime, i ovde su za "osnovnu varijantu" bile upotrebljene veS ranije odredjene odgovarajude;'relativne stope rasta drustvenog proizvoda po sektorima na bazi empiriSkih podataka za period 1956*1962. Za "maksimalnu varijahtu" bile su upotrebljene ved ranije odredjene odgovarajude relativne stope rasta drustvenog proizvoda po sektorima na bazi empirickih podataka za period 1956-196o. A za "ublazenu varijantu" bile su upotrebljene ved ranije odredjehe odgovarajude relativne sto pe rasta clruStvenog proizvoda po sektorima na bazi empiriSkih podata ka za period 1958-1962. UnoSenjem u investicioni model crvako odredjenih relativnih stopa rasta prema navedenim varijantama, .kao i ostalih odgovarajudih, adekvatno izraSunatih egzogenih veliSina, izraSunate su odgovarajude endogene promenljive velicine za sve tri varijante. Bazume se, pri tome izjadunate vrednosti drustvenog proizvoda po sektorima i globalno za oba kombinovana modela potpuno su jednake kao i njima odgovarajude relativne stope rasta, dok izraSunate vrednosti privrednih bruto-investicija po sektorima i globalno predstavljaju ulaganja sredstava, koja obezbedjuju neophodne materijalne uslove u obliku kapaciteta osnovnih sredstava za ostvarenje postavljenih proizvodnih ciljeva. . Ovde izvrsena kombinacija osnovnog neto i bruto-modela sa . investicionim neto-modelom omogudila je svojom konkretnom primenom ne samo plansko isracunavanje osnovnih promenljivih velicina agregata proizvodnje /X., T. i Z./, ved i promenljive veliSine privrednih bruto-investicijai (I.)* Sije ulaganje obezbedjuje neophodrie materijalne uslove u obliku'L osnovnih sredstava za ostvarenje postavljenih proizvodnih ciljeva* Sa glediSta planiranja samo odredjenog struktur- ' nog razvoja proizvodnje i obezbedjenja neophodnih materijalnih preduslova u obliku osnovnih sredstava za usmeravanje i realizaciju tog razvoja, ovako kombinovani model, osnovnog modela sa investicionim, mogao bi se smatrati dovrlenim i praktiSki upotrebljivim. Medjutim, sa opltijeg gledista planiranja druStveno-privredne reprodukcije samo ova kombinacija d.va modela ne bi se mogla smatrati dovrsenom, te prema t i i ni praktiSki zs.cLovpljavajudom. Naime, proizvodnja ne moze biti ole sama sebi cilj, poS%o sluSi raznim oblicima proizvodne i neproizvodne potrosnje* Ali, planiranje raznih oblika potrosnje ved nije tako jednostavno, posto zahteva bilansno uskladjivanje planirane potrosnje sa planiranom proizvodnjcan* Istini za volju, globalno uskladjivanje bilansa potroSnje i proizvodnje i e predstavljaju vedu teskodu, jer je u i globalu druStveni proizvod jednak agregatu finalne traSnje. Ali u strukturno dezagregiranim sektorima privrecle to ved nije sluSaj. Naime,

eliSina druStvenog proizvoda u jednom sektoru /delatnosti/ privrede oze vrlo osetno da se razlikuje od veliSine finalne traSnje u istom sktoru. I upravo ovaJ&njenica zahteva odredjivanje i sektorskih gregata finline traSnje, bez Sijeg poznavanja adekvatno:plansko strIcturno bilansiranje i uskladjiyanje proizvodnje sa potrosnjom ne bi Llo moguiSe. A jedini naSin da se ovaj vaSan problem koliko-toliko s5i, sastoji se u primeni nekog strukturnog vise&ektorskog modela, dji se zasniva na strukturnoj /dvodimenzionalnoj/ medjusektorskoj avisnosti. Zbog toga se u upotrebljeni kombinovani viSesektorski mo31 morao na odredjeni naSin nuSno ukljuSiti i poznati strukturni sdel medjusektorske zavisnosti* Ovom ukljuSivanju moglo se pristupiti s obzirom da je medjuskfcorski model zasnovan na neto i bruto-agregatima proizvodnje* Ali x se pojavila i odredjena problematika, koja proizilaziiz okolnosL da je medjusektorski model statiSan, te ga treba na izvestan naSin Lnamizirati* .Ovo dinamiziranje medjusektorskog modela izvrseno je na i naSin, Sto su prethodno u sam model unete ve<5 dinamizirane osnovj 5 promenljive veliSine (Z., Y. i Z.) iz polaznog osnoynog neto i mto-modela, Sime je ujedjio uspostavljena veza i omogu^ena uskla&je3st izmedju kombinovanili modela. Medjutim, da bi se omogiSSena usklajenost izmedju kombinovanih. modela i konkretno ostvarila, bilo je po ebno da se na odgovarajuSi nain dinamiziraju i tehnicki koeficije; u medjusektorskom modelu. Ovako dinamiziran i uskladjen medjuseki >rski model bio je takodje upotrebljen u svom irtverznom obliku, Si ! je omogu6eno neposredno izraSunavanje finalne trazne po sektorima globalno, a da je pri tome izbegnuta potreba ne samo za triangula.jom, veS i za inverzijom matrioe tehniSkib koeficijenata. Ovaj diimiziran i uskladjen medjusektorski model moSe se kondenzovario i u >5enom obliku predstaviti na sledeSi naSin: .
Z(t) = a. + a. J . x

'T Xj(t)

L v
i=l

1,2, ..., 8] 1,2, ? 8J

(3)

p l r

z(t) -

I I

0
5=1

- 201 7

Upotrebljene oznake u ovom investicionom modelu imaju slede6a znaSenja: I. Endogene promenljive veliSine a) Promenljive veliSine cilja (l) Z^= bruto drustveni proizvod po sektorima b) PamoSne prpmenljive veliSine (1) X. = materijalni troSkovi po sektorima 0 (2) F^ = finalna traSnja po sektorima II. Egzogene promenljive veliSine a) Instrumentalni promenljivi parametri (l) r. = relativne stope rasta drustvenog proizvoda po sektorima (b) Objektivno dati strukturni parametri (1) a. = druStvefii proizvod po sektorima u baznom periodu (1963) (2) a. . = tehniSki koefioijenti reprodukcione :" L matrice po sektorima
.

I ovde oznaka t predstavlja redni broj godisnjeg perioda te uzima t=0,l,2, ..., a oznaka i predstavlja indeks: koji-pokaziijer redM;T>^o^' sektora kao davaoca i=l,2,lll,8; dok oznaka j predstavlja indeks koji pokazuje redni broj .sektora kao primaoca j=l,2,**,8. * Sistem jednaSina (3) koji konstituise ovaj medjusektorski model, sastoji se iz n=3 x 8 = 24 jednaSine, koliko ima i endogenih promenljivih veliSina ( Z . , X. i F.J. Ukupan broj egzogenih promenlji1 0 . . . vih veliSina iznosi N=2 x 8 + 8 x 8 = 1 6 + 64 = 80. Broj objektivno datih strukturnih parametara ianos.i m = 1 x 8 + 8 x 8 = 64 = 72. . Erema tome, broj stepena slobode iznos s = N - m = 80 - 72 6. Kao zakl juSak, proizilazi da se i ovde istih osam instrumentalnih pa rametara (i = 1,2,3, ..., 8) mogu proizvoljno ( u raznim granicama) menjati i da njihovim fiksiranjem sve endogene promenljive veli Sine postaju jednoznaSno odredjene, te se pomoSu sistema jednaSina

- 202 -

;5v) inogu lako i brzo izraSunati* T stvari, poSto se i ovde radi o :. J .verznom obliku ovog medjusektorskog modela, ovi instrumentalni paimetri isto tako predstavljaju politiSko-ekonomske ciljeve, koje eba odrediti kao radnu hipotezu za planiranje, a u skladu sa odrejenom koncepcijom o nasem drustveno-privrednom razvoju, o nasim poebama kao i moguSnostima. . . U kombinovanoj primeni ovog medjusektorskog modela zajedno i pjblaanom osnovnom kombinacijom dva modela poSlo se od'iste, veS >otrebljene tri empiriSke varijante oiljeva, koji planom treba da idu ostvareni* Naime, i ovde su za "osnovnu varijantu" bile upotreb|ene veS ranije odredjene odgovaraju6e relativne stope rasta druStsnog proizvoda po sektorima na bazi enrpiriSkih podataka za period 556-1962. Za "maksimalnu varijantu" bile su upotrebljene ve ranije Iredjene odgovarajufie relativne stope rasta druStvenog proizvoda > sektoriika na bazi empirickih. podataka za period 1956-1960. A za LblaSenu varijantu" bile su upotrebljene veS ranije odgovarajuSe ilativne stope rasta drustvenog proizvoda po sektorima na bazi empiLSkih podataka za period 1958-1962, Unosenjem u medjusektorski mos ovako odredjenih relativnih stopa rasta prema navedenim varijani ima, kao i ostalih odgovaraju^ih, adekvatno izraSunatih egzogenih sliSina, izraSunate su odgovarajuSe endogene promenljive veliSine > sektorima i globalno* ' Ovako kombinovani sistem od tri posebna ekonomska mode-

1, na bazi inverzije i dinamiziranja samog medjusektorskog modela,

loguSio je ne samo utvrdjivanje strukture finalne traSnje po sektojna, ve6 i uzajainno' proveravanje, korigovanje i.uskladjivanje kako imih ekonomskih modela, tako i njihovih promenljivih veliSina - ci- leva, instrumenata i parametara modela. Na taj naSin; mogao se -za ryu (drugu) fazu plann.ranja pripremiti uglavnom na empiriSkim poicima zasnovan materijal, koji je ipak imao dovoljno siroke okvire neophodnu fleksibilnost da bi se dalje sektorsko planiranje moglo i uspehom i na jedinstvenoj podlozi odvijati, Svaki pojedini sektor s time dobio solidnu polaznu osnovu za dalje strukturno dezagregira> planiranje, kao i izbor konkretno utvrdjenih varijanti. Pri tome^ s,razume se, svaki sektor morao u svom radu da koordinira ne samo. . i drugim sektorima, ukljuSujufii tu pre svega i s&odni sektor, ve i morac' a jodi raSuna i o koncepcijskoj usaglaSenosti kao i o si-' d. ist^mskpvj moguSnosti realizacije, Sve ovo je u k^ajnjoj lini'ji dovej do kolektivnog rezultata, koji izradjeni Sedmogodisnji plan prikaije kao najbolje moguSe sagledano reSenje za date uslove i moguSnosL potrebe. i ciljeve. ,

- 203 -

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Stvarnost, br. 12, Beograd, 1962. 37- Kresic, I.j Ifojnic, D. s "Problem israde lokacionih modela kao komponente jedinstvene metodologije regionalnog plani= ranja", Ekoinomski institut NRH, Zagreb, 1963 *

38 . Kubovic, B.-: "Regionalni aspekt privrednog razvitka Jugosla vije1, Ekonomski pregled, Zagreb, 19 6 1 . 1 ~
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obrabotki nadljudenij", Moskva, 1962 .

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-p 20$ 48. Markovic, Lh.: "Zakon akumulacije i ekonomska funkcija drzave", Kultura, Beograd, 19 6 1 . . 49* Marks, K. : "Kritika politicke ekonomije", Kultura, Zagreb, 1949. ' 50. Marks, K.; "Kritika Gotskog programa1 , Kultura, Beograd, 1 1948. . 51. Marks, K. : "Kapital", I i II, Kultura, Beograd, 1947 1948. i

52. Medenica, V.; Trickovic, V.: "Tendencije strukturnih promjena u proizvodnji i potrosnji i njihov uticaj na promjene cijena", SZPP, /interna publikacija/, Beograd^ 1962. 53* Medenica, V. j "Formiranje i osnovna raspodela' nsiacionalnog dohotka", Pad, Beograd, 1961. 54. Medenica, V.s "Sistem raspodele nacionalnog dohotka u uslovima radnickog i drustvenog samoupravljanja Jugoslavije1, ' Finansi-je, br. 7-8, Beograd, 19 6 1 . 55 Medenica, V . 5 "Prethodne te2e o sistemu bilansa u vezi iz rade Sedmogodisnjeg plana 1964=70", Komunikacioni materijali, br. . , SZPP, Beograd, 1963 * 6 56. Menges, Go: "{Jkonometrie, Wiesbaden, 1961. 57* Mihajlovic, K. j Stojanovic, R.{ Todorovic, D; Kubovic, B.j Colanovic, B.j Mladenovic, M.j Vinski, I.; Horvat, B.j Uvalie, E . } Ambrozic-Pockar, M.; Kresic, I . 5 "Problem! regio= nalnog privrednog razvoja", Ekonomska biblioteka, br. 18, Beograd, 1962 . 58. Minic, M . 5 "Ekspoze u Saveznoj skupstini o drustvenom planu za 1964. godinu", Borba, Beograd, 21.XII 1963 * 59 Mitropoljekij, A.K. s "Tehnika statisticeskih vycislenij", Moskva, 19 6 1 . 60. Notkin, A.I."Ocerki teorii socialisticeskogo vosproizvodstva", Gospolitizdat, Moskva, 1948.

61. Orthaber, A.s "Naucna i metodoloska pitanja investicionih

varijanti1 , Ekonomist, br. 1-2/1958. i "Elementi metodologi 1 je planiranja", SZPP, Beograd, 1963*

62 . Popovic, M.s "Jedinstvo privrednog sistema - samoupravlja

nje * planiranje", i,"Ustavni sistem SFEJ", Komunist, Beo = grad, 1963 .

- 20? 63 . Rankovic, S.; "Ekonomska efektivnost uvodjenja nove tehnike u soci jalizmu1 , Beograd, 1963 * 1 . . .
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65 . Savezni zavod za privredno planiranje: "Osnove i elementi

sistema planiranja Jugosla!vije", Komunikacioni materijali, br. 24, Beograd, 1964. 66. Savezni zavod, za privredno pl&niranje: "Gradja za elemente metodologije planiranja u uzeni'smislu u Sedmogodisnjem planu privrednog razvoja 1964-1970. godine", Beograd, 1964. .

67 . Sekulic, M.: "Input-output analiza", Ekonomski institut NRH, Zagreb, 1963 .

68. Sekulic, M. ; "Problem prixnene medjusektorskih modela u bilanskom uskladjivanju plana", SZPP Komunikacioni materija li, br. 15 Beograd, 1963 .

69. Sirotkovic, J. ; t'Problemi privrednog planiranja u Jugoslaviji", Naprijed, Zagreb, 1961. 70. Sirotkovic, J.j "Metode ekonomske analize i ekonomska politika", Ekonomski pregled, Zagreb, 19 6 1 . 71 Sluzbeni list br. 45/1946; "Zakon o opstedrzavnom privrednom planu i drzavnim organima za planiranje". 72. Sluzbeni list br. 58/19515 "Zakon o planskom upravljanju narodnom privredom". 73* Sluzbeni list br. 3/1953s "Ustavni zakon o osnovama drustve nog i politickog uredjenja FNRJ i saveznim organima vlasti". 74. Stojanovic, R. j "Teorija privrednog razvoja u socijalizmu1 , 1 Kaucna knjiga, Beograd, 1961. ' 75 Strumilin, S.: "Balans narodnogo hozjajstva kak orudie socijalisticeskogo.planirovanija", Voprosi ekonomiki, br. 11/1954. . .

76 . Sefer, B.: "Proucavanje strukture i elasticnosti traznje", Ekonomist, br. 1 /1963 .

77* Tinbergen, J. : "Econometrics1 , New York, 1951* 1

78 . Tinbergen, J . 1 "On the Theory of. Economic Policy", Amster

dam, 1952.

- 208
79 Tinbergen, J.; 'Centralization and Decentralization in Eco nomic Policy", Amsterdam, 1954. 80. Tinbergen, J. s "Selected Papers'? Amsterdam, 1959* Growth1 New York, 1962. , 1 82. Tintner, G.; "Mathematics and Statistics for Economists",. New York, 1954.

81. Tinbergen, J . } Bos, H.C. : "Matematical Models of Economic

83 . Tintner, G.; "Econometrics", New York, 1952.

84. Tintner, G.: "Handbuch der Bkonometrie", Berlin, i960.

85 . Todorovic, M. s

n0 nekim pitanjima privrednog sistema, zakon vrednosti i odnosi raspodele", Socijalizam, br. 6/1962. i br. 1/1963.

86. Trickovic, V. ; "Strukturne promene u licnoj potrosnji a1 posebnim osvrtom na rezultate ispitivanja porodicnih budzeta", Ekonomist, br. 3/1960.

87 . Vadnal, A. s "Matematicki uvod v ekonometrijo", Ljubljana,

1955. . . , 88. Vinski, I.: "Nacionalno bogatstvo Jugoslavije", Ekonomski institut NEE, Zagreb, 1957*

89. Vojnic, D.; "Neki aspekti problema analize i planiranja in=

vesticija", Zavod za privredno planiranje NRH, Metodoloski materijali, br. 6, Zagreb, 19 6 1 . 90. Vojnic, D.;."Neki metodoloski aspekti problema planiranja prostornog razmjestaja proizvodnje", Ekonomski institut, Zagreb, 1963 . 91. Vranic, V.: "Vjerojatnost i statistika", Zagreb, 1958. 92. Vukmanovic, S.Tempo: "Zasto su potrebne promjene u sistemu planiranja", Bilten CVSSJ, br. 5/1961. 93* Vukmanovic, S.Tempo; "Delovanje sistema raspodele i plani ranja na privredna kretanja i razvoj Jugoslavije", Nasa stvarnost, br. 6/1962 . .

DO SA D A IZ A S L E STU D IJE
1. Znacaj i perspektiva pomorske brodogradnje Edvard Kuko i Miljko Trifunovic 2. Faktori dugorocnog razvoja Medunarodni promet Jugoslavije m orskim putem i potrebe razvoja pomorskog saobracaja D r Srdjan S rdar i Gracija Jankovic 3.. Mineralna sirovinska baza I Rezerve, proizvodnja i trendovi po zemljama i regionima i mesto Jugoslavije u svetskoj proizvodnji m ineralnih sirovina 4. Mineralna sirovinska baza II Rudarski kapaciteti i mogucnost prosirenja istih prem a bilansu m ineralnih sirovina krajem 1962. g. 5. Pravci razvoja geoloskih istrazivanja u periodu 1964 1970. 6. Problem i mobilizacije licnih sredstava za stambenu izgradnju 7. Analiza ckonomskog polozaja prxvrednili grupacija 8. Mesto Jugoslavije u medunarodnoj podeli rada 9. Sitna industrija i mogucnosti njenog razvoja u nasim uslovima 10. Ispitivanje faktora dugorocnog ekonomskog razvoja Jugoslavije i njenih podrucja 11. Prim jena medusektorskog modela u planiranju (Metodoloska razrada) 12. Koncepcije perspektivnog razvoja automatizacije i elektronike u SFRJ 19641970. 13. Elementi metodologije planiranja dugorocnog privrednog razvoja D r Branko Horvat, Dancika Nikolic i Pavle Sicherl

Yugoslav Society
BrankoHorvat

An essay n

iasj,

International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc W h ite Plains, N ew York

Texi translated by H en ry F M ins Fo otnotes and references rend ered by D o ro th y Pribic'evic' O rig in a lly p ub lish ed in 1967 as Og/(*c/ o Ju B O i/ave n sio m dru^lvu by Ju g o slaven sk i lu s iitu tz a Ekonom ska Istraziv/anja, Belgrade Library of Congress C atalo g Card N u m b e r: 79-77456 I n te m a iio n a l Arts and Sciences Press, Inc W h it e Plains, N e w York Translation o19G9 by International Arts and Sciences Press Inc A ll rights reserved Prin ted in the U n ite d Slates o f A m e rica

Contents

Foreword

C H A PT ER I

Historical Presuppositions o f the Yugoslav T ype o f Society (Associationist Socialism)

C H A PTER II

T h e Transition Period and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

C H A PT ER III

Econom ic Organization

C H A PTER IV

Productive Labor, Social Property, and the Structure o f Yugoslav Society

C H A PT ER V

Conversion of the Party into a League o f Political Activists

C H A PTER VI

Evolutionary Perspectives

"Ideas are m aterialized in a nation to the e x te n t th a t a need f o r them exists I t is n o t enough th a t th o u g h t sh o u ld strive tow ard realization, existe n ce its e lf m u s t enter in to th o u g h t Karl Marx

Foreword

A n ep och o f ou r p ostrevolutionary d evelopm ent seems to have term inated This realization leads us to a critical reexam ination of the road we have traveled, as well as to an ex a m in a tion o f future possibilities, the unfolding o f prospects o f developm ent It is a fascinating but risky enterprise. T he present Essay was no t w ritten in haste, and probably can not be read thro ugh in haste either. It is the result o f my thinking a b o u t o u r society fo r the last sixteen years The section T he T ransition P eriod was w ritten and published as long ago as 1951; the last section, o n the th eo ry of the party, was w ritten only after th e Brioni P lenum o f the Central C o m m ittee o f the C om m unist P arty o f Yugoslavia, w hen study o f these problem s had becom e socially relevant, in the sense o f the q u o ta tio n o f Marx th a t has been ad o p te d as the epigraph o f this book. Part o f the te x t has been published in E k o n o m ist, Pregled, G leddta and T aHe feme. Part I and C h apters 11 and 14 are tak en from my bo ok V Tow ards a T heory o f P lanned E c o n o m y A ltho ugh these fragments came into being in the course o f a decade and a half, final revision showed th at their research results did no t require am en d m e n t At the same time, n u m ero u s additions and reform ulations have been m ade A nd, o f course, com p letio n o f th e w o rk called for a series o f new researches. T h e title chosen is no accident: the Essay is no t a system atic study. It aims at nothing m ore th an the elaboration o f some factors th at in m y ju d g m e n t are strategic, merely giving the basic outlines o f an overall picture o f o u r society A great deal had to be o m itted . In the ec o nom ic section, for exam ple, there is no analysis o f the function ing o f the econ om ic mechanism. In the sociological

ix

section there is no tre a tm e n t of' the sociology o f self-government, o f the sociological effect o f the exo d u s from the village, and o f m any o th e r m atters. T h e political section lacks an analysis o f the parliam entary system , o f elections, o f the organization o f the governm ent apparatus, o f the functioning o f the com m unal system, and o f the place and role o f Yugoslav trade unions. These gaps could be filled only by a team of scholars. In places, the te x t is bu rd e n ed with fo o tn o te s F o o tn o te s are disagreeable things in and o f themselves; m oreover, they m ake the text less readable. A lth ou gh I was aware o f these facts, I was com pelled to a d o p t the fo otno teo lo gical alternative for the following reasons As a Marxist, I w anted to remove some inveterate vulgarizations and revisions o f Marxist econom ic and political theo ry O ne striking instance is the th eory o f productive labor, which has im p o rta n t consequences in practice, In such cases a protective covering o f relevant citation s was necessary. I k n o w , from personal experience with this case, th at th e omission of even a single citation leads to charges o f intentional d is to rtio n , lack o f principle, etc. Moreover, as a Marxist, I was interested in pointing o u t those predictions o f Marx that had proved, in the c o n te x t o f o u r society, to be m istaken. O ne such pred iction concerned the ec onom ic organization o f socialist society. A rg um ents o n this p o in t are su pp lem ented by q u o tatio n s, as in the previous instance. Finally, in scientific work, as distinguished from journalism , citations are som etim es needed in o rd e r to draw a clear line o f d em arcatio n betw een accepted ideas and o n e s own co n trib u tio n and, in particular, to bring o u t auth oritativ e ideas w ith which the a u th o r is n o t in agreem ent Dobrila Midkovid and Anica Savic5evit5 to o k u p o n themselves the disagreeable task o f converting my m an uscrip t in to a legible text. I thank th em for their patience and care. B ranko H orvat

C H A PTER I

Historical Presuppositions of the Yugoslav Type of Society (Associationist Socialism)

1 SC H EM A TIZA TIO N OF SOCIOECONOM IC DEVELOPM ENT

In beginning o u r analysis, it will be o f value to recapitulate, in schematic form, the basic pro po sitio n s of M arxs and Engels theo ry of social d ev elo pm ent In all probability this will be merely a review o f things that are well k n o w n in the Yugoslav milieu. But it seems to me th a t this conceptual fram ew ork should be defined in advance, as clearly and precisely as possible, in order to bring o u t unequivocally the c o n tin u ity o f o u r e x tra p o latio n o f the Marxist analysis and its applicability to the new social p h en o m en a with which we are dealing, for the first time, in this work. F o r a long period o f time, m uch longer than that o f w ritten history , h u m an co m m u nities could hardly m anage to p roduce enough to survive. In the then-prevailing social relations there was no room for class ex p lo ita tio n . 1 H ow ever, as in n o v a tio n s gradually accum ulated, the productivity o f labor rose. In m an y com m u nities it became possible to pro duce regularly m ore than was absolutely necessary for survival Thus, an o p p o rtu n ity arose to live on o th e r peo p les surplus produ ct. When this econom ic o p p o rtu n ity becam e ap pa ren t, it was seized u pon by som e m em bers o f the co m m u n ity . A nd since the others (w ith in o r outside o f the c o m m u n ity ) were n o t willing to p a rt with their surplus p ro duc t, they were com pelled to do so by brute force; they were m adei'/ai'es Society became a class society, with the ruling class appropriating the surplus p ro d u c t o f the exploited class and using it for its own purposes. In this sense, i.e., on the basis o f controlling the means

o f existence, class exp loitation has co ntinued to be exercised in all societies until o u r times A slave is a m an o w ned by a n o th e r (free) m an, ow ned in the same sense as cows and plows. This formal similarity led Aristotle, in an tiq u ity , to classify slaves as econom ists are today tem p ted to classify wage-earners2 - in the same ec onom ic category with cows and plows, distinguished only as tools th at speak as against those th a t low o r are mute. This was a delusion on the p art o f a m an who conceived of the then-existing social relations as natural and therefore eternal.. Plows and cows work equally well in all social systems, but hu m an beings do n o t F o r on e thing, slaves were very inefficient workers F o r another, their re p ro d u ctio n costs were high. O n bo th scores, im provem ents were possible, and this is what m ade feu d a lism a m ore efficient social system. The new ruling class had com e to realize that, in o rd e r to extract the surplus labor, it was no t necessary to resort to slavery ,. F eudal lords found it quite sufficient to own land, to be able to com pel serfs to w ork for them a certain am o u n t o f time The possibility o f working for som e time on o n e s ow n land, and o f paying the feudal ren t not only in term s o f labor but also in term s o f p ro d u c t, and later in term s of' m o n ey , was conducive to the rising labor productivity. In feudalism the w orker was no longer the p roperty o f the m aster, but was still personally d e p e n d e n t on him, i.e., he was still m ade to work for him by m eans o f n o nec o n o m ic institutions. T he land was n o t only a m eans of' p ro d u c tio n ; it was also a m eans of' direct political pow er because a feudal estate was a sort o f small state headed by a landlord exercising political, m ilitary, and adm inistrative powers. The serfs were tied to the land, and hence were not only w orkers b ut subjects of their feudal lords as well. T he next obvious possibility was to replace personal dep en dence by m a rk e t d e p e n d en ce and still have a sm oothly working so cioeconom ic m echanism . A fte r a certain n u m b e r o f violent clashes o f antagonistic social forces in various countries, this proved possible Workers, possessing no m eans o f livelihood, have no o th e r choice but to sell their lab o r p ow er to the owners of the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n , i.e., to the owners o f capital. A new social system , capitalism , came into being A t the beginning, the workers h ad no political rights. Moreover, fines and corporal pu n ish m en t in the factory , so c o m m o n in those days, represented a direct co n tin u a tio n o f m aster-serf relations But after the new system had becom e m ore settled, this practice could and had to be d iscon tin ued ; political rights were granted, with no ill effects for the stability of' the system. Political and ec onom ic pow er was held 2

firmly by the pro pertied class, while the free m arket system provided an efficient barrier for preventing a mass invasion o f the higher social strata by m em bers of the propertyless class Personal freedom and a relatively high social m obility had a trem e n d o u s im pact on labor p roductivity The slave and feudal economies, not to speak o f primitive society, were almost stationary. Capitalism m ean t a dram atic change in hu m an history. In the last tw o centuries the a p p ro x im a te period o f time that the organization o f p ro d u c tio n m ay be described as capitalist the p ro d u c tio n o f material wealth has expanded m ore than in all the previous tho usan ds o f years This is bound to have had a p ro fo u n d effect on the course o f social developm ent. It need hardly be said th a t the sketch presented in the preceding paragraphs is nothing m o re th an a scheme. Its sole purpose has been to p o in t o u t the crucial fa c to r in social d evelopm ent: the relationship betw een people in p ro d u c tio n . A ncient society was characterized by slave labor; feudal society, by serfdom ; and capitalism, by wage labor. Clearly, these relations are n o t a m a tte r o f choice, a m a tter o f ethics, o r o f likes and dislikes. There is no th in g n a tu ra l abo ut them ; A ristotle th o u g h t that slavery was natural, while others think the same o f wage labor in the service o f private capital or o f the governm ent ap pa ratu s If history teaches us anything, its lesson is th a t social relations change, th at p ro d u c tio n expands, and that there is a correspo nd ence betw een these tw o changes This corresp ond ence is very com plex, but, schem atizing again, it may be reduced to the following. The develop m en t of productive forces m akes a new social system feasible; once the social change is m ade, it helps p ro d u c tio n to expand further. In class societies, social changes do n o t o cc u r by friendly agreem ent or by means of rational legislation o r an y th in g o f the k in d; they are tire o utcom e o f the conflict of antagonistic social classes fighting for their interests. The class whose interests are tied up with the new and superior m ode o f p ro d u c tio n emerges victorious and reorganizes the society. In the m ost developed countries, class struggles at the end o f a social epoch are likely to result in violent revolutionary overthrow o f the old social system s Once the new social system is m o re or less established in the m ost advanced countries, the ruling classes o f o th e r countries, unless they lag very m uch behind the general develo pm ent, are likely to subm it w ith o u t civil wars. All this m eans two things: first, social d evelo pm ent is gradual and stages ca n n o t be skipped; second, since it is linked with the develop m en t o f social forces, social developm ent, i.e., the succession of social systems, is irreversible 3

T he process described is n o t a straight-line process There can be tem p o ra ry deviations and m ov em en ts backward. Prior to the advent o f capitalism, the world was n o t a unified whole as it is to d ay , and so entire civilizations could perish w ith o u t significant consequences for subseq uent developm ent. T he scheme is primarily applicable to European h isto ry, which has been m ore or less a u to n o m o u s and sp ontaneous, and therefore the process could work itself o u t fully. O nce capitalism had taken firm ro o t in E uro pe, it began to spread all over th e world by m eans o f trade and conquest. Capitalist in stitutio ns were im p o rted into no n-E uropean countries, whose social systems encom passed the entire range from primitive society to feudalism; as a result, the m ost com plex social processes were set in m o tio n Perhaps the only universal characteristic o f all these processes was that everywhere capitalism was gaining ground against all rival social systems,. However, even in E u rop e, slavery, feudalism, and capitalism are n o t three rigid historical system s neatly separated from each other. In each, the institutions o f the o th e r tw o were kn o w n and developed to a certain extent. They are n o t pu re systems, and they can be classified as separate systems only in terms o f the p re d o m in a n t institutions Determ inism in developm ent, i.e., in the succession of these systems, only means that, for instance, the uprising o f R om an slaves u n d e r S partacus in the 1st ce ntu ry B,C, and the peasant wars in E u ro p e in the 15 th and 16th centuries co u ld n o t achieve the purpose o f th eir initiators,3 while the war o f the N o rth e rn states in the USA for th e abolition o f slavery in the 19th century co u ld n o t fa il to achieve this goal (ultim ately). As concrete events these are, o f course, pro d u c ts of unique historical circum stances and, as such, un repeatable. But once we abstract the irrelevant details, a regularity appears and provides a basis for generalizations It is obvious that any single co u n try may skip stages o f developm en t and that this is exactly what many backw ard countries are doing today. However, this fact does not affect the validity of the generalizations, fo r it is only societies that lag b eh in d th at are able to skip stages o f developm ent This observation is intended as a re m in d e r th at purely rationalist blueprints o f econom ic institutions fo r exam ple, the com m unist com m un ities in A m erica during the last ce ntu ry or the present-day com m un ist village co m m u nes in China are useless. Finally, the two-class scheme focuses a tte n tio n only on the main driving force of' social change: the struggle betw een those who, as the ruling class, are united by their vested interests in the existing social system and wish to preserve it, and those whose 4

prospects are to benefit from the change and w ho therefore form the opposing social class. But ruling and exploited classes are not necessarily hom og eneo us; they are no t necessarily rigid, and b etw een them there usually exist a certain n u m b e r o f middle groups which, o f course, m u st all be taken in to a c co u n t in an analysis o f a concrete society. T h e two-class scheme is n o th in g but a convenient and very useful abstraction from social relations.. An a tte m p t to neatly classify all the individual m em bers o f a given society into tw o classes would only reveal extrem e naivete on the part o f an overzealous empiricist. T h e purpose o f the two-class scheme is to provide a simple analytical fram ew ork for studying polarization tendencies in the society, with their inevitable result - fu n dam en tal social conflict. By the term fu n d a m e n ta l social c o n flict as distinguished from social conflicts betw een individuals and groups that are part and parcel o f life in every conceivable h u m an society I m ean the situation in which the fu nd am ental principle o f social organization involves social conflict betw een groups th at n o t only have divergent interests b ut are also related to each o th e r as upper and low er groups, and as m in o rity and m ajority groups In all class societies it is easy to po in t o u t the existence o f the fu nd am ental social conflict, and, conversely, w henever we d e te c t the potential existence o f the fu n dam en tal social conflict, we may confidently expect the developm ent o f a class society We shall shortly have an o p p o rtu n ity to m ake practical use o f the last hypothesis..
2. STA TE CAPITALISM

Social develop m ent did n o t end w ith liberal capitalism. This is obvious to us today, b ut it was k n o w n to very few when Marx and Engels began their analysis In this c o n te x t we cannot avoid discussing, if only in a very fragm entary w ay, the problem o f the socialist revolution. It is well k no w n that Marx and Engels, extrapolating the historical trend, reached the conclusion that socialist revolutions w ould break o u t in the m ost advanced countries 4 In fact, however, socialist revolutions occurred in relatively backward countries, with n o particular signs that they will necessarily be repeated - at least no t in a violent form in the most advanced countries. How is one to ac coun t for the failure of this prediction, which seemed to be so m uch in accord with historical experience? Let us first n o te th a t the failure o f the prediction was n o t at all general Marx and Engels proved to be right in predicting violent socialist revolutions,5 and they were right, too, insofar as they

expected th a t it w ould be the m ost developed capitalist countries where the working class would be able to realize the first objectives o f its program At the time o f The C o m m u n ist M a n ifesto these objectives were, am ong others, the eight-hour working day, universal suffrage, w orking class political and trade union organizations, progressive taxes, free elem entary education, social insurance, and a rising stan dard o f liv in g .6 T o day in all advanced capitalist countries these requirem ents are m ore or less satisfie d ;7 m oreover, in a certain n u m b e r o f countries, private ownership o f productive m eans has been partly abolished, with c e r t a i n industries passing into state ownership through nationalization. But all that was accom plished w ith o u t a great socialist revolution although in various countries there have been a certain n u m b e r o f bloody class clashes o f the 1848 type, A nd this brings us to o ur second point R evolution is n o t a p ro d u c t o f d ev elop m ent as such, bu t of unbearable social tensions In the pioneering countries, pre-1848 capitalism frequently generated social tensions approaching the explosion point. F o r an illum inating description o f the workings o f a capitalist m echanism in those days, one should look up the historical chapters o f M arx s Capital. However, at that time conditions were still no t ripe for the new social system. L ate r on, socialism becam e theoretically feasible, but social tensions were not generated to the e x te n t necessary for a violent revolution. Why? I think that two crucial, closely related, and m utually reinforcing causes m ay be adduced as an explanation. First, unlike previous econom ies, the capitalist econ om y was n o t static; it was expanding relatively quickly, providing a possibility b o th for the toiling classes to im prove their lot and fo r the pro pertied class to accum ulate w ealth. Second, th e free m ark e t proved t o be a very successful organizational principle; since it o p erated im personally, apparently no o n e could be blam ed for the existing miseries. F o r bo th these reasons the ruling class found it possible to give political rights to the toiling class w ith o u t endangering its own position. This m eant th e fu rth e r easing o f social tensions. Gradually, the working class succeeded in organizing itself into trade unions and political parties, and the stronger the labor m o vem ent became, the sm aller th e gulf betw e en the p rop ertied and working classes became. F o r b e tte r o r worse, the well-organized labor m o vem ent saved advanced capitalist countries from socialist revolutions. T he situation was different in th e backward countries. Here, primitive accu m ulation of capital, w ith the accom p any ing social conflicts, was c o n te m p o ra n e o u s with the relatively high standard

o f living in the advanced countries and with the socialist ideologies professed by strong labor m ovem ents in those countries. As the Russian R evolution o f 1905 showed, there was reason enough for a revolution. And once the great revolution had begun, it was very natural th a t it would no t stop sh ort o f atte m p tin g to accomplish the m ost radical program the epoch had produced, the program o f socialism, for revolutions are the locom otives o f h isto ry , They break the bonds o f tradition, remove the obstacles o f vested interests, and clear the ground for a free m o vem ent toward limits defined only by existing revolutionary ideology, which reflects the material and cultural conditions of the epoch as a whole, not merely of the cou n try carrying o u t the revolution A lthough su bsequent im p le m e n tatio n s o f the revolutionary ideology are modified to a great e x te n t by the historical peculiarities of the co untry concerned, the essential fact stands out clearly, as is dem o n strate d by the tw o m ost m o m e n to u s national revolutions In the 18th ce n tu ry , the F rench R evolution did away with feudal relations, thereby paving the way for the more efficient capitalist form o f organization; in the 20th ce n tury, the Russian R evolution removed the n ext obstacle, private ownership, and improved the efficiency o f the ec onom ic m achine still fu rth e r A fte r the Russian R evolution had proved succcssful, it was likely that it would be followed by a n u m b e r o f socialist revolutions in o th e r backward countries. Marx expected that capitalist developm ent would lead to the polarization o f wealth w ithin the m ost advanced countries and that this would m ultiply class co n tradiction s to the p oint of revolution. That, indeed, did h appen in the earlier stages o f capitalist develop m ent, but the rapid expansion o f productive forces helped to check the polarization process before it had gone too far. Hence, in its later stages, capitalist developm ent led instead to the a c co m p an im en t o f m o n o p o liz atio n and imperialist wars to a p olarization of wealth o n an international scale, as a result of w hich the class conflict in the backward capitalist countries was magnified and eventually led to socialist revolutions We m ust n ex t investigate fu rther possible changes in productive relations. We have seen th a t these lelations (ex cep t in primitive society) have passed through three stages: that o f com plete personal d ep end ence o f the w o rker on the master; that of partial depend ence; and th at o f com plete personal independence o f the w orker, who, in w orking for the master, was compelled only by the im personal force o f the m arket We have seen that the successive stages had increasing ec onom ic efficiency. 7

The whole process represents, in fact, a gradual liberation of the individual from social bonds, an equalization of men, a mastering o f social relations in a m a n n e r similar to that by which nature and its forces were being mastered. If' this generalization is meaningful, the nex t stage may consist in an elim ination o f all individual private owners o f productive means, whose role as organizers of p ro d u c tio n will be taken over by a single owner, the state; this will lead to an equalization o f individuals in their relations to the state. This exp ro p riatio n of private capitalists by the state was w hat the socialist revolution was intended to accomplish. T he econom ic advantages o f state ca p ita lis m 8 over private capitalism arc trem endo us In organizing p ro d u c tio n according to a rational plan, the state is able to speed up ec onom ic grow th tw o or three times [16: Ch. 10] The characteristic feature of capitalism is the alienation of hum an labor [17: 19 6-208], In o rd e r to live, the proletarian is obliged to sell his inner being, his labor power, and he has no control over the p ro d u c t o f his work This observation implies two things: first, the w o rker is primarily an appendage to the m achine; he is used to m ake capital yield fruits; second, the fate o f the final p ro d u c t is governed by the blind forces o f the m arket In state capitalism, selfL alienation reaches the ultim ate possible limits, because the entire society is proletarianized But at the same time, total alienation provides the m eans for its ow n total d estruction , F o r while an individual ca n n o t, the society as a whole can control the p ro d u c t of its work with the help o f the state. A nd this is the p o in t that attra cts the main a tte n tio n o f socialists S tate control is justified n o t lo r its o w n sake, b u t because it is th o u g h t to be the only alternative to the chaos o f private capitalist p rod uction. However, if it can be show n that a planned ec on om y can dispense with state control, it will b ec o m e appa ren t that state capitalism is only a transitional stage in the d evelopm en t toward a n o th e r and m o re efficient social system - socialism. C on trol o f p ro d u c tio n w ith o u t the state as interm ediary m eans c o n tro l by direct producers, which in turn m eans th a t the equality o f proletarians is transform ed into the equality o f m asters The process o f h u m an alienation, started in the first class society, com es to an end, and in the first classless society it is reversed. L abor gradually ceases to be suffering. un pleasantness, and toil, and becomes the prim ary need of m an, the affirm ation o f h u m an life,. O f course, all this has nothing to do with the ethical desirability o f such a system. It only indicates the possibility o f su p erio r efficiency on the p art o f such a system. A nd if one can establish the po ssib ility a n d eco n o m ic su p erio rity o f a social system , this w ill be

equivalent, in a M arxist fra m e w o rk , to proving its inevitability R etu rnin g to the problem of state capitalism, we have to inquire into w hat the social forces and processes are by which liberal and private capitalism is being transform ed into m o n o p o ly and state capitalism One o f them , an (in com plete) socialist revolution, has already been m entioned The other, gradual transform ation, is by now so well k now n that a brief'review will suffice. The free play o f m ark e t forces in com petitive capitalism leads to a gradual co nc en tratio n of p ro d u c tio n in the hands of a smaller and smaller n u m b e r o f firms, whose size correspondingly increases One o f the reasons for the greater efficiency of larger firms is purely technological: up to a certain point, the increase in o u tp u t reduces p ro d u c tio n costs, The o t h e r and by far more im p o rtan t reason is related to the m arket, A large firm controls a certain p ortion of' the m arket and can th erefore undertake planning; a large firm is financially strong, which in a m ark et ec o nom y means th a t it co m m ands credit; hence it can exert pressure on weaker partners and in general can m anipulate the terms of' buying and selling in its own favor; it is able to survive periodic crises when smaller firms go under. Thus, com petitive capitalism constantly generates tendencies toward m o no polization. Faced with the econ om ic p o w e r o f em ployers, workers begin to organize themselves into trade unions. In o rd e r to be effective, trade unions m ust becom e large organizations, and they grow until they reach the absolute limit o f a nationw ide association. A t that stage m o n o p o ly labor confronts m o n o p o ly c a p ita l.5 A similar process takes place in politics. In o rd e r to have a stable governm ent, the n u m b e r of political parties is reduced until all political life is d om inated by two m ajor parties. i0 In addition, there is a strong tendency for these tw o parties to link themselves with the o th e r tw o m o n o p o ly groups and to represent their inteiests. Thus we are likely to get a conservative p a r ty favoring the interests o f private capital and a labor p a r ty su p ported by the trade unions. F o u r giants d o m in a te the social scene in m o n o p o ly capitalism: organized capital, organized labor, and the tw o political parties Insofar as the political parties clearly identify themselves with two antagonistic social interests, the oligopoly o f fo u r reduces to duopoly. The Marxian vision of' the two-class stru ctu re of society materialized (a lthough with som e im p o rta n t m odifications d ue to the bureaucratization process) in the concrete social organization o f a m o d ern advanced capitalist co un try. Capital and labor fight for suprem acy. The im m ed iate o u tc o m e o f this battle is not necessarily know n. An extraordinary event say, a serious slump

.. may suddenly increase the possibility o f the abolition o f private ow nership or, at any rate, seriously disturb the old balance o f pow er in favor o f l a b o r In this case, capitalists may resort to fascism, as they did b etw een th e tw o wars. On the o t h e r hand, the ruling class m ay stu b b o rn ly refuse to settle political issues by political m eans say, by banning socialist parties Finally, various countries will be able to preserve the precarious equilibrium betw een two antagonistic social forces, traveling slowly along the road o f gradual nationalization in o n e form or a n o th e r (first, perhaps, nationalizing unprofitable industries in need o f com plete re c o n s tru c tio n 1; then, industries vitally im p o rta n t for th e n a tio n ; n ext, unorganized industries in need o f co o rd in a tio n ; and th en again, m o n op olized industries in which private m o n o p o ly cannot be to le ra te d ; and so forth, until the last possible candidate for socialization is taken up) and along the path o f increasing state control.. The widespread absentee ow nership prevalent in m odern capitalist econom ies makes the process relatively painless Every new lab o r governm ent will have to take a n o th e r step in the direction o f extending public ownership, and so private capitalism will be gradually replaced by state capitalism. At this point we m ay sum m arize the above results. The problem o f the system o f p ro d u c tio n relations corresponding to a planned econo m y has been put into perspective. S tate capitalism is such a possible system; it is so n o t only as a logical possibility b u t also as an empirical reality. But this know ledge is n o t sufficient for the solution o f o u r problem . We m ust ask: is state capitalism an o p tim u m system u n d e r the given conditions? In the early days o f socialist th o u g h t, the West Indian socialist W A. Lewis writes, it .. was alm ost an axiom th at o n ce p rop erty passed from private hand s to public ownership, all the m ajor social problem s were autom atically solved; it would be put to purposes conform ing m ore to the public interest, incom e would be m ore equitably distributed, ec onom ic pow er w ould be dem ocratized , efficiency w ould increase, and the class struggle betw een owners and workers w ould end. This view has no t survived the ex perien ce [2 0 :1 8 1 ]. Professor Lewis was referring primarily to British experience, but the conclusion may be easily generalized. T he main reason for the inad equ ate functioning of state capitalism should be sought, I suggest, in the distinguishing feature o f its econ om ic and political organization: the rule o f bureaucracy. Thus, o u r next task is to analyze the econom ic consequences o f a bureaucratic organization of' the econom ic process

10

3, B U R E A U C R A C Y A N D O FFIC E FE T ISH ISM

In analyzing the functioning of' private capitalism and the ideology it generates, Marx laid great emphasis on w h at he called com m o d ity fetishism , i e, a tendenc y to treat relations between men as relations betw een com modities. A closely corresponding p h en o m e n o n in state capitalism m ay be called office fetishism . It m eans hiding actual h u m an relations behind impersonal b u re a u c ra tic rules, a m ystification of' the activities of office-holders. The ju d g m e n ts of' the m arket are infallible, as are the ju d g m en ts o f an official with respect to his subordinates. The holding of' office confers upon the in c u m b e n t the quality o f being cleverer, m ore h onest, m ore reliable (politically or otherwise) in short, superior to all individuals placed low er in the hierarchy of' office The parallelism goes even further. Both the free m arket and the bureaucratic stru ctu re have their separate lives that cannot be brought u n d er conscious control. In the case o f the free m arket, the c o n te n tio n seems fairly obvious In the case o f bureaucracy, it may app ear so m ew h a t puzzling and therefore requires a m ore detailed inquiry.
W ebers T h eory o f Bureaucracy

B ureaucracy, as a social institution, has three fundam ental characteristics: 1. When administrative tasks are simple and undifferentiated, no specialized apparatus is necessary for their execution. In a small social organization, the person in a u th o rity is able to con tro l social activities econom ic, political, and military - m ore or less directly. As the co m m u n ity grows in size, the need will arise for an apparatus to m ediate betw een the source o f p o w e r and the mechanism for carrying ou t orders As the needs of the co m m u n ity b eco m e m ore diverse and social life becomes m ore com plex, the need will arise for increased specialization o f the m em bers o f the m ediating adm inistrative apparatus. Thus, quantitative expansion and co m p lex ity of adm inistrative tasks provide technical preconditions for the developm ent of bu reaucracy But this is n o t the whole story. 2 Like m o n ey , the in stitu tio n o f bureaucracy has been know n in all social systems, with the exception o f primitive society. However, the institu tion (again, like m oney ) reached its fully developed form only in the capitalist system. The relation between the develo pm ent o f the m o n ey eco n o m y and that o f bureaucracy is n o t only that of parallelism, b u t also a relation o f m utual

11

causation. As Max Weber, the fo u n d e r o f system atic study o f bureaucracy, 11 p o in ted o u t, m o n ey is a norm al presupposition o f b ureaucracy; it m akes regular pecuniary co m pensa tion possible and desirable.. In feudalism, the ad m in istrato rs the feudal lords were in possession of th e m eans o f ad m inistration . Similarly, the soldiers possessed th eir own arms, In capitalism, the m em b ers o f the ad m inistration and the arm y are separated from the means they m anipulate, and this appears to be related to the separation o f the m eans of p ro d u c tio n from th e direct p r o d u c e r s , 12 Money, in the sense of capital accounting, becam e an institu tio nal basis for b oth rationalization and depersonalization o f h u m an relations. B ureaucratic structures fitted perfectly into this social fram ework. 3. T h e third characteristic o f bureaucracy is th at it is a p ro d u c t o f a particular type o f au th o rity . Following Weber in his classification, b u t setting his scheme in a different theoretical fram ew ork, we can distinguish th ree fun d a m e n tal types o f au th o rity . Tiaclitional a u th o rity rests on an established belief in the sanctity o f im m em orial traditions and in the legitimacy o f the status o f those exercising au th o rity u n d e r them [21: 3 0 1 ] , The ioyalty o f su bordinate m em bers o f the co m m u n ity is given to the in c u m b e n t in office and no t to the legal order. Hence there is a tendency to ap propriate th e means o f adm inistration, "When econom ic d evelopm ent is slow, as it was before the advent of capitalism, changes in social institutions are very small and all o f social life, including the institution o f a u th o rity , is likely to be strongly traditionalized, T he existence o f traditional au th o rity minimizes the possibility o f gradual ad a p ta tio n to the changing c o n dition s o f life; as a result, the existing institutional stru ctu re econom ic, political, religious - tends to com e into conflict w ith the social needs it is expected to serve, and the co n trad ictions betw een the tw o tend to accum ulate. Since th ere is little possibility o f solving these co ntradiction s within the traditional fram ew ork, a social explosion usually demolishes the traditional au th o rity and replaces it, for the tim e being, by the charism atic a u t h o r i t y o f t h e leader o f the revolutionary m ovem ent. Charism atic a u th o rity rests on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, the heroism or exem plary character, o f an individual person and o f the norm ative order revealed or ordained by him [21: 3 0 1 ] . T h e essence o f a charism atic m o v em en t is em ancipation from the rou tine, and there fo re the corresponding type o f au th o rity is b ou nd to be short-lived and transitional in character. C harism atic m ov em ents eith er fail and perish, or succeed and through the routin ization of charism a build new, traditionalized system s Then the cycle may repeat itself 12

With the advent of capitalism the m echanism ju st described ceases to o p erate not in the sense that traditional and charismatic au th o rity canno t appear any m ore, but in the sense th a t they cease to do m in ate th e social scene. T he impersonal m ark e t and exprop riation o f the m eans of p ro d u c tio n and adm inistration destroy personal loyalties to th e in cum ben ts of offices. Rapid ec onom ic d evelop m en t requires flexible ad ap ta tio n s of' the social fram ew ork, which, implying changes, exclude traditionalized solutions and, recurring in quick succession, make charismatic solutions unlikely. A new type o f a u th o rity develops, the type Weber calls rational legal a u th o rity Legal au th o rity rests on belief in the legality o f the p attern s o f norm ative rules and in the right o f those elevated to au th o rity u n d e r such rules to issue co m m ands [21: .300]. The rules are universal, cover all possible cases o f c o n d u c t within the ju risd ictio n o f those in a u th o rity , and define th e limits o f th at jurisdiction. O bedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order, which thus becomes the . fun da m e n tal source o f au th o rity . As I . Parsons com m en ts on "-'Weber [21: 5 1 ] , the autho rity extend s to individuals only insofar Eg'they o ccupy a specifically legitimized status u n d e r the rules, an > s_ - .Office, and their powers are limited to a sphere of' c o m p e te n c e '-.vas defined in regulations. O utside this sphere they are private individuals w ith no m o re a u th o rity than anyon e else. Thus a possibility arises fo r a new and m ore subtle fetishism o f office to be added to th e traditional c o m m o d ity fetishism ; an aspect o f e x p lo itativ e relations hidd en behind th e m a rk e t is sup plem ented o r replaced by the other, hidden behind th e office. The individuals w ith split personality, as it were, masters in the office and clients at hom e, owning nothin g and deciding on everything, public servants by title and public m asters by position, are bureaucrats. T he adm inistrative staff', whose con stituen t m em bers they are, takes th e form o f a bureaucratic structure. Weber distinguished seven fun d a m e n tal categories o f rational legal au th o rity . These categories are nothing b u t technical or formal characteristics of' a bureaucratic structure. T h ey are as follows: a co n tin u o u s organization o f official functions bound by rules; a specified sphere o f co m p ete n ce; the organization o f offices follows th e principle o f hierarchy, i.e., each low er office is under the c on tro l and supervision o f a higher one; the rules regulating the c o n d u c t o f an office may be technical rules or norm s; the adm inistrative s ta ff is separated from ow nership o f the means of adm inistration; the in cu m b en t does n o t ap prop riate his official position; adm inistrative acts, decisions, and rules are recorded in writing [21: 303-304] 13

These technical features o f bureaucracy m ake it an extrem ely efficient tool fo r handling mass adm inistration A dm inistrative fu nction s can be specialized according to purely objective considerations, and then discharged by functionaries w ho have adequate specialized training, Business is c o n d u c te d objectively, according to calculable rules and w ith o u t regard to persons. F rom the p o in t of view of those w ho hold th e suprem e au th o rity , the bureaucratic m achine works w ith unrivaled precision, stability, and reliability. Stringency o f discipline m akes possible a high degree of' calculability o f results. Finally, the scope o f operation s of the bureaucratic ty pe o f adm inistrative organization appears practically unlim ited, and this organization is formally capable o f application to all kinds o f adm inistrative tasks [21; 3 0 9 ] , All this leads Weber to conclude: E xperience tends universally to show th at the bu reaucratic type o f adm inistrative organization . . . is, from a purely technical po in t o f view, capable of attaining the highest degree o f efficiency and is in this sense formally the m ost rational k n o w n m eans o f carrying o u t im perative co ntrol over hu m an beings [21: 309], B ut th ere is a snag in this ideal-type analysis o f a social institution. Bureaucracy is perfectly suited for an im perative i.e., coercive - control, b u t it does n o t insure th at the interests o f the con tro ller and the con tro lled are identical. Moreover, th ere is a strong tendency for these interests to be polarized. A typical bureaucratic stru ctu re looks like a pyram id with a tiny top and a large base: w ith a flow o f com m u n icatio n in only one direction, from the top d o w n w a rd ; with these com m u n icatio n s having an imperative character; with b o th ends loose at the top, where hierarchical relations disappear in the sense that there are n o m ore superiors, and at the b o t t o m , w here th e y disappear in the o p po site sense, nam ely, there are no m ore inferiors, and with no direct co m m u n icatio n betw e en th e to p and the b o tto m o f the social p y r a m i d . The "p urely bu reau cratic ty p e of adm inistrative organization begins to assum e the o m inou s aspect o f p otential social conflicts. Clearly, W ebers ideal-type analysis appears to be dangerously simplified and misleading If we are to evaluate the e f f i c i e n c y o f the system when developed to its u ltim ate consequences, we m u st tak e in to a c co u n t th e h u m an relations the system is likely to generate. In additio n, we m ust consider the dysfunctional effects o f the system th a t are d eterm in e d by its technical characteristics.

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D y sfu n ctio n a l E ffects o f B ureaucracy and In e ffic ie n c y o f th e Bureaucratic M ode o f O peration ( B ureaucratism )

We have seen how strong the forces of integration are in a m od ern m ass-production ec ono m y. In executing its adm inistrative functions, the nation w ide bureaucracy does n o t behave capriciously. In fact, there are m arked regularities, which may be classified u n d er three main headings. 1. Ideally, the bureaucratic apparatus is expected to c a n y o u t the com m an ds of' the authorities w ith o u t questioning their validity, This m akes for the calculability o f results, which is one of the essential p reco nditions fo r the superior efficiency o f a bu reaucratic organization, In practice, however, bureaucracy does n o t op erate in a social vacuum. T h e calculability of' behavior in a bureaucratic organization rests on the premise th a t official policy will be faithfully carried o u t by subordinates, But why should it? True, there is stringent discipline backed by the th rea t o f pu nishm en t. But this safeguard is operative only when individual m em bers o f the apparatus are involved. It breaks dow n when the interests o f the bureaucracy as a social group, or even only the interests o f the higher strata o f the hierarchy, com e in to conflict with th e policy to be executed. Various consequences follow. T he adm inistrative sta ff is an apparatus o f political rule or o f ec onom ic m anagem ent, In either case, if' reliability and calculability are to be achieved, th e interests o f th e bureaucracy and th e ruling class m u st coincide, It is therefore n atu ral that in a class society th e u p p e r strata of th e bureaucratic hierarchy will consist o f m em bers of th e ruling class o r o f those aspiring to en ter its ranks. 13 Hence we reach the conclusion that a bureaucratic organization, in o rd e r to be viable in a class society, m ust be a class-oriented organization. T his at once d estroys the foun d a tio n s o f rational legality on which Weber built his thesis of the m ax im u m formal efficiency of the bureaucratic organization. Being class-oriented, bureaucracy generates social conflict and thus prevents the achievem ent o f m ax im u m efficiency, Em pirical illustrations for the foregoing conclusions can be found w ith o u t difficulty. T h e re cent history o f th e most im p o rta n t and m o st developed capitalist countries furnishes them readily. In Weimar G erm an y , to q u o te J. D, Kingsley, an a tte m p t was m ade to im pose p arliam entary con tro l u p o n a Civil Service b u t partially co m m itte d to the ends th e R epublic sought to pursue; and the a t te m p t failed disastrously. In F rance, too,

15

reactionary officials successfully sabotaged the efforts of the Blum G overnm ent in finance and foreign affairs; and the Roosevelt A d m in istratio n was forced to assemble almost a whole new set o f officials to carry o u t the New Deal reforms. No com parable situation has arisen recently in England, b u t th a t is clearly because the bureaucracy in its u p p er ranges has been representative o f the ruling class as a whole and because its aspirations have been those to which successive governm ents were c o m m itte d [25: 2 1 9 ] . T h e last s ta te m e n t stands in need o f correction. British bureaucracy has also had an o p p o rtu n ity to show its class bias; one case occurred during the general strike in 1926, 14 and a n o th e r during the second L ab o r governm ent ( 1 9 2 9 - 1 9 3 1 ).15 It becomes clear th a t bureaucracy hinders social progress by its very nature. This fact is extrem ely relevant in the case o f socialist revolution, The conclusion reached by Marx th a t socialist revolution, in o rd e r to be successful, m ust dem olish and replace the old state apparatus, proves to be confirm ed by historical e v e n ts.16 There is, however, a practical question: replaced by what? S uppose the ruling classes are dispossessed and the bureaucratic hieraxchy is filled up w ith persons entirely unrelated to and even hostile to the old ruling classes. Is the new classless bureaucracy likely to behave differently from the old one? Before we a tte m p t to answer this question, we m ust consider two technical features o f b ureaucratic action. 2. In order to insure precision, im personality, and calculability, bureaucracy in action m ust be governed by rules th at are, ideally, supposed to cover all possible cases. In practice, o f course, no b ureaucratic brain can anticipate and fix, by rules, the infinite diversity of life. Hence there is an in herent con tra d ictio n in the system: a com pletely bu reaucratized organization would require that the n u m b e r o f rules be alm ost as great as the n u m b e r o f concrete decisions. Since this is impossible and the n u m b e r o f rules is m uch smaller, an im p o rta n t elem ent o f imprecision and unpredictability creeps into the organization. T o cope with this defect, those in a u th o rity tend to m ultiply rules, whose sheer n u m b e r and increasing inconsistency w ith each o th e r have a strong negative effect o n those w ho are required to observe these rules, and this drives them to inactivity. If the n u m b e r o f xules is reduced, th e situation is n o t improved, A p a rt from the increased possibility o f evasion, the typical fun c tio na ry now feels less secure and hen c e consults the higher-ups m ore frequently. T he behavioral effect o f this con tradiction is reflected in the tendency to avoid responsibility; by definition, bureaucracy is n o t responsible for its decisions (because they are preordained regulations) and is 16

irresponsible in behavior The hierarchy o f status amplifies this effect and adds a new one: n ot only responsibility b u t also work tends to be avoided, the form er being passed upw ard, the latter dow nw ard. A considerable a m o u n t o f intellectual and em otional energy is wasted in th e process N o r is this all. The fun dam en tal principle o f hierarchy is conform ity to rules and to the au th o rity o f superiors. Functionaries are trained to conform , for this makes the bureaucratic organization work, C o n fo rm ity is clearly a m eans to the end th a t the organization sets o u t to achieve. But for the m em bers o f the hierarchy, con fo rm ity is an essential precond itio n for their own existence. The result is displacem ent o f goals by means, a typical bureaucratic endeavor to satisfy rules and s u p e r io r s ,17 and n o t to assist clients. T he process is effectively sum m ed up by R K M erton: (1) An effective bureaucracy dem ands reliability o f response and strict devo tio n to regulations, (2) Such devotion to the rules leads to th eir transform ation into absolutes; they are no longer conceived as relative to a given set o f purposes, (3) This interferes with ready ad a p ta tio n un der special conditions n o t clearly envisaged by those w ho drew up the general rules. (4) Thus, the very elem ents th a t are conducive to efficiency in general pro d u c e inefficiency in specific instances [29: 3 6 6 ]. T he dy sfunctional effects o f bureaucratic organization are magnified as the organization increases in size,. In nationw ide bureaucracies, the process comes to a logical end: the apparatus designed to facilitate control becom es uncontrollable itself. Technically, it is simply a consequence of what E, Jaques calls a parad ox o f executive w o rk : . . . the higher the executive, the greater the n u m b er o f people d ep e n d e n t on him, bu t the greater also is his dependence: for the carrying o u t o f his wishes is in the han ds o f an increasing n u m b e r o f peo p le [30: 2 2 7 ] , Even if P la to s P hilosopher stands at the sum m it o f the bureaucratic structure, he will be able to realize his projects only within the limits o f the p erfo rm ance possibilities o f the apparatus at his disposal F o r the reasons en um erated, the apparatus will ten d to handle the tasks inappropriately and th u s force the Philosopher to take decisions that m ay look fantastic to outsiders, B ut there is no necessity for a national bureaucracy to have a Philosopher as a leader. Perhaps it is m o re realistic to ex pect that, normally, the leader will have m uch m o re m o dest intellectual and organizational capacities. In this case the main task o f the leader may reduce to a p e rm a n e n t struggle for preservation o f his o w n position in the hierarchy in which case the last trace o f conscious control fades away The probability th a t this will happen increases when we
17

take into a c co u n t the n ext gro up o f d y sfu nction al factors 3. The process o f ad m inistration is no t timeless n o r is it in d ep en d e n t of the size o f the organization, In a large bureaucratic organization, with m any interm ediary links, there will be a considerable lag betw een the m o m e n t in time when th e com m and is issued at the top and the m o m e n t in time when the c o m m an d is carried o u t by functionaries a t the o th e r end, This lag is doubled w h e n t h e other-end officials initiate the process by first transm itting in fo rm atio n upward and then aw ait instructions on how to act. It is trebled or q uad ru p le d if, for one reason or a nother, in form atio n is n o t properly u n d e rsto o d at either end after the first transmission. O ften, to o, c o m m u n icatio n s will travel the same distance a n u m b e r o f tim es because, at every link in the chain, bureaucrats, taking care o f th eir ow n safety, will endeavor to clear u p any controversial po ints O n th eir long jo urn ey s, in fo rm atio n and instructions also get d istorted for psychological reasons, and for all the o t h e r reasons we exam ined u n d e r (1) and (2) While the info rm atio n and instructions are traveling up and dow n, circum stances change and the solution applied m ay prove g r o s s l y i n a d e q u a t e . B o t h cases reflect a n o th e r in h ere n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f b u reaucratic organizations nam ely, th e c o n tradiction o f centralization and decentralization. I f the aim is m axim um efficiency, decentralized bureaucratic organization is a logical and psychological im possibility: logical, because it destroys c o o rd in a tio n ; psychological, because it is impossible to train a man to conform and to assum e initiative at the same time The balance is, then, norm ally struck in favor o f CentralizationCentralized organization produ ces results like those described by M. C hardon in F ran c e o r by the a u t h o r in Yugoslavia All branches o f the public service, says C hardon , are so organized and staffed as to pro duce words, papers, inaction. No technical consideration directs their efforts. Instead, there is an intricate n etw o rk o f ro u tin e m echanism s; co nstan t dissipation o f forces; chains o f costly links on which business stagnates as successive verifications pile up; m en consider, then reconsider; m en verify, th en reverify and coun terverify; th e least discrepancy gives rise to d o u b t, to su p plem en tary inquiries, to com m entaries, to pointless arid discussions [31: 4 0 8 ] , As a co ncrete illustration o f the u ltim ate effects: T o build a new bridge in place o f one palpably unsafe, tw en ty distinct adm inistrative steps were necessary, with the result th at it to o k fifteen to eighteen m o n th s to initiate the co n s tru c tio n [31: 4 0 8 ] My second exam ple is taken from a com pletely different social milieu, b u t there, too, centralization gave similar results I t relates to the oil industry

18

during the period o f adm inistrative planning in Yugoslavia: Even with their own m an agem en t and accounting, enterprises were not in d epende nt The D irectorate [th e Federal G ov ern m ent agency] interfered with even the m ost trifling businesses and problem s of the enterprises, from the caloric value o f food in dining halls to annual p ro d u c tio n plans. F re q u e n t changes, com plete d ependence, w rong ec onom ic directives resulting from , ignorance o f the problem s o f individual enterprises or from m ere G leichschaltung have transform ed enterprises in to u n m o tivated and initiativeless agents of an ec onom ic policy c o n d u c te d by passing them by , Failure to fulfill plans could always be explained by innum erable objective difficulties . , , the n u m b e r o f em p loy ed personnel increased rapidly w ith o u t corresponding ec onom ic effect; in the General D irectorate, 3 6 0 em ployees were receiving ab o u t 170 reports and sending o u t circulars in the same p ro p o rtio n . . [32: 1 9 1]. T he rep orts accum ulated, form ing volumes o f m any h und red s o f pages, in which all the details of a dam aged oil pum p could be traced but from which it was absolutely impossible to evaluate the eco n o m ic situation o f the industry. Plans were changed several times a year; in one extrem e case an oil refinery got the final version o f its annual p ro d u c tio n plan m m id-D ecem ber o f th e c u rren t year, 10 The exam ple o f F ran c e is typical for the functioning o f governm ental bureaucracy in its traditional province. The Yugoslav exam ple is typical for relatively m o d e rn cases o f entire econom ies being run adm inistratively. Similar examples could be m ultiplied at will and also indicate, am ong o th e r things, that, as a rule, the m o re backw ard the co u n try , the less efficiently bureaucracy works.
B ureaucratic P olarization o f S o ciety

B ureaucratic organizations m ay be, and norm ally are, invaded by elem ents alien to them , This m ay, and to a considerable extent does, m itigate the evils o f b ureaucratic adm inistration. There are countless m odifications possible, b u t they d o n o t concern us here. What we are prim arily interested in is discovering the inherent tendencies of th e bureaucratic typ e o f organization, and for this purpose the p u r e typ e is best suited. Let us suppose, therefore, th a t the social life o f a co u n try is organized and controlled by a huge bureaucratic a p p a ratu s What sort o f social relations are likely to emerge? We need only draw the conclusions o f the above analysis. The fu ndam ental principle o f bureaucratic organization is obedience The behavioral co nsequence is obsequiousness toward

19

(i.e., receiving orders from) superiors, co m pen sated for by arrogance tow ard (i.e., giving orders to) subordinates, This behavior changes m arkedly at the top and the b o t t o m o f the b ureaucratic pyram id; the top displays or at any rate is able to display arrogance; the b o t t o m can choose only obedience. Interests are polarized because w hat represents m ax im u m freedom of choice fo r the to p represents at th e same time m inim um freedom o f choice for the b o tto m . T h e closer the organization conform s to its logical ideal, the greater the span betw een the m ax im u m and m in im u m relations, with the resulting m axim ization o f potential social conflict. Hence there is a possibility for a sharp social differentiation to appear, the fu n d a m e n tal historical d ifferentiation betw e en the ruling and th e ex plo ited classes This potential conflict then materializes in overt signs of'social stratification. In order to have a stable and efficient system , the rulers need a loyal bureaucracy. This loyalty upw ard is bo ugh t by ec onom ic privileges and reinforced by statu s d iffe re n tia tio n .19 Thus there will be a wealthy and pow erful m in o rity and a p o o r and powerless m ajority. Within the b ureaucracy, Marx had already n o ted , the hierarchy serves to m aintain the m ysterio us rightness of regulations, while tow ard the ex terior the bureaucracy forms a closed co rp o ra tio n [35: 65] . As an adm inistrative apparatus, the bureaucracy is inherently identified with the state. Bureaucracy considers itself' the u ltim ate aim o f the sta te , Marx says. . .the aims of the state are tran sform ed into the aims o f bureaucracy, or bu reaucratic aims are transform ed into the aims o f the s tate [35: 64-65].. By taking the form o f a closed c o rp o ratio n and using the powers of the state for its ow n purposes, the bureaucracy becom es a privileged m inority con trary to th e interests o f the great m ajority of' the m em bers o f society. This m inority takes co ntro l of the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n , while the m ajority m ust sell its labor p o w e r in o rd e r to live. T h e fo rm er will rule; the la tter will be ruled. A nd th a t is n o th in g b u t the classical M arxian two-class stru ctu re of' society. We m ay now answer the qu estio n posed previously. Even if the socialist revolution radically d estro ys the o ld state apparatus and in a dm inistrative jo b s replaces the m em bers o f the o ld ruling class b y m em b ers o f th e h ith e rto e x p lo ite d class, th e new so ciety will n o t necessarily be a classless, socialist so c ie ty I f th e fu n d a m e n ta l principle o f bureaucratic organization the principle o f hierarchy is le ft to operate, in th e course o f tim e tw o social classes w ith co n flictin g interests w ill again emerge. In order to prevent this, the state, as an institu tio n whose essence is coercion, m ust to use 20

the famous phrase o f Engels w ith er away. T he em ergence o f class antagonism and o f a ruling class does n o t d epen d o n the ow nership of the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n by the individual m em bers o f that class, b u t on class c o n tro l o f the m eans o f p rod u c tio n , insofar as this control enables th a t class to ex e rt political as well as power-backed c o n tro l.20
4 A S S O C I A T I O N S SOCIALISM

C om plete state control m eans the s u bo rdination o f every individuals whole life, work, and leisure to th e orders o f those in pow er and o ff ic e .22 It is the re d u c tio n o f m an to a cog in an all-embracing m achine o f com pulsion and coercion. It forces the individual to re n o unce any activity o f which the governm ent does not approve. It tolerates no expression o f dissent. It is the tran sform atio n o f society in to a strictly disciplined labor army as the advocates o f socialism say o r into a pen iten tiary, as its o p p o n e n ts say [38: 2 5 ] . If state capitalism is su b stituted for socialism, the p icture von Mises draws in the passage ju st quoted is n o t unlike th a t emerging from the analysis of the pure bureaucratic system in the preceding section. Where von Mises and o th e r econom ists o f the liberal school err is, o f course, in their a tte m p ts to show th a t state capitalism should or could be replaced by liberal capitalism. It suffices to com pare the capitalist countries o f 1848 w ith the welfare states o f o u r day to see at once th a t the idea is n o t very co m m endable, But this is n o t a correct way o f looking at the problem . The essential po in t is that social institutions change to g eth er with the develo pm ent o f productive forces and th at, therefore, 19th ce ntury institu tion s canno t be applied to a 2 0th century econ om y . State capitalism has proved to be m arkedly m ore efficient th an th e system it has replaced, and this m eans th a t the co ntrad ictio ns it generates will have to be solved in a new way, I m ust repeat th a t the ill effects o f state capitalism can be m itigated in various ways and that, therefore, there is no n ecessity for the picture pain ted by von Mises to com e true. But there is the p o ssib ility. A nd 1 should add th a t this possibility increases, as the historical experience of o u r ce ntu ry tends to suggest, with the degree o f backwardness o f the society concerned. T he need for econom ic d evelopm ent is felt m ost strongly in the m ost undeveloped countries, where the eco no m y is nearly stationary and the tra d itio n is o ften closer to feudalism than to capitalism. The first elem ent the need fo r developm ent points up the necessity for meager resources to be pooled, fo r available 21

qualified personnel to be p u t u n d e r a unified co m m and, and for the state to be m ade the responsible organizer of' the econom ic process T he idea that, in this ce n tury, the state plays, o r should play, a decisive role in transform ing statio nary econom ies into growing econom ies seems to com m and uniquely wide acceptance. But realization of this idea m eans the creation of a powerful bureaucracy. The second factor semifeudal relations indicates th at underdeveloped countries have had no o p p o rtu n ity to pass through the rationalization and im personalization process of' the capitalist m a rk e t (w hich creates the trad itio n necessary to m ake bureaucracy w ork p ro p e rly ,23 b u t that there will be a strong tendency to transfer feudal status-consciousness to b ureaucratic hierarchies and, similarly, a tend ency to preserve the tradition o f a unified political-econom ic power free o f control from below. And th a t m eans a strong class polarization. D evelopm ent requires state intervention, and state interven tion has a potentially harmful effect; this is j u s t an additional vicious circle w ith which an underdeveloped e c o n o m y has to cope The price o f skipping a stage of d ev elo pm ent is the involvem ent in g reater risk. There are a n u m b e r of policies that, in co ncrete situations, may limit the risks involved in bureaucratization. T h e y are n o t o u r concern here. What we m u st do consists n o t merely in m odifying the old system , b u t in outlining a new system that is m o s t likely to replace the old one. The new system m u st satisfy the criteria o f bein g both possible and m o re efficient.. T h e essential characteristics o f the new system follow directly from the preceding discussion and can be reduced to a single o ne: negation o f the principle o f class polarization. The new society, if it is to be m ore efficient, m ust be a classless one. It is easy to see th at there are tw o aspects to the p roblem : one is econom ic, the other, political. We begin with th e e c o n o m ic factor. Von Mises correctly draws a tte n tio n to o n e im p o rta n t d i f f e r e n c e betw een public ad m in istratio n and econom ic m anagem ent o f a business [38: 58-63] In public adm inistration there is no m arket price fo r achievements. A n ec onom ic calculus ca n n o t be applied to assessing the success o r failure o f a bureau. T h e efficiency o f a police d e p a rtm e n t o r o f a tax-collecting office ca n n o t be established in the same way as th at o f a factory. T h erefo re the activities o f bureaus m ust be guided by rules and regulations and by the directives of superiors, T h e m ore im personalized the system manages to becom e, the closer it will a p p ro x im a te Weberian rational-legal au th o rity C om pared with public adm in istratio n, ec on om ic m anag em ent has a great advantage in possessing a yardstick for success and o')

failure, in the form of surplus o f retu rn over cost, a yardstick that is failJy objective within the limits o f inescapable m arket im perfections. This m akes it possible to avoid bureaucratizatio n even of very large organizations. Since net revenue can be ascertained by ac counting n o t only for the w hole business concern b u t also for any o f its parts, it is feasible to decentralize m anagem ent and responsibility w ith o u t jeopardizing the unity o f o peration s and the a tta in m e n t o f their goal. Responsibility can be divided. There is no need to limit the discretion of subordinates by any rules o r regulations o th e r than those underlying all business activities, nam ely, to ren d er their o peration s p ro fita b le [ 3 8 : 5 8 ] . T h is h elp s to resolve the centralization-decentralization co ntradictio n and to stim ulate individual initiative and collective en trepreneurship. E co nom ic surplus can be used n o t only as a check on efficiency b u t also as a direct m otivational device. U n d e r the condition s o f ec onom ic welfare that we k now , econom ic m otiv a tio n is likely to have an extrem ely strong im pact o n the perform ance o f individuals, and there is no reason for leaving this possibility u nex plo ited . Profit plus p ro fit a p p ro p riatio n does thrs n o t mean capitalism? Yes, if the in stitutio n of capital, in th e Marxian sense, is retained as well B ut there is no need for this to occur, T he inner organization o f a private (or1 state) enterprise represents a bureaucratic pyram id with tw o loose ends, the one-way flow o f co m m an ds and the workers providing a base on which the stru ctu re rests. F o r reasons analyzed earlier, the interests o f the base and the s tru c tu re above it diverge. T o p ro te c t their interests, workers are com pelled to organize themselves in to trade unions, i.e., to build new bureaucratic structures in the opposite direction. T h us the workers m u s t supp ort tw o bureaucratic structures that d o the jo b o n th eir behalf. It is a very ro u n d a b o u t m e th o d o f organizing everyday life. It is easy to see that, insofar as the abolition o f private ow nership removes the source o f antagonistic interests, the need for tw o bureaucracies fighting each other disappears. Instead, the base cart be directly connected with the to p through a line o f upward-flowing specific co m m ands: the board o f directors is replaced by the w orkers council. By connecting the tw o loose ends o f a form erly bu reaucratic pyram id, the eco n o m ic organizations are transform ed into self-governing associations and capitalism is replaced by socialism. I t m ay have been noticed th at state capitalism implies, by definition, absence of private ow nership and that, in spite o f this, the loose ends are left u n co n n e cted in the organization o f

2,3

p rod uction . This happens because o f the internal logic o f the bureaucratic organization. B ureaucratic a u t h o r i t y , Max Weber writes, is carried o u t in its p urest form where it is m ost clearly do m in ated by th e principle o f a p p o in tm en t. There is no such thing as a hierarchy o f elected officials in the same sense as there is a hierarchical organization o f app o in ted officials. In the first place, election m akes it impossible to achieve a stringency o f discipline even approaching th a t u n d e r a p p o in ted officials. Indeed, it is open to a su bo rdin ate official to c o m p ete for elective hon ors on the same term s as his superiors, and his prospects are n o t d ep e n d en t on the su periors j u d g m e n t [21: 3 0 7 ] , In o th e r words, the loyalty o f the functionaries ceases to be linked upward and the hierarchical stru ctu re tends to disintegrate. A pplication o f the principle of' a p p o in tm e n t to the very top o f a bureaucratic pyram id presents an interesting problem. The pyram id may be tru n ca ted , i.e.. th e organization may be ru n by a collegial body th a t co-opts new members, This collective body will norm ally have o ne m e m b e r w h o acts as prim u s in ter pares and w h o comes to hold this position by being elected by his colleagues (the initiative being taken either by them or by himself, or prescribed by rules). The tru n ca ted pyram id is a pure, technical type o f a self-perpetuating bureaucracy. Experience suggests that all bureaucracies tend to develop elem ents of this type. B ut there are tw o fu rth e r im p o rta n t m odifications. In private capitalism, the owners o f w ealth n o m in ate the to p officials o f econom ic organizations legally and, to a large ex ten t, actually, In state capitalism this function is p erfo rm ed by the wielders o f political power. So we pass in to the sphere o f political organization. M odern political systems, technically d e n o te d as democracies, solve the top a p p o i n t m e n t problem by a fo u rth m eth o d : connecting the tw o loose ends at regular intervals o f a given n u m b e r o f years. This p ro ced ure is called elections, and it produces parties, parliam ent, and governm ent, i.e., th e source o f suprem e au th o rity . Th ere is no d o u b t that the m ore efficient this procedure, the g reater the chance that the o peratio n o f the hierarchical principle will be subjected to som e social control, But there is also little d o u b t th at the p otential efficiency o f the procedure is severely limited To be effective, the governm ent m ust hold office for som e time, i.e., it must be stable. To be stable, th e intervals betw een elections m ust be long enough and the n u m b e r o f parties reduced. The former, by definition, excludes freq u en t co m m u n icatio n o f com m ands; the latter implies the fo rm a tio n o f huge party bureaucracies, Weber has already pointed o u t th at the b u re aucratizatio n o f party 24

organization m akes th e m em b er o f parliam ent an agent o f the leaders o f the p arty o rgan ization [21: 3 8 7 ] . The point was expanded on by R H. S. Crossman, w ho in a few words generalized m od ern experience by noting that the responsibility o f ministers to the parliam ent is rapidly becom ing a constitutional fiction, going on to say: Along with Ministerial responsibility, the responsibility o f the individual M em ber o f Parliam ent has withered a w a y ......... Now the prime responsibility o f the M em ber is no longer to th e elector b u t to the Party. W ithout accepting the discipline o f the Party he cann ot be elected; and if he defies th at discipline, he risks political d e a th [18 : 18]. Due to the long distance, the upw ard line from the base to the top tends to con stitute a con nectio n betw een the tw o loose ends o f the social pyram id th at is m ore formal than real. The obvious remedy appears to lie in cutting this distance, in forming ind epend e n t selfL n e cted structures th ro u g h o u t the system, in con forming (to use Yugoslav political parlance) self-governing com m unes. In m ore familiar words, the rem edy is decentralization of power,. There ave very few social activities th at require rigid central control. Strictly speaking, only activities aimed at the p rotection o f the interests o f the c o m m u n ity against th e outside world belong in this category. Foreign policy is one such; defense is a n o t h e r Practically all other executive functions c a n 24 be left to the jurisdiction o f the com m unes, which are elem entary units o f economic-political associations. It is hardly necessary to point ou t th a t the technical solution, decentralization, becomes possible only u n d er certain social conditions, nam ely, u n d e r conditions conducive to eliminating the causes that generate fundam ental social conflict A federation of self-governing associations political, econom ic, and any o th e r was M arxs vision o f socialism, as inspired by th e sho rt history o f th e Paris C om m u n e [4 0 ] . As the foregoing analysis shows, this is a possible and more efficient alternative to bureaucratic social organization. It is im p o rtan t to realize that bureaucratization means more than a mere coo rd in a tio n and differen tiation o f administrative fu n c tio n s. Bureaucracy is an in stru m en t o f im perative co o rdination - to use a term o f W ebers once again based on coercion and, when nationw ide, em bodied in the state. Given the existence o f the fun dam ental social conflict, coercion is an essentia] elem ent of social organization, indispensable if disintegration is to be prevented, T h e fu nc tio n o f coercion is perform ed by a special apparatus whose loyalties are linked on the basis o f interests th a t are divergent from those of the m ajority 25

against w hom the coercion is to be applied.. T h e process is, clearly, self-rein forcing. Rationalizing the experience o f the Prussian state, Weber (like his c o u n try m a n Hegel before him ) implied th at it represented the end o f the possible develop m ent o f social in s titu tio n s O nce put in this form, the mistake b ecom es obvious N o t every authority has to be based on coercion. T Parsons has p ointed o u t th at professional a u th o rity , that o f a do cto r o r o f a university professor, is n o t [21: 52] . A nd this provides the clue to the solution. In governing a co m m un e, as well as in running a factory, there are tw o types o f decisions to be m ade O ne o f them represents policy decisions, decisions concerned with valuations, that is, w ith setting up a hierarchy o f social values T he o th e r ty p e represents technical decisions; once th e policy (th e e n d ) is decided upon, technical experts set o u t to im ple m e n t it in th e m ost efficient way (the m eans ) B ureaucratic au th o rity , actually and often formally as well, m akes b oth types of decisions im o actu, If, however, the tw o types o f decisions can be separated, then, w ith o u t any loss in efficiency, the co o rd in a tio n o f technical perform ance will be based on professional a u th o rity . A nd elected self-governing bodies will be engaged in finding o u t th e system s of values th a t best con form to the existing valuations o f the m em bers o f the com m unity. T here is no need for coercion in this scheme, for the alternative to coercion is n o t anarchy but a system c o m m an d in g u ndivid ed fu n dam en tal loyalties C o m m on agreem ent on fu nda m e n tals m akes possible free disagreem ent on everything else. Men cease to be representatives o f bureaucratic organizations and instead begin to represent themselves as freely developed personalities. The destru c tio n o f conc en tratio n s of p o w e r m akes it possible to create a society in which th e free develop m en t o f each is the co n d itio n for the free d ev elo pm ent o f all [Marx, 36: 6 3 ], The withering away o f the s ta te is a slow process, which depends primarily on the rate o f expansion o f material wealth at th e disposal o f the c o m m u n ity . But once it is started, the class polarization process will be stopped and reversed, Class society came in to existence as a result o f the rising productivity o f labor The same cause will m ake it perish. 5. W O R K E R S S E L F -G O V E R N M E N T IN H ISTO R IC A L PERSPEC TIV E A fte r the sweeping generalizations in the preceding sections, it w ould seem necessary to give some consideration to concrete 26

historical events. However, despite this restriction, the discussion will prove to be sufficient for o ur purpose, In a second section we shall proceed to an analysis o f the co n tem p o rary situation.
T he F irst Three Waves

Exam ined within the frame o f reference discussed in the preceding sections, th e a m o rp h o u s historical co n tin u u m o f the last tw o centuries begins to assume a definite structure, and the regularities of p a ra m o u n t interest for o u r subject become apparent. We can distinguish four waves of events, which are partly succcssive and partly superim posed on each other. O u r story begins w ith the first wave, which pro duced a group o f prophets o f a new social order. The second h a lf o f the 18th ce n tu ry witnessed the advent o f a new, capitalist society. The new society generated new class conflict, and very soon the exploited class acquired its first intellectual defenders - n o t q u ite conscious defenders, to be sure, because, as Engels observes, they did n o t claim, at first, to em ancipate a particular class, bu t all h u m an ity at once The most developed countries o f th at time supplied the most rem arkable of these prophets. F o r my purpose it will suffice to m en tio n th ree o f them , the three w hom S c h u m p e te r [4] aptly characterizes as A ssociationist2 5 Socialists They are R o b e rt O w en (17 71-18 58), a Briton o f Welsh origin, and Charles F o u rier (17 72 -1 8 3 7 ) and Louis Blanc (1 8 1 1 -1 8 8 2 ), tw o F ren c h m e n All three advocated social recon struction through p ro d u c ers associations O w en, the m o st fam ous of the three, conceived o f future society as a federation o f co m m un es governed by pro du cers He came to this view after spending tw o decades as m anager o f a large c o tto n mill in the S cottish village of New Lanark, where he improved the houses o f his workers, organized edu cation for their children, reduced working hours, and, in general, anticipated by over a century the tre a tm e n t th at workers were to receive on a national scale O w e n s ideas inspired the cooperative m o vem ent And in the early 1830s he was the leading figure in the growing trade union m ovem ent, which had only ju st emerged from illegality and which came to stim ulate the fo rm ation o f self-governing w o rksh ops Under O w e n s influence the new Builders U nion was tu rn ed into a Guild to carry on the building industry, thereby anticipating th e future schemes o f French Syndicalists and British Guild Socialists However, after the Grand National Consolidated Trade Union was formed (1 8 33 -1 834 ), em ployers and governm ent acted quickly, and in a few m o n th s

27

O wenite unionism came to an a b ru p t end. F o u rie r designed phaianst&res in which capitalists, workers, and scientists were to live to g eth er in a h a rm o n io u s co m m u n ity based on w ork so organized as to correspond to the personal likings and capacities o f individuals. Louis Blanc, the least original but the m ost realistic of the three, prop osed th at th e state u n d e rta k e to establish social w orkshops (ateliers so cia u x) th a t were to be run by the workers When the 1848 revolution made him un ex p e cted ly a m em b er of the Provisional G ov e rn m en t in Paris, Blanc tried to put som ething of this program in to practice. But, naturally, his bourgeois colleagues tricked him o u t of the governm ent and skilfully sterilized his activities. Blancs ideal was an egalitarian society, w ith personal interest merged in the c o m m o n good. This he sum m ed up as: A chacun selon ses besoins, de chacun selon ses fa cu ltes the idea that later in M arxs h an ds becam e fam ous as the form ula o f com m unism . The Associationists were u to p ia n socialists: instead o f analyzing the actual cond itio ns o f develo pm ent, they were concerned with devising ideal plans for social re co n stru ctio n C o nsequently, when actual realizations were a tte m p te d (and a n u m b e r o f Owenite, Fourierist, and similar com m u nities were organized), failure was m ore or less inevitable. But the Associationists ideas left a lasting effect on the developing culture o f the new society T he appearan ce o f the gigantic figure o f Marx o n the intellectual scene m arks the beginning o f the second wave in the historical process u n d er consideration. Marxism is prim arily a social theory ( o r ideology) o f the already em ancipated working class. Thus the essential feature o f the new wave is th a t isolated individuals and their followers are replaced by broad m ovem ents: the developed capitalist p ro d u c tio n of the second half'of the 19th ce n tury generates trade unions and working class political parties. These differ in details, but their program s are basically the same; they call for elim ination o f private capitalist control o f the p ro d u c tio n process. T h e p ro fou nd influence o f Marxian th ou g h t (w hich, however, was in terp re ted in various ways) on working class m o v em ents is well know n, and there is no po in t in describing it here. But with respect to my m ain purpose, that o f tracing the develo pm ent ol the in stitu tio n o f w o rk e rs m anagem ent, I should like to m entio n three m ovem ents separately, one o f which professed Marxism, while the o th e r two did not. A lth ou gh they had serious shortcom ings, som etim es p ro p o u n d e d nonsensical ideas, and occasionally were q u ix o tic in their ad ju stm en ts to reality, these

28

m ov em ents well express the fundam ental strivings of' the working class. A t the end of the last cen tury, the F ren ch trade un io n m ovem ent, then still in its infancy, came to be strongly influenced by the idea of revo lu tio n a ry syndicalism T he Syndicalists w anted to place the m anagem ent o f industry in the hands o f the trade unions T rade unions were to be federated locally into bourses de travail, which would establish a m o n o p o ly of' labor, presently take over ow nership o f the industries, and run them u n d e r local sell-governing communes. Syndicalists repudiated parliam entary action, relied on a conscious m in o rity instead o f on th oroughly organized big unions, and hoped to achieve their aim by the general strike. These four characteristics of' the m ov em ent explain at once w hy Syndicalists came to be d etested equally by em ployers and by o rth o d o x trade union leaders; why, by disorganizing the w orking class m ovem en t, their action inflicted damage on i t ; 26 and why they failed to achieve the goal of w o rk e rs management. T h e industrial militancy o f the F rench syndicalist unions reached its peak in 1902-1906; later it receded, and a fte r World War 1 their ideas were basically m odified In this process, a not insignificant role was played by the fact that, as a result o f the war, the u nio n s m ultiplied their m em bership and developed into big bureaucratic organizations Syndicalism spread from F rance to the United States, where it developed u n d e r the U S Socialist L ab o r Party, led by Daniel De Leon, and becam e k n o w n as industrial unionism.. The Am erican m o vem ent advocated the organization o f all workers into one big union w ith sections for each industry. Industrial unionism thus overcam e tw o basic weaknesses o f syndicalism; it m ade use o f political action and o f strong union organization. However, it had weaknesses in o th e r respects; it never exerted great influence on the A m erican w orkers and died o u t a fte r World War 1. R evolutionary and industrial syndicalism spread to Australia, Canada, Mexico, and som e o th e r countries, including Britain, where its influence was reflected in the famous m anifesto o f the Welsh miners, The M in e rs N e x t S te p (1 9 1 2 ), which urged abolition of capitalist ow nership in the mining industry and com plete con trol over the industry by the workers. B ut in G reat Britain at th a t time an a u to n o m o u s British m ovem ent, guild socialism , began to develop as well. Guild socialists opposed state m anagem ent of industry o n the ground that it would lead to bureaucracy and that thereby the social position of wage-earners would n o t be changed. But they realized th a t the state is a very im p o rta n t in stitutio n that m ight be turned to very good use: the 29

working class should captu re the state and use it to take industry Linder public ownership. After that, Parliam ent would hand over the task of' adm inistration to the national guilds (th e former trade unions) within the term s o f a parliam entary charter. Guilds, as well as com m unes and o t h e r political, social, etc., associations, were to be organized so as to allow every individual to participate and to have an effective say. All this was in sharp contrast with the current th eory o f dem ocracy which, says G. D. H. Cole, the leading theoretician o f the m ovem ent, assigns to the ordinary citizen little m ore than a privilege o f choosing his rulers, and does no t call u p o n him . him self to rule1 [44 : 13]. The N ational Guilds League, formed in 1915, exerted great influence on the shop stew ards m ov em en t and on several unions During and a fte r the war, a n u m b e r o f small guilds were created, Most im p o rta n t in this respect was the m o v em en t to reorganize the building ind ustry as a national guild in which em ployers were to become salaried adm inistrators, subject to election by the workers em ployed, In the ensuing depression o f 1922-1923, this m o vem ent collapsed, and a year later guild socialism as an organized m ovem en t was dead. I f the first wave b rou ght into existence individual socialist ideologues and isolated groups, and the second wave p roduced organized m ovem ents, the third wave b roug ht the first realizations Broadly speaking, the E uro pean revolutions of 1848 m ark the time w h en the working class em an c ip ated itself and asser ted itself as a separate social class. It m ight be supposed that in the revolutions that were to follow, the working class would a t te m p t to establish industrial self-governm ent Let us exam ine this hypothesis in the light o f the events that actually to o k place. The era o f proletarian revolutions began with the Paris C o m m u n e in 1871, The C o m m u n e passed a decree by which in dustry was to be reorganized on a cooperative basis and enterprises were to be run by the workers. The Russian revolution o f 1905, the next in time, p rod uced factory councils th a t a tte m p te d the m anagem en t o f enterprises,. B oth the Paris and the Russian revolutions were crushed, and w orkers m an agem ent did no t survive them. D ifferent was the destiny of' the second Russian revolution, the Great O c to b e r Socialist R ev olu tion o f 1917. It was the first successful proletarian revolution. The resurrected w ork ers councils o f 1905 played a leading role in anticipating and carrying o u t the revolution. 27 As early as N o v em ber 1917, a decree on w ork e rs control was passed, according to which the factory co m m itte es o btained the right o f com plete c o n tro l o f enterprises,.

30

However, the ensuing civil war, w ith its c o n c o m ita n t shortages and sabotage, required strict centralization and a military organization o f all the life o f society, including industry. In 1918 the com m ittees were transform ed into organs of the trade unions, and in 1920 they lost the right of participation in m anagem ent. A fte r that the rem nan ts o f w ork ers control were alive for a n u m b e r of years, first in the practice o f appo inting a red director (a worker) and later in the m anage m ent triangle: director party secretary secretary o f the trade union factory branch. In the late twenties, Stalin did away even with these rem nants and in truly Weberian fashion proclaim ed that the essential con d itio n for discipline and efficiency was that the director had absolute and co m plete control over the enterprise and th at lie was subject only to orders from above. E dinonaclialie [one-m an m anagem ent] was ad o p te d as a basic principle o f social organization Significantly enough, after a short while the gap betw een w o rk e rs wages and managerial salaries was w idened several times.. W orkers control was eliminated. The Russian revolution had a strong im pact on revolutionary ferm entatio n in o th e r European countries, with the result that workers either e x to rte d con stitution a l and legal reform s or, occasionally, assum ed m anagem ent o f their factories (tem porarily, or course). The m ost dram atic o f all was the Hungarian revolution that gave birth to the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1918 Here the w o rk e rs councils were first created as political organs that later concerned themselves with m anagem ent in the nationalized undertakings. However, the revolution was crushed very soon, and instead o f w orkers control Hungary got fascist dictatorship. The same was the destiny o f the n ex t revolution, the Spanish civil war, in which the a ttitu d e toward w o rk e rs m anagem ent was the same. In C atalonia, enterprises with m ore than 100 em ployees (and som e o th e r categories o f enterprises) were socialized. In 1936 a decree provided for w o rk e rs m anagem ent in these enterprises. If the revolutions generated by the social antagonism s o f private capitalism so invariably28 p ro d u c ed a ttem p ts to establish w ork e rs con trol in the enterprises, it w ould be expected that in the countries in which private ow nership has been elim inated, social upheavals w ould generate the same tendency even m ore clearly. The events in Poland and Hungary in 1956, with the very p ro m in e n t role that w ork e rs councils played, m ore than confirm this expectation. It is frequently said (b o th in the West and in the East) that wherever w ork e rs m an agem en t has been a tte m p te d it has failed. In a sense this is true But the inference that w o rkers m anagem ent 31

should therefore be regarded as an unrealizable u to pia is manifestly false. In no historical period have new social institutions been successfully established at one stroke, w ith o u t b itter fights against reactionary forces and w ith o u t m an y failures What is significant in the events we have reviewed is n ot the failure to achieve the goal, but their continual recurrence d espite all their failures
The Last Wave

The three waves described so tar could n o t fail to exert a great influence and to m odify that stable and sanctified p a tte rn o f social life we call the establishm ent, T he establishm ent itself began to change, and this is the fo u rth and surface layer o f the historical trend we set o u t to investigate. Various kinds o f w o rk e rs and works councils - the former are com posed o f w orkers only and are m ore prevalent than the latter, which include em p lo y ers representatives as well - are as old as the trade unio n m ov em ent. These councils o r co m m ittees dealt with com plaints, welfare w ork, and con dition s o f em p lo y m en t; they were always advisory, the em p lo y e r reserving the power of m aking the final decision. B u t for a long time they were only sporadic29 in occurrence and did not represent an institution Similarly, labor legislation dealing with some form o f w o rk e rs participation in factory organization, almost exclusively confined to welfare m atters, can be traced back in several countries (Prussia and Austria, for instance) to the end of the last c e n tu ry .30 These, too, were sporadic events, and the e x te n t o f w o rk e rs participation was Insignificant, World War I and the Russian revolution represent the first landm ark in the history o f w o rk e rs participation in m anagem ent. D uring the war, in o rd e r to enhance war p ro d u c tio n , the British and G erm an governm ents sought the co op e ratio n o f th e unions and o btained it, As a result, various fo rm s o f m anag em ent-w ork er co op e ratio n were developed. The events th a t occurred in both 31 countries are so significant th a t they w arrant a few m ore words. The three years preceding th e o u tb re a k o f the war represent one o f the m ost disturbed epochs in British in du stry , says J. B. Seym our, the historian o f the Whitley Councils, A t the co m m en c em en t o f the war, 100 strikes were in progress [48: 9 ] . It was during this period that syndicalist influence was strongest in Britain and th a t (in 19 12) the miners and the largest o f the four railway unions adop ted the d em an d for com p lete con tro l over the industry by the workers. It was also during this period that the 32

future shop stew ard s m ovem ent was foreshadowed (Glasgow engineers strike in 1912). Before the war, shop stewards were m in o r officials appointed by the union from am ong the m en in the w orksh op; they were to see that their union dues were paid and new com ers organized. They had no p o w e r to negotiate grievances; n or were they officially recognized by the m anagem ent [48: 1 0 ], Then came the war which, as C. G. R enold tells us on the basis o f his firsthand experience as an em ployer, was regarded by large sections as a capitalists w ar and the restrictions, controls, and hardships were resented accordingly [49: 16]. It suffices to add th at in 1915, un der the Treasury Agreem ent, after the trade union leaders had voluntarily pledged themselves n o t to sanction strikes during the war, the dissent o f the rank and file was certain. T he big Clyde engineers strike early in 1915, when the strike com m ittee disregarded superior u n io n officials and w on the strike, set the p a tte r n and initiated w hat became k n o w n as the shop stew ards m o v e m e n t . 32 T h e m o v em en t bro ugh t works co m m ittees to a high p o in t o f developm ent. Syndicalism, guild socialism, the shop stew ards m ovem ent, the increasing n u m b e r o f w orkdays lost by strikes despite all restrictions (2 million in 1915, 2.5 million in 1916, 5,5 million in 1917) this alarming situation called for governm ent intervention. In O c to b e r 1 9 1 6 a c o m m itte e (k n o w n as th e Whitley C om m ittee) was ap p o in ted to exam ine m e th o d s for securing perm anen t im provem ent in industrial relations. T he following year, the Whitley C o m m itte e produ ced its scheme o f em ployer-w orker cooperation. F o r each in d ustry a national jo in t council and district councils were to be form ed, to bring to gether em ploy ers organizations and unions, and in individual establishm ents jo in t works c o m m itte es were to provide a recognized m eans o f co nsu ltation betw een the m anagem ent and the employees. But th e scheme, on the whole, failed to work, except in governm ent departm ents. The em ployers, as a b od y, have never favored the scheme T he trad e unionists, frightened by the shop stew ards m o vem ent, appear to shrink from giving a u th o rity to any rank-and-file m ov em ent an d away from the central organizations [4 8: 1 9 1]. By 1929, o u t o f abou t 100 works com m itte es formed in response to the Whitley C o m m ittee recom m en dations, only one-half were still alive. A fte r the war, the governm ent rejected the m iners and raih v a y m en s d em an d for nationalization and self-government. T h e first p o s tw a r recession, which started in 1921, killed the shop stew ards m ov em en t and guild socialism. T he situation was back to norm al, and the capitalist m achine could 33

work again as before b u t no t quite: the seed had been sown Unlike Britain, G erm an y was defeated in the war, an d events took the o th e r possible form. The defeat, coupled with the trem en dou s influence o f the Russian revolution, produced a G erm an revolution (1918). Workers and soldiers councils sprang up all over the c o u n try . Frightened to dea th , em ployers were ready to go very far to escape full-scale socialism. A nd thus G erm any became the first capitalist co u n try to have a co n stitu tio n (July 1919) that, am ong the fundam ental rights o f citizens, included the following one: F o r the purpose o f safeguarding their social and econom ic interests, the wage-earning and salaried em ployees are entitled to be represented in W orkers Councils for each establishm ent, as well as in Regional W orkers Councils organized for each industrial area, and in a Federal W orkers Council (Article 165 [4 6 :1 0 ]) . On the basis o f the co n stitu tio n , a law was passed in 1920 making w o r k s c o u n c i l s [Bet>iebsiate\ com pulsory in all establishm ents with 20 or m o re em ployees The councils were to supervise the working o f collective agreem ents, e n te r into agreem ents on the conditions o f work and on subjects not regulated by wider agreem ents, watch over hiring and firing, and also advise the em ployer on how to improve efficiency and organization. But constitu tions and laws are dead letters if not backed by active social forces The G erm an working class m ovem ent o f that time was deeply divided b o th in its trade union and in its parliam entary sections T he m ajority, w ho held the pow er, w ere u n d eterm ined, hesitating. The governm ent bureaucracy was hostile This gave the em ployers breathing space. The results o f the revolution were gradually u nderm in ed (the slump o f 1924 playing a no t insignificant part) and then liquidated. The process came to an end in May 19.33, w hen both trade unions and works councils were abolished, m arking the advent o f fascism. In o u r day, unsuccessful o r half-successful socialist revolutions .. this seems to be the lesson o f H ungary, G erm any, and S p a i n . end in fascism. As to the o th e r E uropean countries, it suffices to m entio n that in the period 1919-1922, fo r the same reasons, similar laws were passed in Austria, Czechoslovakia, N orw ay, and elsewhere. In Yugoslavia, the law on pro tec tio n o f workers (1 9 2 2 ) provided for election of w orkers com m issioners fr a d n ic k ip o v je r e n ic il from the shop floor, whose task it was to pro tec t w o rk e is interests and co operate with the em ployer. The a ttitu d e o f em ployers and trade unions very soon reduced this provision to a mere formality [10: 2 2 ] , A fte r a period o f strikes, a similar solution was reached u n d er 34

the Popular F ro n t governm ent in France in 1936; it involved the recognition of w ork e rs delegates [delegues o u v n e r s }, with the right to m eet m anagem ent every m o n th . In the U nited States a som ew hat different union-nranagem ent c o o p e ratio n on p rod u c tio n problem s began on o n e of' the railways in the 1920s, when the union w anted to reduce costs in o rder to secure w ork for railway shops. Other firms and unions experim ented with similar ideas until the 1929 depression, which killed experim ents o f this kind. A decade later the steelw orkers union developed quite successful coop eratio n plans in a n u m b e r o f small steel and steel p ro ducts firms T he steelw orkers scheme survived the last world war and c o n tin ued to be o perated in som e 50 firms [ 5 1 : 5 5 ] , The second land m ark in the developm ent o f w orkers participation in m anagem ent was provided by World War II. Like World War 1, it initiated a cycle, though on a m uch larger scale. Again governm ents sought the co operation of workers in o rd e r to increase war p ro d u c tio n , and jo in t p ro d u c tio n com m itte es were set up in various countries (Britain, the United States, Canada) Again Britain was victorious and G erm any was defeated, and there was a s p o n tan eo u s d evelo pm en t in the form er and legislative measures were taken in the l a t t e r Again British miners expected to get self-government; instead, they got j o in t consultation But there were also several novel features, o f which the most im p o rta n t were the large-scale nationalization in some countries and the full-scale nationalization in a n u m b er o f oth ers (East E u ro p e and S o uth east Asia). In all nationalized industries, jo in t co nsu ltation betw een w orkers and m anagem ent was intro d u ce d as a m a tte r of course. In Britain, tw o national agreem ents during the war set the p attern for the establishm ent o f works com m ittees: the co m m itte es were to be advisory and were to provide an ou tlet for the regular exchange o f views betw een em ployers and employees on welfare and p ro d u c tio n m atters, subject to the qualification that terms and cond itio ns of em p lo y m en t were to be dealt with by the unions on b ehalf o f the workers. In 1947 the National J o in t Advisory Council re co m m en d ed to the em p lo y ers organizations and unions th at j o i n t consultative m achinery be set up where it did not already exist. The re c o m m en d atio n was followed, and today there are several h u n d re d w o rks co m m ittees in existence in B ritain .33 In G erm any the legislation of the Weimar period was n o t only revived b u t also pressed a step further, from jo in t consultation to co dete rm in atio n [M itbestim m ung] . In the two basic industries (coal, and iron and steel) the unions achieved parity for w orkers 35

representatives o n the supervisory board [A u fs ic h ts r a t] , a body which ap p o in ts the board of m anagem ent. Moreover, o n e of' the m em bers (there usually are three) of the m anag em ent board, the personnel director [A rbeitsdirektor] , is nom in ated by the union (law of' 1951), In o th er industries, w o rk e rs representatives are still in the m in o rity , although this m inority (one-third) may be larger than in the Weimar period. Workers ' councils [B etriebsrdte] , representing b o th wage and salary earners, m ust be elected in alt establishm ents em ploying n ot less than five p e rm a n en t em ployees (law of 1952) In France a law passed in 1946 m ade it com pulsory for industrial concerns em ploying m ore than 50 w orkers to establish a works co m m itte e [co m ite d'entreprise] representing the m anual workers and the technical grades. Every act o f m ajor m anagem ent im p ortance m ust be approved by the com m ittee. If there is a disagreem ent, the case goes to arbitration. Similar laws were passed in Belgium in 1948, and in the N etherlands in 1950. In 1946, in Sweden, the unions and the em p lo y ers associations reached an agreem ent according to which enterprise councils were set u p in firms with 25 or m ore em ployees T he task o f these councils m ay be broadly described as jo in t co nsu ltation on all im p o rta n t m atters It is o f som e interest to record th a t when, in 1923, a Royal C om m ittee propo sed the form a tio n of similar jo in t p ro d u c tio n com m ittees, both unions and em ployers opposed the idea and nothing came of it F ro m World War II to 1950, enterprise councils were set up in 2 ,6 5 0 firms em ploying a total o f over 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 workers [42: 5 6 -5 8 ], Similar jo in t consultation co m m ittees were in trod uced in Norw ay (1 9 4 5 ) and Denmark (1 9 4 7 ) on the basis o f u n io n-em p lo yer agreem ents, and in Finland by a special law (1946 ), In a n u m b er o f o th e r countries the prewar practice of' jo in t consultation was c o n tin u ed after the war or, where it had not existed, was introd uced for the first time. In 1951 the Internation al L ab o r Office registered m ore than 30 countries with p e rm a n e n t organs of' w o rk e rs particip atio n in m anagem ent. While practices vary, they have a c o m m o n feature: w ith few exceptions, they are confined to jo in t consultation.
C haracteristics o f D ev elo p m en t A fter World War I

It will be useful to a tte m p t a brief evaluation of' jo in t consultation as it came into being and developed during the last fo u r decades T he following five aspects of' the problem seem im po rtant. 36

) The m o tiva tio n for setting up j o in t consultative m achinery falls into three distinct categories. R evolutionary pressure from below com pels em ployers and the governm ent o f the day to relax managerial au tho ritarian ism Since the struggle arises o u t o f a strong clash o f interests, its o u tco m e m ust be legally sanctioned to remain perm a n en t (although legal sanctions o fte n prove to be a fiction) The G erm an case is typical for this situation N ext, during m o d e rn totalitarian wars, governm ents are vitally interested in stepping up p rod u c tio n , and therefore devise and advocate schcmes o f jo in t co n su ltatio n to bridge the gap between em ployers and w orkers The case is typified by British and A m erican practice With respect to the latter, the International L abor Office stu d y says: T he general purpose o f the Labor-M anagenient P ro d u ctio n C om m ittees was to raise the q u a n tity and quality o f o u t p u t for w ar p ro d u c tio n by the jo in t effort o f labor and m anag e m en t in each war p la n t [53: 197J. The e x te n t to which this purpose was achieved is seen from the following evaluation o f the same study: While there seems to be little d o u b t that the c o m m itte es m ade a substantial con tribu tion to plant o u tp u t, a n u m b e r o f the co m m ittees did not aid to as great an e x te n t as had been exp e cted , [53: 2 5 7 ], Some 5,000 c o m m itte es were set up in plants w ith w ar contracts. Most o f them disappeared with the end o f the war. T h e third type o f m otiv a tio n is that o f individual em ployers w ho are not forced b y law to a d o p t j o i n t consultation. They adopt it primarily on econom ic grounds. This point is illum inated by the following s tatem en t by C G. R eno ld, him self an em p loy er with successful co nsultatio n in his firm: In the first place the point should be m ade that the whole d ev elop m ent had its origin in a very practical need the need felt by the m anagem ent for closerco n tac t with its m en in the interest o f s m o o th w orking [49: 100]. O n the occasion of my visit to Renold, it turned out that he is n o t a socialist and does n ot regard himself as one, but that he is deeply aware o f the fact that, u n d e r the new conditions, the old m e th o d o f running the enterprise could only result in decreasing its success. T h e need for regular con tact with w orkers representatives appears when a concern outgrow s one-man m a n a g e m e n t,34 It becom es urgent in the tu rb u le n t conditions o f w ar and industrial unrest. A nd o n ce the works council is set up, it is likely to co n tin u e to exist in the ensuing period of military and industrial peace. War has a n o th e r effect as well: it increases the self-consciousness o f the exploited classes and hum anizes the m em bers o f the higher social strata, thus providing a psychological bridge betw een th e tw o w o rlds.35. Then there are also a small 37

n u m b e r o f em ployers 36 w ho are interested in jo in t consultation fo r its ow n sake, because they regard it as a hum anizing in stitu tio n This O w enite type o f em ployer, earlier practically n onexistent, is likely to m ultiply to the e x te n t to which the adverse social pressure o f their equals and o f the establishm ent as a whole decreases T h e exam ple o f individual em ployers, the r e c u r r e n t in terv e n tio n s of governm ents, and th e con stan t im p rovem en t o f the w o rkers education al standard gradually create an atm o sph ere in which j o i n t consultation becom es an indispensable p art of m anagerial ro utines Precisely this seems to be happ enin g in Britain to d ay , as d e m o n s tra te d by the appearance o f y et a n o th e r type o f em ployer. In the m ajority o f firms visited by the N ation al In s titu te o f Industrial Psychology research team, joint con sultatio n seemed to be regarded as an up-to-date technique for im proving m an ag e m en t-w o rk e r relationships [52: 59] . C o m p etitio n is the essence o f capitalism; accordingly, there is n oth ing to stop a capitalist firm from c o m p e titio n even in im proving relations with workers. This sounds paradoxical, but these are the co ndition s o f full e m p lo y m e n t u n d er capitalism. Clearly, such com p etitio n , if pursued consistently, m ust eventually lead to the destru c tio n of capitalist relationships, b u t this will be n oth ing m ore than a parallel to the p h e n o m e n o n th at Marx described so well: the d estru c tio n o f profits by c o m p etitio n initiated to increase profits N ationalized industries and nationalized econom ies present a separate case. There, jo in t con su ltatio n is an indispensable m inim um to m ake these systems w ork at all, that is, to m ake them socially acceptable. The only fu rth e r dev e lo p m e n t [ can visualize is a constant increase o f w o rk e rs participation in m anagem ent, either granted by the governing bureaucracy or fought o u t by revolutionary means 2. W hat happens to the discipline in an organization when executive auth ority is u n d erm in e d by ev e ry b o d y s having the right and the o p p o rtu n ity to questio n the validity o f the co m m an ds from above by reference to his own set of criteria? This is the very first question our W eberian-minded generation will ask in co nn e ction with the practicability o f w o rk e rs m anagem ent schemes F o r is it n o t true that an efficient' organization requires obedience, o bedience being defined as following such a course th at the c o n te n t o f the c o m m an d may be taken to have become the basis o f action for its ow n sake [Weber, 21: .300] ? In fact, however, the literature on j o i n t con sultation and w orkers m a n a g e m e n t,37 including the m ost detailed field studies, shows no awareness o f th e problem o f discipline. I can d o no

38

better than q u o te the testim o ny of tw o employers,.38 When I first took the step of introducing jo in t consultation on a veiy broad basis into my own w o rk s, writes G S. Walpole, I was told by most o f my fellow em ployers that I was selling a pass to the enem y, and that the first result would be that works discipline w ould go to the devil,. I have found, on the contrary, alter two years experience, that w orks discipline has improved almost out o f recognition, and that every o th e r legitimate interest o f ow nership has been catered to in a measure which four years ago I would not have believed possible: p ro d u c tio n is up, absenteeism is d o w n ; wastage is reduced and valuable time is saved [54: 166], C G Renold explains the m ystery o f this ph en o m en o n : The need to base managerial au th o rity oil reason rather than on arbitrary pow er - as is implied in the whole philosophy o f jo int consultation - has enhanced that a u t h o r i t y [49: 119], It is hardly necessary to add that the same applies with even greater force to the system based on the philosophy of self-government. F or w an t o f references (no field study has been m ade so far) I may perhaps be excused in backing this co n ten tio n by my own experience as a m e m b e r of a w orkers' council. S e l f - g o v e r n m e n t sub stitu tes u nderstanding for obedience, agreem ent for the exercise of arbitrary power. By eliminating capitalist or bureaucratic duality and the polarization o f interests, it reduces tensions and im proves coordination. 3. T h e success o f jo in t co nsultatio n has been ra th e r limited so far, and we shall exam ine the reasons for this in a m om ent, M cKitterick and R o berts evaluate the success o f the G erm an works councils o f the Weimar period by saying that councils were useful in protecting the w o rk e rs interests, bu t achieved virtually nothing in the way o f genuine participation in m a n a g e m e n t [60: 9], As regards the postw ar develop m ent, the same authors state: Where w o rk e rs councils exist, the general experience has been th at em ployees take a keen interest in their activities , , [60: 20] . In Britain, the broad masses of workers are still apathetic, bu t four-fifths o f the w ork e rs representatives in councils su p p o rt the institution and show a keen interest in it [ 5 2 : 6 4 ] . It is also significant th at the experience in jo in t consultation has induced chief executives, senior m an agem en t, and w o rk e rs representatives to take a more favorable view in .37, 48 and 58% o f the cases, respectively, and a less favorable view in only 9, 5 and 1% o f the cases, as co m pared with the view on jo in t consultation they had originally held [52: 6 5 ], 4. N ext, there is the problem ol the fu n d a m e n ta l relation betw een capital and labor. These tw o opposing sides are reflected 39

in the very term jo in t consultation. T he initiative on the part of the em ploy er in introducing jo in t consultation in his firm is not infrequently a deliberate a tte m p t to anticipate and check the d evelopm ent o f u n io n ism .39 But even if this is no t the aim, jo in t c onsultatio n increases loyalty to the firm, and this loyalty and loyalty to o n e s class are tw o different - nay, conflicting loyalties 40 It p roduces w o rk e rs leaders who are n o t trade union officials and so aie outside the grip o f the trade union m achinery. Clearly, unions will not be enthusiastic a b o u t partnership proposals and freq uen tly will be opposed to them. 41 On the oth er h and, if a unio n or shop stewards seek to participate in jo in t com m ittees, em ployers will fear infringem ent on their own prerogatives T he hopelessness of the situation lies in the fact that b o th sides are correct in their fears. With the em ployers basically opposed to surrendering their arbitrary p ow er and the unions basically unwilling to assume responsibility for the organization of p r o d u c ti o n (because they gain n oth in g and lose their independence, along with their grip on the m e m b e rsh ip s loyalties), the status q u o is likely to be prolonged and potential changes prevented. The logic of the situ atio n is such that unions act in virtual collusion with em ployers against workers, a collusion that becomes overt in m ore tu rb u len t tim es.42 This sheds new light on the events we have surveyed; form idable social forces have opposed, and will co ntinue to oppose, w ork e rs participation in managem ent. 5. The trade union parad ox represents a n o th e r illustration of the working o f bureaucratic structures In o rd e r to protec t themselves in a world o f polarized interests, the world whose institutions are against them , workers build strong bureaucratic organizations: unions and parties. Once these organizations are built, they acquire their separate interests, different from the interests o f those who su p p o rt th e whole structure. There is nothing ethically w rong in this; it does n o t h ap p e n because the leaders are wicked; given the institu tio n, the d evelopm ent observed is inevitable. The way o u t of the impasse is logically easy. T he organization m ust first be used to elim inate the fundam ental cause o f the polarization of interests in this case, to eliminate private control of p ro d u c tio n A nd then the bureaucratic principle of organization m ust be replaced by self-government. However, actual unions and socialist parties are not likely to follow this course im m ediately, of their own accord. Having b ecom e a p art of the establishm ent, with a clearly defined role in it, they are no t prone to leave the life o f ro u tin e and rush in to the uncertainties of full-scale socialization. Self-government, on the o th e r hand, is an 40

idea so alien to the spirit o f bureaucracy that it is clear that it will en c o u n te r vigorous resistance. 43 The situation, however, can n o t remain com pletely unchanged There is no reason to believe th at business cycles have died out But there is som e reason to believe that the governm ents of industrial countries in the second half o f ou r century can not afford to tolerate heavy u n em p lo y m en t w ith o u t risking m ajor social upheavals Curing the slump introduces the first decisive elem ent o f change into the process: the increasing degree o f social control The welfare state is its symbol. However, unin terru p te d full em p lo y m e n t has had a thoroughly anticapitalist effect: it generates co m p etitio n in the im pro vem ent o f m anagem ent-w orker relations, for the em ployers are vitally interested in avoiding labor turnover, in escaping strikes, and in overcom ing resistance to the in tro d u ctio n o f new processes, while workers feel secure and for this reason are actively conscious of their rights and potentialities 44 By raising the status o f the workers, em ployers gradually surrender their au tocratic power; thereby their social fu nc tio n loses its c o n te n t In this way the second elem ent, the increasing degree o f w o rkers m anagem ent, is introduced into the process. It is n o t likely that the process will always develop sm oothly. In case of revolution, however, the trend is even clearer. In the 150 years that have passed since the first Owenite ex pe rim en t in New Lanark, relations betw een em ployers and workers have been constantly changing These relations are reflected in the character o f meetings between employers and em ployees which, as the British National In stitu te o f Industrial Psychology describes aptly, over the last 150 years show a historical developm ent from d ep u tatio n and negotiation to c o n su ltatio n [52: 2 9 ] , and, we may add, to direct m anagem ent in the end. This last phase o f d evelopm ent supersedes the bilateral character of the m eetings and unifies the interests o f all those concerned in the institution o f self-government The last four decades have already produced the first a ttem p ts to go beyond m ere consultation,. Germ an codeterm in atio n is a case in point A nd the first individual firms have already begun to move even fu rth e r toward the state o f genuine w orkers self-government.45 We see that by the time World War II was over, the idea of w o rk e rs self-government was already in the air It was n o t grasped as som ething distinctively new; it was not y et system atized or introduced in to university curricula,46 b u t it was nevertheless firmly established, like all those great ideas that m ark rn epoch and whose significance comes to be appreciated only afterward In the light o f w hat we have learned from the history o f this idea, we 41

may be induced to envisage the following hyp othetical situation Suppose a social revolution occurs som ewhere, sweeping away all the traditional barriers and like all preceding revolutions raising the dem and for w orkers m anagem ent. Suppose, further, that the cou n try in q uestion is fo rtu n a te enough to have w o rkers m anagem ent developed before the bureaucratization process, resulting from the socialization o f the ec ono m y, has proceeded so far as to polarize society, separating the revolutionary elite from the broad masses. If these circum stances obtain, it is very likely th a t w orkers self-government will becom e a p e rm a n e n t social institution. N ow , the situ ation described is in tact n ot so hyp oth etical; it materialized in postwar Yugoslavia. The decisive period was the first five years after the revolution. A law passed in 1945 provided th at w o rk e rs com m issioners [radnicki p o v je re m c i] , as legal representatives o f the workers, should establish contact with m anagem ent, govern m en t agencies, and union branches, with the task of protecting the social and econom ic interests o f the w ork ers and helping advance production, In the following year the m ajo r p o rtio n o f the ec o nom y was nationalized, and nationalization was co m pleted in 1948 (with the ex cep tio n o f agriculture and craftsmen),. In the m eantim e, the w ork ers com m issioners ceased to exist; instead, trade unio n factory branches o b ta in e d the legal right to m ake proposals to the m anagem ent. This was a retreat from control to consultation, a dangerous step backward reminiscent o f Soviet developm ent in 1917-1920. However, by 1949, there was already a new change: in a n u m b e r o f factories, consultatio n betw een the m anagem ent (m ostly people w ho had taken an active p a rt in the revolution themselves) and workers came to be spontaneously introduced, Parallel with this, the fierce attack o f the C om inform , launched in the m iddle o f I 94S and continuing over a period of several years, acted as a force helping to check the polarization process In the fall o f 1949 the Political Bureau of the Central C om m ittee o f the Yugoslav C o m m u n ist Party ad o p te d an o rien tation aiming at im m ediate transition to self-governm ent by producers in the econom y. In D ecem ber o f th a t year, the governm ent and trade unions jo in tly issued an in stru ction on the fo rm ation o f w o rk e rs councils as advisoiy bodies Councils were elected in 2 I 5 larger enterprises; but soon o th e r enterprises asked to enjoy the same privilege, and by the middle o f 1950 there were already 520 councils in existence In Ju n e 1950 the N ational Assembly passed a law by which the councils were transform ed from advisory into managing bodies. T he working collective of every enterprise elects the w o rk e rs council [radnicki savjet] 42

which, as long as it enjoys the confidence of the electors, is the suprem e policy-making body in the enterprise. The council elects its executive co m m itte e, the managing board [upravni o d b o r ] , which is concerned with day-to-day im plem entatio n of' the councils policy; the actual execu tion o f the directives, as well as the j o b of ro utin e coo rd in a tio n o f the activities of the enterprise, is left to be p erform ed by the general m anager and the expert technical and adm inistrative staff', This piece o f legislation did not at once cause the perennial m an agem ent-w ork er antithesis to cease to exist, but conditions were created fo r a solution. By 1950 it had alieady becom e ab un dantly clear th at, in general, bureaucratic organization results in inefficiency and undesirable social relations, and thus the in tro d u c tio n o f w orkers m anagem ent cleared the gro und for a series of institutional changes that were to follow, 47 S u b s e q u e n t d ev e lo p m e n ts in o th e r spheres o f social life strengthened the new organization o f industry. Self-government o f produ cers was ex tend e d beyond the im m ediate place o f work, while all representative organs, from local councils up to the Federal Assem bly, got a second cham ber, the Council of Producers, In 1953 a change in the C o n stitu tio n took a c co u n t o f the new social institutions W orkers' m anagem ent has becom e a p a rt o f th e social s y s te m FOOTNOTES
[All q u o t a t i o n s fr o n t nojiSerbO'Croaiiati sourccs ha ve been retranslated
I.

i S ch u m p e te r Ls one o f those w h o disputes this statem ent [1 ; 1 4 6 |. Hut a glance at any m odern w o rk on the a n th ro p o lo g y o f p rim itiv e co m m u n itie s su ffices to show that S c h u m p e te r is in error. In this respect, K n ig h t's a rticle on ca p ital in the En cyclo p e d ia. B riia n tiic a (1 9 4 6 ) is ch ara cte ristic: "T h o u g h for hum an* reasons, laborers are not usually referred to as m eans o f p ro d u c tio n ,1 they are e co n o m ica lly sim ilar to o th e r p ro d u c tive agents. T h e , d iffe re n ce is in s titu tio n a l, and in a slave e co n o m y laborers o f all classes w o u ld be m erely species o f capital goods 'I his o f course was once largely the ease in parts of the U S A T h e re usually are, indeed im p o rtan t d ifferen ces; sen tim ent and social usage* inclu ding relig io n, cause hu m an slaves to be treated in a som ew hat d iffe re n t w a y from w o rk anim als, or m achines Im p o rta n t e co n om ic d ifferen ces arise in the co n tro l oT re p ro d u ctio n and the rearing o f ch ild re n . H o w e ve r, all these things are m atters o f d eta il and o f degree, and sim ila r d istin c tio n s exist b etw een m an y categories o f capital g o o d s .. . In short, the m eaning o f capital and its yield is essentially un co n nected w iLh the general o rg anization o f (lie social e co n o m y . . . The d istin ctio n b etw een hum an beings and p ro p e rty and that b etw een personal and real p ro p e rty are im p o rtan t in law and hum an relatio n s blit no fundam ental eco n om ic d ifferen ces correspond to them This is true even in the case o f m ilita ry victory,, as w iih the B ulg arian peasant uprising o f 1277; a fte r the v ic to ry o f its leader, the shepherd Iv a ilo , lie becam e the T sar A n d , as in fairy tales, the shepherd Iv a ilo m arried the w id o w e d Em press 1 r exam ple, the young En gels w ro te (1 8 4 7 ), in a d o cu m e n t that form ed the basis o for The C o m m u n is t M anifesto- the d evelo p m en t o f the p roletariat in almost all civilized co u n trie s is being suppressed b y force and thus the o pp onents o f the C o m m u n ists them selves w o rk w ith all their m ight on the o u tb reak o f the re vo lu tio n F o r this reason the co m m u n ist re vo lu tio n w ill not be a national re vo lu tio n ; it

3,

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5..

w ill be carried on I in all civilized co u n trie s at (lie same lim e. that is at least in En glan d, A m e rica, Fra n ce and G erm any* In each o T lhe.se co u n trie s the pace o f its develo pm en t w ill be faster or slow er, depending on w h e th e r tbis or that co u n try bas a more developed in d u stry , greater w e a lth and a bigger q u a n tity o f p ro d u ctive fo rc e s " [2 :3 5 6 and 358| In fact, sh o rtly b efo re his d eath, M ars cam e to expect that it w o u ld be p recisely Russia that w o u ld set the exam ple N o w . he and Engels w ro te in 1882. Russia is the advance unit o f the re v o lu tio n a ry m ovem en t in E u r o p e " [ 3: 6 0 1 | On an o th e r occasion, M arx at a m eeting in A m sterdam fo llo w in g the Hague Congress o f the First In te rn a tio n a l in 1872, singled out A m e ric a and En glan d as co u n trie s in w h ich the w o rk e rs could achieve their aim s b y peaceful means M T w e n ty years later (1 8 9 1 ), Engels w ro te : It is possible to im agine an old so cie ty growing p eacefu lly into a new one in co n n trics w h ere the na tio n a l represen tation co n centrates all a u th o rity in its hands, w h ere b y co n stitu tio n al means, yo u can do w h ate ve r you w ish so long us you have the m a jo rity o f the people behind y o u ; in d em o cratic repu blics such as Trance and A m e rica, in m onarchies such a ft E n g lan d w here , . the d yn a sty is pow erless against the w ill o f the p e o p le * [4 ; 6 7 ] A co m p arison o f this q u o ta tio n from Engels, then near the end o f his s c ie n tific career, w ith the stand o f the twenty-seven-year-old Engels q uo ted in the preceding fo o tn o te , shows that Engels* in Ihe course o f his life, passed through a certain evo lu tio n , That c v o ln lio n was also co n d itio n ed b y the accu m u late d histo rical experience o f h a lf a cu n |u ry See, e g t F o rd e n u ig c n d c r K o n m u tttis tisc h c n P a tt e i in D eu tsch lan d [D e m a n d s o f the Co m m un ist P a rty in G e rm a n y ] (1 8 4 8 ), by a co m m itte e o f six, inclu ding M arx and En gels; the program o f the S o c ia l D e m o c ratic W ork ers Pa rty o f G e rm a n y ad opted in 1869; the G o ih a Pro g ram o f 1875; the m in im u m program o f the Fren ch W ork ers P a rty , 18 80; the 1883 d raft program o f the Russian social d em o cratic group Q svo b o /h d e n ie tr u d a " ; I tic program o f the So c ia l D e m o c ratic W o rk ers Pa rty o f A u stria , 1888; the program o f the S erb ian So c ia l D e m o c ratic P a rty , 1903; etc E r M D urb in made the fo llo w in g in stru ctive co m p ariso n : O n e hundred and one years ago in 1841 B rita in stood at the beginning o f the hu ng ry fo rties ' L e t us suppose that the represen tative m em her o f the to ilin g and starving industrial p ro le tariat had been to ld , 4In three generations y o u r great-grandchildren w ill w o rk for eight hours a day (instead o f tw e lve ) fo r an average real wage o f three ponnds a w eek (instead o f tw en ty-five sh illin g s); there w ill be universal adult suffrage (instead o f a tin y electorate com posed e n tire ly o f the ric h ), and universal and free elem e n tary e d u catio n (in place o f y o u r illite r a c y ); m ost o f the u n e m p lo ye d w ill be supported by a state insurance and assistance schem e (instead o f being h u m iliate d , as y o u are, by the Po o r L a w ); there w ill be regular provisio n for the sick and the aged (instead o f the p riva te ch a rity and starv atio n fro m w h ich yo u s u ffe r); the sons oF poor men w ill go to O x fo rd and C am bridge at the expense o f the state, and w o rk iu g men w ill enter the House o f C o m m o n s in large num bers and o cc u p y the highest o ffices in the state; the reco g nition o f T rad e U n io ns w ill be the rule, and not the e x c e p tio n ; and m ost m em bers o f y o u r class w ill possess little p ro p e rty W hat w o u ld the poor man o f 1841 have had to say to all th a t? H e would., I suggest, ha'e laughed b itte rly The prospect w o u ld have seemed preposterous to him unrealizable in its o p tim ism , a foolish d rea m 15 : 2 5 | B y state cap italism '* 1 m ean state o w n ersh ip and d irect co n tro l and m anagem ent o f all m eans o f p ro d u c tio n , o r at least their d o m in a n t part Su ch a system is som etim es called state socialism . In the g eneral case, state capitalism or state socialism m ay be considered as the final stage o f capitalist d evelo p m en t or the in itial stage o f socialist d evelo p m en t, w h ere an acco m plished re vo lu tio n w o u ld d em o n strate w h e th e r it is one or the o th e r H o w e ve r, the social co n ten t o f a re vo lu tio n does not result from its label, hut from its real effects on social existence ['he Trench R e v o lu tio n p roclaim ed b ro th e rh o o d and e q u a lity , but brought a bourgeois so ciety w ith the right o f the e co n o m ica lly stronger, and w ith exploitation - Fu rth e r, w h a t abouL those societies that do not go throngh a vio le n t re v o lu tio n ? T h e p osition m ight be taken that socialism should not he idealized* and that in an an alog y w ith capitalism , w h ich prodnced fascist G e rm a n y and can to n al S w itz e rlan d , there is the socialism o f S ta lin is t Russia and self-governing Y u g o slavia T h e n , too. slate o r state-bureaucratic socialism is in som e respects a d isto rtio n o f socialism , bnt in other respects it is a first crude phase, out o f w h ich the self-governing phase grows [fia m e n g o , 6 f pp 1 I and 18 1 A t Ibis p oint the question arises: to w h at degree can socialism be d is to rte d " and still co n stitu te so cialism ? T o r exam ple, i f there are prison cam ps, is there or is there not socialism any lon g er? A nd then the question arises again: from the p o in t o f

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v ie w o f M a rxism , is not .Mate s o c ia lis m a c o n lra d ic tio in a d jc c to ? M ust U n o l be cith e r not statu or n o l so cialism ? W h at has been said leads to the co n clusio n that it is preferable s c ie n tific a lly to use a single term* n a m e ly, state cap italism . T h is term fo llo w s from M a rk 's d escriptio n o f capital as p o w e r over labor and its p rod ucts [9 6 : I fi7 ) + and is cu sto m ary in Y ng o slav e co n om ic lite ratn re Thus, M. N o va k says that the p reservation o f slate o w n ership \ vo u ld mean not an ab o litio n o f the p roletariat but a tran sfo rm ation o f all uien in to p roletarians, not the a b o litio n o f capital bnt its universal rule, in w h ic h it m ay develo p and necessarily develops an e x p lo itatio n o f its ow n k in d 17: 921 * A p p ro ach in g the p rob lem from an oth er angle, N , Pasic com es to the co n clu sio n : " f o rm e rly , slate in te rve n tio n in the e co n o m y w as m istaken ly id e n tifie d w ith so cialism , J f Ih is crite rio n w e re applied to the Jast few decades, it w o n ld bring in to the socialist cam p all the p ro m in en t ca p italist p oliticians o f the time, from Ba ld w in and R o o se ve lt to H itle r and de G a u lle [8 : 11 |. A . Dragicevid co n ten ds that n a tio n a liz atio n o f means o f p ro d u c tio n and planned e co n o m y are p reco n d itio n s o f so cialism , b u t o n ly p re c o n d itio n s and no th in g m o r e " |9 : 21 8| S im ila rly , P K o vq c and Dj M ilje vic observe that state o w n ership and state m anagem ent b y them selves prod uce little change in the position o f the p ro d u ce r in p ro d u ctio n and in his right to p a rtic ip ate in the m anagem ent o f the e c o n o m y . , In co u n trie s w h ere the so cialist re vo lu tio n has been victo rio u s, the state, instead o f b eco m in g an organ o f the w o rk in g p eo p le, m ay becom e and does becom e an organ o f the g o vernm ent and p arty apparatus, w h ich rules 'o n b eh a lf o f the w o rk in g p e o p le ' [1 0 : 13] I m ay add that in a certa in sense this lin e o f thin kin g was alread y an ticip ate d b y En gels: T h e m o dern state, w h a te ve r its form , is essentially a capitalist m achine, a state o f capitalists, an ideal total ca p italist. T h e more p rod uctive Forces it takes over, the m o re it becom es the real co llective b od y o f all the capitalists, the more citizens it e x p lo its The w o rke rs rem ain wage-earners, p roletarians, The capitalist re latio n sh ip is not ab o lish ed ; rath er, it is pushed to an extrem e State ow n ership o f the p ro d u c tive forces is not the so lu tio n o f the c o n flic t, but it co n tain s w it h in its e lf the fo rm al m eans, the k e y to the s o lu tio n [1 1 : 293 1 . A sim ilar ju d gm en t w a s arrived at by L. Fa b ria alm ost h a lf a ce n tu ry ago, in co n n e ctio n w ith L e n in s S ta te an d R e v o lu tio n ', he d rew the fo llo w in g logical co n clu sio n : Even i f the state becom es the o w n e r, w e shall still have state cap italism , and no t socialism . . . W ith the state as o w n er, all the p roletarian s w o u ld becom e em plo yees o f the state instead o f em plo yees o f p rivate capitalists T h e state w o u ld be the exploiter* and this means that the e ntire apparatus o f m ajor and m in o r adm inistrato rs and the entire b u re a u cra cy , w ith all its hie rarch ical orders, w o u ld co n stitu te a new ru lin g and ex p lo itin g class A p p a re n tly som ething like that is taking place in Russia [ 12: 1 6 4 1 T h e re has been a tend ency am ong us in recent years to replace state ca p ita lis m b y the e m o tio n a lly neu tral term o f s ta tis m (w h ic h at the same tim e elim inates discussion as to the m eaning or meaninglessness o f the co n ce p t o f state so cialism ) (see, fo r exam ple, M Pop ovie |1 3 : 3 28-336). M. Pe cu jlic | H J ) , S. S to ja n o vic is most radical in this respect: Statism is the name that should be given to the system based on state o w n ersh ip o f the means o f p ro d u ctio n and on state m anagem ent o f p ro d u c tio n and o th e r social activitie s The state ap paratus represents a new ru ling class A s co llec tiv e p ro p rie to r o f the means o f p ro d u c tio n , it em ploys lab o r p o w e r and exp loits it The share o f the in d ivid u al m em ber o f the ruling class in the d istrib u tio n o f the surplus value is p ro p o rtio n a l to his position in the state hierachy, . . . The sp ecific ch ara cte ristic o f the statist class, as com pared to others, is that its e co n om ic p o w e r com es from its p o litic a l p ow er, w h ile the converse is true o f the b ou rg eoisie (1 5 : 33 ] 9 The tw o m o n o p o liz a tio n trends are n o l necessarily antagonistic to each o ther, A s R . H Grossm an, a B ritis h so cialist, puts it: , . i t must be noted that, in m odern la r g e - s c a le in d u stry , there are certain co m m o n interests u n itin g organised m anagem ent and organized la b o r. F o r instance, it is o b vio u sly co n venient for b oth sides that p o w e r should be co n ce n tra ted in fe w e r and few er ha n d s [ 1 8; 10) 10. T w o great m o n o lith ic stru ctures face each o th e r,' says R o b e rt M c K e n z ie in describing the tiritish scene, and adds, c h a ra c te ris tic a lly : and c o n d u ct fu rious argum ents ab o ut co m p a ra tive ly m in o r issues that separate th e m ( 19: 586 | . It is n o t d iffic u lt to agree w ith Crossm an that M c K e n z ie , in his B ritis h P o litic a l P a rtic s t has sh ow n co n clu sive ly that the tw o great parties have developed in acco rd ance w it h the la w o f increasing o lig a rc h y w h ic h operates in in d u s try , in the trade unions, and on F le e t S t r e e t " | 18; 21 |. [1 In w h a t fo llo w s. W e b e rs position w ill be d evelo ped in greater d eta il, in view o f the fact that W e b e r in itia ted the syste m atic investig ation o f b ureau cracy and tbat subsequent p ractice in the So vie t U n io n (w h ic h S talin advertised as the M arxist d ictato rsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t) co incid es, to the greatest possible e xten t, w ith that

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12

13,

14. 15

16

17

18.

p osition 11 turns out Hint it was W e h cr and not M a rs. w h o was [he ideological precursor o f S ta lin and his successors In [his respect, as in m an y others ih e vulgar pseudo-Mar.s ists a ttrib u te d an ideo lo g y 10 M ars that was n o l o n ly foreign to him but was d ia m e tric a lly opposite to his vie w s on the stale, class struggle, and socialism . I f (he phrase o th e r things being e q u a l is interp reted as m eaning under co n d itio n s o f an tag on istic class interests.* the fo llo w in g passage from Ma.v W eber m ay help to illu strate the p o in t; The e x p ro p riatio n o f w o rke rs in general, inclu d ing clerical personnel and te ch n ica lly trained persons, from possession o f the m eans o f p ro d u ctio n depends on the fo llo w in g p rin cip a l eco n om ic factors: (a ) the fact that, o th e r tilings being equ al, it is generally possible to achieve a higher level o f technical e ffic ie n c y i f the m anagem ent has e vle n sive co n tro l o ver the selection and the modes o f use o f w orkers, us com pared w ith the situ atio n created by the a p p ro p ria tio n o f jobs o r the existence o f rights to p articip ate in rtianagem enI These latter co n ditio n s prod uce te ch n ica lly , as w ell as e co n o m ica lly , irratio n al obstacles to e ffic ie n c y . ; (b ) in a m arket e co n o m y , u m anagem ent w h ich is not ham pered b y an y established rights o f the w o rkers, and w h ic h e njo ys un restricted co n tro l over the goods and equ ipm ent that underlie its loans, is in a su p erio r credit p osition . ,;(c )f r o m a h isto rical p oint o f view , the ex p ro p riatio n o f labor has developed since the 16th c e n tn ry , both e x te n sively and in te n s ive ly , by the sheer technical su p e rio rity oriented to the p articu lar m arket situ atio n s and by the stru ctu re o f p ow er relatio n ship s in the s o c ie t y " 12 1i 227 1 In p ro p o sitio n (a ) w e see a theo retical ancestor o f the Stalin ist argum ent for centralized a d m in istratio n 1e d in o n ach alie \ that was in tro d u ce d in the U S S R at the end ol the 1920s (see C h .5) C!f the illu m in atin g em pirical studies by 'I II, B o tto m o re [2 2 1 on the fre n c h higher civil service and by R K Kelsal |2 3 | ori its B ritis h co u n te rp a rt Before the last war. the Trench higher civ il service was a virtu a l m o n o p o ly o f the Parisian grande bourgeoisie A fte r the war. in the p eriod 1945-1951, 6 5 % o f the successful candidates at the adm ission e xam in ation s cam e fro m fam ilies in the first tw o o ccu p atio n al grades (e m p lo y e rs and independ ent professional m e n ; higher civil servants m anagers and te ch n ician s), w h ich accoun t for o n ly 9 % o f the adult male p o p u latio n [2 2 : 1-191 In 1950, in B rita in , people born to the propertied and professional classes (i e the fam ilies o f landed gentry and o th e r persons not g ain fu lly em p lo yed , large and small em p lo yers, high and in te rm e d iate civil servants, managers, professional p eo p le ) held 71 9 % (79 9 % in 1939 and 8 6 .0 % in 1929) o f the highest posts in the civil service, w h ile the same o ccup atio n s co u stilu te d o n ly 18 1% o f ihe ad ult m ale p o p u latio n in the same year [2 3 : 15 7 |. A m e ric a n civil servants are more m idd le class1 in sucial o rigin, but in one sig nifican t respect the 1 A m e rican b nre au cra tic elite resem bles the o ther tw o : the exclusion o f people o f w o rk in g class origin. W o rk ers co n stitu te m ore than h a lf o f A m e rican s o c ie ty , but prod uce o n ly 10 % o f its highest adm inistrato rs C'f Bendix (2 4 :2 9 1 . C f G e rlli and M ills: ^ T h e general strike o f 1926 show ed that British bureaucrats w ill stand so cially and p o litic a lly w ith the ruling class (2 6: 175] S. M.. Lipset q uotes G eorge Lan sb u rv, a m em ber o f that g o vernm ent and subsequently leader o f the La b o u r P a rty , as say in g : ^ A II through the life o f the late G o v e rn m e n t, T reasu ry o fficials obstructed and hindered the M inisters in their w o rk N o one can d eny this1 | 27: 25 9] , S M. Lip se t observes: S in ce the days o f K arl M a rx , some socialists have m aintained that a successful socialist state must destroy the old slate apparatus and erect a new ad m in istrative org anization . In recent lim es persons w h o have served in, o r studied, socialist governm ents have suggested that one crucial reason for their failure to proceed more vig oro u sly toward (lie attain m e n t o f their goals has been the b ureau cratic co n se rvatism 1 o f old civil se rva n ts [ 2 7 :2 5 8 [. In stu d yin g Ih e b eh avio r o f a section o f A m e rican m ilita ry b urean craey as participant-observer, A K Davis n o te s :"B n re a u c ra tie personnel su ffer from ch ro n ic slatus-an.siety E v e ry o n e focuses his a tte n tio n on his superior, w hose slightest display o f pleasure or displeasure is m agnified and d isto rted dow nw ard- T he m ildest criticism from a su p erio r is o fte n view ed by the recip ien t as a crushing a tta c k [ 28: 3 8 9 ] The Same, o f course, takes place in every b ureau cratic org anization , perhaps in a sligh tly less pron o unced fo rm ; e ve ry o n e w ill k n o w this from personal esp erience. F o r the British w a rtim e exp erien ce in a d m in istrative planning, sim ilar in m any rcspects to the Yug o slav e xp erien ce, see the illu m in atin g b o o k o f Professor E. Devons f 3 3 j Cf, also W E u c k e n for the G erm an experience |3 4 f T h e m ost interesting w o u ld be the exp erien ce oT S o v ie t p lanning because it lias been in existen ce long enough to e lim in a te som e, o r m an y, o f the defects apparent in the first few years o f Y ugoslav planning Bu t I d o not k n o w o f any good c ritica l accoun t

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0.

2.

o f the S o v ie t exp erien ce, w ritte n by S o v ie t au tho rs, that 1 could q u o te, Scattered evidence suggests that the p ictu re is essentially the same S tatu s d iffe re n tia tio n is achieved through ranks and un iform s, through exclusive clubs and o th e r sim ila r means o f o ste n tatio n . Privileges in livin g quarters and vacatio n resorts re in fo rc e the d ifferen tiatio n,. A more su b tle m etho d is reflected in the absence o f criticism u p w a rd : a p rivate is n o t supposed to criticiz e a co lo n e l, not even outside the b arracks. T here are, o f course, a n u m b er o f o ther processes co n d u cive u> the p erp etuatio n o f b ureau cratic p olarization (fa m ily ties, for instance p lay a sig nifican t ro le), but w c ca n n o t discuss them here. H o w e ve r, one is w o rth m entio ning because it represents an in e vitab le exten sion o f status d iffe re n tia tio n to in te rn a tio n a l relatio n s It is the develo pm en t o f a strong natio n alism w ith a tendency to d o m in a tio n B y its very nature, b ureau cracy is p a trio tic .1 As such, it 1 sp o n tan eo u sly proceeds to build up the m y th o f national grandeur, for it is germane to its w a y o f thinking to a ttrib u te to various nations various degrees o f merit* n a tu ra lly reserving the highest, or n e x t ro the highest, ran k for its o w n nation This serves tw o useful purposes: by cred itin g its e lf w ith Ih e actual and h y p o th e tic al achievem ents o f the natio n or, w h ich com es to ih e same thing* o f the social organization, dom estic b ure au cra cy proves its ow n in d isp e n sab ility; by assuring the rest o f the p o p u latio n that they belong to a superio r na tio n or live under a superior system , b u re au cra cy tries o p rovid e fictitio n s strata beneath the b otto m stratum , i.e , lo tra n s fo rm the loose b o tto m end o f ih e social p yram id in to a psoudohicrarehical stratu m sim ilar to all the others above it, in o rder to prevent the d evelopm ent o f consciousness o f an tag on istic interests In this w a y the operatio n o f Ih e h ie ra rc h ic a l p rin cip le transcends natio nal b ou nd aries and brings about b u re au cra tiz atio n on an in te rn a tio n a l scale S o m e econom ists m ight p refer to use the term p ro p e rty or Pw uercftip for w h a t I call c o n tro l over w e a n s o f prod uctio n . Thus, instead o f speaking o f p rivate and b ureau cratic c o n tro l, one m ay speak o f p rivate and state o w n ersh ip I have chosen uiy phrase because it describes the essential relatio n sim p ly and straig h tfo rw ard ly and because, being free from ju rid ic a l co n no tation s* it is not as am biguous as the alternative term C f. the fo llo w in g d ictu m o f Marx and En gels: "C o m m u n ism deprives no man o f the p o w e r to ap p ro p ria te the p rod ucts oF the s o c ie ty ; all it does is dep rive him o f the p o w e r lo subjugate the labor o f others b y means o f such a p p ro p ria tio n 1 [3 6 : 51 1 The m eaning o f the statem ent depends on w h e th e r we p la c e em phasis on the p o w e r to subjugate the lab o r o f o th e rs or on ap p ro p ria tio n N o w , i f put in this fo rm , e ve ry o n e acqu ainted w ith M arxism w ill recognize that the em phasis is on the former. Bu t it has o ften been co rivenienl to transfer it to the latter, and in this case surprising ly few people have heen able to realize that the co n clu sio n the p o w e r to subjugate the lab o r o f others vanishes w h en p rivate p ro p e rty is ab o lish e d IJ is a no n scquintK In Yugoslavia to d ay w e fre q u e n tly use the term self-governing socialism S tr ic t ly speaking, the a ttrib u te self-governing o r a ss o c ia tio n ist is unnecessary. 1 use it o n ly for d id actic reasons because i( p rovid es a d irect and unam biguous d escrip tio n o f the social system in question S o c ia lis m ,1 like all terms in extensive use, has com e * to m ean such a variety o f things von M ises1 usage in the q u o ta tio n b elo w being an in stru ctive exam ple that it is seriously lacking in the precision requ isite for a S cie n tific term In fact, this alread y happens in p rivate cap italism as an in e vitab le result o f capitalist develo pm en t C o m p a re the fo llo w in g data on the d istrib u tio n o f em plo yed p o p u latio n in En g lan d and W ales before the advent o f cap italism and at the end o f its laissez-faire phase o f d evelo p m en t | 37; 2 15 1:
Late ]Hth c e n t u r y 1^21

E m p lo y e rs E m p lo y e e s In d ep e n d e n ts

14 34 S2

4 yo 6

It appears that under Ih e system so dear to von Mises. the life, w o rk , and leisure*' o f 90yo or the p o p u latio n are su b o rd in ated to the orders o f those in p ow er and o ffic e The fignres in the tw o co lum ns are not stric tly com p arab le. Ih e first colum n ' is an estim ate based on ih e w ell-kn ow n figures o f G reg ory K in g ; hence th e y are o f d o u b tfu l a c cu ra c y. Bu t this docs not afreet the general picture.. T h e En glan d oT Hie 1700s cun easily be replaced b y, for exam ple, the Yugoslavia o r Russia o f the 1920s*

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and then the p ro p o rtio n o f ind epend ents (peasants and artisan s) rises If) m ore than four-fifths o f the e m p lo y e d p o p u la tio n 2 3 T h e trad itio n and co n ce p t o f 21 m e rit( non patron ag e civil service w as related in m an y co u n trie s to the needs o f tlie d o m in a n t business groups, w h o dem anded cheap and e ffic ie n t service fro m the state. J D o nald Kin g sle y has sh ow n h o w in En glan d the p o licy o f a m erit civil service grew w ith the increase in p o litical p o w e r o f the business class Business groups desired an e fficie n t state that w o u ld fa cilitate and p rotect Ih e d evelo p m en t o f c o m m e rc e [2 7: 257-2 581 24. T h is sim ple truth is alm ost e n tire ly neglccted in the m odern p o litic a l'c c o n o m ic lite ratu re , w h ic h is so p ro fo u n d ly in flu e n ce d by the existen ce, and apparent in e v ita b ility , o f colossal b ure au cra tic organizations, E v e ry o n e w h o dares to take it up is lik e ly to be d en o un ced as an an archist o r a visio n ary A refreshing exce p tio n , and p ossib ly a display o f in te lle c tu a l courage, is p rovided b y W. R M o rris- Jo n es: It is o ur present thesis that the m ost p o w e rfu l c o n trib u tio n to the so lu tio n o f the p rob lem o f b u re au cra cy lies in a revival o f local governm ent through a re co n stru ctio n o f its fu n ctio n s and a d ete rm in a tio n o f its areas on the basis o f the p eo p le's ties and lo y a ltie s {3 9 : 25 ], 2 5, T h e term w as alre ad y used b y A N e f f in 1950 [ 42 | and b y L. H H a n e y in 19 J I M 3 |. 26^ C o n se q u e n tly , syn d icalism , or an archo-syndicalism , as it is so m etim es called, has b ecom e a d ero g ato ry w o rd in the w o rk in g class vocabulary^ It is o f interest to note h o w the o pp on ents o f w orkers* self-governm ent in va ria b ly use this term to designate and denigrate those in favor o f it, even i f the Ja tte r have no co n n e ctio n w ith syn d icalism . In this c o n n e c tio n it is instru ctive to an alyze the vo ca b u la ry o f Soviet-Chinese criticism s o f the Y u g o slav w o r k e r s governm ent, as w e ll as the vo ca b u la ry o f sim ilar criticism s by o rth o d o x trade u n io n leaders in W estern co u n trie s 21 S o vie ts o f W o rk in g P e o p le s D epn ties, to geth er w ith So vie ts o f S o ld ie rs D eputies, acquired p o litical p o w e r an d, in fact, yave the new So vie t state its name (so vie t = co u n c il) It is interesting to note the testim on y o f G G u rvic h w h o , even b efore the O c to b e r R e v o lu tio n o f 1917, to o k part in fo rm in g w o rk e rs 1 co u n cils in R ussian enterprises (fo r exam ple, in the w ell-k n ow n P u tilo v fa c to ry ). G u rv ic h says that L e n in at that tim e to o k the position that p lanning and social re vo lu tio n w ere im possible i f they w ere not based on the d irect p artic ip atio n o f the w o rk e rs, on w o rk e rs self-m anagem ent This position also w e n t in to the second program o f the B o ls h e vik P a rty w h ic h , ho w ever, w as d estroyed a fte r it w as printed [6 6 : 6| 28 This a b so lu te ly u n ifo rm p attern is ch ara cte ristic fo r the E u ro p e a n revo lu tion s A sian re vo lu tion s proceed in a so m e w h at d iffe re n t w a y. T his can be explained by the small size o f the w o rk in g class in these co u ntries and b y the fact that they have a d iffe re n t c u ltu ral trad itio n 29, T h e oldest w o rk s co u n cil still in existence in B rita in is, as far as I k n o w , that at the B o u rn v illc W o rk s o f the co co a and ch o co la te m an n fa ctu rin g firm o f C ad bu ry B ro th e rs L td In this firm , w o rk s co m m itte es were established at the beginning o f the c e n tu ry . T h e aim o f the m anagem ent w as d efin ed as rap p ro c h e m e n t o f e m p lo y e r and w o rk e r (4 5 : 2 ]. 30 F o r the sake o f com pleteness, an interesting e arly G e rm an atte m p t should be m en tio n ed . The In d u strial C o m m issio n o f the re vo lu tio n a ry N a tio n a l A ssem b ly, w h ic h m et in F ra n k fu rt in 1848, put fo rw ard a re so lu tio n asking that fa c to ry com m ittees, consisting o f e m p lo y e rs1 and w o r k e rs representatives, issue w o rk rules subject to the ap pro val o f d istrict fa c to ry co u n cils clcctcd b y the fa c to ry co m m itte es in the d istrict. T h e re so lution was never enacted because the re vo lu tio n collapsed sh o rtly thereafter [4 ft: I | . 31, T h e dem and for w o rk e rs co n tro l in B ritis h in d u stry was most acute in the tw elve-year period o f J9 10-1922.. Tor a d etailed and tho ro ug h acco u n t o f w h at was happening, see B Prib ieevie | 4 7 | . F o r a standard w o rk on the co m p arab le G erm an m o vem ent, see C W G u ille lia u d [ 4 6 1 32. C h aracte ristic o f the m ood o f the w o rk e rs was the fo llo w in g published statem ent by the C ly d e strikers: W e ho ld the vie w that the trade un ion o fficials are the servants, n o t the masters, oT the ran k and file, and that they require som e pressure at tim es to m o ve them in the path the ran k and file desire them to tre ad j 5 0 ; 131 |, D K irk w o o d , one o f the leading m em bers o f the C ly d e W ork ers* C o m m itte e , told the visitin g P rim e M in iste r, L lo y d G eorge, at a m eeting in D ecem b er 1915, that th e y had organized the strik e " i n d efian ce o f y o u , in d efian ce o f the G o v ern m e n t and in d efian ce o f the trade un ion o fficials*1 14 7 : 568 j . C o m p a rab le to the B ritis h shop stewards* m o vem ent was the G e rm an w o rk s co u n c ils m o vem ent a fte r 19 18. A nd co m p arab le to the statem ents o f the C ly d e

48

.strikers w as the fo llo w in g published statem ent o f the striking m e talw o rkers in D usseld orf in 1924: In a great nu m b er o f to w n s, the trade unions had adhered to Ih e general strik e p roclaim ed b y the w o rk s co u ncils W h e re this lias not yet taken place, |he w o rkers must fo rce them to jo in Ih e m o vem ent T h e leaders o f the unions w h o refuse m ust be ejected from th e ir offices*1 [4 0 : 7 0 1 . 33 In q u irin g in to the p rob lem o f jo in t co n su lta tio n in British industry* the N atio n al In s titu te o f In d u strial Psych o lo g y sent question naires to 4,719 m an ufacturin g establishm ents em p lo yin g over 2 50 p eo p le; returns w ere received relating to 75 i establishm ents, o f w h ich 545 had jo in t co n su lta tio n 152: 2 1 ].. 34. In m an y instances the idea to o k shape in the m inds o f in d ivid u al em plo yers or managers faced w ith ra p id ly exp anding personnel, and w as o rig in a lly intended as no m ore than a su b stitute, oT sorts, for that d irect personal co n tact w h ic h is so easily lost w h e n the p a yro ll lengthens and the ratio o f skilled and sem iskilled w o rke rs increases * T his is Ih e te stim o n y o f G . S. W a lp o le , also an e m p lo y e r [5 4 : 3 9 ] 3 5 , Jl h e research team o f the N atio n al In s titu te o f In d u strial Ps yc h o lo g y records: A nu m b er o f the you n g er executives told us that th e ir favorable a ttitu d e to jo in t co n su ltatio n had been acquired through exp erien ce in the services during the w a r | 5 2 :6 9 | . 36 In Fra n ce they have form ed their o w n org anization called U n io n das Chefs d 'E n tr a p m e s - A c tio n p o u r les S t m c iu r e s Hum atnes. 37. C f W . H . S c o tt [5 5 , 5 6 ], 1 . Ja q u es [ 30 ], G. S W alp o le [ 54 ] , C. G . R en o ld (4 9 1, Z Ihc tw o I L O studies 15 3, 57 1 and the N I I P stu d y [ 5 2 ) , for jo in t co n su lta tio n ; and P K o v a t and Dj M iljevie [ 1 0 1, the Congress o f W o rk e rs C o un cils o f Y ug o slavia ( 5 9 | , and an I L O stn d y | 5 S 1, fo r w o rk e rs m anagem ent 38 A s fur as Y ug o slav exp erien ce is co n ce rn ed , the co n clusio ns o f a ve ry serious stu dy by the I L O m ay be q u o te d : '* w h ile the self-governm ent m achinery for labor relatio n s has decreased the fo rm e r p o w e r o f m anagerial personnel, it does not appear to have im paired their a u t h o r ity , . , It has u n d o u b te d ly re info rced tbe position o f the co lle c tiv e w ith reference lo the m anagem ent, but does not seem to have un derm ined lab o r d isc ip lin e [ 58; 203 ]. 39 D escribing co n d itio n s in the U n ite d S tates, the I L O stu d y cited above says: A co n siderab le n u m b er o f p rew ar plans for jo in t co m m ittees in factories had been developed p rim a rily by m anagem ent in o rder to interest w o rk e rs in the successful o p eratio n o f factories, and in m an y instances had been aim ed at u n d e rcu ttin g the d eve lo p m e n t o f u n ion ism [ 53: 1 8 5 ). 40 T he resulting deep p sycho log ical c o n flic t o f the w o rk e rs is w e ll analyzed by the already-qnoted fa v is to c k In stitu te s tu d y : . . it seemed as though the o n ly time the m em bers o f the C o u n cil co u ld hold their heads high was if there was a m anagem ent-w orkcr fight o n ; i f there w as no fight th e y felt g u ilty, as if th e y were n o l doing w h a t w as expected o f th e m [3 0 ; 1221 the d e sira b ility o f em p lo y m en t w ith the firm has led w o rk e rs to lo o k to the m anagem ent ra th e r than to the trnde unions for se cu rity o f e m p lo y m e n t, and has aroused in the w o rk e rs leaders an acute c o n flic t over lo y a ltie s d ivid ed b etw een the firm and the trade u n io n s [3 0 :

m |.
41. I h e fo llo w in g statistic seems sig nifican t. In B rita in , the in itia tive for starting jo in t co n su ltatio n has com e from m anagem ent in ab o u t three-quarters o f all cases, and in o n ly 4 % from w o rk e rs and unions, resp e ctive ly 152: 161). T h e percentages are not susceptible to a sim ple and straig h tfo rw ard e x p lan a tio n , but basically k I th in k , they sh ow that unions are n o t interested in pressing for w o rk e rs p a rtic ip a tio n in management, 42 T h e co n clusio n is generalized, but it is o f co urse not d iffic u lt to p oint to co n crete histo rical situ atio n s that re fle ct this typ e o f process d ire c tly . I choose the G erm an w o rk s co u ncils o f the W e im a r p eriod to illu strate Ihe p oint In this co n n e ctio n , C W f G u ille b au d . their histo rian, has the fo llo w in g to sa y : T o the G erm an masses . . , the w o rk e rs co u n cils stood for the d em o c ratiz a tio n o f the ind ustrial system and the attain m e n t, in the e co n om ic sphere* o f thu same rights o f self-governm ent and self-determ ination as they thought th e y had achieved by the re vo lu tio n o f 1918 in the p o litic al sphere , . . . B u t w h e n it cam e to the practical w o rk in g out o f the basic and, to the in d ivid u al w o rk e rs , the most im p o rtan t part o f the stru ctu re - the w o rk s co u ncils tb e y found that the h u lk o f the p o litic a l leaders o f labo r were in league w ith the em plo yers to prevent any too w id e exten sion o f p ow ers to these co u n cils 14 6 ; 212-2 I 3 I The unions w ere apprehensive o f losing leadership [5 :4 1 1 and hence w ere anxious lo insure that the w o rk s co u n cils did not becom e really e ffe ctiv e ; they and their p o litic al allies, the m a jo rity S o c ia lists, w ere hacked up to the ntm o st by the em plo yers, w h o w ere at least as m uch co ncerned to fe tte r the w o rk s co u ncils and

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lo co n fin e them w ith in the o rg anization o f the unions OT the h iite r the em ployers w ere n o l afraid . , 43,. As an em pirical illustrzilion I chouse tw o nuchoritutive p ro n o u n ce m e n ts o f unions and party view s in U ritain, but e q u ivalen t exam ples could be fourld w ith o u t d iffic u lty in any o ther co u n try Ih e fo llo w in g statem ent o f M r. G u n te r during the p arlia m en tary debate on jo in t co n su lta tio n in 1950 is evaluated b y the N a tio n a l In s titu te o f In d u strial Ps yc h o lo g y as a very w e l K h xpressed trade u n io n v ie w : T h e re has been an am azing revival o f the old syn d icalist idea oT d irect w o rk e rs co n tro l in certain sections o f labor. In my o p in io n it is im possible to envisage any great develo pm en t in the sphere oT jo in t co n su ltatio n if w e im agine that this old, fuzzy idea o f w o rk e rs co n tro l can operate In the last resort m anagem ent m ust be allo w e d to manage and to m ake d ecisions, and must accept the re sp o n sib ility W hat w e seek is that th e ir decisions and p o licy shall be translated to the w o rk e rs so that rhey m ay un d e rsta n d ,th e ir objectives, and thereb y help to ensure that co o p e ra tio n w h ich cun result in m uch b ette r and hig her p ro d u c tio n 1 ca n n o t leave the trade union side w ith o u t expressing m y b e lie f that the m a jo rity o f trade un ionists do not desire to see the establishm ent o f w o rk e rs 1 co n tro l, as it is som etim es cu lle d (5 2 : 82 I . T h e L a b o u r P a r t y s 1957 p o licy d o cu m e n t on natio naliz ed ind ustries asks the q uestion , in the ch ap ter on w o rk e rs 7 p a rtic ip a tio n D ire e l R epresen tatio n ?** and answers it in the negative: The syn d icalist v ie w o f in d u stry run b y w o rk e rs, either through their trade nnions or through elected boards, was rejected b y the lab o u r m ovem eut m an y years ag o [6 1 ; 39] N o te the reference to s y n d ic a lis m in both instances 44, CT. H . A Clegg: lo d a y in d u strial d iscip lin e is a d iffe re n t m atte r in all industries from the p rew ar p eriod o f heavy u n e m p lo ym e n t. T his is o fte n said to be one o f the greatest d iffic u ltie s o f lJritish ind ustry to d ay . A t the same tim e, full e m p lo y m e n t has done m ore to m ake in d u stry m ore d em o cratic and to raise the status o f the w o rk e r than any legislation or any m achinery for jo in t co n su ltatio n could d o [ 6 2 : 7 8 ] , N ote, h o w ever, that the co n clu d in g antithesis o f Clegg is sp urio us; the causation is d iffe re n t from the one im plied D e m o c ra tiz a tio n o f the ind ustrial organization p ro d u c e d jo in t co n su lta tio n not 't h e o th e r w a y aro u nd . I f so, an oth er straig h tfo rw ard co n clu sio n follow s. O n ce generally ap plied, jo in t co n su ltatio n becom es a social in stitu tio n and ca n n o t be abolished w ith o u t social upheavals Lint n either can it be p etrified in its present form , in w h ich the a tte n tio n o f w o rk e rs is channeled to w ard w e lfare matters'; w h ile m anagem ent reserves the right to make the crucial m anagerial decisions W o rk ers w ill ve ry soon begin to insist that this to ilet d e m o c ra c y be replaced by real d em o cracy '* C . A , M ye rs u n in te n tio n a lly describes som ething o f the sorl happ ening in S w e d e n w h e n he says: But unless the co m m itte es begin to tackle real problem s , . , the sta g n a tio n m ay turn iu to disgnst and revulsion. T o ile t d e m o c ra c y , as one person described the cu rrent co n cern lo r b ette r w ashroom s, lighting, etc,, m ay su ffice fu r a tim e, b u l it is h a rd ly the ind ustrial d e m o c ra c y that the lab o r m o vem ent said it was seeking ( 5 1 : 7 1 ) . In c id e n ta lly , i f the above analysis is co rre ct, it gives tw o sim ple co n servation form ulas for the p rotagonists o f the status quo, In o rder to save p rivate capitalism , the unions m ust be recognized and helped to develop into stable b u re au cra tic o rganizations. Fu rth e r, large-scale wars must be avoided, since they d estroy capitalist social d iscipline. O f course, a certa in lim ite d am o un t o f u n e m p lo ym e n t must be m aintain ed in order to preserve discipline. A sim ilar group o f co n d itio n s applies to stale capitalist system s In o rd e r to preserve such a system , Ihe stale m ust lik ew ise avoid m ajo r w ars and the d islo ca tio n resulting from them It m ust then extend the b u re au cra tic strn clu re to the inferio rs in the large b u re au cra tic stru ctu re k n o w n as a c a m p . N a tu ra lly , a safety valve must also be p rovided in som e m ild form o f jo in t c o n su ltatio n . H o w e v e r, both rem edies have o n ly tem p o rary effects 45 D uisburger K u p fe rh u tie, w h e re the chairm an o f the w o r k e rs ' co u ncil is a m em ber o f the managing b oard, is a G erm an exam ple G la cie r M etal C o m p a n y is an o u tstan din g British exam ple T h e c o n s titu tio n o f the G la c ie r W o rk s C o u n cil says: The fu nctio ns o f the co u ncil shall be . to carry the re sp o n sib ility o f d eciding the p rin ciples and p olicies w h ic h shall govern the m anagem ent o f the fa c to ry in the light o f o p in io n s o f producers and managers, in the light o f the interest o f consum ers, shareholders, and the na tio n at large, and in the light o f total co m p an y p o lic y [3 0 : 155 1* In seeking to achieve this aim (th e m anagem ent to surrend er its arb itra ry e x e cu tive power., w h ile the w o rke rs d evelop responsible and e ffe ctive co llective decision-m aking), both m anagem ent and w o rk e rs had to o verco m e e no rm o us d iffic u ltie s resu lting from Iheir ow n learned a ltitu d e s and from the to ta lly un con gen ial in stito tio n a l setup in w h ich th e y were to a c L These d iffic u ltie s are in d ic a tive o f the p ro fo u n d changes in social

50

relations b rought about b y self-governm ent I he social and p sycho log ical changes that to o k place in the G la cie r C o m p a n y are a d m irab ly described in the T avisto ck In s litn te stu d y w ith the telling title T he Changing C u ltu re o f a F a c t o r y [3 0 ], 46 In fact, academ ic econom ists, o f both the le ft and the rig ht, are still un aw are o f its im pact C f a ch ara cte ristic fo o m o ie observation by J A S ch u m p e te r: W ild so cialisatio n s a term that lias acqu ired o ffic ia l standing are attem pts by w o rk m e n o f each plant to supersede the m anagem ent and to take m atters into their o w n bands T hese are the nig htm are o f every responsible s o c ia lis t" [ 63: 226 ]. 47 I*or in d u strial self-governm ent, see K o v a t and M iljevfc [ 1 0 1.. F o r a general discussion o f the in s titu tio n o f self-governm ent and a d escrip tio n o f self-governm ent schem es in the rest o f the system , see L G er&kovic (6 4 )

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[1 | [2 l 13 1 141 [5 | [6 | [7 1 [8 ] [9 ] [1 0 ] [1 1 ] [ 12 j [1 3 ] I 141 [1 5 ] [I6 | I 17 J [1 8 | 1 19] [ 20 J [21 | [2 2 ] J, A S ch u m p e te r Jn ip e tia lis m and S o c ia l Classes. B la ck w e ll, O x fo rd , 1951. r. Engels* "P rin c ip le s o f C o m m u n is m ,5 in E a r ly IPorfrj o f M a rx and Engels, 1 K u lm ra , Zagreb, 1953 K M arx and F Engels, Pre fa ce lo Russian E d itio n o f the M an ifesto o f the C o m m u n ist P a rty M Works, V o l X V , Parti^ d at. M o scow . 1935. K M arx, C ritiq u e o f the G o th a Pro g ram , F, En gels, C ritiq u e o f the D r a ft E r fu r t P ro g ram ] K u ltu ra , Belgrade, 1959. E F M. D urbin* The Case for S o c ia lis m ,''in Pro b le m s o f E c o n o m ic Planning, Routledgo* L o n d o n , 1949 S o c ia l Self-M anagem ent in Yugoslavia, Y u g o slav S o c io lo g y A sso ciatio n , Belgrade, 1966. M N ovak, In tro d u c tio n to the P o litica l E c o n o m y o f S o c ia lism , E c o n o m s k i p reg lcd ,\ E c o n o m ic R e v ie w ], Zagreb, 195 5. N. PaSid', P u b lic C o rp o ra tio n s in G re a t B rita in and O th e r Western Countries. K u ltu ra, Belgrade, 1957 A D ragicevic, N e ce ssa ry L a b o r an d S u rp lu s o f L a b o r, K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1957 P ICovaif and D j.M iljc v jc , S e lf'A Ian ag crn e n t o f P ro d u c e rs in E c o n o m y , Savrem ena ad n iin istrae ija [C o n te m p o ra ry A d m in is t r a t io n ], Belgrade, 1958 F Engels, A n th D lfh rin g , N ap rije d , Zagreb, 1946 B u re a u c ra c y an d T e ch n o cra cy . B o o k I edited by V. S ta n o viJic and A S lo ja n o v ic , Sedm a sila, Belgrade, 1966 B u re a u c ra c y an d T e ch n o cra cy, B o o k II. edited b y V S tJin o v iic and A . S lo ja n o v ic ; Sed m a sila, Belgrade, 1966 M Pccu jlic* Classes and C o n te m p o ra ry S o c ie ty , S avrem ena adm inistraeija, Belgrade, I 967. S . S to ja n o v ic , T h e E ta t is t ic M y th o f S o c ia lis m , Praxis. 1967* N o, |-2 B. H o rvat, The E c o n o m ic T h e o ry o f a P la n n e d E c o n o m y , K u ltu ra , Belgrade, 1961 K . M arx, E c o n o m ic and P h ilo so p h ical M anu scrip ts o f 18 4 4 ," in E a r l y W orks o f M a rx an d Engels, K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1954, II H. S C rossm an, So c ia lism an d ilte N e w D espotism , Fabian T ra c t 258, L o n d o n , 1956. R M c K e n z ie , B ritis h P o litic a l Pa ttie s, H e in e m an n , L o n d o n , 1955. W A Lew is, " T h e A d m in is tra tio n o f S o c ia list E n te rp rise s,1 in O verhead Costs. 1 A lle n and U n w in , L o n d o n , 1949 M , W eber, The T h e o ry o f S o c ia l an d E c o n o m ic O rganization, Hodge. L o n d o n , 1947. 1. Bo tto rn o re , "H ig h e r C ivil S ervants in F ra n c e , in T ran sactio n s o f the S e c o n d W o rld Congress o f S o c io lo g y . V o l I I , In te rn a tio n a l So c io lo g ic a l A sso ciatio n L o n d o n , 1954 R K Kelsull, H igher C iv il S e rv a n ts in B rita in , R o u tled g e and Kegan, L o n d o n , 1955 R Be n d ix , H ig h e r C iv il S e rvan ts in A m e ric a n S o c ie t y , U n ive rs ity o f C o lo ra d o Press, B o u ld e r, C o lo , 1949 J. D. Kin gsley t R e p re se n tativ e B u re a u c ra cy , A n tio ch Press, Y e llo w Springs. O h io , 1944., H H G ertb and C. W M ills, A M arx for the M anagers, reprin ted in R e a d e r in Bu re a u c ra cy , edited b y R K M e rto n et a I F r e e Press, G lencoe, III , 1952 S M. Lip se t, A g rarian Socialism . U n iv e rs ity o f C a lifo rn ia Press, Berkeley. 195 0 A.. 1C D a v is , B u re a u c ra tic Pattern s in the N a vy O ffic e r C o rp s , reprin ted in R e a d e r in B u r e a u c ra c y , op c it

[2 3 ] [2 4 | [ 25 | 12 6 ] [2 7 | |2 8 ]

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R K M e rto n , Bu re a u c ra tic S tru c tu re and P e rso n ality 1 ibid 1 E . Jnques, The Changing C u ltu re o f a F a c to ry , D ryd e n Press, N e w Y o r k , 1952. W . R< S h arp , The F rc n c h C iv il S ervice . B u re a u c ra c y iti Ti-ansition. M a cm illa n , N e w Y o rk, 1931 B H o rvat, E c o n o m ic s o f the Yug o slav O il In d u stry, T e h n ic k a K n jig a 1 Feehm cal Bo o k s |, Belgrade, 1962. H. Devons, Plan n in g in Practice, Cam b ridg e U n iv e rs ity Press, 1950 W, E u e k e n , On Ih e T h e o ry o f C e n tra lly A d m in iste re d E c o n o m y : A n A n a ly s is o f the G erm an E x p e r im e n t ," E c o n o m ic a , 1048. K . M arx, C ritiq u e o f Mogul's P h ilo s o p h y o f R ig h t. V Mujjlefo, S arajevo, 1960 1C M arx and F. lingels, M a n ife sto o f the C o m m u n ist P a tty . K u liu r a , Zagreb, 1948. VV T O akeshoLt, C o m m e rce an d S o c ie ty , Clurcdo n Press* O x fo rd , 1936 L. von Mises, B u re a u c ra cy , H odge. G lasg ow , 1945 W . H M o rris Jo n es, So cia lism and B u r e a u c ra c y . Tabian Tract 277, L o n d o n . 1949. K M arx, T he C iv il Wat in F ra n ce . K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1947 J* A S ch u m p ete r, H is to ry o f E c o n o m ic A nalysis. O x fo rd U n iv e rs ity Press, N e w York., 1955 F. A N e ff, E c o n o m ic Doc trines, M c G ra w - H ill, N e w Y o r k , 1950. L H H a n e y , H is to ry o f E c o n o m ic Thought. M a cm illan , N e w Y o r k , 1911 G D H. C o le , G u ild Soctalisrtt R e state d , L o n d o n , 1920. A IVo r to C o u n c il in B e in g A n A c c o u n t o f the S ch e m e in O p eratio n at B o u m c v iU e Works, Pu b lica tio n D e partm en t. B o u rn e ville W o rk s, 1921. C. W . G u ille b a n d , 77ie W orks C o u n c il Cam bridge U n iv e rs ity Press, 1928 1 ., Pribieevi, D em an d f o r W o rk ers C o n tro l in the R a i l w a y , M in in g and 3 E n g in e e rin g In d u strie s 1910*1922, d o c lo ra l thesis, N u ffie ld C ollege, O x fo rd , 1957, J, B. S e y m o u r, The W h itle y C o u n cils S ch em e, K in g, L o n d o n , 1932 C. G R e n o ld , Jo in t C o n s u lta tio n over T h irty Years, A lle n and U n w in , L o n d o n , 1950 H W o lfe , L a b o u r S u p p ly an d R e g u latio n , C lare n d o n Press, O x fo rd , 1923. C A M yers, In d u s tria l R e la tio n s in Sw eden . T e ch n o lo g y Press, C am bridge, Muss , 195 l. Jo in t C o n s u lta tio n in B ritis h In d u stry . N a tio n a l In s titu te o f In d u strial P s y c h o lo g y , S tap le s Press, L o n d o n , 1952 L a b o u n M a n a g c m e n t C o o p e ra tio n in U n ite d S ta te s War Pro d u c tio n , In te rn a tio n a l L a b o u r O ffic e , S tu d ie s and R e p o rts, N e w Series, N o 6, M o n tre a l, 1948 G S W alp o le, M a n ag e m e n t and M e n Jo n a th a n Cape, L o n d o n , 1945 W H S c o tt, J o i n t C o n su lta tio n in a L iv e rp o o l M a n u fa c tu rin g F irm , U n iv e rs ity Press oT L iv e rp o o l, 1950. W , H S c o tt, In d u s tria l L e ad ersh ip and J o i n t C o nsu lta tio n . U n iv e rs ity Press o f Live rp o o l, 1952 B ritis h Jo i n t P ro d u c tio n M a ch in e ry, In te rn a tio n a l L a b o u r O ffic e , Stu d ie s and R e p o rts, Series A N o . 43, M o n tre a l, 1944 W o rk ers' M a n ag e m e n t in Yugoslavia In te rn a tio n a l L a b o u r O ffic e , G eneva, 1962 C ongress o f W ork ers' C o u n cils o f Yugoslavia, edited b y A D eleon and L j. M ija to v ic , R a d , Belgrade, 1957 T F. M M c K it le r ie k and R D. V . R o b erts, W orkers and M anag em ent, Fabian Research Series N o 160, L o n d o n , 1953 P u b lic Enterp rise. L a b o u r's R e v ie w o f the N atio n alise d Ind ustries. Lo n d o n , 1957 H . A Clegg, In d u s tria l D e m o c ra c y at?d N a tio n a lisa tio n . B la c k w e ll, O x fo rd , 1950 J A.. S ch u m p e te r. Capitalism , So cia lism and D e m o c ra c y , H arper, N e w Y o r k , 1950 L G crS k o vic, S o c ia l M anag em ent in Yugoslavia. Savrem ena ad m inistraeija, Belgrade, 1957. R C o la k o v ic et at t R e v ie w o f the H is t o r y o f the League o f C o m m u n is ts o f Y ug o slavia In s titu te for S t u d y o f the W o rk e rs ' M o ve m e n t, Belgrade, 1963 J D uvig naud , Georges G u rv itc h : A S o c io lo g ic a l T h e o ry o f Self- M an ag em ent/ A u to g e stio n [ Self-M anagem ent ] , 1966, N o I

48] 491 50] 51 j 52] 53] 54] 55] 56] 57] 58] 59] 60] 61] 62] 63] 64] 65] 66]

52

CHAPTER II

The Transition Period and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

In the first prjrt o f this essay, an ex am inatio n was m ade o f the historical presuppositions o f our society and o f th e broad outlines o f general tendencies in its socioeconom ic developm ent. As we approach o ur situation to d ay , o u r m e th o d o f analysis m u st be changed. I t m u s t becom e m ore m in u te and detailed, and the broad generalizations m ust m o re and m o re be replaced by exam ination o f the interrelationships o f concrete events. In this co n tex t, it is first necessary to reconsider th e theory and practice o f the t r a n s i t i o n period and th e dictatorship o f the proletariat. Thereafter, in th e light o f o ur revised o rientatio n, we proceed to a n a t t e m p t t o s y s t e m a t i z e th e stages o f o u r concrete postrevolutionary developm ent, which, as we shall see, coincides with M arx s transition period.
6, T H E T R A N S IT IO N PER IO D

Once a victorious rev olution has destroyed the old capitalist order, it can no t be expected instantly to install the new socialist order. Between the tw o o rders there com es a transition period during which, by a sequence o f revolutionary changes, the capitalist system will be p u t aside, transform ed , and replaced by th e socialist system. T his is M arx s celebrated transition p erio d T h e transition period should last a short time and encom pass the m ost basic, crucial changes, such as the taking o f power, the rep la cem e nt o f the ap p a ra tu s o f governm ent, the abolition of 53

private p ro p e rty , the estab lishm ent o f a new system o f law, etc.. O f coursc, this would n o t signify th a t socialism had already been attained, but th a t a basis iiad been reached on which it could develop further. This system , to be built on a socialist fo un dation , would have to possess the characteristics of a socialist system as described by Marx and Engels: the withering away o f the state, the disappearance o f classes and ex plo itatio n , the free d ev e lopm e nt o f the h u m an personality and the unim ped ed creative m anifestation o f his individuality, and so forth. When the system th at actually developed did n o t correspond to those characteristics, a bit of sleight-of^hand was perform ed, and it was proclaimed to be socialist n o t because it was so but because, fo r exam ple, private ownership had been done away with. A t the same time a tendency appeared to treat socialism as a transition period. On th a t basis it becam e possible to apply M arxs thesis of the revolutionary dictatorship o f the proletariat n o t to the transition period b u t to socialism as a whole. The last act o f this revision o f M arxs th o u g h t consisted in interpreting the dictatorship o f the proletariat as a form of e x e r c i s i n g rule, i.e., as a violent, un d em o cratic, political dictatorship (and n o t as the class c o n te n t o f the state o f th at period). T hereby Marxism was definitively stood on its head, and any thing th at reinforced the p ow er o f the bureaucracy could be presented as a socialist measure; u n d er the influence o f these pragmatic actions, socialism o ften took on a c o n te n t th a t was alien and, in m any respects, antithetical to the original socialism o f Marx F o r these reasons, it will be well to try to give a short ac coun t o f the original position o f Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the problem o f the transition period.
M arx, E ngels, and Lenin 011 the T ransition Period

In o rd e r to have a correct in terp re tatio n of the position of Marx and Engels on the transition period, it would be necessary to give a f u l l and exhaustive a c c o u n t o f its historical developm ent. C onsiderations of space com pel us to limit our historical a c co u n t to a sketch. As early as in th e D eutsch-F ranzosische Jahrbitcher, Marx designated the proletariat as the bearer o f socialism. The idea o f the con q u e st o f p ow er by the proletariat is expressed especially clearly in The C o m m u n ist M anifesto. T here it is shown to be a necessary consequence o f the class struggle in capitalist society, Marx and Engels say: . . the first step in the revolution by the working class is to 54

raise th e proletariat to the p osition of ruling class T h e pro letariat will use its political suprem acy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instru m en ts o f p ro d u c tio n in the hands o f the state (i.e., the pro letariat organized as th e ruling class), and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible [ 1: 27] . Here (as elsewhere in th e M a n ifesto ) no thing con crete is said concerning the fu ture com m unist society, b u t only a statem en t, in the m ost general outlines, of the im m ediate problem s and perspectives of the fu tu re d evelopm ent of society. T h e co n dition s had n o t y et com e in to being for an y th in g m o re concrete. A lthough the term d ictatorsh ip of' th e p ro le ta ria t is n o t used in the above citation (o r elsewhere in the M a n ifesto ), th at is what is involved. M eanwhile (in 1848) revolution had broken o u t in France and spread to all o f Europe. Marx and Engels to o k an active part in the revolution and m ade a careful analysis of it. Now the concept, which had been wanting, finally crystallized. In his Class Struggles in France fr o m 1 8 4 8 to 1850 (w ritten in 1850), Marx wrote: T he bourgeoisie forced the Paris proletariat into the Ju n e uprising. . .. . T h e n . the bold slogan o f the revolutionary struggle appeared: O verthrow o f th e bourgeoisie! D ictatorship o f t h e w o r k i n g c l a s s .1" ( M a r x s emphasis). This socialism (re v o lu tio n a ry B.H.) is an a n n o u n c e m e n t o f p e rm a n e n t revolution, is class d ictatorship of the proletariat as an essential transitional stage tow ard the elim ination o f class differences in general, tow ard the destru c tio n o f all p ro d u c tio n relations on which these differences are fo u n d e d , to w ard the abolition o f all social relations th a t correspond to these p ro d u c tio n relations, tow ard the o verthrow o f th e entire ideology arising from these socialist relation s [ 1: 133], A nd in his fam ous l e tte r to W eydem eyer, dated March 5, 1852, Marx said: What I did that was new was to prove: 1) th a t the existence o f classes is only b o u n d up w ith p articular historical phases in the d evelop m ent o f p ro d u c tio n , 2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the d icta to rsh ip o f the proletariat (M arxs emphasis), and 3) that this dictatorship itself only con stitutes the transition (my emphasis B.H.) to the abolition o f all classes and to a classless society [ 3 ] . Here for the first tim e the qu estio n is clearly and explicitly raised o f the transition period and o f the political organization corresponding to it, the dictatorship o f the proletariat, and the c o n te n t o f that transition period is outlined in a general form. 55

A n ything m ore con crete a b o u t the transition period could only be said on the basis of analysis o f practical experience, if it were no t to be m ere speculation. Since 1848 was followed by a t w e n t y - y e a r period o f relatively peaceful dev elo p m e n t o f capitalism, Marx did n o t concern himself, during th at period, with the problem of the transition period, Tn 1871 a new revolution b ro k e o u t in France, whose practical results (above all, those o f the Paris C o m m u n e ) provided a wealth o f material for fu rth e r theoretical generalization. Marx and Engels, o f course, followed and analyzed the course o f events with great c a r e . T h e im m e d ia te result of this analysis were M arxs addresses, published u n d e r the title of The Civil Wai in Prance, In th a t work, Marx describes the C o m m u n e as follows: Its true secret was this It was essentially a working-class governm ent, the result of' the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form, at last discovered, by which the econom ic em ancipation o f labor could be achieved, that is, th at all becom e workers, and productive w ork ceases to belong to a certain class [ 1: 481 ]. The decrees of the C o m m u n e show w hat co ncrete practical measures had to be taken in o rd e r to realize those ends: a co m m u nal adm inistration of the state was set up, the factories w ere tu rn ed over to be managed by w orkers associations, the old oppressive m achinery o f state had to be dem olished and replaced by w o rk e rs officials and deputies, and p ro te c tio n against the new bureaucracy was needed by insuring th a t it was con stantly under co ntro l by the masses, by having all officials replaced at fixed periods, and by having the highest salaries in the bu reaucracy no higher than the wages o f a worker, A nd the bureau cracy itself, all t h e a u th o ritativ e m achinery o f state, becom es increasingly superfluous T o the degree that anarchy o f social p ro d u c tio n disappears, Engels added som e years later, com pleting the analysis m ade by him and Marx, the political a u th o rity o f the state will also w ith er a w ay [1: 145] ,. With this, the p ro blem o f the transition period was fully solved. But it received its classic form u lation som e years later in M arxs C ritique o f the G otha Program, w ritten in 1875 and published in 1 8 9 1 . Q u o ta tio n s from this w o rk are m isin terp reted w ith rem arkable persistence. M arxs classical d efinition o f the transition period is as follows: B etween capitalist and c o m m u n ist society lies the period o f the revolutionary transfo rm atio n o f the o n e into the o ther. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be no th in g but the revo lu tio n a ry dictatorship o f the 56

p ro le ta ria t [ 4 : 3 5 ] . . This s ta te m e n t is o fte n interpreted as m eaning that com m unism is a second phase following a period o f socialism, intervening b etw een capitalism and com m unism . However, by com m unism Marx m eans a so cioeconom ic system different from the capitalist system, so that socialism, too. is com m unism in fact, its lower stage, as Marx defines it several pages earlier (p. 24). C om m unism and socialism differ in the degree o f their ec onom ic m a tu rity (Lenin), but are not diffe rent systems. It might be said, as a rough image, that they differ so m ew hat as free com petitive capitalism differs from m o n o p o ly capitalism. lu s t as it w ould be ridiculous to contrast m o n o p o ly capitalism to feudalism, and to say th at the capitalism o f free com p etitio n co n stitu tes a transition period from feudalism to m o n o p o ly capitalism, so it w ould be ridiculous to im p u te such a distinction to Marx with reference to com m unism . In his C ritique o f the G otha Program, Marx invariably contrasts capitalism and com m unism with the u tm o st clarity, and m akes it clear th at tw o phases m ay be distinguished in the fu tu re system socialism and com m unism and th at betw een th at system and capitalism there lies a transition period in which the state takes the form o f the dictatorsh ip o f the p roletariat It clearly follows, therefore, that u n d e r socialism there no longer is a dictatorship o f the proletariat, there are no classes or class explo itatio n , etc., and S talins idea o f the d ictato rship o f th e proletariat u n d e r socialism is no thin g b u t an anti-Marxist thesis, one m ore featu re o f his r e a c t i o n a r y s t a t e - c a p i t a l i s t ideology, in which the term dictatorship o f the proletariat really m eans the dictatorship o f the bureaucracy. However, some passages in the C ritique may give rise to som e confusion. Thus, o n p . 22 Marx says: VVhat we have to deal with here is no t a com m u nist society th a t has dev elo p ed on its ow n foundations, but, on the con tra ry, that has ju s t em erged from capitalist society and th at is thus, in every respect, econom ically, morally, and intellectually, still stam ped with the birthm arks o f the old society from w hose w om b it em erges. Even now this principle is interpreted as meaning: these traces in socialism have to be wiped o ut; hence socialism is a transition period. Several lines earlier, however, Marx speaks of' the society just emerging from capitalism as being a society based on co m m u nal principles, in which producers d o n o t exchange their p ro d u c ts , in which the category o f value no longer applies. A nd as regards the traces, they will persist even after society has progressed deep into co m m un ism . F ro m a later te x t it appears that the ec onom ic vestiges o f capitalism consist in the fact that 57

productive capacity is n o t far enough developed to satisfy all needs. The moral vestiges consist in the fact th a t people will n o t im m ediately learn to w ork fo r society w ith o u t any standards o f law [Lenin, C ollected W orks} , and th a t the existence of the state will continu e t o r a long time u n d e r co m m un ism , having the func tion o f maintaining bourgeois law ( to all according to their w o rk ), which in turn signifies that for the com plete withering away o f the state, com plete com m unism is re q u ire d { ib id ). T he spiritual vestiges consist in the fact th at th e co ntradictio n betw een intellectual and m anual labor will co ntinue to exist, which is one of th e main sources of present social inequ ality and which will only disappear in the second stage o f com m unist society (ib id : 440). It turn s o u t th at w ha t is actually involved is com m u nist society, and n o t a transitional period. In regard to this, Lenin says in his S ta te a n d R ev o lu tio n What is usually called socialism was term ed by Marx the first or low er phase o f com m un ist society. Insofar as the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n becom e c o m m o n p ro p e rty , the w ord co m m u n ism is also applicable here, providing we d o n o t forget th a t this is n o t c o m p l e t e c o m m u n i s m . T h e great significance o f M arxs explanations is th at here, too, he consistently applies materialist dialectics, the theory of developm ent, regarding com m un ism as som ething which develops o u t o f capitalism . , . In its first phase , . . com m un ism ca n n o t as y e t be fully ripe econom ically, entirely fr e e fr o m traditions and rem n a n ts o f capitalism (m y emphasis B.H.), H ence th e interesting p h e n o m e n o n that com m unism in its first phase retains the narrow h orizo n o f bourgeois rig h t etc. [Vol 25: 4 4 2 ] , Then w hat o f the transition period? Why is it n o t emphasized in M arxs general view, b u t is instead passed over, o r lias to be supplied implicitly? It will be seen from th e q u o ta tio n s above, and from L e n in s in terp re tatio n , th a t Marx simply was thinking o f socialism and spok e o f a transition period prior to it. It would seem th a t Marx and Engels th ou g h t o f the transition period as m uch sh o rter than is the case in present-day practice. T he difference is all the greater in view o f the fact th at the socialist revolution bro ke o u t in relatively backward countries, where this transition period objectively had to last longer in any case: it was necessary, u n d e r the dictatorship o f the proletariat, to build u p the industrial potential and organization of p ro d u c tio n which advanced co un tries had b uilt up u nd er the dictatorship o f the bourgeoisie. T h a t is w hy it is no accident th at there should be the following difference betw een th e term inologies o f Engels and Lenin. In a preface, w ritten in 1891, to a w ork of Marx, Engels 58

says: A new social o rd e r is attainable, an o rd e r in which to d a y s class differences will disappear, and in which, a fter perhaps a b rie f (m y emphasis B.H.) transition period which will be linked with certain deprivations b u t w hich, from a moral p o in t of view, will be very useful, the m eans o f life, o f enjoym en t, o f developm ent and of the application o f all physical and spiritual capability will, in increasing abundance, be universally available. This will result from the planned use and fu rth e r developm ent o f the already existing en o rm o u s productive forces o f all m em bers o f society, along w ith th e equal obligation o f all to w o rk [ 1: 5 2 ]. While Engels says th at the socialist ec on om y , even if it should not be in stitu ted in an instant, will still come to pass after a short period, Lenin gave the following interp re tatio n in 1919, that is, a fte r the transitional period had already been in existence for two years: This aim (socialism, th a t is, the elim ination o f classes and of ex plo itation B.H.) canno t be achieved all at once; it requires a su ffic ie n tly lo n g transition period from capitalism to socialism and therefore, since the reorganization of p ro d u c tio n is a difficult m atter, and because time is needed for a fund a m e n tal change in all fields o f life, and because the great powers are used to a bourgeois and petty-bourgeois adm inistration , it can be attain ed only in a long persistent struggle. Therefore, Marx speaks o f the entire p erio d o f the dictatorship o f the proletariat as a period of transition from capitalism to socialism [6: 401 ] A nd a year earlier, in Jan u a ry 1918, Lenin writes: , . , the transition from capitalism to socialism requires long birth pains, a long p erio d o f th e dictatorship o f the proletariat, the destruction of all that is old, the ruthless elim ination o f all form s o f capitalism, the coo pe ratio n o f th e workers o f all countries who m ust un ite all th eir efforts to ensure final v i c to ry ( Speech at Third All-Russian Congress o f Soviets, C ollected W orks, Vol, 26: 42 9) (m y emphasis B.H,). Lenin expresses himself similarly in o th e r works; som etim es he even speaks o f the epoch o f the dictatorship o f the p ro leta riat, as will be broug ht o u t later by further citations. T he above statem en ts by Lenin give bo th the definition and the d u ra tio n of the transition period. O f course, all his ex pectatio n s related to the backward cou n try that Russia was. This brief accoun t of th e principal statem en ts o f Marx and Engels regarding the transition period would be incom plete w ith o u t special m en tio n of L en in s in terp re tatio n o f those statem ents, o f which we have already spoken in the course o f the 59

exposition.. Lenin expressed his view on these premises m o st fully in his S ta te and R e v o lu tio n , which aims precisely at giving a correct in te rp re ta tio n of th e position o f the classics. It is unnecessary at this point to cite all o f Lenins prop ositio ns; some have already been n oted and o th ers will be given later. We will only rem ark th a t Lenin, by way o f a correct in terpretatio n, inverts M arxs s ta te m e n t in the C ritique o f the. G otha Program, speaking o f the transition period betw een capitalism and c o m m u n is m (M arxs last form u lation o f this principle); there Marx only says th a t tw o phases m ay be distinguished in that futu re com m unism , In o th e r writings Lenin speaks very precisely o f the transition period as the historical period betw een a capitalism th at has been defeated, but has no t y et disappeared, and a socialism th a t has begun b u t has n o t yet been attained. We cite som e o f the statem ents. In his article F u tu r e Tasks o f Soviet A u th o ritie s (1 9 1 8 ), he wrote: Unless we are anarchists, we m ust accept the necessity o f the state, th at is, coercion, fo r the period from capitalism to socialism [Vol. 26: 2 3 8 ]. In the already cited passage from Greetings to Hungarian W orkers (19 1 9 ), Lenin says th at the abolition o f classes and class exploitatio n ca n n o t be achieved at o n c e and th a t it requires a sufficiently long t r a n s i t i o n period from capitalism to socialism! [ 6 : 4 0 1 ] . A ccording to this, socialism is already a classless society, and the task o f the transitional period is to liquidate class exploitation. This is also w hat Lenin says in his article Econom ics and Politics in the Epoch (!) o f the D ictatorship o f the P ro letariat, when he writes: Classes remain and will co ntin ue to rem ain during the epoch (!) of the dictato rship o f the proletariat. D ictatorship will be unnecessary when classes d isapp ear They will n o t disappear w ith o u t a dictato rsh ip of the p ro leta riat [6: 4 49 ] . A t the Third All-Russian Congress o f Soviets, Lenin said: There is n o t a single socialist ....... w ho would n o t ad m it the obvious tru th that betw een socialism and capitalism there is a long (!) m ore or less difficult transition period o f the dictatorship o f the proletariat, and th at this period in its form s will depend greatly on w h e th e r small o r large ow nership, small o r large cultures, p re d o m in a te [Vol. 26: 4 1 5 ] , And to conclude: one q u o ta tio n in which he rejects as un-Marxist - w ith the u tm o s t clarity - the assertion that there is no transition period betw een capitalism and socialism (which would have to be the conclusion if socialism is identified w ith the transition period). Criticizing Rykov, Lenin declared at a party conference in 1917: C o m rade R y k o v says th at there is no transition period betw een capitalism and socialism. T h at is not

60

correct. It is a d e p a rtu re from M arxism [Vol 24: 2 1 6 ]. Lenin is consistent in his tre a tm e n t o f this question. He presents th e same co nceptio n in all his w orks, m aking fu rth e r citation superfluous.
Current Q uestions

The preceding discussion lias dealt chiefly with the correct in te rp re ta tio n o f M arxs statem ents, We m ust now go on to discuss some problem s arising o u t of present-day conditions. We have already posed one basic question: what is M arxs transition period? It is the period o f social developm ent between t h e c a p i t a l i s t socio eco m om ic system and the com m unist socioeconom ic system. When does this transition period begin, and how long does it last? 1 think this question might be answered as follows: the transition period begins with the political revolution, in which the working class takes power, and it comes to an end with the ec onom ic re v o lu tio n ,1 i e., by the co m p lete reorganization o f the eco no m y on cooperative principles (Marx). O f course, w hat we call the political and ec onom ic revolutions are tw o sides o f a single process o f p e rm a n e n t revolu tio n (Marx and Lenin), the tran sfo rm atio n o f class society into classless society, o f a chaotic anarchic econ om y in to one that is consciously guided and p lanned. When, as the result o f so cioeconom ic developm ent, the p oint of socialist revolution is reached in a cou n try and the working class takes pow er there, it uses th a t p o w e r to co n d u c t revolutionary changes in the econom y o f its co u n try , creating the conditions for its own liquidation and for the creation of a com m unist society. This, then, is the task o f the d ictatorship o f the proletariat. Lenin said the following o n this subject in 1922: So long as classes exist, a class struggle is inevitable. In the transition period from capitalism to socialism, the existence o f classes is inevitable, and the program o f the RKP says quite definitely that we are taking only the first steps from capitalism to socialism. Therefore, b o th the C o m m un ist Party and the Soviet authorities, as well as the labor unions, have an obligation to accept openly th e existence o f the econom ic struggle and its inevitability until such time as there is at least basic electrification o f industry and agriculture, until small farms and control by the m ark et are cut o u t at the ro o ts [8: 7 4 6 ]. The transition period is one o f fierce struggle with the residue of the old capitalist socioeconom ic system , a struggle in which the 61

triu m p h o f th e new social order w ill o nly be assured after co m p le te tra nsform ation o f th e so c ie ty 's economy.. T he seizure o f pow er, b y itself, does n o t assure the trium ph o f socialism a n d the im p o ssib ilty o f restoration, as is shown by the case of the USSR, a case the classics did no t foresee (nam ely, the possibility th at the w orkers party w ould win p o w e r and rem ain in pow er, and yet arrive a t a restoration or, m ore precisely, at p e rp etu atio n of the class system). It had seemed (and m any still believe so) th at coun terrevo lution could begin and go forward only by virtue of the old o rd e r and fo r the purpose o f restoring th a t o rd e r O n that account, a tte n tio n was devoted exclusively to the fight against the elem ents o f the old order. It turned o u t, however, th a t the main danger to the successful revolution came from a n o th e r direction. In that sense, as Lj. Tadic observes, the history o f Stalinism is the classic m o del o f co u n terrev o lu tio n in socialism " ( m y em phasis B H.) And Maoism, we see, reinforces this m odel. What, th en, are the criteria for co m m u n ism to be actually built a fte r th e political revolution in a given co un try? If the dictatorship o f th e p roletariat in a co u n try shows a tendency to retain the state and even to reinforce it, to m ake a fetish o f political a u th o rity , then it evidently is n o t perform ing its task, which consists in the withering away of political functions; it is transform ed from th e dictatorship o f the proletariat to its opposite, th e dictatorship over the proletariat, the d ictato rsh ip of' the bureaucracy over the people Marx, and Lenin a fte r him , speak o f th e transition period only in con nectio n w ith the proletarian state in o th e r words, o n ly as m u ch organized (i e , g o v e rn m e n t) in terve n tio n in th e ec o n o m y as is n eed ed to rem ove the capitalist fe tte r s This evidently leads to an e c o n o m y in which th a t organized force is no longer necessary in the b attle against capitalist survivals. After th e successful conclusion o f the political revolution, the state takes into its hands th e fun dam ental p ortion o f th e means o f'p ro d u c tio n , and during a short period o f state socialism creates the preco n d itio n s for turning them over to associations o f direct prod ucers for transfo rm ation o f state p ro p e rty in to ow nership by the people as a w h o le [Kidric, 9: 6 ] , A t the same time, by m eans o f a steady re in forcem ent of planning elem ents in the balances o f the ec o n o m y as a whole, a process is begun o f rapid elim ination o f anarchy in p ro d u c tio n and o f its result, ec onom ic imbalance inherited from capitalism. On this m atter, Engels says: T o the degree to which anarchy in social p ro d u c tio n disappears, the political a u th o rity o f the state is w e a k e n e d [10: 3 0 0 ]. The fu rther this process goes forw ard, the less the state intervenes in 62

the econom ic life o f the co u n try ; the associations o f direct producers begin to con du ct the e c o n o m y directly by m eans of higher associations o f producers; class differences disappear; labor p rod uctivity increases trem e n d o u sly ; the entire ec on om y is so organized th a t political coercion on the part o f the state loses its goal and withers away S o ciety , says Engels in his classic passage on the withering away o f the state, which will newly organize p ro d u c tio n on the basis of a free and equal association o f producers, will p u t the state m achinery where it belongs: in a m useum , along with the distaff and the bronze a x e , And this m eans th a t the ec onom ic revolution as well has been won, th a t the transition period is over, th a t the d o m in a n t factors in the eco nom y are the elem ents o f a new social order, a classless society, com m unism . N ow the resto ration o f a society o f class exp loitation is as impossible as, say, the restoration o f the system o f slavery un der capitalism. The cou n try in which the first socialist revolution to o k place, the Soviet U nion, w ent along the p ath described above, but stopped a t the first step, nationalization o f the means o f pro du c tio n , so that the transition period developed into a new class system . The party-governm ent apparatus, which had initiated the reform , set itself apart, in a po sition o f independence with respect to the proletariat and o t h e r strata o f society T he stronger th e governm ent executive apparatus becom es in general, the m ore in d ep en d e n t [it is] o f the working class and the working masses, E, Kardelj generalizes, the m ore it will tu rn into a separate social force tending to m aintain and fu rth e r develop state-capitalist form s and relationships. In o th e r words, u nder these co n d itions the proletarian i evolution itself produces a fo rc e t h a t d e g e n e r a t e s to th e level o f th e despotism o f the state-capitalist bureaucracy [11: 2 8 4 ]. 'Thus, in the USSR, failure to com plete the ec onom ic revolution prevented the advance o f the political revolution, and this fact is an excellent illustration of their interrelationship, The foregoing acco unt also settles the m ore or less scholastic questions o f th e con stru c tio n o f socialism, the transition to com m unism , etc. The socialist revolution gets rid of the pow er o f the bourgeoisie, and society begins to build socialism. The term o f socialism m a y b e e x te n d e d even to this period, in the sense th a t it is no longer a m a tte r o f fu r th e r developing the old social system , capitalism , b u t o f beginning th e in stitu tio n o f a new social system , socialism, it is a socialism th a t is o nly beginning, to be sure, bu t th at is why we speak o f socialism and n ot o f capitalism in 63

co nnection with it.. In this regard, Lenin noted at the Third All-Russian Congress o f Soviets: . We have only begun the period of transition (m y emphasis - B H.J to socialism; we have n o t yet reached it. You will be correct if you say that o u r republic is a socialist republic o f the Soviet, Y ou will also be right along with those w ho call m any republics in the West d em ocratic, although everyone kn ow s that there is n o t o n e o f even the m ost d em o cratic republics th at is com pletely d e m o c r a tic .........T hat is ho w we are now . We are far even from the point where we would be ending the transition period from capitalism to socialism. We have never deceived ourselves with the h op e th a t we shall end this period w ith o u t the help o f the international proletariat. We have never had any illusion a b o u t this and we k n o w h ow difficult is the p ath leading from capitalism to socialism, and we are obliged to say th at o ur Soviet republic is socialist because th a t is th e p ath we have taken , . [Vol. 26: 4 2 2 ] , It was also in th at sense, in m y opinion, that Marx implicitly m e a n t to include the transition period in socialism, as has been suggested in the form o f q uestions attac h ed to an earlier qu o tatio n . This is a co nception th at is, o f course, com pletely different from the co nception th a t socialism is reduced to the transition period, i.e., th a t they are identical, As for the con stru c tio n o f socialism, we have referred to this earlier T he same applies to the qu estio n o f the transition to the higher phase o f co m m unism . Indeed, socialism is the same thing as com m unism , no m ore and no less, e x c ep t that in socialism the i n s u f f i c i e n t d evelopm en t o f productive potential m akes it i m p o s s i b l e to use the direct ap p ro p riatio n o f objects o f co nsum ptio n, and it is still necessary to m easure labor and confirm its effectiveness in o rd e r to ob tain criteria for d istribu tion o f the means of' subsistence. T he m ore the p ro d u c tio n forces rise, the greater the e x te n t to which cond itio ns will be established econom ic and others for the transition to distribution according to needs, th at is, com m un ist distribution. At this p oint an o th e r question arises: why do we speak at all ab out the transition period from capitalism to com m unism , while we do n o t speak o f transition periods betw een o th er social systems? The reason is that we consider the transition period w ith o u t separating it from the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, In all previous social system s the new class came to pow er only a fte r it had b ecom e m aster o f th e c o u n tr y s econo m y, after it had becom e the ow ne r o f the means o f p rod uction. But in 64

the socialist revolution the proletariat com es to p ow er just because it does n o t possess the m eans of production.. In ail previous systems the political revolution precedes the ec onom ic revolution,. Finally, the difference is that the presocialist evolution o f society to o k place co m p le te ly sp o ntaneo usly, before consciousness was involved, whereas with the appearance o f socialism people begin to c o n tro l their social development.. At the o u ts e t there are only unsure efforts, but the course o f d ev elo pm ent is m ore and m ore in the direction of consciousness determ inin g being, when, as Engels says, people themselves, with full consciousness, m ake their ow n h isto ry . when social causes th a t men set in m o tio n will yield pred o m in a n tly , and in increasing measure, the desired effect [10: 300], These basic differences m ust n o t be lost sight of' in defining M a r x s term o f the transition period from capitalism to com m unism . In po in t of' fact, there are always periods o f transition betw een social systems; there is never a sharply delim ited boundary. But it would be a serious m istake to identify this transition with M arx s transition period, which is n o t merely a transition bu t a very particular transition, The theoretical sense of the Marxian transition period may be stated roughly as follows: During the transition period, the step is m ade from class to classless society. B ut this does n o t m ean th a t all the traces o f class society are elim inated; this occurs o nly u n d er socialism. A nd ju st because socialism is already a classless society, it is n o t a transition to com m unism but is itself com m unism , its first phase. N o r is the liquidation o f the last residues o f class society economic, m oral, and spiritual (Marx) - a higher step upw ard, since the basic class category, ex plo itatio n , is already liquidated during the transition period, just as the basic econom ic category o f all p re com m unist systems is also liquidated, nam ely, the chaos and anarchy of production,. T otal liquidation o f chaos in the econo m y, which would m ean th a t consciousness totally d eterm ined being, will never be achieved, that is, it is an eternal process th at will rem ain even u n d e r com p lete com m u nism , and even a fte r it; but we can speak o f th a t liquidation to the e x te n t that the process has already (and alre ad y refers to a period o f a tendency) begun, and insofar as it m eans a step th a t is com p leted in the transition period. O ne further rem ark: i f com m unism is n o t regarded as the system th a t takes the place o f capitalism, which grows directly o u t of capitalism (M arx), which is the next stage in the d evelopm ent o f hu m an society, b u t is regarded as the end o f a 65

period o f develop m ent and as such is contrasted to the previous class epoch, then socialism also takes on a different meaning; it ceases to be the low er phase o f co m m unism and remains a transition period from class society to classless society, But these are static abstractions, which contrast to ta l class society to to ta l classless society, co nceptions that in m y opinion are foreign to Marx and Marxism. F o r a theory o f developm ent such as M arxs, the question o f to tality w ith o u t exception and w ith o u t traces o f the previous state can never arise, since even w hen the new quality appears in the course of develop m ent, it appears while elem ents o f the old and elem ents of the new are b oth present; the new is defined as the d o m in a n t characteristic, as w hat is basic. The change in this basic factor already m eans a change in quality, regardless of' w h e th e r the traces o f the previous conditions are already com pletely elim inated. C onsequ ently, socialism, with its traces, is already a classless society, co m m unism , and n o t a transition to com m unism . T h i s M a r x i a n co n c ep tio n o f the transition period was supplem ented by Lenin, w ho defined state capitalism (u nd er Soviet rule!) as a transitional phase o f the organization of social p ro d u c tio n , in the direction of socialism. How Lenin conceived o f that state capitalism, which would be the ec onom ic aspect o f the transition period ju st as the dictatorship o f the proletariat was the political aspect, will be seen from som e statem en ts by him, cited below. In polemicizing w ith Bukharin at the session o f the All-Union Central Executive C om m ittee, April 29, 1918, Lenin said: Bukharin says that there ca n n o t be state capitalism u n d er Soviet authority, This is obvious nonsense There is a whole series of' enterprises and institutes th at are u n der Soviet au th o rity and belong to the state, which itself shows the transition from capitalism to socialism. . . We ca n n o t help raising the questio n of' state capitalism and socialism, o f how to behave in the transition period here, with a Soviet a u th o rity we have a bit of capitalism and a bit of socialism existing to g e th e r [Vol. 27: 2 7 5 ] . Three years later, in an article On the T ax in K in d, Lenin wrote: The m ore we are unable to achieve a direct transition from small p ro d u c tio n to socialism, the m ore capitalism is inevitable in a certain measure as a sp on tan eou s p ro d u c t of' small p ro d u c tio n and trade, and the m ore we are obliged to use capitalism (specifically directing it along the tracks o f state capitalism) as an intervening link betw een small p ro d u c tio n and socialism, as a m eans, a p a th , a m a n n e r o f increasing p ro d u c tio n forces [ 8 : 7 0 0 - 7 0 1 ] . In the same year, Lenin said th a t 66

 private interest, private interestedness, econom ic calculation m ust be em ployed at first as an essential bridge, leading, in the lands o f small peasants, through state capitalism to socialism [8: 7 3 6 ] . It is characteristic th a t these statem en ts by Lenin, in which he supplem ents M arxs co n c ep tio n of the transition period and makes it m o re concrete, com e in th e period a fte r the O c to b e r revolution. He m akes the same p o in t to us in his re p o rt at the 1 1th Congress o f the RKP{b) in 1922: . . . there {in the old books B.H.) we can read a b o u t the state capitalism that occurs in capitalism, but there is n o t a single b o o k a b o u t state capitalism that comes with com m unism . N o t even Marx rem em bered to write a w ord on this and he died w ith o u t leaving one precise q u o ta tio n or instruction.,,, T h a t is w hy we m u st n ow find o u r o w n w a y [8: 765] . By that time even B ukharin had becom e aware o f the possibility of the form a tio n o f state capitalism and with it, class exp loitation u nd er the Soviet p o w er The following excerpt is highly illustrative: O f great im po rtan ce is the questio n o f the transition perio d from capitalism to socialism, i e., the period o f the dictatorship o f the proletariat. The working class, at the m o m e n t o f its victory, is n o t a uniform m ass.......... It wins at a time when p ro d u c tio n has declined and the material insecurity o f the broad masses has increased. This ca n n o t b u t lead to the appearance o f a ten d en c y to d eg e n era tion , that is, the fo rm a tio n o f a managerial stratum in the form o f a ru d im en tary class [12: 182] . B ukharin expected th at this tendency tow ard restoration o f class society would be paralyzed by the g row th of the p ro d u c tio n forces and the abolition o f the m o n o p o ly o f education. What happened, however, was th at the bureaucracy consolidated itself m uch m ore quickly th an the forces developed that could be able to co ntrol it o r p reven t its form ation , Eight years later, in 1930, the well-know n Soviet revolution ary , K. Rakovskii (w h o soon perished in th e Stalin purges), could only observe: F ro m a proletarian state with bureaucratic deform ations, as Lenin defined the political form o f o u r state . . . we are developing into a bureaucratic state w ith p r o l e t a r i a n com m un ist rem nants. Before o u r eyes a large ruling class has been, and is still, developing which has its ow n internal subdivisions that constantly grow and m ultiply by co-opting those interested, and with the aid o f direct and indirect ap pointm ents. , . . As the fo un d a tio n o f these original classes, there is also original private ow nership, th at is. ow nership by the state au th o rities [12: 196] T h e foregoing citations are also of' interest as evidence that 67

p ro m in en t Soviet revolutionaries were aware of the danger of the degeneration o f the dictatorship o f the proletariat into a dictatorship over the proletariat, the danger o f p erp e tu a tio n of class society. T hey tried to fight against the danger, blit were n o t successful. T he pressures from an undeveloped e c o n o m y and, corresponding to that, an undeveloped social consciousness were too great, The huge steam roller o f objectively cond itio ned statism overcam e the subjective forces th a t tried to co ntro l it.
T he T ransition Period and S ta te C apitalism

O u r survey could be ended here. H istory shows th at state capitalism is in fact the best material prep aration for socialism .... the step ! o n the staircase o f history b etw een which and the step c a l l e d s o c i a l i s m . . . there are 1 1 0 interm ediate step s [L e n in ,5 ,V o L 2 5 :5 3 3 ]. And th at is why countries that have earned o u t the revolution before they have passed through th at stage go through the phase o f state capitalism u n d e r c o m m u n ism . O n the o th e r hand, countries th at have passed thro ug h or are arriving at com plete state capitalism u n d er capitalism (at present, the most developed capitalist countries) have already gone th rou gh their transition p e rio d before the revolution and, u n d er their capitalist shell, show m any features of' the future socialist society. In the first case, the political revolution precedes the econom ic revolution; in the second, ec onom ic evolution precedes the political. Characteristic o f b o th phases is th a t the tw o c o m p o n en ts n e e d e d f o r t h e design o f socialism are n o t co-existent. Accordingly, it is p ro b a b ly b etter, in b o th cases, n o t to speak o f a transition period, b u t of the d evelo pm en t o f an auxiliary intersystem , state capitalism, etatism . However, in the event th a t a co u n try has sim ultaneously attained the requisite ec onom ic and political m atu rity , it can in a relatively short time certainly w i t h i n t h e l i f e t i m e o f a single generation carry out sim ultaneously the political and econom ic tran sfo rm atio n o f tire fo rm er capitalist system in to the socialist system ; and in that case we can speak o f a transition period. I thin k it can be said th a t the p ostrevolutionary d evelopm en t o f Yugoslavia is a classic instance o f the transition period. The test for distinguishing betw een state capitalism and M arxs transition period consists in the establishm ent o f the process of the withering away of the state. Insofar as a given social structure develops in the direction o f state capitalism, it is impossible, o f course, to speak o f the w ithering away o f the state; on the co ntrary, the state grows stronger and pen etrates every pore of 68

social life. S tate capitalism, like every class system , has its ruling class. This is the bureaucracy. In o u r analysis o f the origin o f bureaucracy, we saw th a t the state bureaucracy is never confined only to the official apparatu s This is and was the basic weakness of Webers analysis. Bureaucracy is always class-tinged; the officials are always s o m e o n e officials. In fully developed state s capitalism, tw o otherw ise diverse groups the professional politicians, w ho are the bearers o f pow er, and the officials merge com pletely to form a single bureaucracy. This is the well-known process o f the fusing o f the state and p a rty apparatus into a single total bureaucratic m onopoly, State capitalism, even if not in its ex trem e forms, seems to be a necessary stage in the d ev elo pm ent o f social systems.. F o r this reason the p ion eer socialist revolutions (and capitalist evolution) ended up in th a t system , and only countries th a t appeared later Yugoslavia, for exam ple had any chance o f avoiding it. But state capitalism is no t a petrified system . Like liberal capitalism, it bears within it the m o to r o f its o w n d estruction . It is n o t any new class that will be its grave-digger b u t the loss o f functionality by the bureaucracy as the ruling class, as a result o f which it will be simply elim inated o r absorbed in the course of developm ent. This fact o f evolution was n o te d by Mihajlo Markovic, w ho concludes in a pow erful passage: T he battle o f th e bureaucracy to retain its privileged status in postcapitalist society creates, at the same time, th e con dition s for its disappearance In o rd e r to give the illusion of speaking for th e progressive forces o f society, it converts in to the main p urpose of the revolutionary m ov em en t w hat were the m eans o f carrying it o u t: industrialization, increased p roductivity, material welfare. But whatever d efo rm ation s it leads to, it increasingly creates a state o f society in w hich the bureaucracy will lose even th e last excuse fo r its ex isten c e [13: 6 5 ] , A nd a fte r the disappearance o f the bureaucracy, o n the basis of nonprivate p ro p e rty th a t lias been created, the only possible developm ent is the self-governing society, th a t is, socialism.
7 D IC T A T O R SH IP OF TH E PR O L E T A R IA T

We begin our discussion w ith the already cited classic statem en t by Marx in his C ritique o f the G otha Program Between capitalist and com m u nist society lies the period of the revolutionary tran sfo rm ation of the one into the o th e r There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be no thing b u t the revolutionary dictatorship o f the p ro leta ria t [4: 3 6 ], 69

This s tatem en t c o n stitu te s a condensed re sta te m en t of the analysis m ade by Marx and Engels in The C o m m u n ist M anifesto, from which we take tw o additional excerpts: The pro letariat will use its political suprem acy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie. . . . In the beginning this ca n n o t be effected except by m eans o f despotic inro ads on the rights o f p ro p e rty and on the conditions o f bourgeois p ro d u c tio n . When, in the course o f d evelopm ent, class distinctions have disappeared and ail p ro d u c tio n has been co n centrated in the hands o f a vast association o f the w hole n a tio n , the public pow er will lose its political ch aracter . . . When the p r o l e t a r i a t . . . as a ruling class , . . sweeps away by force the old cond itio ns of p ro d u c tio n , then it will have sw ept away, along with these conditions, the conditions for the existence o f class antagonism s and classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its ow n suprem acy as a class [1: 2 7 ]. T he citations given will recall to us M arxs theory o f the dictatorship of the proletariat and the transition period, which may be fo rm ulated in the following four propositions, 1. Inasm uch as the d e stru c tio n o f the capitalist system is p erfo rm ed by violence, by a revolution (which seemed m ost likely to Marx), socialism will n o t com e at once or autom atically. 2. The transition period betw een capitalism and com m unism , of which socialism is a lower phase, characterizes a distinct ty p e o f state, 3. This is the state o f the revolutionary dictatorship o f the proletariat, which signifies that: (a) the state represents the class interests o f the proletariat, and (b) it is a revolutionary regime, i.e., it is based on force, on d espotic inro ads, on lim itation o f political liberty. 4. The revolutionary d ictato rsh ip o f the proletariat is a tem porary regime, w hose sole p u rp o se is to abolish the old relations o f p r o d u c tio n and, thereby, the proletariat as a class with special interests. In this analytical fram ew ork and in o u r historical c o n te x t, we can now consider the corresponding section in t h z Program o f the Yugoslav C o m m u n ist League A ntagonistic forces arc n ot yet sufficiently w eaken ed to cease to be a danger to the existence o f socialism. T h erefo re the w orking class ca n n o t give up the w eapon o f its class struggle the d ictato rsh ip o f the proletariat and the leading role o f the League o f C om m u nists o f Yugoslavia in the struggle to overcom e the social and m aterial factors which, in various ways, still exert pressure o n socialist relations in our reality in the sense o f capitalist re storation or b ureaucratic state 70

capitalism [ 14: 2.35]. This ju d g m e n t was m ade eight years ago, in the period after the first econom ic and social affirm ations o f w orkers selfL government. Eight years are not a long time, b u t in times of rapid social transform ations it is a long enough time to justify a check on that ju d g m e n t in the light of to d a y s historical situation. 1.. First o f all, the C om inform antagonism s have been overcom e to a certain e x t e n t The socialist countries o f Europe, w ith the ex cep tio n o f Albania, have partly revised their form er attitudes. 2. F urth er, all those countries have for some time been intensively carrying o u t reform s that have m any features o f the path we have already followed U n d o u b ted ly , we have here a historic tendency toward getting closer. 3. T he c o u n t r y s general position in foreign policy is favorable. On the internal plane, rapid ec onom ic developm ent has led to a considerable rise in the standard o f living, which is now tw ice as high as eight years ago.2 Econom ically and politically, the co u n try is m ore stable than at any time in the past This was bro ugh t o u t m ost evidently in the ease with which the political police was abolished, Obviously, the system enjoys universal support.. 4 . W o r k e r s a n d social self-government has definitively established itself and becom e the essential originator o f social actions in the nation. On the basis o f these four observations, the conclusion m ust be draw n that the resto ration o f capitalism in o u r cou n try today is un th in k ab le This does not m ean, o f course, that the road to so cialism p r e s e n t s n o obstacles now. On the contrary, developm en t itself creates new obstacles, Bureaucracy is one, and a very dangerous one. But it i s o d efo rm a tio n th a t arises on a basis o f socialism and has no connection w ith the form e r class enem y. C onsequently, th e d icta to rsh ip o j the proletariat is pow erless w ith respect to th a t danger T he proletariat is not im m u n e to bureaucratization, for its o w n state and p arty may be the vehicles of bureaucratic tendencies, as the experience o f various nations shows Moreover, even on the theoretical plane it w ould appear that no t everything is in order. The proletariat is the class o f wage workers. Do wage w orkers exist in Yugoslavia today? Obviously n o t . A ccordingly, u n d e r present Yugoslav conditions it is historically meaningless to use the term dictatorship o f the p ro le ta ria t w ith o u t qualification. It would seem that the contin u an c e o f the dictatorship o f the pro letariat is linked to the co n tinuance o f the leading role of the
71

C om m unist League Such an interp re tatio n is possible, but it is entirely outside the fram ew ork o f Marxist analysis. But whatever the role o f the C o m m u n ist League m ay be, it does no t consist in preventing a capitalist restoration, fo r we have already seen that such a possibility has ceased to have any present relevance. Hence, it would be well if the role o f the C om m u nist League were defined precisely in the fu ture with reference to the tasks co nfro nting us, and not with reference to the problem s we have already solved. O u r conclusion with regard to evaluating the historical situation m ight be as follows. During the last qu arte r-c en tu ry the transition from capitalism to socialism has been m ade in Yugoslavia Political power has been won, the despotic inroads on the right o f ownership and on bourgeois relations o f p ro d u c tio n have been abolished, while all o f p ro d u c tio n is con cen trate d in the hands o f associated individuals 3 T he dictatorship of' the p roletariat has com pleted its historic mission and will have to be replaced by som ething that we m ight call th e state o f the working peo p le or th e state o f all the p eo p le, 4 The n ex t task is to go a little dee p er into the timing of this transition from capitalism to socialism.
8 T H R E E ST A G E S OF TH E Y U G O SL A V SOCIA LIST R EV O L U T IO N

It is custom ary to speak o f a single revolution by which the transition is m ade from capitalism to socialism. B ut if we m ake a careful analysis o f the last qu arte r-c en tu ry o f o u r social evolution, we shall find that we have gone through three revolutionary breaches corresponding to three stages o f the revolution; more precisely, the third stage has just begun. N aturally, these revolutions were not entirely u n expected, and the changes proceeded continu ously. There is no d o u b t, however, that there were three qualitative leaps in these changes. The first revolution coincided in the main with the fight for national liberation. It cleared the country o f the occupier, s m ash ed the old socioeconom ic order, and elim inated the exploiting classes The enem y in this revolution was clearly defined. Its aims, too, were precise: state socialism o f the Soviet type. C orresponding to this, in the political sphere, was a m on olithic centralized revolutionary co m m u nist party. C onsolidation o f this first revolution was suddenly in terru p te d in 1948 by the C o m in fo rm attacks. It tu rn ed o u t th at Stalinism and socialism are n o t identical, and that state socialism, except as a brief transitional stage, is a contraclictio in adjecto. It was 72

suddenly confirm ed th at there is n o ready-m ade recipe for establishing socialism, and th a t we ourselves had to work it o u t according to o u r ow n needs. The enem y was no longer so clearly defined its form erly, bu t still could be d eterm ined fairly easily T h ey were the agents o f Stalinist d o m in atio n from w ith o u t and the declared partisans o f Stalinism from within; in the given situation, the la tte r were, objectively, traitors to their country.. However, the im m ed ia te goals were all b u t clear; it was necessary to m ake a critical analysis o f the entire preceding approach to the co nstru ction o f socialism, In this process som e erroneous actions w e r e taken for example, the administrative forcing of collectivization.5 Blit very soon, on the basis o f the revolutionary in tu itio n of th e masses, an orien ta tion was m ade toward all fu rth e r developm ent, in th e form of w orkers self-government. The party o f that period was a p arty o f transform ation. A t the Sixth Congress in 1952, th e historic decision was m ade to transform the classical co m m u nist party into the League o f C om m unists. The change was a small one at first, b u t it grew with time, The p arty continu ed to be m onolithic and not m uch less centralized than previously. A t the base o f the form a tio n o f a centralized party (and th a t is one of the co ntra dictions o f th a t period, a co n tra d ictio n th a t constantly evoked disagreements and m isunderstandings), there was the pledge o f thoro u g h and effective decentralization in all o th e r spheres o f social life. A system with w orkers and social selfL v em m en t had never been achieved anyw here in the world; go there was no experience in back o f it, no model, no guide. It was a voyage into the u n k n o w n . To elim inate the risks o f excesses and chaos, the process had to be led by a well-organized, single, and au thoritative political organization. This was the p arty or the League o f C om m un ists o f the period o f the second revolution. It is n o t necessary to stress the fact that the pattern o f developm ent described above is an e x p o st fa c to rationalization. Certainly no one can say th a t he expected such a developm ent in 1 945, let alone in 1941, However, we have to discover the logic of events, even if e x p o st f a c t o , in o rd e r to attain the elem ents o f e x trap olation for the future. T hat that logic, in an operative sense, was no t discovered at the time is shown by the F o u rth Plenum. And precisely for th a t reason we can take that political event as the beginning o f o u r third revolution. Over a broad area o f chains o f events, the reform began that is now on the march. As inten d ed , the reform began as econom ic, but rapidly expanded in to a very far-reaching sociopolitical reform . The Brioni Plenum is only the m ost conspicuous political fa cto r in the transform ation o f the ec onom ic reform into one covering society in general,

7,3

This third and, in all prob ab ility , m ost im p o rtan t o f the three stages o f the revolution differs essentially from the preceding two. The possible alternatives o f subseq uent developm ent are highly com plex, and it is n o t clear a priori which are the m ost desirable. F u rth erm o re , the enem y is n o t clearly defined as o f now,. To begin w ith, it is not a class enem y o r foreign d o m in atio n . A t th e present time it is o ur o w n conservatism, reactionary dogm atism , and bureaucracy th a t have grown up on o u r own socialist soil. Drastic m anifestations of these dangers appeared in the abuses o f th e State Security Agency, R ep o rtin g on these abuses to the Skupstina, Avdo H um o stated: All of' its w ork and working m eth o d s were so set u p as to con tradict self-government and direct dem ocracy in the fo rm ation o f equality o f rights betw een o u r nations and nationalities and the affirm ation o f industrial and s o c i a l r e f o r m s . T h e y d issem inated suspicions concerning everything progressive and suspected everyone w ho did n o t think as they did. In this way m any governm ent agencies and sociopolitical organizations were d estroyed, producing helplessness and dem oralization, and thereby paralyzing the foci o f progressive dem ocratic th o u g h t and action. 6 The State Security Agency was set up as an organ of the socialist state, w ith the function o f insuring the con stru ctio n o f socialism. However, in catering to the safety o f the state, th e Agency as H u m o s rep ort shows u n d erm in ed socialism Its subversive activity had no co nnection whatsoever with foreign intervention or the prew ar bourgeoisie; it was an a u to c h th o n o u s p ro d u c t of p o st)ev o lu tio n a ry evolution To be sure, the d efo rm atio ns o f th e S tate Security Agency were not accidental, no r were they th e only ones, They can only be u n d erstoo d as p art o f a broad com plex o f social and political events in the n ation, which we analyze in detail later. Antisocialist tendencies and activities did no t appear only within the g ov ern m en t apparatus, as in the case o f the State Security Agency They were also m anifested within the governing political body, within the League o f C om m unists The general idea o f the League was th a t it was to be a m o nolithic organization with a n u n d i v i d e d will, constructing socialism and, w ith equal unanim ity, fighting against the enemies o f socialist construction, who were of course the League, This concep tion proved to be defective. The League found itself inside a magic circle of f o r m a l unity [E Kardelj, 1 6: 4.30] ; conservative tendencies appeared at the sum m it o f the p arty , with the proclaimed principles divorced from practice [ K. Crvenkovski, 16: 238, 245]; the guiding political bodies had reached a crisis [V. Vlahovic, 16: 729]; as a result, the confidence o f the masses o f people in the 74

League o f C om m unists was shaken [Tito, 16: 136], Such a situation is n o t arrived at suddenly; it was prepared by inadequate control o f the course o f events in recent decades. For the present, we shall only anticipate o u r later analysis and m entio n some o f the m ost im p o rta n t factors. F ro m 1950 on, w hen w o rkers governm ent was introd uced, a fairly co n tin u o u s line can be drawn o f the co nstru ction o f socialism in o u r co u n try , a line oriented toward decentralization, self-government, and the affirm ation o f the h u m an personality. A t the o u tse t the greatest emphasis was laid on the econom ic sphere F ro m 1958 on, with th e in tro d u c tio n o f the Program o f the League of C om m unists which, following The C o m m u n ist M anifesto, proclaims the free developm en t o f each individual as the p re co n d itio n o f the free developm ent o f all the accent o f socialist co nstru c tio n has been placed m ore and m ore on the political sphere A t the same time, self-government reform s were intensified, An a t te m p t at econom ic reform was m ade in 1961,7 followed by the new C o n stitu tio n o f 1963; then at the Eighth Congress o f the League a y ear later, with proposals for m ajor reform s within the League, which were defeated,8 however; in 1965 the 1961 reform was renew ed, this time in a m ore thoroughgoing way,9 and a year later the Brioni Plenum clcared the way for reorganization of the League. It should be b orn e in mind th at there was a similar coincidence o f the revolution with the battle f o r n a t i o n a l liberation, and th e process o f self-governing c o n s t r u c t i o n coincided with the resistance to C om inform intervention. B oth coincidences reveal the unity th at has been forged in o u r p a rty for a Jong time. Even bureaucratically oriented individuals carried o u t the self-government reforms,. But when, after a decade o f prep arations and consideration, self-government began to show itself fully, foot-dragging and opp osition began to appear. And w hen th e self-government reform s o f 1958 were intensified, by the logic of events, o p po sitio n was show n; w ithin th e League o f C o m m u n ists there was a d iffe ren tia tio n in to progressive and self-g o vern m en t fo r c e s, on the one hand, and conservative, bureaucratic, a n d even o p en ly counterrevolutionary fo rc e s on th e other. T he b attle w asjoined.10 The o u tco m e is kn ow n , at the Brioni Plenum, for th e first tim e, it was stated explicitly in a p arty d o cu m en t: There are forces in the League o f C om m unists th at openly stand for a policy o f the hard fist, forces th at are trying to establish their rule over th e League o f C om m unists and, through it, over the governm ent Those forces were then defined m ore clearly as bureaucratic, guild, and m onopolistic, even as far as openly co u nterrev olu tion ary forces [16: 1 1 ], 75

T he question arises o f how to fight effectively against such enemies, of w h at political system to em ploy to eliminate dangers from such enem ies in the future. We still need to find the answer. Obviously, the political p a rty o f the period we are entering upo n m ust differ radically from the party o f the preceding two periods. It is no longer a party fighting to build socialism in a nonsocialist environm ent. It is a party (to give it that name conditionally) that, in a socialist environm ent, is fighting for the lull assertion o f socialism, and against all sorts o f d efo rm ation s and deviations In this sense the liquidation o f the political police at the Brioni Plenum symbolically represents the close o f an epoch o f presocialist d evelopm ent It is o n this fo un d a tio n th at the general approach to the problem s o f Yugoslav society rests. We now proceed to a detailed analysis o f each o f the three aspects o f that society: economic, social (in the strict sense), and political.

FO OTNO TES
1. T hat is the term Engels uses. In his le tte r to Fu rati dated Feb- 6, 1892, Engels says, in co n n e ctio n w ith this q ne stio n : H o w w ill this e co n o m ic re vo lu tio n e n d ? T h a t w ill depend on the co n d itio n s under w h ic h o ur p arty takes o ver p o w e r, on the tim e and the m an n er in w h ich this is achieved*' J 7: 1 3 4 1 It is w o rth spending a little tim e to con sider just w h a t this observation means. Decades, not to speak o f centuries, passed until the c o n n try attained a social p ro d u ct oT ab o ut 340 dollars per capita, w h ich still left it in the group o f underdeveloped nations N o w , in o n ly eight years, the in com e has risen to ab o ut 650 dollars (in 1965 prices) and ind ustry hns assumed the ch aracteristics o f a m o d e rate ly developed in d u stry . Yugoslavia is to day m uch m ore developed than the most developed co u ntries in the tim e w h e n Murx and Engels lived . M a n y w ill doubtless he greatly surprised to learn that the degree o f ind ustrial d evelo pm en t in Yug o slavia approaches that o f p rew ar Fra n ce , that in som e regions it has reached the level o f Fra n ce before the w a r, and that in Slo ve n ia it has gone n o tice a b ly b eyo n d it. A cco rd in g to the calcu latio n s o f S. S ta jic , the social p ro d u ct per capita was 650 dollars in Yugoslavia in 1966, and 880 dollars in T ran ce in 1938 (1965 p rices) Som e data on ag ricu ltu ral and in d u strial p ro d u ctio n w ill illu strate this fact m o re cle a rly : Tran ce ! 938 A ctu a l E le c t r ic it y , b illio n k w h Steel, m illion tons C em e n t, m illion tons G ra in , m illio n tons 20.8 6.2 4] 17 7 C o m parative 9 9 3 0 2.0 8.4 15.5 1 8 4.0 10 6 Y ug o slavia 1965

2.

The dam in the second co lu m n for France have been reduced b y a fac to r o f 2 11, in p ro p o rtio n to the nu m b er o f in h ab itan ts, in o rder to m ake possible a direct com parison w ith Y ug o slav data {S G J- 1 9 6 6 and S ta tis tic a l Y e arb o o k o f U N , 195 1). W e could also p oint o u t that, as regards p ro d u ctio n , Y ug o slavia is n o w w h e re Ita ly and A u stria w e re ten years ago It m ight ap pear at first glance that the in d ivid u al p ro d u c tio n by farm ers and craftsm en co n trad ic ts this A c t u a lly , this is not so ; no a lie n " elem ent is involved. See S ce tio n 15.

76

4.

O nce terms have becom e a part o f d aily usage, there is great p sycho log ical resistance to changing them , even w hen the contents th e y sig n ify have changed in re ality. People co n tin u e to use the same terms, but have in m in d a co m p le te ly d iffe re n t con tent Thus, an atte n tive exa m in atio n o f the language o f our d aily press, inad eq u ately critica l articles b y w riters, and speeches b y p o litic a l p ersonalities shows that three ke y term s have taken on new c o n te n t: b y the w o rk in g class they mean all w o rk in g people w h o are o b je ctive ly or su b je ctive ly interested in the co n stru ctio n o f socialist so cie ty in Y ugoslavia, n a m e ly ,th e o ve rw h e lm in g m a jo rity o f the p o p u latio n ; the class e n e m y is the enem y o f the co n stru c tio n o f so cialism , to w it, p olitical emigres and b u re au cra tic and declassed elem ents in the c o u n try ; the dictatorsh ip o f Ihe p ro le ta ria t is the state o f ih e w o rk in g class as d efin ed above It fo llo w s from these d e fin itio n s that a one-class system has been created in our nation. T h a t this is a co n tra d ic tio n in term s, and that the d ictatorsh ip o f the p ro le tariat is inconsistent w ith socialism w it h in the fram ew o rk o f the M a rx ian system o f thought, are logical d iffic u ltie s that disappear in the face o f the psycho log ical eq u ilib riu m th e y give rise to In Ja n u a ry 1949 the Seco n d Plenum o f the C entral C o m m itte e o f the Yug o slav C o m m un ist Pa rty ad opted a re so lu tio n that the ce n te r o f g ravity should be placed on the fo rm atio n o f rnral labor coo peratives, and that this .should be d on e w ith the utm ost boldness and in a short time. D espite the S o v ie t experience, it was expected that this w o u ld result in increased ag ricu ltu ral p ro d u c tio n ; it was regarded as the rood to b uild ing socialism in the villages; and it w as intend ed as a dem o n stration to the authors o f the R e so lu tio n o f the In fo rm b u ro that they w ere w ron g in saying that Y ug o slav Co m m un ists did not intend to ca rry out co lle c tiv iz a tio n [ 1 8 : 4 7 3 ] T h e h arm fu l effects o f this course soon b ecam e m an ifest, and it w as rad ically revised early in [9 5 3 T h e criticism o f p ra c tic e , V. B ak a ric observed ten years later, "was faster than o u r th e o re tical criticism *1 [ 19: 101. B o rb a , D ecem b er 10, 19(iti T h e S ta te S e c u r ity A g e n cy acted w ith p articnlar destructiveness in K o so vo and M e to h ija T h e repo rt on the resp on sib ility o f the m em bers o f the p ro vin cial co m m itte e there states: the se cu rity agency . . , had . , a negative attitu d e to w ard the life and cadres o f S erb ian and M ontenegran n a tio n a lity , w h o .. w ere sh ado w ed , slandered, and m istreated, and had police records opened on them , e sp ecially in the case o f p eo p le w ith progressive attitu d es and id e a s ' ' {B o rb a , O c to b e r 14, I9 6 G ; m y em phasis - B .H ,).

7.

B y and large, this refo rm w as unsuccessful, p a rtly due to p o litic al o pp ositio n, but for the m ost part due to ignorance o f and failure to realize the o p eratio n o f the m echanism o f a decentralized e co n o m y , so that the reform was inad equ ately prepared and b a d ly executed C f [ 1 7 ] . T ailure o f the re fo rm led lo repeated ab an d o n m en t o f the five-year plan and (a consequence that is o ften o ve rlo o k e d ) to serious p o litic al co m p lic atio n s 6 K , C rven kovski (to cite an a n th o rita iiv e w itn e s s) brings out the fact that in the course o f the p rep aratio ns for the Eig h th Congress, there was very sharp and, to a great e xten t, ju stified criticism , m ain ly o f the w o rk o f the C e n tra l C o m m itte e o f the League o f C o m m un ists. In co n n e ctio n w ith the planned standards for the S tatu te s of the League . , these criticism s w ere taken in to accounts but not fu lly . B u t later, as the tim e for the Congress d rew near, other tendencies and o th e r forces in the League o f Co m m un ists began to be expressed, so that the p latfo rm o f greater d em o cracy w ith in the League and the co n cc p tio n o f its role in the next period have been cut d o w n to a m in im u m / C rve n k o vsk i goes on to say that p rin ciples are p roclaim ed in p arty docum ents, but som ething q u ite d iffe re n t is p racticed , and conclud es: Needless to say, this co n d itio n can h a rd ly be ascribed o n ly to the m an ifesta tio n o f a conservative co n ce p tio n at the su m m it, altho ug h that co n cc p tio n and that o pp ositio n cann ot be u n derestim ated . II was p o w e rfu l and in flu e n tia l Because o f this o p p o sitio n , the su m m it co u ld not be reorganized, and that had its effect su bseq uen tly Bu t conservatism has also penetrated the h ie rarch ically co n stitu ted organization, and has m ade it im possible for the base to co u n te ract those tendencies at the to p [ 16: 2 38] 9- B u t still w ith inad equate kn ow led g e o f e co n om ics, resulting in a sharp drop in the grow th o f p ro d u c tio n , and in 1967 to stagnation, w h ich could not but evoke p olitical co m p licatio n s. 10. T h e b attle co u ld not but be s h a rp / V . V la h o vic observes, b etw een the forces that dem anded that w o rk in g people should be kept as far as possible from the arena o f decision, that th e y should be reduced to the status o f clie n te le . and the forces that dem anded far-rcaching changes., beginning w ith the m ethods o f form ing governing agencies and guiding p o litic al life , d ow n to e x p licit co n sideratio n o f the essence o f p olitical leadership in the system o f self-governm ent1* (1 6 : 7 2 9 ]

77

REFERENCES
111 [2 ] [3 ] [4 ] [5 ] [6 ] [7 ] IB ] (9 ) [ 10] 111] (1 2 ! jl3| [ 14] [1 5 ] (1 6 1 [1 7 ] [1 8 ] [1 9 ] K. M arx and F Engels, Se le cte d Works, V o l I, O G 1 Z, M o scow , 19 4 B Ib id ., V o l. II. K M a rx a n d F' Engels, S e le cte d Writings, O G I Z , M o sco w , 1948 K Marx* C ritiq u e o f the G o ih a Program , K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1948 V I L c n in , Worfcj, 4th edition V, 1 L e n in , M a rx , Engels, M a rxism , O G I Z , M o sc o w , 1946 S e c o n d In te rn a tio n a l, R a d , Belgrade, 1 9 5 K V I L e n in , S e le cte d W orks in T w o Volum es, 4th e d itio n , V o l II, O G I Z , M o sco w , 1946. B K id ric , Thesis on the E c o n o m ic s o f the T ra n sitio n Pe rio d in O u r C o u n t r y / ' K o in m u n ist, 1950, N o 6. F , En gels, A n ti-D iih rin g , N ap rije d , Zagreb, 1946 V StiinovtfUf and A , S to ja n o v ic, B u r e a u c ra c y and T e ch n o cra cy , B o o k II, S cd m a sila, Belgrade, 1966. Ib id ., R o o k I. M M a rk o vic , So cia lism and S e lf*M a n a g e m c n t, in Id e a s and Pe rsp ectives o f So cia lism , Praxis, Zagreb, 1965 P ro g ram o f the Leagtte o f C o m m u n is ts o f Yugoslavia, K u ltu r a , Belgrade, 1958. L j T ad ic, C u rre n t T h e o re tic a l Pro b lem s o f the C o m m u n ist P a r t y * in M a rx an d the P re se n t D a y , B o o k I I , I D N , Belgrade, 1964 Le ag u e o f C o m m u n is ts o f Yugoslavia U n d er S e lf'M a n a g e m e n t,^ d i\ t6 b y M , N ik o lic , co llected texts, K u ltu ra , Belgrade, 1967. B. H o rv a t, E c o n o m ic Scie n c e and the N a t io n a l E c o n o m y , N a p r ijc d v Zagreb, 1968,. R. tfohikoviC* et a l , R e v ie w o f the H is t o r y o f the L e a g u e o f C o m m u n ists o f Yugoslavia, in stitu te for the S t u d y o f the W o r k e r s M o ve m e n t, Belgrade, 1963 V. Bakaritf, On A g ric u ltu re an d P ro b le m s o f the Village. K u ltu ra , Belgrade, I9 6 0

78

C H A PT ER III

Economic Organization

How should socialist ind u stry be organized? T w o organizational principles are in c o n tra d ictio n : centralization and decentralization. Discussion on these principles, w hich has been u n d er way for a long tim e in ou r c o u n try , has recently begun in th e o th e r socialist countries o f Euro pe as well. In a bro ad er sense, a p erm a n en t d i s c u s s i o n is in process within every social organization. C entralization and decentralization in te rp e n etrate one a n o th e r and have very diverse aspects; th e a p p a ren t simplicity o f th e term s is deceptive. An obvious historical com parison is enough to bring ou t this fact. U nder feudalism, for example, there was the strictest centralization for th e Fiefs o f th e feudal lords, and extrem e decentralization and looseness in the e c o n o m y o f a c o u n try as a w h o l e , C a p i t a l i s t d e v e lo p m e n t com pletely reversed these relationships. The feudal centralisms were b ro ken up and replaced by individualism, which fou n d its characteristic expression in i n d u s t r y in the form o f free co m petition. However, this individualism led, by way o f the m arket, to strong co ncentration o f p ro d u c tio n within national boundaries, and then more and m ore to worldwide industrial integration. But th e decentralization o f liberal capitalism did n o t prove to be a p erm a n en t organizational form. F ree co m p etitio n leads spontaneo usly and steadily to the co n c e n tra tio n and centralization o f capital, and subsequently to extrem ely centralized industrial structures m onopolies. Society then p ro te c ts itself from m o n o p o ly by the total centralization o f industrial func tion s in the hands o f th e state. 79

T he q uestion arises: w hat kind of directions in d evelo p m e n t can be expected in a planned socialist eco nom y? T h e answers to this q uestion have been fairly u niform : c e n tr a lis ts . Socialists have explained the superiority of centralism by the econo m ic efficacy o f a centralized planned econom y. T he o p p o n e n ts o f socialism have pointed to ce ntralization as the disadvantage of socialism, since it denies the personality. T h e differences betw een th e socialist and the nonsocialist, accordingly, appeared in the realm o f in te rp re ta tio n and values F ro m the p o in t o f view o f ec onom ic facts, the agreem ent was practically total, T he reasoning goes som ew h at as follows A u to n o m o u s econom ic units and free co m p e titio n in the m arket lead to business cycles. T he fu rth e r the ec on om y develops, the m ore com plicated it is; and the m ore com p licated it is, the worse the crises and the greater the need fo r state intervention, In o rd er com pletely to avoid ec onom ic fluctuations, centralized planning has to be in trodu ced . A fte r the installation o f a central plan, each econom ic u nit is assigned p ro d u c tio n tasks on ju s t a b o u t the same basis as integrated enterprises working on a program set up by the head office o f some trust. The econ om y is viewed as a single en o rm o u s enterprise, an d m an agem en t o f the ec on om y as replacing the adm inistrative functions o f the enterprise. When a planning system o f this k ind was in tro du ced in the Soviet U nion a fte r th e O c to b e r R evolution, it was by and large taken by b oth the Left and the Right as som ething that was to be expected. A nd until the present, in fact, it remains one o f th e very few basic questio ns on which socialist and nonsocialist econom ists agree. There are tw o pure system s: capitalism, w ith private ownership, the m arket, and free c o m p etitio n ; and socialism, w ith state ownership, planning, and central d e term in a tio n o f the productive goals o f ec onom ic units. In the last tw o decades various sorts of m ixtures o f these pure c o m p o n e n ts have appeared. In the m ixed systems there is, to a greater o r lesser degree, state intervention (n ationalization, universal social insurance, etc,) in the sphere o f capitalist ec onom ic relationships, w ith the p urpose of bringing abo ut th e welfare s ta te , O f the three types o f econ om y cited, we are interested only in the socialist typ e here and, within th at fram ew ork, only in the question o f the n atu re of planning. In discussions o f this question, reference is frequently m ad e to p ro positio ns from the classics o f Marxism. A ccordingly, it will be w orthw hile to begin by adducing sections from the w orks o f Marx and Engels relating to the point u n d e r discussion.

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9 M A R X A N D EN G E LS ON SO C IA LIST ECONOM Y First G roup o f P rop osition s

We k now that Marx and Engels firmly avoided giving any system atic descriptions o f socialist econom y. T h e y felt (indeed correctly) that any a tte m p ts to answer the q u estion at th at time would be unscientific, uto p ian , co nstructed after the m an n er of H e g e l [ 1 : 4 2 1 ] , Their m ajo r w orks co ntain only isolated fragm ents relating to th e q u estion of socialist planning, which give only the m ost general o f statem en ts. I t is characteristic, in addition, th a t the m ost extensive fragm ents o ccu r in tw o explicitly polem ic works, C ritique o f the G otha Program and A nti-D uhring, indicating th a t th e a u th o rs were led to the discussion by the theoretical m istakes o f others, and n o t because they w an ted to develop any definite theses These lim itations o n the q u o ta tio n and in terp re tatio n of citations are not always adequately taken into account, In his Basic M an ifesto o f the F irst In tern atio nal, Marx contrasted capitalist and socialist e c o n o m y in the m ost general of terms: , the great dispute betw een th e blind rule o f the law o f supply and d em and , which com prises bourgeois ec onom ic policy, and social p ro d u c tio n directed by social planning, which is the essence o f the ec onom ic policy o f th e w orking class [2: 52] A t the same time, the capitalist e c o n o m y prepares the way for the socialist e c o n o m y , and this idea is developed by Engels: In trusts, freedom o f c o m p e titio n changes into its opp osite m o n o p o ly ; while the u n p la n n e d p ro d u c tio n of capitalist society capitulates before the planned p ro d u c tio n of socialist society . . . With o r w ith o u t trusts, the official representative of capitalist society, th e state, will ultim ately have to u n d e rta k e the direction o f p ro d u c tio n . . . T he m o d ern state, n o m a t t e r w h a t its form, is essentially a capitalist m achine . . the ideal total capitalist. The m o re it takes over o f p roductive forces, the m o re it becom es the total capitalist.. , . Capitalist relations are n o t elim inated; they are ra th e r bro ugh t to a head. But, b roug ht to a head, they topple over, S tate ow nership o f productive forces is n o t the solution, b u t it conceals within itself the technical conditions, the key to the solution. This solution can only consist in th e practical recognition o f the social n ature of m o d e rn forces of prod u c tio n , and therefore in harm onizing m e th o d s o f p ro d u c tio n , ap pro priatio n, and trade w ith the socialized ch aracter o f the m eans of pro d u c tio n . And this can be achieved only by society openly and directly taking possession o f th e m eans o f p ro d u c tio n th a t have o utg row n all 81

control except that o f society i t s e l f [3: 291-293] Engels defines the m eaning of this social approp riation a little m ore closely: With the seizing o f th e m eans of p ro d u c tio n by society, the p ro d u ctio n o f c o m m o d itie s and, sim ultaneously, the m astery o f the p ro d u c e r by th e p ro d u c t are abolished (m y emphasis B.H.). A n a r c h y in s o c i a l p r o d u c t i o n is replaced by conscious organ ization [3: 2 9 8 ], This also determ ines the principles o f distribution: With the final recognition o f the real n ature of the productive forces o f today, social anarchy in p ro d u c tio n gives place to a social and planned regulation o f p ro d u c tio n according to the needs o f the co m m u n ity and o f each individual T h e n the capitalist m ode o f ap propriatio n, In w hich the p ro d u c t enslaves first the p ro d u c er a n d t h e n the appro p riato r, is replaced by a m e th o d o f ap prop riation o f the p ro d u c t based u p o n the n ature o f m odern m eans o f p ro d u c tio n : on the one h and, direct social ap propriation as the m eans o f m aintaining and exp an ding p ro d u c tio n ; and on the other, direct individual a p p ro p riatio n as the m eans o f subsistence and e n jo y m e n t [3: 2 9 4 ]. It follows that the m arket an d the category o f value will be abolished and, w ith them , co m m o d ity p ro d u c tio n : T he only value recognized by the ec on om y is the value o f goods. W hat are goods? P ro d u c ts m ade in a society o f m ore or less isolated private producers, therefore, prim arily private p ro d u c ts [3: 3 2 3 ]. Marx expresses th e idea th a t exchange value is a form o f appearance o f the p ro p o rtio n al distribu tio n o f social lab o r in the system o f private exchange o f individual p r o d u c ts o f lab o r [4] .. If it is desired to avoid the anarchy o f th e co m m o d ity m ark et, there m ust be direct control o f the allocation of social labor: In fact, no form o f society can p rev ent the regulation o f p ro d u c tio n , one way or an o th er, by the available w orking time. B ut, so long as this regulation is n o t carried o u t th ro u g h direct conscious control over w orking tim e - which is possible only w ith co m m on p roperty b ut ra th e r throu gh the m o v em en t of prices and goods, it rem ains w h a t y o u q u ite correctly said in the G erm an-F rench y ea r b o o k s [ 18:11 ]. In line with this, there is th e following passage in C a p ita l I n socialist society, m o n e ta ry capital declines. Society distributes th e lab o r force and m eans o f p ro d u c tio n t o the various branches o f th e ec on om y. Insofar as I am con cern ed , th e produ cers can receive p aper vouchers for which they can o b tain from the consum er reserves o f society a q u a n tity corresponding to 82

their w ork time. These vouchers are n o t m oney. T h ey do no t circulate [5a: 311]. When there is no m arket, there is no need for m o n ey either. But i t is necessary and possible to exercise control over the p ro p o rtio n s o f ex p e n d itu re o f social lab o r time. . after the abolition o f the capitalistic m etho d o f p ro d u c tio n , while m aintaining social p rod u c tio n , specific values rem ain p re d o m in a n t, because the regulation o f working h o u rs and the distribution o f social w ork am ong th e various groups o f producers and, finally, the b o o kk eep ing becom e m ore im p o rta n t than ever [5: 7 8 6 ]. The same th o u g h t is repeated in the C ritique o f the G otha Program: W i t h i n the collective, o n com m on ly o w n e d m eans of p ro d u c tio n based on society, the p ro du cers do no t exchange their p rod uc ts; nor does w o rk spent o n p ro d u c tio n appear here as the value o f these products, as material p ro p e rty ow ned by them , because now, con tra ry to capitalist society, individual w ork becom es n o t indirectly b u t directly the c o m p o n e n t p art of the entire w o rk [6: 15], Then follows the w ell-know n s ta te m e n t o f the principle o f distribu tio n according to labor, including the following: C o nsequently, the individual p ro d u c e r gets back from society after ded u c tio n s exactly w hat he has given. , . , He gets a certificate from society th a t he has d on e such and such an am o u n t o f w o rk ,.,. .. With this certificate he receives from the public store o f consum er goods a corresponding q u a n tity o f goo ds [ 6 : 1 6 ] . T hese considerations have given rise to a violent polem ic among socialist econom ists as to the existence or no nexistence o f co m m o d ity p ro d u c tio n u n d er socialism. These polemics, like S talins solution o f th e tra n sfo rm a tio n o f th e law o f value, are sufficiently familiar for me n o t to dwell on, Engels conceives th e process o f social planning as follows: As soon as society takes over the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n and uses them fo r p ro d u c tio n as direct socialization all w ork . , . becom es in advance direct social w ork. The q u a n tity of social w ork in som e p ro d u c ts d o es n o t now have to be established in r o u n d a b o u t ways; daily ex perience show s on the average the a m o u n t o f w o rk t h a t is necessary. S ociety, therefore, cann ot arbitrarily decide th a t the a m o u n t o f w o rk necessary for some p rod u c ts, which is now directly and precisely know n, shall c ontinu e to be expressed in som e merely relative, uncertain, i n a d e q u a t e measure which was fo rm erly unavoidable as a necessary ex pedient , , instead o f in its natural, adeq uate,

8.3

absolute measure of w o rk tim e (Engels emphasis). . . . The beneficial effect o f the various co n su m er goods, com p ared with the am o u n t o f w o rk required for their m anu facture, will finally d eterm in e this plan (p ro d u ctio n ). People will th en co m plete everything very sim ply, w ith o u t the intervention o f the fam ous values " [3: 326-327] We can now give the conclusion o f a previously in terru p te d statem ent by Engels: A narchy in social p ro d u c tio n is replaced by system atic, d e f i n i t e organization. T he struggle for individual existence disappears. Then, fo r the first time, m an, in a certain sense, is finally m arked off from th e rest o f the animal kingdom and emerges from mere animal cond itio ns o f existence into really hum an ones. T he con ditio ns o f life which su rround m an, and which have h ith e rto ruled him, now com e u n d e r the d o m in io n and control of man, w ho, for the first time, b ecom es th e real conscious lord o f N ature, because lie has now becom e master o f his own social organization. T he laws o f his own social actio n, h ith e rto standing face to face with m an as laws o f N ature foreign to and dom inating him, will then be used w ith full understandin g and thereby mastered by him , , , Only th en will m an himself, m ore and m ore consciously, m ake his ow n history only then will the social causes set in m otio n by him have, in the main and in a constantly growing measure, the results in tend ed by him. It is the ascent o f m an from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freed o m [ 3: 298] This pro po sitio n was used by c o n tem p o rary Soviet econom ists to form ulate the thesis o f planning as th e (basic) law of developm ent o f socialist ec on om y and society. In planning and carrying o u t the plan, the question o f centralization and decentralization can also be treated as a q u e s t i o n of th e relationship o f a u th o rity and a u to n o m y . Discussion of' this q u estion was topical even in Engels time; he devoted a sho rt article to it, from which we cite the following statem ents: S om e socialists have recently c o n d u c te d a crusade against w h a t they call the principle o f a u th o rity . They believe that it is sufficient to call a certain act autho ritaria n for it to be condem ned. . . . A u th o rity in this sense m eans th e im position o f an alien will upon o u r will and, on the o th e r hand, a u th o rity presupposes s u b j u g a t i o n , . . E xam ining the econom ic, industrial, and agricultural relations o n w hich the cited bourgeois society is based, we find th a t there is a ten dency to replace isolated action b y c o m b i n e d a c t i o n , . . Everywhere co m b in ed action, 84

com plicated by the process in which one d epends o n another, takes th e place o f in d e p en d e n t ac tion by individuals. But c o m b i n e d a c t i o n m e a n s organization., and can there be organization w ith o u t auth o rity ? Let us take it th a t th e social revolution deposes the capitalists a n d t h a t w orkers a u th o rity manages p ro d u c tio n and the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w e a l t h . L e t u s t a k e th e co m p letely antiauthoritaria n view th a t the c o u n try and m eans o f w ork have becom e th e collective p ro p e rty o f th e w orkers w h o use them . In this case, will a u th o rity disappear o r simply change its form? Let us see. We shall take, as an exam ple, a c o tto n mill. Before it is turn ed into thread, c o tto n m ust go throu gh six operations. , . This m ust be decided u p o n by delegates w ho are at the head of each stage o f the w o rk , o r it is settled, if th at were possible, by a m ajority o f votes. The will of the individual m u st be subordinate, and t h a t m eans th a t the question is settled authoritatively. . . . A desire to destroy au th o rity in a big in d u stry m eans a desire to destroy the industry itself. , A n o th e r exam ple: the railroad. Here, too, the coop e ratio n o f an en o rm o u s num ber of people is absolutely essential; this co ope ratio n m ust be realized at precisely d eterm in e d hours in o rd e r to avoid accidents. T h e first condition is the d o m in a n t will, which solves each s ub ord in ate question, w h e th e r th a t will is o f one delegate o r of a c o m m itte e entrusted w ith th e d u ty o f carrying o u t the decision o f the m ajo rity [8: 580-581] T his m ight be tak en as su ppo rting the conclusion that au tho ritaria n form s o f organizing enterprises are inevitable. As we k n o w , this conclusion was actually draw n and was k n o w n as the principle o f one-man m anagem ent. And in co n n e ctio n with organization o f the econ om y as a whole, th e conclusion m ight be draw n th at centralism was indispensable* In fact, this conclusion was actually drawn, in b o th th eo ry and practice. Most o f the cited passages are well k n o w n ; th ey have o ften been q u o te d and have been th e subject o f m a n y discussions. T hey have been assembled and arranged in a definite order, and th us give a definite picture o f th e organization o f socialist p lann ed econ om y. This p icture does n o t seem m uch different from the organization o f planning (including ex perim ents w ith n o n c o m m o d ity econom y) in the Soviet U nion over th e past several decades, and from our own vision o f planned e c o n o m y up to 1950 I t will be o f value now, however, to p resen t a choice o f s ta te m e n ts from the classics, s tatem en ts which have been less frequ ently cited in th e past and w hich illum inate a n o th er aspect of social planning.

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Second G rou p o f Propositions What is the meaning of socialism? U n d o u b te d ly it is, as every Marxist will say, the liberation o f m an from natural and social necessity, the d eparture from the kingdom o f necessity, the liberation o f the alienated individual, and the affirm ation o f his h u m an integrity As a twenty-five-year-old y o u th , a bourgeois r a d ic a l1 dem o crat at the time, Marx was enthusiastic over the idea o f h u m an liberation: Man, w ho would be a spiritual being, a free m an a republican Petty-bourgeoisie will n o t be o n e or the other. . . What th ey w ant is to live and m ultiply . . t h a t s w hat animals want, . . M ans feeling o f his own values, freedom , should be aw akened in the breasts o f these people. Only this feeling, which disappeared with th e Greeks and which w ith Christianity is lost in th e blue sky, can again m ake o f society a c o m m u n ity o f m en for th e realization o f their greatest aim: a dem o cratic s t a t e [9: 32] . The same th o u g h t, in its m ature form, appeared several years later in the jo in t w o rk o f Marx and Engels, The C o m m u n ist M a n ife sto : In place of' the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association in which th e free developm ent of' each is the conditio n for th e free d ev elo pm en t o f all [10: 6 3 ] . This central propo sition o f the basic program o f m o d ern socialism was overlooked for som e time. Its insistence on the developm ent o f th e individual as the preco n d itio n for the developm ent of society was in to o great a con trast with the au tho ritaria n conceptions o f socialism, in which th e relationship is exactly reversed. This p rop o sitio n received th e pro m in en c e it m erited in the program o f th e League o f Yugoslav C om m unists,2 In th is co n n e ctio n , the key q u estion is o f course the relationship to the state Marx observes: F ree d o m is w hen the state is transform ed from an organ th a t is d o m i n a n t over society in to an organ th a t is com pletely s u b o r d in a te . , . [6 :2 4 ] .. Engels w ro te at length a b o u t the state It is w o rth repeating one o f his classic statem ents: When there is no longer any social class to be held in subjection; when class rule, and th e individual struggle for existence based u p o n o u r present an archy in p ro d u c tio n , with the collisions and excesses arising from them , are rem oved, no thing m ore remains to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a 86

state, is no longer necessary. The first act by virtue of which the state really co n stitu tes itself' the representative o f the whole o f society - th e taking possession o f the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n in the name o f society th a t is, at the same time, its last in d ep en d e n t act as a state.. S tate in terfe ren c e in social relations becomes, in one do m ain after an oth er, superfluous, and then dies o u t by itself; the governm ent o f persons is replaced by the ad m inistration o f things and by the c o n d u c t o f the processes o f p r o d u c tio n [3: 29 4 -2 9 5 ], This reasoning, correctly interpre ted, is a rem arkable m odel of' analysis,. However, in terp re tatio n s are possible, and actually do o c c u r , w h i c h c o n tain a dangerous non se q u itu r Taking possession of' th e m eans o f p ro d u c tio n in the nam e of' society" p o te n tia lly eliminates th e collisions and excessess, b u t n ot necessarily, Interference by state au th o rities in social relations m ay becom e unnecessary, b u t for th a t additional p recond itio ns have to be realized in addition to the basic o n e (state-social pow er). Otherwise, new partial interests can arise and th e p o w e r o f the state, far from being superfluous, can be engaged in protecting them . We k n o w tod ay th a t this is n o t an academ ic possibility . B ut Marx and Engels realized the danger o f b ureaucratic structures. T h ey drew im p o rta n t conclusions in this respect from the experience o f the Paris C om m une, T h e C om m u n e a t th e very beginning h ad to acknowledge th at the working class, com ing in to po w er, could n o t rule w ith th e old state .machinery . . th a t it had to secure itself' against its own deputies and em ployees, proclaiming th a t all of' th em , w ith o u t exception, were dispensable at any t im e [11: 18], T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n w a s l a t e r in tro d u c e d in to o u r new C o n stitu tio n , under th e nam e o f th e principle o f rotation. In add itio n , the C o m m u n e m e a n t decentralization: T he Paris C o m m u n e had, o f course, to serve as the source for all the large industrial resources o f France, As soon as Paris, and o th e r centers, were b ro u g h t in to co m m u n al adm inistration, the old centralized au th o rity had to be replaced in th e provinces by self-m anaging p ro d ucers (m y emphasis B.H..) [11: 62] . D ecentralization does n o t m ean particularism : u T h e unity o f the n atio n was n o t to be broken, but, on the c o n tra ry , to be organized by th e C o m m una l organization. I t was to becom e a reality by the d e stru c tio n o f the state p ow er which claimed to be the e m b o d im e n t o f th a t u nity b u t w hich w anted to be in d e p e n d e n t of', and superior to , the nation i t s e l f [11: 62].. T h a t is th e kind o f co m m u nal system th a t is being set up in Yugoslavia. Finally, the position o f the w o rke r-prod ucer m u st also be

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defined Engels gives the following thesis o f Marx: . the w ork e r is free only when he becomes the o w n e r o f his o w n m eans o f p ro d u c tio n . [ 1 2 : 3 5 1 ] . N otes and C o m m e n ta ry T h e tw o sets o f fragm ents o f statem en ts by Marx and Engels show w hat a com plicated problem it is to in terp re t them correctly. T he in terp re tatio n does n o t depend on the a u t h o r alone b u t, p ro b ably. ju s t as m uch on th e interpreter. The same words, w ith the same gramm atical meanings, have a diffe rent sense in d ifferent social situations 3 This applies particularly to the selection o f the relevant statem en ts A ccordingly, it was n o t o u r in tention, in selecting the passages and c o m m en tin g on them , to arrive at any absolute tru th , b u t prim arily to outline tw o ways o f reasoning both, incidentally, based on those choices. S tarting (gram m atical ly) from Marx, it is possible (in term s o f m eaning) to arrive at entirely d ifferent results I t is very probable th a t Mao Tse-tung today sincerely believes him self t o be the au th en tic in te rp re te r o f M arxs th ou gh t, and th a t m an y o th ers regard him as ju st th a t. A nd it seems to m e m o re than pro bab le th a t Stalin and the m ajority o f th e delegates at th e 16th Congress o f the CPSU(b) regarded th e following thesis as a m asterpiece o f M arxist dialectics: We are for the withering away o f th e state. A nd, at the same time, we are for the strengthening o f the dictatorship o f the p ro letariat which is th e m ightiest and strongest a u th o rity o f all state authorities th a t have existed so far The strongest developm ent o f state a u th o rity with the aim o f preparing cond itio ns fo r th e w ith ering away o f th e state authority th a t is the Marxist form ula. Is this c o n tra d ic to ry ? Yes, it is c o n tra d ic to ry . B ut it is a co ntradic tion o f life and it com pletely reflects M arxs dialectics [ 1 3 :1 2 7 ], This should n o t lead us in to any agnostic relativism. On the contrary, we can say th a t we k n o w th a t th e theses o f Stalin and Mao are no t Marxist. But th a t is n o t the question. The problem is th a t citations as such are n o t a useful m eans of investigation. This applies particularly to citations from th e works o f Marx, u n d o u b t edly the m ost difficult and com plex a u th o r w ho ever w rote in th e field o f econom ics When it comes to socialist econom ics, m o re over, appealing to the classics is an e m p ty p rocedure, w ith o ne or tw o exceptions. Since Marx and Engels always refused to erect any system o f socialism, such an appeal would be a d o u b ly h y p o t h e t ical assertion: we know w ha t they would have th o u g h t a b o u t the economics o f socialism had they th o u g h t a b o u t it 88

Nevertheless, every Marxist has to define his own position with regard to M arxs propositions. T h a t is im plicit in the con cep t Marxist, O n th a t principle, and w ith the lim itations given, I have a tte m p te d to m ake an in terp re tatio n , a very crude one, of the fragm ents in the foregoing tw o sections. T w o facts seem in d u bitable to me. First, experience has show n th a t th e thesis o f the liquidation, by m eans o f planning, o f the m arket, com m odities, and m o n ey was incorrect, F o r o n e thing, this thesis shows a failure to overcom e th e influence o f pre-Marxist u to pian socialism; for an o th er, it reflects a revolutionary optimism th a t greatly abbrevi ated th e tem poral and in stitu tio nal distances to the future. M ore over, n o t all propo sition s are o f the same theoretical and practical im po rtan ce In essence, w hat characterizes socialism is n o t the existence or the absence o f com m o dities and m o ney , b u t the exist ence o r th e absence o f the free p rodu cer, th e liberation o f hum an individuality A nother typical danger in in te rp re ta tio n is th e logical fallacy o f confusing necessary and sufficient conditions. We illustrate this by th e in te rp re ta tio n o f a well-known pro p o sitio n from T he C o m m u n ist M a nifesto C om m u nism deprives no one o f th e pow er to ap propriate the p ro d u c ts o f society; all it does is to deprive him o f th e p o w e r to subjugate the lab o r of others by such a p p ro p ria tio n [10: 5 1 ] . E x p ro p ria tio n o f th e m eans o f p ro d u c tio n puts an end to the possibility o f exploiting o th e rs labor by direct appropriation. F ro m this the conclusion was d raw n - for a long time and to this day in some places th a t nationalization o f th e m eans o f p ro d u c tion pu ts an end to exploitatio n and autom atically attains social ism, whose au th en ticity is m easured by th e percentage of n atio nal ization. B ut this is a non sequitur, E xplo ita tio n ca n n o t be done away with w ith o u t doing away w ith private pro p e rty , b u t doing away w ith private p ro p e rty does not m ean th a t exploitation, too , is necessarily do n e away w ith. E xp rop riation is a necessary, n o t a sufficient, condition for socialism, fo r the withering away o f the state, etc. It should no t be necessary to expand m u ch m ore on this su b ject, T o seek in Marx fo r a ready-m ade solution for socialist ec o n omy would n o t only be fruitless but, from everything we k n o w o f him, anti-Marxist. W hat is m ore, no system, neith er socialist nor any o th er, should be looked fo r in Marx. He explicitly warned us against it: T ech ow fu rth e r pictures to himself th a t I have co nstru cted a sy stem , although I did exactly the opposite, and in the Manifesto, which was directly in ten d ed for workers, I rejected all systems,

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and p u t in their place a critical stu d y of' th e conditions, course, and general results of' the real social tren ds. A nd such a s tu d y can n eith er be m odeled after som eone else, no r p u t to g e th e r like a cartridge b e lt [14: 73-74]. In keeping with his general m ethodological ap proach, Marx gave his analytical categories an expressly historical character; they were devoted to analysis o f a single, very definite socioeconom ic system and as a rule d o n o t apply to analysis of the p h e n o m e n a o f any o t h e r institutional system. C on seq uen tly, it is un-Marxist to mechanically transfer the categories o f Capital and to use them as the political econom y o f socialism. In his last theoretical w ork, ju s t before his dea th , Marx ridiculed Wagner, the G erm an econ om ist, for trying to do ju s t that: In the opinion o f Mr. Wagner, M arxs theory o f value is the cornerstone o f his socialist sy stem . Since I never w ork ed o u t a socialist system , this is merely a fantasy o f Wagners , . / tu tti q u a n ti" [15 : 456]. A little later he ridicules the idea th a t the theo ry o f value from Capital is applicable to socialism: , , , all this simply leads . t o the position th a t in M arxs socialist state the im p o rta n t thing is his theory o f value constructed for bourgeois society . . [ 15: 4 7 6 ] . However, even fo r categories th at are correctly applied, in th e ory it is useless to seek for a definition in Marx, as Engels warns: These rem arks (P. F irem an, 1892) are based on a m isunder standing th a t Marx wants to give a definition, and th at in Marx one m ay at all seek a once-and-for-all established definition. Naturally, where things and their m u tu a l relationship are n o t co n ceived as a p e rm a n e n t b u t as a changeable and th o u g h tfu l reflec tion o f his ideas, they are also su p p o rt for change and transform a tion; they are n ot compressed in to a stiff definition b u t emerge in their historic or logical process o f f o r m a tio n [16 : x x i ] . A nd once again, Engels 4 : B ut all con cep ts o f Marx (A uffassungsw eise) are n o t doctrines b u t m ethods, T h ey do n o t provide co m p lete doctrines b ut starting points for fu rth e r research and m e th o d s fo r th at research, Finally, it is o f in terest to cite the testim ony o f A. Bebel: By th e way, n o b o d y would reject the expression Marxist t h e o r y but Karl Marx himself , i f h e were alive [17: 339] One m ight ask: then w h a t is there left o f Marxism? A bove all, there is the dialectic m e th o d o f investigation. Precisely because this m e th o d has elim inated the lim itations o f a system , o f rigid definitions o f inapplicable concepts, th e Marxist principles o f in vestigation are flexible, adaptable, always m o d ern , dialectical. It is 90

not som ething th a t can be learned by m em orizing citations and form ulations from thick books; it ca n n o t be repeated after so m e b o d y . It can be mastered only by critical study of the conditions and general results o f actual social ev o lu tio n , and certainly n o t by repeating the words of a teacher, bu t by repeating so to speak an active a ttitu d e tow ard the world in which we act 5 That a ttitu d e is basically and, above all, critical As the twenty-five-year-old Marx declared: If building a fu tu re and com pleting it for all time is n o t our affair, th en it is all the m ore certain w h a t we should d o right now. We are thinking o f reckless criticism o f everything existing, cer tainly reckless in th at the criticism does n o t fear its results, and also th a t it does n o t fear a conflict w ith the existing forces [19: 38] . And th a t is w hat the m ature m an did in his life work,, which bore a second title: C ritique o f P olitical E co n o m y, Accordingly, Marxist dialectics is incom prehensible to dog matists, n or is it by any m eans easy to apply. B ut it provides us w ith a relatively simple and reliable criterion fo r distinguishing Marxists from M arxists, Arguing by citations, disputing a b o u t definitions and co nstru c tio n o f system s these are the character istics o f the people o f w hom Marx once said: I only k n o w th a t I am n o t a M arxist [1: 4 2 0 ] , Hence, w hat remains fo r us is a critical exam ination of o u r Yugoslav reality. 10 S E L F-G O V E R N M E N T Uniqueness of the Yugoslav E co n o m ic System Up to a b o u t 195 1, the agencies o f the United N ations and o th e r in tern atio nal bodies th at m ad e periodic surveys o f world eco nomics or of the econom ies o f individual regions had no difficulty in classifying the Yugoslav ec o n o m y . Yugoslavia was classified, along with the Soviet Union and the o th e r East European countries, as having a planned eco nom y. Later, some fluctuations set in. In bo th West and East, the Yugoslav econ om y was excluded from the Soviet b lo c or the socialist c a m p , b u t where it belonged was not certain. S om etim es the classification was m ade on a geographical principle, and Yugoslavia was assigned to Western E u ro pe (a bit arbitrarily) o r to S o u th e rn E urope (rath er m ore accurately). O ften, the Yugoslav eco nom y was treated as a group by itself. These dilem m as o f the statistical and economic-analytical agen cies o f in ternation al organizations give us an o p p o rtu n ity to return
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to the q u estio n of the types of present-clay ec ono m y w ith which we began. There are tw o pure types: the private capitalist type with the so-called free m arket, represented, for exam ple, by the U nited States, and the centralized p lanned type with state o w n e r ship o f the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n , represented, for example, by the Soviet U nion. Along with these are o th e r, in term ed iate forms, ac centuating o ne o r the other c o m p o n e n t m ore o r less, as is the case with th e welfare ec o no m ie s o f som e countries o f West E u ro pe where Social D em ocratic parties are in p o w e r To which o f these three types does the Yugoslav econom y belong? It is interesting to n o te th at it has been placed in each o f the three, according to the circum stances of th e classification and th e classifier. T h e extrem e protagonists o f private p ro p e rty had little hesitation in stressing the bureaucratic-centralist character o f th e Yugoslav ec o n o m y . A t the oppo site extrem e, Chinese-oriented econom ists likewise did n o t hesitate to call the Yugoslav eco nom y a capitalist o n e B etween these extrem e groups, whose views are no t o f any special scientific interest, there are a large n u m b e r o f serious econom ists w ho are inclined to place the Yugoslav econ om y in one o f the m ixed types, viz., the typ es in which there is some kind o f symbiosis b etw een private initiative and governm ent in terventio n. O ur thesis on this m atter is th a t n on e o f th e three foregoing ideas has a scientific basis. The Yugoslav econom y is obviously n o t a private-capitalist one, because private ow nership o f th e m eans o f p ro d u c tio n has been abolished. N or is it a centralized planning type, because econom ic agents are a u to n o m o u s in th eir decisions. F u rth e rm o re (and this is o f decisive im portance), it is no t an eclec tic m ixed econom y in which p riv ate6 and state ow nership coexist, because b o th capitalist private p ro p e rty and state ow nership have been abolished (viewed as a process th a t has advanced far enough to have becom e irreversible), T h e Yugoslav ec onom ic system is n o t eclectic, b u t monistic; in all its aspects it is based o n a single fu ndam ental principle social ow nership and this is the source o f its unity It is a type o f ec o nom y th a t we could m ost accurately describe as associationist socialism. In this c o n te x t we m ust n o w consider the interrelationships o f self-government, centralism, and planning
H orizontal D ecen tralization

E co nom ic connections are horizontal (on a definite territo ry , w ith o u t regard to differences in eco n o m ic activities) or vertical (according to ec onom ic activities, w ith o u t regard to th e territory). 92

Theoretically, fo u r co m bin atio n s are possible in the organization o f the econ om y (and o f society): (1) horizontal and vertical d ec en tralization ; (2) h orizontal decentralization and vertical centralization; (3) h orizontal centralization and vertical d ecentrali zation; and (4) h o riz o n ta l and vertical centralization. The first solution corresponds to a free-com petition econom y with such can tonal elem ents as we see in S w itzerland, for example. T h e second solution, carried o u t consistently, is n o t very likely in practice. It w ould m ean n ationalization o f branches o f the econ o m y , along with local a u to n o m y . The third solution represents a centralized organization o f th e state, along w ith free co m p etition of econom ic units, which is also unlikely in practice in any extre m e form. The fo u rth solution corresponds to centralized planning o n the basis o f state ow nership. It entails this system because vertical organization predeterm ines horizontal and, hence, total econ om ic (and social) organization. A u to n o m o u s econom ic units are the p re co n d itio n for territorial au to n o m y , and the aboli tion o f a u to n o m o u s ec onom ic agents w ould in all probability lead to bureaucratic centralism in general. This analysis, I suggest, is b u t an application o f the general Marxist analysis, according to which th e m eans o f p ro d u c tio n d e term in e p rodu ctive relations and the la tter d eterm in e all o th e r relationships. In th e presocialist epoch, ho rizo n ta l organization was pre d o m i nantly political, and vertical organization was p re d o m in a n tly eco nomic. In a socialist society, altho ugh em phases will p rob ab ly c o n tin ue to rem ain, the in te rp e n e tra tio n o f political and econom ic factors will be enorm ously greater, and this is a m eans o f id en tify ing and thereby elim inating the political and econom ic. The Y ugo slav solution, like the Swiss one, belongs to the first o f the categoriesnam ed. However, there is a huge difference betw een the tw o, which in this c o n te x t com es d o w n to the fact th a t a Yugoslav c o m m u n e practices m u ch m ore ec onom ic intervention th an a Swiss can to n , and th at, on th e o th e r h an d, Yugoslav producers practice m u ch m o re direct political in terventio n (E c o n o m ic House o f the Parliam ent) th an those w ho c o n tro l7 Swiss econom ic organ izations. With the lim itation stated, h orizontal decentralization is a k n o w n historical p h e n o m e n o n , and in this c o n te x t we need no t dwell fu r th e r o n it here. Vertical decentralization, in the sense of au to n o m o u s ec onom ic units, is a p ro d u c t of liberal capitalism. The aspect th a t interests us, the self-governm ent o f the producers, is a p ro d u c t o f associationist socialism alone and requires fu rth e r a tte n tio n .

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Vertical D ecentralization It will probably n o t be incorrect to say th a t until recently all Marxists were vertical centralists. T he question arises: why? T h e following ex planation seems plausible in th e light o f w h a t has been said. in the struggle for power, the decisive role is played by an efficiently organized w o rk e rs p arty . Accordingly, Marxists have always insisted on an organized working class w ith a class con sciousness o f its interests and a class p a rty t h a t is politically organ ized - while any territorialization o f w o rk e rs interests, by way o f developing elem ents o f self-government in e c o n o m ic units, w ould necessarily lead, in the fram ew ork o f the capitalist system , t o a weakening o f class solidarity and th ereb y to a decrease in the striking force o f the class p a r ty ,8 In this sense, M arxists waged a struggle against the anarchists and syndicalists while M arx was still alive and im m ediately after his death. T h e correctness o f this position was historically confirm ed b ey o n d a d o u b t by the suc cessful proletarian revolutions o f the first h a lf of this century. However, it was precisely this th a t led to intellectual inertia: w hat was tru e in the capitalist situation was transferred, m echani cally and autom atically, to th e socialist situation. Until very re cen t ly m an y Marxists (and m an y non-M arxists)9 regarded w o rk e rs councils as anarcho-syndicalist p h e n o m e n a against which a b itte r fight h ad to be waged. N aturally, the s ta te m e n ts o f Marx an d Engels had a great influ ence on the thinking o f later generations of Marxists T h e ir basic interest lay in the analysis o f the political p reco n d itio n s for a successful proletarian revo lution. When the first revolution, th e Paris C o m m u n e , was accom plished in 1871, M a rx s a tte n tio n was drawn above all to the first political acts of th e C o m m u n e . In th a t c o n te x t, in sta te m e n ts cited earlier, he strongly em phasized the significance o f h o rizo ntal decentralizatio n. Marx did n o t leave u n n o ticed the form a tio n o f w ork e rs councils in Paris [1 1 : 65, 7 0 ] , b u t n e ith e r then n o r later did he ascribe any special im p o rta n c e to t h a t.10 In the sense o f our p a tte r n in the preceding section, Marx seems to have leaned to w ard the second solution: horizontal decentralization and vertical centralization. F ro m this to the double centralization o f the fo u rth solution was n o t a big step fo r insufficiently critical partisans. Here it is im p o rta n t to m en tion a causal co n n e ctio n th a t will enable us to answer som e questions th a t arise later in o u r analysis. W orker self-government was n o t arrived at fo r th e sake o f m aking vertical decentralization possible. On th e co n tra ry , decentraliza 94

tion was a necessary condition fo r genuine w o rk e r self-govern m ent. W orker self-government has been attack ed even from the ranks o f workers on tw o diffe rent bases: (a) as being u to p ian and im possible in practice; (b) as injurious to the labor m o v em en t T h e second ju d g m e n t m ay be dismissed as a n o n sequitur: as we have seen, it assumes unconsciously (and q uite unjustifiably) th a t w hat is harm ful in a capitalist situation m ust be harm ful in a socialist situation as w e ll T h e first ju d g m e n t could be co ntested only theoretically until a few decades ago. Since th at time Yugoslav experience has given us irrefutable historical evidence: worker self-governm ent is n o t only possible in practice (it has been fu n c tioning in Yugoslavia for over a decade) b u t is economically efficient (since it was resto red , the Yugoslav e c o n o m y has reached the highest rate o f gro w th in th e w orld [21 ]), A t the same tim e, altho ugh w o rk e r self-governm ent in its full force was realized for tiie first tim e in history in Yugoslavia, it is n o t so m eth ing specifically Yugoslav, I f an econom ic or social p h e n o m e n o n is practically possible, if it passes th e test o f eco nomic efficiency, and if th e historical tendencies fo r its realization can assert themselves, th en from the Marxist p o in t o f view it is n o t only possible b u t necessary as well. In this respect the genesis o f w o rker self-government as a social p h e n o m e n o n can be called a classic case. This genesis to o k place in four phases, as was depicted in Section 5

On A u th o rity Discussions on a u to n o m y and centralization bring to the fore, to d a y as in Engels tim e, the problem o f a u th o rity . This is an extrem ely com plicated p ro blem w hich, as we know , goes b eyo nd th e b o un ds o f ec o n o m ic analysis, b ut still ca n n o t be passed over, because of its im portance, We shall confine ourselves to indicating th e basic features o f the problem . W ithou t a u th o rity there is no effective organization; w ith o u t organization there is no efficient ec o nom y, O ften, however, the m istake is m ade o f assuming th a t a u th o rity is a u th o rity , i.e., th a t there is only one kind o f a u th o rity . This is a m ost serious error, leading to com pletely topsy-turvy conclusions regarding the neces sary features o f social and ec onom ic organization. Wc believe it necessary to distinguish a t least fo u r kinds o f a u t h o r i t y . 11 The criterion for defining the first tw o kinds of au th o rity is th e presence o r absence o f prestige. In a dem ocratically oriented soci

ety in the Marxian sense - th a t is, in a society th a t is an associa tion o f freely developed individuals there is no basis for giving the prestige of' certain individuals or groups m ore im po rtan ce than that o f o th e r individuals (o r groups). C on seq uen tly, in a socialist society, as regards prestige, every individual has only o ne v o te . However, there are social fun ctio ns th a t lack prestige (o r a t least it is n o t p re d o m in a n t). When we are sick and go to the d o c t o r and he prescribes a certain medicine, in the norm al case we c a n n o t dis p u te his decision, [n this ease the dem ocratic rule is inapplicable, and we subm it m eekly to the a u th o rity o f a sp ecialist The same sort o f thing applies in school, in training for sports, in auto m o b ile service, etc. In a developed econom y the division o f labor is also developed, with professional specialization, and this grows as the econom y expands and develops. Hence, the au th o rity o f specialists plays a greater and greater role This discussion is directly relevant to analysis o f tlie functioning o f the institution of' w o rker self-government. T he m o st frequent criticism o f th a t in stitu tio n is th a t th e a u t h o r i t y o f the leader ship is called into question and th at this decreases the efficiency of' the business It is true th a t a u t h o r i t y is called in to q u estion , b u t w h at a u th o rity ? N o t th e au th o rity o f the specialist, b u t a u th o rita r ian decisions in the realm of prestige: arbitrary lining, firing, and transferring, and, in general, arbitrariness w ith respect to personal relations; raising and lowering wages; decision o f key alternatives in the o rien ta tio n of the enterprise, etc. I f authoritarianism , i.e., arbitrariness, is elim inated in this d o m ain , it can only help the solidarity o f the collective and hen ce th e efficiency o f control. What causes difficulty in p ractice is the absence o f any sharp line o f d e m arcatio n betw een t h e decisions o f specialists and d e m o cratic decisions, the dom ains o f specialist and d em o cratic a u th o r ity. There is an area in which these tw o au tho rities and these two types of decision overlap. However, this is n o t a difficulty th a t is specific fo r this case alone. N o w here in econom ics and society are there sharp boundaries, and this has to be ta k e n in to a c c o u n t in order to avoid the confusion th a t arises from identifying these interzones and areas where no overlapping occurs T h e criterion fo r distinguishing the o t h e r tw o k inds o f au th o rity is the presence or th e absence o f governm ental com pulsion. This leads us discreetly to an analysis of th e problem o f th e state, a problem th a t is entirely outside the scope o f this discussion. F o r o u r purposes it suffices to say th a t there is a political au th o rity based on com pulsion (in th e usual sense o f th e w ord) and a social au th o rity based on social pressure, approval or disapproval, affirm ation o r b o y c o tt, etc.,i.e., on p o te n tia l sanctions arising out 96

o f life in a social u n it It is a n o to rio u s fact th a t in class societies, and in general in h eterog eneo us societies, political au th o rity , alth oug h strong, is som etim es u nable to prevent social explosions. In ho m o g en eo u s societies the im po rtan ce o f social a u th o rity increases,12 This second d ifferentiation of types o f au th o rity is directly relevant to the problem of centralization and decentralization. A nationalized branch o f industry th a t is ru n by the state may be formally organized o n the same principles as a system o f w orker self-government Centralism here and centralism there But there is an essential difference T he first case involves a political a u th o rity th a t dictates; the second involves a social a u th o rity to which the w ork e rs collectives subm it voluntarily because they realize their econom ic and social interests. This brings o u r analysis to the question o f the enterprise and its role in an ec on om y o f the Yugoslav type or, a little m ore broadly, in associationist socialism. 11. T H E C O LLEC TIV E AS E N T R E P R E N E U R In an econom y m ad e up of self-governing bodies, th e exercise of managerial fu nc tions is n ot the task o f any special class o f indi viduals, b u t of th e collectivity o f m em b ers o f econom ic organiza tions, which we shall call w o rkers' collectives. Social evaluation and risk-taking (also an aspect o f evaluation) are explicitly fu n c tions o f th e collective. Supervision is a two-directional process in which every m em b er of the collective takes part. T h e remaining fu nction, co ordin ation , is purely technical and as such is left to technical experts, w ho are themselves m em bers o f the collective On this basis we arrive at the first im p o rta n t conclusion: th e col lective is q u a lified to exercise entrepreneurial fu n c tio n s 13 C oordinating activity is n o t in a n d o f its e lf a purely technical activity; in o th e r words, it is n o t in d ep en d e n t o f social relation ships. When supervision is a one-dimensional process, i.e , in the case o f bureaucratic supervision, the efficiency of coordination drops. A n d it is obvious th a t changes in efficiency are o f enorm ou s im p o rtan ce for econom ic th eory . Let us therefore dwell for a m o m e n t on a closer view o f th e problem . The efficiency o f coordinatio n com es do w n to the problem o f c e n t r a l i z a t i o n as against decentralization. Bureaucratic rule requires strict centralization. A nd this m eans (som ething th a t von Hayek m ade skillful use o f in his plea for the free capitalist m ar ket) th at existing and potential resources are dissipated from the m ere necessity o f n o t letting th e facts be to o generally k n o w n . F o r 97

there are kinds o f know ledge which by their n ature can no t appear in statistics and for this reason the central au th o rity can no t be presented in statistical form. Statistical d ata which such central au tho rity would have to use could be o b tain ed only by abstracting the smaller differences betw een tilings, by grouping - ju st as in dealing with resources o f th e same kind item s th a t vary in location, quality, and o th e r features, in a way that could be o f great significance for a specific decision [26: 524] . T o insure m ax im um utilization of th e resources and m em bers o f society, von H ayek proposes to use the functioning o f th e price mechanism. And u n d o u b ted ly , from a certain p o in t of view, the m ark e t provides a m u c h m o re effective co m m u nicatio n m ech a nism than an adm inistrative hierarchy. However, th a t is only one aspect o f the problem; the o th e r tw o are: ( ] ) coo rd in a tio n o f the m arket choices (in time and space), and (2) c o m m u n icatio n below the level o f th e enterprise I f we are effectively to solve th e p r o b lem o f coordin atio n, we m ust solve it in its entirety. If o th e r factors remain unchanged, independence in c o m m u n i cating decisions enhances efficiency . In that case it does n o t sig nify disunity and disruption o f the organization, and hence an u n econ om ic and anarchic disaggregation. O n th e co n tra ry , it means m axim u m labor eco nom y because o f th e cessation o f im m ediate initiative and im m ediate responsibility on the p art o f th e im m ediate perform ers, workers, and low er supervisors o n the enterprise level, and of collectives on the level o f the national eco no m y . Adm inistrative control and m an agem ent are unable to react quickly and successfully to changes and problem s arising directly o u t o f work, and this tardiness and crudeness are the general causes o f great losses. Within the enterprise, hierarchical relations have a depressing effect on individual p erfo rm an ce; they check initiative, u n d erm in e the w ork e rs drive, create o pp osition in short, low er working efficiency 14 A ccordingly, the initiative and responsibility should be left to those w ho are in direct co n tac t with the j o b to be done.. D ifferent social arrangem ents can m eet this re quirem ent in varying degrees T h e system o f w o rk e r selfgovernm ent certainly m ust be b e tte r th an any possible alternative in this respect. C om pared to private capitalism, the state-capitalist organization has show n m arked efficiency, as measured by the degree o f grow th o f p ro d u c tio n , since it could utilize planning on a national scale. C om pared to state capitalism, socialist organiza tion will be m ore efficient, since it is in a position, by reason o f eliminating class antagonisms, to m ake greater use o f available knowledge, as well as o f the intellectual and em otional energy o f th e m em bers o f th e social u n i t . 15
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A lthough a collective may be a u to n o m o u s to a great e x ten t, it canno t o f course be fu lly au to n o m o u s. In the case of evaluations th a t involve essential damage to the interests o f o th e r collectives, some higher representative body m ust h and d o w n a decision. This is a very com plex and little-investigated problem , bu t we cannot consider it here In the m atters th at concern us primarily, the dep endence o f the collective will be chiefly technical in nature. T he ideal solution would be to separate the regulatory and o p era tive functions, leaving th e fo rm e r to representative agencies while the latter are settled by w orkers collectives and their associa tions On this basis, suprem e co ordin ation , including th e social plan, along w ith th e instrum entalities for its ex ecu tio n, would be left to the S k u p s tin a ,16 It should be em phasized that coordination will have to be partially accom plished on the spo t with th e help o f specialized governm ent m achinery, in which case the regulatory fu nctions gradually go over into operative ones This interference o n the p art o f the state apparatu s m ay be very p ro m in e n t in the first days o f a new system. But as th e process o f standardization and in stitu tion alization goes forw ard, the intervention can be grad ually reduced to a basically rou tine activity. Banks play a special role in this general coordin atio n by com bining custom ary business criteria with the in ten tio n s o f the social plan, N aturally, the p lan ning agencies provide the enterprise with the relevant data, which becom e the elem ents for form ing their econom ic policy. The firms re p o rt on th eir ow n im p o rta n t decisions, thus enabling th e p lan ning agencies to prepare new sets o f d ata wherever required. T h e social plan, the banks, and the availability o f info rm atio n repre sent an effective coo rd ination mechanism th at enables the econ om y to fun c tion s m o o th ly w ith o u t central m anagem ent. The final result o f all this is to m inim ize risks and uncertainties, so th at the fun ctio ns o f the enterprise app ear in an entirely new lig h t In carrying o u t ec onom ic plans, the main task o f planning agencies consists in m aintaining norm al m arket relationships. Inso far as price fluctuations can be avoided, unw arranted profits and losses will likewise be avoided (th e foreign m ark et, o f course, p re sents a serious p ro blem ) B u t to the e x te n t th at stability is achieved, p r o fits a n d losses o f enterprises w ill d e p e n d o n the p ro d u ctive e ffo r ts o f their collectives T h e n ex t question relates to the distribu tio n o f revenue. There is n o need w hatever for the entire a m o u n t of profits earned by a given collective to be d istributed uniform ly to its m em bers Part o f th e p rofit th a t is to be distribu ted to the m em bers o f the collective has the fu n c tio n o f an incentive. In the general case, we w ant to maximize the supply of en tre p ren e u rsh ip , which we atta in by 99

institutionalizing a system of d istrib utio n th at is universally accepted as fair. Thus, the gross p ro fit is split into tw o parts: the net profit, which is used as a reward to the m em bers o f th e collective to stim ulate the supply o f the productive fa cto r o f e n tre p ren e u rsh ip ; and a rem aind er (if any), w hich is of the nature of ren t, and as such m ust be absorbed by taxes. When we speak o f p rofit as a price for entrepreneurial services, we m ean net profit, i.e., th a t p art o f p rofit left to the free disposal o f the collective. A negative profit, o r loss, calls for a similar approach, Within a definite interval it will be regarded as a m a rk e t penalty for failing to provide the average q u a n tity o f e n tre p ren e u rsh ip . In this sense, and treating absolute loss as only a special case o f general o p p o rtu n ity loss, the entrepreneurial functio n o f the collective includes the assum ption o f risk as one o f its co m p onents, as K night rem inds us som ew here. However, reducing th e wage fund below a certain level w ould hardly appear to be socially permis sible A ccordingly, th e state, o r the co m m un e, will have to inter vene and, in th e same way th a t it to o k a superp rofit by m eans o f a tax , it will provide a subsidy for a superloss. I t may also h ap p e n th a t some enterprise is no t operating p rofitably , and th at the col lective was n o t subjectively responsible for this, so th a t a p erm a n e n t subvention will be necessary, or even liquidation. In all these cases the risk is borne by the o w n er o f th e capital, i.e., the com m u n ity ; this reflects S c h u m p e te rs exam ple, in which assum ption o f th e risk was excluded from the entrepreneurial function. We now come to o u r second and final conclusion. The coiiective-enti ep reneur is c o n sta n tly active in th e process o f tech n o lo g ical, com m ercial, a n d organizational im p ro ve m en t, th a t is, it considers itself as essentially an innovator. T h e supply o f innova tions is autom atically regulated by the system o f m aterial rewards and penalties. Enabling p eople to follow their m aterial interests, the in stitu tio n strongly m otivates (althou gh, o f course, it is n o t the o n ly m otivation acting in the same direction) co n s ta n t increases in efficiency, which result in increased p ro d u c tio n , and this in turn increases the welfare o f the cooperative in general. Analytically, this institution restores a pow erful productive factor, a profitable price.
12. C E N T R A L IZ A T IO N M isguided P olem ics on C entralization

C entralization, like every w o rd th a t is used a great deal, has 100

m an y sem antic aspects th a t lead to confusion in discussion. M ore over, this term has a certain em otio n al co n n o ta tio n th at increases the confu sio n still further. T o d ay it is fashionable to be a decentralist, ju st as a short time ago it was fashionable to be a centralist As we shall see, there are objective justifications for this. N e verthe less, ju s t as som e tim e ago n o t every centralization was positive and every decentralization negative, so to day n o t every decentral ism is the expression o f an advanced position, n o r is every central ism th e expression o f b ureaucratic reaction. The naive conceptions o f ec onom ic decentralization on th e principles o f liberal capitalism o f the m iddle o f the last ce ntury ( o f course, the protagonists o f these co nceptions were unaw are o f this do ctrin a l identity) are just as econom ically misplaced and politically harm ful as was the em phasis on centralist solutions o f the Stalinist period. Very frequently the arg um ent for the advantages o f econom ic centralization takes the following form. T he activities o f a large n u m b e r o f ec onom ic units m ust be co ord inated . This requires a central plan, the ex e cu tio n o f which requires a central organ o f pow er, nam ely, the state. D ecentralization m akes it impossible for th e undeveloped regions o f the co u n try to catch up; it opens up a gap b etw een th e developed and undeveloped regions. Decentraliza tion o f the decisions o f a u to n o m o u s econom ic agents leads to wasting societys resources Evidence: unused capacity, duplica tion o f investm ents in som e regions, and inadeq uate investm ents in others Very often the answer to this reasoning is th a t econom ic organizations k n o w for themselves w hat is more pro fitable for them, and th a t they will m ake use o f th eir resources as profitably as possible. A ccordingly, planned direction must be avoided because the plan m ay be faulty, and resources should be decentral ized to a m ax im u m in o rd e r to avoid faulty central interventions, Dissipation o f social resources was m u c h greater in the period o f centralization. Evidence: political factories, low lab or productiv ity, uneconom ical investments, Both lines o f arg um ent have a kernel o f t ru th and accurate citations so far as statistically m easurable p h en o m en a are con cerned. B ut they are also full o f am biguous use o f term s and crude non seq u itu is Let us exam ine som e o f them . The centralist argu m e n t contains the need for coo rd inating ec onom ic activities and for a central i.e., general - social plan, B ut it does no t follow th a t this plan is obligatory (in th e sense o f adm inistrative obliga tion) or th a t the state has to execute it. Obviously, there is a need for a u th o rity , but it does n o t follow th a t it m ust be exclusively a political au th o rity . Tru e, an u nco n tro lled m ark et ec ono m y gives rise to a tend en c y to polarize the developed and undeveloped 101

regions. B ut why should we leave such a process un controlled when effective instru m en ts for regulating it. fully com patible with decentralization, are kn ow n ? True, in the decentralization process in o u r co untry, there was and still is waste of the resources o f society, but th a t was no t and is no t the result o f decentralization as such, but of: (a) badly c o n d u c te d decentralization, and (b) inevitable inconsistencies in transferring from one organizational regime to another. In the decentralist argu m en t, it is true th at ec onom ic agents are subjectively m otivated to exercise the most effective control when they are working with th eir ow n resources. B ut it does n o t follow th at m axim um profitability o f th e individual enterprise is at the same tim e m ax im um social profitability. T h e differences may be enorm ous. While it is tru e th a t the social plan canno t be forced on the enterprise and th a t the state cannot, by adm inistrative measures, derogate from the a u to n o m y o f the w o rkers collective (for th a t would be th e end o f w ork ers self-governm ent), neverthe less it does n o t follow th a t we should n o t insist on striving to achieve the social plan and to insure this by ec onom ic (hence, n o t administrative) means. It is very possible th at the social plan may be faulty at the enterprise level17 b u t it does n o t follow th at adding up the a u to n o m o u s plans o f enterprises yields th e best solution for the econom y as a whole On the contra ry, a social plan on the level o f the national e c o n o m y is certainly b e tte r th an w hat the individual firms can conceive. T he centralist-decentralist polem ic was particularly anim ated am ong us in the period betw e en 1961 and 1963. Those were the days o f p re paratio n for in trodu cing the new C on stitu tio n , when significant reform s were m ade in th e direction o f fu rth e r decen tralization and d em o cratizatio n of o u r econom ic and social life. It was precisely during this period that there was h ea te d disagree m ent over the te m p o o f econ om ic developm ent. Psychologically, it is u n derstand able th at this coincidence led a n u m b e r o f eco n omists to a n o th e r non s e q u itu r : if there was a slowing d o w n of grow th a fte r the decentralization reform s, th en the decentraliza tions were a brake on econom ic developm ent F o rtu n a te ly , these conclusions did n o t lead to a change in the course o f the c o u n t r y s internal policy An analysis of the m echanism o f the slow dow n of 1961-1962, in the so-called Y ellow B o o k [2.3] in m id-1962 and at the Zagreb Congress o f E conom ists in January 1963, show ed th at the slow dow n of grow th was due primarily to the following causes: (a) the preceding period o f d evelopm ent had left behind it certain disprop ortion s, which weakened the ec onom ic stru cture (stagnation of exports, agriculture, and heavy in d u stry ); (b) several
102

radical econom ic reform s were instituted in this situation (regard ing incom e d istribution and the system o f credit, banking, and foreign trade); (c) each o f these reform s by itself w ould have been a m ajor additional b u rden on the econom ic machine, all th e m ore so in a situation where they were instituted all at once, the negative effects being heightened by the insufficient structural and organizational preparatio n o f the reform s; and (d) there was general eco n o m ic instability and un ce rtain ty , with firms changing their p ro d u c tio n program s in the hope th at the situation would clear u p and ec onom ic conditions would stabilize, while the econom ic m achinery wavered and its tem po fell to a half o f what it had been However, after the necessary lessons had been learned with reference to ec onom ic policy and ade q u ate measures had been taken, the ccon om y returned to its fo rm er developmental tren d in ] 96.3 and exceeded it in 1964, A ccordingly, after the transitional difficulties had been overcom e, decentralization did n o t h in d er econom ic d ev e lopm e nt; on the contrary, it created the p oten tial preco n d itio n s for its being m ore rapid, in the following period, than it had been before.. B ut it should be added at once th a t the actualization o f these po tentialities did no t give rise to any d a ta w hatsoever to indicate a n ew delay in econom ic growth in the years from 1965 to 1967,
C entralization o f Initial E co n o m ic C onstruction

In a certain sense th e situation in socialist countries after the revolution, with respect to taking pow er, was like the situation in colonial countries a fte r attaining independence. In both cases the old app aratus o f p o w e r had to be destroyed and a new one erected. In both cases radical reform s had to be conducted (agrarian reform, nationalization), and, in the socialist case, social reform s as well. A nd in bo th cases there was an acute shortage o f m an agem ent cadres on w hom the new regimes could rely In such a situ atio n the idea of decentralization would be a reactionary one, ta n ta m o u n t to liquidating the achievements o f the revolution and o f national lib era tio n .18 In such a situation the only correct solu tion is the strictest political and econom ic centralization. C entralization means, in this instance, great pow ers o n the p art o f central governm ent agencies, lim itation of' local a u to n o m y , direct in terventio n by th e state through economic-adm inistrative measures The co ndition s ju st described prevailed in Yugoslavia for the first five years a fte r liberation. During th a t time the agrarian reform was carried o ut, as well as the first and second 103

nationalizations; ministries and agencies for branches of the eco nom y , and th eir groupings, were organized; centralized planning was in tro d u ce d and the first five-year plan p u t into execution; a new adm inistrative apparatus was set up; and the first fo un d a tio n s were laid for the new social and political system . All this could be accom plished in such a radical fashion and in so sh ort a tim e only by holding to strict political and econom ic centralization. T h a t was a time w hen it was correct, as well as fashionable, to be a centralist. The du ra tion o f the centralist period varies, o f course, from one country to another, It depends on the d epth o f the preceding revolutionary transform ation, on the degree o f econom ic and cultural developm ent, and on the international economic-political situation. But the period itself is inevitable and corresponds, in socialist countries, to M arxs well-known period o f the dictatorship o f the proletariat. T he questio n arises: when the basic transition has been m ade from o ne system to the o th er, in the sense o f the initiation o f an irreversible developm ental process, i.e., when the fundam ental in stitution s o f th e old system have been crushed and replaced by adequate new institutions, what is to be done then? Yugoslav practice has given a very definite answer to that question, an answer identical with the vision o f Marx and Engels. C entralization is no t a goal b u t a means. The goal is the e n a ctm en t o f the transition from one system to a n o th e r A fter that transition has been m ade, a new m eans m ust be ad o p ted , adequate to the new goal. This new goal is th e co nstru ction o f a socialist society. Practice in Yugoslavia and in o t h e r countries has shown th a t centralization is a very p o o r m eans for realization o f th at goal The a tte m p t was m ad e to set up d em ocratic centralism. But the course of developm ent was as follows, w ith o u t exception: d e m o c r a tic centralism, dem ocratic centralism , dem ocratic centralism , and finally centralism itself; this m e a n t a dangerous and false bureaucratic road. What counts is n o t the good o r bad intentions o f individual leaders o r groups, but the necessary consequences o f bureaucratic stru ctu res Historical experience has shown the tw o fu nd am ental defects o f centralism: political and econom ic. They co ndition and p en etrate one a n o th e r O n th e political plane, centralism inevitably leads to totalitarian bureaucratization o f the social stru ctu re and to the well-known Stalinist excesses. In this situation th e fund am ental M arxist socialist postulate, the free develo pm ent o f each individual is the co ndition o f th e free developm ent of all, becomes incapable o f realization. O n the ec onom ic plane, because 104

o f the shackling of individual and locai self-initiative and the discouraging o f developm ent, the en o rm o u s (although latent) em otional and intellectual energies of society lose their efficacy, and th e tem p o o f ec onom ic developm ent and. above all, the standard o f living o f the w ork er d ro p below w h at they could be, objectively, in socialist society , 19 Along with th e new system, therefore, th e process o f econom ic a n d political decentralization m ust begin. This m eans the w ithering away o f the sta te , nam ely, the replacem en t o f political au th o rity by social au th o rity , o f the state m achinery by social self-government. Sad historical experience was needed before this simple tru th , which the classics foresaw, could be seen and carried o u t in practice A ctu ally , this should n o t surprise us. G reat intellectual and em otio nal effo rt and a co m pact political organization are required to c o n d u c t strict centralization o f the ec o no m y, only to proceed to its liquidation w hen it has attained its highest p oint o f efficiency. It m ight be expected th a t some strong social pressure would be required for such a reversal o f the process o f social organization. C entralization of M odern E c o n o m y The seeming parado xes o f the situ ation are n o t exhausted by making the observation, as in the preceding section, th a t the only task o f centralization is to prepare decentralization. The paradox is heightened by the fact th a t this decentralization m ust m ean an effic ie n t c e n tr a l i z a t i o n .. This is the source o f fresh misunderstandings in discussions ab out centralization and decentralization. What is involved? O f necessity, the n ature o f technological processes and the o r g a n i z a t i o n of p ro d u c tio n and distribu tio n make th e m o d e m eco n o m y centralistic. Sism ondism was impossible even in the last ce ntu ry, and certainly so to d ay . It is n o t only the tran spo rtatio n and p o w er system s th a t m ust be regulated, as is perfectly clear, b u t also foreign trade and exchange, the system o f the internal m arket, th e allocation o f investm ents, the p ro d u c tio n of entire branches. If this is n o t d o n e, th e result is business cycles and crises or, at th e very least, flu ctua tions anti inflationary spirals. In this respect, n oth in g is changed by giving an econo m y the nam e of' socialist. T h e m a rk e t is inherently unstable, as Marx show ed in his schemes o f re p ro d u c tio n , as we can d em o n strate by the m od ern tech n iq u e o f ec onom ic m odeling, and as is kn ow n in practice on th e basis o f historical experience. Hence, an uncontrolled, decentralized m a rk e t eco nom y is inherently unstable and subject 105

to business cycles. T he emphasis is on control here; how is it to be achieved? In trying to give an answer, we may again refer to Yugoslav experience A fter the early centralized planning had been increasingly elim inated and econom ic organizations had been given au to n o m y , there gradually came to be a loss of' con nectio n between the setting o f plan goals and th eir realization. T his became particularly obvious in 1961 and 1962 T he plan suddenly fou nd itself in a vacuum. T he criticisms th a t at the time were directed at the m akers o f the plans were to a great e x te n t u n fo u n d e d . The essential thing is no t th a t the plans were badly draw n up (in the sense o f planned balancing o f resources and p ro d u c tio n ) or th a t they were overstrained. T he plans were at least as good as in previous years. T h e essential thing was th at the sy ste m o f planning, taken broadly, i.e., as the p re p aration and e x e c u tio n of the plan, had n o t changed even thou gh the conditio ns o f the econom y had changed. The gap betw een the planning system and the system of doing business was bridged by m eans o f the O fficial G azette and ad h o c adm inistrative interventions,20 which o f course did n o t add to the efficiency o f doing business, The lack o f serious scientific w ork in this field had very serious consequences B ut in the end practice once m ore came to the rescue. At th at very time there began the serious developm ent o f a new organizational form, which was to con trib u te tow ard renewing the link betw een the planning and the execution o f the plan: econom ic integration. When centralism fr o m above had w eakened, it had to be replaced by centralism fr o m below . This is the m eaning o f integrative m ovem ents in the Yugoslav ec on om y . Integ ration is s t i l l o n e o f t h o s e p h e n o m e n a th a t evoke considerable m isunderstanding. It is o fte n regarded as a merger o f enterprises, But merger is only o n e o f the m any possible, and actual, form s taken by integration. O fte n , integration (and particularly merger) is b rou ght a b o u t by political pressure, which is h arm ful because it is a negation o f the essence o f integration as a de-politicized centralism. Practice has show n that such forced integrations show p o o r com m ercial results However, if n o t theoretically, th en by e x p e r i e n c e , the m isunderstandings are elim inated and the integration m ovem ent leads to new and diversified form s o f econom ic co o peratio n, whose spectrum begins at one end with a contractual relationship betw een the central enterprise and the co o p e rato r and ends w ith fusion, and at the o th e r end com prises the coo peration o f tw o or m ore enterprises, up to integrative projects on the level of a branch o f the e c o n o m y .21 106

Integratio n is carried o u t for the purposes o f specialization oi produ c tio n , rational distribu tio n of supplies to foreign m arkets, and jo in t financing o f capital fo rm a tio n . Integrative associations com e into being in situation s where it is necessary to centralize the taking of econom ic decisions on a b roader base than th a t o f the individual enterprise. On this principle, in contrast to central agencies o f eco nom ic p o lic y , th ere is. instead of a large n u m b er o f individual and separate enterprises, a m uch smaller n u m b e r o f econom ic subjects.. The e c o n o m y is no longer atom istic, but acquires a definite organizational stru ctu re of its ow n. The fo rm ation of this structure fills the organizational gap betw een the social plan and the a u to n o m o u s enterprises. To the e x te n t th a t i n t e g r a t i v e processes develop, the need for adm inistrative intervention by govern m en t agencies disappears When these processes are in essence co m pleted , regulatory m echanism s will have been b uilt into th e e c o n o m y th a t reduce governm ent interventio n to a m inim um . The centralism of this system differs radically from the centralism of the system we spoke o f earlier, o f w hich, by a co ncaten atio n of' historical circum stances, people usually think w hen they speak o f centralism. T h e difference does n o t lie in the way in which decisions are arrived at; they are arrived at centrally in b o th cases. T he difference does lie in the n atu re of' the a u th o rity on which the decisions are based. In th e first case, it is the political au th o rity o f the state; in th e second, it is th e social a u th o rity o f associations o f self-governing organizations. In this system, naturally, th e system o f planning also takes on essentially new features In fact, th e elabo ration o f this system still lies ahead of us We discuss this in the final section o f this chapter. Two Dangers Self-government and decentralization arc n o t the universal panaceas to the problem s o f socialist co n stru ctio n. Centralism, which was unavoidable at a certain stage o f developm ent, contained the po ten tial danger o f bureaucratization and decreased efficiency. As we k n o w , this danger did n o t remain merely potential, b u t it became actual in a num ber o f countries. D ecentralization, which is indispensable in the present phase of developm ent, has its risks as well, We m en tio n tw o: m on opo ly and th e profiteering m entality. A fte r w ork er self-government had been inaugurated in 1950 and the general and principal d irectorates had been liquidated in the n ex t tw o years, the decentralization process began in a very 107

simplified and rigid pattern. O ne o f the postulates o f this p a tte rn w a s : o n e e n t e r p r i s e , o n e w o r k e r s council. Organs o f self-government a t higher and low er levels were n o t con tem p lated . The desire was, o n the one h an d, to preserve the integrity of the enterprise from being bro ken up into shops and, on the other, to prevent huge econom ic organization from m aking it impossible for genuine w ork er self-governm ent to function. The latter was in keeping with a second p o stulate: full c o m p etitio n . C o m petitio n was required, on the o ne hand, in o rd e r to p ut the econom ic agencies used in the adm inistrative form of m anag em ent on the road to businesslike in d epend en ce and initiative, and, on the o th e r hand, in order to avoid the appearance o f m o n o p o ly . C o o peratio n was possible only via cham bers o f com m erce; the individual branches o f th e ec o nom y (e.g,, oil) held semilegal m eetings for the purpose of doing business; trade was strictly separated from p ro d u c tio n ; and only later did th e possibility o fle g a l co operation appear sham efacedly in th e o rdin ance concerning w hat were called professional associations. The econom ic arsenal consisted, in practice, o f a single w eapon: the so-called rate o f accum ulation and funds. T his was roughly the p icture in 1952 and 195.3, It soon turn ed o u t th a t this rigid and oversimplified scheme had to be m ade m uch m ore flexible and com plex. A n d life itself began to m odify it. T he organizational forms o f selfL governm ent were broadened from below, o n th e level o f the shop and the econom ic unit, as well as from above, o n the level of ec onom ic form ations capable o f comprising enterprises located in various parts o f th e country. In keeping with this, the pro h ib itio n o f associations yielded place to stim ulating th em , thereb y m arking the beginning o f the integration process described earlier. The accu m u lation and funds rate was replaced by a varied and rich arsenal, later enlarged and perfected. At th e same time there is n o d o u b t that, in a m ark e t ec ono m y, integration m eans n o t only increased efficiency but also increased econom ic power. The la tte r is w hat we had in m ind in speaking o f m o n o p o ly . Increased ec onom ic p o w er can be used in socially beneficial or in socially harm ful directions Here again it is n o t good o r bad in te n tio n s that are involved, b u t the logic o f the situation. Accordingly, au to m a tic correctives m ust be built into the ec on om y. We already have such correctives: o n the o n e h an d , the Yugoslav League o f C om m unists, the trade unions, and public opinion,- and, on the o ther, the com m issions of social supervision, the cou rts of h o n o r, the cham bers o f com m erce, and the price bureau. W hether they are ad e q u ate remains to be seen. M onopolistic abuses do n o t seem, qualitatively, to be of great

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im p o r t a n c e in the Yugoslav e c o n o m y today. They appear primarily in the form o f running up prices and o f pressure on w eaker com petitors. However, no serious scientific stu d y has yet been m ade o f the problem , and it w ould be well w orthw hile to u n d erta k e one as so on as possible. The second danger is the fo rm ation of a profiteering m entality. O bviously, the financial profitability o f a business and material stimuli are only m eans, and n o t the goal, o f socialist constructio n. T he goal is th e fullest possible satisfaction of th e needs o f society. However, an insufficiently contro lled insistence on the m eans may s om etim es lead to an interchange o f m eans and goal in the consciousness of people and in th eir m otivations and am bitions Such a q u id pro q uo w ould be very harm ful, since it would check the fo rm ation o f socialist social relationships and, com bin ed with the negative effects o f m o n o p o ly , m ight cause a dem an d for r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f g o v e r n m e n t interventio n, with all its consequences. The presence o f this danger has been th e basic criticism o f the Yugoslav system m ad e by some o f its critics. O ne o f th e most interesting o f these com es from P. Sweezy [ 2 4 ] , th e Am erican Marxist. His argum ent is essentially as follows T h e creation o f materia] interestedness and exclusive o rientation o n m arket earnings m ust lead to the form a tio n of a profiteering m entality. Hence, a system o f aspirations is set up in society, and these aspirations are obviously n o t socialist. The evaluation o f social desirability in term s o f p ro fit is characteristic o f a capitalist system. Therefore, when ttie present generation, which m ade the revolution, transfers the d o m in a n t positions in society to a generation lacking the subjective fa cto r th a t prevents a restoration, the new generation, bro ugh t u p in a spirit of m a rk e t individualism and egoism, will be in no position to resist degeneration toward capitalist social relationships. Sweezy already sees the beginning o f the degeneration process in th e absence o f revolutionary socialist ideals am ong the y o u th and in th e ten d en c y for everyone to concern himself only with his own personal p rob lem s and a co m fo rta b le life. To rem edy these defo rm ation s, Sweezy proposes a considerable red u ctio n in the social esteem accorded to financial success, and th e inauguration o f nonfinancial form s o f incentive, such as co m petitions, posters, and new spaper articles on the best workers, campaigns based on c u rren t political slogans, and, where necessary, g ov ern m en t intervention to replace profiteering m a rk e t regulation o f p ro d u c tio n and in every way to c o m b a t the appearance o f any kind of m o n o p o ly . A p a r t f r o m t h e a r b i t r a r y e v a l u a t i o n s o f Yugoslav 109

 d e fo rm atio n s, Sweezy gives us a prescription we are quite familiar w ith, which conies do w n in practice to replacing the free decisions o f th e producers by bureaucratic orders and to the critical use o f o n e s own thinking by the working o ut o f directives. Certainly Sweezy does n o t personally desire these consequences; he speaks in favor o f the establishm ent o f w o rk e rs councils. At the same time, w orkers councils are the same kind o f foreign body in a g ov ern m ent ow nership system as they are hi a system o f private ownership, A w o rk e rs council is an in stitution th a t fits com pletely only into a system o f social ow nership, and it presupposes th e degovernm entalization and a u to n o m y o f the im m ediate producers,. Sweezy is Marxist enough to see the fundam ental difference betw een the Yugoslav and the capitalist situations, the absence of private ownership. However, this only leads him to deny th e Chinese assertions o f the existence of capitalism in Yugoslavia, and to replace th em by the thesis o f capitalist degeneration. It is well to iecall here that, according to Marx, capital is n o t the accu m u lation o f p ro fit (otherwise, the category of' capital would exist in every m ark et eco n o m y ) but p o w e r over labor and its p r o d u c ts [7: 1 67 ), Is n o t au to n o m o u s w o rk e r seIfL governm en t the m o st effective possible antithesis to pow er over the labor of' o th e rs ? A nd would it n o t seem th at the sub stitution of governm ent ow nership for private ow nership would n o t greatly alter the pow er over labor and its p ro d u c ts ? S w ee zy s criticism has enabled us to exam ine certain criticisms th a t can be m ade o f the system of self-government. This criticism obviously does n o t hold w a te r and is p robably the result o f very inad equ ate knowledge of actual events in o u r c o u n try on the part o f the author. B ut the problem o f the negative effects o f the m ark e t o n the ethical dom ain o f socialist society still rem ains and merits careful and serious study. Finally, one m ore rem ark, fo r th e sake o f com pleteness, All the foregoing analysis is based on Yugoslav experience. In som e otherco u n try , or at som e o th e r time in this c o u n try , the historical situation will determ in e o th e r solutions and conclusions. F or example, in a co u n try w ith a pow erful d em ocratic tradition and w i t h l a b o r h a b i t s t h a t c o r re s p o n d to an industrialized environm ent, the stim ulating effects o f decentralization and the dangers of' centralist d e fo rm atio n s will perhaps n o t be as great as in the Yugoslav situation. Similarly, with a rapidly rising social standard of living, ec onom ic stimuli will gradually lose their efficacy in the a tta in m e n t o f social goals and will be replaced by no nec o n o m ic stimuli. In th a t situation, both the division o f l a b o r and specialization will be m u c h greater, and, along with them , the 110

e x te n t of professional a u th o rity . It is likely th a t at th at time central social ad m inistratio n will be able to occupy a much b ro a d er field o f'application w ith o u t fear o f abuse in evaluations or o f bureaucratic d e fo rm atio n s

13. P L A N N IN G F au lty D ich o to m ies

Certain polemics w ith respect to the n ature o f planning in Yugoslavia m ay be reduced to the following three alternatives:22 1 Should a plan be a prognosis or an obligation to act? 2 In the case o f planning on d ifferent levels, should the relationship be one of' equality or subordination? 3 Should the social plan be derived from local and partial plans, or should the latter be derived from fragm entation o f a central social plan? It is evident im m ediately th a t these alternatives en ter directly into the polemics on d ecen tralization and centralization. Clearly, the first of' the alternatives in each o f the three pairs will occur in extrem e decentralist positions, while the o th e r three alternatives represen t p ostulates o f equally extre m e centralist views. After w h at has been said, it will be clear th a t all these alternatives are intrinsically faulty. Instead o f the formal-logical dichotom ies expressed in e ith er-o r term s, the o rien ta tio n has to be o n the dialectical solutions th at imply b o th -a n d : both obligation and prognosis; b o th s u b ordin ation and equality; b o th upward and dow nw ard flow o f planning. We c o m m e n t briefly on these theses. 1., A plan th at was n o t binding on a n y o n e for an yth ing would no t be a plan b u t an intellectual exercise. A plan has to be strictly binding on the agencies o f econo m ic policy: econom ic ministries (o r ministries in general, as far as the social plan is concerned) and, in a definite, precisely defined sense, bank s and cham bers of com m erce. All these are representative bodies, responsible for carrying o u t the goals o f the plan. F ro m the p o in t o f view o f a u to n o m o u s ec onom ic organizations, th e plan is only a prognosis, and it is all the m ore probable, the b e tte r the planning system is w orked o u t and the higher the professional level o f the planning. A plan is also a prognosis in this sense: no one will insist on its perfo rm an ce 100 percent.. New circum stances m ay call for changes in th e plan th a t m u st then be m ade in co n fo rm ity with established procedure, which m ay n o t bypass th e representative agencies, 2. E quality of rights is a pre co n d itio n o f self-government. If we

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d e s t r o y equality o f rights, we should effectually liquidate s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s would be acceptance o f S w eezys inconsistent position, of which we spoke previously. On the o th e r hand, this does n o t m ean th a t all su bord in atio n m ust be anathem atized S u b o rd in atio n is a category th a t follows from authority.. Nevertheless, political su b ord ination (in the sense o f adm inistrative orders backed by th e p ow er o f the state) is absolutely unacceptable; social s u b o rd in atio n , which takes public opinion in to acco unt, is always in o rd e r Likewise, it is n o t co ntrad ictory to em phasize the ex pert n atu re o f th e plans that have been w orked o u t by the best experts in the co u n try , and to give m ore social weight to the opinions o f representative bodies than to individual ec onom ic subjects. In a word, insistence on social interests is n o t incom patible with the inviolability o f au to n o m y . The deciding fa c to r is the w ay in which this insistence is carried out. A t the same time, even the standard adm inistrative subo rdin ation is possible w ithin individual state agencies. 3.. T h e social plan is n o t a m echanical sum o f local and partial plans, b ut it is n o t in d e p e n d e n t o f th em . In working o u t the social plan, there m ust be a c o n stan t flow o f in fo rm atio n u p w ard from below, and vice versa, and a jo in t solution of the problem s of real o r presum ed divergence o f interests. Mechanism o f Planning This is an en orm o us them e, which goes far bey ond o u r field o f vision here. F o r the p resen t, we can only deal with a few basic factors and form ulate th em in nine theses. 1. It is o f fu nda m e n tal im p o rta n c e to realize that co n struction o f th e plan is not o nly a jo b fo r exp erts b u t also a social a ct Both com p o n en ts are o f equal im p o rta n c e for the efficacy o f planning,. As fo r the c o m p o n en t o f expertise (should we p erhaps say, o f science?), this is qu ite evident. In co nnectio n with the social act, one rem ark is ess e n tia l If th e plan is to be n o t only p u t forward b u t also earned o u t, it has to contain m otiv atio n for its execution. T h at means th a t those engaged in th e ec o n o m y m ust actively com prehend th e in ten tio n s o f the plan, and at the sam e tim e their interests are n o t in conflict with those intentio ns. Accordingly, p l a n n i n g presupposes u n in te rru p te d co n tac t with econom ic subjects, consultation and exchange o f ideas, and agreem ents and jo in t decisions. C o nsequen tly , integrative processes also facilitate planning to a large ex ten t. A plan derived from this kind o f w ork has considerably insured its execution. 2. T h e realism of a plan c o n s titu te s an ad dition al m otiv a tio n for

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its execution. T o the e x te n t th a t the planned predictions fit into the facts (and these predictions need n o t be only the tasks im posed by law b u t the elem ents o f d o c u m e n ta tio n backing up the plan), the plan will inspire confidence in those engaged in the eco n o m y th a t w h a t it predicts will actually com e to pass. It will then be in their ow n interest to m ake a b e tte r ad justm en t to w hat has been envisaged by th e plan. 3. The short-term and long-term aspects o f the plan m ust be distinguished. The difference is th at in the first case th e capacitics are taken as given, since th ey ca n n o t change essentially, and econom ic policy concentrates on current p rod u c tio n . In the second case, the basic problem is the change in econom ic capacities, i.e , in the am ou nts, structure, and allocation o f investments. 4. When the capacities arc given, effective regulation o f p ro d u c tio n is attained by such custom ary economic-financial m eans as credits, interest, rent, q uotas, turno ver tax, bonuses and subsidies o n dom estic and foreign trade, foreign exchange parity, g u a r a n t e e d prices, and governm ent reserves. Where drastic in terv en tion is required, m easures o f physical control are used: price fixing, im p o rt and e x p o rt quotas, and allocations of materials in sh ort supply. T h e stability and solidity o f the econom ic system can be evaluated by the degree to which m easures o f the latter category are absent, 5. As regards econom ic grow th, the question of investm ents is crucial. It is precisely in this respect th at the socialist econo m y shows a m arked superiority over the capitalist econo m y. O f the three aspects o f investm ent, th e on e th at is technically the easiest to solve is th e m a tte r o f volum e. If th e investm ents are to o large, th ey can be checked by taxatio n. I f they are lower than required, the additional funds needed for financing can be collected from previous item s by the m ost suitable means. 6. It is m uch m ore difficult to solve the problem s of the optimal stru ctu re and allocation o f investm ents. This set o f problem s has never had a satisfactory solution am ong us and, in fact, along with incom e d istrib utio n, is the basic subject of all o u r polem ics on the econom ic system. A t o ne time it was held that practically all investm ents should be centrally controlled in o rd e r to o b tain their o p t i m a l s tru c tu re and allocation, with m aximal econom ic developm ent. It was found , on th e basis o f Yugoslav practice, that it is sufficient to control directly, by various investm ent funds, a b o u t one-third of total investm ents (less than in France, for exam ple, and it is still n o t the objectively possible m inim um ) to achieve an extrem ely high rate o f growth. (We cannot speak of 113

optim a; the reason is n o t the a m o u n t o f investm ents controlled, for 100 p ercent w ould n o t do th at, b u t because we d o n o t know where those o ptim a are.) T he explanation is to be sought in the heterogeneity o f the investm ent projects. There are productive groupings w hose m inim um capacities are relatively large in relation to the social p ro d u c t of' the country. F o r such projects, th e only solutio n is financing from central funds; similarly, decisions as to the m agnitude of capacity, technical procedures, and location have to be m ade centrally. In o rd e r to constru ct the Djerdap h yd roelectric station and the Skopje iron and steel mill, several p e r cent o f the annual p ro d u c t had to be c o m m itte d , as well as picked teams o f engineers and economists. On the o th e r h an d, there are productive groupings whose m inim um profitable capacities are small (e.g., som e units o f the m etal and lu m b er industries); in such cases, centralized decisions are ou t o f place.. S o m e p r o d u c t i v e g r o u p i n g s are sources o f econom ic develo pm ent, e.g , the p o w e r ind u stry , heavy in du stry , and, in part, co m m un ication s and chemicals. In these dom ains m ore social intervention is called for. Most productive groupings, however, are h e te ro n o m o u s in n atu re and' ad a p t to m arket dem ands w ith o u t any great difficulties. This applies to the textile and footwear industries, and by and large to the p ro d u c tio n o f co nsu m er goods, for which gestation periods are short, profits usually high, and m inim um profitable capacities n o t to o large. This sector of the eco no m y can take care o f its investm ents itself Finally, (m acro)locatio n is decisive fo r the extractive industries and for groups engaged in processing b ulk raw materials, fo r which social control has to be insured. F o r m ost productive groupings, the individual investors are adequately co m p e te n t to insure location. 7. Ju st as there are m eans o f short-term equalization, th ere are also m eans o f long-term equalization: shares in investm ent financing, with which control is fu rth e r extend ed to a p o rtio n of t h e r e s o u r c e s from decentralized funds as well, favoring investm ents in industries th at are lagging or applying the brakes to those th at are overinvesting, doing this by m o re favorable tax atio n (in the form er case) or by relatively prohibitive tax atio n of excessive investm ents (in the latter case). Building perm its may be used as a m eans o f physical control. 8, The d ev elo pm en t o f undeveloped regions is a special problem. As a rule, investm ents in such regions are less profitable th an in developed areas (because o f th e absence o f adequate infrastructures, shortages o f skilled labor, and the absence o f
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external economies). In a m arket econom y there is therefore a con stan t tendency to channel investm ents to developed districts, t h e r e b y i n c r e a s i n g t h e gap betw een the developed and undeveloped areas and disintegrating the national ec ono m y. These tendencies are corrected by setting aside certain quan tities of' society s investm ent resources u n d e r a special system (e.g., the F u n d for U ndeveloped Regions), to be expended exclusively in undeveloped regions T he m eans o f (7) can also be em ployed. 9. When we spoke, in the preceding theses, of the need for social control, we did n o t necessarily imply control on the part o f governm ent agencies. In a socialist econom y (in fact, the process has already begun un der capitalism), banks can also act as organs o f social contro l. In this way the system acquires greater flexibility and th e eco nom y is still fu rth e r degovernm entalized. Final Notes Three com m ents m u st be made. T he first relates to the fairly frequent confusion concerning obligations and responsibilities. A decentralized eco nom y is n o t an e c o n o m y w i t h o u t obligations and responsibilities. On the co ntra ry, these are in principle entirely clear, and they should be so in concrete practice as well. In this conn ection th ere is an argum ent th a t is instructive. Since th e subjects o f 'th e ec on om y are au to n o m o u s, they are responsible fo r all the consequences o f their decisions. I f a duplication o f capacity takes place som ewhere, th en the collectives o r m anag e m en t are n o t socially responsible enough and they have to be called on th e carpet and brought back to the right p a th by political m eth ods. If individual incom es are to o high som ew here (and if, for exam ple, labor productivity is high and resources are large), th en th a t too is a sign o f social irresponsibility and calls fo r political measures. I f dislocations occur in some sector o f p ro d u c tio n , th en in all likelihood the producers are g u i l t y , In short (and so m ew h at in caricature), inadequate consciousness is guilty o f its m isfortunes. Very close to these ideas is th e po sition of the centralist, according to w hom these s o r t s o f d i s l o c a t i o n s a r e a n e c e s s a r y consequence o f decentralization. T here is no need to go in to detail on the voluntarism o f these explanations in o rd e r to show how wrong they are. To be sure, w h en a system is still unfinished an d no t y et solid, subjective factors play an extrem ely im p o rta n t part A ccordingly, it is n o t only unnecessary to ab a n d o n th e m e th o d s o f control, political w o rk , and the like, but, on th e co ntra ry, to m ake m ax im u m use o f 115

them . T hat is one thing, b u t it is som ething entirely different to assert absolute responsibility for individual decisions and their consequences. In principle, one can be responsible only within o n e s own sphere o f competence.. The w orkers collective o f one enterprise ca n n o t be responsible for the Yugoslav ec o n o m y, for it is no t qualified, n o r does it have the possibility o f seeing w h a t is best for the econ om y as a whole.. What is expected o f a collective is th at it m ake use o f existing working conditions to attain the m axim um prosperity for its enterprise by legal m eans and in com pliance with definite social standards I f in so doing it arrives at econom ic dislocations, the w o rk e rs collective is n o t responsible; som eone else is. Hence, an individual w o rk e rs collective can only be held responsible for its individual errors ( o r successes). If certain branches w ork badly (o r get ex tra personal incom es), som eone else bears the responsibility. A nd those o th e r p eople are the agencies of econom ic policy and, in th e first place, th e state apparatus The state apparatus is responsible for creating conditions for econom ic activity so th a t the normal interests o f econom ic organizations will mesh with social interests, Le,, th e norm al business activity o f ec onom ic organizations can n o t elicit econom ic d i s l o c a t i o n s a n d w a s t e o f social resources This is an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y difficult task and an extraordinarily great responsibility; in this respect, the state app a ratu s is in a m u ch m o re difficult situation in th e Yugoslav econom y than und er capitalism or in an administratively planned ec o n o m y . In the former, by definition, the .state apparatus is n o t responsible for the activity o f private produ cers (although it should be n oted th at there has been a considerable evolution o f ideas in this respect in the so-called welfare econom ies); in the latter, the hierarchical d i s c i p l i n e m a k e s direct in terventio n possible in cases of dislocation. In o u r ec o n o m y , the state apparatus is in an economically paradoxical situation, since it is responsible for the actions o f subjects w hom it does n o t control because they are au to n o m o u s The parad ox is specious because the impossibility o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , bureaucratic control does n o t signify the impossibility o f control in general B ut the problem is that nonadm inistrative co ntrol (although potentially effective) is enorm ously m ore com plex, and th a t it requires n o t only m u ch greater expertise b u t also a m ajo r psychological strain to m ake an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a p p a r a t u s exert nonadm inistrative control 23 F u rth e r theoretical and practical investigations are needed in this field, and it is n o t im possible th a t m ajo r institutional changes will be made in the future 116

In a broad sense, an ad e q u ate system o f info rm atio n is also a co n s titu e n t elem ent in ec onom ic activity,. For ec onom ic decisions to be correct, it is n o t sufficient that the m otivation be correct; it is also necessary th at those active in the eco no m y k n o w accurately w h at is to their best interest In this respect the existing system of in fo rm a tio n is far from adequ ate, either institutionally (w h o is co m p e te n t to give w hat in fo rm atio n , o r from w hom the given in fo rm atio n can be ob tain ed ) or technically (keeping in mind the vast unexp loited possibilities o f m o dern inform ation techniques). T h e final rem ark relates to the observation o f a deleterious disp ro portion in the present phase o f developm ent. All the above-m entioned analysis shows that the Yugoslav ty p e o f e c o n o m y is m uch m ore com plex than the types we had previously been acquainted with. In addition , it is a new type o f eco no m y, for which there is no foreign experience th at can be copied. Because o f both these reasons, the problem s faced by responsible social-political and state agencies are extrem ely com plex anc! fraught w ith consequences, Many problem s o f the present stage o f develo pm en t are still open and unresolved. With fu rth e r rapid e c o n o m i c developm ent, the p roblem s o f planned socialist co ordinatio n o f society and of' the econom y will becom e even m ore com plex. These tasks and p rob lem s can be solved effectively only on the basis o f scientific research of th e highest quality. T he socioeconom ic m achinery is, o f course, incom parably m ore com plicated than any kind o f mechanism in th e field o f technology. Yet this com plex ec on om y has available only the m ost primitively organized kind o f research in the field o f the social sciences, and particularly so in the field o f economics. The experience o f 1961 and 1962 is a warning that this d isp rop ortion is n eith er academ ic n o r inn ocu ous A nd the m o re com plex the e c o n o m y b e c o m e s , t h e m o r e serious are th e potential consequences.
FOOTNOTES
l . 2 T o r M arx, being rad ical m eant "g e ttin g to the root. A nd the ro o t o f u man is the man h im s e lf [2 5 : 81 It w o u ld be interesting to an alyze h o w m an y programs o f other socialist parties, w h ic h con sider them selves M a rx ist, co n tain this p rop o sitio n, and under w h at co n d itio n s it entered in to and departed from p arty programs F o r exam ple* Engels* w o rk on a u th o rity is p ro b ab ly to be in terp reted c o rre c tly us a reactio n to irresponsible attacks on social d iscip lin e rather than as insistence on a u th o rita ria n go vernm ent as co m p ared to self-government, L e t t e r to W . S o m b a rt, M arch J 1, 1 B95 . T h e extent to w h ic h this basic elem ent ol M arxism is u n kn o w n is illustrated by the fo llo w in g in cid en t at a recent in te rn a tio n a l con ferencc, I had been asked to explain the p rin ciples o f the p lan nin g o f the Y u g o slav eco n om y T he presentation was o rien ted to w ard sh ow ing h o w o u r in stitu tio n s! so lu tion s result from o u r p ractical s itu a tio n . T h is p ra g m a tic, cornnion-sense Y u g o slav ap proach o b vio u sly pleased

4,. 5.

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those present, but at the end o f the discussion, un A m e ric a n p rofessor, w ith many apologies and assurances that I did not have to answer if it was not co n ven ien t, asked, W h at docs this have to do w ith M a rx ism 1 M y answ er that for us this was ? pure M arxism brought a w ave o f applause and laughter, I| was taken as a trium ph o f academ ic h u m o r; but it w as the most accn rate answ er possible. fi. A g ric u ltu re and the artisan atc cacli lias a sp e cific p osition , w h ic h has not been ad equ ately fo rm u late d in th e o ry nor e ffe ctiv e ly solved in p ractice . H e n ce our constant d iffic u ltie s in these tw o areas o f the e co n o m y . In an alyzing the nature o f the social org anisatio n o f lab o r in these tw o areas, tw o facts must be tak e n into a cco u n t: (a ) the process o f so cializa tio n has n o t been co m p le te d , and ( b ) the lab o r o f an in d ivid u al w ith his ow n m eans o f p ro d u c tio n is not c a p ita lis tic a lly organized and does not in any w a y represent a foreign elem ent in a socialist e co n o m y based on social ow nership. It is p ro b ab ly no o ve rsim p lific atio n to say that alth o u g h state ow nership represents the negation o f every form o f p riva te p ro p e rty , social o w n ership negates o n ly capitalist private o w n ership 7, Those w h o co n tro l hence, ow ners and m anagers; there is no analogy in the Y ugoslav social situatio n 8,. A sim ilar analysis can be m ade o f trad e unions 9. F a r examples som e British trade u n io n leaders, 10. Bu t we need not o ve rlo o k E n g e ls ' in te rp re ta tio n , in the in tro d u c tio n to T he C iv il War hi F ra n c o , . Ih e most im p o rtan t decree o f the C o m m u n e ordered the org anization o f big industries and even o f m anufacture* an o rg anization that w o u ld be founded not o nly o n associated w o rke rs in each fa c to r y b u t w o u ld unite all these associations in one big fe d era tio n ; in b rief, an o rganization w h ic h , as M arx in C iv il Ji'dr quite co rre c tly said, m ust fin a lly lead to co m m u nism , , , [ 1 1 : 1 7 ] , 13. Tt is possible to su bd ivid e the co n c c p t o f " a u t h o r it y in o th e r w a ys as w ell F o r exam ple, E rie h Fro m m distinguishes ratio n al and irra tio n a l, and p u b lic and an on ym ou s, a n th o rity (2 2 : 108-1 12],. 12- This should not he co n fuscd w ith social co n fo rm ism , w h ich is an e n tire ly d iffe re n t p henom enon T h e ideal so cialist so cie ty is a u n io n o f n o n co n fo rm ist in d ivid u als w h o base their relatio n ship s on social a u th o rity . It is interesting to note that co n form ism (as E ric h Fro m m e ffe ctiv e ly d em o n strates, it is the utm ost alienatio n o f the p erson ality |2 2 : 158 ff. f ) som etim es claim s so cialist relatio n ship s as a m o d e l; it is not w o rth w h ile 's p u tte rin g . This co n clusio n can be illu strated b y a statistical p icture o f the collectiveentrep reneur in ac tio n un der the p articu lar Y ug o slav co n d itio n s in 1958 In that year the regular d aily m eetings o f Ihe w o rk e rs 1 co u ncils co n tain ed these ty p ica l item s in the fo llo w in g p ro p o rtio n s: plans o f p ro d u ctio n and in ve stm e n t, exp end itu res on p ro d u ctio n and sales, acco un ts o f the e xecutive co m m itte e, free use o f funds 4 0 % ; w o rk in g relation ship s, d iscip lin e, e co n om ic d elicts 1 9 % ; wage rates, standards, and labor p ro d u c tiv ity , d istrib u tio n o f p ro fit - 1 7 % ; social cjuestions und cadres - 13%; m iscellaneous 1 1 % [ 67: 1 1 ] In 19 56 the average net p ro fit rnade and d istrib uted am ong the members oT the co llective was ab o ut 10 % o f the standard wage fund (data from S t a t is tic k i g o d isnjak F N R J 1958 lY u g o s la v S ta tis tic a l Y e a rb o o k 1 9 5 8 ), pp. 105-106) 14 Em p iric a l studies have just begun in this field W h a t has been d on e so far show s that labor p ro d u c tiv ity p ro b ab ly decreases sig n ifica n tly un der the cu sto m ary co n d itio n s o f au to cratic business m anagem ent as com pared to w h at is possible w h e n w o rk e rs are able to p a rtic ip ate in arriving at decisions that a ffec t their w o rk, T h e N a tio n a l In s titu te o f In d u strial P s ych o lo g y ( N U P ) reports an A m e ric a n ex p e rim e n t in a textile m ill, w h e re the d iffe re n tia l p ro d u c tiv ity in this respect had been 54-61 (w ith the usual m anagem ent p rin cip le s) and late r reached 76-86 units (w ith w o rk e r participa* tio n ) [2 7 : 2171, In an oth er A m e ric a n e x p e rim e n t, in a clo th in g fa c to ry , C o ch and Fre n ch found that relative p ro d u c tiv ity w e n t from about 50 to ab o ut 70 un its, w h ile flu c tu a tio n and aggression were in inverse p ro p o rtio n to the degree o f co o p e ra tio n 1* [2 8 : 524 ] * M e n tio n sh ou ld be made o f the pioneer w o rk , still o f general significance to d a y , of Iv L c w in and others on the d iffe re n ce s am ong " a u t o c r a t ic ," d e m o c ra tic, and laissez-faire leadership [2 9 ] (sum m ed up., along w ith late r investigations., in [ 3 0 ) ) and o f the w o rk o f K L e w in on group decision ( 3 1 ) R e fe re n c e m ay also be made to the w ell-kn ow n H a w th o rn e experim ents, T h e general sig nifican ce o f these experim ents is ap tly sum m ed up b y R B e n d ix : A co n tro lle d o bservatio n o f sm all w o rk groups over a n u m b er o f years show ed that increased p ro d u c tio n on the w h o le was linked m ore to m o ral groups than to any o th e r variab le (such as b reakfast, higher 13

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p a y, variatio n s in d eve lo p m e n t, tem peratu re, e tc.) M o rale , again, was Jin k e d to im p ro ved supervision, a prestige p osition o f cach m em ber o f the group, w ith increased a tte n tio n given to in d ivid u al prob lem s, opinio ns, Und suggestions [ 3 2 . 78 ] 15. T h e foregoing sectio n is taken in large p art fro m a stn d y o f S o v ie t, A m e ric an , and Y ug o slav org anization o f the p etro le u m in d u stry that I m ade in 1952 for one o f our large oil firm s J3 3 : 22 |. L a te r 1 tested these theses by an an alysis o f the weaknesses o f ce n traliz atio n in the Y ug o slav e co n o m y . In the e co n om ic org anization o f p ostw ar Y u g o slavia, tw o d iffe re n t periods m ay be d istin g u ish e d : (1 ) ad m in istrative , m arked by strict ce n traliz atio n and ending in 1951; (2 ) the present arrang em ent, m arked by develo pm en t o f the free m a rk e t and w o r k e r self-governm ent, w h ic h represents the lab o ra to ry co n d itio n s for testing tlie co n clusio ns arrived at above.. U n fo r tu n a te ly , no stu d y has yet been m ade o f the e co n o m y as a w h o le S ee also the sh ort w o rk by II. Bica n ic [ 34 j. 1 have studied one in d u stry (o il) in detail I give here som e data on la b o r p ro d u c tiv ity ; C e n tra lisa tio n oT m an ag em ent began, in the m ain, in 1947; it reached its hig h p o in t in 1950 an d , in co n n e ctio n w ith the establishm ent o f w o rk e rs co u ncils, was essentially d on e a w a y w ith from 1952 on. A g ain st this general b ackg ro u nd , lab o r p ro d u c tiv ity in the p etro leum ind ustry (p ro d u c tio n and d rillin g ) w as: 1941 JO G ; 194fi - 74; 1947 - 96; 194 8 - 63; 1949 - 7 0 ; 1950 - 59; 1951 7 S ; 1 952 111; I 953 - 163 [3 5: R e v ie w 9 ]. A lth o u g h these figures do not by any m eans represent the en tire e c o n o m y , since the oil in d u stry is m u ch m ore sensitive than o ther industries and the fo rm u la I co n structed to m easure la b o r p ro d u c tiv ity co u ld not co m p le te ly e lim in a te the effects o f n atu ral co n d itio n s, the figures still describe an im pressive tre n d . 16. A sim ila r idea was expressed b y Clegg and C h e s te r in discussing tlic fu tu re o f British n a tio n a liz a tio n : Pa rlia m e n t should decide w h ic h fu n ctio n s can and should be carried out in a w id e r field than in d ivid u al enterprises, and should do so through a responsible regional and n a tio n a l a u th o rity , s p e cifica lly fo r this fu n c tio n [3 6 : 2 0 0 | . T h e authors em phasize that , , the future o f n a tio n a liz atio n depends on the d is co very and use o f resources w h ic h w ill m ake natio nal o w n ership and national planning co m p a lih le w ith a d etailed co n d u ct o f affairs on the s p o t (3 6 : 2 1 1 ]. 17. T o r exam ple, i f a plan is d raw n up for the p ro d u ctio n o f 2 0 ,0 00 p rod ucts, as happened in S o v ie t planning p ractice I S . O u r guests from re ce n tly lib erated A sian - A ftican co u ntries o ften en co u n ter great d iffic u ltie s w h en, in th e ir desire to get the b en efit o f Y ug o slav experiences in planning, [h e y in te rvie w Y ug o slav eco n om ists and realize (h a t all o f it is m o re or less in ap p licab le to their co u ntries. 19. This m akes the reasoning o f the protagonists o f ce n traliz atio n naive, w h en they assure us that im proved o rg anization could p reven t the w aste o f resources T he core o f the m atte r is that cen tralism has a d efin ite b u re au cra tic logic o f its o w n , w h ic h is not to be " im p r o v e d " in any w a y . C e ie ris p aribus, the level o f e fficie n c y o f a cen tralized system is necessarily a n d e v e ry w h e re lo w e r than w h a t is o b je ctive ly possible. 20. W e m ight take, as a good ind ex o f the degree oT d ece n traliz atio n and de a d m in istratio n , the vo lu m e o f the an nu al issues o f the O ffic ia l G az e tte and the nu m b er o f internal in stru ctio n s o f the b an k for the y e a r in q uestion . 21. Illu strative in this respect is the tw e n ty- ye a r h isto ry o f the o rg anization o f a ty p ic a lly cen tralist b ran ch , the oil in d u stry . In 1945 the P e tro leu m C o m b in e w as set up in Zagreb, covering all the p ro d u c tio n and processing o f p etro leum in the country,. T h e d evelo p m en t oT schem atized state-econom ic cen tralism led in 1947 to a revam ping o f the C o m b in e and to the fo rm a tio n o f general and p rin cip a l d irectorates o f the federal and re p u b lica n a u th o ritie s T h e d ire cto ra te s w ere elim inated in the d ecentraliz atio n process from 1951 to m id-1952, and m arket ind epend ence and co m p e titio n were inaugurated The in d ep en d en t firm s hegan at once to m ake sem ilegal and legal co n tacts; various professional and business associations w ere fo rm ed , w ith vurious sections, co verin g the p etro leum trad e Tin's trend and te n d e n cy led, in early 1964, to the fo rm atio n in Zagreb o f a new C o m b in e , w h ic h co n stitu ted ab o ut two-thirds o f the b ranch (o n the te rrito ry o f the single re p u b lic ), w ith the integ rative m ovem ent co n tin u in g in tlic re m ain d e r oT the b ran ch . It w o u ld seem as though the circle had com e around to the starting p o in t o f nin ete e n years earlier. B u t this is not the case; it is n o t a circle , but a spiral. T h e first C o m b in e w as founded by Jh e state, even though a re vo lu tio n a ry one; the second C o m b in e was form ed by self-governing co llectives, even thou gh w ith som e p o litic a l assistance (alth o u g h no t ce n tra l). T h e first and the last p oints o f the spiral are Separated by a period o f tw e n ty years, during w h ich preciou s exp erien ce w as a c cu m u la te d ; this not o nly im p ro ved the organization

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te ch n ica lly but also, on the basis o f d efin ite prin ciples, m o ld ed the consciousness o f the direct producers as managers. B u t there are still rep u b lic fro ntiers that have not been o verco m e, an eviden t sign that to d a y 's in te g ratio n ist m o vem ents are not co m p lete, (A f t e r tins sectio n had already been w r itte n and p ub lish ed , a second C o m b in e for p etro leum was established in V o iv o d in a as w ell ) 22. W e o w e this sy ste m atiza tio n to C o m rad e R . D avido vic, 23, It is interesting to no te the in h eren t in c lin a tio u o f a d m in istratio n e ith er to desist from c o n tro l or to exercise it in a stric tly a d m in istrative fo rm . T h is m ay help exp lain a n o th e r apparent p arad ox , n a m e ly, that w e hear at one and the same tim e any nu m b er o f co m p la in ts o f excessive d ece n traliz atio n and m an y co m p la in ts that d ece n traliz atio n is n o t carried fur enough. D o th are co rre c t, and the e x p lan a tio n is us fo llo w s. A c t u a lly , excessive d e c e n tra liz a tio n 1 refers to absence o f co o rd in a tio n that results in disorder* co n fu sio n o f co m p e te n ce , irre sp o n sib ility , and waste, In s u ffic ie n t c e n tra liz a tio n 1 means the existence o f unnecessary obstacles to the exercise o f the right to self-governm ent, w ith sim ila r negative eonsequenccs. The p rocedure for o b tain in g loans Is so co m p lic a te d , nig g ard ly, and in e ffe c tu a l that it leads to serious abuses; so m etim es m onths are needed Jo get ap proval o f triflin g am o un ts o f foreign exchange, w ith the result that it becom es im possible to co m p lete a many-sided o p e ra tio n ; som e e co n om ic actio ns depend on a nu m b er o f approvals, and the a p p licatio n w and ers from one agency to an o th e r, losing a m onstro u s am o u n t o f tim e ; banks are m uch m ore ad m in istrative agencies than business o rg anization s; etc,. T o that exten t the dem ands are ju stifie d th a t d ec e n traliz atio n be carried out co n sisten tly , thereb y stan d ard iz in g the operating co n d itio n s for e co n om ic organiza tions.

REFERENCES
\ 1] [2 ] [3 ] [4 | [51 [5 a ] 16] [l] [8 ] [9 1 |1 0 ] f ll] [ 12 j [1 3 ] [ 14 j 1 15j [1 6 ] 11 7 1 [1 8 ) 119] 12 0 J [21 ] [ 22 1 E n g e ls L e tte r to K S c h m id t, A ug u st 5, 1880, in S e le cte d W riting s o f M a rx artd Engels, O G I Z , M o sco w , 1948. K M a rx , 4,Dasic M an ifesto o f the In te rn a tio n a l A sso cia tio n o f W o rk e rs , in f i r s t In te rn a tio n a l. R a d , Belgrade, 1950 F. Engels, AnTi-D iihring, N a p rije d t Zagreb, 1946. M a rx s L e tte r to K u g elm an n, J u ly I I , 1868, in L e tte r s to K u g eltn an n , Belgrade, 195] K M arx, C a p ita i V o l I I I , K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1947. Ib id ., V o l II. K M a rx , C ritiq u e o f the G o th a Pro g ram I En gels, C ritiq u e o f the D r a ft E r f u r t Pro g ra m ; K u ltu ra* Belgrade, 1959, K. M a rx and F Engels, E c o n o m ic and P h ilo so p h ic a l M a n u scrip ts , in E a r ly Works, K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1953 F En gels, O n A u t h o r it y , in S e le cte d W orks o f M a rx and Erigels, V o l, 1, K u ltu ra , Zagreb* 1949 " M a rx s L e tte r to Ruge, 1843* in E a r ly Works, K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1953. K . M a rx and F Engels, M a n ife s to o f The C o m m u n is t Part\\ K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1948. K M arx, The C iv il War in F ra n c e , K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1947, En gels" L e tte r to E B e rn stein , O c to b e r 25, 1881, in S e le c te d lVWwi#s.. G olu n ski-Stro g oviE, T h e o ry o f S ta te and La\v_ Zagreb, 1947K M a rx ,A 7 r Vogt, K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1955. K M a rx , C ritiq u e o f A d o lp h W ag ner's B o o k , C o lle cte d Works, V o l. 15V Partiz d at, M o sco w , 1935. F En gels, Pre fa ce to V o lu m e I I I o f C a p it a l in M a r x s C ap ital, V o l I I I , K u ltu ra, Z agreh, 1949. A Bebel, A tta c k s on the Basic V ie w s and T actical S ta n d p o in ts o f the P a r t y , M a rx ism a n d R e visio n ism , N a p rije d , Zagreb, 1958, L e tte r From M arx to Engels, Ja n u a ry 8, 1868, in K . M a rx and F Engels, C o rrespo n den ce. V o l I V , K u ltu ra , Belgrade, 1960 L e t t e r from M a rx to Huge, Sep te m b e r 1843* E a r l y W orks o f M a rx an d Engels, K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1953. K M a rx and F Engels, Works, 2nd e d itio n , M oscow . B H o rv a t, N o t e on the R a t e o f G ro w th o f the Yug o slav E c o n o m y , Papers and M o n og rap h s No.. 4, J I E I * Belgrade E F ro m m , T he S an e S o c ie ty , Rad* Belgrade, 1963.

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[2 3 ]

[24[
[2 5 )
[

26]

[2 7 ] [2 8 ]

I 29 ] 130]
131 I [321 i 33 |

Causes and C h aracte ristics o f E c o n o m ic Trend s'in 1961 and 1962, by a group o f econom ists, Savp lan . D A M -7, Belgrade, 1962 Pe ace fu l T ran sitio n s from S o c ia lism to C ap ita lism , ' M o n th ly R e view , M arch 1964, pp 569-590 K. M a rx , C ritiq u e oF Hegel^s P h ilo so p h y o f R ig h t , E a r ly W orks o f M a rx a n d Fngets, K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1953 l; H a y e k , T he Use o f K n o w le d g e in S o c ie t y / A m e ric a n E c o n o m ic R e view , 1945, pp 519-530 J o i n t C o n su lta tio n s in British In d u stry , N a tio n a l In s titu te o f Ind ustrial P s yc h o lo g y , Staples Press, L o n d o n , 1952. L. C o ch and J . R P fre n e h , O ve rco m in g R esistance to C h ang e,1 J I u r n a n 1 R e la tio n s, 1948, K L e w in , R L ip p it, and R K W h ite , Pattern s o f Aggressive B eh avio r in E x p e rim e n ta lly C reated So c ia l C lim a le s , Jo u rn a l o f S o c ia l P s y c h o lo g y . 1939 R L ip p it and R. 1 W h ite , A n E x p e rim e n ta l S tn d y o f l eadership ;md G ro up C L i f e , " in R ead in g s in S o c ia l Psyc h o lo g y , edited b y G E Sw an so n e i a l , H o lt, N e w Y o r k , 1951 K L e w in , G ro u p D ecision and S o c ia l C h a n g e , ibid. R . Be n d ix , H ig h e r C iv il S e rva n ts in A m e ric a n Society^ U n ive rs ity o f C o lo ra d o Press, B o u ld e r, C o lo ., 1949. B H o rvat, I h e O rg an izatio n o f En terp rises for the E x p lo ita tio n o f O il in Yug o slavia and Certain O th e r C o u n trie s / 1 O rg an izatio n o f L a b o r, 1952, N os. 1 1- 12. R. Bican ie, E c o n o m ic G ro w th U n d e r C entraliz ed and D ecen tralized Plan ning : Y u g o s la v ia ," in E c o n o m ic D e v e lo p m e n t and C u ltu ra l Change, 1957. D H o rva t, E c o n o m ic s o f ih e Yugoslav O il In d u s try , d o cto ra l dissertation at E c o n o m ic Faculty.. Zagreb., 1954. H. A Clegg and T. Ii C hester, The F u tu re o f N a tio n a lisa tio n , B la c k w e ll, O xford. 1953

I 34 1 [35 | [3 6 ]

CHAPTER IV

Productive Labor Social Property, and the Structure of Yugoslav Society

14. PR O D U C TIV E LA B O R IN SOC IALIST SOCIETY It is c o m m o n ly held th at Marx defined productive la b o r as laboron the p ro d u c tio n o f m aterial goods. This apparen tly purely academ ic p ro p ositio n lias qu ite far-reaching consequences, o ne of' which is th a t social p ro d u c tio n defines, b o th statistically and in co nceptio n, only th e material p a rt of p ro d u c tio n . Services are no t included, which m eans th at o fte n n o serious social ac cou nting is m ade o f them . In a m o d ern ec o n o m y , however, the n u m b e r o f those em p loy ed in th e service sector increases faster than the n u m b er o f those in the material p ro d u c tio n sector, so th a t the standard o f living, ec onom ic stability, etc., depend to an almost decisive e x te n t on w hat takes place in productive services. Moreover, the term p ro d u c tiv e has a definite em otional content.. It is a good thing to be p ro d u c tiv e and it is embarrassing to be n o n p ro d u c tiv e . There will even be political theories a b o u t p ro d u c ers" o r direct p ro d u c ers, who are the bearers o f the social system and for th a t reason are autom atically progressive, in con trast to the m ore or less dubious n o n p ro d u c e rs . 1 All this indicates the great theoretical and practical significance o f a correct definition o f the co n cep t o f productive labor. T h e w ord correc t should n o t be in terp re ted as m eaning tru e , for definitions are inherently n eith er true nor false, b u t useful or a d e q u a te w ith respect to a broad theoretical d o m a in in which

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the con cep t of' p rod uctive labor is to have a definite categori cal function. We may state at th e o u ts e t th at m ateriality as the criterion o f p r o d u c t i v i t y lia s n o th eo retica l m eaning or justification whatsoever, and th a t Marx did n o t reduce labor to lab or in the f i e l d o f m a t e r i a l p ro d u c tio n . N o t only th a t, b u t Marx c h a r a c t e r i z e d such a characterization as nonsense from a theoretical point o f view. B ut let us see w hat is involved.
Marx on P roductive Labor

Marx, thoroughgoing as he was in his theoretical thinking, did no t concern himself with the unhistorical th eory o f productive labor in general N ow here in his volum inous w ork can there be found an a t te m p t to form u late such an eternally valid th eory (there are, to be sure, som e general definitions, but th ey are very rare). He approached the theo ry of productive labor historically; he was interested in the problem o f productive labor only in co nnection with th e ec onom ic ep och he was studying and for which he was trying to fo rm ulate a com prehensive political econom y. That epoch was the epoch o f capitalist p ro d u c tio n . His starting p o in t was identical with the stan d p o in t o f th e typical c a p i t a l i s t entrepreneur. The capitalist is interested in the profitability o f his business; he tries to maximize the difference betw een prices and costs. I f this is the typical behavior o f th e typical productive subject in the capitalist system , then that m ust be ado pted as the criterion o f th e pro ductiv ity o f lab or in th at system. L ab or is productive when it p rodu ces surplus value.2 What is incom e from the p o in t o f view o f society is gross incom e from the capitalists p o in t o f view. W hat the latter regards as n et incom e corresponds to the incom e o f the co m m u n ity less wages, However, even the c o m m u n i ty s incom e, the gross incom e, is an abstraction insofar as a society based on capitalist p ro d u c tio n takes the capitalist position and therefore considers real incom e only incom e which is dissolved in p ro fit and r e n t [3: 776] T h e above tw o ex cerpts form ulate the essence o f M arxs problem . In w hat follows we discuss, in a m o re system atic way, some o f the m ore im p o rta n t aspects o f th at problem . T h e only place where Marx treats th e problem system atically is th e ch apter on productive labor in the first v olum e o f Theories o f Surplus Value (a critique o f A d a m Sm ith) and in the appendix to that volume (M arxs positive opinions). These two chapters will provide m ost o f the citations required. Since we shall be going against the 123

c u n c n t here, a certain a m o u n t of caution will be required. To avoid the accusation o f a ttrib u tin g o u r own opinions to Marx, we shall confine ourselves to b rief com m entaries, allowing Marx to speak for himself. We begin w ith the well-known and frequently ad duced s tatem en t in Capital, defining the labor process, in d ep en d e n t o f its historical forms, as a process betw e en m an and nature: I f we exam ine the whole process ( o f w ork B.H.) from the p o in t o f view o f its result, the pro d u ct, it is plain t h a t b o th the instr um ents and the subject o f lab o r are m eans o f p ro d u c tio n , and th at the labor itself is productive la b o r [ 1: 1,37]. To avoid m isunderstandings (which, however, occur constantly), Marx im m ediately adds the following fo o tn o te : This definition o f p ro d u ctive labor from th e s ta n d p o in t o f the lab or process alone is by no means directly applicable to th e capitalist process o f p ro d u c tio n [ I : 137] . F o r th e capitalist m ode o f p ro d u c tio n a different definition is required, which Marx takes over from Sm ith 3 S m ith, as o ften h app en ed with him, really had tw o incom patible theories. According to th e first, which Marx regarded as the co rrect o n e,4 labor is pro ductive when it pro du ces capital. A ccording to the second, the criterion consists of th e p ro d u c tio n of material goods (in con trast to n o n p ro d u c tiv e labor e x p e n d ed o n nonnvatcrial services). This second definition o f S m i t h s is regarded today as the Marxist d efinition of the social pro d u c t. I t will hardly surprise any educated econom ist th a t Marx, like o th e r econom ists, criticized the weaknesses of S m ith s second definition., In th e system of simple co m m o d ity p ro d u c tio n , the pro d u c er exchanges his p ro ducts for m eans o f subsistence. The capitalist m ode o f p ro d u c tio n breaks th e b ond betw een lab or and ow nership o f the m eans of' p ro d u c tio n , and inserts th e m achinery o f capitalist p rod u c tio n b etw een th e exchange of labor and co nsum ption goods. The goods p ro d u c e d may be th e same, b u t the social c o n te n t o f pro d u c tio n is now d i f f e r e n t T he result o f th e process o f capitalist p ro d u c tio n is n either itself a p ro d u c t (use-value) n o r goods; it is use-value th a t has a certain working value. Its result, its p ro d u c t, is the creation o f surplus value for capital, and therefore the tran sfo rm atio n of m oney or goods into capital . . . Capital achieves this specific prod u c t of the process o f capitalist p ro d u c tio n only in exchange f o r la b o r, which is therefore called productive lab o r [7: 3 7 7 ] . T he definition of produ ctiv e labor follows directly: P roductive labor, therefo re in the system o f capitalist p rod uction is labor th a t produces surplus value for him w ho 124

makes use o f it, o r th a t transform s the objective conditions of labor into capital and their o w n e r into a capitalist. It is, consequently, lab o r th a t pro du ces its own p ro d u c t as capital. If we speak o f p ro d u c tiv e labor, we are speaking of' specific social labor, o f la b o r th a t presum es a definite relationship betw een the b u y e r and the seller o f la b o r [7: 373-374].. C o nsequently , n o n p ro d u ctive labor is defined by the same criterion as p rod uctive labor, which has no co nnection with nonm aterial services If productive lab o r is d eterm in e d as labor w hich is directly exch a n g ed fo r capital," it is th u s a t the same tim e absolutely established th a t n o n p ro d u ctive labor is labor th a t is exchanged no t for capital b u t d irectly for incom e . , [7: 2 4 4 ] . T h e same conclusion is repeated elsewhere in C apital: However m uch the capitalist b u y s w ith surplus value for his o w n co n su m p tio n , it does n o t serve him as m eans o f p ro d u c tio n or to pro duce value. In the same way, th e labor h e buys to satisfy his natural and social needs is n o t p ro d u c tiv e labor. Instead o f using the purchase o f these goods and lab o r to convert surplus value in to capital, he, o n th e co ntra ry, uses or spends this surplus value as in c o m e [4: 5 1 7 ] . F ro m this p o in t o f view it is obviously irrelevant w h e th e r labor results in material goods o r non m ateria l services: It emerges from th e above th a t productive lab or first of all has no conn ection with the specific c o n te n t o f the lab o r or with its par ticular use or use-value. T he same kind o f labor can be either productive or n o n p ro d u c tiv e [7: 3 7 8 ] . Thus, e g., a tailor em p loy ed in a tailor shop is a productive w orker, On th e o th e r h and , a tailo rs assistant (w h o works in my house) is n o t a p roductive w orker, although his la b o r gives me a p ro d u c t, trousers, and he gets the fruit o f his labor, m o n e y [7: 379] A n d w h at is th e situation w ith th e classic nonp rod uctive workers, e.g., artists? M arx s an sw er is unequivocal: A singer, for exam ple, w ho, a t h e r own risk, sells h e r singing is a n onp ro d u c tiv e w orker. B ut th e same singer w ho is engaged by an e n tre p ren e u r to sing a t concerts and th u s earn m on ey is a productive w orker, because she p roduces capital [7: 3 7 8 ] . Hence we conclude: It is characteristic o f all kinds o f n o n p rod uctive labor th a t the m o re I use it like purchasing all o th e r goods for th e purpose of co nsum ptio n the m ore I exp lo it the p roductive w o rk e r,. While, on the o th e r h and , my p o w e r to use th e productive w orker docs n o t increase at all in p ro p o rtio n t o m y use o f the non pro ductiv e w orker, bu t, on the co ntrary, it decreases in the

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same p r o p o r tio n [7: 382] Marx sum m ed up his theo ry o f productive lab o r very clearly in a n o th e r passage o f Capital A fte r establishing th a t the division of labor ex p a n d s the c o n c ep t o f pro du ctiv e labor, he emphasizes that capitalist p ro d u c tio n narrows it in a specific m anner: Capitalist p ro d u c tio n is n ot m erely p ro d u c tio n o f goods, it is in essence p ro d u c tio n o f surplus value. T he worker does not prod uce fo r him self b u t for capital.. It is, therefore, no longer sufficient for him to produce. He m u st p rod u c e surplus value. The p ro d u c tiv e w o rker is o n ly h e w ho p ro d u ces surplus value f o r the capitalist, w h o c o n se q u e n tly serves the s e l f p ro d u c tio n o f capital I f we take the liberty o f choosing an exam ple outside material p ro d u c tio n , a teacher is a produ ctiv e w orker when he works n o t only to educate children, b u t w hen he works to enrich an employer. This relationship is the same w he th e r the capital is placed in a fa ctory o f know ledge or a factory o f sausages C onsequently, the con cep t o f the p rodu ctive w ork er contains n o t only the relationship b etw een the activity and its useful effect , . . bu t also the specific social relationship of p ro d u c tio n , begun in history . . . [4: 4 4 2 ] , This, th en, is M arx s th e o ry of p roductive and no nproductive labor. B ut Marx goes a step further. He is now interested in establishing w h e th e r and to w hat e x te n t S m ith s second definition may be regarded as a first approxim ation. I f this could be accom plished, his m odel of' th e capitalist system could be som ew h at simplified w ith o u t losing any o f its essential features. He begins with a generalization o f the empirical evidence o f his time: The law of' econom ic d ev e lopm e nt is such th a t fu nction s are distributed am ong various persons, and the craftsm an or the peasant w ho produces his ow n m eans o f p ro d u c tio n is gradually transform ed into a small capitalist, w ho also exploits the labor o f others, or loses his means o f p ro d u c tio n . . and becom es a hired worker. This is the trend o f the form o f society in which capitalist p ro d u c tio n predom inates. In exam ining th e essential relations o f capitalist p ro d u c tio n . . it can therefore be assumed th at . . . all fields o f material p ro d u c tio n the p ro d u c tio n o f'm aterial wealth is (form ally o r actually) sub ord inate to the capitalist m o d e of p ro d u c tio n This supposition, which expresses the limit, and which, therefore, increasingly approaches absolute accuracy, affects all workers em ployed in p ro d u c tio n of' goods as hired laborers, while the means of p ro d u c tio n ap p e ar to them , in all fields, as capital. In this case it can be considered characteristic for the productive w orker, th a t is, for the w o rker who produces

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capital, t h a t his labor p rodu c es goods, material wealth. Thus, productive labor, in add itio n to its m ain feature, w hich has no co n n ectio n w ith, and is c o m p le te ly in d e p e n d e n t fro m , th e c o n te n t o f th e w ork, o b tain s a sec o n d characteristic, d iffe r e n t from the first (m y emphasis B.H.) [7 1 : 385] It remains to be seen w h e th e r these tendencies can be seen in the dom ain of' spiritual p ro d u c tio n . In nonm aterial p ro d u c tio n , and when it deals exclusively with exchange, that is, when it p rod uc es goods, tw o things are possible: 1. It results in goods, in use-values, which have outlines separate and in d e p e n d e n t from the p ro d u c er and the consum er, which, therefore, can exist in the period betw een p ro ductio n and co nsum p tio n, and which, in th a t period, can circulate as selling goods, such as, for example, books, pictures in short, all artistic creations o f the artist himself. Here capitalist p ro d u c tio n is applied in o n ly a very lim ite d m easure (m y emphasis B..H.) If, for example, a w riter fo r a collective w ork say, an encyclopedia uses m any o th ers as assistants . . . 2. P rod uction is inseparable from the act o f producing when it concerns artists, actors, teachers, doctors, priests, etc. Here, too, the capitalist form o f p ro d u c tio n appears only in som e f i e l d s ........ A ll these p h en o m en a o f capitalist p ro d u c tio n in these areas are so insignificant, com pared w ith the entire p ro d u ctio n , th a t th e y can be co m p le te ly ig n o re d ' (m y emphasis B.H.) [7: 386- .387.].. The following conclusion emerges. In M arx s thinking, the essential features o f the capitalist m ode o f p ro d u c tio n can be established by analyzing th e p ro d u c tio n o f m aterial goods, which in th a t system is for the m o st p a r t organized on a capitalist basis a n d w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s th e pre d o m in a n t portion o f total p rod uction, T he kinds o f lab o r which are n o t fixed in goods, by their nature, can frequently n o t be subject to the capitalist m o de of p ro d u c ti o n [7: 279] and are n o t o f m ajor interest for M arxs investigation, In this sense, M arx organized his investigations in Capital as well, where he speaks chiefly o f com m odities, that is, o f material pro d u c ts A nd th a t is all.
The Sense o f th e R evision o f M arxs T h eory o f

Productive Labor Still an o th e r in te rp re ta tio n is possible. Marx may have confused m a tte rs and n o t seen th a t this special theo ry o f his contradicts his philosophical views and his general th eory o f the d evelopm ent o f socioeconom ic system s That is ju s t w hat is implicitly presupposed by all those auth o rs w ho deduce the M arxist definition o f the 127

social p ro d u c t from M arxs philosophical materialism and his t h e o r y o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b etw een the base and the superstructure. As far as philosophical materialism is concerned, it can be said at on ce th at m ateriality in the philosophical sense (e x cep t in vulgar philosophy) is n o t identical with tangibility, substantiality, which is precisely the criterion o f the m aterialist d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h e social p ro d u c t th a t appeal to Marx, C on seq uen tly , it is inadmissible to link Marxist philosoph y with the material c o n te n t o f production , As for th e relationship with the th eo ry of the base and th e su p erstructure, the best elaborated version o f this do ctrin e I k n o w o f is from the pen of la . A, K ronrod, the Soviet econom ist; it can be judged by som e illustrative q u o tatio n s Social p ro d u c tio n is the result of m aterial p ro d u c tio n , the result o f productive labor. P ro d u ctio n show s the results of h um an labor, th e aim o f which is th e re p ro d u c tio n o f material conditions for the life o f society, the approp riation of natural resources th a t satisfy h u m an needs. But, precisely for this reason, the results o f spiritual p ro d u c tio n d o n o t create p ro d u c ts in the eco n o m ic sense, bu t are merely a reflection o f th e process o f material life confusing m aterial and spiritual p ro d u c tio n leads to non-M arxist cancellation o f the difference b etw een th e base and the superstru cture, to identification o f the results o f material p ro d u c tio n , which creates pro ducts, w ith the results o f spiritual p ro d u c tio n , which reflects th e m aterial process of life [8: 9 ]. Marx held th a t the relations of people in p ro d u c tio n , econom ic relations, are the m ost im p o rta n t d e te rm in a n t o f the stru ctu re o f every k n o w n society,. We speak o f feudal, capitalist, etc , societies because o f the feudal, capitalist, etc., eco nom ic relations in those societies. The ideologies or, m o re generally, the cultures o f those s o c i e t i e s r e f l e c t t h e i r ec onom ic bases and as such are superstructures. In every class society th e culture is th e culture o f the ruling, i.e., the owning, class. T he p r o p e r t i e d class creates its culture either directly, as spiritual p ro d u c ers, or indirectly, as purchasers. In any event, the ow ners and those w ho d epend on them live off' the w ork o f th e unpropertied. All th a t follows from t h i s e x t r e m e l y s im p lified p resentatio n of the materialist co nception o f history is the fu n d a m e n tal sociological distinction betw een th e econom ic sp h e re and the ideological sp here o f society. We need only glance a t th e preface to the C ritique o f Political E c o n o m y to see th a t Marx could n o t have identified the m o d e o f p ro d u c tio n o f material life, i.e., the base, with the tangible material p ro d u c tio n . F o r him t h a t material base o f society was s y n o n y m o u s with the ec onom ic stru c tu re . Distinguishing

base and superstructure does not provide any criterion for distinguishing betw een goods and services, which is the basis o f the M arxist definition o f the social product. H ow are the services o f the barber, nurse, and s tree t cleaner to be classified? Should they be included in th e base or the su p erstru cture o f society? Kronrod seems to be aware o f the difficulty an d proposes that in such cases the co ncrete fun ctio n o f the labor m ust be analyzed in respect to its p ro d u c tiv ity (p, 15), b u t does no t give any guidance as to the way in which this is to be done Moreover, neither does the relationship betw een m aterial" and s p i r i t u a l p ro d u c tio n d eterm in e the relationship betw een productive and n o n p ro d u c tiv e labor We have seen th at, according to M arx s definition, the m ental w ork o f the artist or writer, insofar as it is organized on a capitalist basis, is ju s t as productive as the w ork o f a w orker, b u t th e labor o f a craftsm an tailor (in the capitalist system ) is n o np rod uctive. If we do no t intend to teach Marx w hat lie sh o u ld have th o u g h t, we have to take the definition o f productiveness in the sense in which he him self used it B ut from the previous q u o ta tio n s it is evident th a t Marx defined p rod uctivity in the sense o f capital accum ulation, i.e ., in the sense o f the social relations existing u n d er the capitalist m ode o f 1 production. This has no c o n n e ctio n w hatever with the problem of the relation betw een base and su perstru ctu re, or with the relation betw een m aterial and n on m aterial p ro d u c tio n . A fte r the first inconsistency has been included, others follow. We have seen th at in M arxs thinking, when we speak o f p ro d u ctive labor, we are speaking o f socially d eterm in e d labor. It follows th a t the sam e physical aggregates o f goods and services will have d iffe r e n t c o n te n ts o f p roductive labor, depending o n w he th e r the ec o nom y is capitalist o r socialist Ignoring this im m ediate logical consequence, the advocates o f the M arxist definition o f t h e social p ro d u c t prescribe the sam e statistical rules for calculating th e social p ro d u c t in b o th economies, namely, the inclusion o f material goods and th e exclusion o f nonm aterial services. In this co n n e ctio n , one refinem ent merits brief com m ent. S om e auth o rs try to develop their Marxism a step fu rther by postulating som e slightly diffe ren t formula as socialism. With this we come to the n e x t point. F ro m the time o f A dam S m ith, a t the end of the eighteenth ce n tu ry , the distinction betw een productive and no nprodu ctiv e labor has always had a m arked class and political to ne As Marx p u t it. Sm ith in fact classified g o vernm ent officials, lawyers, and priests in the same category as clowns and servants. Such a procedure could n o t b u t evoke loud protests on the part o f the 129

former. T he case of M althus is typical. It was required th a t the above-m entioned social strata be m ad e productive. It m ight have been expected th a t these apologetics would reappear in th e discussion on this subject in th e m id-tw entieth century K ionrod is ready to supply us with the desired theory: O n the o th e r hand, socialism creates new productive functions, . T h e function o f th e socialist state and the func tion o f the party as the guiding force o f socialist society are directly productive functions, since the state and the p arty play an economic-organizing role, d irectly guiding and organizing the entire process o f material p ro d u c tio n in socialist so c ie ty [8: 3 9 ], F o r Marx, o f course, th e state app a ratu s was the p ro to ty p e o f social parasitism, and the thesis o f th e w ithering away of th e state is well enough k n o w n n o t to require fu rth e r p r o o f The q u o ta tio n s serve as an illustration o f the fact th a t M arxism and the Marxist theoretical inheritan ce are n o t necessarily on e and the same thing. 5 We still have to answ er th e qu estio n o f the origin o f the M arxist definition o f the social p ro d u c t, and to explain the solidarity o f the tw o opposing camps, non-M arxist and Marxist, with respect to this problem- F ro m am ong the various possible explanations, we take as the basis for ours the well-tested Marxist tre a tm e n t o f theory as socially conditioned. Since the M arxist definitions are either arbitrary or lead to theoretically meaningless results, anti-Marxist a u th o rs can have nothing against them . T he political pressure, or bias, o f the last q u o ta tio n from K ro n ro d is obvious. Id en tificatio n o f the pro du ct with the materia] p rod u c t m ay be in p art due to the influence of J .Stalin and his prim itive philosophical m aterialism .6 But it w ould seem th at this identification is prim arily the result o f the particular econom ic conditions in the Soviet U nion a t the time when planning was in stitu ted in th a t country. It seemed evident to t h e p e o p l e w h o were entering on the process o f rapid industrialization t h a t th e im p o rta n t things were steel an d coal, i.e., tangible material goods, by m eans o f which they were trying to increase the productive wealth o f the c o u n t r y . 7 Consciously or unconsciously, lab or in th at field o f social activity to o k on an a u r e o l e o f special usefulness o r sublim ity. The suggestive Smith-Marx term o f p rodu c tiv e lab o r fitted splendidly into the em otional requirem ents o f the situation, and the a u th o rity o f M arxs name could n o t b u t reinforce the total impression. O nce this process has been lived throu gh , th e p o stu late is evident in and o f itself and there is no need for logical analysis People simply k n o w th a t factory workers are p rod uctiv e and th at university

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professors are no t, and that the latter live off the lab o r o f the workers. The last tw o sentences generalize th e a u t h o r s personal experience. Productive Labor U nder Socialism If we try to ex ten d th e Marxian analysis to socialist economics, we can proceed on th e following basis. T he Marxist approach to ec onom ic analysis m eans essentially the historical d eterm in atio n o f ec onom ic categories, the assertion o f their social dependence. And if we wish to include social relationships in the definition o f labor produ ctiv ity , th en it will be clear, u p o n reflection, that philosophical m ateriality o r th e distinction betw een base and superstru ctu re does n o t directly provide the criterion required and th a t the problem is m ost appropriately solved on the basis developed by Marx: by posing th e question o f the basic orien ta tio n of th e so cioeconom ic system in question. T he result o f the process o f capitalist p ro d u c tio n is capital and hence, Marx concludes, in th a t system only th at w o rk is productive which prod u c es capital This applies to b o th the m aterial and the spiritual sectors o f p ro d u c tio n . If, on this basis, we pose the question o f w hat the result o f socialist p ro d u c tio n is, we cannot b u t conclude th a t th ey are use-values. In a society in which the im m ed iate and u ltim ate goals o f p ro d u c tio n coincide, the function o f capital as an agent for organizing p ro d u c tio n becom es superfluous and th e p r o d u c tio n o f p rofit is no longer the criterion o f productiveness. In such a society , p ro d u c tio n is n o t organized for the sake o f m aking a p ro fit or accum ulating capital, b u t for the p u rpose o f satisfying h u m a n needs. A ccordingly, any and all labor is pro du ctiv e th a t produces goods and services for the satisfaction o f the needs o f p eople, i.e.., any and all labor th a t increases the welfare o f th e social co m m u n ity . A t the same time, th e m istake should n o t be m ade o f regarding all socially recognized lab o r as productive. U n d e r socialism the criteria o f productivity consist in the satisfaction o f needs, bu t those needs are n o t abstract, nation al, social, historical, b u t quite c o n c r e t e , p e r s o n a l , individual. T h e welfare o f the social co m m u n ity is greater or smaller, depending on w hat happens to the welfare o f each individual m em b er o f th a t community.. A part from th e welfare o f specific people, th ere is no o th e r welfare. B ut in th a t c o n te x t on e kind o f labor co ntrib u tes to increasing well-being, while a n o th e r kind does n o t change well-being b u t only creates the co nditio ns for its realization and in a way represents an ex pe n d itu re o f p ro du ctio n. The first kind o f lab o r is productive, 1.31

the second is nonproductive.. In the first kind o f labor may be included lab or th a t p roduces com m odities, educational and scientific labor, medical and cultural labor; in the second kind: governm ent adm inistration, police, the armed forces, the w ork o f politicians. It is a characteristic o f socialism as a social system th at it stim ulates labor o f the first kind and limits labor o f the second kind. And from o u r theoretical p o in t o f view, th a t means stimulating productive labor and limiting n o n p ro d u c tiv e labor. In this respect the functioning o f socialism is formally identical with the functioning o f capitalism: b o th system s rely on productive labor and limit no np ro d u c tiv e labor. The con ten ts of productive and nonp rod uctive labor, however, differ considerably. There is a n o th e r m istake th at should n o t be made, T he fact th at m aterialized and nonm aterialized labor are equally productive does n o t m ean th a t there is n o so cioeconom ic difference between them . This difference does not, of course, consist in the vulgar distinction of m aterial goods and nonm aterial services, as in classifying the m akers o f b o o ts as productive w orkers and barbers as n o n produ ctive workers, a distinction made, e.g., in official Yugoslav statistics. T h e difference is th a t some goods and services are sold on the m arket, while others (educational, medical, and similar services) are n o t The fact is th a t m aterial goods do m in ate in the first sector, while the second consists exclusively o f n o n m a t e r i a l serv ic es But these are secon daiy , derivative characteristics th at can be used as a so rt o f ap p ro x im a tio n and n o t as a fu ndam ental theoretical criterion of d ifferentiatio n. It is interesting to note th a t n o n m a rk e t p ro d u c tio n (w ith o u t the services o f the state apparatus) in o u r cou n try is already one-te n th of total p ro d u c tio n and is increasing m o re rapidly than p ro d u c tio n for the m arket. P ro du ction for the m a rk e t and p ro d u c tio n fo r im m ediate s a t i s f a c t i o n o f needs i.e., ec onom ic and no nec o n o m ic p ro d u c tio n , to use the usual term inology determ in e a definite social grouping, which will be discussed in a later chapter. Like the difference in eco no m ic organization, this m akes the distinction im p o rta n t and o f theoretical interest. A t the same time, this distinction, as has been said, has absolutely no co n n e ctio n w ith asserting a criterion for the social productiveness of labor. If there were such a connection, m a rke ta b ility w ould then d eterm in e the p ro d u c tiv ity o f labor under socialism , which is absurd. We can n o w sum m arize the result o f o u r analysis. T o tal socially necessary lab o r in a socialist society is divided into productive and n onp ro d u c tiv e labor. T h e first c o n trib u tes to well-being; the second serves to m aintain th e social fram ew ork o f p ro d u c tio n . 132

Productive lab o r may take place b o th in the m arket and in the n o n m a rk e t spheres. In the first case th e labor results, fo r the m ost part, in material goods; in the second case, in nonm aterial services. All these distinctions are n o t merely m atters o f abstract theo ry; they can be established statistically, and the results o f the relevant categories o f labor can be changed..8

IS. IN D IV ID U A L AND SOCIAL PRO PER TY U N D E R SOCIALISM Posing tlie Problem P ro p erty is one o f th e basic categories in analyzing social p h en om ena. Capitalism is said to be based on private p r o p e r t y , 9 and socialism is based on social pro p e rty . What exactly does this m ean? I t w ould be difficult to say th at the problem s in this field have been elucidated and solved. Nevertheless, p ro p e rty , perhaps even m ore than productive labor, is n o t simply an academ ic problem , b u t is involved, in a m ost direct way, in social organization and social practice.. Vulgarization of the problem o f pro p e rty and naive dogm atism concerning it have led to great damage to socialist co n stru c tio n am o n g us, and to an even greater e x ten t in o th e r socialist countries. T h e socioeconom ic theo ry o f socialism began to be formed at a time when there was as yet no socialism- The basic motive that guided socialists, th e theoretical and practical workers, was revolt against the social defects o f the capitalist system and confidence th a t it was possible and necessary to con stru ct a b e tte r social system. Because o f this they were, above all, oriented toward criticism and destru c tio n o f the existing social system. M arx s Capital has the su btitle o f A C ritique o f th e Political E con om y o f C apitalism . It is no w o n d e r th at for a long time socialism was defined negatively, as the negation and antithesis o f capitalism. In capitalism the m arket exists anarch ically; therefore, there is no m ark et in socialism. In capitalism, econom ic decisions are taken by th e productive units themselves, the enterprises; therefore, in socialism there can be no a u to n o m o u s enterprises, b u t econom ic organizations m ust be subject to the central decisions o f a governm ent plan. Capitalism was based o n individual initiative; therefore, individual initiative is som ething evil and m ust be replaced by social initiative, em bo died in the state. U n der capitalism there is private p ro p e rty , w hich is the source o f crises, exploitation, etc.; therefore, socialism must d o away w ith private 133

pro p e rty and replace it with governm ent ownership,. T od ay we k n ow , on the basis of practical experience, how naive and false these antinom ies are T he m ark et need n o t be anarchical; planning need not be adm inistrative; individual initiative is n o t necessarily bad, and governm ent initiative is n o t the only alternative; in addition to private and governm ent ow nership, there is a third possibility, social ownership. This last an tin o m y will be the subject o f o u r next inquiry. First, however, we note th at a n o th e r real antino m y has developed in the m ean tim e, the an tin o m y betw een M arxs socioeconom ic th eory and vulgar Marxism, which has no thing b u t phraseology in c o m m o n with it, 10 The dogm a th a t there is an identity of private p ro perty and capitalism, and o f governm ent ow nership and socialism, and that governm ent ow nership converts capitalism into socialism is wrong, as we now k n o w , for three distinct reasons. First, private p ro p e rty exists in simple co m m o d ity p ro d u c tio n , and y e t that is not capitalism; in ancient despotism s, as Marx emphasizes, there was state ownership and y et th a t had nothing w hatever to d o with socialism. In fascist countries the state totally regu lated social and econom ic life, bu t they were still capitalist countries, F u rth e r, we m ust establish the essence o f capitalism. It does not consist in private ow nership but, as Marx fo rm u lated so brilliantly at the very ou tset o f his scientific and political activity, , pow er over lab o r and its p ro d u c ts . 11 P ow er over labor seems to me to give the essence o f capitalist private ownership b e tte r and m ore precisely than the usual concept o f exploitation E xploitation is an am biguous term , literally: it has tw o m ean in g s.12 WJiat answer shall we give to the following question: w ho is exploiting a private person or a socialist enterprise if the private person pays a w o rk e r 100,000 din. and th e enterprise pays him only 8 0 ,0 0 0 din? A nd w ha t o f ex ploitation o f agricultural producers by the co m m u ne, a fact which farmer Bradic m entions? E x plo itatio n can m ean failure to make p a y m e n t for w o rk done Such ex plo itation exists wherever there are m ono poly situations As a result, ec onom ic theo ry in the West frequently proposes to take the degree o f m o n opo ly as the only objective measure o f exploitation. In th a t sense, because o f t h e i r g r e a t l y d iffe rin g operating conditions, economically privileged w orkers collectives exp loit others, arbitrary decisions by the state and by banks lead to exp lo itation , and, o f course, taking advantage o f or creating m o nop oly situations on the m arket means exp loitation of som e collectives b y o th e rs .13 This is a very serious problem , which we have hardly investigated at all But ex ploitation can also signify the specific social relationship in 134

which one class of individuals, by means o f private ownership or state power, subordinates another, and larger, class economically. T he latter class is that o f wage workers The former class lias p o w er over labor. Evidently, th at po w e r does n o t consist in the replacement of private ow nership by state ownership.. Rather, it may even be increased, since it gives rise to to ta l pow er o f the state over labor and its prod uc ts; the process o f alienation may reach its absolute limit. It need n o t be so, but can be, and history shows that it actually does get to th at point. In contrast to the vulgar Marxism em b odied in the Stalinist dialectical reinforcem ent o f the state, the truly Marxist ju d g m e n t would be roughly as follows Under capitalism, p o w er over tabor is based on (unlim ited) private p ro perty in the m eans o f production. Accordingly, the basic p recond itio n fo r the construction of socialism, in which every p o w e r o ver labor will end and hence the process of dealienation will begin, consists in th e liquidation of (unlim ited) private p ro p e rty in the m eans o f p rodu ction At the same time this is, as the m ath em aticians would say. only a necessary and not a sufficient conditio n for eliminating capitalism or for constructing socialism. In o th e r words, the fact that private property is elim inated does n o t m ean that socialism is being constructed or has been constructed S om ething more is needed. The third reason for the falsity o f the above-mentioned identities is the following. A change in social institutions leads to m etam orphosis o f econom ic categories. Just as private ownership, u nder the co nditio ns o f simple com m odity produ ctio n, does n o t lead to the establishm ent of pow er over labor, although it can do so if, and to the e x te n t that, the conditions exist for the develop m en t o f capitalist com m o dity p rod u c tio n , so, und er the conditions o f a socialist ec o nom y, private ownership need n o t lead to capitalist relations an d can be totally integrated into the developm ent o f socialism and socialist relations. How, and u nder w hat conditions, is a question that m u st be investigated, and it is a q uestion to which Yugoslav experience gives a definitive answer. Socialist or Nonsocialist Character o f P rodu ction b y the Individual Producer We begin with a well-known practical example: the position of the craftsm an in the Yugoslav econom y. Starting from the dogm atic co nception th a t individual craftsmanship (th e term individual was used intentionally in order to avoid the negative em otional c o n n o ta tio n o f the term p rivate ) is essentially 1.35

n o n s o c i a l i s t , lo cal, and n o t only local, agencies applied administrative measures o f pressure and harassm ent As a result, the n um ber o f craftsm en began to decrease, Those w ho left their occupations were prim arily those individuals w ho were unwilling to endure social discrim ination against th eir labor and the insinuations th a t they were speculators and antisocialist elements. There rem ained, in addition to the older and hence im m obile craftsm en, those to w ho m socialism and social labels were irrelevant and w ho were interested only in gain, regardless o f how and on w hat basis it was achieved. Since o u r econo m y was expanding rapidly at the same time, th e dem an d for the services o f craftsm en increased irresistibly, regardless o f the social theories of o u r local agencies. A kind of El D orado was set Lip for the speculative elements; the setup was all th ey could possibly desire, for an ec onom ic m o n o p o ly was given them . When this had taken place, adm inistrative sanctions did little good, T axes were raised beyond the real capacities o f th e taxed. Again the h o n est ones left their positions, since they could n o t stand th e pressure; those w ho rem ained, and their num bers increased, 14 were the speculators w ho knew how to overcom e these obstacles as well, T h e m o no poly o f the latter was reinforced still further. O n this basis, o ur theoreticians had arrived at the point they anticipated: treating the private o w n e r as a tax evader and speculator. This was an empirical verification o f the correctness o f th eir theory and policy, b u t they failed to see th at their policy no t only did n ot reduce antisocialist p h en o m en a b u t increased them on a massive scale. Before the war, the craftsm an was a m an with a m odest incom e, with no political am bitions, and w ith a certain traditional guild h o n esty in business; m ore th an h a lf o f the craftsm en could not live off the earnings from their craft, and only 2% o f them em ployed m ore than fo u r assistants [ 17: 124-126] . In developed capitalist countries the craftsm an can hardly be distinguished from the w orker, th e co m p etitio n is keen, and th e n u m b e r of ban kru ptcies am ong artisans (tak en in the broad sense, to include tradespeople, those engaged in services, etc.) is en orm ou s In Yugoslavia it was only after the w ar th a t artisans began to buy autom obiles, to build villas, and to carouse in night clubs the three earmarks o f newly fou n d wealth am ong those with limited means Twelve years ago 1 witnessed an unpleasant scene, in which an old electrician, presenting his bill for the w ork he had done, suffered a heart atta c k because he was told, as a m a tte r o f course, th a t he was a speculator and price extortio nist. When he regained his com posure, he got angry and rejoined: Why was he a

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speculator? H a d n t he d o ne his w ork honestly and well? H a d n t he charged for his w o rk strictly according to the regulated tariff? D id n t he pay taxes to the co u n try ho nestly? D id n t he love his co u n try the way every o th e r citizen did? Why was he always greeted with insults; why was his honesty always im pugned? Why w a sn t he ju st as good and h onest as any o th e r w o rk e r or the clerks in some governm ent office? Why did he have to be dishonest just because he w orked fo r himself? It m ight be said o f all this th a t o ne can n o t generalize from a single case, that it is impossible to be sentim ental a b o u t social transform ations, and th a t this is a typical case o f petty-bourgeois m entality, incapable o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g social changes. B ut was petty-bourgeois psychology involved here, o r a faulty th eory? A non-Marxist and anti-Marxist theo ry , like the antinom ies m en tio ned above? In the past twelve years, as I followed o u r social developm ent, I have often th o u g h t o f th a t old electrician w ith his petty-bourgeois psychology. T hat m ay have beeji his m entality, b u t its core was labor as the criterion ol h u m an w o rth . And th a t is a criterion th at is socialist, b ey o n d a d o u b t. A fter all, w h a t is involved? Individual P ro perty as an Integral Category o f a Socialist Socioeconom ic System Let us retu rn to M arxs definition of capital, which provides a safe and simple guide to a decision. Does a farm er w ho works ten hectares w ith his family, o r an electrician who goes around with his son repairing o u r h o m e electrical systems, achieve po w e r over o th e rs labor? O f course n o t Is there any internal econom ic or social logic th a t dictates th a t he may do so in the futu re? I f the farm er or electrician w orks alone o r w ith his family, there is certainly no danger of any such d evelopm ent A nd if he works w ith a helper? Probably n o t even then. How m any helpers can be tolerated? T h at depends on a practical evaluation, the criterion being as follows: as long as the p ro p rie to r w orks him self and that direct w ork is his basic fu n c tio n , there is no danger o f capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t . A s soon as his prim ary function becomes en trepreneurship, i.e.,, the organization o f the labor o f others, then even by definition lie is no longer a w orker b u t is a capitalist. Here tw o problem s emerge th a t call for elucidation. If there are cases in which private ow nership does not lead to capitalist relationships, does th a t fact in itself suffice for private ow nership to be tolerated? The answer is categorically in the negative, Capitalist relationships arc n o t the only criterion according to which society has to be taken into account F or 1.37

example, we have abolished the private practice o f m edicine Health care has been socialized in some socially m ature capitalist countries as w e ll The fact is that health care is a field in which n o t only capitalist relationships canno t be to lerated , b u t com m ercial co m m od ity-m o ney relationships in general. Health, education, and culture are not co m m od ities that can be m atters o f buying and selling betw een suppliers and purchasers; in this field, d istribution is according to needs and n o t according to ability to pay, More precisely, it should be th at way u n d e r socialism. The second problem relates to the laten t deleterious effect o f private ow nership arising o u t o f the dynam ics o f the ec o n o m y . T he m arket leads to differentiation by way o f c o m p etitio n ; some productive units fail, while others expand. We can, w ith o u t any difficulty, limit the n u m b e r o f assistants th at the individual pro d u c er may em ploy, and thus we can formally m ake the c r e a t i o n o f capitalist relations impossible. B u t w hen the productive unit grows to th at limiting p o in t and is capable o f ex panding still further, there will be a certain am o u n t o f pressure in the direction of getting aro u n d the requ irem en ts o f law,'and of the private p ro p rie to r turning into an entrepreneur. It is well kn o w n th a t such cases are constantly arising. The solution to this problem is not to be sought in exacerbating sanctions, for w hen a negative econom ic p h en o m e n o n keeps reappearing, it has a disorganizing effect, and criminal sanctions neither diminish nor avoid the harm ful effects o n the econo m ic and social system. In such cases there is evidently som ething o u t o f o rd e r in the system, and the rem edy has to be sought in institu tion al changes and n o t in criminal law. A t the same time, it does no t follow th a t the only alternative is elim ination, o r at least vigorous prosecution, o f private p ro p e rty , a conclusion that has o fte n been dra w n until the present tim e The path th a t has to be tak en, in m y opinion, is the tran sform atio n into a socialist category p ro perty based on individual labor and the integration o f the individual pro ducers in to the ec onom ic and social system as c o n s titu e n t and fu n c tio n a l parts o f th a t system, n o t leaving them as foreign bodies with serious dysfunctional effects. A n indication as to h ow this can be accom plished is given by o u r practice, and I shall return to this question a fte r dealing with a n o th e r serious problem : the size o f resources in private p rop erty . In a tim e o f a u to m atizatio n , the criterion o f individual labor is n o t sufficient to m ake the fo rm a tio n o f p o w er over labor impossible. This pow er can com e into being indirectly, via the m arket, if enough capital is ow ned (which we shall call resources in o rd er to avoid an invidious co n n o ta tio n ) H ence the criterion of
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labor has to be su pplem en ted by limiting the size o f p rodu ction resources with private ow nership. T he key factor here is n o t that capital bears f r u it. In o u r co u n try , as elsewhere, savers receive interest o n their deposits in banks o r cut c o u p o n s on governm ent bonds. In th a t way their capital bears fr u it, b u t y et I do no t imagine th a t a n y o n e will see an yth in g antisocialist in it. Some save, and others consum e beyond their incom es (b y means of consum er credit), the latter paying a prem ium to the fo rm e r in the form o f interest - n o t directly, o f course, bu t through the banking m echanism ; and e c o n o m ic equilibrium is established in the sphere o f c o n s u m p t i o n ,. 15 In fact, the fu n dam en tal m eaning o f interest-bearing savings is precisely accum ulation for the purpose o f co nsum ptio n. Saving for the purpose o f productive investm ents is an o th e r m atter. A shipper who system atically p uts his savings in to the purchase o f new trucks, which he re nts out, o r a farm er w ho does th e same with newly purchased land o r tractors does no t em ploy labor p ow er directly, b u t still practices p o w e r over labor, indirectly, via th e market. H ow far and in w hat way the possession o f m eans o f p ro d u c tio n has to be limited is a question o f practical evaluation. It m ay be decided th at no o ne m ay own m ore than one or tw o houses (besides his ow n ) and rent th em out; it m ay be decided -that owners o f tractors or autom obiles m ay o nly w ork with them themselves a n d m ay n o t hire them out. We thus come to the conclusion th a t individual ow nership o f means o f p ro d u c tio n , w ith which the o w n e r him self works, is n o t only com patible w ith socialism b u t is an integral category o f the socialist m o d e o f ec o n o m y . Socialism is a socioeconom ic system b a s e d on personal productive labor. Since everything th a t c o n trib u tes to the affirm ation o f personal lab o r as the criterion o f social value is a socialist factor, everything th a t leads to the co ntrol or d egradation o f individual lab o r initiative represents an antisocialist factor. In this sense, individual p ro p e rty in the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n represents a socialist category insofar as it satisfies the following three conditions: ( I ) if the ow ner con tin u es to be p r i m a r i l y a w o r k e r and docs n o t becom e primarily an en trepren eur, i.e., provided the e m p lo y m e n t o f o th e rs labor p ow er is adequ ately confined; (2) if the a m o u n t o f productive re so u rces is adequ ately limited; and (3) it m oney-m aking, com m ercially o rien te d activity does no t appear in fields that, because o f their social fu n c tio n , m ust be divorced from direct relationships of purchase and sale, as is the case w ith educatio n or medical care

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Collective P roperty and Social Property Socialism aims at high develop m en t of the ec ono m y and hence cann ot be based on individual ownership o f m eans of' p ro d u c tio n subject to the three lim itations m e n tio n e d above. Socialism is obviously based on social ow nership, and individual ow nership plays a peripheral role, B u t a peripheral role is n o t the same tiring as an insignificant role When all is said and d one, half of ou r active po p u latio n consists o f individual owners, and th e co nditions u n d e r which these p rodu cers are inserted in to the process o f socialist co nstru ction are o f great im po rtance . L im itations by criminal law, when th ey clash witli ec onom ic processes, cause great econom ic harm and serious social d e fo rm atio n s T h e form er are well known. T he thing then is that the ec onom ic process should channel itself eco n o m ica lly in the desired direction, nam ely, in the direction o f socialist co n struction , We n oted earlier th a t successful productive units will try to break dow n o r get around the limits set them . As long as we rem ained at th a t point, individual ow nership would remain a foreign body in socialist co n stru ction, som ethin g th a t on a petty-bourgeois basis co nstantly gave rise to capitalist tendencies. I f we were to reinforce sanctions, we w ould re p eat th e story o f the artisan r y . It is evident, therefore, th a t the only correct p ath consists in m aking the transition thro ugh the set limitations, in making a single co n tin u o u s evolution from individual to social ow nership, from small artisan w orkshops to m o d e m factories. Let us look at this problem in a single illustrative instance. A y o u n g skilled w ork e r (farm er, truck er, tavern-keeper, etc..) has inherited his w orkplace (farm , truck , bar, etc.) from his father. The y oun g fellow is capable and enterprising; he has e x p a n d ed his business and hired a helper. A t this p o in t he w orks o u t a practical little idea th a t he p aten ts (th e idea m ay consist in the use o f a new system, in an original way o f organizing tran sp o rt, in good organization o f tourist propaganda, although this kind o f idea ca n n o t be p aten te d ). O u r craftsm an is able to find a b u y er for his p a t e n t (let us say it is a lock to p ro te c t autom obiles from theft) and draws royalties. B ut he is not inclined to live the life o f a rentier; he w ants to p ro d u c e his p r o d u c t and develop it further. A nd here th e danger of com ing in to conflict w ith the law arises, A second (a n d m u ch m ore c o m m o n ) possibility is th a t ou r craftsm an ca n n o t sell his p aten t. We k n o w th at inventors am o n g us have eno rm o us difficulty in finding takers fo r their inventions Many o f these discoveries rem ain unused, to the great harm o f the econo m y. Now w h a t should be d o n e in these two cases? 140

Obviously, institutional possibilities m ust be created for o u r p ro d u c er to bring o u t the industrial potential as far as possible. Since this is largely based o n individual ow nership, the transition m ust be prepared to the s u b seq u e n t category o f ownership., Ifi But even before this can be d one, it is possible and even necessary to in tro d u ce elem ents o f self-government This n e x t category is collective ow nership; we call this form o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a cooperative [zadruga] We have p ro d u c tio n cooperatives Some o f these cooperatives involve up to several h u n d re d people F rom the s tan d p o in t of the problem we are concerned with here, this is econom ic nonsense, But in practice it has a m eaning, at least in those cases in which they form such associations,. Until now , cooperatives have had certain privileges as com pared with enterprises F o r this reason some technologically l e s s advanced producers, some kinds o f m anu facture, have organized in the form o f large cooperatives. In such cases the c o o p e ra tiv e does n o t present the appearance o f collective ow nership, b u t the legal form o f primitively organized p rodu ctio n. This p robably represents an anachronism , and it may be predicted th a t such associations will n o t p e rsis t.17 It may be expected that cooperatives, like one-m an w orkshops, will be limited as to the n u m b e r o f people engaged and the a m o u n t of resources they use. Ju st w hat those limits should be is a practical m atter. The criterion could be based on the principle th a t a cooperative should in essence be a transitional form betw een the individual craftsm an and the fully developed enterprise Given this criterion, the t r a n s i t i o n w ould have to be prepared for in good time, psychologically and organizationally. Agriculture is a special case. C oo peratio n there has proved to be one o f the m ost efficacious transitions to higher forms of ownership. A t the same time, it is n o t clear why farm ers working cooperatives have been neglected, and their n u m b e r is decreasing. In some countries, cooperatives have developed very well for some reasons that have no t w orked with us, Genera! agricultural cooperatives give the impression th a t they are local m onopolies, artificially set up by adm inistrative measures, ra th e r than a natural interm ed iate in the social organization o f agricultural p rodu ction. T o the e x te n t th at this is correct, it is econom ic loss. Finally, when p ro d u c tio n has o utgrow n the sphere of the cooperative, the cooperative is converted, by a definite step, into a self-governing enterprise with m o dern productive organization and eq u ip m en t F u r t h e r developm ent is via cooperation and integration, with restrictions to prevent monopoly. If he is hard-w orking and capable, our artisan will begin his
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working career as th e o w ner o f a one-m an shop and end it as the m anager o f a large m od ern factory. During the phases o f his developm ent, he will regard himself, and act, as a socialist laborer. N o t for an instant will his ethics as a p ro d u c er conflict with socialist ethics. F ro m th e first day he will be stim ulated to develop p ro d u c tio n and to achieve social and material appreciation for the results obtained. P roperty will never ap p e a r to him as the goal (his goal is the effectiveness o f labor), but as a means, as the correct form o f organization o f p ro d u c tio n in a definite stage o f developm ent o r in definite functional situations 18 A nd in this s e n s e all t h r e e f o r m s o f o w n e r s h i p f o r m a s i n g l e , labor-conditioned, socialist ownership. N aturally, only a small n u m b e r o f enterprises will travel the road th a t has been depicted. C o m p etitio n will do away w ith some o f them at the o u tset; some will prove to be excellent organizers o f w ork on th e level o f five employees, but very p o o r organizers on the level o f 100 or more, Nevertheless, on the on e h and , those who succeed will pro duce w h at would otherw ise be lost to society, and, on the o ther, the firmness and consistency of system will c o n trib u te to the general cohesion o f o u r socialist society. T he im p o rta n c e o f this last result for the further d evelop m ent of dem o cratizatio n and h um anization of social relationships can hardly be exaggerated. Conclusion All three form s o f ow nership have a single characteristic in co m m o n th at has n o t y e t been discussed. I t distinguishes socialist prop erty from capitalist p ro p e rty , in econom ics and in principle. This is th e principle th a t the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n , n o m a tte r by w hom th e y are managed or h ow they were acquired, are basically social Therefo re, a n y o n e w ho w ithdraw s a productive capacity from the po ten tial general social fund o f resources has to pay a definite price for the privilege o f having that capacity re d o u n d to his benefit and no one elses T h a t price is interest, and it has to be paid on resources used, w h e th e r by a craftsm an, an association, or an enterprise Social ownership of the m eans of p ro d u c tio n means, am ong o th e r things, th a t socialist society allocates the available productive forces in such a way as to achieve m ax im u m productive effect In this sense, uniform interest is o ne of' the m eans o f allocation. A nother is rent All p rodu cers have to pay a marginal interest and rent; this m erely equalizes the d em an d for m eans o f p ro d u c tio n with the supply, which in principle indicates optimal distribution. Those p ro du cers w ho are unable to pay the marginal interest and rent c a n n o t get eco nom ic permission to make use o f 142

the social fund of m eans of p ro d u c tio n , since withdraw al from the fund would deprive a n o th e r pro d u c er o f the possibility o f em ploying those m eans m ore efficiently and thus b e tte r meeting social dem ands. T he fact that the purchase o f such means o f p ro d u c tio n is financed from o w n incom e, w he th e r individual, cooperative, or from th e enterprise, and no t from credit, does n o t alter the situation in any way. Insisting on o w n m eans in that sense signifies operating with a nonsocialist category. F re q u e n t m en tio n has been m ade recently o f the need to do away with interest o n basic resources, since it is said to discourage the in tro d u c tio n o f new techniques. Such a thesis is faulty in b o th theory and practice. I f the interest is set properly, in line w ith the principles th a t have been stated, it ca n n o t discourage the in tro d u c tio n o f new techniques if those techniques m ean an actual rise in th e social p ro fita b ility in th e given situation, B ut n o t eveiy thing th a t is new is necessarily m ost profitable, o r at least not in every situation. If we com e across some evident anomalies, the fault can n o t be a ttrib u te d to interest, bu t to o th e r m eans th at are poorly defined: im posed prices, excessive installm ent paym ents, inadeq uate am o rtiza tio n , o r som ething else. Doing away w ith interest would mean introducing elem ents o f private p ro p e rty into o u r system. It would mean that the enterprise can do w hat it pleases with its resources: invest in projects o f substandard profitability, fail to use available capacity, etc, Such a posture for the productive process seems to m e totally unacceptable in a socialist society. In practical application, o f course, various ada p ta tio n s o f the principles stated will be required. There will be withdraw als and ex e m p tio n s called for by the technological, organizational, and o th e r characteristics o f the productive process. We can n o t go into th e m here. However, there is one theoretically and practically im p o rta n t conclusion th at m ust be drawn. Interest and rent represent n o t only m eans of a llo c a tio n ,19 b u t also m eans o f economic; exp ropriation and, in th at sense, are essential to the o p e r a t i o n o f s o c i a l ownership. W orkers collectives may app rop riate only th at p a r t o f revenue from p ro d u c tio n that is above th e m in im u m social p ro fita b ility o f the m eans em ployed, to the e x te n t that that part is the p ro d u c t o f their w ork, and n ot due merely to the fact th a t they have th e resources at their disposal. S om ethin g o f the kind already exists in o u r practice, although very inconsistently and n o t th o u g h t thro ug h theoretically. Interest is charged on basic resources And land prices, because o f the charging o f rent, are considerably lower than before the war, reflecting the process o f econom ic expropriation. 143

On this basis we have concluded ou r analysis in a circle that seems paradoxical at first sight. We began by arguing th a t un der certain conditions individual p ro p e rty likewise has a socialist character, and th at therefore individual p ro d u c tio n should be encouraged just as m u ch as cooperative or enterprise produ c tio n . We c o n c l u d e d by observing th a t socialism implies social o w neish ip, and th a t social ow nership presupposes eco n o m ic ex pro priation of all concrete ow ners of m eans of p ro d u c tio n The paradox is only apparent, o f course. The latter is the conditio n o f the former. It is at the same time the analytical s ta te m e n t of the co n te n t o f the category of social p ro p e rty . It is o f interest to note th a t noth in g essentially novel has been uncovered in this discussion. All the p h e n o m e n a we have dealt with already exist in o u r ec o nom y. A t the same time, as Had^i Vasilev remarks: When we tu rn the bases o f analysis of a society upside dow n, we have to pay for it in th eo ry and practice. A nd we are paying . . by m aking it possible for us, in the sphere o f essential relations, to take certain decisions by the unconscious force of' objective laws, and thereb y give those decisions the im print of empiricism and im provisation rather than conscious socialist p ra ctice [1 8 ] , The a t te m p t has been m ade, in this direction, to in terpret the already k n o w n p h e n o m e n a within the f r a m e w o r k o f a single consistent Marxist-based theoretical approach. This is n o t a m a tte r o f reco m m en din g a pragm atic approach to the problem , as in the following way o f thinking Because o f the unevenness of'social and econom ic d evelopm ent in every social system, there are survivals remaining from previous s y s t e m s , rem nants o f feudalism in capitalism, rem n a n ts of' capitalism in socialism. The individual peasant, innkeeper, peddler, and craftsm an, like the individual lawyer, artist, etc... are rem nants o f this kind am ong us. B ut the activity o f these people is useful as a su pp lem en t to social p ro d u c tio n and they are therefore to be tolerated. In p o in t o f fact, these w orking people (and they co nstitute half th e active po p u latio n o f o u r coun try) are, or at least should be, just as m uch builders o f socialism as those in factories and offices, and as such should be n o t tolerated b u t integrated into o u r social system. In this respect o u r system of self-government m akes it easier to consider and solve th e problem Self-government m eans th a t th e direct produ cers themselves organize their w o rk and a u to n o m o u sly distribute the incom e from their labor. This principle applies to collectives num bering tho usands of' workers, b u t it also applies, and m ost directly, to the individual producer. However, it is n o t only th a t individual p ro d u c er th at is involved Along with him , we have inherited 144

from capitalism the cooperative and the state enterprise. Are they to be tolerated? Obviously, none of these three types o f productive organization is to be tolerated as a relic o f the past; they have to be tra n sfo rm ed and directly included in a single socialist organization o f p ro d u c tio n A t the same time, the fact is th a t the problem o f ownership, especially individual ownership, is looked on as a delicate topic that it is no t politically o p p o rtu n e to discuss at any length. The cause o f this o pp o rtu n ism is, as far as I can see, n o t only th a t no ad e q u ate theory has been devised, but th a t in practice there arc aberrations, fluctuations, m isunderstandings, and serious political and material losses. Characteristic in this regard was the reaction to the 1953 regulation, providing th a t groups o f citizens m ight a l s o e s tab lish enterprises. T he liveliest and m ost typical reactions, Milentije Popovic w rote on this p o in t [19: 67-69], came from reactionaries on the one hand, , and from C om m unists on the o ther, even from people in positions of leadership in districts and cities, . , . The reactionaries applauded the decree, som e C o m m unists were firmly opposed to it, , . ,. In fact, those C o m m u nists viewed the fam ous citizens g ro u p also as a group o f capitalists - to them it m ean t a possibility o f a revival and rehabilitation o f capitalism .......... We m ust m ake it clear th a t the 'citizens g ro u p was a group o f working people, not o f capitalists T oday, the citizens g ro ups w ould n o t cause any ex citem ent, even though, u n fo rtu n a te ly , the decree in question did no t lead to any significant new initiatives, because in past years adm inistrative initiative was regarded as som ething m ore deeply socialistic. B u t even to d ay the discussions concerning farm trac to rs 20and individual taverns arouse suspicions th a t an overt or covert tendency tow ard the resto ration o f capitalism is involved, Hence the great personal risk, which others will n o t understand and will attack , for an y on e w ho takes up this theme, A nd hence the regular avoidance o f th a t th em e 16. V E R T IC A L S T R U C T U R E OF YU G O SLA V SOCIETY: STR A T IF IC A T IO N A n u m b e r o f strata and g rou ps can be discerned in o u r co u n try , w ith differences, tensions, and conflicts o f interest am ong them as th e result o f real or imagined opposing interests o r simply as the result o f various factors arising o u t o f group psychology. Thus, we can distinguish am ong farmers, farm workers, workers, and tradesm en T h en th ere are skilled and unskilled workers; the latter
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are to a great e x te n t included am ong th e farm w orkers Within the econom ic organization there are groupings of workers, subo rdin ate em ployees, and responsible officials. In educational, scientific, and cultural institutions, collectives consist o f creative w orkers and professional, adm inistrative, and adjunct personnel. Differences exist betw een physical and intellectual w ork, b etw een tow n and cou n try . There are relationships o f su b o rd in atio n b etw een chief' and underling in the tim e-hallowed hierarchical stru ctu re o f the governm ent adm inistration. S tate officials (especially if they are n o t merely hierarchically delim ited bearers o f ra n k b u t bearers o f p ow er as well) are co ntrasted w ith groups outside the governm ent sphere,. As in every c o u n try , there are also various interest groups.21 T h e ie are also purely psychological antitheses. T h e aggressive and dy n am ic businessm an differs from the critical, contem plative, and system atic scholar, w h o in tu rn is unlike the optim istic, improvising, and com prom ise-oriented politician. All these differences give rise to social tensions, b u t they represent structural cross sections at very different levels and o f very different im portance. It will be necessary, therefore, to introd uce some system into o u r investigation. Social Stratification in Yugoslavia Social diffe ren tiation , and h ence structuring, m ay be horizontal or vertical. By definition, horizontal d ifferentiation po stulates differences am ong groups, and those differences may (and in fact do) lead to conflicts o f interest. B ut these conflicts are n o t antagonistic A ntagonistic differences are characteristic o f a vertically differentiated society, and vertical differen tiatio n is inherent in any class society, H orizontal groupings are arrived at because o f differences in social role, as th e result of th e division o f labor. Vertical groupings are arrived a t by virtue of differences in the sta tu s o f the various social g ro u p s,22 As w ith S toetzel [23: .363], we m ay also define the status o f a person as the sum o f th e behavior th a t he may rightly exp ect from o th e r persons, and we m ay d efine his role as the actions th a t o th e r persons m ay rightly ex pect from him. O n this basis the sum total o f all the statuses and roles o f a society w ould m ak e up the social system . In this section we shall consider status, or vertical social differentiatio n. In o th er words, we shall examine how groups differ by virtue o f occupying different positions in the social hierarchy, h o w those positions are interrelated as higher and low er, w ith the result th a t groups represent strata, and social d ifferentiation appears as a process of

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differentiation. S trata are never distinguished by only a single characteristic. On the o th e r hand, the individual characteristics th a t enter into the determ in a tio n of strata are n o t absolutely correlated with one a n o th e r and hence do n o t define the stratum with com plete precision. In view of this, we believe th a t strata m ay be ap p ro xim ately d eterm ined on the basis o f (a) differences in social repute, prestige, which in turn is m ostly the result o f the two following characteristics: (b ) financial status 23 and (c) social power, which is show n by the possible and actual making of im p o rta n t social decisions. 24 U n fo rtu n a te ly , since empirical w o rk in this field is rare and o fte n unrepresentative, we shall be com pelled, in analyzing the stratification o f Yugoslav society, to rely on experience, in tu itio n , analogy, and general ideas. These hetero gen eous and scientifically ra th e r unimpressive bases may, for th e tim e being, ou tlin e the following hierarchy o f social groups, 1, G ov e rn m en t political figures, eco n o m ic and non eco nom ic leaders, T h e m em bers o f this group m ake the m ost im p o rta n t social decisions, have the highest incom es as a group, and for b oth reasons have the highest prestige as a group. 2. I n t e l l e c t u a l w o rk e rs in econom ic, n o necon om ic, and governm ent adm inistrations, Ih i s group by and large coincides w ith th e group o f university-trained graduates. But there are exceptions, F o r exam ple, teachers would probably have to be included as well. A nd o n the o th e r hand, n o t all graduates o f u n i v e r s i t y ed ucation are necessarily ed u ca ted people, i.e., intellectuals. In the fram ew ork o f their position in the social d i v i s i o n o f labor, the intelligentsia falls in to three fairly w e l l - d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s u b g r o u p s : th e technological-econom ic intellectuals ( te c h n o c ra ts ); the u pp er adm inistrative echelons ( b u re au crats ); and the intelligentsia in the narrow or classical sense (hum anist intelligentsia). 3. The (routine) office w orkers correspond to w hat are called w h i t e - c o l l a r w o rk e rs in Western societies This stratu m co n stitutes o u r m iddle class and som etim es gives a particular im p rin t to social occurrences (see the analysis, in Section 19, o f th e genesis o f the bureaucratic m en tality in the parly). Office w orkers are divided in to three strata: those w ith secondary education, w ith low er edu cation , and adju n ct personnel. 4, Workers as a s tra tu m are p re tty clearly differentiated into three o r even four substrata: (a) highly skilled; (b) skilled; (c) semiskilled; and (d) unskilled, including the transitional category o f farmer-workers T here are significant social differences between 147

the first tw o and the second pair o f categories.25 5, Artisans represent a residua) category; in ad dition to artisans, in the strict sense o f the term (ow ners of shops for materia] p rod uctio n and services), the classification should include all o th e r p r i v a t e persons engaged in ec onom ic activities (e x c e p t in agriculture). It is characteristic for this grou p th a t it lias the lowest percentage o f self-renewal: only 9,2% o f the children o f artisans remain in th at social group (co m pared to 21% for unskilled workers, .32% for office workers, and 64% for peasants). The largest p ro p o rtio n o f sons of artisans b ecom e skilled and highly skilled w orkers (26%).. It emerges th at in to d a y s social situation the artisan s tra tu m is subject to con stan t dissolution and does not show any tend ency to persist.26 6. Peasants, w h o today are differentiated by regions and n o t by substrata, as they were at one time The above list calls for som e c o m m e n t The strata are presented in sequence, from highest to lowest. The sequence is unreliable only for the artisans, for w hom there is considerable difference in ranking based on social consideration and income; their social status is low, ju s t below th at o f the peasant, while their incom e is relatively high.. When this social group is b etter integrated into Yugoslav society, its status will p rob ab ly coincide w ith that o f skilled and highly skilled workers, w ho o ccup y the largest share o f all groups in the fo rm atio n o f artisan cadres, b o th within and between generations. A n indication in th at direction is given by empirical studies, which show th at highly skilled and skilled workers regard artisans as th e closest social g ro u p 27 An empirical test o f the vertical stratification o f Yugoslav society emerges from the ab o v e -m en tio n ed study o f Vojin MiliC [16: 213] .,28 We can assume th a t lower intergeneratio n m obility will correspond to higher social statu s in a s tratu m , i.e., th at their children will prefer to stay in the social group of their parents m ore than when the status o f the group is low. I f stratification is very significant, the differences betw een the lowest and the highest strata will be very great, We n ow consider three series of Mrlid indices of association (th e ratio o f observed and theoretical frequencies corresponding to co m plete m obility). Indices higher than unity indicate th a t social origin facilitates entry in to a category, and vice versa for indices greater than unity. T h e first series shows th e e x te n t to which children rem ain in the social category of their p arents above the degree corresponding to com plete m obility: peasants, L 3 0 ; unskilled and semiskilled workers, 2 23; skilled and highly skilled workers, 2.32; ro utin e office workers, 4 03 ; and professional and managerial cadres, 8. 82, 148

The second series indicates upw ard m obility, i.e., the chances th at persons from lower social strata have o f reaching the professional and managerial g roup: for persons o f peasant origin, 0,45; o f w o rk e r origin, 0.84-1.07; families of white-collar workers, 4 01; and families o f professionals and managers. 8 82. Hence, w ork e rs children have only one-ninth the chance, and peasants children one-tw entieth the chance, o f getting into the leadership category o f professionals and managers than children born to families o f the latter group. D ow nw ard m obility, as we can illustrate from the third series in Milis tables o f indices o f association, enco un ters even greater obstacles, as m ight be expected. The flow o f persons from the highest social group to o t h e r groups has the following indices: to white-collar workers, 4 .9 3 ; to workers, 0.45-0.22; and to peasants, 0,13. C om pared to the chances o f remaining in their ow n social group, the highest one, these persons are tw en ty times less likely to becom e workers and seventy times less likely to b ecom e peasants. It m ust be rem em bered that the scale of stratification is not d isco ntinuo us; there are no gaps betw een the strata and they in terp e n etrate; th e u p p er portions o f lower strata overlap the low er p ortio ns of u p p e r strata. Highly skilled workers rise farabove the lower limit o f the s tra tu m of white-collar workers; the highest intellectual cadres rise to the first ranks o f the managerial stratum.. This overlapping, this blurred differentiation, and co n tin u ity are o f great im p o rta n c e fo r the consequences o f stratification, as will be discussed later It is only if we imagine each stratum to have a center o f gravity that it is possible to form a d isco ntinuo us hierarchical classification into six centers o f gravity, as was done. It will be seen that with the exceptio n o f the first stratum , stratification is a function o f education. T he higher the education, the higher the social status Higher education makes the type o f w o rk m ore intellectual; only m anual o ccu pations are left for the semiliterate. This is the basis o f the frequent observation th at manual labor is lower per se, and th a t an intellectual social status is higher. A ctually, the statu s o f physical and intellectual workers is derived from their educational status, and in itself does no t co ntain any hierarchical differentiation, In o th e r words, there is nothin g inherently in ferio r a b o u t physical labor. There is no physical labor as stren uou s as top-flight sport, and no physical labor as d irty as w ar; y et bo th are ranked very high on the scale o f social values. Participants in volunteer y o u th labor projects evaluate outstan d in g achievem ents in these projects at least as high as brilliant results at school. The fact is that there has never y et 149

been a society with sufficient eco nom ic resources to render an essentially equal education possible for everyone On the o n e hand, education is requisite for the perform ance of co m p lex social tasks 29 and, on the o ther, it obviously affords tangible advantages to its possessors in the daily struggle for a place in society. Therefore, the strata to w h o m ed ucation is accessible, w ho have a m o n o p o ly on education, occupy a higher position in the social hierarchy in their societies We may add here th at in situations in w h i c h w e a l t h begins to lose its significance fo r vertical d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , as is characteristic o f present-day society, education becom es the key factor in social s tratifica tio n .30 If we try to define the above-m entioned strata quantitatively, we com e to the classical p yra m id o f 1961 31

Thousand Managerial cadres Intellectual workers Functionaries: secondary training primary training adjuncts Workers: highly skilled skilled semiskilled unskilled 60 170 343 410 82 835 163 84.3 42 6 1,032 2,46 4 292 4,40 8 8,22 9

In % 0.7 2.1

10 1

Artisans Peasants Total active p o p u latio n

30 0 3.5 53.6 100.0

Since statistical studies in this field have not been com pleted and the available statistical data are partial and rand om , a desirable com parison o f the changes in social stru ctu re according to periods is no t yet possible. I t can only be stated th a t over the six-year period o f 1957-1963, fo r which d ata are available, the n u m b e r o f workers rose by 5 8 % . 32 I f this rate continues in the future, workers will make up h a lf the active po p u latio n o f Yugoslavia by 1970. On the basis o f th e meager scattered data, we m ay conclude th a t o u r society is m ore o p en than any o th e r society at a similar 150

stage o f ec onom ic d ev elop m ent: the m obility betw een its various strata is greater. This is particularly true o f the highest s t r a t u m , 33 and is obviously the direct result o f the revolution. However, general social m obility and, hence, openness have n o t perm anently attained the degree o f social m obility o f the m ost developed industrial countries. A ccording to the figures o f Milic, the degrees o f openness are, in p ercen t o f theoretically possible m obility: F r a n c e , 4 9 % ; S w itz e rla n d , 51%; West G erm any, 60-63%; Yugoslavia, 65%; S w eden, 66%; and the USA, 68% [ 16: 2 2 6 ] . A t the same time, we should n o t be deceived by the persistence o f the social pyram id o r by to d a y s m obility. They reflect a m o m e n ta ry situ atio n, which will change as a function o f the rate o f econom ic development.. In particular, we can w ith certainty predict a change in the pyram idal structure. In the first place, the base the peasantry is changing very rapidly. Also, along with numerical changes, the peasantry is being transform ed into groups th at are very different sociologically farmers and workers. In addition, a fte r m igration from the villages slows dow n, there will be an absolute decrease in the n u m b e r of u n s k i l l e d workers. T he n u m b e r o f skilled workers, lower functionaries, and intellectuals will increase b o th absolutely and relatively. This will gradually change th e pyram idal structure into a spheroidal one, w ith the extrem es n o t em phasized and the basic mass o f society c o n c e n trate d aro und the e q u a to r E ducation eliminates the s tra tu m w ith o u t any skills. The lowest stratum , the peasantry, will be tran sfo rm ed and will decline as a function of econom ic develo pm ent. The highest, or governing, stratu m will, if present social trends contin u e, dissolve in the institutions o f self-government and gradually tu rn into a professional grou p o f adm inistrators. In that society the distrib ution of education might to a great e x te n t coincide with the natural d istribution of intelligence, and p ro p e rty differences w ould be trifling.34 The question now arises: w hat are the relationships of social stratification and classes in o u r cou ntry ?
S ocial Classes

Class is one of those concepts th a t are m uch used b u t no t precisely defined. A lm ost every a u t h o r has his ow n definition. We m ust therefore begin by arriving at a suitable definition for o u r analysis. It should first be n o ted th a t the term class is used in at least tw o widely differing senses, M arxs d ictum th a t all previous history has been the h isto ry o f class struggles is an instance o f its 151

em p lo y m e n t in the sense o f an essentially bivalent social structure, in which the struggle o f tw o antagonistic classes (o r class groupings) is the m otive force o f history These tw o classes are the class o f the p ro p e rtie d and the class o f the n o n p ro p e rtie d . In a n o th e r sense, class is used to d e n o te differences w ith respect to estate and caste. T he la tter are closed, while a class is an o p e n group d eterm in e d by exclusively ec onom ic factors, i.e., by private p ro p e rty In th at sense, classes exist only in capitalist society In w h a t follows, the c o n c ep t o f class will be used in either sense, w ith o u t explicit specification, since it will be obvious from the c o n te x t w hat is involved. The questio n now arises: w hat a b o u t classes a fte r capitalism? I f pro p e rty is the key criterion for defining classes, the answer was very simple at o n e tim e, and for m any sociologists it still is tod ay. As long as there exist three kinds o f p ro p e rty private, cooperative, and state there will be three class groupings In subsequent d evelop m ent the first tw o kinds o f p ro p e rty will be elim inated and, with it, class society, since state ow nership provides the basis for th e form ation o f a single class, which thus becomes identical with society. T oday, on the basis of historical experience, we know how naive and in correct th a t con cep tio n is I f we use the co n c e p t o f class in th e first sense, th en class polarization is possible on the basis o f state ow nership as well (the class o f [indirect] ow ners is called the bu reau cracy), as on the basis o f the previous kinds o f p ro p e rty . A nd Marx spoke o f the Statist societies of the an c ie n t O rient as class societies O n this basis, pro p e rty and class society are Siamese twins, and fit together well theoretically,. Difficulties arise w ith social p ro p e rty , and th ey are n o t only sociological difficulties, lu rists to o have great trou ble in defining social p ro p e rty . We en c o u n te r the idea th at social p ro p e rty is a co n tra d ictio in adjecto. A society com prises all the m em b ers o f the society, and p ro p e rty can o nly be defined in relation to those excluded from it. Social p ro p e rty might be defined as nation al p ro p e rty to be sure, in relation to o th e r n ation al econom ies; b u t this is n o t operation ally applicable in the dom ain o f o u r analysis Hence, it is probably m o st suitable to consider social p ro p e rty as the a b o litio n o f property. Now, o u r th e o ry can also include this case; a society whose productive organization is based on social p ro p e rty is a classless society. We m ight also insert an elem e n t o f evolution into o u r theoretical approach . In precapitalist societies the strata are m ore and m ore open (castes estates classes), and private p ro p e rty becom es m o re and m ore the d o m in a n t principle o f organization o f 152

social prod u c tio n . This d ev elo pm ent reaches its culm ination in capitalism, in which classes app ear in the second sense, a fte r which those classes undergo further transform ations. In postcapitalist bureaucratic structures we can speak o f quasictasses.35 As we k now , p rop erty relations play the key role in M arxs definition o f class At the beginning of the ch a p te r on classes in Volume 3 of Capital, he w rote: Owners o f naked labor power, owners o f capital and landow ners, to w h o m rent, profit and ground rent are a specific source o f incom e, that is to say, hired laborers, capitalists, and landowners, are the three great classes o f m odern society based 0 1 1 the capitalist m ode o f p r o d u c tio n [3: 8 1 6 ]. This gives a succinct picture o f the relatively simple stru ctu re o f English society o f th e last ce ntury T h e re a fte r m atters became m uch m ore com plicated and we therefore require a reworking o f the definition o f class. O ne o f the m ost com plete is L en in s well-known definition [31: 1 6 2 ]. He gives four attribu tes o f a class: (1) classes are groups that differ in their position in a historically determ ined system o f social pro du c tio n , i.e., they are themselves historically d eterm ined; (2) they differ in their relation to the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n (p ro p e rty criterion); (3) they differ in their role in the social organization of labor; and (4) they differ in the ways o f acquisition and in the size o f their share in the wealth o f society. To these should be added tw o m ore: (5) on the basis o f I to 4, classes differ in their social influence and. particularly, in their position in the system o f political power; and (6) classes in themselves become classes for themselves when they develop a consciousness o f their class interests and their historical identity, which enables classes to perform their social role, A fte r the definition has been established, we still have to define the basic fa cto r that converts a social group in to a class w ith the above-m entioned attributes. We believe th at this factor consists in m o n o p o ly in m a k in g im p o rta n t social decisions What are to be regarded as im p o rta n t decisions in a given society can be d eterm in e d empirically. Social im p o rtan ce d epends on w hat the m em bers o f the concrete society thin k of it, as well as on the essential existential im po rtan ce o f the decision. In view o f the latter factor, we can go a step fu rth e r Just as hum an w o rk activity is the essence o f his existence as h u m a n , so m o n o p o ly o f th e co n d itio n s o f labor is the necessary and sufficient condition for class differentiation. 36 It follows directly th at a bureaucratized Stalinist society is a class society w ith a classical two-class structure. However, th e identification is not always so simple It will be necessary, therefore, to do as the m athem aticians do, to w ork o u t an operational test for determ ining the cases in which 153

the condition o f m on opo lization o f im p o rta n t social decisions is satisfied. This test consists o f tw o requirem ents. First, a prestige differentiation m ust exist in the given society. This m eans th at the u p p er stra tu m (o r strata) has (o r have) w hat is generally regarded as very desirable (wealth, educatio n, political power, etc ) in considerably greater m easure than the lower stratu m (strata). F o r th e status of the u p p e r stratum to be conserved and perp etu ated, there m ust be some barrier th at prevents the m em bers o f th e lower stratu m from p enetrating th e reservation o f the u p p er stratum and taking p art in its advantages This gives rise to a tend enc y fo r institutional checking o f social m obility, and consciousness o f contrary interests develops (since the q u a n tity of t h e things desired is limited). Second, n o t every prestige differentiation is necessarily o f a class n ature Talented artists always enjoy greater social respect than those w ith o u t talent. That has no con nectio n with class contradictions, since n o artist can guarantee that his son will also be a talented artist. F o r a prestige difference to have the above-m entioned consequences, it m ust be based o n in h erited and n o t achieved sta tu s 37 Hence, the second fundam ental condition for class d ifferentiatio n is the existence o f a sufficiently high correlation b etw een family co nnections and social status, But the problem of inheritance calls for brief supplem entary analysis, First o f all, we consider the developm ental aspect o f the inheritance o f social status In feudalism, fo r example, political o r social status was directly inherited, and this was expressed in m em bership in a relatively closed o rd e r o f society and in inheritance o f titles o f nobility. In capitalism, only wealth is directly inherited, b u t th at is quite sufficient to create class barriers In a certain postcapitalist bureaucratic system, neither political position n o r capital is inherited, indicating further weakening o f class barriers But it w ould be a mistake to regard them as insignificant, L et Lis make a definition. T he direct inheritance o f p ro p e rty is n o t in and o f itself sufficient to insure the perp etu atio n betw een generations o f bourgeois families. Cases are familiar in which capital piled up in o ne generation is lost in the following one, leading inevitably to loss o f bourgeois status. F o r th a t status to be m aintained, the capital has to be invested productively, according to all the rules o f the capitalist order. In th a t process it is irrelevant w h e th e r the investm ent is m ade in a factory, in stocks or persona! edu cation or, as occurs m ost o ften , in some co m bination o f these, S om ething similar occurs in a b ureaucratic system as well. F unctionaries econom ic, political, governm ental - can no t

154

transm it their fun c tio ns to their children by inheritance. B ut they can re co m m en d their offspring to their friends, who are also functionaries, when the tim e com es for them to find a place in society. Insofar as a centralist cadre policy is in force, which may be taken to be the rule, we o btain the p h en o m en o n we could describe as quasi-inheritance That docs n o t signify, o f course, that certain bureaucratic positions are absolutely guaranteed As in the case o f their capitalist colleagues, they have to satisfy certain prerequisites o f the system . They m ust have certain m inim um qualifications for ex e cu tio n o f the functio ns in question, and they m ust be fitted to the rules of the bu reaucratic code. B ut b o th o f these are to a great e x te n t guaranteed by their h o m e training. Even when there is no abuse o f c o n n e ctio n s at all (which is, o f course, an academ ic supposition), the offspring are form ed in the spirit of the milieu in wliich their parents m ove, and even fo r th at r e a s o n a l o n e ( t h e y are reliable, positive, com m unicative, cooperative, etc.) they are more acceptable than o th e r candidates. This gives the young b ureau crat, at the very beginning, a definite advantage over his c o m p etito rs from o th e r social strata, as is the case with a y o ung en tre p re n e u r starting with his f a th e rs capital; each o f the tw o inherits a land o f capital This class differentiation is all th e stronger, the greater the privileges o f the bureaucracy (and hence the desirability o f remaining in th a t milieu are greater), th e lower the educational level o f the p o p u latio n , the less dem ocratic the political system , and the lower the econom ic develo pm ent of' the cou n try If the capitalist shares in the distribution o f surplus value in p ro p o rtio n to his capital, the b u reaucrat shares in p ro p o rtio n to his status in the power hierarchy. In this way we have defined the criteria for asserting the existence or n onexistence o f class differentiation in Yugoslavia, T he stratification stru ctu re spoken o f earlier is in no way specific to Yugoslavia and in no way prejudges the answer to the question D evelopm ent m ay proceed from the same initial structure in the direction o f forming classes and in the direction o f overcoming class residues T h e direction the developm ent will take depends exclusively on w h e th e r the social system p roduces cohesive forces that will cem ent the various strata, or w h e th e r it produces forces th a t will dissipate them . B ut before proceeding to a definitive evaluation o f o ur situation, a warning m ust be given against a n o th e r frequent error. F ro m the functional differences of organizational and executive work, and from the fact th a t to d a y and am ong us the former ranks higher than the latter, the conclusion is drawn th a t there is an inh eren t hierarchical quality in the tw o kinds o f work, and a

155

c onsequent tendency for society to be differen tiated into leaders and the Jed, This tend enc y does in fact exist, b u t the division of labor is no t necessarily hierarchical Organizational w ork merely calls for specific qualifications and specific abilities, as does any o th e r kind o f work. In milieus w ith a developed scientific tradition, deans o f faculties, university presidents, and directors o f institutes arc n o t b e tte r scholars, b u t b e tte r organizers o r people w ith social connections. They are far from having the greatest social prestige; in fact, it w ould seem to be held th a t a scientific worker, even if he is a good organizer , should n o t w aste his time in adm in istratio n , for which less capable people can be used Likew ise, there are countries w ith old and well-developed d e m o c r a t i c trad itio ns in which generals, functionaries, and ministers have very m odest prestige and incom es A nd finally, to p u t it quite plainly, the paid m an ager o f an estate, even if he is an organizer, is certainly n o t above the o w n e r o f the estate. The co ntradiction betw een organizational and executive w o rk is itself a historical con trad iction, like m an y oth ers we have encou n te red , and is determ in e d by the social system. The fact is that, in certain historical societies, organizational w ork provides the o p p o rtu n ity o f accum ulating social p ow er (and the larger the organization th at is being managed, th e m ore power), and this becom es the basis for prestige differentiation. In such situations, organizers set up a m o n o p o ly o f g o v e rn m e n t; m o re precisely, it is possession o f that m o no poly th at gets th em to specialize in organizing, and executive labor, which is deprived o f any pow er o f decision as to w orking conditions, appears as wage labor. A precise answer to the question o f the e x te n t to which the various strata o f Yugoslav society are co m p ac t o r disintegrated can only be given by empirical studies Here we confine ourselves to t h e s ta te m e n t of certain processes. Thus, for exam ple, a centralistically c o n d u c te d cadre policy leads to creation o f a first stratum and to re in fo rce m e n t o f class elements. Positions o f leadership are arrived at by political c r it e r i a ,38 which m eans th a t the candidate m eets the requ irem en ts o f the establishm ent. Since in this way the existence o f individuals is linked to fitting into the hierarchical structure, they try to fit, and they arrive at equalization of stations, co nceptio ns, co n d u c t and interests, The first stratu m becom es internally ho m o gen eous and externally d ifferen t from th e o t h e r strata 39 O ne of the empirical indications o f the fo rm a tio n o f a first stratu m consisted in the familiar tendency to take on m ore th an one fu n c tio n ; still a n o th e r is the tendency to live in separate districts o f the city. O n t h e o t h e r h an d , the in stitu tio n o f self-government 156

constantly m akes in nu m erab le vertical cuts in the stratified structure, co nnecting previously o p ened local managerial sum m its w ith the executive base in ascending lines o f self-governing decisions, by m eans o f which th e strata are disintegrated horizon tally and integrated vertically in the w ork collective. The weaker the in ten sity of stratification in the initial phase (which the revolution to o k care of in ou r case) and the lower the degree o f i n t e r f e r e n c e from outside, the m ore successfully these integrative m echanisms function T h e c o n c l u s i o n s a r e f a i r l y o b v i o u s Social openness (intergeneration m o bility) guaranteed by equalized educational o p p o rtu n itie s; self-governing integration ; and political d em o cracy to g e th e r th ey d e stro y stratification, elim inate class residues, and prepare th e way for a classless society.
17. H O R IZ O N T A L ST R U C T U R E O F Y U G O SL A V SOCIETY: Q U A S IP R O F E S SIO N A L G R O U PS

I t has already been em phasized th a t self-government m akes vertical cuts in the social pyram id and leads to integration of the individual strata. O n the o th er h and , the functional division of labor in societal life leads to the fo rm a tio n o f groups distinguished by their functions and n o t by their position in the social hierarchy, These groups m ay, and in fact always do, have diffe ren t interests, bu t th ose interests are by their n ature nonantagonistic, nonpolarized. Critics o f the Marxist thesis o f the possibility and necessity o f d evelopm en t o f the classless society had emphasized th a t in any existing society there m u s t be social, and hence class, differentiatio n. B u t this is a n o n se q u itw There m ust be som e d ifferentiation in any developed society, if for n o o th e r reason t h a n t h e d i v i s i o n o f labo r. B ut only a vertical status diffe rentiation , stratificatio n, represents a class differentiation. H o r i z o n t a l d i f f e re n tia tio n in to quasiprofessional groups is characteristic o f a new, classless society. In the horizontal stru ctu re o f Yugoslav society we can distinguish the following four groups: peasants; o th e r producers fo r the m ark et; workers in n o n m a rk e t o ccupations; and those in th e state apparatus. O f these four groups, th e peasantry is a g roup th a t has a place in bo th h o rizontal and vertical structures T he form ation o f th at g roup is historically co n ditioned, and today it is undergoing g reater qualitative and quantitativ e tran sfo rm ation s than any o th e r group. We begin our analysis w ith a consideration o f the social position o f th e peasantry in Yugoslavia

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T he Peasantry Peasants still con stitu te a b o u t half the po p u latio n o f o u r country . B ut this fact need n o t alarm us to o m uch , since it is the statistical aspect of the problem . An intensive ex od us of the active p o p u latio n from the village and from agriculture, at a rate o f a b o u t 2% per a n n u m , is u n d e r way. T w e n ty years ago three-fourths o f all Yugoslavs were peasants; during the life o f this generation the p ro p o rtio n o f the peasantry will d rop by some 15%, as is the case in o t h e r developed countries The peasants doubtless co n s titu te the m ost conservative social group in o u r co u n try . It should be n oted at the o utset, however, th a t their' conservatism is n o t due to the fact th a t they are small holders, as is generally th o u g h t, b u t to o th e r causes. Actually, t h e popular n o tio n th a t tire peasant, fully and rationally m otivated, holds on to the land fanatically, has a fanatical belief in p ro p e rty , and anarchistically resists progress th a t belief confuses cause and effect and is in flagrant co ntra diction w ith the facts, A n inquiry c o n d u c te d in C roatian village schools showed th a t n o t ]% of the 8th grade e n ro llm en t o f 1 9 6 3 /1 9 6 4 w anted to rem ain orr their p are n ts farms [59: 74], The reasons for the peculiarities o f peasant social behavior may, I suppose, be reduced to the following four points: 1 C ultural backw ardness, lack o f education, even illiteracy. 40 The historically c o n d itio n ed ideological heritage of primitive and conservative beliefs, traditions, and notions, o f patriarchalism and o th e r encum brances, has been conserved to a certain e x te n t to this very day. The reason fo r th e negative inheritance o f the past being stronger am ong peasants than am on g o th e r groups and for its tighter hold is to be found in the following three characteristics o f their present situation. 2. E xisten tia l tie to th e soil In a situation w here there is n o t an u n b o u n d e d possibility o f productive e m p lo y m e n t outside o f agriculture, and where, within agriculture, surplus labor pow er co nstitu te s up to one-third of the active p o p u latio n [60: 1 0 6 ], possession o f o n e s ow n land, the struggle for the land, and econom ic in d ep end ence represent a rational way o f insuring the p easants own existence.. 3 One-clirnensioiial social m o b ility o u tw ard is linked w ith the preceding po in t In a facto ry, people from the village and from the city mix. There is a lively exchange of ideas and experiences, m aking it impossible to retain petrified views and positions, hindering m anifestations o f cultural lim itation. People com e from the village but do n o t move back; a person remains a peasant 158

b u t does n o t b ecom e one. F u rth e rm o re , the mass ex od us from the villages rapidly alters the age stru ctu re in the direction o f the older generations, which are m ore conservative by nature. 4. E co n o m ic backw ardness and com m unication-isolation o f villages. Labor p ro du ctiv ity is considerably lower in villages than in nonagricultural occ u p atio n s 1,1 In 1960, 46% o f o ur peasant fields were still harvested with the sickle, and an additional .38% w ith the scythe, Because o f the well-known differences between village and city, the village has lagged in general social developm ent and hence appears as a sort o f social ballast. But the village situ atio n is changing rapidly in all four aspects. And in tins co n nection there is no d o u b t w hatever th at the peasant him self will change as socialist d evelopm ent insures him m ore stable and profitable sources o f incom e, a higher standard o f living, a m o re cultural life (Kaidelj [61; 180] J. T h e decisive im p etu s tow ard social tran sfo rm atio n was given by the p e o p le s liberation war, in which the peasantry to o k part in full force. T o d ay education is m u c h more available to the villager than ever before, although it m u st be said th at m uch m ore could have been do n e in this dom ain. The productivity o f agricultural labor is rising m ore rapidly than the p ro du ctivity o f labor in indu stry , in Yugoslavia as in o th e r countries. Differences in th e standard o f living betw een the coun try sid e and the city are diminishing. Large-scale farming is in tro d u cin g in to traditional pro d u c tio n m e th o d s n o t only elem ents o f m o dern tech no log y b u t also a new organization o f w ork and echoes o f the social processes that are taking place in the city Various form s o f co op eration betw een the peasant and large farm s m ake the social effect o f the m o d em ly organized sector o f agriculture greater than the percentage o f area o r prod u c tio n covered by th a t sector. Here we m ust retu rn to the p rob lem o f personal (private) pro p e rty as an au to m a tic criterion for being progressive. T he peasant is n o t reactionary because he is a small holder. We n o ted earlier th a t this re actio n ary p easant w on the war o f peo p les liberation and the social revolution, n o t only in o ur co u n try but also in Algiers, Vietnam , and elsewhere. It would seem th a t a general confusion exists betw een the effects o f private prop erty u n d er capitalism and the effects th a t can be expected und er o u r institutional system. U nd e r capitalism, the peasantry is constantly subject to stratification. A few peasants get rich and become landowners, w ho exploit the labor pow er o f others A certain n u m b e r of peasants get p o orer, lose their land, and are proletarianized. Most peasants c o n tin u e to defend themselves against being proletarianized and h op e to m ake their way in to the 159

class of agricultural capitalists. N othing of the kind is taking place in Yugoslavia,, T he agrarian m axim um m akes it impossible to act in th e direction o f exploiting t h e l a b o r o f o t h e r s . Leaving th e farm does n o t m ean proletarianization. In fact, conditions have been created u n d er which personal possession o f land has becom e a legal fiction, and th e essential social position of th e individual p ro d u c er is n o t different from th a t o f an associated p r o d u c e r F o r exam ple, the f i r s t s t a t e m e n t can be seen from the ordinance o n the agrotechnical m inim um . F u rth e r, if it is necessary to ex propriate rent o n land, th a t can be d o n e by a tax on cadastral incom e. I f private m eans of p ro d u c tio n have to be trea ted as social capital, in terest o n the basic resources o r on the operating fund can likewise be ap p ro xim ated by a definite tax. Individual and associated producers sell and buy land and basic resources in the same manner. T he second sta te m e n t is based on the fact th a t in Yugoslavia the w ork e r is b o th p ro d u cer and m anager I f this holds true for the associated producer, it is equally valid for the individual producer, In c o n n e ctio n with th e problem u n der discussion (and this applies as well to the problem of the individual pro d u c er in o th e r sectors o f p ro d u c tio n ), it is o f in terest to note th a t o u r consciousness has arrived at a kind o f m y stiq ue o f the collective. Collectively organized p ro d u c tio n is autom atically progressive and s o c i a l i s t , an d in d iv id u a lly o r g a n iz e d p r o d u c t i o n is p etty-b ou rgeois and nonsocialist. This prejudice, which has hardened in to a tight dogma, has its ro o ts in the social experience o f the capitalist system, and is transferred uncritically to the new institutional bases. Indeed, the revolution does n o t depend on the small o w n er b u t on the n o n p ro p e rtie d ; and it is m u ch easier to organize collectives and to set them in m o tio n to destroy the social system than it is fo r individuals to do so. It is also of interest to n o te th at individual producers, and hence peasants too, are an elem ent openly op po sed to a Stalinist system of socialism. Such a system aims at total c o n tro l o f the personal lab o r o f t h e individual, and this aim is m ost effectively attain ed by liquidating all in dependence and including every individual hi a definite hierarchical organization, a b ureaucratic structure. Finally, peasant groups have to be given at least one social plus, along with their various minuses. O ur associationist society is bipolar; one p art o f social activity proceeds a t w ork and is oriented tow ard work, the o th e r p a rt takes place at the place o f residence aild is o riented toward the satisfaction o f o th e r hu m an needs. In the first case, working bodies are involved; in th e second, 160

com m unal bodies.. As an individual p rod ucer, and to the e x ten t th a t he is only an individual p rod ucer, the peasant is disqualified fo r working collectives.. B ut th a t is n o t all there is to socialism. There are indications th a t peasants are m ore active in com m unal organizations than m em bers o f o th e r social g r o u p s 42 We m ay conclude th a t the individual peasant is also a potential socialist p ro d u c e r T h e fact th a t he is n o t one is actually conditioned by the fo u r factors noted. But ec onom ic developm ent a u t o m a t i c a l l y tra n s fo rm s th e village in the d irection of increasingly greater identification with socialist goals. Paraphrasing the well-known d ictum o f Lenin, we could say th at socialism, based on w orker self-governm ent, co nstan tly creates socialist tendencies even in those sectors th at form erly were nonsocialist. N o np easant Producers for th e M arket (the Working Class) T he working class is one o f the political terms we use the most, b u t it c a n n o t be said t h a t the term is precisely defined. Even the Program of the League o f Yugoslav C om m u n ists fails to state what is m ean t by th e w orking class, o f which it speaks at length. S om etim es w orkers are identified w ith m anual laborers [38: 4 1 ] . This identification is vague and, to a great ex te n t, meaningless, for typists are also m anual workers, and so are peasants; as far as the q u a n tity of m anual o peration s is concerned, surgeons and pianists d o n o t differ from w ork ers in the optical or electronic industries; moreover, technological progress is constan tly elim inating m anual work bu t n o t workers, to the same e x te n t F u rth er, a simple division into m anual and intellectual workers leads to obvious nonsense. It turn s o u t th at a skilled m echanic w ho diagnoses w hat is wrong with o u r car is a m anual w orker, while the p o rte r o f a g ov ern m en t in stitu tio n is an intellectual worker! T he division into intellectual and routine w orkers m akes m o re sense, with the latter divided into m anual and n o n m an u al workers. Even here caution is required. F ro m the Marxist p oint of view, the physical properties of a p h e n o m e n o n have little relevance tor social analysis T he key factors for analysis are social relations, a p o in t th a t is o fte n overlooked. In line with w hat Gram sci says a b o u t intellectuals and proletarians, the m ost widespread m ethodological e rro r consists in seeking the criteria of differen tiation only in the n atu re of intellectual d evelop m ent and not in th e entire system in which they (and hence th e grou ps e m b o d y in g th em ) were in the general com plex o f social relationships In fact, the w o rk e r or proletarian, for example, is n o t characterized by his manual or instrum ental w ork, b u t ra th e r by th a t w ork u n d e r given co nd itio ns and social 161

relationships ,. , [3 9 :3 1 2 ] We often come across a defin itio n o f the working class as c o m p r i s i n g p r o d u c e r s w h o w ork w ith social m eans o f produ c tio n . 43 It is typical, first o f all, th a t this d efin ition excludes w orkers o f the private sector, i e , ju s t those w ho are closest to the classical c o n c e p t o f the working class. Evidently, it is implicitly presupposed and intuitively felt th at t o d a y s working class differs considerably from th at o f form e r times. F u rth e r consideration o f this definition depends on th e m eaning o f the word p ro d u c e r. The eom m onsense interp re tatio n is simple: a p ro d u c e r is a workingm an w ho produces som ething, som ething tangible. Are workers in tran sp o rt also producers? Most people will p robably agree th a t they are, And salespeople in shops? Here opinions will differ., 44 Then w h at are bank and insurance employees? Here, I suppose, a m ajority will agree th a t they are neith er w orkers (and that is why we call them em ployees) n o r producers, However, are n o t banks traders in m o n ey , so th at what applies to the salesgirl also applies to the b a n k clerk? A nd further, where do nurses fit, f o r example? In the m iddle class, along with teachers, bookkeepers, and o th e r workers in white coats and white collars? What exactly does that m ean in o u r social fram ew ork? Obviously, o u r traditional set o f categories is no longer very useful Here I should like to warn against the previously elaborated and very widespread th eo ry o f p ro d u c tio n , according to which only w ork in w hat is called material p ro d u c tio n is productive, and all other work is nonproductive. F o r this p urpose tran sp o rt and trade are included in material pro du c tio n , and our statistics even add the hotel and restaurant industry.. In th a t case salespeople, waiters, and ch am berm aids would therefore be included in the working class. To m y m ind, they should be so included, but n o t because of t h i s t h e o r y o f p r o d u c t i v e lab o r The differentiatio n o f productivity (a socioeconom ic p h e n o m e n o n ) on the basis o f m ateriality (a physical p h e n o m e n o n ) is theoretically meaningless. Marx emphasized very clearly th at the same physical w ork m ay be econom ically eith er p ro duc tive o r no n p ro d u c tiv e . The next question relates to the place o f w ork in a given branch o f production. A m an w orking at a m achine in a factory is u n d o u b te d ly a worker. B ut does his forem an also belong to the working class? Here opinions will differ 45 Even m ore so, an em ployee in the com m ercial sector is obviously no t a worker. On the o th e r hand, w h a t essential difference ( if any) is there between an unskilled w o rk e r in a g o vernm ent m o n o p o ly and an assistant clerk? 162

Here again we recognize an uncritical transfer of capitalist social relations If the p ro d u c tio n o f a factory has to be decreased, the w orker at the m achine will be discharged - n o t the foreman and t h e clerk, because th e y represent fixed charges, overhead, Therefore, workers at m achines, in direct p ro d u c tio n , must organize in unions, and their interests com e to differ from those o f the overhead personnel, whose interests are identified with those of' the e m p lo y e r A t the same time, a capitalist factory is hierarchically organized, with the workers as the base and the em ployers, controllers, and o th e r m anagem ent personnel as s u p erstru ctu re. The em plo yer is thus vitally interested in having his m anagem ent personnel identify with his interests. In a Yugoslav factory all these differences becom e void, to a great e x te n t The em ployees do n o t identify with the em ployer since there is no em ployer, and the workers do n o t organize in a union to defend th eir special class interests. There are all sorts o f co n tra d ictio n s in a Yugoslav factory, to be sure, b u t th ey are o f a different nature. They are contradictio ns within a collective which, with reference to the outside world, does n o t appear as a conglom eration o f co n tra d ic to ry and polarized interests, but ra th er as a social whole, as a collective entering into interactions w ith o th er collectives Empirical studies o f Yugoslav factories have only been begun, so th a t any generalizations will have to form ed and taken with a great deal o f caution. One possible generalization relates to internal groupings in an enterprise. If the m em bers of a collective are grouped on the basis o f the influence they have on the w ork and the decisions o f the w ork e rs council, three groupings appear, with a clearly hierarchical d iffe re n tia tio n :46 (1) managers of firms and ec onom ic entities, and experts; (2) forem en, em ployees, and skilled workers; (.3) semiskilled and unskilled workers. What is significant in this grouping is th at forem en, em ployees, and skilled workers have equal influence, which means th a t the classical gap in the capitalist fa ctory has been e lim in a te d .47 It is equally significant th at workers are n o t at all a h o m og eneo us group; it is sharply differentiated on a qualification basis. This result is in full agreem ent with th e results o f the previously cited empirical study, which showed th a t the lowest two categories o f workers were not c o n te n t with their position as workers (ab o u t 5 times more unskilled workers were d iscon tented than highly skilled ones), It is also in accord with the fact th at m in o r absences from w ork, o f which the adm inistration o f enterprises gets notice, are m ostly from semiskilled and unskilled workers [42: 202].. Finally, it would seem th a t we can conclude that grouping in Yugoslav 163

factories is almost exclusively based on skill and education.. Education is of prim ary im p o rtan ce in the prevalence of group tensions and social stratification. In t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l stru ctu re of Yugoslav econom ic organizations, one function has always been a stum bling block: the function o f m a n a g e r It is one th at is inherently con tra d icto ry . When the process o f elim inating adm inistrative m an ag e m en t o f the econom y was begun, the m anager was installed as curator o f societys interest in th e enterprise, and hence installed from outside. This police function stayed w ith th e m anager in the later stage o f full develo p m e n t o f self-government B u t by now pressures have appeared in the direction of defending the rights of the collective to self-government, and the solu tion found has been increased lim itation o f the operative jurisdiction o f the manager. Thus, the hybrid role o f the manager, atte m p tin g to use two divergent systems, adm inistrative and self-governing, has the result, first, th a t operative ef ficiency is considerably lessened, and second, th at the manager becom es a foreign elem ent in the collective, In m ost cases th e m anager is im posed 48 o n a collective from w ith o u t, fundam entally on the basis o f w h a t are called political criteria. Both factors lead to faulty selection, and people with decidedly low professional qualifications retain positions of this kind,. Data on the amazingly low educational level of som e managerial cadres are to o well k n o w n to require citation. In o rd e r to m aintain themselves, such managers tie up with political elem ents outside the enterprise and set u p cliques o f people o f the same sort inside the enterprise Sociological stu d ies, Veljko Rus states in his lucid report, show th at groups with low education are less inclined to coo perate with o th e r groups o f workers, less inclined to critical com m unication, less interested in exact in fo rm atio n , less ready to co irect faulty orders by higher agencies, and m uch m ore aware o f hierarchical differences [33: 1 0 8 6 ]. Clique fo rm atio n is a source o f the conflicts that fill o u r newspapers. 49On the o th e r h and , it is precisely for these reasons, paradoxicat as it m ay seem at first glance, th a t positions as managers som etim es rem ain unfilled for a long time. Qualified candidates are eith er unacceptable to the various unofficial groups or are unwilling to expose themselves to being m istreated by those groups Thus, the tensions and c o n tra d ictio n s in Yugoslav enterprises have fairly clear sources. Those sources have little in c o m m o n with the social situation in capitalist enterprises, and the tendency o f developm ent is obviously in the direction o f elim inating them, I th in k we can say th a t f o r all the incom pleteness o f the system as it now exists, and the d e fo rm a tio n s th at occasionally appear,

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a f t e r ten years o f w ork e rs self-government, during which hu n d re d s o f thousands o f em ployees have gone through the school o f self-government, the goals th a t were set have begun to be realized. T he form erly heterogeneous, even antagonistic elem ents have merged o r are merging in to a single collective. D iversity o f in terests w ith in the co llective are o f secondary im portance as co m p a red to th e u n ity o f interests vis-a-vis the o u tsid e w orld If this analysis is correct, it leads to extrem ely im p o rta n t consequences. T he classical c o n c e p t o f the working class has lost its social c o n te n t T o a certain e x te n t this is evident. T h e working class was always the class o f wage workers. As wage labor disappears as a social category, the working class will cease to ex ist.50 What is left are w orking people, the w orking folk or workers, as a sy n o n y m for the active p o p u l a t i o n . 51 It emerges, in short, th a t in o u r social situation the working class is transform ed, inco rpo rating o th e r groups (office workers and professionals) w ith w hom they w ork in the process of p ro d u c tio n in to a single quasiprofessional social group, which we could call produ cers producing for the m ark e t 52 Those producers are vitally interested in m aintaining and further developing their a u t o n o m y , a n d in elim inating co ntra dictions within their collectives. In this sense, their interests are identical with the interests o f developing and affirm ing socialist classless society. A nd because they con trol the productive resources o f society, they represent th e principal motive force o f socialist d evelopm ent.
Workers in N on m ark et O ccu p a tio n s (th e In telligentsia)

In a technical sense, the intelligentsia should com prise engineers working in factories, jurists in governm ent d e p a rtm en ts, professors o f philoso phy , and scientists. In a socioeconom ic sense their po sition is very different, and they m ust be grouped apart. Here, we shall designate as the intelligentsia highly ed ucated working people in the fields o f health, education , science, and culture. I t should be said at once th a t this differentiation is m ost u n o rth o d o x . As a rule, the intelligentsia is subdivided in to two groups, creative and re productive workers or, as the Am erican philosopher Hodges calls th em [ 4 5 : 4 2 8 ] , intellectuals and p ro fessio n als In the first group com e scientists, artists, philosophers, and all those w ho create culture, for w hom ideas and culture are ends, n o t means. The second group comprises engineers, physicians, journalists, and all practitioners whose jo b it is to apply and diffuse culture. In this sense D. Pejovid finds th a t
165

there is an im m easurable distance betw een the activity of, say, a philo so pher or an a u th o r from any engineer o r p hy sician [36: 2 6 7 ], I t is n o t m y inten tion to con test the validity of' these distinctions o r their relevance to an analysis, for exam ple, of' the form ation of' the cu ltu re of a given society. A t the same time, such a classification would be quite arbitrary, and hence inapplicable, in analyzing the socioeconom ic position o f the various groups in Yugoslav society. Perhaps, in some sense, the activity o f a philo so p h er is really im m easurably diffe rent from th a t of' a physician. With reference to the socioeconom ic con dition ing of' the existence of the people in q uestion in o u r society, their activities are of the same kind. Ever since it appeared for the first time in Russia in the latter half of' the nin etee n th ce n tu ry , the term intelligentsia has always had a slightly subversive aura 1 think we m ay say frankly th at c o m m u n ist parties have traditionally been distrustful o f the intelligentsia, and th a t traces o f th a t a ttitu d e still remain am ong us.53 T he reasons for it are probably stated m ost explicitly by L e n in :34 No o ne can d eny th a t the intelligentsia , as a particular stra tu m of m odern capitalist society, is m ark ed generally by individualism and incapacity for discipline and organization; in this it differs, am ong other ways, ancf in a negative sense, from the proletariat; this is also one o f the ex planation s o f intellectual sluggishness and inconstancy so often felt by th e p ro letariat; and this characteristic of the intelligentsia is inseparable from the daily co n d itio n s o f its life and w o rk , wliich in very m any ways are close to the cond itio n s of p etty-b o u rg e o is existen ce (individual w ork o r w ork in very small collectives) [4 6: 3 7 8 -3 7 9 ] . Rosa L u x em b u rg reacted to this evaluation o f'th e intelligentsia, and it will u n d o u b te d ly be o f historical and th eoretical in terest to cite h er criticism, even a t th e cost o f prolonging c i ta tio n s :55 According to Lenin, this aversion to subm itting to the absolute p ow er of the Central C o m m ittee is fou n d in the intellectual, w ho has rem ained an individualist and is inclined to anarchy, even when he has ad o p te d socialism, while the true and genuine proletarian draws from his class instinct a kind of" pleasure in surrendering to a pow er th at rules and com bines an u n rem itting discipline with its rigor . . We begin by noting th a t exaltation of the innate inclinations with w hich proletarians are endow ed with respect to socialist organization, and m istrust o f the intellectuals, are n o t in essence an expression of' the revolutionary M arxist way of' thinking; on th e co ntra ry , it can easily be shown th a t these argum ents b o rder 166

on o p po rtunism No d o u b t it c a n n o t be denied th a t in m ost socialist parties of' Western Europe there are links betw een o p p ortunism and the intellectuals, as there are between op p o rtu n ism and decentralizing tendencies But there is nothing so c o n tra ry to Marxism, to its historical d i a l e c t i c a l m e t h o d o f t h o u g h t , as t h e s ep a ratio n o f p h e n o m en a from the h isto tica l background o u t ol which they arose, and their form u lation into theoretical p attern s o f absolute and general significance Reasoning abstractly, one can only recognize th at the intellectual, as a social being w ho came from the bourgeoisie and is alien to the proletariat, may approach socialism n o t basically b u t against his class consciousness. T hat renders him m ore liable to o p p o rtu n istic fluctuations than the proletarian, who finds a very reliable revolution ary su p p o rt in his class instinct . , A u to n o m istic and decentralistic tendencies are therefore to be explained, not as Lenin does, by the unbalanced n ature of the intellectual, b u t by the needs o f the bourgeois parliam entary politician, n o t by the psychology o f the intellectual, b u t by o p p o rtu n istic policies.......... If we took Len ins position as a basis, and were afraid o f any intellectuals influence in the labor m ovem ent, the greatest danger to the Russian Socialist Party would be the organizational plans proposed by Lenin. N othing would more certainly subject the labor m ovem ent, still so young, to an intellectual elite, hungry for power, as this bu reaucratic arm or, m otivating it and converting it in to an a u to m a te ruled by the c o m m itte e And conversely, there is no more effective guarantee against o p p o r t u n i s t i c i n t r i g u e s and personal am bition s than the in d ep en d e n t revolutionary activity of the proletariat, by means of which it comes to th e co n c eptio n o f political activity . T h e p o le m ic betw een Lenin and Rosa Luxem burg was con d u c te d in 1904, long before any w o rkers party had firmly attain ed power, In a situ atio n of" th at kind, decentralist tendencies could be objectively dangerous to the struggle, especially the illegal one, which called for a firm and centralized organization, As a result, Lenin, regardless o f the correctness or incorrectness o f his arg um ent, could voice a certain m istrust o f the intelligentsia. In Yugoslavia, however, a quarter-centu ry has passed since the o u tb re a k o f the successful socialist revolution. In this situation decentralist tendencies are n o t only not undesirable, b u t in fact represent the fu nda m e n tal line o f'fu rth e r developm ent, the m ost effective guarantee against o pp ortu nistic intrigues and 167

personal a m b itio n s, This last s ta te m e n t by Rosa L uxem burg, in the c o n te x t o f co n tem p o rary political events and the F ou rth Plenum, has a p ro p h e tic ring.56 T he intelligentsia, in the narrow sense of the word as defined above, is oriented toward a special field o f hum an activity. Producers for the m arket turn o u t external elem ents for h um an welfare or, rather, they create the material base o f th a t welfare; the intelligentsia is aimed directly at man, its activity is directly humanist. This holds true for the health w orkers who take care o f preserving m a n s physical life; fo r the w orkers in edu cation whose task it is to develop m a n s intellect; for cultural workers, artists, and philosophers w ho discover the m eaning o f life and form the values of their era. A nd even scientific workers, whose discoveries are used by the eco no m y or the army, go beyond the utilitarian character o f their patents by insisting that, above all, they are discovering and asserting scientific tru th A lth oug h it would probably be wrong to say th at the intelligentsia re p re se n ts51 the conscience and the consciousness o f their era, there is little d o u b t that by their activity they express, explain, and form the conscience and the consciousness o f their era. That expression and explication may be accurate or distorted, u s e f u l or dangerous, fo r ruling circles and ruling classes. C onsequently, regimes pay close a tte n tio n to the activity o f the intelligentsia, and a tte m p ts are n o t wanting to control them in one respect or the o t h e r What is the situation am ong us in this respect? I think the following three factors m ay be n oted: 1, The large m ajority of' to d a y s intelligentsia, m ore than th re e -fo u ith s ,3f) were formed after the war, i e , against the background of socialist construction. 2. Since higher education is free and, at least in principle, available to all, intellectual cadres are recruited from all social strata; hence we m ay speak o f a p e o p le intelligentsia. s .3, T h e intelligentsia to o k a very active p art in the prewar r e v o lu t i o n a r y m o v e m e n t 59 and in the battle for national liberation and postw ar co n stru c tio n , so that m any prew ar cadres n o t only identified with socialism bu t represent the m o st active factors o f socialist development.. We may draw the conclusion th a t the Yugoslav intelligentsia has a very broad social base and is n ow o n e o f the m ainstays o f the system There m ay be isolated abuses, it is true, as is the case with factories as well, b u t deviations en masse arc quite impossible. We could now take a step forward in the analysis similar to the one in considering the position o f p ro ducers for the m ark et Just 168

as all who w ork in factories identify with the interests o f the w orker, so do those w ho w ork in institu tions identify with the interests o f the intelligentsia In hospitals and schools, groups work that arc professionally and otherw ise heterogeneous. But un der conditions o f self-government, those groups still represent individual working collectives. F o r this reason it is probably better and m ore suitable today to speak o f the intelligentsia as workers in n o n m a rk e t occupations. The term n o n m a r k e t should be made clear at the outset. A lthough, in principle, hospitals, schools, theaters, m useum s, etc , may sell their services on the m arket, they do this only exceptionally in any civilized c o u n try Health, education, learning, and culture are too im p o rta n t for the life o f the society to be left to the a u t o m a t i c action o f the m arket F urth er, it is m uch harder to measure p ro d u c tio n in these activities than in the m ark e t sector, and often it is impossible in principle. What is the value o f saving a hu m an life, o r of Einsteins theory of relativity? What has been said does n o t signify th a t n o econom ic considerations are possible or required A certain m o n etary evaluation o f the effect is b oth possible and necessary, since the co nd itio ns are thereby created for the financial independence of n o n m a rk e t activities, and hence of' their operational au to n o m y A university or scientific in stitute, which lives o ff the state b u d g et exclusively, m ust inevitably end up in a situation where the desires and interests o f the controller o f the budget, and n o t scientific tru th , are the criteria of its work. A t the same time, n o m a tte r h o w the financing o f n o n m ark e t activities is organized, it can never be reduced to the supply and d em and m echanism of atom istic subjects on the m arket Definite social decisions are necessary, which are only the financial expression of some sort o f tax o r subsidy (fo r social insurance, for schools, etc,).. Since any such tax has to be collected in the m a rk e t sector, a certain conflict o f interest arises between workers in m arket and n o n m a rk e t activities. In such co ntrad ictio ns the latter, as recipients, are in an unfavorable position. C onsequently, personal incom es in the n o n m a rk e t sector show a chronic, and som etim es a critical, tendency to lag behind incom es in the m arket s e c to r This violation o f the principle to each according to his lab o r is the source o f political d isco n ten t and a certain hypercritical a ttitu d e On the o th e r h and, it is im p o rta n t to see th at historically, self-g o vern m en t first arose in the n o n m a rk e t secto r Even in the Middle Ages the universities had already w on their a u to n o m y , and have k ept it d ow n to the present, developing their self-governing 169

organization and resisting the attack s o f the state bureaucracy. 60 The h um anist character o f n o n m a rk e t activities m akes those engaged in them highly sensitive to class and social differences, so th at they spontaneously resist bureaucratic pressures and equally spontaneously u nderm ine hierarchical social structures The high ed ucation o f the w orkers in these activities o perates in the same direction If socialism should m ean a socicty w ith o u t classes, socially organized as a co m m u n ity o f associated individuals, then the intelligentsia and all w orkers in n o n m a rk e t activities represent, to the highest possible ex te n t, an active social force in socialist construction. This is easily understandable. E d ucation , culture, and hum anist activities and o rientation s have always characterized advanced systems and m ovem ents The State Apparatus {the Bureaucracy) The danger o f bureaucracy m anifests itself in all large social organizations, in large enterprises, in unions and parties, and in the state apparatus. Irrespective of the unity o f the interests of the w ork ers collective, therefore, it w ould be b o th naive and dangerous to neglect the analysis o f and the struggle against bureaucratic tendencies. F u rth e rm o re , sectoral bureaucracies have definite c o m m o n interests and show tendencies toward form ing a cartel with the state bureaucracy This is the situation in which m od ern societies find themselves, as expressed in this e lo q u en t parable by Maurice Duverger: Instead o f a single ty ra n t and his few ad ju tan ts, we have a m ultiplicity of petty tyrants. Each o f them has his sphere o f action. B ut the pressure of all of them paralyzes, m ore or less, p eo p les freedom o f m ov em ent; people are a good deal like Gulliver, when th e Lilliputians tied him dow n with tho usand s of threads, each of which was insignificant, b u t all together were overpowering M odern governm ent tends to be m ore than ju s t the group o f chiefs, authorities, adm inistrators, w h o individually abuse their power It has becom e an en orm ou s m achine, whose overall functioning goes beyon d the activity of each o f its chiefs Its mere mechanism is oppressive, apart from the inten tio n s o f the people th a t m ake it up We call this p h e n o m e n o n bureaucracy It does n o t confine itselt to governm ent, i..e , to pow er over nations; it spreads to all the dom ains o f power in large m o d e rn com m unities: to giant firms, political parties, mass organizations, etc, Even if a b s t r a c t l y , m echanically, w ith o u t passion, w ith o u t physical violence, the oppression that em anates from the bureaucracy is in 170

no way less than w ha t arises from the pow er hunger o f the chiefs This is probably one o f the basic factors o f antagonism in highly developed societies As we approach the level o f abundance, class struggles and rivalry between citizens lessen (subject to the reservations that we have presented) Oil the o th e r hand, the conflicts between the authorities and the citizenry are sh arp en ed [53: 172].. Although individual propositions o f Duvergers may be disputed or criticized, they u n d o u b te d ly form a realistically drawn picture, on the whole If we except the Pharaohs or the Chinese adm inistration, which were quite specific at that, bureaucracy as a mass social p h e n o m e n o n is som eth ing entirely new. It is a child of ou r century. But the most com plex of' bureaucracies, and the most dangerous, is the state b u re au cracy . It differs from others in one essential p ro p e rty : it relies on physical force.61 It is for this reason that I set the state app a ratus apart as a special social group. In the state app aratus 1 include the governm ent adm inistration, the judiciary, the police, armed forces, and professional politicians In developed countries the key positions in the apparatus o f the state are as a rule held by highly educated people, i.e., the intelligentsia in the technical sense, In ou r co u n try this is no t altogether the case, b u t insofar as there are deviations, they obviously broaden ra th e r then narrow the social base from which governm ent officials are recruited This too is one o f the results o f o ur revolution By virtue o f their origin and previous activities, g o v e r n m e n t officials, like m a rk e t and n o n m ark e t workers, co nstitute progressive elem ents But in contradistinction to the la tte r , w h o ate p e rm a n e n tly rev o lu tio n ized b y their social situ a tio n , officials in the govern m en t, as wielders o f p o w er and living in stric tly hierarchical social structures, are exp o sed to fe a rfu l conservative a n d antisocialist pressures relating to the situation that is conditioned by tendencies to deform ations in consciousness, to defo rm atio n s in behavior, and to the well-known bureaucratic p h en o m en a o f which the antisocialist activity o f the police group around R ankovic is only the m ost flagrant example. C onsequently, it is no w o n d e r that the establishm ent o f s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t in g overnm ent agencies came latest, that self-g o v e rn m e n t develops m o st slowly there, and that the form ation o f a unified collective is m ost difficult Obviously, the integration into a single collective o f the m inister and his staff, of the general and his soldiers in th e ranks, o f the ch ief o f some division o f the state and his em ployees, is m uch more difficult than similar processes in a factory or scientific institution O f all the social groups we have considered, the state apparatus 171

is num erically the smallest. B ut because o f the fact th a t it is the group th at holds pow er in its han ds (even though und er some control), the social effects o f its behavior far exceed the size o f its numbers. I shall n o t discuss here w h e th e r and to w h a t e x ten t pow er co rru pts ju st as m o n ey d oes. 62 B ut some observations m ay be n o t uninteresting, M Duverger says th a t we have inherited from the theologians o f the Middle Ages a classification o f such basic h u m an impulses as the sexual im pulse, the desire for learning, and the desire for dom ination. The last-nam ed, concupiscentia dom inandi, concerns us particularly. H obbes asserts th a t hunger for p ow er is a general inclination o f all m e n [5 4: 83] He explains it by the fact that people have the same drive tow ard riches, and since wealth is insufficient to go aro u n d , conflict arises, in which he w h o has m ore p o w e r gets m ore. In m o d ern psychoanalysis, A dler regards the drive toward assertion as one o f the tw o k ey conceptions o f his individual psychology. It is a drive arising o u t o f the childs feeling o f inferiority toward adults, and it drives children to set themselves goals th at w ould make them d o m in a n t over those around th e m [55: 5 5 ], A ccording to Adler, the drive to p o w er has an exclusively rational character, nam ely, to preven t tlic dangers th a t co m e from inferiority. However, F ro m m [56: 135-168] warns o f the irrational elem ents in the nonphysiological drive which, according to him, represents only o ne pole o f a single sym biotic relationship, the o th e r pole of which is yearning for submission When, w ith th e d evelopm ent o f capitalism, the individual was to m from his social ties, he was n o t only liberated from his form er b ond s but also felt himself isolated, unsu p p o rted , helpless, p e tty , and full o f anxieties. Overcoming the intolerable anxiety and isolation, and returning to certainty, can be m ade possible by restoring the sym b iotic relationship with o th e r individuals by m eans of d o m in a tio n or by means of o n e s own subordination, depending on the situation. We could also add the empirical fact that, in bo th animal and h u m an com m unities, individuals appear w h o d om inate and wage u n rem ittin g warfare for the sake o f th a t d o m in an t position. T h e foregoing is like bits in an in com plete mosaic, enabling us to form a picture o f the total I see th a t picture som ew hat as follows. In historical societies the existence o f each individual is threaten ed, and he wages a perpetual battle for survival 63 In th at battle, force p o w e r may play the key role. The m ore pow erful the individual, the greater Iris share in the limited riches o f society, and the m ore assured his existence and th a t o f his offspring Those who are n o t in a position themselves to insure d o m in a tio n over

others find it advantageous, to the degree of their weakness, to p u t themselves u n d e r som eone m ore pow erful and to g ether to plunder the weak In this way the drives to d o m in atio n and subordination are com p lem ents of' the single drive to insure existence, This drive is t h e n r e i n f o r c e d by irrational co m p o n en ts, as From m em phasized, arising o u t o f the psychological inability to endure the isolation that is reached in to d a y s class society. In this way the social situation forms a definite type o f behavior th a t is so intensive as to resemble a physiological drive, and represents one o f those survivals o f capitalism in peo p les consciousness o f which there is so m uch talk. It m ay be added th at particular personal characteristics m ay favor the assum ption o f a state of dom ination or subordin atio n, as the case m ay be, and that particular social structures m ay favor or h am p er the developm ent o f such relations, Evidently, then, either because o f personal predispositions or because o f social conditioning, a certain n u m b er o f individuals have a veiy active drive to d om inate, This drive m ay be satisfied in sports, in public activities, o r at the place o f work, in the form o f being the first or the best. Success is rew arded w ith social prestige o r material benefits. In these cases, personal and social interests coincide fo r the m ost part It is tru e th at success may also be attained by fraud, bu t there is little chance th a t this will be lasting When p o w e r is involved, the situation is very different. There is always the possibility o f abuses, which sanctions and controls are n o t effective or th oro ugh enough to prevent, with the result th a t the freedom o f others is fettered, while private ideas, wishes, and interests are im posed with definite som etim es violent forms o f exp loitation o f individuals and groups Historical exam ples are to o weil k n o w n to require iteration I f o u r analysis is accurate, then (unlike collectives in m ark et and n o n m a rk e t activities) the state app a ratu s ca n n o t be regarded as an a u to c h th o n o u s socialist force On the contra ry, we m ay expect that strong conservative and bu reaucratic tendencies will appear in that social group. As has been said, it is n o t a m a tte r o f the good or evil in ten tio n s o f the individuals w h o perform governm ent functions.. The Marxist position, which regards the develo pm ent o f ec onom ic social fo rm a tio n s as a natural-historical process, is less able than any o th e r to shift off to the individual the responsibility for cond itio ns th a t are socially created [4: liii] . T herefore society, by m eans of' effective con trol, m u st provide assurances against disagreeable shocks. And th a t is w hat ou r society does: ro tatio n , deprofessionalization of' politicians, spreading of' p o w er (c o m m una l arrangem ent and o t h e r forms o f decentralization), 173

strengthening of' co ntrol over representative agencies, and total liquidation o f such organizations as the political police. But there still remains m u ch to be done, p a r t i c u i a r l y in f o r m i n g a responsible, dem ocratically trained and active public opinion, which is the m ost effective in stru m en t for preventing abuses of' p o w e r It would be naive, o f course, to ex p e ct th a t the elem ents o f pow er in the state could be quickly, o r easily, o r totally eliminated or rendered harmless,. T h a t is w hy we speak of' the withering away o f the state as a long and painful process. B ut there is n o d o u b t that to the e x te n t th a t the state apparatus loses the attrib u tes o f p ow er and is transform ed into an e x p e rt servant o f society, that social group will be transform ed , from a poten tially conservative and antisocialist one, into a vehicle o f social progress.
C onclu sion

If we consider the process o f social p ro d u c tio n from the econom ic sta n d p o in t (i.e., how the d em ands o f the m em bers of' that society are m et, h o w their eco nom ic welfare is raised), we readily see that m a rk e t and n o n m a rk e t activities make positive c o n trib u tio n s tow ard th a t goal, while the w ork o f governm ent adm inistration is necessary, to be sure, y e t does n o t add to a n y o n e s well-being, and has the character o f a social expen ditu re. Obviously, the less governm ent adm inistration there is, the m ore resources are left to satisfy the m aterial and nonm aterial needs o f the m em bers o f society, This brings o u t still a n o th e r aspect o f the special position o f the state apparatus in the process o f social pro d u c tio n , which was discussed in co n ne ction with setting up the theo ry of productive labor. F u rth er, we separated o u t o f the group of' produ cers (m ark et and n o n m a rk e t) the peasants, w ho are different, m ainly because of their historical heritage, We saw th a t there are weighty reasons w hy m a rk e t and n o n m a rk e t p ro ducers c a n n o t be treated as a single social group. T h eir m aterial interests m ay even conflict. A t the same time, these tw o groups are natural counterpoises. The producers fo r the m ark e t m ay exert a positive influence in correcting unrealistic program s and co nceptions o n the p art o f their- hum anistic colleagues, w ho are som etim es inclined to idealize things and to m a k e p r o p o s a l s th a t are inco m p atible w ith the m aterial possibilities o f the cou ntry . On the o th e r h and, w orkers in the n o n m a rk e t sectors are b o th interested in and capable o f supplying a social criticism o f d eform ations th a t m anifest themselves as consequences o f c o m m o d ity -m o n e y relations (b ureaucratic and 174

m o n o p o l i s t i c t e n d e n c i e s , u n c o n t r o l l e d race lo r profits, petty-bourgeois m entality, etc,). Thus, o u r investigation has led us to the conclusion th a t there are, o r are emerging, four social groups in Y ugoslavia at the p r e s e n t stage of dev elo p m e n t T w o o f these groups (the non pea san t p ro ducers in m arket and n o n m a rk e t activities) are instru m en ts of socialist developm ent. O ne of these groups (the peasants) are by heritage a conservative elem ent It is the largest grou p num erically, b u t its social influence is small; in addition, as the result of econom ic developm ent, a very intensive process o f social transfo rm atio n is taking place within the group. The last group (the governm ent ap paratus) is likewise a conservative elem ent, although o f a diffe rent type. We m ay n o t ex p e ct that ec onom ic d ev e lo p m e n t will autom atically transform it in the socialist sense; here effective social c o n tro l is required, In this investigation I have tried to state how the various groups o f society developed o u t o f preceding classical forms o f classes and strata. I believe it is evident th at those classes and strata have not disappeared, th at in varying degrees they blend w ith and attach themselves to the new forms, and th a t as a whole o u r society has for a long time been undergoing an intensive process o f social t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a n d r e s t r u c t u r i n g . B ut the evolutionary co nnections axe visible. The final picture is m ost u n o rth o d o x . N either differences in incom e level, n o r differences betw een m en tal and physical labor (with the only ex c ep tio n o f the difference betw een city and c o u n try ), and hence, and even m o re so, differences in p ro p e rty o r inherited status, which are the traditional sources o f the division of society in to classes and strata n on e o f these are essentially operative in the structuring of to d a y s Yugoslav society. And this should n o t surprise us. G ro u p loyalties are d eterm ine d by position in the process o f social p ro d u c tio n . By m eans o f the institu tion o f self-government, th at p ro d u c tio n is im m ediately socialized, eliminating the basis for the fo rm ation o f classes and creating the p re cond ition s for their withering away, where they exist. In the place of' classes, various kinds o f professional groups are beginning to form. N o r is it accidental th a t this new social stru ctu re is reflected to a definite e x te n t in th e stru ctu re o f the F ederal Assembly, the highest political b ody of the c o u n try , where there are fo u r different cham bers (political-econom ic, ed u c atio n and culture, health and social welfare, and adm inistrative).64 Finally, o u r results can be quantified. T he stru ctu re o f the active p op u latio n , arranged in the above-m entioned groups, would appear as follows, in census y e a r s : 65

175

Peasants O th e r m arket producers N o nm ark et producers G overnm en t apparatus Active populatio n

No. 5,003 1,943 224 220 7,390

(thou san ds) 1953 1961 _% No. % 67.8 55,4 4,408 26.2 2,887 36.3 .3.0 408 5.1 3.2 30 257 100 0 7,960 100.0

It will be seen th a t the stru ctu re is chang ing very rapidly, and in the direction o f a decrease in the p ro p o rtio n o f m a rk e t producers and an increase in the p r o p o r tio n o f n o n m a rk e t producers. T h e nu m b e r o f peasants is decreasing absolutely, b u t the governm ent apparatus remains in a state o f expansion. All these tendencies (with the exception o f the last) are familiar from the developm ent of o th e r co un tries as well, b u t these processes were form erly m uch slower. Tf' the p re sen t rate o f ec onom ic d evelop m ent (and thereby o f social transfo rm ation) also con tin u ed over th e n e x t eight years, at the end of' this decade, workers in th e ec onom ic sector w ould be the d o m in a n t group and would com prise over half the active p o p u l a t i o n , the p ro p o rtio n o f n o n m a rk e t p rod ucers would increase by o ne-tenth (alm o st doubling in absolute n um ber), and the p ro p o rtio n o f peasants in the p op u latio n would drop below 40%. In the fu rth e r course o f socialist c o n stru c tio n in o u r cou ntry, we may expect, in ad dition to the falling o ff o f the peasantry and the tran sfo rm atio n o f the state apparatus, an increased social ho m og eneity within the various groups Three im p o rta n t factors operate in t h a t direction. O ne is the system atic decrease in the spread o f personal incomes. This p h e n o m e n o n is observed in all the countries fo r w hich data exist, and particularly in countries th at ab a n d o n the capitalist m o d e o f p ro d u c tio n [57: 162-1 6 9 ], T h e second fa cto r is th e gradual equalization o f stan dards o f ed ucatio n and culture. T h e third fa cto r consists in the integrative effects o f social self-government. In this way a classless society is being con stru cted in Yugoslavia,
FOOTNOTES
1 lh u s e.g., the t e d e ry l C o n fe re n ce o f the S o c ia lis t A llia n e e o f the W o rk in g Peo ple o f Y u g o slavia, in its d o cu m e n t dated M a y 27, 1967, found it necessary to cull fo r an ideological-political struggle for the fo rm atio n o f a self-governm ent consciousness in the ch ara cte r o f edu ca tio n , science, and c u ltu re : "T h is w ill co m b at the idea that a c tivitie s living o ff iiurplus labor are parasitic, w ith o u t distinguishing that part o f social re p ro d u c tio n w ith o u t w h ich there can be no rapid advance o f p ro d u c tiv ity and

176

w ith o u t w h ich it is im possible 1 0 meet Ih e needs o f the w o rkin g man | I 1 3 | This p ro p o sitio n does n o l ch ara cte rise o n ly Ihe capitalists o f M a rx 's tim e; iden tical id e a s ap p ear among co n te m p o ra ry lei us say, A m e ric a n - capitalists: "G o v e rn m e n t is powerless to create a n yth in g in the sense in w h ich business produces w ealth and ind ivid uals prod uce ideas Ja n d ] in ve n tio n s (S u tto n et a i , The A m e ricart Business Creed, p. 195, cited by G a lb ra ith [2 : 1 8 4 |). 3. A c c o rd in g ly , it appears that not o n ly m ust Marx be defended against So vie t econom ists, but S m ith lo o needs p ro te c tio n from som e o f his W estern colleagues A n excellent defense was presented by A W L e w is In tw o o f his articles he deals w ith the basic classical ap p ro ach [5 : 6 ] , in te rp retin g S m ith on Lhc same basis (hat M ars does (alth o u g h , as far as I k n o w , he is not fam diar w ith M a r x s in te rp re ta tio n ), as can be seen from the fo llo w in g excerpts: A s S m ith put it, there are tw o elem ents in p ro d u ctive lab o r firs t, his p rod uct is com p osed o f wages goods (goods that are part o f the w o rk e rs co n su m p tio n B H ) and excludes services S e c o n d , p ro d u ctive labor produces a p ro fit above wages and therefore has a greater average p roduct than n o n p ro d u ctive lab o r This d istin ctio n is m ade and used o n ly for the purpose o f an alyzing the accu m u la tio n o f ca p ital N o te : 4 S t r ie lly speaking, S m ith 's d efin itio n < d iffe re n tia te s b etw een goods and services Hut o u r m odern d istin ctio n b etw een wages goods and other p ro d u ctio n appears to be precisely w h at he was aim ing al and w h ich best agrees w ith his analysis M N eoclassical econom ists attacked this d istin ctio n from the stan d p o in t o f the th e o ry o f values, but since this w as not thought o f in that co n tex t, the attack is irre le v a n t." A n d fin a lly : "C lassica l econom ists ap pro ached the analysis o f accu m u la tio n through co n su m p tio n o f wages goods. T h e y divided consum ers in to three classes: (1 ) the cap italist and la n d o w n er; (2 ) producers o f services and lu x u ry goods; and (3 ) prod ucers o f wages goods. In a broad sense, the co n sum p tio n o f non-wages goods was part o f the ca p italists' and la n d o w n e rs c o n s u m p t i o n since th e y considered that class (2 ) supports class (1 ) for entertainm ent., etc., from the p rofits w ru n g from class (3 ) Thus* w hen they spoke o f the savings o f capitalists, th e y som etim es thought o f a re d u ctio n o f th e ir personal co n sum p tio n o f wages goods, but m o re o ften they thou gh t o f less personal service, th e re b y reducing the num ber supported in class ( 2 ) M [7 : 2 39 | . 4 < lLet us con sider the first, co rre ct d e fin itio n Pro d u c tive labor, in the sense of capitalist p ro d u c tio n , is hired labor, w h ich in exchange for part o f the capital not o n ly reproduces (his part o f the ca p ital . . but also produces a surplus value for the capitalist O n ly the par( o f hired labor that produces ca p ital is p ro d u ctive '* [7 : 239 ] 5 The so m ew h at more ca u tio u sly fo rm u late d statem ent o f N o tk in is still another exam ple o f lb e sam e d o ctrin e [9 : 8 3 b ) ft should be added (hat S o v ie t statisticians do not fo llo w the ad vice o f th e ir econ om ist colleauges and do n o t co u n t governm ent and p a rty services as ad d itio n s to the social product. 6 Thus, K ro n ro d reinfo rces his p osition by citin g these p hilo so ph ical reflection s by S ta lin : Fo r people to be able to live, th e y need fo o d, clo thing , shoes, houses, heating, etc ; in order fo r these m aterial goods to exist, th e y have to be p ro d u ce d [S : 3 | 7. K ro n ro d w rite s; " l h e great tasks posed for o ur co u n try b y the new five-year plan call for increasing still fu rther the p art o f lab o r d evoted lo the sphere o f m aterial p ro d u ctio n . " [ 8: 3 9 - 4 0 |. 8 A c t u a lly , this has alre ad y been done at the Y ug o slav In s titu te for E c o n o m ic R esearch See D. H o rva t [ 1 0 1 9 B u t p ro p e rty under cap italism is undergoing a certain m etam orphosis and lim itatio n o f p ro p e rty rights, an im persona li/a I ion and d isintegration .O n this see the intellig ent and succinct text o f M Pcfiujlic J I I : 37-47] 10. W e can add to vulgar M arxism vulgar socialism in general Thus, vulgar socialists w o u ld not perm it even in d ivid u a l o w n ership o f co n sum p tio n goods; ow ning an au to m o b ile or a house w as regarded, and som etim es is still regarded, as an expression o f bourgeois ap petites; and it was d em anded, and is still dem anded, that co n sum p tio n goods be o w ned in co m m o n and (h a t the in d iv id u a ls life be co m p le te ly regim ented It is not hard to discover the essence o f all such theories: their pelty-bourgeois m e n ta lity A s usual, M arx bad som ething to say ab o ut tills p henom enon He calls it p rim itive co m m u n ism , w h ich , as the first positive ab o litio n o f private o w n ership is o n ly , therefo re, a m anifest fo rm o f the vileuess of p rivate o w n ersh ip , w h ich w ants to establish itse lf as a p ositive co m m u n ity In one rem arkable passage M arx w rite s: "C o m m u n ism is p rim a rily g eneral private o w n ership D ire ct p h ysical possession is to him the one aim o f life and existence; the labo rer's w o rk is not abolished but is extended to all men T h a t com m unism 2

177

II. 12

J 3.

14

15. 16

17

18.

19 20

since il negates m an 's p e rs o n a lity is o n ly the co n sequ ential expression o f p rivate o w n ership, w h ich itse lf is that negation G e n e ral e m y , w h ic h is co n stitu te d as force, is m erely u co n cealed form in w h ic h greed is established and satisfied, o n ly in an o th e r w ay 'The m eaning o f all p rivate o w n ersh ip as such is d ire c ted , a t least, againsl ric h e r p rivate o w n ership as envy and a desire for eq u alizatio n . file p rim itive eo m m u n isl is m erely a co m p le tio n o f that envy and desire for equ alizatio n in regard to the dem o n strate d m in im u m . T h e fact that Ihe a h o litio n o f private ow nership has little to do w ith actu al ap p ro p ria tio n is proved by the abstract negation o f the w h o le cu ltiva te d and civilized w o rld , the re tu rn o f the ujinaiui'Qt p o o r and unnecessary s im p lic ity o f m an, w h o has not o n ly not o verco m e private o w n ership, he hasn't even achieved i t '' ( 12: 225-226 | K . M ar.v, E c o n o m ic a n d p h ilo so p h ica l M a nu scrip ts, 1844 [1 2 : 167] T h e tw o m eanings o f the co n ce p t o f e x p lo ita tio n have also been discussed by R L u k ic , although his analysis is so m ew h at d iffe re n t. See "E x p lo ita tio n as an E le m e n t o f S o c ia l Classes [1 3 : 369-373 ], In m y article D ivisio n B e tw e e n C o lle ctive s A c c o rd in g to L a b o r 114 ] t 1 have show n ho w the p op ular slogan that in d ivid u a l incom es in enterprises should rise in p ro p o rtio n to the increase in labo r p ro d u c tiv ity negates d istrib u tio n according to labor and thus leads to e x p lo itatio n . It is a ch ara cte ristic featu re that artisans are the social group that is the least self-reproducing: o n ly 9 2 % o f the ch ild re n o f artisans rem ain artisans themselves. A ls o ch ara cte ristic is the intrag e n eratio n m o b ility o f persons active in 1939 and 1 960: less than a third o f today fs artisans w ere artisans before the w ar, h a lf o f them w ere rc cru ile d from am ong p rew ar w o rke rs and 7 % from am ong p rew ar peasants ( V M ilic ). I h e th e o ry o f this p rob lem is dealt w ith in detail in m y book E k o n o n tx k a teotija planskc p rivred c ( I lie E c o n o m ic T h e o ry o f a Plan ned E c o n o m y ) [ 15: 65-91 ] In co n n e ctio n w ith this tran sitio n , a new s item from B o rb a , O c to b e r 1 966, is instru ctive W e cite it in fu ll: T h e m n nicipa! c o u n c il in S o m b o r re ce n tly handed d ow n an unusual decision in the case o f artisan A n a K re k o , a w e a ve r from Bezdan , under w h ich there w ill be ap plied in Ih e shop the prin ciples o f e m p lo y m e n t and self-governm ent thal are valid for artisan shops w ith social ow n ership S p e c ific a lly : the decision stresses that self-governm ent by the w o rkers w h o are m em bers o f the w o rk in g o rganization w ill be in tro d u ce d in the w o rk sh o p in q uestion F u rth e r, there is to be free e n try in to the w o rk e rs o rg anization and free exit from it, on the basis o f a decision by the m em bers o f the co lle c tiv e , each m em ber having equal rights and obligations Most im p o rtan t, decisions as to d istrib u tio n o f the in com e and the means for in d ivid u al incom e are to be taken by all the m em bers o f the w o rk e rs 1 co o p e ra tive This step was decided on, as A n a K re k o states, in o rder to take full advantage o f the possibilities fo r o p e ratio n and expansion o f the m aterial basis o f the w o rksh o p In general^ the dom ain o f " t h e a rlisan ry*' has not had any fu n c tio n a l sig n ifican ce in our e co n o m ic classificatio n fo r a long tim e, and causes unnecessary d iffic u ltie s for eco n om ic analysis and e co n o m ic p o licy and p lanning C o o p e rative s o f artisans, w h ich produce as an y enterprise does, should be inclu d ed in the e co n o m ic branch and grouping in to w h ich their p ro d u ctio n fits H o w e ve r, e very a tte m p t at such a refo rm has been vig o ro u sly opposed by artisan cham b ers o f co m m erce and b y o th e r agencies representing artisans. O ne artisan o ffic ia l gave me this e x p la n a tio n : E c o n o m ic a lly , thal w o u ld be c o rre c t, bul then the artisan ry w o u ld be reduced to the level o f the private craftsm an , and artisan o fficials d o n t w a n t to be considered as representing a p rivate o w n er A t the present level o f so cio e co n o m ic d evelo p m en t, small-scale trade, small-scale hotel and restaurant business, m iscellaneo us services, etc , are m uch m ore e ffic ie n tly co n du cted by in d ivid u al in itia tiv e than b y cu m bersom e enterprises In tax te rm in o lo g y , they can appear in ih e u n p rete n tio u s fo rm s o f ca p ital tax and land tax T e n years ago this w as the d o m in a n t co n ce p tio n , us is sh o w n by the fo llo w in g sta te m e n t fro m K a r d e l j's book on farm p o lic y : A n o th e r indispensable ad m in istrative m easure is the p ro h ib itio n o f ih e purchase o f basic means for large-scale p ro d u c tio n , such ax tractors and sim ila r m a c h in e ry . These means can o n ly serve to render services to others o r for vario u s n o n ag ricu ltu ral activitie s In o ther w o rd s, those resources (since they were in p rivate hands for the most p art) could be a so urce o f re in fo rcin g cap italist tendencies on the farm, In an y event, to le ra tin g such a stale o f affairs co u ld o n ly favor an tiso cialist tendencies on thy land and create obstacles to the realizatio n o f o u r socialist farm p o lic y 16 1: 310-31 11

178

2 1 C f, J . D jo rd je vic [ 2 0 : 264 - 2 6 6 |. 22 C r M , Po p o vic f 2 1: 34 J and V. M ilic [2 2 : 3 - 3 8 ). 23 A stu d y m ade by P N ovo sel on 350 urban and rural subjects show ed a co rre latio n o f 0 8*0. 9 b e tw e e r the ran k o f in d ivid u als in social prestige and the incom e it w as felt th e y sh ou ld receive H is interesting that all the subjects, regardless o f their so cio e co n o m ic status (w it h the e x ce p tio n o f one peasant), gyve a p p ro x im a tely the same ran k listing (co rre la tio n c o e ffic ie n t: 0 .9 1 ) [2 4 : 622-623] 24 A sim ila rly three-dim ensional d ete rm in a tio n o f social s tra tifica tio n , inspired by W e b e r, is given h y |C M a y e r [2 5 : 330-331 ] W eb er defines p ow er as the ab ility 10 co n tro l the b eh avio r o f o thers; M o yer defines it as the c o n tro l that certain groups are In a p osition to exert on ilie o p p o rtu n itie s o f others. 25. T y p ic a l in this respect are the results o f an In q u iry by A T o d n ro vje , w h o questioned 5,012 w o rk e rs. H e received the fo llo w in g answers to the q uestion , A re y o u co n ten t to be a w o r k e r ? : % in given category very w ell satisfied H ig h ly skilled S k ille d Sem i-skilled U n sk ille d 412 22 5 19.4 15.8 dissatisfied

5 4 1 1.4 J7 9 24.0

26 27

28

29

30

31

A h o u l h a lf Ih e hig hly skilled w o rk e rs are ve ry well satisfied w ith their statu s; a q u arte r o f the unskilled w o rke rs are dissatisfied in the m ain or alto geth er (th e others said : satisfied by and larg e ,* all the sam e to m e ) [2 6 : 165] F u rth e r, in 1960 the first tw o groups to o k part in w o rk e rs ' co u n cils lo tw ice the extent o f their p ro p o rtio n am ong w o rkers, w h ile the sceond p air o f groups p articipated to o n ly h a lf the ex te n t o f their p ro p o rtio n am ong w o rk e rs ( S Z S , fifteen 230, p .9 ) A n I D N in q u iry brings out the fact that in no case w ere less than h a lf the m em bers o f the w o rkers* co u n c il hig hly skilled w o rke rs, w h ile for sem iskilled and unskilled w orkers the figure was nine-tenths A g a in , ab o u t h a lf the unskilled and sem iskilled w o rk e rs ow ned land , as against 29-38% for the o ther tw o categories |2 7 : 9-10, 42] S ee [ 16; 202, 2 0 6 ], T h e data relate to the A Z S d efin itio n o f artisan A t the same tim e, sem iskilled and u n skille d w o rke rs regard peasants its closest to them , w h ich is reasonable in view o f the fact that two-thirds o f them eom e from peasant fam ilies S ee M I l i c [ 2 f i : 8 2 , 2 8 6 ] A d d itio n a l in fo rm a tio n is given by an in q u iry by IO N , acco rd in g to w h ich 8 0 % o f in d u strial w o rk e rs are satisfied lo belong to the w o rk in g class, 7 0 % believe that w o rk e rs are valued and respected am ong us, and 9 5 % believe that the w o rk in g class rules; nevertheless, 8 5 % w ant th e ir ch ild re n to be o ffice w o rkers 12 7 1 4 3 ] E d u c a tio n lik ew ise m akes the relatio n ship o f the in d ivid u al to Y ug o slav society positive In s tu d y in g the degree o f social in teg ration o f the vario us categories o f w o rk e r (co m b a tin g inad equ ccies in co m m u ne and enterprise, p articip atio n in w o rk e r and social self-governm ent, p o litic a l m em bership, satisfa ctio n w ith statu s), M Hid finds that . the level o f q u a lific a tio n o f the w o rk e r is d ire c tly p ro p o rtio n a l to his degree o f in te g ra tio n (o p eft . p 93) In this co n te x t, w h a t happens in o ur higher e d u catio n nam ely, the insistence, on p seud od em oeratic grounds, that eve ryo n e w h o wishes to shonlcl be 'adm itted, regardless o f his w o rk in g and in te lle c tu a l q ualities, w ith a sim ultan eou s decrease in tbe nu m b er o f scho larsh ip s leads to p e trifa c tio n o f the hierarchical stru cture. The crite rio n for adm ission to the u n ive rsity becom es the p ro p e rty (an d edu ca tio n a l) stylu s o f the parents To som e ex te n t these negative aspects co u n te rac t the increase in the n u m b er o f cities w ith hig her e d u catio nal in stitu tio n s O n e o f the crite ria that can be used to d eterm ine the nu m b er o f m anagerial persons is personal in c o m e o f o ver 7 0 ,0 00 din per m o n th in 1963, w h ich includes about 2 5 % o f all em p lo y ed persons in the social sector (ftidekx. N o ve m b e r 1966, p 4 6 ) B re akin g this d ow n into in d ivid u al categories in terms o f mean incom es, in thousands o f dinars, we have: m anagers o f in d u strial and co n stru c tio n enterprises, 77 and 75; heads and assistant heads o f cities, districts, and co m m u nes, 76 and 62; governm ent a d m in istratio n fu n ctio n a rie s, 7 6 ; federal and rep u b lic secretaries, 92 and 90; c h ie f justices and district atto rn e y s, 72 and 83; m a n a g e r o f cham b ers o f com m erce, 77; and managers o f co m m e rcia l agencies and insurance com panies, 80 and 66. T h e incom es o f u n ive rsity professors and teachers w ere 7 6 ,000 and 35,000 dinars.

179

resp e ctive ly ( S 2 S , B itte n 400. pp. 20-51).. In 1961, the S Z S rcpi.stered 93,366 persons as m anagerial personnel in the fo llo w in g categories: (1 ) perm anent m em bers o f representative bodies, 2 ,! 10; (2 ) go vernm ent ad m in lit rat ion fu n ctio n a rie s, 2,2 70; (3 ) supervisors and inspectors o f g overnm ent ad m in istra tio n , 12,672; ( 4 ) heads of in stitu tio n s, 10,800; (5 ) assistants to heads o f in stitu tio n s and supervisors, 13,269; (6 ) m anagers o f business firm s, 2 7 ,1 75 ; (7 ) tech n ica l d irectors, 8 ,9 4 2 ; (8 ) c o m m e rcia l and fin a n cial d irectors, 2 ,6 4 3 ; (9 ) others, 13,430 (B itte n 312, p 89). T h is spread is evid e n tly too broad I f w e su btract categories 3, 5 t 7, and 8, vve have a total o f 55,835 persons left* I f w e take into a c co u n t in all the categories o n ly those w ith seco n d ary, college, and u n ive rsity e d u ca tio n , there rem ain 6 1,012 persons. O n the basis oT these co n siderations, the nu m b er o f m anagerial cadres com cs to 60,000 It is o f interest to no te that the edu catio nal level o f m anagerial p ersonnel is rising rap id ly. A cc o rd in g to an S Z S survey in 1953, o f a total o f 51,911 persons, 9 % had un ive rsity training and 2 1 % had seco n d ary e d u c a tio n ; in 1961, o f 9 3 ,366 persons, the relative figures w ere 3 9 % and 36% { B i lw n 73, p. 10) O f the m anagerial cadres, 2 9 .000 w ere recruited** from the ranks o f the intellig entsia and 31,000 from fu n ctio naries w ith secondary e d u ca tio n , so that these tw o categories sh ou ld be d im inish ed b y these num bers In te lle c tu a l w o rk e rs are persons w ith college and u n ive rsity training, and their n u m b er is d raw n from the sam e so urce as the num ber o f o fficia ls and w o rk e rs {B itte n 312. p 88)are a residual ca teg o ry : the figures given s h o w 152,000 p rivate p ro d u c tive and service artisans and 139,000 p rivate persons em p lo y ed in o ther e co n o m ic fields, esp ecially in trade and in the restaurant business (B itte n 312. p. 23 ) Peasants are those engaged in ag ricu ltu re w h o are n either w o rke rs n o r fu n ctio n a rie s (B itte n 3 12, pp, 22, 2 3 ) 32 h tg oslavija 1945- I 9 6 4 t p 60 33, T his thesis is co n vin cin g ly su pp orted b y the data o f M illc on Hie social origin o f g overnm ent em plo yees (in % ) 1 16; 2 0 9 ]'. f a th e rs O c cu p a tio u A g ric u ltu ra l M anu al N on rn an u al

A ssistants and those w ith p rim a ry e d u catio n E m p lo y e e s w ith seco n d ary and college e d u catio n E m p lo y e e s w ith u n ive rsity e d u catio n M anagerial cadres ( S Z S d e fin itio n )

84 2 55. 1 64 9 31.9 48 9 27 2 61.6 36.7 24 9 38.4 21*7 5 L1 33 0 35.1 29.1 15.8

It w ill be seen that, as w e co m e to higher p ositious in social s tra tific a tio n , there is a elcar and regular d eclin e in the share o f m anual lab o r groups as co m p ared w ith w o rke rs o f n o n m anu al origin (m a in ly fu n c tio n a rie s) The ru le does n o t p revail for the managerial cadres B u t it m ust be kep t in m ind that the degree o f self-renewal am ong m anagerial cadres is one o f the highest {3 6 .2 % ) and that, as in other societies, there w ill be a strong te n d e n cy fo r that rate to rise, the fu rth e r w e go from the tim e o f the revolution. 34 T h e conversion o f the p yra m id al in to a sp heroid stru cture is an e m p irica l faci to day in the in d u strially m ost d evelo ped co u n trie s T h is stems fro m the chungc in the overall d istrib u tio n o f the na tio n a l incom e, from the rise in the general level o f e d u ca tio n , and fro m the d im in u tio n o f in co m e d iffe re n tia ls. T h e last facto r is im pressively illu strated by R. S u p e k s data co n ce rn in g the real incom e o f a Fre n ch state c o u n c ilo r and an A m e ric a n sk ille d w orker. A t the beginning o f this ce n tu ry the in co m e o f the c o u n c ilo r w as five tim es as great T he re afte r it decreased and w o rk e rs in co m e increased, so that in the m id d le o f this ce n tu ry an A m e ric a n skilled w o rk e r earns m ore than a fr e n c h state c o u n c ilo r | 29: 111] 35. I b o rro w this term from M P e c u jlic, w h o holds q u ite co rre c tly , it seems to me that b ureau cracy sh ou ld n o l be id e n tifie d w ith class because, although it has the m o n o p o ly o f g overning, it possesses it no t on the basis o f its o w n right o f o w n ership, but on the basis o f a delegation o f right.. A c t u a lly , the sep aration o f p ro p e rty from

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36

37 38-

39.

40.

41.

42.

go vernm ent is the h isto rical basis o f ttie fo rm a tio n o f the b ureau cracy and its d iffe re n tia tio n from class1 [ 30: 1 4 1. ' T his is the co n clu sio n o f M Pe cu jlic as w e ll: I f this a c tiv ity is Ihe basis o f p e o p le s existence, then p ow er (m o n o p o ly ) o ver the co n d itio n s o f lab o r is the fac to r that m ust d eterm in e the position in p ro d u c tio n re la tio n s [3 0 ; 8 |. C f. also ascribed s t a tu s " and achieved statu s in R L in to n ( S tatu s and R o le [ 32: 202*203 I). S . M ozina reports on an in q u iry in w h ich p o te n tial candidates fo r the position o f manager w ere asked w h a t the c rite ria w ere that decided on p reference for their ch o ice as d ire cto rs! four-fifths declared that the crite ria w ere p o litic a l, and o n ly o n c 'te n th regarded the crite ria as professional | 33: 3S9|. 1 E m p iric a l studies on the local level sh o w that m anagerial cadres choose their friends from the same stratu m (in three- quarters o f cases), w h ile lo w e r fu n ctio n a rie s choose am ong th eir friends so m eone from higher strata, In this c o n n e c tio n ," Z. M lin a r co n clud es, it is an obvio us ch a ra cte ristic that those w h o alread y hold the highest position in a given c o m m u n ity ca n n o t m ake co n ta cts on a stratu m higher up in the ve rtical scale o f the c o m m u n ity 's stru ctu re T h e re fo re he m akes re lativ ely higher intracateg orial friend ship s w ith his equals, and thereb y produces a re lativ ely closed stru ctu re in the c o m m u n it y " | 3 4 : 9341 v >Rus* investig ation s lead him to a sim itar co n clu sio n : L e g a liz a tio n o f arbitrariness, respect fo r an iso latio nist p o lic y , and the in e ffica e y o f p u b lic c o n tro l, even o f c rim in a l actions o f m anagerial personnel (in 1965, m anagerial position s in our re p u b lic w ere held by 1,500 persons w h o had been co n victe d o f abuse o f th e ir o ffic ia l p ositio n s) all this leads us to the p resum p tio n that in d ivid u a l m e rito c ra tic groups im p e rc e p tib ly lead to a more o r less hom ogeneous social stratu m , w h ic h by n o w already has considerable social p ow er, since even the co u rts ca n n o t m aster i t (3 5 : 1 0 9 4 ]. B y m e rito c ra c y R u s means gradual fo rm a tio n o f u m anagerial su m m it that co n trols s o cia l'p o litica l o rg an iz atio n s. V . V la h o v ic em phasizes the fetishization o f statem ents by people in high m anagerial position s and adds: W e speak o f the fetishization o f fu nctio ns, w h ic h leads us to lo o k less at w h a t people are w o rth and k n o w . and m ore at w h a t fu n c tio n th e y ho ld O n the basis o f fu n c tio n w e form o ur relatio n s to p e o p le |5 8 : 7 2 9 | T h e co m m en ts o f M lin ar, R us, and V la h o v ic re fle ct the p heno m eno n o f the b ure au cra tic alie n atio n o f m an , o f w h ic h M. M a rk o vic a p tly s a y s :1* , in choosing those w h o m they wish to have close relatio n s w ith , the p rim a ry facto r w ill not be w h o the o th e r person is but w h a t fu n c tio n he has. A fu n c tio n w ill be frie n d ly w ith a fu n c tio n , n o t a m an w ith a m a n I 36: 5 1 ] In 1961, 4 ,5 % o f the w o rkers and em ployees and 2 9 % o f the rest o f the p op u lation over tlie age o f 15 were illiterate T h e latte r figure m ay be taken as representative o f the illite ra cy o f the p easantry (re co n stru c te d from S tatistic!*! b iltcn 312,, p. 2 10; Ju g o s la v ia 1 945-1964, pp. 44-45). T h u s, about one-third o f (he peasants are illiterate In 1 955, fo r a m illio n dinars o f m arket valu e, 10 work-years were required in a g ric u ltu re but o n ly 3 vvork-years in in d u stry [cf. 1 . H o rv a t, 37: 5 19] S o m e th in g 3 less than 4 m illion Y ug o slav peasants p ro vid e a p o p u latio n o f 20 m illio n w ith fo o d , as co m p ared w ith 7 m illio n A m e ric a n farm ers w h o feed 200 m illion i.e., Yug o slav ag ricu ltu re is one-sixth as p ro d u c tive as A m e ric a n ; ind ustry is tw ice as p rod uctive, re la tiv e ly (d ata fro m S StajiC ) A n em pirical stu d y in the K ra ljcvo d istrict leads K K ilib a rd a to the con clusio n that peasants su b m it more proposals relatin g to the c o m m u n ity and are b ette r info rm ed on these m atters than ind ustrial w o rkers, K ilib a rd a explains this greater social co m m itm e n t by the fo llo w in g facto rs: ( I ) the w o rk e r can have his interests served through his w o rk e r o rg an iz atio n b ette r than the peasant can at w o r k ; ( 2 ) very fre q u e n tly , the p rob lem s that one village w ants to have solved essentially affect an o th e r village or villages, and o ften a ffec t the district as an association o f villages; (3 ) in the w in te r, peasants have re la tiv e ly m ore tim e to get acqu ainted, to discuss and criticiz e , and to call fo r and make proposals fo r solving the problem s o f th eir c o m m u n ity than in d u strial w o rk e rs ; (4 ) w o rk e rs influ e n ce their c o m m u n ity agencies in d ire c tly , through th e ir w o rk e r o rganizations, w h ile farm ers can do this o nly d ire c tly ; (5 ) farm ers arc m ore ind epend ent than w o rk e rs T h e p rivate farm er on his farm o fte n feels Jess d ep end ent on c o m m u n ity agencies , . than the w o rk e r does w ith respect to the leaders o f the w o rk e r org anization . T he form er does not have to fear being discharged, o r o th e r reprisals on the part o f the vviclder o f social pow er, w h o m ay see its interests th re a te n e d ; (6 ) peasants seem to k n o w the people and the problem s in c o m m u n ity agencies b etter than w o rk e rs do This is a result o f the greater co m m u u ica tio n in co n n e ctio n w ith vario u s questions Tor w h ic h a w o rk e r does not have to go to the lo c al au th o ritic s [ 62: 46 ]

181

43. This d e fin itio n also appears in the League Program , pp* J 18 and 125 44. M arx inclu des sales assistants in wage w o rke rs [ 3: 255]., 45 li.g , M Pe c u jlic classifies fo rem en w ith tech nician s in a tran sitio n a l ca teg o ry |2 7 : 3 8 ]. 46 In a stu dy b y J . Z u p an o v and A . S, T an nenb au m [4 0 : 1 2 1 ), q nestions w e re put to w o rkers (8 9 % were m em bers o f the League o f C o m m u n is ts ) o f the tw o *yea r courses at the W o rk e r s U n ive rs ity o f Zagreb T h e in flu e n ce was rated from I (= n o n e ) to 5 (= ve ry high) T h e grouping is m ine M anagers o f firm s E x p e rts Managers of e co n om ic en terprises lo r e m e n E m p lo y e e s 4.7 4.1 3 4 2,7 2,7 H ig h ly skilled S k ille d S e m isk ille d U n sk ille d 2 5 2.2 1 6 1.5

47 A n in terestin g bit oF in fo rm a tio n (w h ic h calls for fu rth e r an alysis) is Clia l skilled w o rk e rs and em p lo yees w ith se co n d ary ed u ca tio n are n u m e ric a lly d o m in a n t in governing bodies, T h ese tw o categories appear in governing bodies lo a greater p ro p o rtio n than their p ro p o rtio n in the w o rk in g force. E m p lo y e e s w ith u n ive rsity e d u catio n, sem iskilled w o rkers, em plo yees w ith lo w e r e d u ca tio n , and unskilled w o rkers (in that o rd e r) arc less than p ro p o rtio n a te ly represented f 4 1 : 222> 2 2 5 ] 48. In an em p irica l stu d y in a large co lle c tiv e , K, K ilib a rd a finds that a b o u t 6 0 % feel they ca n n o t essentially influ e n ce the ch o ice o f a m anager, and that ab o u t four-fifths o f Leag ue o f C o m m un ists m em bers and n o n m em bers w a n t to have a d irect and strong influ e n ce on the ch o ice o f a m anager [6 2 : 1 1 S M 2 0 ]. 49 A n a ly z in g the 1965 vo lu m e o f D elavska poiirika, V. R u s [ 35: 1082] co n clu d e s: A s a ru le, th e agents o f arbitrariness are the m anager and o th e r leaders in the w o rk e rs ' o rg anization . the victim s o f arbitrariness in sm aller w o rk e rs 1 org anisatio ns are most fre q n e n lly skilled w o rk e rs an d r in larger enterprises, professionals In c id e n ta lly , the vio le n t, arb itra ry , and illegal ca d re p o lic y * o f leaders to w ard skilled w o rkers anti te ch nician s p oints up the professional in fe rio rity o f the hegem onic groups in w orkers* o rg anization s, 50, It is w o rth no ting that in one S ta lin is t system the w o rk in g class still retains its social co n ten t 51 A sim ila r co n clusio n is reached by H . Hadfciom erovie (Pregied, 1964, No. 6, pp 599-C00) T h is is in tu itiv e ly felt by o u r p o litic a l w o rk e rs as w ell, w h o p ra ctica lly never speak o f the w o rk in g class* except in the cu sto m a ry phrase " t h e w o rk in g class and all w o rk in g p e o p le . Lik e w ise , d iffe rin g from p revious stalu te s, the S ta tu te o f the League enacted in 1958 begins w ith the w o rd s: The Leag ue o f C o m m un ists o f Y u g o slavia is the organized p o litical p o w e r o f the w o rk in g class a n d w o rkin g p eo p le o f Y u g o s la v ia (m y em phasis - B .H ) T h e S ta tu te o f 1964 begins w ith ih e id e n tical fo rm u la tio n Thu s the co n ce p t o f the w o rk in g class is e xten ded to co ve r the entire active population., w ith the possible e xcep tio n o f the peasant and the craftsm an : T h u s, social lab o r to d ay com prises, and lin ks in the sam e lab o r process, people from unskilled w o rkers to those w h o w o rk in institutes, hospitals, e du catio n, ad m in istrative agencies, etc Because o f these co n sid eratio n s, the c o n c e p t o f the w o rk in g class is changing, taking on a hroader m eaning In essence this co n ce p t com prises all w o rk in g people w h o take part in the so cial lab o r process and in so cialist e co n om ic relations, A ll have the same goals; greater p ro d u c tiv ity , d evelo p m en t o f p ro d u c tive forces, increased p ro d u ctio n d istrib u tio n acco rd in g to w o r k , and ever greater d evelo pm en t o f so cie ty as Ihe c o m m u n ity o f p ro d u ce rs1' (ti. K a rd e lj, |4 3 : 7 7 ]). T h is co n ce p tio n is close to but n o l id e n tical w ith M a rx 's extended co n ce p tio n o f the p ro d u ctive w o rk e r as a co n seq u ence o f the co o p e ra tive nature o f la b o r [4 : 441 ] 52. M. P e cu jlie reasons in the same w a y : T h e far-reaching changes that are beginning in the nature o f Ihe so cial d ivision o f labor, in p ro d u c tio n re latio n s them selves, lead to the d issolution o f all old relatiu ns and strata. T h e inh erited d ifferen ces b etw een strata , . are beginning to disappear . . . The gap, the so cial distance, is d im inish in g b etw een the fo rm e rly sh arp ly p olarized, separate, and h ie ra rc h ic a lly arranged so cial strata T here is co m in g in to being a closer co n n e ctio n , an in te rp en e tratio n , an Integration o f th e w o rkin g class in th e o ld n ica n in g o f th e w ord, p a rtic u la rly o f its m o s t d e v e lo p e d sectors, w ith the strata o f the te ch n ica l intellig entsia. T h e y are beginning to act in sim ila r w a ys A n d the d evelo pm en t o f m odern te ch n o lo g y is also w o rk in g in the sam e d ire ctio n . ,. B u t the social co n d itio n s un der w h ic h p rod ucers w o rk , the lab o r s ilu a tio n in w h ich th e y are, are alread y acting d ire c tly in the sam e d ire ctio n . . the trend to w ip e out the

d istin ctio n b etw een a d m in istrative and e x e cu tive m ental and p h ysical la b o r (b y means o f self-governm ent) are leading to the estab lish m ent o f a m o d ern class o f

p h y s i c a l a n d m e n t a l p ro d u c ers u n d er c o n d itio n s o f se lf-g o v e rn m e n t and se lf-d istrib u tio n . I li i s is w h at is beginning to ch aracterize to d a y 's w o rk in g class under
the co n d itio n s o f self-governm ent [4 4 : 28-29] it is not clear w h y Peeu jlic calls this ne w q uasip rofession al group class, w h e n that co n trad ic ts his ow n th e o ry o f the class [ 3 0 } and w h e n the m eaning o f socialism consists in the a b o litio n and not the fo rm atio n o f classes I have the im pression that P e cu jlie is aw are o f this, and that the reasons fo r Ih e te rm in o lo g y are practical-po litical rath e r then scie n tific 53 This is expressed, altho ug h in a m ild form * in the relevant fo rm u latio n s in the Program o f th e League o f C o m m u n is ts ( c f p, 145). 54 As L j T a d ic rem arks (3 6 : 2 7 9 ], L e n in to o k his thesis as to the intellig entsia from K u u ts k y B u t lo n g before tlie fo rm a tio n o f co m m u n ist parties we find an th in te lle ctu alism in the lah o r m o vem ent am ong the anarchists. T y p ic a l in this respect is the criticism B a k u n in aim ed at scholars? B y his ve ry nature the man o f learning is inclined to every kind o f m ental and m oral p erversion, and his greatest offense is that he overrates his kn o w le d g e , his o w n intellig ence, and despises an yo n e w h o is not learned G iv e him the p o w e r to ru le and he w ill be the harshest o f tyrants, for the sch o lar's arrogance is repu lsive and d isto rted and lim its freedom m o re than any o th e r kind o f arrogance . .[4 7 :1 1 9 ], 55,. O n the O rg an izatio n o f Russian S o c ia l D e m o c ra c y ; w e cite from [4 8 : 183-187|. 56 In a d d itio n to the h isto rica l instances that L e n in and R o sa Lu x e m b u rg dealt w ith , it is w o rth w h ile considering so m e present-day h isto rical exam ples. A n tU in le lle c tu a l feelings are ch a ra cte ristic o f to d ay's bourgeois parties and m ilieus. In A m e ric a in te lle ctu als are called eggheads; in E n g la n d , G aitsk e ll, the fo rm e r L a b o u r Pa rty leader, w o u ld take o ff his jack e t and tie at m eetings, to sh o w that hrt was not an inveterate in te lle ctu al, as he was accused o f being T o a great ex te n t these are petty-bourgeois antagonism s, b u l there are substantial d ifferen ces as well,. I f one o f Ih e crite ria o f the progressive nature o f a social g ro up in A m e ric a to d ay is its attitu d e to w ard the w a r in V ie tn a m , then the 'eggheads * are the o n ly progressive group.. T h e w o rk in g class takes a passive a ttitu d e and o ccasio n ally p articipates in an tico m m u n ist dem o n stration s T h e hig bourgeoisie is o p e n ly aggressive, T his situ atio n is not u n e x p e c te d , In its day the M c C a rth y terror was also aim ed p rim a rily at the A m e ric a n intellig entsia A n interesting analysis o f the roots o f anti-intellectualism is given by E Fisch e r, the A u stria n C o m m u n is t, in his article T h e In te lle ctu a ls and P o w e r " ; the egghead* is b itte rly accused o f being an un settlin g fa c to r , o f la ck in g p o litical conscio usn ess,1 o f no t being lin ked to the p e o p le / o f being u n re lia h le , unstable, in co n stan t; His learning does not respect tactical consideratio ns, the re lia b ility o f the fa ith fu l p arty m an , the in d e stru ctib le d evo tio n o f the o rd in a ry m an , A n ti-in te llectu aiism is not aim ed at the specialist w h o obeys orders, but at " t h e in te lle ctu al w h o poses question s and brings tab oo s un der d iscussion, A t the same tim e, Fischer says, the p referen ce o f a co n siderab le nu m b er o f intellectu als, in co n ju n c tio n w ith their m asters, m akes it easier fo r an ti- in tellectu alism , in times o f crisis, to e vo k e aversion to the in te lle c tu al am o ng the people, am ong the m em bers o f a p arty o r o rganization " Seen in h isto rical perspective, it is ch ara cte ristic that even in the last th irty years o f the iast c e n tu ry , w h e n the n o tio n o f i n t e l l e c t u a l first appeared, it was not so m uch a s y n o n y m for m ental w o rk e rs ' as it was a m ocking co lle c tiv e nam e given to those w h o defended D re y fu s, sym p ath iz ed w ith the p r o l e t a r i a t , s t o o d for m o dern art A n li- in te lle c tu a lism was blended w ith a n tira tio n a lis m , anti-Marx Ism , an ti-Sem itism , w ith every kind o f reactio n a ry m o vem ent and id e o lo g y, In the Nazi jarg on the in te lle c tu a l w as d efin ed as the beast o f in te llig e n c e .1 In most co u n trie s, a n tM n te lle c tu a lism was spread in o rder to take an aggressive a ttitu d e at a n y m o m e n t o f crisis; it even in fe cte d , som etim es m ore and som etim es less, the lab o r m o vem ent and the co u ntries engaged in co n structin g so cia lism [4 9 : 1029-1035], 57 T h e ir job [th e in te llig e n tsia's] is to be the con science and the consciousness o f th c ii era . , (D . Pe jo vic [5 0 : 2 6 1 ] W , M ills , the w ell-kn ow n A m e ric a n socio lo g ist and unsparing c ritic o f his s o c ie ty , observes; a typ e o f social m an , the in te lle c tu a l has no p articu lar p o litical d ire ctio n , but the w o rk o f each man o f kn ow led g e has a co m p le te ly sp e cific kind o f p o litical im p o rta n ce : his p o litics are p rim a rily the p o litics o f tru th , because it is his d u ty lo m ain ta in an ad equ ate d e fin itio n o f r e a lit y . . . . T he in te lle c tu a l should be the m oral co n science o f his so cie ty, at least in so far as the value o f tru th is co n ce rn ed , because that is, in the final an alysis, his p o litic s [5 1 : 3 1 )

183

58 A cco rd in g to the 1948 census, there w ere in that y e a r a to tal o f 79,000 persons w ith u n ive rsity or college diplom as In the 1945-1965 p erio d, 2 22,000 stu dents o btained diplom as From un iversities and colleges In the m ean tim e a certain nu m b er o f older inte lle ctu als died ( S C I , p 59; Ju g o sla via * . p 303. S G I , p

1955

1945 1964

1965

S0 0 ).

59 It is not w ith o u t interest to no te that the intellig entsia is p layin g a sim ilar re vo lu tio n a ry role in co n te m p o ra ry n n d cvelop ed co u n trie s In this co n n e ctio n T B. B o tlo m o re , tile En g lish socio lo g ist, observes; in alm ost all Asian and A fric a n co u ntries (lie in te lle ctu als have p layed o u tstan d in g parts in the struggles against co lo n ial rule. U n ive rs ity students have often been the sh ock troops o f the independence m o vem ent, and those w h o w ere stu d y in g abroad farm ed or helped form new na tio n a l p a rtie s [5 2 ; 1091 60, In this co n tex t, rccent un iversity resistance lo the d ictatorsh ip in A rg e n tin a is o n ly a n atu ral expression o f a secular trend O n e sh o u ld in te rp ret stu dent m o vem ents in a nu m b er o f Eu ro p e a n and A m e ric a n co u n trie s in the sainc sense 6 L S o n ic authors m ain ta in that possession o f p o w e r is the fu n d am e n tal ch ara cte ristic o f the b u re au cra cy, and that therefo re it can o n ly be g o vernm ental In that case, the business b ureau cracy is called te ch n o cra cy (cf. J . D jo rd je v ic [4 7 : x v - x x v iii]). 62. The F re n ch have u ch ara cte ristic saying w h ic h , so far as their exp erien ce in the m atter goCsS, figures as a p o p u lar p ro ve rb : h o m m e Mu. h o m m e fo u tu (a man elected is a man done fo r) 63. It is w o rth noting that the n o to rio u s co n ce p tio n o f the struggle fa r e x is te n c e '1arose first n o t in Ihe n a tu ra l but in the social sciences B io lo g ist D a rw in b o rro w ed it from his c o u n try m a n , eco n om ist M althns. 64,. H o w e ve r, in the lig h t o f the above analysis* 1 see no ju stifica tio n for the existence o f an ad m in istrative house 65. T h e data are o n ly a p p ro x im a tely co rre ct because o f the inad equ ate su b d ivisio n and mere in accu racy o f o ur d em ographic statistics.. T h u s, in one p u b lica tio n ( S Z S , Biltan , , pp 22, 23) m ilita ry personnel is in clu d e d in the group o f go vernm ent and co u rts for 1953, but is not stated for 1961 T h is suggests that the state apparatus has d im inish ed, w hereas in fact it lias increased, T h e num ber o f peasan ts is o btain ed by su b tractin g the num ber o f w o rk e rs and em p lo yees from the to tal activc ag ricu ltu ral p o p u latio n (ibid.) O th e r m ark et p ro d u c e rs " is a residual categ o ry T h e nu m b er o f non m arket w o rk e rs, (cu ltu ral-e d u catio n al, s c ie n tific, and health-social a c tivitie s) is increased for 1 95 3 by 2 8 ,000 persons em p lo yed in mass o rganizations, professional associations, the lib eral professions, and religious o rganizations ( S Z S t B itten , . p 9), w h ile for 196 1 the nu m b er added is 5 3 .000, an ap p ro x im a tio n for the same categ o ry, o btain ed by in clu d in g persons from o th e r a c tiv itie s ' w ith o u t co u n tin g em ployees in e co n o m ic associations (6 ,5 5 9 ) and m ilita ry personnel, the nu m b er o f w h o m * although data are in s u ffic ie n t, w e presum e not to he greater than in 195 3 (B itten , , p 9; B itten , pp. 2 2, 23, 169) Tor 1953* the g overnm ent apparatus is taken from the S Z S , b u t for 1961 il is augm ented by m ilita ry personnel (7 5 ,0 0 0 , according to the situ atio n o f 1953, , p .9). N o i co u n tin g the arm ed forces whose cadre m akeu p is co n d itio n ed by the in te rn a tio n a l s itu a tio n , the apparatus o f the state grew as fo llo w s over the eight-year p eriod (B itten . P- 9; B itten I t p I 69 );

312

73

73

312

73

73

1953 fe d e ra l agencies R e p u b lic agencies O th er agencies and courts 4,443 9,661 130,859

1961 17,191 24,772 139,910

1ndex 3B8 256 107

T o tals:

144,963

181,873

125

In a c tiv e persons and persons o f u n k n o w n o cc u p a tio n are su btracted from the active p op u lation (B itten . pp 22 and 23).,

312

REFERENCES
S tx io P o litic a l T re n d r a n d A c t io n s o f the S o c ia list Leag ue A fte r the S ix th Congress, Tederal C o n fe re n ce oT the S o c ia list A llia n c e o r the W o rk in g People o f Y u g o slavia, B o ib a , Belgrade, 1967 | 2 1 J . K . G a lb ra ith , T he A fflu e n t S o c ie ty , H o u g h to n M ifT lin , B o sto n , 195 8 j 3 | K M a rx , Capital. V o l I I I , K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1948 [ 1]

184

5
6
7 S

Ib id k V o l J, K u ftu ra , 2ugrcb> 1947 W A L e w is, E c o n o m ic D evelo p m en t w ith U n lim ite d S u p p lies o f L a b o u r . M a n c h e ste r S c h o o l, 1954, W . A. Lew is. U n lim ite d S u p p l y : F u rth e r N o t e s / 1M a n ch e ste r S ch o o l, 1958 K. M a r* , T h e o ry o f S u rp lu s Values, Vol. I, K u ltu ra , Belgrade, 1953 la A. K ro n ro d , Basic Q uestions o f M a rx ist- Le n in ist T eaching on P ro d u c tiv e L a b o r in Cap italism and .Socialism , N ap rijcd , Zagreb, 1948; tran slatio n oT w o rk published in /svesftfa >lfcacTt?mw N a u k S S S R , 1947, N o. I* A I N o tk in , E s s a y on ih e T h e o ry o f S o c ia lis t Pro d u c tio n , O G I Z , M o sco w , 1948

B H o rva t, 4,A n Integ rated S y s te m o f S o c ia l A cc o u n ts for an E c o n o m y o f the Y ug o slav J y p c ,1 re p o rt lo C o n fe re n ce o f In te rn a tio n a l A sso ciatio n fo r Research in 1 In c o m e and W e a lth , M a y n o o th , Ire la n d , 1967; R e v ie w o f In c o m e and W ealth 1968 ^ 11 M P e c u jlic, Classes and C o n te m p o ra ry S o c ie ty , C o n te m p o ra ry A d m in istra tio n , Belgrade, 1967 12 K M arx and F Engels, E a r l y Work*, K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 1953 13 R E u k ic , E x p lo ita tio n as an E le m e n t o f S o cia l Classes," Socialism , 1966, H o 3. 14 13, H osvut, D istrib u tio n A c c o rd in g to W o rk A m o n g C o lle ctiv e s, N a la stvarnost [O u r R e a lit y | t 1902, N o 2 15 B H o rvat, E c o n o m ic T h e o ry o f a P la n n e d E c o n o m y , K u ltu ra , Belgrade, 1961, 16 V M ilic , R e v ie w o f S o c ia l M o b ility in Y u g o s la v ia ," ..Vj'armYcaJ R e v ie w , 1960, N o 3-4 17 K. M ie ic ; Pro fessio nal M o rals o f CTuftsm en*Sinall O w n e rs ," S o cio lo gija [ S o c io lo g y j , 1965, N o 3 IS M H a d ii V asilev, P h e n o m e n o n o f Private O w n e rsh ip in S o c ia lis m ," Kottiunist, M a y 5, 1966. 19 M P o p o vic , So c io - E co n o m ic S yste m , K u llu ra , Belgrade. 1964 20 J D jo rd je vic, So cia lism and D e m o c ra c y C o n te m p o ra ry A d m in istra tio n , Belgrade, J 962 21 M P o p o vic , A T h e o rctie a l- l'ly p o th e iica l Fra m e for the S lu d y o f the S tra tific a tio n S tru c tu re o f So c ia list S o c ie t y , " So cio lo g ija. 1966, N o 1-2 22 V M ilic , A C o n c e p tu a l- H y p o th e tica l Fra m e for the S tu d y o f S o c ia l S tru c tu re , " Soeio lo g ija. I9 6 0 , N o 2. 23 J . S to e tz e l, Ps yc h o lo g y o f In te rp e rso n n e l R e l a t i o n s , i n S ocio lo gija. Vol.. II, ed G, G u rv itc li, N ap rijcd , Zagreb, 1966 24 P, N ovesel. So c ia l S tra tific a tio n and In c o m e N o rm s ," Na^a teme [O u r T h e m e s), 1966, N o . 3. 25 K M a ye r, T h e 1 h co ry o f S o c ia l Classes, in R e a d e r in B u r e a u c ra c y . by R K M erto n et aT , F re e Press, G le n co e , 1952. 26 A T o d o riv ic , 'S o c ia l Consciousness o f W o rk ers and Class S L ra tific a lio u * " S o c io lo g ija , 1965, N o . 3 27 M. P c cu jlic, Changes in the S o c ia l S tru c tu re o f Yugoslavia^ V S P N , Belgrade, 1963 28 S o c ia l S tru c tu re an d M o b ilit y o f the W ork in g Class o f Y ug o slavia, edited by M llic , I D N , Belgrade, 1963 R S u p e k , iS o e io lo g y t S k o lsk a knjiga (S c h o o lb o o k s |( Zagreb, 1963. 29 30 M P e c u jlic, T h e o re tic a l Fra m e for the S tu d y o f Class Changes in S o c ia lis m ," S o cio lo g ija, 1966, No 1-2. V I L e n in , G re a t In it ia tiv e / ''S e le c te d W orks, V o ls 11-111, K u ltu ra , Zagreb, 19S0 31 f. Parsons et a l , T h e o rie s o f S o c ie ty , V o l I, Free Press, G le n co e , 1962 32 33 S M o in a , S P a r t ic ip a t io n o f L e ad er and E x p e rt Cadres in W orkers* S elf- M a n a g e m e n t," G led ista | V ie w s ], 1966, N o 3 Z,. M lin ar, S o m e S tru c tu ra l A spects o f A u t h o r it y in L o cal C o m m u n itie s / 34 C lc d iira , 1966, N o 6-7 3S V P R u s t C liques in W o rk in g O rg an izaLio nS, C ledista. 1966, N o 8*9I h e M ean ing an d Pe rsp ective o f So cia lism (c o lle c tio n o f papers at S e c o n d Session 36 o f K o rc u la S u m m e r S c h o o l, 1964). Praxis, Zagreb, 1 965 37 B. H o rv a t, W o rk in g V a lu e o f P ro d u c tio n in Y ugoslav A g ric u ltu re and in d u s t r y ," E k o n o m ist, 196 I, N o 4 S o c ia l P o litic a l Syste m o f S o c ia lis t Countries, In s titu te for S lu d y o f the W orkers* 38 M o ve m e n t, Belgrade, 1964 A. Grarnsci* S ele cte d Works, K u ltu ra , Belgrade, 1959 39 J Z u p an o v and A S T an nenb au m , D istrib u tio n o f In flu e n ce in S o m e Yug o slav In d u stria l O rg an izatio ns as Seen by M em bers o f T h o s c O r g a n iz a t i o n s H k o n o m sk i p rcg lcd [E c o n o m ic R e v ie w | , 1966, N o 2-3,

10

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1411 2 (42] [43j [44]

S t r u c t u r e o f W o r k e r s ' C o u n c i l s , i n Social S elf-M anagem ent Y u g o s l a v S o c i o l o g y A s s o c i a t i o n , Belgrade* 1 9 6 6 , B K a v c i e , i;O n P r o t e s t W o r k S u s p e n s i o n , " Gledil'ta. 1 9 6 6 , N o , 2. E K a r d e l j , " N e w C o n s t i t u t i o n oT t h e S F R Y [Socialist Federal R e p ub lic Y u g o s l a v i a ] , " i n D raft C o n s titu tio n o f th e S F R Y , K o m u n i s t , B e l g r a d e , 1 9 6 2 . Tomic,

itt

Yugoslavia,

oT

14 5 1 [46] [47] [48 | [49| 15 0 ] [51] [521 153 ] | 541 (55} [56| [57] [58] [591 {60J [61 ] [62| [63]

M P e c u j l i c . , C l a s s a n d P o l i t i c a l A v a n t - G a r d e i n t h e C o n t e m p o r a r y S t r u g g l e Tor S o c i a l i s m , 1 i n C urrent P roblem j o f R eo rg a n iza tio n and F u rth e r D e v e lo p m e n t o f th e L C Y | L e a g u e o T C o m m u n i s t s o T Y u g o s l a v i a ] , V S P N , B e l g r a d e , 1 9 6 7 D . C H o d g e s , A n t i - 1 n t e l l e c t u a l i s m i n a S o c i e t y o f E g g h e a d s , A m erica n Journal o f E co n o m ics and S o cio lo g y, 1 9 6 6 , N o 4 . V I L e n i n , O n e S t e p F o r w a r d , T w o S t e p s B a c k w a r d , ' * S e le c te d 11/2, Belgrade, 1 9 50 1, e d i t e d b y V S t a n o v c i c a n d A. S t o j a n o v i c , S e d m a sila, B e l g ra de , 1 9 6 6 . L j T a d i c a n d T I n d j i e , P arty o f the Proletariat, S e d m a s i l a , B e l g r a d e , 1 9 6 6 . E F i s c h e r , " I n t e l l e c t u a l s a n d A u t h o r i t y , Na$e tcm c, 1 9 6 6 , N o . 1 0 . D P e j o v i c , A g a in st th e C urrent, M l a d o s t , Z a g r e b , 1 9 6 5 . W M i l l s , K n o w led g e a n d P ow er, V K a r a d z i c , B e l g r a d e , 1 9 6 7 B ureaucracy a n d T echnocracy, B o o k I I , e d i t e d b y V, S t a n o v c i c a n d A S t o j a n o v i c , S e d m a s i la , Belgrade, 1966. M D u v e r g e r , I n tr o d u c tio n to P olitics , S a v r e m e n a a d n i i n i s t r a c i j a , B e l g r a d e , 1 9 6 6 . T H o b b e s , L eviathan. K u l t u r a , B e l g r a d e , 1 9 6 1 . A A d l e r , K n o w led g e o f M an, K o s r n o s , B e l g r a d e , 1 9 5 8 E F r o m m . F lig h t fr o m F reed o tn t N o l i t , B e l g r a d e , 1 9 6 4 B H o r v a t , E c o n o m ic T h eo ry o f a P lanned E c o n o m y t K u l t u r a , B e l g r a d e , 1 9 6 1 League o f C o m m u n is ts o f Yugoslavia in C o n d itio n s o f S e lfftla n a g e m c n t, c o l l e c t i o n o r texts edited by M Nikolic, K ultura , Belgrade, 1967 S S u v a r , B a s i c C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a n d C o n d i t i o n s o f t h e P r o c e s s o f S o c i a l i z a t i o n o f I a n d i n Y u g o s l a v i a / 1 S o c io lo g y o f the Village, 1 9 6 6 , N o , 1 1 - 1 2 , ' I K l a u z c r , " S u r p l u s L a b o r F o r c e i n Y u g o s l a v A g r i c u l t u r e / * S o c io lo g y o f the Village, 1 9 6 5 , N o . 7 - 8 . E. K a r d e l j , P ro b lem s o f S ocialist P o licy in the Village. K u l t u r a , B e l g r a d e , 1 9 5 9 . K. K i l i b a r d a , Self-A Ianagenient and the L eague o f C o m m u n ists. S o c i o l o g i c a l Institute, Belgrade, 1966. M D j u r i e , The S o c io lo g y o f M ax Weber, M a t i c a H r v u t s k a , Z a g r e b , 1 9 6 4

B ureaucracy and 7 technocracy m B o o k

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CHAPTER V

Conversion of the Party into a League of Political Activists

As Marxists, wc can expect th a t the establishm ent of w orker self-government should lead to considerable changes in productive relations, and th at these changes in turn should condition and pro duce equally m ajo r changes in th e political superstructure The question o f a thoroughgoing coordinatio n o f the political system was only a question o f time. That coordination, o f course, has been in progress for a long time, so that the preconditions have been created for a radical reform. F u rth e r, just as the in tro d u c tio n o f w orker self-government had been greeted with skepticism and w ith criticism th a t it was an im practical and u to pian undertaking, similar m anifestations of distrust were shown in co n ne ction w ith th e im pending political reform In the Social D em ocratic West it was said that w ork er self-government had failed wherever it had been tried, th at it destroys necessary labor discipline, and th a t it slows d ow n ec onom ic developm ent because workers would use up all their incom e instead o f p u ttin g som e aside as accumulation, O u t o f the C o m i n f o r m E a s t c a m e t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n th a t w orker self-government weakens the d ictatorship o f the proletariat and stands in co ntradiction to the integrated planning o f socialist econom y . 1 T od ay it is said th a t society has never been organized w ith o u t political parties, that the absence o f one or more strong, well-organized political parties could not bu t lead to chaos in social life, th a t the withering away of the state and of parties is a
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utopia and m eans m ortal danger to socialist construction. These criticisms m ay be m ore characteristic of the foreign scene than o u r social picture. More characteristic of' the latter m ay be a certain confusion, due to th e fact th a t there is no clearly elaborated th eo ry (e x cep t for some statem en ts o f principle) to serve as a basis. In any event, the need for an elaborated th eo ry o f the party a t to d a y s stage c a n n o t be d is p u te d ,18 POLITICAL PARTIES Rise o f Political Parties As is usual, a historical approach to o u r p ro blem will be useful, Political parties have not always existed, and it is reasonable to e x p e ct th at th ey will have therr end just as they have had their beginning T he fact is that we have becom e so accustom ed to the existence o f political parties in to d a y s world th at we do n o t even reflect th a t parties (apart from som e ru d im en tary beginnings) only appeared on the stage o f history during the last century, parallel to the rise o f a new social class, the bourgeoisie, which organized its parties in the struggle for p o w e r and fo r the defeat o f feudalism, A certain policy o f d em ocratization was also in keeping with the interests o f the bourgeoisie, and the right to vote was ex tend e d , although with various restrictions, such as literacy and pro p e rty qualifications U nder the pressure o f w orkers organizations, unions, and parties, which (with insignificant exceptions) appeared in European countries only in the second half of the last century, universal suffrage was gradually won. However, w om en won the right to vote only here and there before World War 1, and in one civilized cou n try in the hea rt o f E urope, w om en still d o n o t have th a t rig h t We are so accustom ed to the existence of universal suffrage, as we are to parties, that we tend to forget how relatively late they appeared and how slowly they developed. This relatively slow develo pm ent m ade possible the d em ocratization o f political life in the countries o f Western E u rop e w ith o u t m ajor social convulsions. Certain traditions, custom s, and habits grew up th at m a d e possible the resolution o f political disputes w ith o u t dangerous o r excessively brutal social conflicts. O u r lands are belated in this respect I t rs hardly over a ce n tury th a t serfdom was done away with (and n o t in all regions at th at), and nation al union was o btained less than fifty years ago. T here has n o t been tim e for a dem ocratic tradition to develop n o r (as Veljko Vlahovic would s a y 3 ) for citizens, by participating in political life, to develop the culture o f d em ocracy. T he general lack of ec onom ic developm ent

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and the lack o f edu cation am ong the broad masses have limited and restricted the process even m ore These facts m ust be taken in to account. F u rth erm o re , n o t only were political parties late in appearing, bu t in the interim they went throug h a definite process o f evolution T he first parties developed o u t o f election com m ittees, which were organized at each election for the p urpose o f supporting candidates and organizing the campaigns. Modern parties arose when these election co m m itte es associated on national scales, when they became p e rm a n e n t instead o f dissolving after the election, and when th ey were organically linked to parliam entary g ro ups [2: 90] , A roun d the election com m ittees were gathered the socially p ro m in e n t and wealthy citizens, who were able to finance election campaigns and whose social status gave them som e influence over local voters. All the conservative, liberal, and radical parties of E u ro p e have m aintained this traditional patrician basis dow n to the present. In the second half o f the last century, the labor m ovem ent in trod uced an im p o rta n t innovation in political organization by founding mass w orkers parties The traditional patrician parties, M, Duverger writes (calling them ca d re parties), corresponded to the era of conflict betw een the aristocracy and th e bourgeoisie: these two classes were few in n um bers and could be perfectly represented by th eir p ro m in e n t spokesm en. The limited scope o f the parties expressed the limited n ature of the political dom ain and gave its hallm ark to the dem ocracy from which the m ajority o f the people were practically excluded. T he mass parties, on the o th e r hand, corresponded to an expansion o f d em ocracy, which became available to virtually all th e p o p u latio n : it could exercise its rights only when it was n o t confined to vote once every four or five years, b u t could really and continually take part in the adm inistration o f the s ta te [2: .34]. T h e w orkers parties, whose m odel was the G erm an Social D em ocratic Party (in whose fo rm ation Marx and Engels to o k part), w orked to politically activate an ever-increasing n u m b e r o f the working class, and by political and theoretical w ork in th e sections educated the m em bers for political battles. To be effective, those parties had to be firmly organized, which was n o t the case with the traditional bourgeois parties Hence centralism. But at the same time those parties fought for socialism and had to foster d em ocracy, which was m anifested in broad exchange o f views and in election o f their leaders by secret vote. Hence dem ocracy, as was em phasized in the names o f the parties. Thus, before the term came into use, the w orkers parties applied dem ocratic centralism as their principle o f 189

organization. To q u o te M Duverger again [2: 3 4 ] , No o th e r ty pe o f p arty carried d em o cratizatio n as far as the socialist parties. But on the very n e x t page the same au th o r notes th a t internal dem ocracy is very limited, th a t the leaders are recruited m ainly by co-optation, that their election is actually only ratification, and th at th e professionals can m anipulate th e elections as th ey please. This o pin ion is interesting in that we can discern in it m an y o f o u r present problems, and th e q u estio n naturally arises: if th a t is the highest stage o f in trap a rty dem o cracy , w hat is th e situation with dem ocracy in o ther parties? C onditions o f illegal struggle by the working class led, at the beginning o f this ce n tu ry , to the fo rm atio n o f still a n o th er ty p e of labor party. This is Lenins cadre p a rty , later to be called com m u n ist parties A c o m m u n ist p arty is characterized by extrem e centralism, strict discipline, and directives proceeding from the top down. B oth types o f w o rk e rs p arty insisted on the struggle fo r w inning p o litica l p o w e r It is from this th a t their organizational forms o btain their functionality O ur problem , however, lies in the con stru ction o f the party a fter power has been w on and a fter the creation o f the preco n d itio n s for the co n stru c tio n o f socialism, and thus in the fo rm ation o f a p arty (w ith reference to political organization) that is to co n s tru c t th at socialism m ost directly. In o th e r words, we know w h a t w ork e rs parties look like and how they function when their function is the conquest o f p o w e r We likewise k n o w w hat parties look like t h a t have to retain power. B ut history has n o t y et showed us how parties should look th at set themselves the task o f doing away with p o w e r M ultiparty and One-Party Systems T he fund a m e n tal ju stificatio n o f m u ltip arty systems is the assertion th a t they insure political freedom . Political freedom is, naturally, som ething that is of value in and o f itself. B ut a m ore pragmatic explanation is also possible. A certain m inim um o f political freedom is necessary to insure the stability o f a social system. An autocratic regime is sitting on a volcano, and is therefore short-lived as a rule M ultiparty systems show their' vitality by natural selectio n, since they m ake it possible tem porarily to a tte n u a te high tensions A political p a rty is founded n o t to insure freedom s in general, bu t its freedoms, i.e., to attain pow er. In o rd e r to attain pow er, a party has to be well organized; it m ust have its professional apparatus, m aterial resources, etc. In this way a bureaucratic 190

s t r u c t u r e is formed, w ith oligarchical characteristics. This p h e n o m e n o n was observed h alf a ce n tu ry ago by R, Michels and form ulated in his well-known iron law o f oligarchy, Bccause o f the division o f lab o r in large organizations and the psychological need of m em bers o f large organizations fo r direction and leadership, Michels holds, th e individuals w ho are in positions of leadership are not, and in the n ature o f things ca n n o t be. controlled by those in lower positions The leaders are restricted only in th e sense in which sculptors are limited: by the n ature o f the materials they w ork with [3].. Speaking of' th e relatively dem ocratic L a b o u r P arty, R, McKenzie, the well-known British political scientist, concludes: the annua! Party conference has the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn. But this does n o t m ean th a t m em bers o f a mass organization in the British parliam entary system have the right to control or direct their parliam entary leaders [4: 5 8 3 ]. Oligarchy within th e parties leads to oligopoly in the political life o f th e co u n try as a whole. In the m ost stable Western dem ocracies the n u m b e r o f parties has been reduced to two, which m o no polize th e entire political life o f the country. Despite the existence o f political freedom s, it is practically impossible to organize a new party and alm ost impossible for in dep ende n ts to c o m p ete successfully in elections, and representatives elected by a given party risk their political careers if they show any tendency to be independent. The party oligarchies then tie up with o th e r oligarchies in society, and the political rights o f th e individual citizen do n o t in fact give him any influence on the functioning o f the m achin ery o f the m o d e rn state. In the Western countries this effect is co m p o u n d e d by the effect o f private capital. The in fo rm atio n m edia are available to all, in principle, and free from governm ent con tro l, b u t are n o t free from the co ntro l o f m on ey. But the info rm atio n m edia clearly form opinion in the m od ern state An instructive instance of the inability o f the citizen to resist the m o dern Leviathan, even when it is on the brink o f disaster, is the failure o f all the actions o f progressive intellectuals in the United States to force (o r convince?!) the governm ent to stop the war in Vietnam . As for the one-party system, it can be said in general th a t it has all the negative characteristics o f m u ltip arty systems w ith o u t their positive characteristics. T em porarily, however, the one-party system can be the m ost effective m e th o d for bringing a b o u t the transition from capitalism to socialism. T o be sure, socialism can also be co n stru c te d w ith a m u ltip arty system, bu t in th at case conservative resistance comes 191

in to play Socialism implies the withering away o f the state, the diffusion o f power, the destru c tio n o f bureaucratic structures, and direct d em o cia cy . The existence o f m any parties implies the existence o f party m achinery, the struggle fo r power, and indirect dem ocracy, Accordingly, the m u ltip arty system , which served as an in s tm m e n t in accelerating the d evelopm en t o f capitalism, can prove to be a stum bling block in the constru c tio n o f socialism. It can, b u t need not. In o u r concrete historical situation, there are certain facts that are relevant, over and above these general considerations. Let us suppose th a t a course has been set tow ard the fo rm a tio n o f a plurality o f parties Then, judging from the events o f th e last few years, the single com m u n ist m ovem en t w ould p rob ab ly split into a conservative and a progressive wing. F u rth e r, in view o f the n u m bers o f the peasantry and the prior traditions o f peasant parties, a peasant p arty w ould in all likelihood also appear. That p arty w ould in the n atu re o f things be conservative. F u rth e r, the long-standing and substantial differences in develo pm ent o f the various regions w ould be a natural basis fo r the fo rm atio n o f political parties with differing interests A fte r all, Yugoslavia is a co u n try with m any nationalities, in which nation al antagonism s have n o t yet subsided, and w ith considerable nation al cultural differences,4 All these could be bases for party form a tio n . A nd if two o r m ore bases coincided, the parties could by the n a tu re of things develop into harshly hostile groupings Thus, for instance, peasants are m ost n u m ero u s in the econom ically undeveloped republics, and the m ost developed republics con tain a m in ority o f the populatio n. U n de r these co ndition s a m u ltiparty system w ould in all probability arouse serious nationalistic conflicts, which i n c i d e n t a l l y were ap parent before the war. Socialism and econom ic develop m en t w ould fade in to the background, the international prestige o f Yugoslavia w ould sink to the prewar Balkan level, and instead o f creating dem o cratizatio n we would have a fierce struggle for power. F o r these reasons a m u ltip arty system is obviously n o t tlie desirable alternative,. Neither is a one-party system. What is left is a no n p arty system. This w ould have to retain the positive aspects o f the m u ltip arty system and avoid the negative aspects How can this be clone? 19 THE R E V O L U T IO N A R Y PARTY AND THE GENESIS OF B U R EA U C R A TIC M EN TA L ITY Before we try to answer the question that has ju s t been raised,

192

we m ust analyze some processes within the party after it has won p o w e r We m ust explain h ow the Brioni Plenum of the Central C o m m ittee o f the League o f C om m u nists in 1966 was arrived at, and w hat essential problem s have to be solved by the projected reform o f the p arty organization. T he R evolutionary Party and the Party in Power To m eet its objectives, a political organization has to change w ith the social co ndition s u n d e r which it operates. This applies particularly in a society in which the changes have been as intensive as in o u r society. It is almost universally agreed today that a gap had arisen betw een the proclaimed and the actual role of the League o f C om m unists, that the League, as a political organization, was n o t adequate to the d em an ds of the tim e.3 A s a result, party forums decided to reorganize the League, In o id e r for the reorganization to succeed, it was necessary to establish: (a) how the League of C om m u nists should act, w hat social functions it should perfo rm ; and (b) h o w and why the present situation, which was evaluated as unsatisfactory, had been arrived at The first task relates to defining the socially requisite o p eration , with which we shall deal in the next c h a p te r T he second relates to discovering the internal processes o u t o f which the recognized p h e n o m e n a sprang. In fact, this is the p reco nd ition to successful solution o f the first problem . In the analysis that follows, 1 shall start from the h y po th esis th a t develop m ent o f the bureaucratic m entality is the basic source o f the operational inefficiency, ideological in adequacy, and a certain estrangem ent o f the LCY as a political organization from the fundam ental cu rrents of our actuality, always keeping in m in d th a t it was the LCY th a t initiated and to a great e x te n t organized those currents. By m en tality I m ean conceptions, beliefs, behavior. Mentality is only in part a fu nction o f organization; to a greater e x te n t it is determ ined by th e general social situation. C onsequently, a narrowly conceived reorganization o f the LCY (and we have already had reorganizations) would n o t be m uch help. If the hypothesis set u p is correct, then o u r analysis leads to finding the genesis of the bu reaucratic m entality . Recognition o f the genesis should m ake it possible to overcom e that m entality, and that, it seems to me, is the fun d a m e n tal task o f the LCY reorganization. T h e prewar co m m u nist party in Yugoslavia, as in m ost o th e r countries, had to operate in deep illegality. Those co n dition s o f struggle called for a very specific organization, whose basic characteristics are: strict ce ntralization, firm discipline, com plete

unity o f action and ideology, and a m o no lithic quality. Positions o f leadership entailed n o t advantages b u t responsibilities and great personal risks; hence, the hierarchy that resulted from the centralization did n o t lead to b u re a u c ra tiz a tio n ,6 The discipline was the p reco ndition for survival and so was n o t a barracks discipline b u t the discipline o f conscious and entire personalities; it was discipline and n o t obedience. Experience show ed that factions destroyed the tissue o f the p arty like cancer; hence, com pletely m onolithic quality was a preco n d itio n o f success The objectives were relatively clearly defined, the enem y was know n, the alternatives were evident. Therefore, unity in ideology and action was com patible w ith d em ocracy , which was essentially present, if n o t always formally. Differences o f opinion and individual preferences paled into insignificance in com parison with the m agnitude of the goal, o n which there was com plete agreem ent In this way, unity was neith er imposed n or form al; it arose from the existential conditio ns o f the political organization o f th a t time. That organization either was united and attain ed the desired goals, o r it was n o t united and was hopelessly lost The moral qualities o f the m em bers of the organization courage, frankness, principle, comradeliness were likewise existentially cond itioned, The organizational principles o f the c o m m u n ist party and the conditions of its struggle n u rtu re d heroes. This picture o f the C o m m u n ist Party o f Yugoslavia may seem som ew hat idealized; nonetheless, I imagine it is accurate; after all, the facts involved are historically verifiable But in tins case it is well k n o w n th a t t o d a y s League o f C om m u n ists differs from its predecessor in m any respects 7 And here the ethical question is o ften asked: What has becom e o f the heroes of those days? How is i t t h a t o u r present political organization d oes n o t train personalities with the same moral qualities? Why do C om m un ists unanim ously a d o p t conclusions they are no t in agreem ent with and by which they do n o t live? Why do C o m m u n ists not oppose co n c ep tio n s th a t th ey k n o w to be bad, even if that would interfere a little with their- advancem ent? What has happened to o u r com radeship, w h en we do n o t react to injustices th at arc evident? Once we were ready to do battle fo r o u r convictions, and today we keep our convictions carefully to ourselves Where have principle and courage gone t o ? 8 T he answers given to these questions stress that heroes are m ade in war, n o t in peace; th at the generation th a t m ade the revolution is now m u ch older and hence m ore cautious, m ore conservative; th a t people ca n n o t be expected to be ascetics, and th at it is norm al for people to w ant to enjoy the fruits o f their struggles, to seek the reward for their services. 194

F u r t h e r , a p a r t y i n p o w e r a t t r a c t s c a r e e r i s t s, a n d co m m od ity-m o ney relations and f'etishization o f the standard o f living underm ine m orality Probably all these answers have sonic part o f th e truth, But it would be defeatism to take such answers as exp la n a tio n s, because they d o n o t indicate how the existing situation can be overcome. R oad to B ureaucratization All p h e n o m e n a have their history of developm ent, including those we are concerned w ith here. One event was m ost im p o rta n t in this respect: the C om in fo rm attac k in 1948 We have pointed o u t how this event accelerated the m a tu ra tio n o f the social and political awareness o f Yugoslav C om m unists, and that a process o f fundam ental im p o rtan ce was soon initiated: the process o f decentralization and self-government B ut 1948 also initiated a parallel process, which has n o t yet undergone analysis and which (unlike the progressive n ature o f the first process on the general ec onom ic and social plane) represents a regress 0 1 1 the moral plane. In short, th a t year the police entered the party for the first time, and C o m m u n ists began to d o u b t C om m unists. This event alone shows th a t the party was no t ideologically prepared for all the com plexities o f peacetim e co n stru c tio n from a position o f power Courage and trust in au th o rity led a certain n u m b e r astray, and the m onolithic ideology o f discipline p u t the m ajority o f the others in a psychologically co ntra d icto ry situation, in which one p arty , at th a t time the m in o rity , stood in opposition to all the o th e r parties, at th a t time the m ajority. In time these situations were overcom e, b u t the party organization has n o t yet recovered from the consequences o f th e ethical shock, I 11 this respect, 1948 represents a m arked breach of c o n tin u ity between the earlier and the later parties, The collectives were transform ed into aggregates o f private individuals, frankness and openness gave way to reserve a n d c a l c u l a t i o n , egoistic o p portu nism to o k the place o f com radeship, principle was replaced by co n fo rm ity , courage by careerism,,9 And the police, once inside the p arty , never left on its ow n initiative F.ven m ore, there was 1 1 0 serious opposition to this practice, G o v e rn m en t and party agencies were quite pleased to obtain reliable in fo rm atio n ab o u t everyone and everything w i t h o u t e f f o r t o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and awareness o f the consequences o f such o pp o rtu n ism was n o t sufficiently developed. C om m u nists became, as it were, collaborationists, n o t against the foreign enemy and internal diversionists, which is a m a tte r o f patriotism, but in the m a tte r ofXjnforming on their own comrades. 195

A l o n g w i t h th e official party organization, which to ail appeaiances functioned as before, an unofficial police organization was form ed; it usurped the right to evaluate, w ith o u t appeal, the patriotism and political reliability o f every citizen, including C om munists. N aturally, police c o n tro l k ep t expanding until it succeeded in taking full cover to use its technical term - and after it was found th a t listening devices had been placed w ith the most p ro m in e n t persons in our public life, this malignant tu m o r on the body o f society was surgically removed at the Brioni Plenum,, A lthough the police violation o f party ethics explains m any d eform atio ns in o u r social and political life, it does n o t explain everything.. Moreover, it calls for an explanation in itself. The C om inform attac k was th e occasion, and p robably hastened the process. B ut other countries had no such occasion, yet similar p r o c e s s e s began to develop theie, and with m uch graver consequences. T h en w ha t is the m atter? The centralized and hierarchical organization o f com m u nist p a r t i e s is a potentially bureaucratic structure. U nder the conditions of illegal struggle and the w ar o f national liberation, that organization was functional and, for reasons we have given, did n o t behave bureaucratically. B ut when the party had com e to power, the possibility o f realizing those potentialities arose In the f i r s t p l a c e , t h e f i r s t years o f co n stru c tio n witnessed a centralization in which the party and governm ent hierarchies m e rg e d ,30 F u rth er, the new social system required th a t the leading positions in the state and the e c o n o m y be filled by politically reliable people that is, the leading cadres were chosen by political and n o t by professional criteria. Discipline was needed for the appa ratu s to fu n c tio n p ro perly. However, it was no longer revolutionary discipline, o f course, but bureaucratic discipline in o th e r words, obedience. 11 In radical social changes, such as the revolutionary replacem ent o f one social system by another, i t is crucially im p o rta n t to insure a certain o rd er in the d ev elo pm ent of the life o f society. The fundam ental mechanisms fo r m aintaining social o rd e r traditions, institutions, custom s, m entality are d ysfunctional (insofar as they arise out o f the old system) or n o nexistent (insofar as the new system goes). The only available tem p o ra ry substitu te is co n fo rm ity to the decisions of the revolutionary governing bodies Ttiis is, incidentally, a n o th e r aspect of the familiar thesis o f the necessity o f the dictatorship of the proletariat C o n fo rm ity then becomes very desirable politically; political criteria generally d om in ate social values At the same time, c o n fo rm ity as a quid pro 196

quo mechanism m ay easily change from being a tem porary means (and historically has o fte n done so in fact) to being a p e rm a n e n t aim, so that the dictatorship o f the proletariat turns into dictatorship over the proletariat and revolutionary spirit tu rns into opportunism . In the course o f these processes, the meaning o f political criteria likewise goes through phases o f developm ent. A t the ou tset, the political criterion m eans choosing cadres who are dedicated to the revolution, th a t is, choosing people on w hom higher agencies can rely and w h o are o bed ien t, so th at the apparatus can c o u n t on them . It is im p o rta n t to n o te that a centralized cadre policy generally, and especially so in politics, lowers the quality o f cadres on every level. N o t the best are chosen, b u t m ed io crities.12 T he leader can have full confidence only in som eone w ho is less c o m p e te n t than h im s e lf.13 Naturally, this sort of cadre policy defends itself by referring to the req uirem en ts o f state secu rity , 14 In the course o f time new cadres appear, w ho form a system and w h o objectively m eet n o t only political but also professional criteria; they are thus co m p e tito rs of the earlier leading cadres,. T h e latter, in order to m aintain themselves, e n te r into various clique arrangem ents and m a k e c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h the leaderships o f sociopolitical organizations. 15 Clique politics produces lack o f principle and inevitably leads to serious social excesses 16 Finally, in o rd e r to insure even fu rth e r the obedience o f the low er strata, in o rd e r th a t the hierarchical apparatus m ay be able to functio n w ith o u t any hindrance, its au th o rity has to be fortified, The leading cadres are m ade p ro m in e n t, pu t on pedestals, described in superlatives; their figures gradually take on unreal dimensions. Giving the nam es o f individual functionaries to cooperatives, streets, and cities is only one o f the m ore violent m anifestations o f this process (w hich, incidentally, was n oted som e years ago and corrective measures were taken). F o r years, states K. Crvenkovski, individuals am ong us raised themselves to the heights ju st by means o f this irrational au th o rity . In o th e r words, pow er on o n e side and fear on the o t h e r A nd i f we c a n y the analysis further, it m eans re inforcem ent o f the bureaucratic m en tality, a characteristic o f the psychology o f the rank and file o f the League o f C o m m u n ists [10: 1.32], T he speeches o f people from the Central C o m m ittee leadership are fetishized, as if we were the only people in the whole society who could t h i n k (V Vlahovic [24: 729] There are tw o measures, two criteria, in the League o f C om m unists: on e for those below and one for those on top (Tito [24: 1 3 3 ]) 197

In con trast to the war and the illegal struggle, peacetim e life does n o t present only two clearly differentiated alternatives with e q u a lly clear consequences. T h e alternatives are num erou s, diversified, nuanced, and the consequences d o not have evident, o r at least n o t obvious, ethical content. With the n u m b e r o f alternatives and the num ber o f conflict situations, the individual now plays a larger n u m b e r of differen t parts in society, which are no t necessarily in h arm on y with one a n o th e r [6: 15-16]. In war, a m an is either a p atrio t or a traitor, i.e., he is on one o f two clearly dem arcated sides. In peace, im perceptible degrees o f transition are possible, from a high degree o f moral integrity to am orality and i m m o r a l i t y , and people have tim e to m ake psychological ad a ptatio ns and to retain an h onorable aspect. F u rth e r, w ar is an exceptional, transitory co ndition ; peace lasts all o n e s life, A person is n o t inclined to be always risking his future; he will usually think: If I fall o u t o f f avor w ith the higher-ups, if I get the re p u ta tio n o f an unreliable m an, if they p u t som ething dow n ab o u t me som ew here in some record, 1 can ruin my career. And since there are so m an y good things in life, w hy should a m an be willfully careless? But all these are only external circumstances, which are no t decisive. What is crucial for the behavior o f the individual are social values. In this respcct the bureaucratic system spontaneously presents o bedience as the basic virtue, and attacks on the hierarchy as the m o st serious sin .17 O nce this has entered into the consciousness o f people, failure to conform to the system o f values seems like D on Quixotism . A m an goes to the barricades because he has his friends s u p p o rt there, social acceptance, A man does no t criticize his superior, does n o t com e o u t in public with ideas that are n o t official, does n o t oppose decisions that he does not in te n d to carry out, is n o m ore conscientious than is absolutely necessary, or is no ncon scientious to the e x te n t th a t is useful to him, does n o t react to falsehood, does n o t com bat i n ju s tic e ,18 and does n o t feel it necessary to d o b attle for his beliefs, because if he did, he would n o t get public supp ort, would be regarded as an eccentric and hard to get along with, and o ften as an undesirable elem ent. Insofar as C o m m unists are concerned, they w ould be regarded as a n tip arty elements. B ureaucratic systems have their own unyielding logic; goodwill is o f no avail. The party organized the state, and th e state governm entalized the p a r ty , E. Redgic co m m en ted in an article [13: 190] In this situation the field o f action was broadened for the m ost conservative forces in the p arty and society (V Vlahovic! [24: 730]

198

Social S tructu re o f LCY To get a b e tte r idea o f the above-m entioned processes o f the fo rm ation o f the bureaucratic m en tality, it would be necessary to m ake a closer inquiry into the strata th a t are bearers o f th a t m entality. In o th e r w ords, inquiry w ould have to be m ade into the social structure o f the m em bership o f the LCY. U nfo rtu n ately , party statistics are very d e f ic ie n t,19 and previous investigations in this field have simply n o t been com pleted (o r at least have not been available to the scientific c o m m u n ity ), so that o u r analysis will be fragmentary. A t the beginning o f 1967 the League o f C o m m unists num bered over a million th at is, it c o n stitu te d one-eleventh o f the adult po p u latio n of the co u n try . This is an en orm o us potential force. The n u m b e r o f m em bers rose m ost rapidly in the period after the w a r to 1952 (from 2 5 8 ,0 0 0 in 1946 to 7 7 3 .0 0 0 in 1952) and then rose rapidly again in the 1956-1960 period (fro m 6 4 9 ,0 0 0 to 1,006,000) - in th e period, th a t is, o f th e second five-year plan, w hen the most rapid p ostw ar rate o f econom ic grow th had been attain ed , with relatively greatest social, political, and econom ic s t a b i l i t y . T h e 1952-1956 period saw th e re fo rm a tio n o f a g r i c u l t u r a l cooperatives, the a b a n d o n m e n t o f perspective planning, and the conversion o f the C om m u nist Party o f Yugoslavia in to the League o f Yugoslav C om m unists; the n um ber o f m em bers d rop ped from 7 7 3 ,0 0 0 to 649,000. F ro m 1961 on, a period with well-known eco nom ic and political problems, the n u m b e r of m em bers stagnated. T h e following data sum up the d evelo p m e n t o f the p a rty in the postrev olu tion ary era: Social C om p osition o f League o f Com m unists 1946 1952
Thousands

1966
%

Thousands %

Thousands

Workers Peasants O th er jo b s (employees) S tudents, military, pensioners, others Total

71 130 27

27.6 50.4 10.3

249 331 146

32.2 42.8 18 9

355 77 408

3.3.9 7.4 39.1

.30

11.7

47 773

6.1 100 0

206 1,046

19.6 100.0

258 100 0 199

If career military m en and a part of the pensioners are included in the em p loy ee s category, then a t the beginning o f 1967 about h a lf o f all m em beis were em ployees It would follow from this th a t the League o f C o m m un ists was prim arily an em p lo y ee s la th e r than a w ork e rs organization. A nd since, because o f the conditions of th e social situation, the m e n tality o f the em ployee is in general closer to the bureaucratic m en tality than to that o f the worker, the hypo thesis m ight be stated th a t the bureaucratic process in th e LCY. in the state, and in society co rresp ond ed to a changc in the social s tru c tu re o f the LCY, in the direction o f e m p l o y e e d o m in atio n , wliich in turn w ould favor fu rth e r bureaucratization Because o f the total absence o f empirical studies, we cannot definitively accept o r reject tliis hypothesis. We can, however, look i n to it a little further. To this end we shall try to squeeze a m a x im u m of in fo rm atio n o u t o f the published statistical data. We can apply the following seven criteria to test the correctness o f the impression as to the em ployee character o f the LCY: (1) the absolute an d relative n u m b e r o f em ployees; (2) the relative increase in the n u m b e r o f em ployees; (3) the social stru ctu re o f the m em bership in th e m ost developed republic as an indication of th e inherent tendencies o f fu tu re d evelo pm ent in the c o u n try as a w hole; (4) the percentage o f LCY m em bers in individual categories o f those em ployed; (5) the acceptance and exclusion of m em bers; (6) the a b a n d o n m e n t o f the LCY; and (7) the social stru ctu re of the party leadership, A fte r that, we m u st inquire in to the stru ctu re of the em ployees themselves,. Finally, the p easant problem calls for special consideration. The first criterion has already been considered.. As for the second, it will be seen from the table th a t in the course o f the two decades after the revolution, the n u m b e r o f workers in the LCY increased by a factor o f 5, while the n u m b e r o f em ployees increased by a facto r o f 15, o r three times as fa st T h e entire period is no t hom og en eo u s in this respect; tw o periods m u st be distinguished: the CPY up to 1952 and the LCY from 1953 to 1966 It should also be k e p t in m ind that, from 1953 on, a different m eth o d o f social classification was u s e d ,20 In the first period the n u m b e r o f w orkers rose b y 3.5 times an d the n u m b e r o f em ployees by 5 4 times, or 1.5 times faster; in the second period the n u m b e r o f em ployees rose only 1 1 times f a s te r .21 The rapid increase in em ployees as co m pared t o w orkers in the first po strevolutionary period is logical and to be ex pe cted : it was the time o f setting up the new app a ratus of p ow e r and the new adm inistration. However, a similar tend enc y, although weaker, occurred later as well. A t the same time it should be n o ted t h a t for 200

a long time the em ployee position was strengthened on a c c o u n t o f the absolute and relative decrease in the n u m b e r of peasants along with a gradual re in fo rce m e n t of th e w orkers position. F ro m 1961 on, however, when it reached a m ax im u m o f 37%, the p ro p o rtio n o f workers has steadily decreased. If we may take it that Slovenia, which today is ap pro xim ately twice as developed as the average o f Yugoslavia, represents the entire c o u n try in the near futu re, th en the evolution oi the social stru ctu re o f the m em bership o f the League o f C om m unists of Slovenia m ay give certain indications as to future changes in the social structure of the LCY, if there are no essential changes in the social situation. In 1946, workers c o n stitu te d 43% o f all m em bers o f the CP o f Slovenia, and b y 1948 the percentage re ad ied its m axim um , 57%, Thereafter the p ro p o rtio n ol workers d ropped steadily, and was 33% in 1966. The p ro p o rtio n o f em ployees (w ith o u t career military and pensioners), however, increased from 8%- in 1946 to 48% at the end o f the period. D ifferent social strata and different jo b categories expand (o r c o n t r a c t ) a t d i f f e r e n t rates in the course o f econom ic developm ent. This m ak es it impossible to directly com pare the grow th of individual social categories o f m em bers, since th a t increase would have t o be related to the changes in the num ber em ployed. In 1966, the following p ro portio ns o f all em ployed were m em bers o f the League o f C om m u nists o f Yugoslavia: Employees with college education Em ployees with university education Em ployees with secondary education Em ployees with p rim ary education Highly skilled workers Skilled workers Semiskilled workers Unskilled workers Average 58,7%, 43 8% 39.3% 37,0% 34.8% 20,6% 12 0% 5.0% 21 .5%

W hat is m ost striking a b o u t these figures (and this is p robably the m o s t precise ind ication t h a t all the published statistics can give us) .is that all categories o i e m p lo y ees are above the average and all categories of workers are below the average, th a t even a m o n g em ployees w ith prim ary education there are m o r e m e m b ers o f th e L C Y t h a n a m o n g highly s k ille d workers.. Because o f the avant-garde role o f the LCY in society, it would be natural to e x p e ct th at the level o f its m e m b e rs qualification w ould be 201

considerably above the social average.. F or this reason, and because of' the rise in the general educatio nal level of the po pu latio n, a rise may be expected in the p ro p o rtio n o f highly skilled categories. In fact, in the last eight years, fo r which there are data, the p ro p o rtio n o f highly skilled w orkers in the group o f w o rker m em bers of th e LCY doubled, the p ro p o rtio n o f skilled workers was unchanged, and the p ro p o rtio n o f semiskilled and unskilled workers decreased. In the em ployees group, only the p ro p o rtio n of those with prim ary edu catio n decreased, while all the o th er categories rose, But em ployees as a group expanded faster than workers as a group, A nd y e t it might have been expected th a t by this year th e League would have relatively m ore highly skilled workers than em ployees w ith prim ary education. But as m atters stand up to the present, it would seem we could conclude th at there is m ore affinity for the party am o n g ro u tin e em plo yees th an am ong workers, and th a t th e party show ed more a f f in ity 22 for ro u tin e em ployees than it did for workers. As to why exactly em ployees with college (not, e.g., university) educatio n were definitely at the head o f the list this raises an interesting q u estio n, which calls fo r fu rth e r investigation. As regards the admission and exclusion of m em b ers during the last decade, fo r which com parable figures have been published, the following flu ctuation s are found: th e p ro p o rtio n o f workers am ong new m em bers fell; am o n g those excluded, it r o s e ; 23 the p ro p o rtio n o f em ployees am on g new admissions rose sharply (from I 8.9% in 1958 to 29,3% in 1965); am o n g expulsions it was stationary (19% to 20%) The fluctuations o f admissions and exclusions are doubly inverse: within each group, and for one group as com pared to the other. F u rth er, from the fact that w orkers arc a d m itte d in a b o u t the same percentage as employees, b u t are expelled a t two and a half times the rate, the conclusion may be drawn that workers are less linked t o t o d a y s LCY than em ployees, th at from the point o f view o f party practice as it exists th e y are an unstable clem ent. Such a conclusion is s u p p o rted by th e data on volu n tary resignations from the organization. In 1966, 7 ,6 4 0 m em bers resigned from the LCY; 53 6% (in 1965, 61.4%) were workers. We m ust now consider the social s tru c tu re of tjie party leadership. In 196,3 workers and peasants m ade u p 20% o f the m e m b e r s h i p o f c o m m u n a l com m ittees, and 13% of the m em bership o f district co m m ittees, o f the LCY [24: 6 9 3 ] . No data have been published fo r the higher echelons, but evidently the percentage m ust be still lower. We get the following picture. Workers form a m inority in the 202

League o f Com m unists and, in particular, a small m inority in the leadership o f the League Em ployees d om in ate the organization, and especially its leadership Ail th e know n tendencies of d evelopm ent po in t to contin uan ce o f this state o f affairs. If we add to this the fact th a t relations in the League were hierarchical and sem im ilitary (M Todorovid), it becomes clear how dangerous the pressures tow ard bureaucratization were in the League of C om m unists o f Yugoslavia. A fter the workers an d em ployees, the peasants also have to be look ed into It is well know n that the peasants p u t their backs into tire war o f national liberation and into the revolution. T h a t made it natural for peasants to co n stitu te half o f all party m embers im m ediately after the war If we w anted to give labels to the changes in the social stru c tu re o f tire party, we could say th at this was the peasant phase, while the period a fte r 1952 was the em ployee phase, As th e p ro p o rtio n o f the peasantry in the p op u latio n decreases, and the m o re rapidly the ec on om y develops, it should be expected th a t the p ro p o rtio n o f peasants in the party m em bership should dim inish. What is characteristic o f this evolution is n o t th a t there was a percent decrease, but th at there was a severe absolute elect ease in the n u m b e r of peasant Communists. In the first years a fte r the war, the nu m b er o f peasants in the p arty rose as a result o f collectivization, which t h o s e a c t i v i s t s w e r e s u p p o s e d t o advance.. When the collectivization policy turned o u t to be faulty, the cooperatives were reform ed in 1952 24In con nectio n with this, during the same year, 39,500 peasants were expelled from the party (as against 25 ,400 and 19,600 in the previous tw o years), and only 8,200 peasants were a d m itte d (as against 5 4 ,0 0 0 and 6 3 ,4 0 0 in the previous two years) Thus, the n u m b e r of peasants (except for a small increase in 1 95 7-1 959 ) fell steadily, and in 1966 was h a lf o f w h a t it was at th e beginning o f the postrevolutionary era. In com parison to the total n u m b e r of active persons, peasants are represented irr the LCY o ne-half as well as unskilled workers and one-fifteenth as well as em ployees with primary education, Obviously, w hat was involved was a sectarian a ttitu d e toward the peasants, arising o u t of dogm atic ideas as to the social being o f the peasant. 25 These co ncep tions can n o t imagine the individual peasant as a socialist builder. T he only thing they can think o f as socialist is groups o f producers included in a hierarchical complex covering the en tire state and subject to direct adm inistration and com m and . A ny th in g th a t was n o t u n d e r such social, that is, b u r e a u c r a t i c , c o n t r o l w a s n o n s o c i a l i s t And so, when adm inistratively formed collectivization was abando ned , it was 203

held th at the socialist transform ation o f the village had been put o f f fo r some fu tu re date, and the individual peasant was left by and large to himself. By 1966 the n u m b e r of peasants in village party organizations fell to a third of the m em bership. The party p o in ts th a t were left in the villages were the g overnm ent agcncies and adm inistrations o f general agricultural cooperatives, which are given a com m ercial monopoly.. T h e political task o f this apparatus o f functionaries consisted in controlling undep end able individuals, and in som e places that task was u n d ersto o d to include restriction o f the ec onom ic activity o f the peasant. Once again we n o te the opposition o f the fu nction ary to th e producers, and this time in a very explicit form . Bureaucratic tendencies in the party now bccarne even m o re pow erful We know w hat political and ec onom ic problem s were caused by th a t policy tow ard the village and the p e a s a n t s 26 A n o th e r factor to be considered is the age structure. As things stand, the p arty is old, especially its leadership. The n u m b e r o f its member less than 25 years old fell from 40% in 1950 to 12% in s 1966 Over th e same years, the n u m b e r o f m em bers over 40 rose from 10% to 30%. In sixteen years, we see, the tw enties and the forties have changed places Aging is a natural process, of' course, and ca n n o t be avoided, b u t it has m ajor negative consequences. Older people are m ore conservative, and since then" developm ent to o k place at a time w hen there was more state con trol and less self-government, they ex hib it a tendency to retain th e stru ctu re o f state control. This is the origin o f the fact th a t the aging o f the party also furthers the growth o f bureaucratic tendencies. O u r analysis now n ee d s to be made m ore precise in one im p o rtan t aspect, namely, the category th at up to now we have provisionally called em ployees. In a capitalist or state-capitalist (Stalinist) system, em ployees are in the main an apparatus o f p o w e r and governm ent Accordingly, we w ould n o t be m aking a m ajor analytical error, m ost likely, if we co ntrasted th em as a group to the workers and peasants In a society that is developing self-government, the picture changes: im p o rta n t differences arise w ithin the e m p lo y e e group More and m ore em ployees begin to break away from their form e r m aster (the private o w n e r or the state) and begin to develop social loyalty, which we studied thoro ug hly above, loyalty to the o t h e r group s with which, by the objective functioning o f the self-governing oiganization o f work, they are in the same or a similar existential situation And it is ju st in this sense that it can be said th at the institutio n o f self-governm ent has essentially d im in ish ed bureaucratic pressures in the League a n d made it possible, despite all opposition, to go 204

ahead with the leorganization o f the L C Y In this c o n te x t it would seem that wc could invert the above-quoted dictum of RedXic to read: the party established s e ^ g o v e rn m e n t, and self-government provided for the renaissance o f the party. Carrying o ur analysis further, we shall group the m em bers of the LCY in to quasiprofessional groups (see Section 17), i.e., look into the horizontal social stru ctu re o f the m em bership. A d eterm in ation o f the horizontal stru cture of the active population and p arty m em bership in 1961 (th ere are no party statistics for 1953, so that no d eterm in a tion is possible) yields the following picture. Active Popu latio n and M embership o f the LCY by Quasiprofessional G roups, 1961 Active po pulatio n (thousands) Peasants O ther m arket workers N o n m a rk e t workers State apparatus Totals
N a te :

% m em bers, ref, to LCY members active popu lation (%) 99 560 105 155 9)9 i 19.5 25.8 60.4 11 5

4,408 2.887 408 257 7,96 0

M a rk e t w o rk e rs inclu de w o rk e rs and em p lo yees in m aterial activities, anti in co m m u n al and fin a n cial activitie s N o n m a r k e t " w o rkers in clu d e persons engaged in c u ltu ra l- e d u c a tio n a l and p u b lic health activitie s, and in agencies ol' so cio p o litica l o rganizations In stale ad m in istratio n , la w , and career m ilita ry ap paratus are inclu ded g overnm ent

Party m em bership is by far m ost freq uen t in th e state app aratus, all b u t n o n ex isten t am ong peasants, with m ark et and n o n m ark e t workers som ew here in between. These facts reflect the crucial trend o f the party to control the agencics o f power. As has been noted, such a trend is natural in the period im mediately following the revolution, when the construction o f the new social o rd e r has to be insured against all eventualities, In the course o f tim e, however, th at trend begins to give a very specific, bureaucratic im print to the entire party organization, and the hierarchical m entality o f the agencies o f pow er (with cadres whose qualifications are considerably above the average) begins to impose itself on the p a rty organization with a force o u t o f all p ro portion to the physical p ro p o rtio n o f the em ployees o f the state adm inistration in the total activity o f the population. In this c o n te x t it would be very im p o rtan t to establish the ex ten t to which the party organization has p en etrated the various strata of s o c ie ty . There are no precise data, but on tine basis o f the 205

s t a t i s t i c s given above, it would seem possible to give an ap p ro xim ate reconstruction, Giving the strata from highest to lowest, th en th e m em bership o f the various strata o f society in the LCY is: Leadership cadres (over) 60% Intellectual workers (a p p ro x ) 50% R ou tine em ployees (approx..) 40% Highly skilled and skilled workers (approx.) 25% Semiskilled and unskilled workers (appro x ) 7% Peasants (approx. ) 2% This means, as might be expected, th a t the highest party cadres are recruited from th e highest social strata. This is characteristic of a party in power. By com prising th e higher social strata to a m uch greater e x te n t than th e lower, a party in p o w e r insures its power, as well as its political control. B ut thereby it also operates in the direction o f conserving stratification, conserving the state; it c o n tributes to the politicalization and bureaucratization o f its own m em bership and o f society as a whole,. T o th e e x te n t th a t these p r o c e s s e s develop, th e party changes from an avant-garde organization to an elitist one. Tliis m akes it crucially im p o rta n t th a t the LCY should contain, in addition to employees, a sufficient n u m b e r o f workers and peasants, The foregoing ob serv atio ns would have t o be am ended by a dynam ic analysis, i e , by ascertaining the tendencies toward changes in the horizontal and vertical structure. Because o f the absence o f party statistics, it is n o t possible to go prior to 1958, even fo r the horizontal structure. S tru ctu re and M embership o f LCY by Quasiprofessional Groups, 1958 and 1966 1958 1966 (thousands) Peasants O ther m arket workers N o n m a rk e t w orkers S tate ap paratu s Totals 122 401 67 148 7.38 77 539 129 154 899 Increase (-h) Decrease()

(% )
-.3 7 -|-35 +93 + 4 +22

In the last eight years there has been a drastic decrease in the nu m b er o f peasant C om m unists, as we fo und previously. As the result o f th e decrease in the n u m b e r o f workers from 1961 on, the last five years have b roug ht a b o u t a decrease in the n u m b e r o f 206

C o m m u n i s t s in t h e nonagricultural eco n o m y as well. The conclusion is justified th a t econom ic instability and uncertainty as to the practical-political o rien ta tio n of the LCY in the last five years found expression in the loss of' party influence among m a rk e t workers But th e m ost interesting in fo rm atio n in the table relates to the stagnation o f the state apparatus and to the extrem ely rapid grow th o f the n u m b er o f C o m m u nists in the n o n m a rk e t category. The first is evidently the result o f a purposeful restriction o f the expansion o f the state apparatus, and is a very positive phenom enon.. The sources o f th e latter p h e n o m e n o n are n o t as obvious, A possible p re su m p tio n is th at the d ev elop m ent o f selfL governm ent (which reached n o n m a rk e t workers only in the last decade and with a considerable lag as com p ared to the m arket sector) and the general d em o cratizatio n o f social and political life favored th e expansion of the LCY in the n o n m a rk e t sector Rapid expansion o f the n u m b e r o f C om m unists in the n o n m ark e t sector as com pared to the state apparatus m ight have evoked certain tensions between these tw o quasiprofessional groups A t first glance these tensions m ight appear to be a kind o f struggle for power, b u t actually w hat is involved is the clash of two differing m entalities and struggle for public opinion in the party on the p art o f tw o groups with equally high qualifications. F u rth e r econom ic dev e lo p m e n t will m ost likely lead to a weakening o f the influence o f the state apparatus, since the n o n m a rk e t sec to r m ust expand faster than the state apparatus, Once the e c o n o m y stabilizes and retu rns to a high rate o f grow th, the n u m b e r o f C om m un ists in m a rk e t activities will begin to rise, thereby diminishing still fu rth e r th e influence o f the apparatus. And the c o n stan t rise in the qualification o f econom ic cadres operates in the same direction. Probably, the period 1960-1966 may be regarded as a transition period, during which the party o riented toward p o w e r and, u n d e r the strong influence of its own pow er apparatus, began to convert itself in to an organization o f political activists, o riented toward becom ing aso cia l avant-garde, t o w a r d k eep ing its distance from p o w er and substituting selfL governing structures f o r power. A nd it is ju st because it is a transition period, in which the old stru ctu res are no longer functional and the new ones are n o t y et erected, th a t we have begun so painfully to feel the b urd en o f the dysfunctionality of the bureaucratic m entality.

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Significance o f the In stitu tio n o f S elf-G overnm ent and D em ocratization o f the LCY

If it is correct that the bureaucratic m entality has begun to check the activity of the League of C om m un ists as the social avant-garde, the question arises: w here did the League find the strength to cope successfully svith conservatism and, in particular, to settle accou nts with the main source o f bureaucratism , the political police? O n e possible explanation is that there were always enough personalities am ong C o m m un ists w ho were sufficiently a u to n o m o u s to be able to overcom e the d e fo rm atio n of' the system. I have no way of' evaluating the e x te n t to which this ex planation is correct, n o r how such a thesis could be scientifically corro borated. But this q uestion is possible: w hy were there n o t enough such persons in o th e r parties, n ot even in parties th a t had made social revolutions? One seeking the answ er to this question might well o rien t him self n o t toward personalities but toward the institutions th a t condition social processes and situations. In that case, it is evident th a t self-governm ent is the fo u n d a tio n o f the vitality of' the Yugoslav social system. Self-government is the direct oppo site o f the hierarchical n ature of the bureaucratic system. T he parallel existence o f these two opposing systems o f societal organization led, as we know , to m any confusions, m isunderstandings, contradictions, and disputes. At the same time the developm ent of self-government put ever-increasing pressure on the bureaucratic structu re, and the possibility o f its forcing itself on society became smaller and smaller. Bringing the bureaucratic processes und er c o n tro l was made possible by tw o factors: consolidation o f the Yugoslav social system on a basis o f self-government, and establishm ent of the p o s s i b i l i t y o f continual com parison o f self-governing and bureaucratic activities In this way political stability, social pressure, and k n o w n alternatives made it possible to gain tiie victory over the conservative forces. This provided, at the same time, a way o u t o f the situation and a guide to fu rth e r action If som eth ing h ap p e n ed in the past only because there were certain personalities, th en in the future som ething else may happen if there are diffe rent personalities. I f desirable social trends d epend only on good leaders, then the training o f those good leaders, if' they are n o t already there, represents an insoluble tL~k as the French E ncyclopedists discovered, But if an in stitution spontaneously produces the desired effects, then the whole business is reduced to the d evelopm ent o f that institution.

208

Until the present, self-government lias been prim arily oriented toward working organizations. On higher levels the p a rty and state apparatus intervened That phase o f o u r develop m en t is evidently over. T he necessary experience has been gained and a definite selfL govcrnm ent consciousness has been form ed In the n e x t phase, self-government has to be carried over to the total co m m u n ity In tliis process the League o f C om m unists will be in a position to lead o nly if every m em b er o f the League will be in a position to come to ills own conclusions quite in d ep en d e n tly and to act on the basis o f personal responsibility and persona] c o m m itm e n t n o t on the basis o f directives from above The precon ditio n for this is the d em ocratization o f the League o f C om m unists, and w hat is basic for the d em ocratization o f the League is the liquidation o f its hierarchical, sem im ilitary rela tio n s (M Todorivic [24: 6 7 9 ] ) That means th at the League m ust transform itself from an organization with centralized initiative into an organization with decentralized initiative, from an organization where the leadership exclusively controls the m em bership in to an organization in which the m em bers also have the possibility o f controlling the agencies o f leadership and where, in the decision process, co m m u nicatio ns and directives circulate b o th up and d ow n. The p iesen t role of the League, say the conclusions o f th e Sixth Plenum of the LCY C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , is to be u n dersto od as increasing dem ocratizatio n o f its interna] relationships, which presupposes above all the openness o f the League o f C om m u nists to all creative and progressive social initiatives . . [24: 20].. The ideas of m u s t and re quire are n o t moral or abstractly political postulates, but express the need o f co ordination with the indispensable social processes by means o f which the League intends to maintain the role of a social avant-garde. Only dem ocratization and openness are reliable guarantees against putschist groupings in the future and the only effective m eans for replacing the appearance o f dogm atic u n i t y by genuine unity in views and a c tio n (Sixth Plenum) In all this there will probably be relatively few mere organizational changes. Organizational fram ew orks are relatively narrow, and the same organizational form s can serve very d ifferent purposes. What it is essential to change, or w h at m u s t be changed, is n o t the organization in the narrow sense o f the term b u t the general ap p ro ach to th e solution o f social problem s. N aturally, this ca n n o t be accomplished o v e rn ig h t.27 But precisely for this reason it is of th e u tm o st im po rtan ce to affirm develo pm ental tendencies and to reveal the roots o f the p h en o m en a

209

20 F U N C T IO N AND O R G A N IZ A T IO N OF LEAG UE OF YUGOSLAV COMMUNISTS The entire preceding analysis was required in o rd e r to establish w hat functions the political organization should perform in the current state o f ou r social and econom ic developm ent. Political scientists distinguish tw o forms o f political organizations: parties, which aim at achieving or participating in pow er; and pressure groups, which pu t pressure on those w h o have p ow er in o rd e r to fu rth er their own interests, Parties are the p ro d u c t o f capitalism; pressure groups have existed u n d er all systems. The political organization th a t o ur historical situatio n requires is clearly no longer a party, However, it ca n n o t be a pressure group either, because its purpose is not to influence those who have power, and in particular not to fu rther partial interests; it aims at a radical tran sfo rm atio n o f that power. Therefore, as in the theory of econom ic organization, the th e o ry o f political organizations must be sup plem ented by a new category. Physicists would probably call the category the an tip arty inasmuch as the result o f the process calls for the annihilation o f parties. Then what are the basic functions of such a political organization am ong us today? The fundam ental task of the existing organization, the League o f Yugoslav C om m unists, is u n d o u b te d ly to accelerate and pro tect the social transform ation th at has been begun, until the tim e when it itself will disappear as no longer n eeded. Actually, th e League o f C om m unists will be successful in perform ing its task to the e x ten t to which it will have succeeded in doing away with itself as a political organization. T he League of C om m un ists does n o t have (as was once inferred on a m ore primitive theoretical level) a ready-m ade formula for socialism, which now only needs to be pu t into effect by crushing the resistance o f various hostile forces. In t o d a y s com plicated situation it is no longer clear w h o the enem y is or where he is, or what is resistance and w hat is a socialist orien ta tio n It is the jo b o f social practice and science (we are speaking o f scientific socialism) constantly to revise, correct, improve, and constru c t th at socialist formula. As far as I can sec, the League o f C om m un ists would have four basic functions, or t w o p a i r s o f c o m p le m e n ta r y functions: the function o f o v e rc o m in g h is to ric a lly in h e rite d co n tra d ic tio n s a n d morally-politically integrating Yugoslav society, and th e function o f overcom ing political conflicts against the b ackground o f socialism and th e co n struction o f a dem o cratic culture,

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Overcoming Historically Inherited C ontradictions and Conflicts Yugoslavia is a highly heterog eneous co u n try , culturally and economically. Per capita incom e is several times higher in the m ost developed districts than in the undeveloped regions. The difference in d evelopm ent betw een ICosmet and Slovenia is as great as, e.g., between Nigeria and Greece The differences in econom ic develo pm ent condition equally great differences in the standard of living, labor p rodu ctivity , edu cation , educational level, etc. Yugoslavia is at the top o f the world scale in relative n um ber o f stu den ts; yet at the same tim e one-fifth o f the p op ulation is still illiterate. The differences between city and c o u n try , between intellectual and manual w ork, are likewise great F u rther, the Yugoslav ec o nom y has one of the highest grow th rates in the world. This produces a rapid transfo rm atio n - not only econom ic, but also social. One o f the signs o f this process is the mass exodus o f peasants to the towns. A n o th e r is the constan t change in the econom ic system. In this situation o f great potential and actual tensions, o f in com plete constru c tio n o f the institutional system , and o f rapid and intensive changes, the c o u n try requires an organized social force th at will have a stabilizing action and be in a position to con trol and direct all those com plex processes,28 Moral-Political Integration o f Yugoslav Society Whereas the first function is confined to establishing mere social equilibrium as the basic condition for the functioning o f any social or, m ore narrowly, political system , the issue is now the establishm ent o f p e rm a n e n t social integration, which is the basis for social self-continuance. It is know n that m orality has an integrative function o f this kind in eveiy society It is also know n th at m orality is a historical, or social, category, and hence that in a heterogeneous society like ours, several moralities, possibly even conflicting ones, may coexist A t the same time, m orality, how ever im p o rta n t, does n o t ex haust social action, to which, for want o f a better term, we may give the name o f political Social action is a com plete system o f social reactions o f individuals and g r o u p s conditioned by inherited and acquired systems of evaluations and prejudices, 0 1 ethical and existential com po nen ts o f hu m an life, personal experience, and m o d e o f in terp retation of s y m b o l ic com m unication. Even when the interests of the individual social groups are no t in opposition, it is easy, in a 211

heterogeneous society, for the possibility o f c o m m u n icatio n to be lost, a cond itio n that m ay then be exploited in various demagogic ways. This is a possibility that predom inates by far when the interests are actually co ntra d icto ry , or w hen their groups think they are Social behavior is determ ined by social character. F or any society to exist, E F ro m m observes [15: 2 2 9 ;a ls o 16: 9 4 -9 5 ], it m ust mold the character of its m em bers in such a way th at they want to do w hat th e y have to do ; their social fu nction must becom e and be transform ed in them into som ething th at they pet form ou t o f an internal need, and not by com pulsion Special character internalizes external needs and thus orients the physical, intellectual, and em otional energy of m an in such a way as to satisfy the needs o f the given socioeconom ic system [17: 2 5 9 ], In analyzing the fun dam en tal types o f social behavior, we may em ploy R iesm ans [18: 8] typology o f social characters, adding th a t Riesman evidently m ade use o f the results o f F r o m m s analysis [1 7 ], We shall, however, give this typology a different theoretical basis, and so m ew h a t alter the terms and c o n te n t o f the various categories. Social character is that part o f the character that is c o m m o n to the various groups o f society and is a p ro d u c t of' the gro ups experience Riesman distinguishes three historical types o f character, which we shall call the traditionally o riented, the individualistic, and the collectivist,29 and which in my s c h e m a tis m correspond to the precapitalist phase o f slow developm ent, liberal capitalism, and organized o r state capitalism.30 In precapitalist and, in general, econom ically undeveloped societies, the d o m in an t social character is m arked by the fact that it is in every respect formed by rigid traditions, precisely dictating the external form s of behavior Thus, social co nform ity is attained by having people simply observe tradition in everything. With econom ic d evelopm ent, society becom es m ore and m ore c o m p l e x a n d c h a n g e s f u n d a m e n t a l l y . Tradition, as the p r e d o m i n a n t i n t e g r a t i v e force, becomes an obstacle to developm ent and m ust therefore be dissolved. The d ev elo pm ent o f a m o n ey e c o n o m y breaks dow n the previous prim ary groups and form s the family as the basic social unit, while m ark et com petition creates individualism. This individualist character is form ed by training in the family, on the basis o f values that correspond to the class character o f the family Thus, the new citizens, from their earliest y o u th , receive a specific class a ttitu d e th a t helps guide them th ro u g h o u t their lives.. This turning inward, toward the self, toward a group o f values and goals internalized from early childhood, is the basis of the force o f social co nform ity in the

individualistic societies o f classical capitalism Howevci, econom ic developm ent not only goes forward more and more, and m ore and m ore quickly, but along with it the com plexity o f society and the te m p o o f social changes also increase, T he reckless co m p etitio n and class unscrupulousness o f classical capitalism becom e dangerous to the social system because they evoke fierce reactions in the form o f revolutions I t becomes necessary to think o f people, as well as p rod u c tio n and profit. F u rth er, the extrem ely com plex division o f labor m akes the cooperation of different individuals of decisive im portance, and a new type o f social character begins to ap p e a r in the m ost developed industrial societies, a type th at is directed outw ard, tow ard others. Behavior is determ ined by w hat others th ink and by th eir evaluations and preferences; it is determ ined by collective, mass prejudices, by conceptions. C o n fo rm ity is now n o t the indirect effect but the direct goal o f behavior, and from that com es the well-know n p h en o m en o n o f c o n fo rm ity , w ith o u t ideas and w ith o u t m orality, in societies w h at is called mass culture 31 In such a situation it is only natural that the inward-directed view becomes useless and is replaced by a rad ar sensitive to even the weakest signals in the behavior and a ttitu d e s o f those around me, thereby enabling me to m ake rapid and suitable adaptations. At first glance the collectivist character seems to be a dialectical negation o f the o th e r tw o m odes, and hence a turn to a society on a higher level, on a level o f cosm opolitanism as com pared with the previous prim ary group. A ctually, however, the collectivist type o f man is n o t socially integrated In the com p etition for the good graces o f others, he tries im m easurably harder to win the favor o f those who decide than the favor o f those d e p e n d e n t on him. He is d e e p l y i m b u e d with the feeling o f hierarchy and, when c i r c u m s t a n c e s p e r m it, shows him self as an unscrupulous bureaucrat. He is in a state o f antagonistic co o p e ra tio n . He represents total alienation o f the p ersonality .32 He remains, w retchedly and helplessly, an isolated individual in the crowd T hat is the point to w hich the regimes o f social existence o f m od ern Western man have com e, as expressed in the title of R iesm an s book, The L o n e ly Crowd Here it is im p o rta n t to n o te th at the lonely crowd, as a social p h en o m en o n , is n o t characteristic only o f highly developed capitalism. It is also characteristic o f the Stalinist systems, which im itate that capitalism n o t only in the productive aspect bu t also in the aspect o f social organization Therefore we can by no means regard the collectivist m entality, which is often m ade such a show of, as an indication o f socialism. T he standard theoretical 213

expositions of it are deeply anti-Marxist, in their term inology and their content. Thus, e g . the basic Stalinist theory of the p a r ty as leading the masses by transm ission is nothing m ore than a variant, with a time lag from Plato and Pareto, o f the ancient elitist theories o f social organization. It is no t a long distance from the elite to the cult o f personality And in p o in t o f fact we could, with the necessary m odifications, apply F r o m m s authoritarian character as one variety o f the externally o rien te d , collectivist character When for various reasons the social system docs n o t function as it should, when the divergence betw een ex p e ctatio n s and reality becom e to o great, when the feeling o f national or social danger goes beyond certain limits, th en within the individual there is a heightening o f the feelings o f anx iety , b ew ilderm ent, personal insignificance and worthlessness, and a specific mechanism is developed o f cscape from this psychologically into lerable reality, It is a m echanism o f rejection o f personal freedom , of merging with the crow d, and a longing on the part o f m an to sub m it to an absolute au th o rity , the a u th o rity of the party and the chief, which offers com plete certainty. A nd therefore the p arty, that is, the Central C om m ittee, can never go astray, and in fact never goes astray, as is seen from the S h o r t Course o j the H istory o j the S o viet C o m m u n is t Party (b ) A nd therefore the leader, from the day he was b o m , must exhibit extraordinary revolutionary qualities, as is seen from the same Shot t Couise and the published biographies o f Stalin. Here it is im p o rta n t to note th a t it is n ot very relevant that the books in question totally distort the facts and th at Stalin was an evil m an, as Lenin saw. The essential thing is th at the social situation p roduced the authoritarian character,33 and it was therefore necessary to find a corresponding leader, and any expressions o f skepticism and criticism had to be treated (even w ith o u t the fabrication of the Moscow trials) as co u n terrev o lu tio n ary activity and treason One can hardly say th at the CPSU(b) consciously and infallibly guided the transform ations o f Soviet society, as was generally believed; indeed, b o th the CPSU(b) and Soviet society went through violent convulsions o f a disorderly d evelopm ent, with the sacrifices that are now generally know n. A fte r these explanations, we m ust now retu rn to o ur situation. We find a traditionally oriented social character in the c o u n try , in those small settlem ents where every bod y k n ow s everybody else, where the level o f edu cation is low, con tact with the outside world w e a k , and people still live in prim ary groups. T h e brief d evelopm ent o f capitalism in the regions o f Yugoslavia to o k on an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c character, A dm inistrative socialism and the
214

relatively prolonged political m o n o p o ly of the leading cadres, with fo rm ation of c o n fo rm ity from the side o f the social security service, led to the d ev elop m ent of the collectivist character and the corresponding m entality. In this connection we can stress three im p o rtan t facts. 1. The transition from o ne m orality to a n o th er or, more broadly, from one social character to an oth er, docs n o t take place all at once. During th e interval there is a period o f anomie, in which the previous standards have ceased to apply b u t the new system o f standards has not yet taken hold or is not yet constructed- These are the very dangerous periods o f declining social m o ra lity and loss o f social discipline. They are periods th a t arc all the m ore dangerous, the m o re tem p estu o u s the social transform ations A nd social transform ations arc functions o f the rate o f econom ic grow th, which in Yugoslavia was one o f the most rapid in the world. 2. Evidently, none o f the three analyzed types o f social character can serve as the basis for constructio n o f a socialist society, We m ust exam ine o u r actuality to see w h e th e r it provides indications for the fo rm ation o f an adequate, fourth ty pe o f social character, which has n o t yet been historically realized, b u t which can and, therefore, m u st be realized 3 Insofar as social d ev elop m ent takes place anarchically in this area, as has been the case for the m ost part up to the present, it is to be expected that the collectivist character will be enhanced What th a t means is depicted by Riesman and F ro m m in their books As a desirable alternative character, with a d ifferen t o rientation , R iesm an gives the a u to n o m o u s character T h e a u to n o m o u s personality is able to adjust to the behavior standards o f his society; however, he does n o t do so mechanically bu t is free to choose whether and how he will do so. But Riesman cannot indicate w hat social in stitu tions in the Western world produce a u to n o m o u s personalities It is evident th at there are no such institution s to d ay , and that a u to n o m o u s personalities remain isolated individuals and as a social type represent an unattainable ideal. The alternative I should p ut forward is the associative character, w h i c h represents a positive definition o f the au to n o m o u s character, The associative personality achieves full integration with the social co m m u n ity n ot in an unconscious, unthinking, and hence enforced way, as individuals d o in the prim ary groups of undeveloped societies, but as a free, a u to n o m o u s personality with conscious choice, making possible the basic conditions o f his 215

social ad a p ta tio n As the in stitu tio n th a t spon tan eously p roduces th e p recond ition s for th e fo rm ation of the associative character, I see the institution o f self-governm ent in all the fields o f social, econom ic, and n o n e c o n o m ic activities. In a sense, social character is only a n o th e r nam e for social relations. T h e associative personality is only a n o th e r n a m e for the socialist personality. The fo rm ation o f socialist social relations may be slowed or accelerated. C haotic d evelopm ent is certainly no t th e fastest possibility D evelo pm ent will be accelerated to the degree th at society is able to form an avant-garde o f associative personalities. Unlike an elite, the avant-garde is n o t called o n to rule, b ut to act; it is n o t differentiated from the m ass, bu t includes the socially m ost m ature individuals from the various clearly articulated social groups; it relies n o t on political au th o rity , b u t on moral a u th o rity In this sense the m oral stan dards o f th e m em bers o f the League of C o m m u nists play a decisive role in r e a l i z i n g i t s m o r a l - i n t e g r a t i v e functions Similarly, this predeterm ines the policy o f recruiting m em bers of the League,
O vercom ing Political C onflicts on the Basis o f Socialism

A l t h o u g h t h e rem nants o f class society have not yet disappeared,34 we have n o t had any serious p roblem s with the class en em y for a long time. The only tw o really serious political crises th a t the cou n try w ent through after the military phase o f the revolution was won were crises within the governing party : the C om info rm in 1948 and th e police conspiracy in 1966. This shows clearly that today th e conflicts arise on a basis o j socialism. O rganizationally and even m ore so conceptually and ideologically, the League o f C om m u n ists was p o o rly prepared to overcom e conflicts of this kind. U n d e r the com plicated conditions o f having won pow er, formal unity proved to be qu ite inad eq u a te In o rder to p ro te c t itself from similar shocks in the fu tu re , the League o f C om m unists had to constru c t certain m echanism s and to set them in m o tio n (this is usually called the d em o cratization o f the p arty ), m echanism s th a t had previously n o t existed or functioned weakly. In order for the League o f C om m un ists to successfully perform its prim ary function, it m ust be a firm organization o f political activists; in o rd e r to be firm, it m ust be essentially unified; in order to be unified, it m u st be deeply dem ocratic. With this we com e to th e fo u rth fu nc tio n

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C onstruction of D em ocratic Culture Yugoslavia does no t have centuries o f peaceful developm ent behind it as a national state, in which the dem ocratic culture o f the citizens could be form ed gradually and in a definite, I should alm ost say natural, m anner, as was the case in France o r England or in th e Scandinavian countries N o r can we perm it ourselves the luxury o f exten din g the process o f con stru cting dem ocratic culture over the com ing centuries and thereafter, A t the same tim e it is obvious th at dem ocracy ca n n o t fu nction if citizens do n o t use th e n d em ocratic rights in a suitable way. It is an unpleasant fact th at we do n o t have m u ch criticism o f th e highest agencies o f state and p arty , o r o f individual high officials, If criticism is lacking, the process o f bureaucratization and hierarchical stru ctu ring of society takes place. T h e reasons for the absence o f this criticism are o f interest, O pposition to criticism appeared very early in w orkers parties. Characteristic in this respect is a reaction o f En gels35 alm ost eighty years ago: The labor m o vem ent is based on the sharpest criticism o f existing society Criticism is its living elem ent; how can it aim at avoiding criticism itself, forbidding debate? Are we to dem and free speech for ourselves only to abolish it within o u r ow n ra n k s? A t the same time, a party, like every bureaucratic o r g a n i z a t i o n , n e c e s s a r i l y generates resistance to criticism (explaining it by the general interests of th e struggle); this resistance is intensified, the m ore the organization is centralized. This applies as well to a party in peacetim e, such as Engels had in m ind, bu t it applies even more to an illegal party, which objectively m ust reduce criticism to a m in im um un der those conditions. What hap p e n s then is th a t the habits form ed un der conditions o f illegality are later carried over u n d e r cond itions th a t are radically different It is evident from the c o n tex t, as from o th e r letters o f Engels, th at his reaction would be even sharper because the party involved was n o t in o ppo sition, bu t had power firmly in its hands. T h e absence o f criticism am ong us is usually explained by saying th at the persons w ho are the potential objects o f th at criticism try with all their might to prevent it. It is well kn ow n th a t there have been interventions with editors and radio broadcasts, as well as throu gh party channels A lthough I would n o t dream o f denying these empirical facts, their interpretatio n seems to me to be one-sided and naive. Those persons influence their milieu m uch less than th ey themselves are p rodu cts o f th at milieu 217

As far as I can see, the basic explanation lies in tlie general undem ocratic atm osp here that we inherited and th a t we perhaps made even m ore undem ocratic. C on sequ ently, criticism o f the central co m m itte e or o f the governm ent will generally be taken as an attack on the regime and on socialism. If the state does not react to the criticism, it will be believed that the person criticized has ended his political career and th a t the criticism actually came from official sources and is only the a n n o u n c e m e n t o f a re p la c e m e n t,36 I f it did turn o u t like that, the critic (and the editor o f the m eans of' co m m u nicatio n involved) w ould get a corresponding entry in his police records and m ight even be called in for an interview. A t the same time, criticism o f o u r bureaucratic chiefs, o f the chairman o f a co m m une, o r o f the head o f an institution would have even worse consequences, b oth for the critic and for the one criticized, it has hap p e n ed that m em bers o f the League o f C o m m u nists have been penalized even when they have n o t made explicit criticisms but merely expressed some unusual idea th at differed from the standard stereoty pes And resignations, as the expression of dissent, have been as good as u n k n o w n in political life. In such a situation criticism did n o t cease, b u t it was transform ed: it becam e irresponsible or stayed behind the scenes, or both. If criticism is discouraged in the everyday relations of' people, people have no chance to get used to hearing criticism. This is the source o f those fantastic, destructive, unproved, and totally irresponsible criticisms o f individuals and institution s th at com e in to the open from time to time. Hence, too, the many intrigues, secret reports, and d enu nciatio ns that took the place o f the open dem ocratic struggle of' opinions. A nd hence, too , the perverted p h en o m en o n o f duplex m an , a moral-psychological type totally contrary to the free creative personality o f socialism. [ 1 1 the last few years things have begun to change. The press, radio, and television have played an en o rm o u s role in the developm ent o f this dem ocratic culture. Liquidation o f the political police has removed the m ajor obstacle to the further developm en t o f this process. We have reached the point where a local new spaper can, w ith o u t m ajo r repercussions, criticize the m anagem ent o f a factory, and Borba can criticize the w ork o f a com m unal com m ittee. A t the same time we have not yet established criticism on the same levels and, even less, criticism from below upw ard In a patriarchal milieu, such as prevailed in a co untry that only recently em erged from its peasant huts, the latter is regarded as a subversion o f a u th o rity that can n o t be tolerated. The patriarchal milieu is no t in the habit o f evaluating 21S

argum ents; it is guided exclusively by personalities. In logic tills is kno w n as the fallacious arg u m en t urn a d h o m in em , The lower the level o f logical culture and logical discipline o f a m a n s thin king , the Soviet logician Asmus explains [21: ,373], the less able he is to divorce the probative force o f an arg um ent from the feelings, s y m p a t h i e s , a n d p r e j u d i c e s it a r o u s e s in him. . , , U n fo rtu n a te ly , it is n o t a m a tter only o f a fallacious consequence of inad eq u a te logical culture The real social situation is such that t h e a u t h o r i t y adds to arg um e n tatio n such a factual and proved-by-experience weight that the logical c o n te n t acquires only secondary importance,. There is still a n o th e r aspect to dem o cratic culture: initiative. The patriarchal milieu creates authorities in order to use them . To the same e x te n t to which the b ureau crat desires power, the patriarchal milieu imposes it upo n him. It is a closed and consistent system. U nder it the citizen does not wish (o r does n o t know , which comes to the same thing) to make use o f his d em o cratic rights. As he once did to G od, he now turns to a higher instan ce for his beliefs and defense, I am, for example, forced by en viron m e nt to exercise p o w e r, journalist S, Djukic reports the Secretary of the C om m un al C o m m ittee o f the League o f C om m u nists o f Vranje as saying (Borba, O c to b e r 9, 1966, p. 4). A nd since our ad m in istration is technically n o t the m ost efficient, as is the rule in an undeveloped co u n try , o u r conservative citizen is in fact pretty much in the right In o rd e r to p u t into effect the rights guaranteed by law, interv entions are required. Interventions conditioned the mechanism of' the VIP (veza i protekcija, which means corrections and p ro te c tio n s ), and this constitu tes the greatest obstacle to efficient functio nin g of' the mechanism o f self1governm ent It turns ou t that the question of' criticism and th at of self-governing initiative do n o t reduce merely to allowing criticism or guaranteeing initiative by regulations, although these o f course are crucial preco ndition s Since we have to deal with a socio-psychological stru ctu re cem ented by traditions, no thing will be accom plished by th at passive permission. Again, criticism can d o great h arm in an uncritical milieu. A nd in a milieu th at is not ed ucated to criticism, even the m ost reasonable criticism m ay give rise to erroneous interpretations, making the criticism lose its meaning. F u rth e r, in a situation o f this kind, insistence on self-governing initiative may be taken as hypocrisy (and this does happ en ) B ut the withering aw ay o f die state is inconceivable in a milieu w here the citizens have n o t learned to m a k e f u l l use, w ith c o m p le te responsibility, o f their civic rights. 219

Exercise o f civic rights c a n n o t exist in a milieu in which the cult of au tho rity exists, in which there is no criticism. There can be no criticism in a milieu in which citizens do not exercise their rights, The bureaucratic patriarchal ring can be e ffec tive ly bro ken only by a political f o r c e th a t is at least in p art outside it. Therefore, in realizing the p reco n d itio n s for fo rm a tio n of a dem ocratic and self-governing society, the League of C om m unists can an d must play th e decisive role. Hence, the fu rth eran ce o f criticism and self-governing initiative, as the bases for th e developm ent o f d em ocratic relationships and the education of citizens in the exercise o f tlieir political freedom s, is one o f the most im p o rta n t tasks o f th e League o f C o m m u n ists C o m m u nists will accomplish this task most effectively if they first develop dem ocratic culture fully in their own ranks. D em ocratic Centralism The function o f the party, a league o f political activists, is the source o f its organization, as has been said. It is usually held th at the basic organizational principle o f th e League of C om m un ists is d em o cratic centralism. But to say this is n o t to say m uch. D e m o c r a t i c c e n t r a l i s m m e a n s t h e t a k i n g o f decisions dem ocratically and th eir centralized, i.e., unified, execution. It should be recalled th a t this principle is applied even in social dem ocratic parties and th a t a centralized variant is applied in co m m u nist parties; in fact, we shall find several variants o f the principle in m an y o th e r organizations. T he problem is w h e th e r the accent is on d e m o c ra tic or on centralism , and h o w th e two co m p o n en ts are com bined. The dem ocratic centralism o f th e days o f w artim e o r illegal struggle is obviously no longer suitable. Still less suitable is dem ocratic centralism as Mao Tse-tung, for exam ple, sees it: The organization m ust be placed above the individual, the m ajority above th e m ino rity, the higher p arty functionaries above the lower, and th e central c o m m itte e above the entire p arty . That is d em o cratic centralism in the p a r t y [22: 8 4 ] . Let us see w hat kind o f d em ocratic centralism would correspond to t o d a y s conditions. First o f all, it is clear th at decisions m ust be taken by m ajority vote. The m inority m ust bow to th e m ajority. Moreover, that m inority m ust n o t organize p erm a n en tly ; th at would be m aking a fraction, like founding a new party A t th e same tim e, the withering away o f the state implies the withering away o f parties. Accordingly, m inorities and m ajorities take form on an ad hoc 2 20

basis for individual decisions, and their personnel com position changes constantly. In this way th e ideas o f the individual (and not, as previously, those of' the chiefs of the party apparatus) com e to expression. As regards all this, op inions are m o re or less in agreem ent. T he disagreem ent begins w ith the question o f how th e m inority should behave w hen a decision is being executed. F o u r answers are possible: go along with it and hold y o u r tong ue; go along with it and start a discussion; do n o t carry it o u t; oppose its execution. U nder norm al circum stances the last tw o solutions are o u t o f th e questio n As for th e first tw o, it seems to me dogm atic to insist o n one o r th e o th e r; everything d epen ds on the circumstances. I f an im p o rta n t decision is ad o p te d by a m ajority o f a single vote, the m ajority will probably be wise to desist from carrying it out. B ut i f 90% of C o m m un ists vote for a decision, th e 10% should reconsider their positio n before reviving the discussion. I f it is a m atter o f ex trem ely im p o rta n t decisions, such as, for example, the struggle against national chauvinism or, in its tim e, the struggle against the C om inform , then, o f course, full u nan im ity is an absolute necessity. But m ost o fte n decisons will not be eith er so fund a m e n tal o r so evident, and hence, I presume, it will be desirable to allow co nstant reexam ination o f decisions m ade while they are being carried o u t. Just w hat decisions com e und er this heading ca n n o t be established in advance. T hat to o is a m a tte r o f dem o cratic cu ltu re In th e last analysis som e qualified m a jo rity may have to decide in each case w h e th e r such reexam in atio n can be to lera te d or no t. The situation is m ost com plicated when there are disagreements on principles, for exam ple, with reference to th e form ulation of program s o r statutes. The ex p lan ation usually given in this case is: m em bership in th e League o f C o m m u n ists is v oluntary; with it yo u accept all the obligations involved, especially the program and th e statutes; if there is som ething y o u d o n t like a b o u t th em , then resign from the League. I th in k this ex plan ation ca n n o t be accepted because it m eans retaining the party organization and implies a direct invitation to form o th e r parties or organizations. The League o f C o m m u n ists is n o t one party am ong others, so th a t i f you are n o t satisfied with it, y o u can enroll in a n o th e r; it is the o n ly organization in which the m ost active fighters for socialism register. Inasm uch as no one is in possession o f the definitive form ula for the co n stru c tio n o f socialism, ju s t as no one know s the absolute tru th , the League m ust be broad eno ugh to absorb a variety o f thinking. This is n o t a m a tte r o f an ab s tra c t t ru th o r an abstract freedom , b u t o f th e very real interest o f the working m an in avoiding unnecessary deviations and insuring the ad o p tio n of 221

the m ost effective solutions, When i t is a m a tter of' new ideas, a m ajority is n o t by any m an n er o f means the best guarantee of their correctness By the very n a tu re o f things, new ideas arc advanced by individuals or by m inority groups, w ho then try to convince the m ajority th a t their views are c o r re c t T o p rohibit such activities w ould be greatly to impoverish the League both theoretically and ideologically, and to destroy its role as an avant-garde. It would be interesting to k n o w what position M arx and Engels would have taken on the question just raised As scholars and political activists, they were o ften in positions where they had to fight for their ideas against the ideas o f the m ajority. A characteristic case in this respect is the Critique o f the Gotha Program, which is ranked today as on e o f M arxs classical political works However, the party leaders at the congress for uniting the G erm an Social D em ocrats at G o th a in 1875 did n o t accept M arxs criticism and did no t find it advisable th a t the congress should kno w o f the criticism. Marx expected th at; in the le tter o f criticism that he sent to B ra c k e 37 he stated th at he and Engels w ould disagree w ith the congress and added: . . it is my du ty no t to recognize, even by d ip lo m a tic silence, a program th a t in m y conviction is com pletely unacceptable and dem oralizing to the p a r ty . Fifteen years later, Engels came to the conclusion th at the tim e had com e to m ake that criticism public. However, the party leadership op p o sed it, even then. Engels stated his position unequivocally in a letter to B e b e l:38 . since you tried to forcibly prevent p ublication o f the article and allowed warnings to get to Neite Z e it th a t in the event of' repetition it might be taken up by the party and censored, the takeover o f y o u r entire press by the party ca n n o t bu t appear in a strange light to me. How do you differ from P u ttk a m e r (Prussian Minister o f the In terio r - B.H.), if you in tro d u ce a socialist law in yo ur o w n ranks? To me personally it is all one, more or less; no p a rty in any co u n try can co n d e m n m e to silence i f I have decided to spea k o u t (m y em phasis B.H.). . the party needs the science o f socialism, and that can n o t live w ith o u t freedom o f m ovem ent. Unpleasantnesses have to be expected, and the best way to deal w ith them is w ith dignity. . . . In these citations, it is n ot a question of' petty-bourgeois anarcho-liberalism, as Stalinists o r Maoists w ould say, but o f the only possible position proletarian scientific workers could take S om e m ight th in k th a t so great a divergence between science and the party is no longer probable today. Such an idea w ould be a dangerous m istake Here is an illustration Let us go back fifteen
ill

years and consider a scholar, or a group o f scholars, whose investigations led them to th e conclusion th a t in the n ex t decade it would be necessary to give up central planning, develop the m arket, m ake banks in d ep en d e n t. Introduce interest, liberalize foreign trade, and p u t into effect everything th a t today is characteristic o f the Yugoslav ec ono m y. Those people would u n d o u b ted ly have been den o u n c ed as bourgeois ideologists, class e n e m i e s , a n d a n t i p a r t y g r o u p s , and would have been uncerem oniously expelled from the p a r t y . 39 A similar lack o f u nderstanding m ay therefo re be ex pected to day w ith the rem ark th a t, as it seems, the center o f dogm atism has now shifted from the dom ain o f econom ics to th a t o f politics There are definite reasons for this. A t one time it was held th at the quickest and m ost stable ec onom ic grow th can be achieved by central planning; y o u simply issue orders and everyone complies. Then we fou nd that adm inistrative planning is no t the most effective but the m ost primitive form o f planned direction of the socialist econo m y. And today o u r neighbors experience is that central planning m eans a steady drop in the rate o f grow th P o litic a l centralism is based on analogous prejudices, The appearance o f divergent thou ghts is interpreted as a dangerous devastation o f u n ity , a d e stru c tio n o f necessary au th o rity , and an intolerable weakening o f political organization. On the con trary, th e o p en expression o f ideas actually strengthens political organization, since all the problem s are brought to the surface at once and ad e q u ate steps can be taken in good time to solve them ; otherw ise, they remain m asked by a formal unity, while pressures accum ulate, leading to explosions. There is a very definite, alm ost a functional, in terde pendenc e. The m ore a political organization is dem ocratized, the fewer pressures there are tow ard setting up fractions or new parties, op en or secret, And the fewer the pressures, the greater th e possibility o f dem ocratization. T h e entire art o f politics consists in effectively guiding this process. Finally, m ention m ust be m ade of the role o f the party press in the p roblem at issue., T o d ay th at press operates p re tty m u ch u n d er directives. As such, it leans toward conservatism, as is generally the case in the organ o f a party in power. B ut if the League of C om m unists wishes to be an avant-garde, it must have an avant-garde press. In the situation as it stands tod ay, the appearance o f a new co n cep tion in a party organ would be regarded generally as a new directive, and not as the individual idea of' the a u th o r (excep t for the L etters to the E d ito r d ep a rtm en t). A ccordingly, party papers reject such w ork and divert them to other new spapers and magazines. B ut they are

rejecting, along w ith those works, all the new and avant-garde ideas. A lthough the party press will have to have a partially directive character in the future too, there is no reason w hy great emphasis should n o t be laid on presenting and discussing new ideas, criticism, and polemics. In fact, it is an essential need. I f the League m em bers are to outg ro w the level of ready-m ade directives and b eco m e political activists finding the m ost adequate solutions for their daily w ork, the p a rty press will have to becom e a stage for the liveliest discussion o f all the theoretical and practical questions o f o u r societal life.
S o m e O rganizational Problem s

On the basis o f o u r practice and o u r discussions up to the present, it would seem that som e organizational solutions have definitively crystallized. We begin with these solutions. 1. Since the League o f C o m m u nists o f Yugoslavia is n o t a traditional political party, whose only concern is vote-getting, but a i m s a t b e i n g a n avant-garde that will transform social relationships and consciousness, its basic organization m u st be Jinked to th e place o f w ork and n o t to residence. Accordingly, party meetings will be open, as a rule T h e Socialist League em bodies the c o m p lem en tary territorial principle o f political organization. 2. Since the LCY is against professional leaders, th en in principle every m e m b e r o f the LCY m ust be a m em b er o f a base o r g a n iz a tio n . T he admission, disciplining, and expulsion o f m em bers are perform ed by the base organization. 3. Since the League o f C om m un ists avowedly aims at decreasing a n d , f i n a l l y , e lim in a tin g th e factors o f p ow er from its organization, a strict separation is m ade betw een it and the state apparatus; party leaders m ay n o t be g ov ern m en t functionaries at the same time, and vice versa, 4. By virtue o f 2 and 3, a system o f ro ta tio n is practiced at all levels. T he m em bers o f the leadership are responsible to their electors and m ay be recalled at any time, in accordance with an established procedure. B u t they may also resign on th eir ow n initiative, because o f dissent or o th e r reasons, w ith o u t thereby affecting their party status. 5. T h e League o f C o m m u n ists is n o t an organization raised above society, n o r does it p ropose to impose its ideas on society by force It o perates by persuasion, exam ple, and organization. In particular, the LCY is n o t outside o f nor above the Socialist Alliance of Working People o f Yugoslavia (S S R N J), b u t o perates

224

within it. Som e agencies, e.g., commissions, m ay operate join tly. 6. Since territorial decentralization (th e co m m u nal system ) has been proclaimed in the c o u n try , the League of C om m u nists has n o t only vertical connections, influencing the g overnm ent and the SkupStina, b u t also suitable c o m m itte es reflecting definite links at all levels o f the organization o f governm ent Up to the present, these have often been chains o f co m m and F ro m now on they w o u l d h a v e to be converted into political consultations. F u r t h e r m o r e , l o c a l c o m m i tt e e s would have much more in dep end ence and exercise m u ch greater initiative in analyzing the political situation on the scene and in taking suitable positions. 7. Until now the fu nction o f collecting and analyzing political in form atio n has been mainly p erfo rm ed by the security service. It has been found th at this w ork was done in an extrem ely primitive and unreliable m anner, and th a t the consequences were horrifying. This practice has been d o n e away with. Obviously, this function has to be taken over by party organizations and com m ittees, together with the S SR N J, with full c o m m itm e n t on the part of the party and o th e r press. In addition , I do n o t see any reason why m ost o f this w ork could n o t be stripped o f the conspiratorial atm o sph ere it has been cloaked in h ith e rto , and perform ed openly. In fact, this is essential if we are to educate politically m ature citizens. T h e n ex t few propositions do n o t seem to have been generally accepted yet: 8., In collecting and analyzing political in form ation , the co m m itte es must have an ex p e rt staff o f professional political scientists, sociologists, econom ists, and psychologists. These functions, o f course, are n o t subject to ro tation . But th e political f u n c t i o n s o f l e a d e r s h i p w o u l d h a v e t o b e gradually deprofessionaiized 9, C om m ittees at all levels w ould have to have sub com m ittees em bracing a wide range o f m em bers of the LCY, and nonm em bers, w ith the necessary qualifications and a m arked interest in working in the field in question. In particular, the c o m m itte es would have to rely on scientific organizations as a whole, and no t only on individuals w ho h ap p e n to be m em b ers o f the subcom m ittees. U ntil now the opinion lias prevailed that scientific organizations have to be financed by the state, and co m m ittees might som etim es get som e services from them . As a result, system atic scientific w o rk was not organized in a n u m b e r o f vital dom ains. Regular review of theoretical trends at ho m e and abroad in the field o f s o c ia l sciences and art; research on the labor m ovem ent; investigation o f political p h en om ena and social processes, and so

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forth all these could be financed directly, and in this way organized, by th e Central C o m m ittee, But district co m m ittees could also have funds for scientific w ork. If for n o th in g else, these funds could serve to c o n d u c t inquiries from time to time in to v a r i o u s local political and social problems.. Actually, the possibilities of w ork are m uch greater for exam ple, finding o u t why self-government is n o t functioning in som e enterprises; why there are tensions with som e social, national, or religious groups; why the po p u latio n reacts negatively or positively to certain measures; and so fo rth . In general, o u r society is becoming m ore and m ore com plex, and u n d er these cond itions th e League o f C om m unists should rely m uch m ore on science than has been the case to date 10. In ord er to carry o u t the principle o f th e right m an in th e right place, we can no longer c o n tin u e o u r previous centralized assignment o f cadres. In ad dition , there can be no genuine in tia p a rty d em ocratization as long as leadership cadres im pose their choices on the highest instances instead o f being b oun d by their electors and the base organizations Elections up to now have been co-optations ratified by voting ra th e r than genuine elections. Naturally, if such was the case in th e League o f C om m unists, this negative practice was even m ore characteristic o f governm ent elections. If we truly wish to enact socialist d em ocracy, it is absolutely essential that C om m un ists be the first to set up their own organization o n those principles, 11, T h e broad masses will judge the League o f C om m unists mainly by w hat sort o f people from their own milieu e n te r the League. Hence, the surest criterion for recruiting new m em bers is to insure th a t the candidate is o utstand in g in his own milieu. I f he is a w orker, is he an inno v ato r or rationalizer? Does he go over the norm ? Is he o utstan d in g in governing agencies and an exam ple to his comrades? If lie is a peasant, is he a m odel producer? F o r students, grades are im p o rta n t; for artists, talent; for a scientist, creativity. O f course, all these people m ust have, in add itio n to their professional ability, a definite moral quality if their milieu is to look up to them . In the present situation, in fact, the moral quality o f th e candidate is o f crucial im portance. In the previous policy for adm itting mem bers, the crucial criterion was his sociopolitical co m m itm e n t. T h at criterion expressed o rientatio n toward a political so c ie ty , toward the governm ent of'society by force. Im m ediately after the revolution, in the days o f the CPY, that o rien tation was functional; to d ay , in the period of the LCY, it is dysfunctional and leads to loss o f prestige and significance by the League o f C om m unists. An inquiry by Kilibarda, with 775 226

subjects, showed th a t a b o u t h alf'o f them tho u g h t that the criteria fo r admission into the LCY were lower than they should be Inquiry into political adm issions in tw o large firms in 1965 showed th at 29% o f the new m em bers were ad m itte d on the basis o f sociopolitical activity, 22% on the basis o f their w ork and zeal, and 13% on the basis o f moral qualities. An inquiry into the opinions o f m em bers and no n m em b ers o f the LCY as to w hat the policy on admissions should be gave inverted criteria, w ith moral qualities in the first place, w ork in second place, and sociopolitical activity in last place [27: 198-203] . The results o f this last inquiry are a good expression of' th e re q u irem en ts o f th e new situation. If' the League wishes to be the social avant-garde, its m em bers must exercise th a t fu nction in th eir milieus T hat is still a n o th e r aspect in which the League o f C o m m un ists differs from classical political parties, which d o n o t try to enroll the best people in the co u n try , but only the best politicians in the coun try . If this is so, then the cadre policy o f recent years was rather unsuccessful. G ood peo p les leaving the L e a g u e ,40 and the refusal o f very positive elem ents to jo in o n the gro un ds th at the League was joined either by people w ho did not enjoy the respect of the public o r by those w ho had lost it - these are indications o f this phenomenon.. 12. In order to insure that elections will really be elections, all elections to party leadership m ust be secret, with the n u m b e r of candidates at least, say, 50%' higher than the n um ber of' places to be filled. There m ust be at least tw o candidates for the post of secretary. Candidacies w ith platform s must be entered at a stated time in advance in o rd e r to enable the voters to choose the best f i t t e d . In order to m ake possible initiatives from below, candidacies may also be proposed by lower instances and basic organizations. All election results m ust be m ade public, Finally, new possibilities: 13. In a system o f self-government, the initiative m ust come from below, and for solving n o t only local problem s but all social p r o b l e m s I f it is alleged that self-government and direct dem ocracy are n o t functio nin g m ost efficiently today , once again the explanation is, at least in part, that m u tatis m utandis they have not been present in the League of' C om m un ists There, the basic organization only received directives, w orked o u t their details, and executed them . The base organization had no initiative, and in general it had no influence in forming the policy o f the League; th a t was d o n e at the center. If the cen te r did not continually send d o w n directives (as h appened in recent years, which is clearly positive), there was disorientation and passivity on the s p o t, and all w ork came to an end. To my way of 227

thinking, the base organization m ust take a m ost active part in the sociopolitical life o f its milieu and o f the co u n try as a whole. It will be in a position to solve som e problem s itself, directly. Som e problem s will go b eyond its sphere of action and there m ust therefore be possibilities of passing them on for solution, in an organized way. by the n ex t higher level in the district. Similarly, som e p ro blem s will be o f the scope o f the republic or all-Yugoslav. F o r exam ple, a base organization may take n o te o f the em igration o f scientific and professional cadres from th e co u n try and have some indication th a t the reason for this is irresponsible pressure by the security service, or an incorrect political relationship to those people, or an incorrect cadre policy. O r th e organization m ay feel that in its co m m u n e, or in the c o u n try as a whole, the political course with respect to individual p ro ducers is incorrect. O r it may be the o pin ion o f the base organization th at the provocations o f the West G erm an G o v e rn m e n t41 can no longer be tolerated and th a t sanctions m ust be applied. Or, on the basis o f the experience o f their m em b ers and friends, it m ay conclude th a t the legal system does n o t m eet the needs o t the co u n try . These attitu d e s and conclusions may be objectively right o r wrong. The essential thing is th a t th ey have appeared and m ust be dealt with. First of' all, the b a s e organization will present its problem to the district com m ittee, I f the district c o m m itte e regards it as justifie d, it will send it o n; if n o t, it is obliged to s u b m i t it for consideration to a district party conference, m ost likely th e annual conference, where the delegates o f the o th e r base organizations will have a chance to evaluate it. I f the conference a d o p ts the resolution o f the base organization, it will send it on to th e n e x t higher instance, where the pro ced u re will be repeated, with a representative o f the b a s e o rg a n iz a tio n having an o p p o rtu n ity to give an oral explanation. In this way individual resolu tion s m ay reach up to the party congress. 14. B ut party congresses are held every fo u r years.. F o r the above-m entioned system to fu n c tio n properly, m eetings would have to be held m o re frequen tly say, every year. We already have such m eetings on the level o f the base a n d district organizations in th e form o f annual ( o r biennial) conferences.. It will now be tim e to in tro d u ce annua] general party conferences as well. It should be ad ded th a t the o rd e r o f this ascending line o f initiative from the base organizations could be linked to th e w ork o f subco m m itte es at all levels. In this way the meetings o f the su b com m ittees and the annual conferences would be transform ed in to genuine political tribunes (instead o f the form e r soporific m o n o to n y ), in which every im p o r t a n t sociopolitical p ro blem

would be taken Lip and which would politically activate the broadest party and n o t only party masses T hat too, n a t u r a l ly , is a p recond itio n for the Leagues fulfilling its avant-garde role and for citizens being prepared for responsible political life T he foregoing fo urteen p roblem s evidently far from exhaust the organizational p roblem s o f the League o f C om m unists, They have been so chosen as to present th e basic organizational precon ditions for enabling the LCY to p erform its functions, as analyzed above. FOOTNOTES
I. C f , e g , A. R u m ian tse v |1 : ]1-34| H e was q uite right from his point o l v ie w : w o rk e r self-governm ent w eakens the d ictato rsh ip o f the b u re au cra cy anti the consequences o f an y d ictato rsh ip . It lik ew ise elim inates a d m in istrative planning
T h i s n e e d w a s u n d e r s c o r e d b y V, B u k a r i c at ( h e f irst s e s s i o n o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n R e o rgan ization o f Ihe League S e e his a d d r e s s at t h e S i x t h P l e n u m o f t h e L e a g u e o f C o m m u n i s t s o f M o n t e n e g r o .

2 3

A recent in q u iry in to the o p in io n s o f's tu d e n ts at the In s titu te o f S o c ia l S cicn cc s cle arly brings out the im p lica tio n s o f the fact that social origin is q u ite secondary as com pared to d ifferen ces in na tio n a l cu ltu re 'S o c ia l origin is alm ost an irrelevant factor in the levels o f evalu a tio n o f the so cio p o litica l system , whereas m ajor variatio ns in ideas can be seen in stu dents from d iffe re n t national-cultural m ilie u s . F u rth e r, the m o re d evelo ped m ilieu s have higher levels o f asp iration : S tu d en ts from centers that are w e a k ly d evelo ped so cio e co n o m ica lly (S k o p je , S a ra je v o ) usually have rather positive attitu d es to w ard this s o c ie ty , w h ile students from the m ore developed so cio cu ltu ral m ilieus (S lo v e n ia , C ro a tia ) are m ore c ritica l 1 F in a lly , n a tio n a lity plays 1 an outstan din g ro le : " . . it was observed that n a tio n a lity . . co n d itio n s the greatest varian ce in attitu d es to w ard ideals, or influen ces the stru ctu re o f the stu d e n t's ideaJs m u ch m ore than o th e r ch aracteristics o f his p erson ality Seco n d placc in the o rder o f im p o rtan ce o f ch aracteristics is m em bership in the League o f C o m m u n ists and the nature o f the fa c u lty . A fte r that com e sex, religious beliefs, social o rigin, e t c / ' (B r o e ic ct til | 5 ] ) . As students are m o re c u ltu ra lly m o b ile than o ther caleogries o f the p op ulation * it m ay be expected that these observations w ould be seen even m ore m ark ed ly in o ther social groups. W e add one m ore bit o f statistics; illite ra c y is 1 in S lo v e n ia , 4 1 % in K o sm e t. T h e re are sim ilar spreads in o ther ind ices o f e co n o m ic, cu ltu ra l, and health standards. E g g the decisions o f the S ix th Plenum o f the C e n tra l C o m m itte e o f the League p oint out th a t the stru ctu re o f the League o f Yugoslav C o m m un ists has been o u tstrip p ed in m an y respects by the d em o cratic and self-governm ent d evelo pm en t o f s o c ie ty (2 4 : 19] N o r m a lly , says M. M a rk o vie , (hose w ill be Ihe leaders w h o have, to the greatest exten t, the personal qualities req u ired Tor successful leadership and w b o can m ost successfully interp ret and a p p ly the p arty program . H en ce the tend ency to regard the directives as their ow n. and the conscious id e n tifica tio n o f the in d ivid u al w ith the co llective w ill o f the o rganization to w h ic h he belongs [ 6 : 1 0 ). A t least one em pirical in q u iry has been m ade in this area; K. K ifiharda finds that the re p u tatio n o r the L C Y lias d eclin ed syste m a tica lly from the tim e oT the w ar o f lib eration to the present | 27; 2!6-21 7, 2 3 4 1. A t the same lim e* no serious em pirical investigation has yet been m ade o f w h a t the League oT C o m m un ists and its m em bers a c tu a lly represent in ih e p eo p le s consciousness and in our ac tu a lity O ne surprising d atum , w h ich calls Tor fu rth e r stu d y, emerged from a ro u tin e p relim inary question naire oT the W o rk e r s U n iv e rs ity on the occasion oT a lecture oT m ine at a large business firm in Belg ra d e : hair oT the fiTty C o m m un ists q ucstio ucd declared that m em bers oT the L C Y are a separate social stratu m , just as w o rkers, peasants, artisans, in te lle c tu a l w o rkers, and leader cadres are In answ ering the next q uestion , o n ly 8 % o f (hose questioned regarded L C Y m em bers as the m ost h ig h ly esteemed social stra tu m ,1 h ile w o rke rs received 32% oT the votes 'w T h e ethical p rob lem is raised most o ften am ong us by p hilosophers; their professional interest is p ro b ab ly also a fac to r As i f it w ere s u ffic ie n t, D G rlic asks, Tor one, that the sam e m an, w h o was onee ready to give his liTe for the tru th , n.eed o n ly imagine h o w bold w o rd s m ay prevent him from becom ing an academ ician,

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an am bassador, or the head o f an institu te , and these sm all social privileges becom e a su fficie n t reason for co n fo rm ism on his part, for silence or s k illfu l cam ou flag e o f ideas, perpetual sh ifting , am biguous investig ation , or shrew d te m p o riz in g 1 [ 7 : 4 0 ] ' A lth o u g h the posing o f the p rob lem seems just to me, ihe so lution s that have emerged from p hilo so ph ical discussion do not alw a ys seem realistic. A lth o u g h u id ivid nals m ay in flu e n ce social processes, and p ersonalities o f high m oral qualities may help raise the general m oral level, there are m an y more relevant w a ys in w h ich social processes form personalities, inclu d ing Ih e ir ethical qualities 9 I still have a vivid re co lle c tio n o f an event som e years ago, at a m eeting o f a te rrito rial base o rg anization C o rru p tio n was under discussion W h y is this point raised at all? " one speaker said (in c id e n ta lly , an o ffic ia l o f the se cu rity p o lic e ) W e all give bakshish to get things done W h a t impressed me at the tim e was not so m ncli Ihe fact th a l one degenerate b ureaucrat had lost Ihe feeling for basic m oral d istin ctio n s, b ul that no n e o f the fift y C o m m u n ists present reacted to his statem ent and th a l the same m an was later elected to the secretariat o f the org anisatio n A fte r the B rio n i P le n u m , he was expelled from the League oF C o m m u n ists and the S e c u rity S e rvic e 10 T h e danger arising from the m erger o f p arty and state leadership was no ted re lativ ely early In 1 930, E K a rd e lj w arned in the S k u p S tin a ; The question o f org anization is at the sam e tim e a p o litic a l one W e have a situ atio n on the local level w h e re the rule Is for tlie secretary o f the p a rly co m m itte e to be elected as ch airm an or se creta ry, at the same tim e, in the local p e o p le s co u n c il The result was that the p arty co m m itte e was merged in his hands w ith the apparatus o r the focal p e o p le s co u n c il T h u s, there was no social factor, o r at least a greatly w eakened one, that could co n tro l the g overnm ent apparatus, that co u ld criticiz e it in the nam e o f the people, in the name o f the p a r t y [2 4 : 3 8 8 ] A lth o u g h it was not stated e x p lic itly , it m ay be presum ed that there was an awareness o f the negative consequences arising from the m erger o f g overnm ent and p arty apparatus, and on higher than local levels. 11, T h is fact* and the existence o f a clear awareness o f it, are w ell illu strated by a case cited in 1964 by S. K a v c ic O n the occasion o f the recep tio n for som e n e w mem bers, the secretary o f a base o rg anization o f the Leag ue in Slo ve n ia said: N o w you are no longer w h a t you w ere b efo re ; n o w th a l you have joined the League o f C o m m un ists, you w ill have to letwe outside a part o f the freedom you had up to n o w / In his co m m e n ta ry , K a vcic rem arks that such cases are o b vio u sly no rarity ['24: 4 5 9 [ T h a t they are not rare is co n firm e d by an em pirical investigation by K . K ilib a rd a in an o th e r part o f the c o u n try (K ra lje v o reg io n ) T h e au th o r is surprised h im se lf by his findings, and tries to find a ju s tific a tio n for th e m : T h e investig ation ind icates the existence o f inaccu rate and in co m p lete view s, and even p rejudices ( s ic l), snch as the state o f in itia tiv e in the League o f C o m m un ists. O il this question, m em bers and nonm em bers o f the League o f C o m m u n ists d iffe r; e g , no n m em bers rarely cite in itia tive as a q u a lity most needed to be a m em ber o f the L C Y and to be a leader in it Even m ore, the o p in io n exists that qualities c o n tra ry to in itia tiv e are requisite to be a m em ber o f the League o f C o m m un ists, and still m ore so to be a leader in it. On this basis, it is held that a certain obed ien ce, even in the classic sense o f the w o rd , is re q u ire d '1 | 27: 501 12 V D akaric notes sig n ifican tly that careerism and o rie n ta tio n to w ard m e d io crity tend lo begin in y o u th organizations ] 24: I 76] 13 i S ch u m p e te r, a fte r citing h isto rical exam ples, rem arks: A s every p o litic al leader knows* it is o n ly in m e d io crity that lo y a lty can be counted u p o n I 8: 2 8 1 ] 14 The fo llo w in g instance is illu stra tive It relates to A m e ric a n g o vernm ent bureun cru cy, but m u ta tis m u ta n d is co u ld ap p ly to an y o th e r n a tio n 's b u reau cracy, incln d ing ours C W rig h t M ills q uotes J . H alle, a m em ber o f I he p o litic al planning s ta ff at the S la te D e p a rtm e n t: W e hope that the A m e ric a n public w ill fin a lly realize that Ihe w ords reliable from the point o f v ie w o f slate s e c u rity have becom e a euphem ism , T his personnel policy acco un ts for Ihe p rim itive p o licy in the last five years o f elim inatin g from governm ent service those w lu i are in te lle c tu a lly am i m o ra lly e m inent and filling their places w ith p o litic a lly acce p ta b le people that is to say, w ith those w h o cann ot be suspected o f being in te lle c tu a lly or m o ra lly s u p e rio r" |9 : 275 1 1 5 L in k in g the tw o p eaks. says V Rus, in an alyzing an article in D elavsk a P o litik a , is o f special interest lo those leadership groups in enterprises w h o lack su fficie n t professional a b ility and su fficie n t success in ru nn in g the enterprises T heir a u th o rity cann ot be justified on e ith er professional or w o rk in g lin es; th e y therefore try lo legalize it on p o litic al lines En te rin g in to association w ith the leaderships o f so cio p o litica l o rganizations is a cru cial m eans, in such cases, for co n so lidatin g positions o f d o m in a tio n | 11: 10911

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Im m e d ia te ly a fte r the Urioni lJ lenum , l it o , o b vio u sly w ith R a n k o v ie in m ind, observed on one occasion that the co n d itio n s un der w h ich a man is situated and w o rk s .sometimes load him to be false to h im se lf and to enter on a path that he w o u ld not even dare to th in k o f T his is n o t a question o f one man. It ts a q uestion oT people w h o arrived at responsible position s and w ere not equal lo th e m " | 24: 139) Su b je ctivism in the cadre p o licy o f the L C Y . 'f V V la h o v ic conclud es co n cern in g tile same p roblem , brought it ab o ut th a l those cadres w h o are incapable o f coping w ith the b attle o f o pinio ns, w h o cann ot rely on their o w n know ledge and a b ility or fail to understand the course oT social d evelo pm en t, set up (he logic and m echanism o f closed groups, a sort o f p o litic a l underground, insulated From the judgm ent oF p u b lic it y 1 (2 4 : 7 3 2 1 , R e actin g to lleg eT s thesis that hie rarch y is p ro te c tio n from the abuse oF p ow er, M arx gives an excellent d escriptio n oF the b u re a u cra cy : . .a s though the h ie rarc h y is not tiie m ain ab u sct and as though the Few personal sins co m m itte d b y em ployees can be co m p ared w ith the sins that essentially emerge From that h ie ra rc h y ; the h ie rarc h y punishes em p lo yees iF th e y sin against it o r iF th e y co m m it a superfluous sin for the h ie ra rc h y ; but the h ie rarc h y p ro te cts the e m p lo yee i f it sins through h im ; in o th e r w o rd s, it is hard to co n vin ce the h ie rarc h y oF the sins o f its mem bers [1 2 : 72] W h e n a p ositive d ete rm in a tio n o f the rules o f livin g is so cially b lock ed, and u tilita ria n ism has b eco m e the basic criterion o f a c tiv ity , then m oral barriers are dow n anti abuses becom e a co n stitu e n t part o f e ve ryd ay life In this co n tex t, K C rve n k o v sk i observes: A n enorm ous nu m b er o f citizens* co m p la in ts and p etitio n s have com e lo the a tte n tio n o f g o vernm ent agencies, the League o f C o m m un ists, and state and p arty fu nctio naries, and have been discussed by the highest represen tative bodies W e e n c o u n te r this p rob lem e ve ry w h ere to d a y ; people co m p la in o f the C o m m un ists and the C o m m u n ists co m p la in oF the v io la tio n not o n ly o f their civic rights but o f their rights as m em bers o f the L C Y T [2 4 : 2 2 11 * T h e first s t a t i s t i c a l d a t a o n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e L C Y w e r e m a d e p u b l i c o n l y i n 1967, w h i c h i n i t s e l f is s y m p t o m a t i c T h e a n a l y s i s b e l o w is b a s e d a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y o n t h e s e d a t a , w h i c h w e r e p r e p a r e d b y S F' i l i pi j 2 4 : 746*7 88 | I n t h a t y e a r a c h e c k o f the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e w a s m a d e ; p r e v i o u s l y * r e g i s t r a t i o n ac co rd in g to o c e n p a t i o n was m a d e w h e n the c a n d id a te was a d m i t te d to the LC Y. As a r e s u l t , t h e n u m b e r o F w o r k e r s a n d p e a s a n t s s h o w n d e c r e a s e d b y 4 5 ,000 a n d 93,000
respectively, a nd the n u m b e r o f e m p lo y e e s a n d o th ers increased by those a m o u n ts

21 T h e Factor oF m ore rapid g ro w th relates to the 1954-1966 p erio d, since there are no data For 1 953 22 T o r a co rre ct in te rp re ta tio n o f the results o f the analysis, it should be rem em bered that it is not su bjective desires that are invo lved but o b je c tiv e ly co n d itio n e d Facts 23. A d m issio n o f w o rkers reached a m ax im um in 1959 w ith 4 3 .0 % o f all admissions, and a m in im u m in 1966 w ith 30 1% Ex p u lsio n s rose from 2 4 .5 % in 195 1 to 5 7 1 % o T al! expulsions in 1965 24 2 V i d a k o v i c g i v e s a n i n t e r e s t i n g e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n t o c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n : . the mass p artic ip a tio n o f the peasant in the arm ed phase oT the re vo lu tio n and in the establishm ent o f re v o lu tio n a ry p o w e r co n trib u te d to the failure o f the governm ental-ad m in istrative n a tio n a liz atio n o f ag ricu ltu re, For the so cio p o liticn lly active peasantry did not passively and su bm issively accept ad m in istrative m ethods o f c o lle c tiv iz a tio n 12 6 : 421. 25 V C vjetic an in has published an interesting em pirical stu d y on C o m m u n ists in a C ro a tia n village. A t the end o f the a rticle he cites, w ith o u t co m m e n t, the statem ent o f peasant Hradic at a p arty discussion in V e lik a G o rlcu . T h e fo llo w in g excerpt from his state m e n t s u c c in c tly sums up Ihe situ atio n in the villag e: W e ll, 1 was an activist for ten years in ail Ihe s o cio p o litica l bodies and leaderships; I have a high position and am a leader in the villag e B u t up to the present, in D o n ji HruSfcvac and its surroundings, no one has given a re p o rt oti the Eig h th Congress o f the L C , oil the I'ifth Congress o f the C ro a tia n S S R N , on the C o m m u n al S ta tu te , o r on the Yug o slav C o n s titu tio n W e do not k n o w w h a t the S ta tu te is, just as .we do not know* w h a t the e co n om ic measures are I do not k n o w ; nor do the others. N o th in g happens there N o b o d y gives a talk on health , ve te rin a ry questions, an im al h u sb and ry, care oF pigs, agriculture, etc N o tracto r has ever plow ed a Fu rro w in D o n ji HruScvac. and w e learn For ourselves w h a t has to be done to im p ro ve anim al husb and ry, w in e making. Farming, and e ve ryth in g else . W e have a co o p e ra tive that sells coal for 80 dinars, and w e sell it for 40 dinars. That is e x p lo ita tio n o f the ag ricu ltu ral prod ucer A ll o f us see that and are w e ll aw are o f it A n d then they say, T h e y 'r e onrs, let them w o r k , but this peasant has 10 acres o f land and you stick a tax on him .

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A n d the co o p e ra tive cheats the peasant. T h a ts the w ay to be a C o m m u n is t . . I have 50 people that w o u ld w aut to be C o m m u n ists, and d o n t 1 k n o w w h y ? I have apples but they are ro tten and the pigs cat them* Y o u have plum s and c a n t sell them . N o t o n ly in D o n ji HruSevac but in S trcz e vg and o ther places W<j have a school, but it Fias gone to the dogs; o u r ch ild re n go out to pasture, w h e n th e y should go eight years to sc h o o l........ Y o u go Lo buy fe rtiliz e r at the co o p e ra tive , and they cheat you in every w a y , i f you w a n t the fe rtiliz e r for the spring, th e y 'll give it to you for the fall and tell you i t s good for the spring. . B u t the farm expert 1 w e n t to sec told uie one kind was fo r this, and the o th e r kind fo r th a t; at the co o p e ra tive they sell it for eve ryth in g . S o w c are ch eating the farm er W h a t kind oT League o f C o m m u n ists o rg anization arc yo u going to have, h o w can you organize in the villages . ? " [ 2 5: 13) It m ight be aftltcd: just w h a t w o u ld u p rop er village p o licy have been lik e ? It is easier to give an ausw er a fte r the fact than before P ro b a b ly , the basic elem ents o f such a p o licy w o u ld have to be: b uild ing o n the p o litic a l ca p ital d erived from the w ar, to carry through an agrarian refo rm lim itin g the size o f holdings and e m p lo y m e n t o f outside la b o r (w h ic h was d o n e ); co n ve rtin g the fo rm e r large holdings in to state p ro p e rty , provide them w ith m echanized equ ip m e n t, m ake them nurseries o f m odern te ch n o lo g y, and form co o p e ra tive relatio n s w ith in d ivid u al peasants (th is was done o n ly in p a rt); and taking advantage o r existing trad itio ns, stim u latin g spontaneous form s o f co o p erative cco n o m y. T h is was n o t d one; not o n ly that, b ut even to d ay the spontaneous fo rm atio n o f co o peratives is ealled w ild c o o p e ra tiv e and is persecuted A ls o req u ired are: by clear directives and e co n o m ic means, stim u latin g the expansion and tran sfo rm atio n o f in d ivid u al p ro d u c tio n to co o p e ra tive p ro d u ctio n in enterprises; e lim in a tin g illite ra cy (a fte r a quarter-century o f so cialist co n stru c tio n , one-tbird o f ihe peasantry is still illite ra te ) and organizing a sp ecific program o f mass e d u catio n and stu d y iu the villag es; sy ste m a tica lly in tro d u cin g into the L C Y Lhc progressive peasants, producers w h o have w o n social respect in their co m m u n itie s; lib erating and stim u latin g e co n o m ic in itia tiv e , and co n sidering the results o f p rod uctive labor as so cialist, aud not k u la k T he situ atio n in w h ich the L C Y was a fte r the B rio n i Ple n u m inaugurated the reorganization as described b y M, H ndZi V a s ile v : I f w e except the a c tiv ity o f the d eveloped organizations o f the Leag ue, w h ich adjusted to the n e w co n d itio n s, the social p racticc o f m ost organizations is characterized as fo llo w s : ( 1 ) a thin la y e r of C o m m u n ists is w o rk in g in the o ld b ure au cra tic w a y , because from such positions they w ill be able to usurp self-governm ent a c tio n or co n tin u e to be id e u tifie d w ith p o w e r; (2 ) the mass o f C o m m u n ists . arc rallying around th eir organization . . from a deep feeling that they arc giving up the old relation ship s, that the actual social a c tio n o f the organization is inad eq u ate and the p rob lem s rem ain open, inside and outside it; (3 ) p assivisation o f a large n u m b er o f C o m m u n ists " [2 4 ; 3 5 8 ] I have no w a y o f establishing s c ie n tific a lly h o w true this evaluatio n is T h e p erson ality o f the a u th o r and the p u b lica tio n in w h ic h it appears ca ll fo r taking it as highly significant A n interesting p ub lic o p in io n in q u iry in 1964 show ed that three-quarters o f those questioned, in e very so cial stratu m , felt that the in flu e n ce o f C o m m u n ists in the w o rk o f agencies o f self-governm ent sh ou ld be re in fo rced , the p rim a ry aim o f this being to im pro ve th e ir w o rk and to create b etter relatio n s in enterprises and establishm ents T h e region w ith the sm allest p rop o rtio u o f persons callin g for increased co m m u n is! in flu e n ce was S lo ve n ia , w h ere it was o n ly 6 0 2 % o f those q uestioned (D lin ic [ 14: 259 | ) In co n trast to the terms in d ivid u al''' and c o lle c t iv e ," the terms in d iv id u a lis tic 1* and c o lle c tiv is t have a p ejo rative m eaning in our language, w h ich is w h a t I m eant to express, C o m pariu g this ty p o lo g y w ith . Tor exam ple, G u r v it c h s ty p o lo g y o f m o ra lity , it w ill be seen that the first typ e corresponds to Ira d itio n a l m o r a lit y ,1 the second to a 1 co m b in a tio n o f im p e ra tiv e * and u t ilit a r ia n " m o ra lity , and the third to a co m b in a tio u o f u lilita ria n m o ra lity and the m o ra lity o f later-m ade ju d g m e n ts ( G G u rv itc h , P ro b lem s o f the S o c io lo g y o f the M oral L ife [ 1 9 |) D escrib in g this kind o f c o n fo r m ity , E F ro m m says: I have lo do w h a t e veryon e does, so thal I have to agree, I dare not be d iffe re n t, I dare not "go o ff o n m y o w n / I must be read y and w illin g to change as standards change; I dare not ask w h e th e r I am right or w ron g , but o n ly w h e th e r I am ap pro ved , to m ake sure that I am not an e x c e p tio n , not d iffe re n t . * N o b o d y has p o w e r over m e except the cr o w d o f w h ich I am a part and to w h ich I s u b m it1' [1 6 : 158 j To the exten t thal man is us th e y w ant him to b e / rnan is not a p e rs o n a lity ; he is

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uneasy, depends on the ap proval o f others, co n stan tly dem anding th e ir permission. A n alienated person feels in fe rio r w h cu e ve r tie is afraid he is not in line, Insofar as his feeling o f his o w n value depends on the ap proval he gets fo r c o n fo r m ity , lie naturally feels threatened in the consciousness o f his eg o/ in his o w n self-respect, w hen any feeling or tho u gh t or actio n is invo lved that co u ld be in terp reted as d eviatio n B u t insofar as he is a hu m an being and not a ro h o t, he cann ot avoid d eviatio n and therefo re alw a ys fears d isapp roval T h e feeling o f strength and s e cu rity does not b reak through in lo his consciousness, but the feeling that he has lost them is a lw a y s th e re " (F r o m m [ 16: 201 ] ) , 33 W e k n o w these c h a ra cte ro lo g ica r* traits from o u ro w n propagandists o f the p o licy o f the firm h a n d / ' requ ired to keep order. T o the degree that this is n o t a m atter of b ureaucrats fighting to keep their positions, it involves disoriented ind ivid uals, confused b y the co n stant chungcs b rou g ht to them b y our social develo pm en t, Ind ivid uals try in g to o ve rco m e their in se cu rity by m eans o f the ce rta in ty o f d ogm atism , and the alienatio n o f th e ir personalities by a sy m b io tic relatio n ship to in fa llib le a u th o rity , D uverger also gives a good d escription o f this au th o rita tive typ e o f m an \ 2 : 2 9 ]: T h is kind o f p o litic a l b e h a vio r is p a rtic u la rly ch aracteristic of iusecure personalities, w h o never succeeded in creating their o w n personalities, in getting sta b ilise d ; o f personalities w h o d o u b t their o w n egos and their ow n iden tities T h e y grope sp asm o d ically for the extern al m ilieu because they find no resources w ith in them selves 34 T h is is a fa irly s lo w process F o r exam ple, the bourgeois re vo lu tio n in E n g lan d to ok place in the seventeenth c e n tu ry , but rem nants o f feudalism have survived d ow n to to day, Y e t no one w o u ld th in k o f regarding England as a feudal c o u n try o r fear that feudalism m ight he restored there 35 L e tte r, Engels to G erso n T rie r, D e ce m b er 18, 1889. 36 It seems to m e ," observes K C rv e n k o v sk i, that we still , , , b elieve that an open rem ark by a fu n c tio n a ry , a person in the ranks o f the League o f Yug o slav C o m m un ists, re latin g to his view s and co n ce p tio n s is the beginning o f the end for h im , that a rem ark co n ce rn in g his p osition is the process o f his rem oval W e do not have the habit o f Tree d ialogue, oT co m in g to agreem euts.. 1 should even say that the higher* w e go, the m ore e x p lic it is . . this m e n ta lity , although it cannot be said that it docs not exist 'b e lo w * " [ 10; 13 1-132] 37. M a rx , L e t t e r to D racke, M a y S , 1875. 38. En gels, L e tte r to R ebel, M a y 1-2, 1891. 39. E ve n to d ay, in fact, dogm atists both al hom e and abroad hold that open b lasphem y is being co m m itte d by us, and th e y state, in the F ic h tc a n sp irit o f so m u ch the worse For the fa c ts , that ssocialist c o m m o d ity p ro d u c tio n is a c o n tra d ic tio hi adjecto 40 T his serious co n d itio n has not ye t heen s y ste m a tica lly studied Three data shed some lig h t: w o rk e rs leave the L C Y most o f all (m o re than h a lf o f all resig nations); the highest percentage leaving is from the m ost developed re p u b lic, S lo ve n ia (2 1% o f the m em bership in 1966, or three tim es the m ean for Y u g o slavia), and resignations o f m em bers o f long stan ding (6 6 % w ith over five ye ars stan ding ) (2 4 : 7 8 4 1, 4 1 - The W est G e rm a n g o vernm ent broke d ip lo m atic relatio n s w ith Y u g o slavia and refused to pay w a r rep aration s

REFERENCES
I [ I] 21 A R u m ja n ce v, So c ia list R e a lit y and the 'T h e o rie s7 o f C o m rad e E K a r d e lj/ 1 K o m u n ist. 1956, N o . 18 M D uverg er, S o c io lo g y o f P o litic a l P a rtie s / ' in So c io lo g y . B o o k I I, N aprijed, Zagreb, 1966. P o lit ic a l Parties, A S o c io lo g ic a l S t u d y o f the O lig a rch ic a l Tendencies o f M o d e m D e m o c ra c y, Fre e Press, G le n co e . 1949, translated from the 1911 original R . T M c K e n z ie , B ritis h P o litic a l Parties, H e in e m an n , L o n d o n , 195S.. M. U ro cic e ra / , " S tu d e n ts and S o c ia lis m , G o d iin /ak [ A n n u a l ] , I D N , 1965. M. M a rk o v ic , M o ra l In te g rity o f Pe rso n ality in So c ia list S o c ia l y/* Filo z o ftja [P h ilo s o p h y ] , 1965, N o . 1* D G rlic , P e rso n a lity and C o u ra g e , F ilo z o fija , 1965, N o J J Sc h u m p elc r, Cap italism , Socialism-, an d D e m o c ra c y, H arp e r, N ew Y o r k , 1950 C . W . M ills, E lit e G o v ern m e n t, K u ltu ra , Belgrade, 1964 | o rig in a lly published as T he P o w e r E l i t e } K . C rve n k o v sk i, D e m o c ratiz atio n o f S o c ie t y and D e m o c ratiz atio n o f the L C Y , " i n

( 3| | 4] j 5] [ 6] [ 7] 1 8) | 9] (1 0 1

233

| 11] [1 2 ] I 13] [1 4 ]

[ J 5] ] 16] | 17] ] 1 H] I I 9] [2 0 ]
121]

| 22 j (2 3 1 [2 4 ] [2 5 ] [2 6 ] [2 7 ]

C u rre n t P ro b le m s o f R e o rg a n iz a tio n an d F u r t h e r D e ve lo p m e n t o f the L C Y : V S P N , Belgrade, 1967 V R u s , C liq ues in W o rk in g O rg a n iz a tio n s ," Gludista, 1966, N o 8-9 K. M arx, C ritiq u e o f H eg el's Ph ilo so p h y o f R ig h t o f ih c S ta te . V Ma.sleSa, S araje vo , I9 6 0 E Kedfelc, C o n tra d ic to ry 1 end end es in ih e S o c ia l S tru c tu re o f the League o f C o m m un ists,* Prcg le d [ R e v i e w ] , 1966, N o 3 P Df.inic, Pu b lic O p in io n on the In flu e n c e o f C o m m u n ists on (he W o rk o f S cl f-Manageruent O rg a n s ," in S o c ia l M an ag em en t in Yugoslavia. Y ug o slav S o c io lo g y A sso ciatio n , Belgrade, 1966 D. T S u z u k i and 1 Fro m m , : Bud d hism and Psyc h o an alysis, N o lil, Belgrade, 1964 E F ro m m , H e a lth y S o c ie ty , R a d , Belgrade, 1963 E Fro m m , F lig h t fro m Fre e d o m . N o lil, Belgrade, 1964. V Riesm an, T iic L o n e ly C ro w d , Y a le U n ive rs ity Press, N e w H aven , I 966 S o c io lo g y . B o o k II, edited by G G u rv itc li, N aprijed. Zagreb, 1966 S e c o n d In te rn a tio n a l, R ad , Belgrade, 195 1 V F Asm us, Lo g ic. Q G I 2 , M o s c o w , 1 9 4 7 M ao Tse-tung. Speech es and A rtic le s , T rid eset dana, [Belgrade, 1949 K M arx, V Engels, C ritiq u e o f the G o th a Pro g ram ; C ritiq u e o f the D ra ft E r f u r t Pro g ram ; K u ltu ra , Belgrade, 1 959. League o f C o m m u n ists o f Yugoslavia in Self-M anagem ent, edited by M. N ik o lie, K u ttu ra , Belgrade, 1967 V Cvjetitfanin, C o m m un ists in the V illa g e / S o c io lo g y o f the Village, 1967, N o Z V id a k o vie , Changes in the S tru c tu re o f Yug o slav S o c ie t y attd the League o f Com m unists. Sed m a sila, Belgrade, J9 6 7 . K K ilib ard a. Self-M an ag em ent and the Leag ue o f C om m unists, Socio lo g ical In stitu te , Belgrade, 1966

L6

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CHAPTER VI

Evolutionary Perspectives

T he analysis o f the fundam en tal co m p o n e n ts of our present social situation has been m ade in the fram ew ork set by this essay The time has com e to cast a glance into the future. It is highly u n p o p u la r in the social sciences (with the exception o f economics) to engage in prognoses. This situation is probably co nd itio ned by the fact th a t those sciences (once again, with the ex c ep tio n o f econom ics) are so far from being exact. Nonetheless, consideration o f the prospects for d evelop m ent is o f crucial im p o rtan ce for the rational c o n d u c t o f social tasks. F o r my part, p e r s o n a l l y , there seem to be the necessary elements for considering these perspectives. It is n o t impossible that, in taking this long view, I am projecting the possibilities o f my own narrow specialty, economics, too uncritically o n to the o th e r social sciences and the p h e n o m e n a o f society in its totality, However, until som eo ne proves the co ntra ry , I am convinced th a t it is possible to program n o t only industrial p ro d u c tio n bu t also. m u ta tis mutandis, social developm en t W ithout such possibilities, after all, scientific socialism loses its meaning We begin with the best-know n factor, the econo m y F o r over a decade the social p ro d u c t o f Yugoslavia increased at the rate o f alm ost 8% annually p e r capita. This grow th m eans doubling per capita p ro d u c tio n (and hence ec onom ic developm ent and the stand ard o fliv in g ) every nine years. In 1965 th e per capita social p ro d u c t o f Yugoslavia was $5 88 ; th a t o f the U nited States was $2,700. 1 This means th a t with unchanged expansion in the 235

future, the Yugoslav ec o n o m y will in the n ext 19 years approach the level o f d evelopm ent o f th e c o u n try th at is today the most developed one in the world, It m eans th a t the present generation o f Yugoslavs may exp ect to reach the A m erican standard o f living, At first glance this m ight seem only an arbitrary exercise in arithm etic. But the calculation is m uch m ore th an th at; it is a real possibility. A t one time it was generally believed, and m any insufficiently trained econom ists still believe so, th at the rate o f grow th m u st decrease as the stage o f d evelopm ent rises This thesis is refuted b o th empirically and theoretically. The arg um en t, based on theo ry, showing th a t the alleged retard atio n is a fallacy is fairly com plicated and specialized, so th a t it falls o utside the scope o f this survey.2 B ut the empirical verification is very simple, We need only com pare the rates o f grow th o f all developed countries in the postw ar period with the corresponding periods in the last one hundred years to see th at present rates are m arkedly higher even though these are well-developed econom ies F u rth er, if we draw up a list o f the th irteen m ost expansive econom ies in th e world, we find th at they are all developed econom ies, w ith a low er limit o f developm ent represented by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and R om ania [ 1 ] . It is possible, therefore, th a t th e econom ic expansion o f the decade will con tin ue over the n ex t tw o decades. B ut possibility is not necessity; this distinction m ust be taken into a c co u n t in discussing the prospects for develop m ent Rapid ec onom ic developm ent is desirable in and of itself because it' m akes possible a rise in the standard of living But econom ic expansion is also a key precon dition for the solution of o th e r social problem s One o f them is also a national question. It was emphasized earlier that great differences among the various republics and regions are a constan t source of social tensions,. It was pointed o u t th at the e x tre m e differences betw een Kosm et and Slovenia are as great as those betw een Nigeria and Greece. If we wanted to elim inate these differences during the lifetime of a single generation, then, with the high rate o f general expansion, the Kosmet e c o n o m y would have to develop at twice the rate of Slovenia That is a difficult but n o t impossible task. But if the Yugoslav e c o n o m y developed at a low rate, K osm et would have to attain a grow th rate some thirty times th a t o f Slovenia [3] . O f course, th a t is quite impossible A ccordingly, slow developm ent w o u l d r e s u l t in p r o l o n g i n g the differences in econom ic developm en t for several generations It does not require m uch im agination to see how far the feeling o f n atio n h o o d would be strained by such an endless con tinu ance o f the econom ic (and hence the general social) process of equalizing the positions o f o u r 236

peoples and nationalities The n ex t question relates to changes in the stratification s tructure o f society, It was shown previously that econom ic developm en t converts the pyramidal structure into a spheroidal one and th u s dim inishes intrasocietal distances, This process is a direct function o f econom ic d evelop m ent and can be accelerated or slowed d o w n as econom ic dev e lo p m e n t is accelerated or slowed down,. Closely con nected with this is the problem of ed ucatio n It has been shown th a t the hierarchical n atu re o f social strata in o u r society is essentially d e p e n d e n t on degrees o f education The higher the ed ucation a given individual achieves, the greater his chances o f reaching the higher social strata. Obviously, therefore, m aking edu cation universal is a key precondition for increasing social m obility and decreasing social differences But for all the degrees of education to be made equally accessible to every m e m b e r o f society, m uch greater resources would be required than are available to o u r society. Therefore, ec onom ic expansion is the crucial, although no t the only, p recond itio n for m aking education universal and thus creating the presuppositions o f a classless soci ety. T he im p o rtan ce o f edu cation for the developm ent of social ist society is so great th at we m ust devote some co m m en t to it. In the section on social stratification, 1 adduced Milics coefficients of association, from which it appears that a w o rk e rs child has on e-ninth the chance, and a p ea san ts child one-tw entieth the chance, o f reaching th e professional and leadership category th a t persons whose p arents are in th a t category have The e x te n t to which these social inequalities are reduced in the future d epends on w hat chances for ed ucatio n the children o f various social strata have to d ay According to the data o f V, [om anovic fo r the 1 961 /6 2 school year [4: 6 7 8 ] , am ong children o f secondary school age virtually all children from the families o f em ployees go to seco nd ary schools, only a third o f children from w orkers families, and one-seventh o f those from the families o f peasants.3 I f we except schools fo r skilled workers, leaving only the secondary schools for training children fo r noninanual and intellectual occupations, and if we exclude assistant and lower functionaries from th e category of em ployees, then w ork ers children have one-fifth as m uch chance as em plo yees children o f getting a secondary education On th e university level the differences, naturally, are still greater A y o u th o f w ork e r origin h a s o n e - e i g h t h t h e c h a n c e , and one o f peasant origin o n e -th irte en th the chance, o f getting into a college o r university th a t a y o u th o f em ployee origin lias 4 It will be seen that these p robability indices are very similar to those based on Milics 237

association coefficients. If we add to this T o m an o v ics observation th a t the social s tru c tu re o f sec ond ary school y o u th has n o t shown any changes in a positive direction since 1959, and th at the inequalities in accessibility to universities from various social strata have very p rob ab ly increased [4: 6 7 9 ] , we shall have to agree that it is time to sound the alarm. Instead o f abstract talk a b o u t the leading role o f the working class and assertions o f the rights o f working people, the workers and o th e r laboring people have to achieve real possibilities for raising their social status and, by em ancipating themselves, em an cip ate society as a whole. It should be added that the period for which T om anovic points o u t a stagnation in positive changes in the social structure o f students coincides with a period o f slowed-down econom ic gro w th and certain anarchic tendencies in the dom ain of no nec o n o m ic activities, including education I f there is any th em e th a t keeps recurring in o u r survey, it is beyon d d o u b t the thesis th at self-government is the crucial principle in the organization of o u r society A ctually, Yugoslav socialism will stand or fall w ith self-government.. As regards self-government on th e initial level, in the factory, I th in k wc may say we have com e a long way front the auto cratic one-man rule o f capitalist and Soviet factories. B ut there is still a long way to go to the realization o f genuine self-government. T o d ay we are probably som ew here betw een the start and the finish, with an influence structure th a t V. Rus, on the basis o f empirical studies, describes as oligarchical [5: 209] . F u rth e r d evelop m en t o f self-government will d epend in large measure on the te m p o o f ec onom ic grow th, In this co nn ection we may list the four p reconditions for realizing self-government, as are well form ulated by M. Markovic [5: 6 6 ] : 1 Technical A u to m a tio n associates individual workers, whose individual effects can no longer be m easured, 1 should like to add the classical observation th at m echanization and au to m atio n o f dirty and hard physical w ork increasingly elim inate the category o f unskilled physical labor, and hence those w orkers w ho are n o t o b j e c t i v e l y in a p o s i t i o n su ccessfuly to participate in self-government 2. E c o n o m ic Self-government can develop successfully only in a relatively w ealthy society, in which the elem entary living requirem ents o f people are already satisfied and in which every individual has attained such a degree o f econom ic security th at lie does n o t have to w orry a b o u t possible econom ic reprisals because o f his social c o m m itm e n t, It may be added th at with the increase in econ om ic develo pm ent th ere is also an increase in the free time needed for social c o m m itm e n t F u rth er, econom ic developm ent 238

diminishes the discrepancies in personal incom es and thus equalizes the socioeconom ic position of self-governing people. 3. Cultural Only e d u c ated , cultured workers, aware o f their historical role, can successfully take part in the leadership o f social processes And culture requires, am ong o th e r things, resources 4. Political The w ithering away of the state is a prerequisite. This precon dition calls fo r further consideration. However in com pletely, self-government is already functioning on the initial levels. If we are to be able to speak o f a self-governing society, self-government m ust develop to higher and higher levels o f social organization It is p re tty clear th at this is one o f the fundam ental tasks of the n ex t stage o f o u r social development. And it is also p re tty clear that the co nstru ction o f self-government upw ard is no t an im m ediate effect o f econom ic grow th. In fact, the direct functional link b etw een the tem po o f ec onom ic growth and certain strategically im p o rtan t social changes disappears at this p o in t It is true th a t econom ic growth reinforces self-government in the factory and thereby heightens the social pressures toward the establishm ent of' a self-governing society as a whole But if the process is n o t stim ulated and controlled in som e o th e r way as well, it can take m uch longer and be m uch less effective than is objectively possible This o th e r way is not econom ic, b ut political; hence, the crucial im po rtan ce o f the political p recond itio n And in o u r society this preco ndition com es dow n, in the last analysis, to the efficient functioning o f the League of C om m unists. T he functions o f the League o f C om m un ists have already been analyzed in detail, leading to conclusions th at need n o t be repeated here F o r the LCY to be able effectively to lead the process o f constructing a self-governing society, it m ust n o t only have an internal stru ctu re th a t is in accord with th a t society b u t it must also be at least one step in advance at all times with respect t o d e m o c r a c y . To be left behind would have disastrous consequences If in traparty dem o cratizatio n lagged behind the currents o f self-government in the society, a tendency for those currents to cease flowing would ap p e ar In fact, we did go through tendencies of th a t kind in the period ju st before the econom ic reform If this happened , it w ould m ean th a t the interests o f the LCY, and o f the state ap paratus as the executive agency, would clash with the interests o f the society as a whole. Such a clash could then be resolved in o ne of tw o ways E ith er the apparatus would impose its will on society by m eans o f the p o w e r o f the state, or pressures would appear for th e founding o f a new party or parties In the first case, we should have a form o f restoration 2.39

of the Soviet ty pe of state capitalism and, in th e second, a form of' restoration of' bourgeois formal d em o cracy ; and in either case, an essential revision o f th e p ath Yugoslavia has tak en thus far on the road to socialism, and an essential slowing-down o f socialist construction. In referring here to the co ncrete Yugoslav exam ple as evidence that the d evelo pm en t o f th e forces o f p ro d u c tio n is the basic vehicle o f social progress, which can be accelerated or delayed by the political factor, we have o f course n o t m ade a new discovery. It belongs to the ABC o f Marxism It is also well k n o w n th a t the conditioning is no t merely one-dim ensional, b u t o perates in b oth directions. A m ore universal and effective educational s y s te m ,5 a m ore r api d and b e t t e r t h o u g h t - o u t d e v e l o p m e n t of self-government, the absence o f national conflicts, social stability, and a progressive political system - all these will assist in rapid econom ic expansion In th e eq uation o f econom ic grow th, the a v a i l a b l e m a t e r i a l resources con stitu te only one o f the ind epend e n t variables; the o th e r variables arc those en um erated here [2: 232] . The above-m entioned reciprocal link between sup erstructure and base becom es m uch m ore im p o rta n t in a social system in which th ere is a definite possibility o f program m ing the superstructu re th at should characterize socialism This observation leads at once to the conclusion th a t th e 8% grow th rate per capita we have re ad ied is n o t th e m a x im u m th a t can be o b tain ed Even higher grow th rates are objectively possible, as can be proved very exactly, even on the basis o f analysis o f purely econom ic ph en o m en a Thus, econom ic research has discovered th at the Yugoslav ec o no m y goes th roug h m o re or less regular cycles [6] , T h ese business cycles and their m echanism have remained u n k n o w n to those w ho shape ec on om ic policy . As a result, faulty measures have been tak en , or intervention has been m ade at the wrong tim e and in the w rong w ay, all o f which diminished the objectively possible rate o f growth However, our problem is no t exhausted by the observation th at the rate of g row th co u ld be higher. It is m uch more com plex. In con trast to th e possibilities of' accelerated expansion, there is the reality o f a slowing-down o f ec onom ic grow th. This retardation began in 1961 and assumed drastic dim ensions in 1967 In our econom y, as in every o th er, industry is th e vehicle of' econom ic growth. The long-term grow th rate of Yugoslav industry conies to som ething like 13% per an nu m . T h a t rate fell to 4.5% in 1966, and to less th an zero this year, som ething th at has n o t hap p e n ed since the tim e of' the C o m in form blockade. What is happenin g to Yugoslav industry? Have the forces o f g row th dried up? Are 240

un ex p e cted or unpredictable surprises in question? Was th at re tardation objectively necessary? T he answer is th at it was n o t necessary, that it could have been avoided, th a t it was n o t un ex pected and, in fact, was foreseen.. F ro m 1952 on, the Yugoslav e c o n o m y has been the scene of a continual proccss of' decentralization, the form ation o f m arket relations, and the re in fo rcem en t o f the ind ep en d e n ce o f ec onom ic persons. This process was accom panied by definite ad a p ta tio n s on the part of the state apparatus. However, changes in th e apparatus, technical preparation of cadres, alteratio ns in th e m e th o d s of planning and controlling econom ic processes, stu d y o f the functioning of the self-governing eco n o m ic mechanism and, as a result, th e possibility o f predicting and directing ec onom ic m ov em ents al! these lagged behind the needs o f the econom y. This backwardness was intensified by th e rapid econom ic grow th (the result o f freeing the initiative o f the se!fL govem ing p roducers), which doubled total p ro d u c tio n in eight years and alm ost tripled industrial productio n. T he gap betw een the capacities o f the agencies o f ec onom ic policy and the needs o f the e c o n o m y widened and led to the first break in 1961, on the occasion o f the inauguration o f 'th e new econom ic system , which fu n ction ed poorly and disabled three versions of the m edium -term plan. Scientists warned o f th e danger of allowing such a condition to c o n tin u e and proposed definite m easu res,6 b u t the responsible agencies and instances did n o t give these warnings proper a tten tio n T hey continued with the practical m a n s approach to the constru c tio n of' the econom ic system and to the in tro d u c tio n of' econom ic policies; econom ic m ovem ents got beyond the conscious control of' society; business cycles were prolonged, u n e m p lo y m e n t increased, grow th slowed d ow n. It is true th at the 1967 stagnation of' industrial p ro d u c tio n will n o t last There will be a revival o f th e upward cycle, b u t th e mean rate o f'g ro w th will be lower th an before, and considerably lower th an was objectively possible, unless th e planning and co n d u c t of' econom ic policy are managed in a m ore scientific way,. But the fact th a t we kn o w th e basic m echanism of th e m ovem ents, th a t we were in a position to p re d ic t som e o f the factors in those m ovem ents, and th a t we can predict the fu rther m o vem ents shows th a t we are in possession o f the fund am ental presuppositions for m ore efficient c o n d u c t of the e c o n o m y in the future..7 Once again, the m ere possibility does n o t signify realization It follows from th e foregoing analysis th at we shall have to cope with great difficulties in o u r social developm ent if' we do n o t succeed in reaccelerating ec onom ic growth. Even if' we should reach the previous tem po of' g row th, or even a higher rate, th at

241

would still not signify th a t we would solve o u r social p roblem s in a satisfactory manner.. The conn ection betw een ec onom ic growth and a well-organized society is not a t all simple There are c o u ntries in the world th a t are m uch m ore econom ically developed than w e are, b ut we should not wish to copy the outlines o f their societies. Therefore, it is n o t only im p o rta n t to bring abo ut econom ic grow th; how it is realized is equally im p o rta n t. In the very long-range view, there can be no contradiction between these tw o goals: th e m ost progressive society will also m ak e the greatest ec onom ic progress.. Conversely, a co u n try that is econom ically retarded will have to change its social system, T h a t is one of th e laws o f socioeconom ic development, But it is easy, in everyday life, to lose perspective, and im m ed iate effects often obscure long-term damage, which is hard to make good later on T hus, for example, M, Markovic warns, If the m erit of an enterprise were always evaluated only by its success in o btain ing revenue and if it were fully established th a t the basic interest o f the w ork e r will be arrived at by increased wages, th a t would have giave effects on the m entality and m orality o f the w orke r and of' all o th er laboring people. The typ e of' people such a society would produce would n o t differ essentially from th e ty p e of people th a t capitalism p rodu c es They would be people whose entire activity would be m otivated by the acquisition and possession of' m aterial goods, They would be people w ho aspire to have m ore, and n o t to be m ore T hey w ould thus be reflecting th e p overty o f spirit th a t is characteristic o f capitalist society, and whose elim ination, according to Marx, is one o f the aims o f c o m m u n is m [5: 7 0 ]. F o rtu n a te ly , it is in no way necessary for commercialism to be made the supreme principle o f social organization in o rd e r to o btain econom ic stimuli and distribu tio n according to w ork B oth are possible by giving com m ercial relations th e place they deserve in the organization o f th e m a r k e t The m ark e t, o f course, is n o t only not identical with society, b u t is o nly o n e o f the m any institutions th at society em ploys to organize its life. B u t it does no t follow from the fact th a t th ere is n o need to com m ercialize th e m orality o f our society th a t no tendencies in th a t d irection exist. In point o f fact, those tendencies are very well m arked, a significant elem ent being primitivism in the approach to socioeconom ic ph en o m en a and ignorance o f the function ing o f the m echanism s o f social and ec onom ic life; and Markovic is thoro ug hly justified in sounding the alarm. Socialism does n o t consist o f the standard o f living, nor o f the power o f th e state, n o r o f the nationalization o f the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n . Above all, socialism is a society o f free, 242

developed, au to n o m o u s personalities, who are in a position to control their social relationships. A nd therefore anythin g that leads to the alienation of the individual signifies, directly, d estru ctio n of socialist construction . We have considered the strategic factors o f the future co nstruction o f o u r society . It is time to conclude. Obviously, nothing is predeterm ined. There are laws o f society th at act au to n o m o u sly and ca n n o t be ignored. We know a good deal ab o u t th em . But, in additio n, there are th e most diverse o f possibilities th at are open. It is up to us to take advantage o f those possibilities intelligently In this respect the task o f the present generation is in no way less than th a t o f the generation th at m ade the revolution and b roug ht the co u n try to the d o o r o f socialism. The task is probably more com plicated, since the society is m ore com plicated But o u r know ledge is greater, And thus there lies before us a fascinating struggle to convert possibility in to reality, for the conscious con stru c tio n o f socialist society. And then w hat, in the fu rth e r perspective? New problem s will arise. We already discern one of' th e m quite clearly. O u r present efforts are directed at equalizing th e starting possibilities of' every m em b er o f society and at judging everyone by the results of his w ork. In tins way we shall avoid the class differences. But we shall n o t avoid all social differences am ong people. Actually, it is ju s t as fo rtu ito u s and unjust fo r one to be born intelligent and a n o th e r to be born m ediocre as it is for one to be born rich and a n o th e r poor. Psychologically the form er may be m uch m ore damaging In a class society, those w ho are oppressed find a psychological o u tle t in explaining their position by the injustice o f the social order, and in fighting against those injustices and th a t society. B ut w h at sense does it m ake to accuse n ature o f injustice and to fight against it? This new privileged group in a classless society, a group t h a t does n o t rely on its origins but on its abilities, has already got its nam e, m eritocracy 9 Society will have to react to the p h e n o m e n o n of m eritocracy ju st as it has reacted to the p h e n o m en a of bureaucracy, p luto cracy, and aristocracy. We can already discern the form this reaction can take D ifferentiation o f in co m e is necessary in a poor society, where it helps pro d u c e stimuli to increased social p ro d u c tio n . As the w ealth o f society increases, econom ic stimuli bec o m e less and less operative, and this makes possible and is the co ndition for decreasing the gap in i n d i v i d u a l i n c o m e s . This process is definitely established empirically Socialist society, in which class barriers have been removed and social m obility approaches th e theoretically possible, is by its very n ature a rich society. Accordingly, th e incom e gaps 243

will be small. T h e n ex t phase of d ev elo pm ent may consist in eliminating all such divergences and m aking all th e m em b ers o f society economically equal Here we recognize M arxs higher phase o f com m unism , With the removal o f econ om ic differences, the social position o f the m eritocracy takes on qu ite an o th e r dim ension, w hich will m ake it likely th a t the p ro b lem o f m eritocracy will cease to be socially significant. Its place will certainly be taken by the new, even m ore subtle p ro blem o f social, or m erely interpersonal, diversity. T h a t will call fo r new solutions, evoke new developm ents, and so on ad in fin itu m A t this p o in t th e possibilities o f scientific analysis co m e to an end, and th e realm o f dream s begins.
FOOTNOTES
1. In 1961 prices, and social p rod uct acco rd in g to the d e fin itio n o f the N a tio n a l S ta tis tic a l In stitu te . The ca lcu latio n s w ere m ade by m y colleague, S S ta jic (at the Y ug o slav In s titu te fo r [Econom ic R e se arch ), w lio m I thank The interested reader w ill fin d the so lu tio n to this p rob lem in m y b o o k ( 2 : C h , 9 ]. It is hard to see the livin g people behind these statistical data It is a great d raw b ack o f scie n tific w ritin g (as co m p ared to lite ra tu re ) that its nu m erical ab stractio ns (w h ic h are requ ired fo r rigor o f an alysis) a c tu a lly destroy the co n te n t o f the pheno m eno n under investig ation A s it happens, on the sam e day that I w ro te the above te x t, I read a le tte r in B o rb a ( J u l y 23, 1967), w h ic h I cite b elo w , to the y o u th d ivision o f R a d io Belgrade, a le tte r th a t gives co n ten t to the datum every seventh c h ild : **This ye ar I co m p leted the 8th grade in the 4V u k S Karad zic* elem en tary school in K o n a k , w h ere I live w ith m y parents M y parents are p oo r ag ricu ltu ral w orkers. T h e y have tw e lve acres o f land , but all the land in our d istrict is poor. In a d d itio n , the crops are subject to natural calam ities. S o m e tim e s the y e a r has a d ro u g h t and uo th in g grows S o m e tim e s the y e a r is ra in y , and again no th in g grows. Last year the T am is o ve rflo w e d in R o m a n ia and flo od ed those near the b ord er This w as in the lands o f B o k a , Sura, K o n a k , and o ther villages M a n y farm ers and state farm s w ere ruined last year,. N in e acres o f o u r land w ere flooded " I have a sister w h o has turned five this y ear, and a b ro th e r w h o finished the 1st grade in elem e n tary sch o o l. 1 a rd e n tly w a n t to co n tin u e .school, but it w o u ld be a disaster for m y parents. 1 alw a ys had e x ce lle n t m arks. D u rin g m y eight grades I got o n jy fo u r up p er se co n d murks, and th a t in the Serbo -C ro atian and Russian languages in the 5th and 6th grades. I a tte n d e d the first fo u r grades in the M ag yar school, and in the 5th grade I w e n t in to the Se rb ia n sch o o l; it was harder for me than for m y friends and the other girls w h o w e n t to the S erb ian school from the beginning, E ve n though there was little ch an ce thal 1 could go on w ith m y schooling, ! to o k the e n tra n ce e xam in ation s for the in s titu te o f C h em ical T e c h n o lo g y in Z ren ja n in O n Ju n e 20 I w as n o tifie d that I had been accep ted , I was o ve rjo y e d that I had passed the entrance exa m in atio n I co u ld o n ly go to school i f I received a stipend.. H elp me! I w ill be e te rn ally gratefu l to you I hope you w ill not disapp oin t me. T h a n k yo u in a d v a n c e . T h e differences from professional and leadership fam ilies w o u ld be still greater, since Io m a n o v i includes ro u tin e and assistant em plo yees in the category o f em ployees. In cities to d ay, e very ch ild co m p letes the eight-grade sc h o o l; in the co u n try sid e , not even h a lf the ch ild re n [ 4 ; 6 7 6 | W e have alre ad y referred lo the great divergences in scho o ling , d epending on so cial origins. A t the same tim e, tale n t and m e d io c rity are equ ally o perative in co u n try sid e and to w n , in w o rk e r and e m p lo y ee fam ilies, This reveals w h a t a w aste o f the n a tio n s talent is b rought ab o u t by unselective e d u catio n. In 1962, fo r exam ple, the D ivisio n for E c o n o m ic Research and M e th o d o lo g y o f P la n n in g of the Fe d e ral In s titu te fo r E c o n o m ic Plan n in g m im eog raph ed a m em orand um co n tain in g this w a rn in g : W it h the g ro w th o f p ro d u c tive forces, the eco n o m y becom es m o re and m o re co m p lic a te d ; in itia tive is d ece n traliz ed ; the final

2 3

4. 5

244

resultant o f the freely arrived at decisions o f thousands o f e co n om ic persons is no t evident in ad van ce; e co n o m ic p o lic y co n tain s a w h o le arsenal o f u n d iffe re n tia te d instrum ents, but the m e th o d s o f guiding the e co n o m y rem ain in d ire c t and the criteria for arriving at decisions are e x tre m e ly co m p licate d The c o m p le x ity o f the e co n o m ic m echanism and the d elica c y o f its fu n ctio n in g w ith o u t in te rru p tio n call for intensive scie n tific research and an alysis on all levels, in the m ost diverse eco n om ic institutio ns, A n d this w ill require the training o f sp ecialised cadres . I tried to p o in t this o u t in m y b o o k Ek o n o m s k a nauka i n aro d n a p rivred a [ E c o n o m ic S cie n c e and the N a tio n a l E c o n o m y ) Jt gives an exhaustive analysis o f the m echanism o f e co n om ic m o vem ents in the 1960-1965 period [7 |

REFERENCES
[ | [ l ] D H o rv a t, N o te on the R a t e o f G ro w th o f the Y ugoslav E c o n o m y . Yug o slav In s titu te to r E c o n o m ic R ese arch , Papers and M o n og rap hs N o . 4, Belgrade, 1963 7 J 1 H o rv a t, E c o n o m ic T h e o ry o f a P la n n e d E c o n o m y , K n ltu ra , Belgrade, 1961. 3 3] M . B a z l e r , C la s s ific a tio n o f Yug o slav R e g io n s b y D egree o f E c o n o m ic D e ve lo p m e n t, w ith a S p e c ia l L o o k at U n d e rd evelo p e d A reas, m asters thesis defended at Y ug o slav In s titu te for E c o n o m ic R esearch, Belgrade, 1967. 4 ) V T o m a n o v ic , S o c ia l In e q u a litie s in E d u c a tio n a l C o n d itio n s , G ledista 1967, N o 5. S ] T h e M e a n in g and Pe rsp e ctive o f So cia lism (c o lle c tio n o f papers at S eco n d Session o f KorCula S u m m e r S c h o o l, 1964), Praxis, Zagreb, 1965 6 ] B H o rv a t, E c o n o m ic C y c le s in Y u g o s la v ia / 1E k o n o m tst, 1967, N os 1-4 7 ] B H o rvat, E c o n o m ic S c ic n c e an d the N a tio n a l E c o n o m y . N a p rije d , Zagreb, 1968. 8 1 P de W o lf f and K . H a rn q vis t, R eserves o f A b ilit y : S iz e and D is trib u tio n , in A b ilit y and E d u c a tio n a l O p p o rtu n ity , edited by A H H alse y , O E C D t Paris, 1961, pp. 135-175, 91 M . Y o u n g , The R is e o f M e rito c ra c y . Penguin, L o n d o n , 1963

[ [ [ [ (

245

BRANKO HORVAT

OGLED O JUGOSLAVENSKOM DRUSTVU

i z d a v a

k o

k n j i

a r s k o

p o d u z e

in 1 n (I o s t
ZAGREB 1969

BEBLIOTEKA IZABRANIH ESEJA Urednik OTO SOLC Naslovmt siranu i^raiio JU LIJE KNIFER

Stamparski zavod O gnjen Prica, Zagreb 1969.

SADRzAJ

PREDGOVOR

............................

I HISTORIJSKE PRETPOSTAVKE JUGOSLAVENSKOG TIPA DRUSTVA (ASOCUATIVNOG SOCIJALIZMA) . ............................ 1. SHEMATIZACIJA DRUSTVENO-EKONOMSKOG RAZVOJA (11) 2. DR2AVNI KAPITALIZAM (17) 3. BIROKRACIJA I FETI5IZAM CINA (25) 4. ASOCIJATIVNI SOCIJALIZAM (39) 5. RADNICKO SAMOUPRAVLJANJE U HISTORIJSKOJ PBRSPEKTIVI (46). I I PRELAZNI PERIOD I DIKTATURA PROLET A R I J A T A ................................................. 6. PRELAZNI PERIOD (74) 7. DIKTATURA PROLETARIJATA (92) 8. TRI ETAPE JUGOSLAVENSKE SOCIJALISTICKE REVOLUCIJE (95). I l l EKONOMSKA ORGANIZACIJA . . . .

11

73

103

9. MARX I ENGELS O SOCIJALISTICKOJ PRTVREDI (105) 10. SAMOUPRAVLJANJE (118) 11. KOLEKTIV KAO PODUZETNIK (125) 12. CENTRALIZAM (130) 13. PLANIRANJE (142). IV PROIZVODNI RAD, DRUSTVENO VLASNISTVO I STRUKTURA JUGOSLAVENSKOG D R U S T V A ................................................. 153

14. PROIZVODNI RAD U SOCIJALISTICKOM DRUSTVU (53) 15. INDIVIDUALNO I DRUSTVENO VLASNISTVO U SOCIJALIZMU (167) 16. VERTIKALNA STRUKTURA JUGOSLAVENSKOG DRUSTVA I STRATIFIKACIJA (183) 17. HORIZONTALNA STRUKTURA JUGOSLAVENSKOG DRUSTVA: KVAZI-PROFESIONALNE GRUPE (200). V TRANSFORMACIJA PARTIJE U SAVEZ POLITIC K IH A K TIVISTA ............................231 18. POLITICKE PARTIJE (232) 19. REVOLUCIONARNA PARTIJA I GENEZA BIROKRATSKOG M ENTALITETA (238) 20. FUNKCIJE I ORGANIZACIJA SAVEZA KOMUNISTA JUGOSLAVIJE (261). V I EVOLUTIVNE PERSPEKTIVE Registar pojm ova Registar autora Biljeska o piscu 285

297 301 303

Teorija se u jednom samo u tolik o

narodu uvijek ukoliko je

ostvaruje,

ostvarenje njegovih p o tre b a . . . N ije dovoljno da misao strem i ostvarenju, sama stvam ost m ora strem iti prema misli. K . Marx

PREDGOVOR

Cini se da je jedna epoha naSeg poslijerevolucionamog razvoja zavrSena. To saznanje potice na kriticno preispitivanje predenog puta. I na istrazivanje daljnjih mogucnosti, pronalazenje evolutivnih perspektiva. Posao koliko fascinantan, toliko i rizican. Ovaj Ogled nije pisan nadusak, pa vjerojatno i nece moci da se cita nadusak. On je rezultat razmiSljanja o naJem drustvu u toku posljednjih sesnaest godina. Od tekstova koji su iisli u knjigu, prvi Prelazni period napisan je i objavljen jos 1951. godine; posljednji, koji se odnosi na teoriju Partije, pisan je tek poslije Brionskog plenuma CK SKJ, kad je istrazivanje tih problema postalo drustveno relevantno u smislu Marxovog citata koji je uzet kao moto ovoj knjizi. Jedan dio teksta objavljen je ranije u casopisima Ekonomist, Pregled, Gledista, Encyclopedia modema i Nase teme; dio I i poglavIja 11 i 14 preuzeti su iz knjige Ekonomska teorija planske privrede. lako su ti fragmenti nastajali u vremenskom rasponu od jedne decenije i po, kod konacne redakcije ispostavilo se da rezultate istrazivanja ne treba mijenjati. Medutim, izvrsene su mnogobrojne dopune i preciziranja formulacija. I, prirodno, cjelina rada zahtijevala je niz novih istrazivanja. Odabrani naslov nije slucajan; Ogled nije sistematska studija. Radi se o obradi samo nekih, po mom misljenju strateskih faktora; samo o osnovnim konturama jedne sinteticke slike naseg drustva. Stoga je mnogo toga ispusteno. U ekonomskom dijelu nedostaje na primjer analiza funkcioniranja privrednog mehanizma. U socioloskom dijelu nije obradena sociologija samoupravljanja, socioloski efekti exodusa sa sela i mnogosta drugo. U poli9

tikoloskom dijelu nema analize skupstinskog sistema, izbora, organizacije drzavnog aparata, funkcioniranja komunalnog sistema, mjesta i uloge SSRNJ. No popuniti sve te praznine mogla bi jedino ekipa naucnih radnika. U tekstu mjestimicno ima dosta citiranja. Citiranje je samo po sebi nesimpaticno, a osim toga smanjuje citkost teksta. Iako svjestan tih cinjenica, bio sam primoran na odabiranje citatoloske alternative iz slijedecih. razloga. Kao marksist bio sam zainteresiran za uklanjanje nekih ukorijenjenih. vulgarlzacija i revizija Marxove ekonomske i politicke teorije. U tom pogledu drastican je primjer teorije proizvodnog rada koja ima znacajne prakticne konzekvence. U takvim slucajevima bilo je potrebno ici na potpuno pokrivanj e svih relevantnih. citata. Iz vlastitog iskustva na istom primjera znam da ispuStanje ma i. jednog citata dovodi do optuzbe o hotimicnom namjestanju, neprincipijelnosti<t i si. Nadalje, kao marksist bio sam zainteresiran i da identificiram ona Marxova predvidanja koja su se u kontekstu analize naseg drustva pokazala pogresnim. Tu se prije svega radi o ekonomskoj organizaciji socijalistickog drustva. Arguinenti za sto potpunije citiranje isti su kao i u prethodnom slucaju. I na kraju, u naucnom radu za razliku od feljtona citiranje je ponekad potrebno da se isticanjem preuzetih ideja jasno ogranici vlastiti doprinos odnosno da se sto preciznije istaknu razlike u odnosu na autoritativne tude ideje s kojima se autor ne slaze. Neprijatan posao pretvaranja mojih originalnih rukopisa u citljiv tekst preuzele su na sebe Dobrila Mickovic i moja sekretarica Anica Savicevic. iRegistre pojmova i autora izradili su asistenti Sofija Popov i Marija Ratkovic. 2elio bih da im se zahvalim na strpljivosti i paznji. Beograd, 24. jula 1967. Branko Horvat

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I H IS T O R IJ S K E PR E TPO STAV K E JUGOSLAVENSKOG T IP A D R U sTV A (A SO C IJA TIVN O G SOCIJALIZM A)

1. SH E M ATIZAC IJA DRUST VENO-EKONOMSKOG RAZVOJA

U pocetku nase analize bit ce korisno da u shematiziranom obliku rekapituliramo osnovne stavove teorije drustvenog razvoja Marxa i Engelsa. Time ce vjerojatno biti samo ponovljeno ono sto je u jugoslavenskoj sredini vec dobro poznato. No izgleda mi potrebnim da se taj koncepcijsM okvir ipak prethodno sto jasnije i preciznije definira kako bi se nedvosmisleno istakao kontinuitet u ekstrapolaciji marksisticke analize kao i njena aplikativnost na nove drustvene pojave koje nas u ovom radu prvenstveno zanimaju. Veoma dugo vremeua, mnogo duze nego sto traje pisana historija, ljudske zajednice jedva su uspijevale da proizvode koliko im treba da prezive. U drutvenim odnosima koji su tada postojali nije bilo mjesta za klasnu eksploatacijua.1
1 J. Schumpeter je jedan od onih koji osporavaju taj stav (1, 146). N o dovoljno je da se pogleda ma koji suvremeni rad o antropologiji primitivnih zajednica pa da se ustanovi da Schumpeter nema pravo.

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Medutim, kako su se inovacije i izumi kumulirali, proizvodnost rada je rasla. U mnogim zajednicama postalo je mogude da se redovno proizvodi vise nego sto je apsolutno potrebno da se prezivi. Tako se javila mogucnost da se zivi na racun viska proizvoda drugih ljudi. Cim se ta ekonomska mogucnost pojavila, neki su je clanovi zajednice iskoristili. A kako ostali (unutar ili van zajednice) nisu bill voljni da odstupe dio svog viSka proizvoda, bili su primorard da to urade grubom silom, postali su robovima. Drustvo je postalo klasno drustvo u kom vladajuca klasa prisvaja visak proizvoda eksploatirane klase i upotrebljava ga za svoje vlastite ciljeve. U tom smislu, tj. zasnovana na kontroli sredstava za zivot, klasna eksploatacija nastavila se u svim drustvima sve do nasih dana. Rob je covjek koga posjeduje neki drugi (slobodni) covjek na isti nacin na koji se posjeduju krave i plugovi. Ta formalna slicnost navela je u ono vrijeme Aristotela da klasificira robove slicno kao sto u nase vrijeme navodi burzoaske ekonomiste da klasificiraju radnike1 u istu ekonomsku kategoriju s kravama i plugovima, uz napomenu da se razlikuju jedino po tome sto govore, dok ostala oruda mucu ili su nijema. To je bila obmana covjeka koji je shvacao tada postojece drustvene odnose kao prirodne i zbog toga vjecne. Plugovi i krave rade jednako dobro u svim drustvenim sistemima, ali.n e i ljudska bica. S jedne strane robovi su bili veoma neefikasni radnici. S druge strane troskovi njihove reprpdukX Knightov clanak o kapitalu u Encyclopedia Britanica iz .1946.- karakteristican je u tom pogledu: Iako se zbog humanih' razloga .radnici obifino ne nazivaju 'sredstvima proizvodnje', oni su ekonomski slicni ostalim proizvodnlm agensima. Razlika je 'institucionaina1 u tobovla, snikoj privredi radnici svih kategorija bit de prosto vrste kapitalnih dobara. To je naravno velikim dijelom vrijedilo za dijelove Sjedinjenlh Americkih Drzava unutar zivota ljudi koji su jog zivi. Doista, obidno postoje vazne razlike; osjetSajnost i dnistveni obiSaji,, iikljuciv religiju, cine da se ljudski robovi tretiraju nesto. drugaCije nego radna stoka 1 1 1 masineV Vazne ekonomske razlike javljaju se kod kontrole reprodukcije i podizanja djece. Medutim, sve je to saino stvar pojedinosti r stepena, i slicne razlike postoje medu mnogim kategorijama kapitalnih.dobara.... Ukratko, smisao kapitala i njegovog prinosa bitno je nevezaii s opcom organizacijom dmstyene privrede... . Razlike izmedu ljudskih bica i imovine, kao' i ;izmedu licne i stvanie imovine, vazne su u zakonodavstvu i ljudsHm odnosima, ali njima ne odgovaraju nikakve fimdairientklne'ekonomske razlike. '

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cije bili su visoki. U oba slucaja postojala je mogucnost poboljsanja i upravo to je ucinilo feudalizam efikasnijim drustvenim sistemom. Nova vladajuca klasa ustanovila je da za izvlacenje viska rada nije nuzno pribjeci ropstvu. Feudalci su ustanovili da je dovoljno posjedovati zemlju da bi se primoralo kmetove da rade izvjesno vrijeme za njih. Na taj nacin sa stanovista vlasnika troskovi reprodukcije radne snage bili su eliminirani buduci da su se seljacke obitelji brinule same za svoju reprodukciju. A mogucnost koju je kmet imao da neko vrijeme radi na vlastitoj zemlji i da feudalnu rentu placa ne samo u obliku rada vec i u obliku proizvoda, a kasnije i u novcu, stimulirala je podizanje proizvodnosti rada. U feudalizmu radnik vise nije bio imovina gospodara, ali je jos uvijek bio o njemu licno ovisan, drugim rijecima bio je prisiljavan da radi vanekonomskim institucijama. Zemlja nije bila samo sredstvo proizvodnje, vec je ujedno bila i sredstvo direktne politicke moci, jer je feudalni posjed predstavljao neku vrstu male drzave na celu s feudalcem koji je vrsio politicku, vojnu i administrativnu vlast. Rmetovi su bili vezarii za zemlju i tako nisu bili samo radnici vec i podardci svojih feudalnih ^===3SQSDodara. P, ..Qeigledna naredna mogucnost sastojala se u nadomje' ^ _ st%vj|nju licne zavisnosti trzisnom zavisnosdu uz koju bi -druf^veno-ekonomski mehanizam mogao i dalje glatko '-vfimkcionirati. Nakon izvjesnog broja zestokih sukoba izmedu antagonistickih drustvenih snaga to se pokazalo izvedivim. Radnici, koji ne posjeduju sredstva za zivot, nemaju drugog izbora nego da prodaju svoju radnu snagu vlasnicima sredstava proizvodnje, tj. vlasnicima kapitala. Pojavio se novi drustveni sistem, kapitalizam. Isprva radnici nisu imali nikakvih politickih prava. Stavise, glo be i tjelesno kaznjavanje unutar tvomice tako cesto prakticirani u ono vrijeme predstavljali su direktno nastavljanje odnosa gospodar-kmet. Ali nakon sto se novi sistem ustalio ta je praksa mogla i morala biti obustavljena, a takoder mogla su se dati i politicka prava bez losih posljedica po stabilnost sistema. Politicku i ekonomsku moc cvrsto je drzala posjednicka klasa, dok je sistem slobodnog trzista predstavljao efikasnu barijeru za spre13

cavanje masovne invazije proletera u vise drustvene slojeve. Licna sloboda i relativno velika drustvena mobilnost imali su izvanredno jak utjecaj na podizanje proizvodnosti rada. Robovlasnicka i feudalna privreda, a da se ne govori o prvobitnoj zajednici, bile su gotovo stacioname. KapitaJizam je znacio dramatsku promjenu u ljudskoj historiji, U posljednja dva stoljeca, sto je otprilike period u kome se organizacija proizvodnje moze oznaciti kao kapitalisticka, proizvodnja materijakiog bogatstva povecala se vise nego u svim onim ranijim hiljadama godina. Prirodno je da je to moralo neobicno snazno utjecati na tok drustvenog razvoja. Jedva je potrebno isticati da skica drustvenog razvoja dana u prethodnim odjeljcima ne prelazi okvire shenae. Njena je jedina svrha bila da se ukaze na odlucan faktor u drustvenom razvoju: odnose izmedu ljudi u proizvodnji. Anticko drustvo karakterizirao je rad robova, feudalno drustvo rad kmetova, kapitalizam najamni rad. Jasno je da ti odnosi nisu stvar slobodnog izbora, etike ili necega sto se voli ili ne voli. Nema nista prirodnoga u njima; Aristotel je smatrao ropstvo prirodnim, dok drugi to isto misle o najamnom radu u sluzbi privatnog kapitala ili drzavnog aparata. Ako nas historija necemu uci, onda njena pouka veli da se drustverii od nosi mijenjaju, da se proizvodnja povecava i da se ta dva niza promjena podudaraju. To podudaranje veoma je kompleksno, no opet, ukoliko ga shematiziramo, moze se svesti na slijedece. Razvoj proizvodnih snaga cini novi drustveni sistem ostvarivim, a nakon sto je drustvena promjena izvrsena, ona pomaze da se proizvodnja dalje razvija. U klasnim drustvima do drustvenih promjena ne dolazi na osnovu prijateljskih sporazuma ili pomocu racionalnog zakonodavstva ili ma cega slicnog; te su promjene rezultat borbe antagonistickih drustvenih klasa koje se bore za svoje interese. Klasa ciji su interesi vezani s novim i superiomijim nacinom proizvodnje pobjeduje i reorganizira drustvo. Pri kraju neke drustvene epohe u najrazvijenijim zemljama postoji vjerojatnost da ce klasna borba dovesti do nasilnog revolucionamog obaranja starog drustvenog sistema. Nakon sto je novi si stem vise ili manje uspostavljen u najnaprednijim zem14

Ijama, vladajuce klase ostalih zemalja ukoliko te zemIje ne zaostaju suvise iza opceg nivoa razvoja mogu biti primorane da ga prihvate i bez gradanskog rata. Sve to znaci dvije stvari. Prvo, drustveni je razvoj postepen i pojedine se faze ne mogu preskociti. Drugo, vezan uz razvoj proizvodnih snaga drustveni razvoj tj. slijed drustvenih sistema nije reverzibilan. Opisani proces nije pravolinijski. Dolazi i do privremenih zaokreta pa i povracaja. Prije pojave kapitalizma svijet jos nije bio jedinstvena cjelina kao sto je to danas i tako su citave civilizacije mogle isceznuti a da ne ostave mkakvih znacajnijih posljedica za kasniji razvoj. Shema je prvenstveno primjenjiva na evropsku historiju koja je bila vise ili manje autonomna i spontana i zbog toga se proces mogao potpuno razviti. Kad se jednom kapitalizam ukorijenio u Evropi, on se poceo siriti cijelim svijetom pomocu trgovine i osvajanja. Kapitalisticke institucije importirane su u vanevropske zemlje ciji su . dru stveni sistemi sadrzavali cijeli spektar od prvobitne zajednice do feudalizma i tako su bili inicirani izvanredno kompleksni drustveni procesi. Vjerojatno je jedina univerzalna karakteristika tih procesa ta sto se kapitalizam svugdje sirio na racun svih ostalih drustvenih sistema. No cak ni u Evropi ropstvo, feudalizam i kapitalizam nisu tri kruta Mstorijska sistema potpuno odvojena jedan od drugoga. U svakom od njih institucije ostala dva bile su poznate i razvijene do izvjesnog stepena. Oni nisu cisti sistemi i mogu se razvrstati kao posebni sistemi samo s obzirom na predominantne institucije. A determinizam u razvoju, tj. u slijedu till sistema, jedino znaci da, npr., ustanak rimskih robova pod Spartakom u prvom stoljecu stare ere ili seljacki ratovi u Evropi u X V i X V I stoljecu nisu mogli postici ciljeve svojih inicijatora1 dok je rat sjevemih drzava u Americi za ukidanje , ropstva u X IX vijeku u krajnjoj liniji morao postici svoj cilj. Kao konkretni dogadaji oni su, naravno, proizvod jedinstvenih historijskih okolnosti i kao takvi su neponovljivi. No kad se apstraMraju irelevantni detalji, pojav1 Cak i ako bi vojnicki uspjeli, kao na primjer bugarski seljacki ustanak 1277 g. koji je nakon pobjede svog voctu, pastira Ivajla, ustolicio za cars. I, kao u prici, pastir Ivajlo ozenio se obudovljenom caricom.

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ljuje se pravilnost koja omogucuje uopcavanja. Ocigledno je da neka pojedinacna zemlja moze preskociti stadije razvoja i to se upravo danas deSava s mnogim zaostalim zemljama. No ta cinjenica ne utjece na valjanost uopcavanja, jer jedino drustva koja su zaostala mogu presko citi stadije razvoja. Drustva u prvoj liniji razvoja ne mo gu to postici. To zapazanje ima svrhu da nas podsjeti kako su cisto racionalisticke sheme ekonomskih. institucija npr. komunisticke naseobine u Americi proslog stoljeca ili komunisticke seoske zajednice u Kini nasih dana beskorisne. Konacno, dvoklasna shema jedino usmjeruje paznju na osnovnu pokretacku snagu drustvene promjene: borbu izmedu onih koji, kao vladajuca klasa, imaju interesa da sacuvaju postojeci drustveni sistem i onih koji bi se koristili promjenom i koji zbog toga predstavljaju antagonisticku druStvenu klasu. No vladajuca i eksploatirana klasa nisu nuzno homogene, nisu nuzno krute formacije i medu njima obicno ima izvjestan broj srednjih grupa koje, naravno, takoder treba uzeti u obzir kod analize nekoga konkretnog drustva. Dvoklasna shema samo je prikladna i korisna apstrakcija drutvenih odnosa. Pokusaj da se tacno razvrstaju svi pojedinacni clanovi nekog danog drustva u dvije klase pokazao bi samo krajnju naivnost jednog ogranicenog empiricara. Zadatak dvoklasne sheme jest da pruzi jednostavan analiticki okvir za studiranje tendencija drustvene polarizacije i njenog neizbjeznog rezultata, osnovnog drustvenog sukoba. Terminom osnovni drustveni sukob za razliku od ostalih. drustvenih sukoba izmedu pojedinaca i grupa do kojih dolazi u svakom zamisljivom drustvu ovdje se oznacava situacija u kojoj osnovni princip drustvene organizacije implicira drustveni sukob izmedu grupa koje ne samo da imaju razlicite interese vec se jedna prema drugoj odnose kao visa i niza i kao manjina i vecina. U svim je klasnim drustvima lako ukazati na postojanje osnovnog drustvenog sukoba. I obmuto, kad god otkrijemo potencijalno postojanje osnovnog drutvenog sukoba, mozemo pouzdano ocekivati razvoj u pravcu klasnog dru stva. Tu cemo hipotezu uskoro moci i prakticki primijeniti. 16

2. D R 2 A V N I K A P IT A L IZ A M Drustveni razvoj ne zavrsava se liberalnim kapitalizmom = Sto je danas ocigledno, ali cega je malo tko bio svjestan u vrijeme kad su Marx i Engels zapoceli svoju analizu. U tom kontekstu ne mozemo izbjeci razmatranje, makar i krajnje fragmentamo, problema socijalisticke revolucije. Dobro je poznato da su Mars i Engels ekstrapolirajuci Mstorijski trend, dosli do zakljucka da ce so cijalisticke revolucije izbiti u najrazvijenijim zemljama.1 U stvari, medutim, do socijalistickih revolucija doslo je u relativno zaostalim zemljama, a za sada nema znakova da ce se one nuzno ponoviti bar ne u formi gradanskog rata u najrazvijenijim zemljama. Kako treba da objasnimo tu pogresku u predvidanju za koje je izgledalo da se tako dobro slaze s historijskim iskustvom? Prije svega valja konstatirati da predvidanje nije ni u kom slucaju bilo potpuno pogresno. Pokazalo se da su Marx i Engels imali pravo u predvidanju nasilnih so cijalistickih revolucija2 a isto su tako imali pravo kad , su ocekivali da ce upravo u najrazvijenijim kapitalistickim zemljama radnicka klasa biti u stanju da ostvari prve stavke svog programa. U vrijeme Komunistickog manifesta te su stavke bile, medu ostalim, osmosatni rad1 Npr. mladi je Engels u spisu, koji je postao osnova za Komunisticki manifest, pisao (1847. g .): . . . da se razvitak proletarijata u gotovo svim civiliziranim zemljama nasilno ugnjetava i da samim tim protivnicl komunista svom silom rade na izbijanju revolucije. . . Stoga komu nis tiCka revolucija nede biti nacionalna, nego de se izvrSiti u svim civiliziranim zemljama istovremeno, tj. barem u Engles koj, Americi, Francuskoj i Njemackoj. Ona ce se u svakoj od tih zemalja razviti brze ill sporije, ved prema tome da li ova ill ona zemlja ima izgradeniju industriju, vece bogatstvo i znatniju kolicinu proizvodnih snaga (2, 356 i 358). 2 U stvari, kratko vrijeme prije svoje smrti Marx je doSao do za kljucka da bi upravo u Rusiji moglo doci do prve eksplozije. Sada . . . pisali su on i Engels u 1882 Rusija predstavlja prednji odred revolucionamog pokreta u Evropi (3, 601). Mars je takoder jednom prilikom, na mitmgu u Amsterdamu poslije Haskog kongresa I intemacionale 1872, izdvojio Ameriku i Englesku kao zemlje u kojima radnici mogu posddi svoje ciljeve mimim sredstvima. A dvadesetak godina kasnije (1891. g.) Engels je pisao: Moguce je zamisliti da ce staro drustvo mimo urasti u novo u zemljama gdje narodno predstavnistvo koncentri5e svu vlast u sebi, gdje ustavnim putem mozes uraditi sve 2to hodes dim imaS vecinu naroda za sobom; u demokratskim republikama kao 2to su Francuska. i Amerika, u monarhijama kao Sto je Engleska . . . gdje je . . . dmastija protiv narodne volje nemodna (4, 67). Uporeflenje ovog citata Engelsa, sada p ri kraju svoje naiidne karijere, sa stavom 27-godi5njeg Engelsa citiranim u prethodnoj blljeSd, pokazuje da je Engels u tbku zivota proSao odredenu evoluciju. Ta evolucija bila je uvjetovana i akumuliranjem historijskog iskustva u toku pola stoljeda. 2 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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ni dan, opce i jednako pravo glasa. strukovne i politicke organizacije radnicke klase, progresivno oporezovanje, besplatno osnovno skolovanje, socijalno osipranje, rastuci zivotni standard.1 Danas su u razvijenim kapitalistickim zemljama ti zahtjevi manje ili vise ispunjeni2, a u izvjesnom broju tih zemalja piivatno vlasniStvo na sredstva za proizvodnju djelomicno je ukinuto prelazenjem odredenih industrija u drzavno vlasnistvo posredstvom niza nacionalizacija. No sve je to bilo postignuto bez velike socijalisticke revolucije iako, u razlicitim zemljama doslo je do izvjesnog broja krvavih klasnih sukoba tipa 1848 sto nas dovodi do naredne tacke u nasim razmatranjima. Revolucija nije proizvod razvoja kao takvog vec nepodnosivih drustvenih napetosti. U pionlrskim zemljama pred-1848ovski kapitalizam proizvodio je drustvene nape tosti u blizini tacke eksplozije. Kao ilustracija i potvrda te teze moze posluziti izvanredan opis djelovanja kapitalisticke masine toga vremena u Mstorijskim glavama Marxovog Kapitala. Medutim, u to vrijeme prilike jos nisu bile zrele za novi drustveni sistem. Kasnije je socijalizam postao teoretski izvediv, ali drustveni antagonizmi nisu se reproducirali u stepenu nuznom za nasilnu
1 Vidi na primjer Zahtjevi Komunisticke partije u Njem ackoj (1848), programski dokmnent koji je sastavio komitet od sest clanova, medu kojima su se nalazili Marx i Engels; program Socijaldemokratske rad nicke partije Njemacke usvojen 1869; poznati Gotski program iz 1876; minimalni program francuske radnicke partije iz 1880; nacrt programa ruske socijaldemokratske grupe aOsIobodenje radaa iz 1883; program So cijaldemokratske radnicke partije Austrije iz 1888; program srpske so cijaldemokratske partije iz 1903. itd. (41, 12572). 2 Engleski sodjalist E.F.M. Durbin ucinio je slijedece zanimljivo uporedenje: Prije stotinu i jedne godine u 1841 Britanija je stajala na pofietku 'gladnih cetrdesetili godina'. Pretpostavimo da se jednom reprezentativnom clanu trudbenickog i izgladnjelog proleterijata reklo: 'Za tri generacije vaSi praunuci radit ce osam sati dnevno (umjesto dvanaest) za prosjecnu realnu nadnicu od tri funte nedjeljno (umjesto funtu i cetvrt); postojat ce opce pravo glasa (umjesto tankog sloja glasaca sastavljenog iskljucivo od bogatih), kao. i opce i besplatno osnovno sko lovanje (umjesto vase nepismenosti); vecina nezaposlenih dobivat ce potporu od drzavnog osiguranja (umjesto da budu ponizavani kao Sto ste vi po odredbama Zakona o siromasima); bit de organizirano redovno staranje za bolesne i ostarjele (umjesto privatne samilosti i gladovanja od cega sada patite); sinovi siromaSnih ljudi ici ce u Oxford i Cambridge na racun drzave, a radni ljudi uci ce u parlamenat u velildm brojevima i zauzimat ce najviSe polozaje u zemlji; priznavanje sindikata bit ce pravilo a ne izuzetak; a vecina Clanova vaSe klase posjedovat ce nesto imovine. Sto bi radnik iz 1841. odgovorio na sve. to? On bi se, vjerujem, gorko nasmijao. T i izgledi Cinili bi mu se nemogucim i neostvarivim u svom optimizmu, nerazboritim snom (5, 25).

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revoluciju. Zasto? Po mom misljenju kao objasnjenje mogu se navesti dva odlucna i usko povezana razloga koji se medusobno pojacavaju. Prvo, za razliku od svih ranijih prlvreda kapitalisticka privreda nije ni izdaleka bila stacionama; ona se razvijala relativno brzo cime se stvarala mogucnost da i trudbenicke klase poboljsavaj.u svoj polozaj i posjednicke klase akumuliraju bogatstvo. Drugo, slobodno trziste pokazalo se kao veoma uspjesan organizacioni princip; kako ono funkcionira bezlicno, izgledalo je da se niko ne moze direktno kriviti za postojece nevolje. Iz oba razloga vladajuca klasa mogla je dati politicka prava eksploatiranima a da ipak ne ugrozi svoje pozicije. To je znacilo daljnje ublazavanje drustvenih napetosti. Postepeno je radnicka klasa uspjela da se organizira u sindikate i radnicke partije i sto je jacim radnicki pokret postajao, smanjivao se jaz izmedu posjednicke i radnicke klase. Bilo to dobro ili lose, tek dobro organizirani radnicki pokret spasio je razvijene kapitalisticke zemlje od socijalisticke revolucije. Situacija se znatno razlikovala u nerazvijenim zemljama. Ovdje se prvobitna akumulacija kapitala, s drustvenim sukobima koji su je pratili, poklopila s relativno visokiin zivotnim standardom u razvijenim zemljama, i sa socijalistickiin ideologijama snaznih radnickih pokreta tih zemalja. Kako je to ruska revolucija iz 1905. pokazala, bilo je dovoljno razloga za revoluciju. A kad je jednom velika revolucija zapocela, bilo je sasvim prirodno cla nece stati prije nego sto pokusa ostvariti najradikalniji program koji je epoha proizvela, program socijalizma. Jer revolucije su lokomotive Mstorije. One kidaju veze tradicije, uklanjaju zapreke posvecenih prava i ciste tlo za slobodno kretanje prema granicama koje postavlja jedino postojeca revolucionama ideologija sto odrazava materijalne i kultume uvjete epohe, a ne prosto zemlje koja izvodi revoluciju. Iako je, naravno, kasnija primjena revolucioname ideologije modificirana velikim dijelom Mstorijskim osobenostima doticne zemlje, o osnovnim cinjenicama moze biti malo sumnje kako se to jasno vidi iz priinjera dviju najznacajnijih nacionalnih revolucija: u X V III stoljecu francuska revolucija uklonila je feudalne odnose i tako utrla put vecoj efikasnosti kapita listicke organizacije; u X X stoljecu ruska revolucija uklortila je narednu prepreku, privatno vlasnistvo, i tako da2*

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lje poboljsala efikasnost ekonomske masine. Nakon sto s e r u s k a revolucija pokazala uspjesnom bilo je vjerojatno da ce je slijediti niz socijalistickih revolucija u drugim zaostalim zemljama. Marx je ocekivao da ce kapitalisticki r a z v o j dovesti do polarizacije bogatstva unutar najrazvijenijih z e m a l j a i da ce to povecati klasne protivurjecnosti do revolucije. To se doista i dogodilo u ranijim stadijima kapitalistickog razvoja, o cemu se u posljednje vrijeme pojavljuje i prva statisticka dokumentacija, ali brza e k s p a n z ija proizvodnih snaga pomogla je da se polarizacioni proces ublazi, pa cak i zaustavi prije no sto je otisao suvise daleko. I tako je umjesto toga u svojim kasnijim stadijima kapitalisticki razvoj pracen monopolizacijom i imperijaUstickiin ratovima doveo do po larizacije bogatstva u medunarodnom mjerilu., cime je klasni sukob u zaostalim kapitalistickim zemljama bio potenciran dok konacno nije bio razrjesen u socijalistickoj revoluciji. Naredni nas zadatak jest da ispitamo moguce daljnje promjene u proizvodnim odnosima. Vidjeli smo da su ti odnosi izuzimajuci prvobitnu zajednicu prosli kroz tri stadija: stadij potpune licne zavisnosti radnika od gospodara; stadij djelomicne zavisnosti; i konacno stadij potpune licne nezavisnosti radnika koji je na rad za gospodara primoran jedino bezlicnim silama trzista. Ustanovili smo da se ti sukcesivni stadiji odlikuju rastucom ekonomskom efikasnoscu. Cijeli taj proces u stvari predstavlja postepeno oslobadanje pojedinca od drustvenih okova, izjednacavanje ljudi, savladivanje drustvenih odnosa na nacin slican onome kojim se savladuju prirodne sile. Ukoliko ova generalizacija ima smisla, tada se slijedeci stadij moze sastojati u eliminiranju svih pojedinacnih privatnih vlasnika sredstava proizvodnje, koji, u svojoj ulozi organizatora proizvodnje, treba da budu zamijenjeni jednim jedinim vlasnikom, drzavom, sto ce dovesti do izjednacavanja pojedinaca u njihovom odnosu prema drzavi. Upravo tu eksproprijaciju privatnih kapitalista od strane drzave trebala je da ostvari socijalisticka revolucija. Ekonomske prednosti drzavnog kapitalizma1 u odnosu na privatni
1 Pod sdriavnim kapitalizznoma podrazumljevam drzavno vlasni5tvo i direktnu kontrolu i upravijanje svirn, ili bar dominantaim dijelom, sred stava proizvodnje. Ponekad se takav sistem naziva drzavnim socijaliz-

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kapitalizam ogromne su. Organizirajuci proizvodnju po racionalnom planu izbjegavaju se periodicne krize i drzava je u stanju da ubrza ekonomski rast dva pa i tri put a (v. 16, gl. 10). Karakteristicno je svojstvo kapitalizma alienacija Ijudskog rada (up. 17. 196208). Da bi zivio, proleter je prinuden prodavati svoje unutamje bice, svoju radnu snagu, i on nema nikakve kontrole nad proizvodom svoga rada. To zapazanje implicira dvije stvaii: radnik je prvenstveno privjesak masine upotrebljavan za oplodnju kapitala; i drugo, sudbinu konacnog proizvoda odreduju slijepe sile trzista. U drzavnom kapitalizmu samoalienacija dostizava krajnju mogucu granicu, buduci da citavo drustvo postaje proletarizirano. No totalna alienacija u isto vrijeme pribavlja sredstva za svoje vlastito totalno unistenje. Jer, ako ne pojedinacni clan, a ono drustvo
mom. Mozda bi se u opcem slucaju drzavni kapitalizam odnosno drzavni socijalizam mogao smatrati zavrsnim stadijem kapitalistickog razvoj a odnosno poCetnim stadijem socijalistiCkog razvoja, kod ega bi provedena socijalisticka revolucija predstavljala kriterij da li se radi o prvom ili potonjem. No drustveni sadrzaj revolucije ne proizlazi iz njene etikete ved iz realnih efekata na druStveno bide. Francuska revolucija je proklamirala jednakost i bratstvo, a donijela je burzoasko drustvo s pravom ekonomski jaceg i eksploatacijom. Osim toga, Sto da radimo s onim druStvima koja nece proci kroz nasilnu revoluciju? Moglo bi se stati na stanoviste da socijalizam ne treba idealizirati i da analogno kapita lizmu, koji je proizveo fasisticku Njemacku i kantooalnu Svicarsku, postoji socijalizam sa Staljinovom Rusijom i samoupravnom Jugoslavijom. I tada drzavni ili drzavno-birokratski socijalizam za neke predstavlja izrodavanje socijalizma, a za druge prvu, sirovu, fazu iza koje slijedi samoupravna faza (Fiamengo 6, ss. 11 i 18). Tu se postavlja pitanje: koliko se socijalizam moze izroditi pa da jos uvijek predstavlja socijalizam? Da li npr. logori joS spadaju u socijalizam ili vise ne? I ratim jo osnovnije pitanje: ne predstavlja li sa stanovista marksizma drzavni socija lizam contradictio in adjecto; je r ili nije drzavni ili nije socijalizam? T o Sto je receno upuduje na zakljudak, da je upotreba jednog termina, i to drzavnog kapitalizma, vjerojatno naudno najispravnija. Taj termin proizilazi iz Marxovog odredenja kapitala kao svlasti nad radom i njegovim proizvodimaa (96, 167) i osim toga Sini se da prevladava u jugoslavenskoj ekonomskoj literaturi. Tako M. Novak piSe da. bi zadrzavanje drzavnesvojine sznacilo ne ukidanje proletarijata nego pretvaranje svih ljudi u proletere, ne ukidanje kapitala ved njegovu opcu vladavinu, u kojoj semoze razviti, a i nuzno razvija eksploatacija svoje vrste* (7, 92). Pristup'ajuci problemu s drugog stanoviSta N. PaSic dolazi do zakljuEka: Nekada je drzavna intervencija u privredi bila pogresno izjednacavana sa socijalizmom. Kada bi se primijenio na nekoliko posljednjih decenija, ta| kriterij bi doveo u redove socijalista sve istaknutije kapitalistiEke politicare novije ere, od BaJdvina i Roosevelta do Hitlera i de Gauleaa (8, 11). A. Dragicevic pise: Nacionalizacija sredstava za proizvodnju i planska privreda jesu pretpostavke socijalizma, ali samo pretpostavke i ni5ta vise. Da bi se doista radilo o spotpuno izgradenoma socijalizmu potreban je uz to jos citav niz drugiii faktora, u prvom redu socijalisti&ki razvitak

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kao cjelina u stanju je da kontrolira proizvod svog rada pomocu drzave. I to je zakljucak koji privlaci glavnu paznju svih socijalista. Drzavna kontxola nije sama sebi svrha vec je opravdana samo utoliko ukoliko je to jedina altemativa kaosu privatno-kapitalisticke proizvodnje. Mectutim, ako se moze pokazati da je planska privreda u stan ju da se rijesi drzavne kontrole, tada ce postati jasno da je drzavni kapitalizam samo prelazni stadij prema drugom i efikasnijem drustvenom sistemu, socijalizmu. Kontrola proizvodnje bez drzavnog posrednistva znaci kontrolu od strane neposrednih proizvodaca, sto nadalje znaci da se jednakost proletera preobrazava u jednakost gospodara. Proces ljudske alienacije, zapocet u prvom klasnom drustvu, zavr'sava se i u prvom fcesklasnom drustvu zapocinje suprotni proces. Rad postepeno prestaje biti patnja, neprijatnost i trud i postaje prva popolitickih odnosa i ekonomske strukture drustva* (9, 218). Slicno P. Kovac i f). Miljevic zapazaju da sdrzavna svojina i drzavno upravljanje sami po sebi malo ili gotovo nikako ne mijenjaju polozaj proizvoda ca u proizvodnji i njegovo pravo na ucesce u upravljanju privredom . . . U zemljama gdje je pobijedila socijalisticka revolucija, drzava, umjesto da postane organ radnih ljudi, moze da postane i postaje organ drzavnog i partijskog aparata, koji upravlja u ime radnih ljudi (10, 13). Moze se dodati da je u izvjesnom smislu takvo gledanje na problem anticipirao jos F. Engels: Modema drzava, ma kakav bio njen oblik, u sustini je kapitalisticka masina, drzava kapitalista, idealni ukupni kapitalist. Ukoliko vise produktivnih snaga ona preuzima u vlastitu svojinu, utoliko vise postaje ukupni kapitalist, utoliko vise drzavljana eksploatira. Radnici ostaju najamni radnici, proleteri. Odnos kapitala se ne ukida, naprotiv, on se sada tek jos vi5e zaostrava. Ali to zaostrenje dovodi do preokreta. Pretvaranje produktivnih snaga u drzavnu svojinu ne rjeSava sukob, ali ono skriva u sebi formalno'sredstvo, kljuC za rjeenje (11, 293). Nadalje slicno je rasudivanje i L. Fabria, koji prije pola vijeka, u vezi s Lenjinovom knjigom Drzfiva i revolucija prostom i neposrednom logikom dolazi do zakljucka: Ako se drzava takoder pretvori u vlasnika, on'da demo imati drzavni kapitalizam, a ne socijalizam . . . U drzavi vlasniku svi bi proleteri postali najamnici drzave umjesto najamnika privatnih -kapitalista. Drzava bi bila eksploatator, a to znadi^ Citava gomila visih i nizih upravljaCa i citava birokracija sa svim svojim hijerarhijskim redovima, stvorili bi novu vladaju(5ii i eksploatatorsku klasu. Izgleda da se neSto slidno ved stvara u R u s iji. . . (12, 164). Posljednjih godina kod nas se javlja tendencija da se sdrzavni kapitalizam zamijeni emotivno neutralnijim terminom etatizam (dime se ujedno eliminira diskusija o smislu ili besmislu pojma sdrzavni socijalizam). Vidi npr. M. Popovid (13, 32836), M. Pecujlid (14). Najradikalniji je u tom pogledu S. Stojanovic: Etatizmom treba nazvati sistem zasnovan na drzavnoj svojini sre.dstava za proizvodnju i drzavnom upravljanju proizvodnjom i ostalim dru5tvenim djelatnostima. Drzavni aparat predstavlja novu vladajucu kla su. Kao kolektivni vlasnik sredstava za proizvodnju on uposljava radnu snagu i eksploatise je. Lifini udio pripadnika vladajude klase u raspodjeli viska vrijednosti proporcionalan je polozaju u drzavnoj h ijerarh iji. . . Specificnost etatisticke klase pored ostalog sastoji se i u tome sto njena ekonomska mod izvire iz politicke moci, dok je kod burzoazije obmut sludaj (15, 33).

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treba ljudi, izraz ljudskog zivota. Sve to, naravno, nema nikakve veze s etickom pozeljnoscu takvog sistema. To jedino ukazuje na mogucnost vece efikasnosti takvog si stema. A ako mozemo utvrditi ostvarivost i ekonomsku superiomost nekog drustvenog sistema, to za marksista znaci dokazati nfegovu neizbjeznost. Vrativsi se na problem drzavnog kapitalizma, potrebno je ispitati koje su drustvene snage i procesi koji liberalni i privatni kapitalizam pretvaraju u monopolisticki i drzavni kapitalizam. Jedan od njih, nepotpuna socijalisticka revolucija, vec je bio spomenut. Drugi, postepena transformacija, danas je vec dobro poznat tako da ce kratko razmatranje biti dovoljno. Slobodna igra trzisnih snaga u konkurentnom kapitalizmu postepeno dovodi do koncentracije proizvodnje u rukama sve manjeg broja poduzeca kojih velicina u odgovarajucoj mjeri raste. Jedan od razloga vece .efikas nosti velikog poduzeca cisto je tehnoloske prirode: povecanje proizvodnje do odredene tacke smanjuje troskove proizvodnje. Drugi i mnogo vazniji razlog u vezi je s trzistem: veliko poduzece kontrolira odredeni dio trzista i zato moze poduzeti planiranje; veliko poduzece financijski je jako sto u trzisnoj privredi znaci da mu je otvoren kredit; ono stoga moze vrsiti pritisak na slabije partnere i opcenito moze udesavati uvjete kupovanja i prodavanja u svoju vlastitu korist; ono je u stanju da prezivi periodicne krize kada manja poduzeca nestaju. Na taj nacin konkurentni kapitalizam stalno proizvodi tendencije monopoliziranja. Suceljeni s ekonomskom snagom poslodavaca, radnici se pocinju organizirati u sindikate. Da bi bili efikasni, sindikati moraju postati velike organizacije i oni rastu dok ne postignu apsolutni limit jedinstvenog nacionalnog udruzenja. Na tom stadiju monopolizirani rad suceljuje se s monopoliziranim kapitalom1 . Slican proces dogada se u politici. Da bi se ostvarila stabilna vlada, broj politicMh partija smanjuje se dok citavi politicki zivot ne padne pod dominaciju dviju ve1 Ta dva trenda monopoliziranja nisu nuzno antagonisticni. Po misljenju engleskog socijalista R.H.S. Crossmana . . . valja zapaziti da u modemoj veliJcoj Industriji ima izvjesnih zajednifikih interesa koji ujedinjuju organiziranu upravu i organiziraru rad. Na primjer, ocigledno je prikladno za obje strane da vlast bude skoncentrirana u sve znanje rukuo (18, 10).

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likih partija1 Nadalje, postoji jaka tendencija da se te . dvije partije vezu s ostale dvije monopolne grape i da predstavljaju njihove interese. Na taj nacin vjerojatno je da cemo dobiti konzervativnu partiju koja favorizira interese privatnog kapitala i labuiistidku partiju koju pomazu sindikati. Cetiii giganta dominiraju na drustvenoj sceni u monopolnom kapitalizmu: organizirani kapital, organizirani rad i dvije politicke partije. Ukoliko se politicke partije jasno identificiraju s dva antagonisticka drustvena interesa, oligopol cetvorice reducira se na duqpol. Marxova vizija dvoklasne strukture drustva materijalizirala se iako s nekim vaznim modifikacijama uslijed procesa birokratizacije u konkretnoj drustvenoj organizaciji modeme razvijene kapitalisticke zemlje. Kapital i Rad bore se za prevlast. Neposredni rezultat te borbe nije nuzno poznat. Neki izvanredni dogadaj, recimo ozbiljna kriza, moze iznenada povecati mogucnost ukidanja privatnog vlasnistva, ili, u svakom slucaju, ozbiljno poremetiti ravnotezu snaga u korist rada. U tom slucaju kapitalisti mogu pribjeci fasizmu, kao sto su to uradili izmedu dva rata. S druge strane vladajuca klasa moze tvrdoglavo odbijati da politicka pitanja rjesava politickim sredstvima, na primjer stavljanjem socijalistickih partija van zakona. U tom slucaju radnicka klasa moze biti primorana da povede nasilnu socijalisticku revoluciju. Konacno bit ce zemalja koje ce biti u stanju da sacuvaju nesigumu ravnotezu izmedu dvije antagonisticke drustvene snage putujuci polako putem nacionalizacije u ovoj ili onoj fortni isprva, mozda, nacionalizirajuci nnerentabilne industrije koje zahtijevaju potpunu rekonstrukcijua, zatim industiije koje su od vitalne vaznosti za naciju, nadalje industrije koje zahtijevaju koordinacijua, pa onda monopolizirane industiije u kojima se ne moze tolerirati privatni monopola, i tako dalje dok i posljednji kandidat za socijalizaciju ne dode na red i povecavanjem drzavne kontrole. Velika rasprostranjenost akcionarskih drustava
1 Dvije se velike monolitne structure suceljavaju opisuje Robert McKenzie britansku scenu dodajudi karakteristiCuo i bijesno se prepiru o relativno neznatnim pitanjima .koja ih razdvajaju* (19, 586). N ije se tesko sloziti s Crossmanom da je McKenzie u svojim Britanskim politickim partijama uvjerljivo dokazao da su se dvije velike partije razvile prema zakonu rastude oligarhije koji djeluje u industriji, sindikatima i 5tampi (18, 21).

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u kojima su vlasnici i uprava razlicite osobe, omogucava da se u modemim kapitalistickim privredama taj proces odvija relativno bezbolno. Svaka noya laburisticka vlada morat ce uciniti jos jedan daljnji korak u pravcu prosirenja javnog vlasnistva i tako ce privatni kapitalizam postepeno biti zamijenjen drzavnim kapitalizmom. Na kraju mozemo rezimirati rezultate dosadasnjih razmatranja. Problem sistema proizvodnih odnosa koji odgovaraju planskoj privredi u osnovnom je definiran. Drzavni kapitalizam takav je moguci sistem; on to nije samo kao logicka mogucnost, vec i kao empiridka realnost. No to znanje jos nije dovoljno za rjesenje naseg problema. Moramo postaviti slijedece pitanje: da li je drzavni kapi talizam optimalni sistem u danim uvjetima? U ranim danima socijalisticke misli pise zapadno-indijski socijalist W. A. Lewis bilo je gotovo aksiomom da ce, kad jednom imovina prijede iz privatnih ruku u drzavnu svojinu, svi veliki drustveni problemi biti automatski rijeseni; ona ce se upotrebiti za svrhe koje vise odgovaraju javnim interesima, dohodak ce biti egalitamije rasporeden, ekonomska moc demokratizirana, efikasnost povecana, a klasna borba izmedu vlasnika i radnika zavrsit de se. To glediste nije prezivjelo iskustvo (20, 181). Profesor Lewis je prvenstveno imao u vidu britansko iskustvo, no zakljucak se lako moze generalizirati. A glavni razlog za nezadovoljavajuce funkcioniranje drzavnog kapitalizma treba, po mom misljenju, traziti u jednoj karakteristicnoj osobini njegove ekonomske i politicke organizacije: u vladavini birokracije. I tako se nas naredni zadatak sastoji u analizi ekonomskih posljedica birokratske organizacije privrednog procesa.

3. B IR O K R AC IJA I F E T I5 IZ A M C IN A Analizirajuci funkcioniranje privatnog kapitalizma i njemu svojstvenu ideologiju, Marx je narocito naglagavao fetiSizam robe, tj. tendenciju da se odnosi izmedu ljudi tretiraju kao odnosi izmedu roba. U drzavnom kapitalizmu tome odgovara pojava koju mozemo nazvati fetisizmom 25

cina. Ona znaci sakrivanje stvamih ljudskih. odnosa iza bezlicnih birokratskih pravila, mistifikacija aktivnosti vrsilaca drzavnih sluzbi, nosilaca cina. cinovnika. Pravorijek trzista nepogresiv je, a isto tako i pravorijek cinovnika u odnosu na svoje potcinjene. Imanje cina prenosi na imaoca kvalitetu vjestijega, postenijega, pouzdanijega (politicki ili inace), inteligentnijega, ukratko: nadredenoga svim ostalim pojedincima koji stoje na nizoj ljestvici cinovnicke MjerarMje. Paralelizam ide cak i dalje. I slobodno trziste i birokratska struktura zive svoje posebne zivote koji se ne mogu podvrci svjesnoj kontroli. U slucaju birokracije to nije sasvim tako i zbog toga zahtijeva potanje ispitivanje.

W eberova teorija birokracije Birokracija, kao drustvena institucija, ima tri osnovne karakteristike: (1) Kad su administrativni zadaci jednostavni i nediferencirani, ne postoji potreba za specijaliziranim aparatom koji bi ih izvrsavao. U maloj drustvenoj organizaciji licnost na vlasti u stanju je da kontrolira manje ili vise direktno drustvene aktivnosti ekonomske, politicke, vojne. Kada se zajednica poveca pojavljuje se potreba za aparatom koji ce posredovati izmedu izvora vlasti i tacaka izvrsavanja naloga. A kad potrebe zajednice postaju raznolikije i drustveni zivot kompleksniji, pojavljuje se potreba za povecanom specijalizacijom clanova posrednickog administrativnog aparata. Kvantitativno prosirenje i kompleksnost administrativnih zadataka stvaraju teTmicke preduvjete za razvoj birokracije. N o to jos nije citava prica. (2) Slicno novcu institucija birokracije bila je poznata u svim drustvenim sistemima osim u prvobitnoj zajednici. N o potpuno razvijenu formu ta je institucija postigla i opet slicno novcu tek u kapitalistickom sistemu. Odnos izmedu razvoj a riovcane privrede i birokracije hije samo odnos paralelizma, vec je to takoder i odnos uZaj a mnog uvjetovanja. Kako je to Max Weber, zacetnik
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sistematskog studiranja birokracije1 istakao, novae je nor, malna pretpostavka birokracije, on cini redovno nagradivanje u gotovom mogucim i pozeljnim. U feudalizmu su administratori feudalni gospodari posjedovali sredstva administracije. Slicno tome vojnici su posjedovali svoje oruzje. U kapitalizmu su clanovi administracije i vojske odvojeni od sredstava kojima se sluze, a to je opet vezano sa odvajanjem sredstava proizvodnje od neposrednih proizvodaca2 Novae, u smislu racuna kapitala, postao . je institucionalna osnovica i za racionalizaciju i za depersonalizaciju ljudskih odnosa. Birokratske strukture uklapale su 'se odlicno u taj drustveni okvir. (3) Treca je karakteristika birokracije da je ona proizvod posebnog tipa vlasti. Slijedeci Webera u hjegovoj klasifikaciji ali stavljajuci njegovu shemu u jedan drugi teoretski okvir mozemo razlikovati tri osnovna tipa vlasti. Trad.icion.alna vlast zasniva se na uspostavljenom vjerovanju u posvecenost vajkadasnjih tradicija i legitimnost statusa onih koji prema njima vrse vlast (21, 301). Lojalnost potcinjenih clanova zajednice pripada nosiocu cina, a ne pravnom poretku. Odatle jaka tendencija da se
1 Weberovi stavovi bit ce u daljnjem tekstu obradeni ne5to detaljnije zbog toga sto je Weber zapoceo sistematsko istrazivanje birokracije kao i zbog toga Sto se kasnija praksa u Soyjetskom Savezu koji je J. Staljin reklamirao kao marksisticku diktaturu proletarijata u najvedoj mjeri poklapa s tim stavovima. Proizlazi da je Weber, a ne Marx, bio ideoloSki predsasnik J. Staljina i njegovih sljedbenika. U tom pogledu; kao i u mnogom drugom, vulgarni pseudomarksisti pripisali su Marxu ideologiju koja ne samo da mu je bila strana vec je bila upravo dijametralno suprotna njegovim shvacanjima o drzavi, klasnoj borbi i socijalizmu. 2 Ako se fraza aceteris paribus interpretira u uvjetima antagonistickih klasnih interesa, slijededi odlomak iz Maxa Webera moze posluziti kao ilustracija problema: sEksproprijacija radnika opdenito, ukljuciv administrativni i tehnicki personal, od posjedovanja sredstava za proizvodnju ovisi o slijededim osnovnim ekonomskim faktorima: (a) Cinjenica da je, ceteris paribus, opdenito moguce da se postigne viSi nivo tehnicke efikasnosti ako uprava ima sveobuhvatnu kontrolu nad izborom i nadinom upotrebe radnika uporedeno sa situacijom u kojoj su zaposlenja prisvojena ill gdje postoji pravo ucestvovanja u upravljanju. U ovom posljednjem sluSaju pojavljuju se tehnicke kao i ekonomske i iracionalne prepreke efikasnosti. . ( b) u trzisnoj privredi uprava nesputana utvrdenim pravima radnika i imajudi neogranicenu kontrolu nad dobrima i opremom koji podlijezu njenim zajmovima nalazi se u povoljnijoj poziciji za dobivanje kredita . . . (c ) s historijskog stanovista eksproprijacija rada odvijala se od X V I stoljeda u privredi koju su karakterizirali progresivni razvoj trzinog sistema, kako ekstenzivan tako i intenzivan, puka tehnicka superiomost orijentirana na posebne trzisne situacije i stxuktura odnosa,vlasti u dniStvu* (21, 227). U stavu (a ) prepoznajemo teoretskog predsasnika Staljinove argumentacije sistema jedinonacalija koji je u SSSR-u zaveden koncem 1920-tih (v. pogl. 5).

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prisvoje sredstva admimstiiranja. Gdje je privredni razvoj. polagan kao sto je bio prije pojave kapitalizina promjene u drustvenim institucijama veoma su male i citav drustveni zivot, ukljuciv i instituciju vlasti, bit ce veoma tradicionaliziran. Postojanje tradicionalne vlasti minimira mogucnost postepene adaptacije na promjenljive uvjete zivota i tako postojeca institucionalna struktura ekonomska, politicka, religiozna ispoljava tendenciju da dode u sukob s drustvenim potrebama kojima treba sluziti te tako dolazi do akumuliranja protivurjecnosti izmedu njih. Kako ima malo mogucnosti da se te protivu rjecnosti rijese unutar tradicionalnog okvira, tradicionalnu vlast raznosi drustvena eksplozija i ona biva zamijenjena, privremeno, karizmatickom vlasti vode revolucionarnog pokreta. Karizmaticka vlast pociva na odanosti specificnoj i izuzetnoj svetosti, heroizmu i primjemom karakteru neke licnosti i normativnom poretku koji ona otkriva i odreduje (21, 301). Sustina karizmatskog pokreta sastoji se u emancipaciji od rutine i zbog toga odgovarajuci tip vlasti mora trajati kratko i biti prelaznog karaktera. Karizmatski pokreti ili ne uspijevaju i propadaju ili uspijevaju i kroz rutinizaciju karizme stvaraju novi tradicionalizirani sistem. I tada se ciklus moze ponoviti. Dolaskom kapitalizma upravo opisani mehanizam prestaje funkcionirati. To ne u smislu da se tradicionalna i karizmatska vlast vise ne mogu pojaviti, vec u smislu da one prestaju dominirati drustvenom scenom. Bezlicno trziste i eksproprijacija sredstava za proizvodnju i administraciju razaraju licne lojalnosti nosiocima cinova. A brz privredni razvoj zahtijeva fleksibilne adaptacije dru stvenog okvira sto, implicirajuci promjene, iskljucuje tradicionalizirana rjesenja i, buduci da se dogada brzim redoslijedom, cini karizmatska rjesenja malo vjerovatnim. Razvija se novi tip vlasti koju Weber naziva racionalnom pravnom vlastL Pravna vlast zasniva se na vjerovanju u legalnost obrazaca normativnih pravila i pravu onih koji zauzimaju polozaje vlasti da na osnovu tih pravila izdaju zapovijedi (21, 300). Pravila su univerzalna i pokrivaju sve moguce slucajeve ponasanja unutar nadleznosti nosilaca vlasti, te definiraju granice tih nadleznosti. Poslusnost se duguje pravno ustanovljenom bezlicnom po retku koji na taj nacin postaje osnovnim izvorom vlasti. Vlast se komentira Webera T. Parsons (21, 51) pro28

teze na pojedince samo utoliko ukoliko zauzimaju odredeni legitixnni status prema pravilima, ukoliko zauzimaju polozaj, a njihova je vlast ogranicena na sferu kompetencije definiranu propisima. Van te sfere oni su privatni individuumi koji nemaju nikakvu vecu vlast no ma ko drugi. Na taj nacin pojavljuje se mogucnost da novi i suptilniji fetisizam polozaja ili cina bude dodan tradicionalnom fetisizmu robe; da jedan aspekt odnosa eksploatacije sakriven iza trzista bude dopunjen ili zamijenjen drugim skrivenim iza polozaja. Individuumi sa, reklo bi se, sizofrenicnom licnoscu gospodari u uredu, a stranke kod kuce; bez ikakve svojine, a odlucujuci o svemu; javni sluzbenici po naslovu, a javni gospodari po polozaju ti individuumi jesu birokrati. Administrativni personal, ciji su oni clanovi, dobiva oblik birokratske strukture. Weber razlikuje sedam osnovnih kategorija racionalne pravne vlasti. Te su kategorije samo tehnicke i formalne oznake birokratske strukture. To su: stalna organizacija sluzbenih funkcija vezanih pravilima; odredena sfera kompetencije; organizacija sluzbi slijedi princip hijerarhije, .tj. svaka niza sluzba nalazi se pod kontrolom i nadzorom vise; pravila koja reguliraju provodenje neke sluzbe mogu biti tehnicka pravila ili norme; administrativni personal je odijeljen od vlasnistva na sredstvima administriranja; imalac cina ne prisvaja svoj sluzbeni polozaj; administra tivni akti, odluke i pravila registriraju se pismeno (21, 3044). Te tehnicke osobine birokracije cine je izvanredno efikasnim oruzjem za rukovanje masovnom administracijom. Administrativne funkcije mogu se specijalizirati prema cisto objektivnim razlozima i tada ih mogu izvrsavati funkcioneri s adekvatnom specijaliziranom naobrazbom. Poslovi se izvrsavaju objektivno prema predvidivim pra vilima i bez obzira na licnosti. Sa stajalista onih koji drze vrhovnu vlast, birokratska masina funkcionira s neuporedivom preciznoscu, stabilnoscu i pouzdanoscu. Uslijed stroge discipline rezultati imaju visok stepen predvidivosti. Konacno, podrucje djelovanja administrativnog tipa organizacije izgleda prakticki neogranicenim, a ta se organizacija formalno moze primijeniti na sve vrste administrativnih zadataka (21, 309). Sve to navodi Webera da zakljuci: Iskustvo opcenito pokazuje da je cisto birokratski tip administrativne organizacije... s cisto tehni29

ckog stanovista u stanju da postigne najvisi stepen efikasnosti i u tom je smislu formalno najracionalnije poznato sredstvo za provodenje imperativne kontrole nad ljudskim bicima (21, 309). No ima jedna nezgoda u toj weberijanskoj analizi idealnog tipa jedne drustvene institucije. Birokracija je potpuno prikladna za imperativnu tj. prinudnu kontrolu, ali ona ne osigurava identicnost interesa kontrolora i kontroliranih. Stavise, postoji jaka tendencija da ti interesi budu polariziraiii. Tipicna birokratska stniktura izgleda kao piramida s tankim vrhom i velikom osnovicom; s tokom saopcenja u samo jednom pravcn, odozgo prema dolje; s imperativnim karakterom tih saopcenja; s dva odrijesena kraja: vrhom, gdje hijerarMjski odnosi nestaju n smislu da nema vise nadredenih, i podnicom, gdje oni nestaju u obmutom smislu, naime da vise nema podredenih; i bez direktne komunikacije izmedu vrha i podnice drustvene piramide. Cisto birokratski tip administrativne organizacije pocinje da dobiva zlokoban izgled sistema punog potencijalnih drustvenih sukoba. Ocigledno Weberova analiza cistog tipa opasno je simplificirana i varava. Ako treba da ocijenimo efikasnost sistema razvijenog do svojih. konacnih konzekvenci, onda moramo uzeti u racun i ljudske odnose koji ce iz tog sistema proizici. A uz to moramo razmotriti i one disfunkcionalne efekte sistema koji su odredeni njegovim tehnickim osobinama. D isfunkcionalni efekti birokra cije i neefikasnost b irokratskog nacina poslovanja ( b irok ra tiza rn ) Vidjeli smo kako su snazne integracione sile u modernoj privredi masovne proizvodnje. U obavljanju administrativnih funkcija nacionalne birokracije ponasaju se na nacin koji ima odredenih pravilnosti. U stvaii pravilnosti su istaknute i mozemo ih razvrstati u tri grupe. (1) U idealnom slucaju birokratski aparat treba da izvrsava naredbe onih na vlasti bez ispitivanja njihove valjanosti. To osigurava predvidivost rezultata, sto je jedan od bitnih preduvjeta za superiomiju efikasnost birokratske organizacije. U praksi, medutim, birokracija ne funkcionira u drustvenom vakuumu. Predvidivost ponasanja birokratske organizacije zasniva se na pretpostavci da ce sluzbena politika biti vjem o provodena od strane 30

podredenih. Ali zasto bi to tako trebalo da bude? Tacno, postoji stroga disciplina podnprta prijetnjom kazne. N o taj zastitni uredaj funkcionira samo kad su u pitanju pojedinacni clanovi aparata. On zatajuje kad interesi birokracije kao drustvene grupe, ili cak samo interesi visih. slojeva hijerarhije, dodu u sukob s politikom koju treba provesti. To dovodi do raznih posljedica. Administrativni personal predstavlja aparat politicke ili privredne uprave. U oba slucaja, ako treba postici pouzdanost i predvidivost, interesi birokracije i vladajuce klase moraju se poklopiti. Zbog toga je prirodno da se u klasnom drustvu gom ji slojevi birokratske hijerarhije sastoje od clanova vladajuce klase ili onih koji nastoje da udu u njene redove1 I tako dnlazimn do zakljucka da . birokratska organizacija da bi funkcionirala u klasnom drustvu mora biti klasno orijentirana organizacija. Time se smjesta.razaraju osnovi racionalne legalnosti na kojima je Weber gradio svoju tezu o maksimalnoj formalnoj efikasnosti birokratske organizacije. Buduci da je klasno orijentirana, birokracija proizvodi drustveni sukob i tako sprecava postizavanje maksimalne efika snosti. Empiricke ilustracije za gom ji zakljucak mogu se naci bez poteskoca. Skorasnja Mstorija najvaznijih i najrazvijenijih. kapitalistickih zemalja obiluje njima. U Weimarskoj Njemackoj, da citiramo J. D. Kingsleyja, sucinjen je pokusaj da se nametne parlamentama kontrola drzavnim sluzbenicima koji su samo djelomicno prihvacali ciljeve koje je Republika nastojala postici; i pokusaj je kata1 Up. interesantne empiricke studije T. B. Bottomorea (22), o francuskoj visoj drzavnoj sluzbi, i R. K . Kelsala (23), o njenoj engleskoj partnerki. Pred posljednji rat francuska visa driavna sluzba bila je praktiki monopol pariSke grande bourgeoisie. Poslije rata, u periodu 19451951, 65% uspjesnih kandidata na prijemnim ispitima potekli su od obitelji iz pndh dviju klasa zanimanja (poslodavci i nezavisne slobodne profesije; visi drzavni sluzbenici, direktori i inzenjeri), koji sacinjavaju svega 3% odraslog muskog stanovnistva (22, 149). U Britaniji sinovi posjednickih i profesionalnih obitelji (aristokracija, veliki i mali poslodavci, visoki i srednji drzavni sluzbenici, direktori, slobodne pro fesije) drzali su u 1950. 71,9% (79,9% u 1939. i 86,0% u 1929) najvisih polozaja u drzavnoj sluzbi, dok se u tim istim zanimanjima nalazilo svega 18,1% odraslog muSkog stanovnitva u istoj godini (23, 157). Amerifiki drfavni sluzbenici po porijeklu su vi3e iz ssrednje klasea, ali u jednom vaznom pogledu amerifika birokratska elita slici na ostale dvije: po iskljuCenju ljudi radnickog porijekla. Radnici saSinjavaju viSe od polovine amerifikog drutva, a daju svega 10% najviSih administratora. Up. Bendix (24, 29).

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strofalno propao. U Francuskoj sn, takocter, reakcionarm cinovnici uspjesno sabotirali napore Blumove vlade u oblasti fmancija i vanjske politike; a Rooseveltova administradja bila je primorana da sakupi gotovo potpuno novu garnituru sluzbenika da bi provela reforme New Deala. Nikakve nporedive situacije nije bilo u skoraspjoj Engleskoj; no to je ocito zato jer je birokracija n svojim gomjim slojevima reprezentirala vladajucu klasu kao cjelinn i jer sn njene aspiracije bile identicne s onim na sto su se sukcesivne vlade obavezalea (25, 219). Posljednja tvrdnja zahtijeva korekciju. Britanska birokracija imala je takoder prilike da pokaze svoju klasnu pristranost; jednom za vrijeme generalnog strajka u 19261 drugi , put za vrijeme druge labuiisticke vlade (1929 1931)2 . Postaje jasno da birokracija po svojoj prirodi koci drustveni progres. Ta je cinjenica veoma relevantna u slucaju socijalisticke revolucije. Marxov zakljucak da socijalisticka revolucija, da bi bila uspjesna, mora razbiti i zamijeniti stari drzavni aparat, potvrdili su historijski dogadaji3 Medutim, postavlja se jedno prakticno pitanje: . zamijeniti cime? Pretpostavimo da je vladajuca klasa ekspropriirana i da je birokratska hijerarhija popunjena licnostima koje nisu bile vezane za, ili su cak bile neprijateljski raspolozene prema staroj vladajucoj klasi. Hoce li se nova besklasna birokracija ponasati razlicito od stare? Prije nego sto pokusamo odgovoriti na to pitanje moramo razmotriti dvije tehnicke znacajne birokratske akcije. (2) Da bi se osigurala preciznost, bezlicnost i predvidivost, birokracija u akciji mora se ravnati prema pravilima koja, u idealnom slucaju, treba da pokriju sve moguce slucajeve. U praksi, naravno, nikakav birokratski mozak ne moze anticipirati i pravilima fiksirati besko1 Up. Gerth i Mills: Generalni Strajk iz 1926. pokazao je da ce britanski birokrati druStveno i polltiCki stajati 112 vladajucu klasu (26, 175), 2 S. M. Lipset citira Georgea Lansburyja, Clana te vlade i kasnijeg vodu IaburistiCke partije, koji veil: Kroz citavo vrijeme trajanja posljednje vlade sluzbenici ministarstva fmancija sprecavali su i koCUi ministre u njihovom radu. To niko ne moze poredi (27, 259). 3 S. M. Lipset primjecuje: Od vremena Karla Marxa bilo je socijalista koji su smatrali da uspjeSna socijalistifika drzava mora razbiti stari drzavni aparat i izgraditi novu administrativnu organizaciju. U skora5nje vrijeme Ijudi koji su studirali ili sluzbovali u socijalistiCkim vladama, ukazivali su da je odlucan razlog za njihov neuspjeh da energifinije pridu ostvarivanju svojih ciljeva bio 'birokratski konzervativizam' starih drzavnih sluihenikag (27, 258).

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nacnu raznolikost zivota. Prema tome postoji protivurjecnost inherentna n sistemn: potpuno birokratizirana organizacija zahtijevaJa bi broj pravila gotovo jednako velik kao i broj konkretnih odluka; kako je to nemoguce, broj pravila mnogo je manji i tako se jedan vazan elemenat nepreciznosti i nepredvidivosti uvlaci n organizaciju. Da bi savladali taj defekat, oni na vlasti pokazujn tendencijn multipliciranja pravila kojih samo brojnost i rastuca medusobna nedosljednost imaju jako negativno dejstvo na one koji se tih pravila moraju drzati i koji se pocinju orijentirati na neaktivnost. Ako se broj pravila smanji, situacija nije bolja. Pored povecane mogucnosti izbjegavanja, tipicni funkcioner sada se osjeca manje sigurnim i zato sve cesce konzultira nadredene. Efekat te protivrjecnosti na ponasanje odrzava se u tendenciji iz bjegavanja odgovomosti; po definiciji birokracija nije odgovoma za svoje odluke (jer su one predodredene propisima), a po ponasanju ona je neodgovoma. Hijerarhija statusa povecava taj efekat i dodaje novi: ne samo odgovomost nego i rad se izbjegava; prva se prenosi prema gore, drugi prema dolje. U tom se procesu gubi znacajna kolicina intelektualne i emocionalne energije. Ali to jos nije sve. Osnovni princip hijerarhije jest pokoravanje pravilima i vlasti nadredenih. Cinovnici su odgajani da se pokoravaju, jer to omogucava rad birokratske organizacije. Pokoravanje je ocito sredstvo za cilj koji organizacija pred sebe postavlja. No za clanove hije rarhije pokoravanje je bitni preduvjet vlastite egzistencije. Rezultat je zamjena cilja sredstvom, tipicni birokrat nastoji da zadovolji pravila i nadredene1 a ne da posluzuje , i pomaze strankama. R. K. Merton efektno rezimira taj proces: (1 ) Efikasna birokracija zahtijeva pouzdanost reakcije i struktumu odanost propisima. (2) Takva odanost pravilima dovodi do njihova preobrazavanja u apsolute; ona se vise ne shvacaju kao relativna za riani niz ciljeva. (3) To ometa brzo prilagodavanje pod posebnim uvjetima koje autori propisa nisu jasno predvidjeli. (4)
1 Studirajuci ponasanje jednog dijela americke vojne birokracije kao ucesmk-promatrac, A. K. Davis zapaza: Birokratski personal pati od kronicSne status-tjeskobe. Svako koncentxira paznju na svog nadredenog, cij.i se najmanji izraz zadovoljstva ili nezadovoljstva uvelicava i iskrivljuje prema-dolje. I najblazu kritiku od strane nadredenog primalac shvaca kao strahovit napada (28, 389). Isto ili slicno vrijedi i za ostale birokratske organizacije, kako to svako zna iz vlastitog iskustva. 3 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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Na taj nacin isti oni elementi koji opcenito pridonose efikasnosti, u specificnim slucajevima dovode do neefikasnostin (29, 366). Disfunkcionalni efekti birokratske 'organizacije povecavaju se s povecavanjem same organizacije. Za bixokra-' cije na nacionalnom nivou proces dolazi do logickogzavrSetka: aparat konstruiran da olaksa kontrolu sam izmice kontroli. Tehnicki to je prosto posljediea onoga sto E. Jaques naziva paradoksom egzekutive: ___ sto je egzekutivni cinovnik visi po polozaju, veci je broj ljudi koji ovisi o njemu, ali je takoder veca i njegova zavisnost: jer izvrsavanje njegovih zelja ovisi o sve vecem broju ljudi (30, 227). Cak iako na vrhu birokratske strukture stoji Platonov Filozof, on ce biti u stanju da svoje projekte ostvaii jedino unutar granica mogucnosti provedbe aparata koji mu stoji na raspolozenju. Iz vec navedenih. razloga taj ce aparat tendirati da zadatke rjesava neadekvatno, sto moze primorati Filozofa da poduzima mjere koje neupucenima izgledaju fantasticne. No nacionalnim birokracijama nuzno ne rukovode Filozofi. Vjerojatno je realisticnije ocekivati da ce redovno voda imati mnogo skromnije intelektualne i organizacione sposobnosti. U' tom slucaju glavni zadatak vode moze se svesti na permanentnu borbu za ocuvanje vlastite pozicije u hijerarhiji uslijed cega i posljednji tracak svjesne kontrole iscezava. Vjerojatnost da ce se to dogoditi povecava se kad uzmemo u obzir slijedecu grupu disfunkcionalnih faktora. (3) Proces administriranja nije bezvremenski i nije nezavisan od velicine organizacije. U velikoj birokratskoj organizaciji s mnogo posrednickih clanova bit ce znacajan vremenski pomak izmedu trenutka kad je naredba izdana na vrhu i trenutka kad je cinovnici na drugom kraju izvedu. Taj se pomak podvostrucuje kad cinovnici na drugom kraju iniciraju proces saljuci prvo informaciju prema gore i zatim cekajuci na upute za akciju. On se' potrostruduje Hi pocetverostrucuje kad, iz ovog ili onog razloga, infonnacija nije ispravno shvacena na jedhom' od krajeva poslije prvog odasiljanja. Cesto ce, medutim, saopcenja putovati istim putem mnogo puta, jer ce na svakoj karici u lancu birokrati, biinuci se za vlastitu sigumost, nastojati da rasciste sve spome tacke. Na tim dugim putovanjima saopcenja i instrukcije iskrivljuju se vec i zbog psiholoskih razloga, a zatim i iz svih onih 34

razloga koji su razmatrani u (1) i (2). Dok informacije i instrukcije putuju gore i dolje prilike se mijenjaju i konacno primijenjeno rjesenje moze se pokazati kao sasvim neadekvatno. Oba slucaja odrazavaju jos jednu inherentnu protivrjecnost birokratske organizacije, naime protivrjecnost centralizacije i decentralizacije. Ako je cilj maksimalna efikasnost, decentralizirana birokratska organizacija logicka je i psiholoska nemogucnost; logicka zato sto razara koordinaciju, psiholoska zato jer je nemoguce odgojiti covjeka u pokomosti pa da se u isto vxijeme od njega ocekuje i vlastita inicijativa. KomprOmisti se onda normalno postize u korist centralizacije. A centralizirana organizacija daje rezultate poput oniTr koje opisuje M. Chardon u Francuskoj ili koje je autor analizirao u Jugoslaviji. Sve grane javne sluzbe, veli Chardon, organizirane su tako da proizvode rijeci, papir i neaktivnost. Nikakvi tehnicki obziri ne upravljaju njihovim naporima; naprotiv, postoji zamrsena mreza rutinskih mehanizama; stalno rasipanje snaga; lanci skupih karika na kojima poslovi stagniraju uporedo s gomilanjem sukcesivnih verifikacija; ljudi razmatraju pa zatim ponovno razmatraju; ljudi verificiraju, reverificiraju i kontrareverificiraju; najmanja razlika podstice sumnju, dodatna ispitivanja, komentare, bespredmetne jalove diskusijea (citirano prema 31, 408). A evo i konkretne ilustracije krajnjih efekata: Da se izgradi novi most umjesto staroga koji je ocigledno nesiguran potrebno je 20 razlicitih administrativnih koraka uz rezultat da je trebalo 15 do 18 mjeseci da se pocne s izgradnjomn (31, 408). Moj drugi primjer uzet je iz jedhe sasvim druge druitvene sredine, no u kojoj centralizacija ipak daje slicne rezultate. Odnosi se na naftnu industriju iz perioda administrativnog planiranja u Jugo slaviji: Poduzeca i pored vlastite uprave i vlastitog racunovodstva nisu bila samostalna. Direkcija se mijesala u sve pa i u najsitnije poslove i probleme poduzeca, od kaloricke vrijednosti hrane po menzama pa do godisnjih proizvodnih planova. Ceste promjene, potpima nesamostalnost, pogresne privredne direktive koje su rezultirale iz strucnog i opceg nepoznavanja problematike pojedinog poduzeca ili iz prostog fakta glajhsaltovanosti ucinili su od poduzeca bezvoljne i bezinicijativne aktere jedne privredne politike koja je vodena mimo n jih ... Za neizvr3* 35

Savanje planova uvijek je pronalazeno bezbroj objektivm h poteskoca a stvamih poteskoca je i tako mnogo fcilo broj zaposlenog osoblja naglo se povecavao bez odgovarajuceg privrednog efekta, a u Generalnoj direkciji .360 sluzbenika primalo je oko 170 raznih izvjestaja i slalo ipoduzecima okruznice u istoj proporciji. . . (32, 191). Izvjestaji su se akumulirali u sveske od mnngn stotina strana kroz koje se tacno, do u pojedinost, moglo ustanoviti kada, uslijed cega i koliko dugo je neka konkretna mjihalica ili pumpa bila u kvaru i koliko je zbog toga izgubljeno nafte, ali je bilo potpuno nemoguce ocijeniti opcu ekonomsku situaciju grane. Planovi su se mijenjali nekoliko puta godisnje,.a u jednom ekstremnoin slucaju jedna rafinerija nafte dobila je posljednju verziju svog godisnjeg proizvodnog plana sredinom decembra tekuce godine1 . Francuski je primjer tipican za funkcioniranje drzavne iDirokracije na njenom tradicionalnom podrucju. Jugoslavenski je primjer tipican za relativno modeme slucajeve kad se citavim privredama upravlja administrativno. Slicni primjeri mogu se umnozavati po volji i oni, medu ostalim, takoder pokazuju da, po pravilu, sto je zemlja ^aostalija birokracija funkcionira manje efikasno.

Birokratska polarizacija drustva Birokratske organizacije mogu imati, i normalno imaju, natruhe stranih elemenata. To moze ublaziti i u stvari znatnoj mjeri ublazava lose strane birokratske organiu xacije. Postoji, naravno, beskonacni broj mogucih modifikacija, no one nas ovdje ne zanimaju. Nas je prvenstveni zadatak otkrivanje inherentnih tendency a birokratske forme organizacije, a za tu je svrhu na neki nacin cist tip najprikladniji. Pretpostavimo dakle da drustveni zivot
1 Britansko ratno iskustvo u administrativnom planiranju, u mnogoie m slicno jugoslavenskom iskustvu, dobro je prikazano u knjlzi E. De"vonsa (33). "Up. takoder W. Euckena za njemacko iskustvo (34). Najzanimljivije bi bilo iskustvo sovjetskog planiranja, jer ono postoji dugo vremena da bi se neki, ili mozda mnogi, defekti iz prvih godina jugoslavenskog planiranja eliminirali. No koliko je meni poznato ne postoji dobra kriticka ocjena sovjetskog iskustva od strane sovjetskih autora, koju bih ovdje mogao citirati. Razasute informacije upucuju na zakljuiak da je opca slika uglavnom ista.

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neke zemlje organizira i kontrolira golemi birokratski aparat. Kakvi ce se drustveni odnosi uspostaviti? Potrebno je da samo povucemo konzekvence iz dosadasnje analize. Osnovni je princip birokratske organizacije poslusnost. Posljedica po ponasanje jest sluganstvo prema naredenjima (tj. dobivanje naredbi) kompenzirano arogancijom prema podredenima (tj. davanje naredbi). To se ponasa nje izrazito mijenja na vrhu i na podnici birokratske piramide; vrh pokazuje, ili si bar to moze priustiti, aroganciju, podnica moze izabrati jedino poslusnost. Interesi su polarizirani, jer ono sto predstavlja maksimum slobode izbora za vrh, u isto vrijeme predstavlja minimum slobode izbora za podnicu. Sto je organizacija bliza tom svom logickom idealu, veci je raspon izmedu maksimum-minin-mm odnosa, cime se maksimira potencijalni, drus tveni sukob. Odatle mogucnost pojavljivanja ostre druStvene diferencijacije, osnovne drustvene diferencijacije izmedu vladajuce i eksploatirane klase. Taj se potencijalni sukob materijalizira u otvorenim znacima drustvene stratifikacije. Da bi imali stabilan i efikasan sistem, upravljacima je potrebna lojalna biro kracija. Ta lojalnost prema gore kupuje se ekonomskim privilegijama, a pojacava se diferencijom statusa1 Na taj .
1 Diferencijacija statusa postlzava se uvodenjem cinova i uniformi, ekskluzivnim klubovima i sliEnim sredstvima za ostentativno ponasanje. Stanovanje u poseboim kvartovima i Ijetovanje u ekskluzivnim odmaralistima potencira diferencijaciju. Na suptilniji nacin ona se odrazava u odsustvu kritike prema gore: od reddva se ne ocekuje da ce kritizirati pukovnika, cak ni van kasame. Postoji, naravno, niz procesa koji pridonose perpetuiranju birokratske polarizacije rodbinske veze, na primjer, igraju znacajnu uJogu no mi se njima ovdje ne mozemo baviti. Medutim, jedan je vrijedan da se spomene, jer predstavlja neizbjezno prosirenje diferencijacije statusa na medunarodne odnose. Radi se o razvoju nacionaUzma s tendencijom dominacije. Po svojoj prirodi birokra cija je patriotska. Kao takva ona spontano prilazi ispredanju mita nacionalne velicine, jer je srodno njenom nacinu misljenja da raznim nacijama pridaje razlicite stepene zasluga, tj. da izvodi propisnu dife rencijaciju statusa, rezervirajuci, prirodno, najviSi, ili idudi najvisi rang za svoju vlastitu naciju i jer to sluzi dvjema korisnim svrhama: pripisujuci sebi stvarna ili hipotetska dostignuda nacije ili, Sto izlazi na isto, domadeg drustvenog sistema, domaca birokracija dokazuje svoju vlastitu nezamjenjivost; uvjeravajuci ostatak stanovniitva o njihovoj pripadnosti superiornijoj naciji, ili o zivotu u superiornijem sistemu, biro kracija nastoji da podmetne fiktivne slojeve ispod podninog sloja, tj. da preobrazi razrjeseni donji kraj drustvene piramide u pseudohijerarhijski sloj slican svima ostalima iznad njega kako bi spreiila razvoj svijesti o antagonistiCkim intereslma. Na taj nacin funkcioniranje hijerarhijskog principa prelazi nacionalne granice i dovodi do birokratizacije u meflunarodnom mjerilu.

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se nacin stvara bogata i mocna manjina nasuprot podredenoj vecini. Unutar birokracije, primijetio je jos Marx, MjerarMjom se odrzava misteriozna ispravnost naredenja, a prema vani birokracija se konstituira kao zatvorena koiporacijaa (35, 65). Kao upravljacki aparat, birokracija se, prirodno, identificira s drzavom. Birokracija vazi samoj sebi kao posljednji, krajnji cilj drzave pise M arx... Ciljevi drzave pretvaraju se u ciljeve birokracije, Hi birokratski se ciljevi pretvaraju u ciljeve drzave (35, 64 65). Formirana kao zatvorena koiporacija i koristeci drzavnu vlast za svoje ciljeve birokracija se formira kao privilegirana manjina suprotstavljena interesima velike vecine clanova drustva. Ta manjina ce prigrabiti kontrolu nad sredstvima za proizvodnju, vecina ce prodavati svoju radnu snagu kako bi mogla zivjeti. Prvi ce vladati, potonjima preostaje samo da tu vladavinu prihvate. A to rdje nista drugo do klasicna Marxova dvoklasna straktura drustva. Sada mozemo odgovoriti na pitanje postavljeno ranije. Cak i ako socijalisticka revolucija radikalno razbije stari drzavni aparat i u upravnom aparatu clanove stare vladajuce klase zamijeni clanovima dotada eksploatirane klase, novo drustvo nece se nuzno razviti u besklasno, socijaJisticko drustvo. Ako se ostavi da dejstvuje osnovni princip birokratske organizacije princip hijerarhije u toku vremena dvije drustvene klase s protivrjecnim interesima ponovo ce se pojaviti. Da bi se to sprecilo drzava, cija je sustina prinuda, mora da opet jednom upotrebimo poznati Engelsov terrnin odumrijeti. Jer pojava klasnog antagonizma i vladajuce klase ne ovisi o svojini na sredstva proizvodnje od strane individualnih clanova te klase, vec o klasnoj kontroli sredstava proizvodnje i ukoliko ova kontrola omogucava toj klasi vrsenje takoder i politicke silom poduprte kontrole1 .
1 Poneko ce mozda radije upotrebiti tennin vlasnistvo ili svojina za ono sto je gore nazvano kontrolom nad sredstvima za proizvodnju. Tako, .umjesto da se govori o privatnoj i birokratskoj kontroli, moze se govoriti o privatnoj ili drzavnoj svojini. Ja sam gornju frazu odabrao zato, jer ona opisuje bitan odnos jasno i neposredno i zato jer, slobodna od pravnih suoznaka, nije tako dvosmislena kao altemativni izraz. Uporedi slijedecu tezu Marxa i Engels a: sKomunizam ne oduzima nikome moc da prisvaja sebi dru5tvene proizvode, on samo oduzima mod da se tim prisvajanjem podjarmi sebi tudi rad (36, 51). Smisao te izjave ovisi o tome da li je naglasak na mod. da se podjarmi tudi rad ili na >prisvajanje. Ako se problem tako postavi, svako tko imalo pozna marksi-

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4. A S O C IJ A T IV N I1 S.OCIJALIZAM Potpuna drzavna kontrola znaci potcinjavanje citavog zivota, rada i dokolice svakog pojedinca naredbama nnih na vlasti i polozaju2 Ona znaci reduciranje covjeka na . tocak u sveobuhvatnoj masini prisiljavanja i prinude. Ona prisiljava individuuma da se odrekne svake djelatnosti koju vlada ne odobrava. Ona ne tolerira nikakav izraz ne, slaganja. Ona je preobrazaj drustva u striktno disdpliniranu radnicku armiju kako to zastupnici socijalizma kazu ili u kaznionu kako to vele protivnicia (38, 25). Ako se drzavni kapitalizam supstituira za socijalizam, slika koju crta von Mises u upravo citiranom odlomku ne razlikuje se mnogo od one koja proizlazi iz analize cistog birokratskog sistema, koja je dana gore. Ono u cemu von Mises i ostali ekonomisti liberalne skole grijese jesu, dakako, njihovi pokusaji da pokazu kako drzavni kapitalizam treba i moze biti zamijenjen liberalnim kapitalizmom. Dovoljno je uporediti kapitalisticke zemlje iz 1848. s danasnjima pa da se uvidi da zamisao nije narocito
zam znat ce da je bitno ono prvo. No cesto je bilo korisno da se naglasak prenese na dmge navodnike i doista iznenaduje koliko je malo Ijudi bilo u stanju da uvidi kako zakljucak mod podjarmljivanja tudeg rada nestaje kad se ukine privatno vlasnistvoc predstavlja jasan i historijski tragi can non sequitur. 1 Kod nas se danas cesto upotrebljava termin samoupravni socijalizam. Striktno govoredi atribut samoupravni ili asocijativni nije potreban. Ja ga upotrebljavam prvenstveno iz didaktiddh razloga, jer on na neposredan i nedvosmislen nacin opisuje odnosni dmStveni sistem. ;Socijalizam, kao i svi termini koji se mnogo upotrebljavaju, danas znaci toliko mnogo stvari von Misesova upotreba u gornjem citatu predstavlja instruktivan primjer da mu nedostaje mnogo od preciznosti potrebne za naucni termin. 2 U stvari to se vec dogodilo u privatnom kapitalizmu kao neizbjezan rezultat kapitalistickog razvoja. Uporedi slijedece podatke o rasporedu zaposlenog stanovniStva u Engleskoj i Velsu prije pojave kapitalizma i na kraju njegove laissez faire faze razvoja (37, 215): Kraj X V II v. 14 34 52 1921 4 90

Poslodavci Posloprimci Nezavisni

Vidi se da je zivot, rad i dokolicaa 90% stanovnistva u sistemu taVn dragom von Misesu potcinjena anaredbama onih na vlasti i polozaju. Brojke u gomja dva stupca nisu striktno uporedive. Prvi stupac je procjena osnovana na poznatim podacima Gregory Kinga i tako je sumnjive tacnosti. No to ne utjee na opcu sliku. Englesku iz 1700-te mozemo lako zamijeniti npr. Jugoslavijom ili Rusijom iz 1920-te, i tada proporcija nezavisnih (seljaci i obrtnici) raste na preko cetiri petine zaposle nog stanovnistva. ^

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preporucljiva. No to nije ispravan nacin prilazenja problemu. Bitno je da se drustvene institucije mijenjaju zajedno s razvojem proizvodnih snaga i da stoga institu cije devetnaestog stoljeca ne mogu biti primijenjene na privredu dvadesetog stoljeca. Drzavni kapitalizam pokazao se izrazito efikasnijim od sistema koji je zamijenio, a to znaci da ce protivrjecnosti koje proizvodi morati biti rijesene na nov nacin. Potrebno je ponovno naglasiti da losi efekti drzavnog kapitalizma mogu biti ublazeni na razlicite nacine i da se stoga Misesovo predvidanje ne mora nuzno obistiniti. No postoji mogucnost. A ta se mogucnost povecava kako to pokazuje iskustvo naseg stoljeca sa stepenom zaostalosti doticne privrede. Potreba za privrednim raz vojem najostrije se osjeca u najnerazvijenijim zemljama gdje je privreda skoro stacionama, a tradicija cesto bliza feudalizmu nego kapitalizmu. Prvi elemenat potreba razvoja ukazuje na nuznost da se oskudna sredstva koncentiiraju, da se raspolozivi kvalificirani personal okupi pod jedinstvenom upravom i da drzava postane odgovomi organizator privrednog procesa. Glediste da u nasem stoljecu drzava igra, ili treba da igra odlucujucu ulogu u preobrazavanju stacioname u rastucu privredu, izgleda da je naislo na jedinstveno sirok prijem. Ali realizacija tog gledista znaci stvaranje mocne birokracije. Drugi elemenat polufeudalni odnosi ukazuje da nerazvijene zemlje nisu imale prilike da produ kroz proces racionalizacije i depersonalizacije na kapitalistickom trzistu sto stvara tradiciju koja je potrebna da birokracija funkcionira kako treba1 i da ce stoga postojati jaka tendencija da se feudalna svijest o statusu prenese na birokratsku hijerarhiju i srodna tendencija da se ocuva tradicija ujedinjene politicko-ekonomske moci slobodne od kontrole odozdo. A to znaci jaku klasnu polarizaciju. Razvoj zahtijeva drzavnu intervenciju, a drzavna intervencija ima potencijalno stetan efekat to je tek jedan vise circulus vitiosus s kojim se nerazvijena pri1 Tradicija i pojam drzavne sluzbe po spremi i bez patronaze u mnogim je zemljama bila vezana s potrebama dominantnili poslovnih grupa, koje su od drzave zahtijevale efikasnu i jeftinu sluibu. J. Donald Kingsley je pokazao kako se u Hngleskoj politika drzavne sluzbe po spremi razvijala s porastom politicke moci poslovne klase. Poslovne grupe zahtijevale su efikasnu drzavu koja ce promicati i tititi razvoj trgovine* (27, 2578).

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vreda mora uhvatiti ukostac. Ulazenje u veci rizik predstavlja cijenu za preskakanje stadija razvoja. Postoji citav niz moguclh politika kojima se u konkretnim situacijama mogu ograniciti rizici svojstveni birokratizaciji. One nas ovdje ne zanimaju. To sto moramo uraditi sastoji se ne prosto u modifikaciji starog siste ma, vec u ocrtavanju novog sistema za koji je najvjerojatnije da ce zamijeniti stari. Novi sistem mora zadovoljavati kriterije da je i moguc i efikasniji. Bitne karakteristike novog sistema slijede neposredno iz prethodnog razmatranja i mogu se svesti na jednu jedinu: negaciju principa klasne polarizacije. Novo drustvo, ako treba da bude efikasnije, mora biti besklasno. Kod toga je lako uociti dva aspekta problema, jedan ekonomski i jedan politicki. Pocnimo s ekonomskim. Von Mises s pravom skrece paznju na jednu vaznu razliku izmedu javne administracije i ekonomskog upravljanja odnosno poslovanja (38, 5862). U javnoj administraciji ne postoji trzna cijena za postignuca. Privredni racun ne moze se promijeniti u svrhu ocjene uspjeha ili neuspjeha nekog ureda. Efikasnost policijske stan ice ili poreznog ureda ne moze se ustanoviti na isti nacin kao i efikasnost tvoraice. Stoga se djelatnostima ureda upravlja pravilima i propisima kao i direktivama od strane pretpostavljenih. Sto vise depersonaliziran sistem uspije da postane, bolje ce aproksimirati Weberovu racionalnu pravnu vlast. Uporedeno s javnom administracijom ekonomsko poslovanje ima velike prednosti u tome sto posjeduje prilicno objektivno unutar granica postavljenih neizbjeznim defektima trzista mjerilo uspjeha ili neuspjeha u visku prihoda iznad troskova. To omogucava da se birokratizacija izbjegne cak i kod veoma velikih organizacija. Kako cist prihod moze biti utvrden ne samo za cijelu poslovnu organizaciju, vec i za svaki njen dio, izvedivo je da se uprava i odgovomost decentraliziraju a da se time ne ugrozi jedinstvo poslovnih transakcija i postizavanja njihovog cilja. Odgovomost se moze podijeliti. Ne postoji potreba da se ogrardci sloboda odluke podredenili nikakvim pravilima ili propisima osim onoga sto karakterizira sve poslovne aktivnosti, naime, da se ucine rentabilnim (38, 58). To omogucava razrjesenje protiv41

rjecnosti centralizacije-decentralizacije i stimuliranje lic ne inicijative i kolektivnog poduzetnistva. Ekonomski visak moze se upotrebiti ne samo kao kontrola efikasnosti, vec i kao orude direktne motivacije. . U uvjetima ekonomskog blagostanja, kakvog ga mi znamo, ekonomska motivacija ima izvanredno jak utjecaj na radni efekat pojedinaca i nema razloga da tu mogucnost ostavimo neiskoristenom. Dobit i prisvajanje dobiti zar to ne znaci kapitalizam? Da, ako je i institucija kapitala u Marxovom smislu zadrzana. No nema potrebe da je zadrzimo. Unutrasnja organizaeija privatnog (i drzavnog) poduzeca predstavlja birokratsku piramidu s dva razrjesena kraja, jednosmjernim tokom naredenja i radnicima koji sacinjavaju podnicu na kojoj piramida pociva. Iz razloga analiziranih ranije, interesi podnice i zdanja iznad nje razilaze se. Kako bi zastitili svoje interese radnici su primorani da se organiziraju u sindikate, tj. da grade nove birokratske strukture u suprotnom pravcu. Tako radnici moraju podrzavati dvije birokratske strukture koje svrsavaju poslove u njihovo ime. To je veoma zaobilazna metoda organiziranja svakodnevnog zivota. Lako je uociti da, ukoliko ukidanje privatnog vlasnistva ukida izvor antagonistickih interesa, potreba za dvjema birokracijama koje se medusobno bore nestaje. Umjesto toga osnovica se moze direktno vezati s vrhom pomocu linije specificnili naredbi koje se odasilju prema gore: direkcija se zamjenjuje radnickim savjetom. Povezivanjem dvaju odresenih krajeva ranije birokratske piramide, privredne organizacije preobrazavaju se u samoupravne asocijacije, a kapitalizam se prevazilazi socijalizmom. Moglo se zapaziti da drzavni kapitalizam implicira, po definiciji, odsutnost privatnog vlasnistva, a da su usprkos tome u organizaciji proizvodnje odrijeseni krajevi ostali nepovezani. To se desava zbog unutrasnje logike biro kratske organizacije. Birokratska vlast pise Max Weber izvrsava se u svojoj najcistijoj formi tamo gdje najjasnije dominira princip imenovanja. Ne postoji tako nesto kao hijerarhija izabranih cinovnika u istom smislu kao i hijerarhijska organizacija imenovanih cinovnika. U prvom slucaju izbor onemogucava da se ma i priblizno postigne tako stroga disciplina kao u slucaju imenova nja. Jer potcinjeni cinovnik moze se natjecati za izbome 42

pocasti na ravnoj nozi s nadredenima, a njegovi izgledi ne ovise o sudu nadredeniha (21, 307)..Drugim rijecima, lojalnost funkcionera prestaje da bude vezana prema go re i hijerarhijska struktura tendira da se raspadne. . Primjena principa imenovanja na sam vrh birokrat ske piramide postavlja jedan interesantan problem. Piramida moze biti kmja, tj. organizacijom moze rukovoditi kolegijum kooptiranjem novih clanova. To kolektivno rukovodstvo imat ce obicno jednog clana koji djeluje kao primus inter pares i koji dolazi na taj polozaj izborom od strane svojih drugova (inicijativa moze da potekne bilo od njih, bilo od njega samoga, bilo da je propisana pravilima). K m ja piramida je cist tehnicki tip autoreproduktivne birokracije. Iskustvo pokazuje da sve birokracije tendiraju da razviju elemente tog tipa. N o postoje dvije daljnje vazne modifikacije. U privatnom kapitalizmu vlasnici imovine legalno, i u velikoj mjeri stvarno, imenuju vrhovne funkcionere privrednih organizacija. U drzavnom kapitalizmu tu funkciju obavljaju nosioci politicke vlasti. I tako prelazimo u sferu politicke organizacije. Modemi politick! sistemi, koji se tehnicki oznacavaju kao demokracije, rjesavaju problem vrhovnog imenovanja cetvrtom metodom: povezivanjem dvaju odrjesenih krajeva u redovnim intervalima od toliko i toliko godina. Ta se procedura naziva izborima i ona proizvodi partije, parlamenat i vladu, tj. izbor vrhovne vlasti. Nema sumnje da, sto je efikasnija ta procedura, veca je vjerojatnost da ce djelovanje hijerarhijskog principa biti podvrgnuto nekoj drustvenoj kontroli. Medutim, isto tako moze biti malo sumnje da je potencijalna efikasnost te procedure veoma ogranicena. Da bi bila efikasna, vlada mora biti na vlasti neko viijeme, tj. mora biti stabilna. Da bi bila stabilna, intervali izmedu izbora moraju biti dovoljno veliki a broj partija reduciran. Prvo po definiciji iskljucuje cesta odasiljanja naredbi prema gore, drugo implicira formiranje ogromnih partijskih birokracija. Vec je We ber istakao da birokratizacija partijske organizacije cini clana parlamenta agentom voda partijske organizacije (21, 387). Tu je tezu razradio R. H. S. Crossman, koji u nekoliko rijeci uopcava modemo iskustvo zapazanjem da odgovomost ministara parlamentu rapidno postajeustavna fikcija nastavljajuci: Zajedno s ministarskom od43

govomoscu odumrla je i odgovomost individualnih. clanova parlam enta.. Sada poslanik nije vise prvenstveno odgovoran biracima, vec partiji. On ne moze biti izabran, a da ne prihvati partijsku disciplinu; a ako se opre toj disciplini, on riskira politicku smrt (18, 18). Zbog velike udaljenosti, linija prema gore od osnovice prema vrhu spaja vise formalno nego stvamo dva odrijesena kraja drustvene piramide. Ocigledan lijek tome sastoji se u presijecanju te udaljenosti, u formiranju nezavisnih samopovezanih struktura kroz citav sistem, u stvaranju ovdje vec mozemo upotrebiti novu jugoslavensku politicku terminologiju samoupravnih komuna. Prostije receno, lijek se sastoji u decentralizaciji vlasti. Postoji vrlo malo drustvenih djelatnosti koje zahtijevaju krutu centralnu kontrolu. Striktno govoreci jedino djelat nosti usmjerene na obranu interesa zajednice prema vanjskom svijetu pripadaju toj kategoriji. Vanjska politika jedna je od njih, narodna odbrana je druga. Prakticki sve ostale izvrsne funkcije mogu1 se ostaviti unutar kompetencije komuna, koje predstavljaju elementame jedinice ekonomsko-politickih asocijacija. Medutim, jedva da je potrebno istaci da tehnicko rjesenje, decentralizacija, postaje mogucim tek u odredenim drustvenim uvjetima, naime u uvjetima koji dovode do razaranja uzroka stvaranja osnovnog drustvenog sukoba. Federacija samoupravnih asocijacija politickih, ekonomskih i u svim ostalim drustvenim djelatnostima to je bila Marxova vizija socijalizma inspirirana kratkom Mstorijom Pariske komune iz 1871 (40). Kao sto gomja analiza pokazuje, te je moguca i efikasnija altemativa birokratskoj drustvenoj organizaciji. Vazno je da se uvidi da birokratizacija znaci vise od proste koordinacije i diferencijacije administrativnih funkcija. Birokracija je instrumenat imperativne koordi1 Ta je jednostavna istina gotovo potpuno zanemarena u modernoj politicko-ekonomskoj literatim kako zapadnoj tako i istocnoj koja stoji pod tako dubokim utjecajem postojanja, i prividne neizbjeznosti, divovskih birokratskili organizacija. Svatko tko se usudi da stane u njenu obranu, riskira da bude proglasen anarhistom ili fantastom. U tome osvjezavajudi izuzetak a vjerojatno i znak intelektualne hrabrosti predstavlja stav W. H. Morris Jonesa: Nasa je . . . teza u tome da najmodniji doprinos rjesenju problema birokracije lezi u ozivIjavanju lokalne uprave rekonstmkcijom njenih funkcija i odredlvanjem njenog podmcja na osnovi drustvenih veza i lojalnosti stanovnistvaa (39, 26-7).

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nacije da upotrebimo Weberov terrain jos jednom koja se zasniva na prinudi i, na nacionalnom nivou, personificirana je drzavom. U uslovima postojanja osnovnog drustvenog sukoba prinuda je bitan elemenat drustvene organizacije, neophodan ukoliko zelimo spreciti rasulo. Funkciju prinude vrsi specijalan aparat cija se lojalnost zasniva na interesima koji su razliciti od interesa vecine stanovnistva prema kome prinudu treba primijeniti. Proces se, jasno, sam pojacava. Racionalizirajuci iskustvo pruske drzave, Weber je slicno kao i njegov zemljak Hegel prije njega implicirao da ona predstavlja zavrSetak moguceg razvoj a drustvenih institucija. Kad se problem jednom ovako formulira, pogreska postaje ociglednom. N ije potrebno da svaka vlast ili autoritet budu zasnovani na prinudi. T. Parsons je istakao da profesionalni autoritet lijecnika ili sveucilisnog profesora to nije (21, 52). I to nam daje kljuc za rjesenje. U upravljanju komunom, isto kao i u upravljanju tvornicom, postoje dva tipa odluka. Jedan od njih predstavlja politicke odluke, odluke koje se ticu vrednovanja, tj. uspostavljanja hijerarhije drustvenih vrednota. Drugi tip predstavlja tehnicke odluke; kad je jednom donesena odluka o politici (ili ciljuo), tehnicki strucnjaci preuzimaju na sebe da tu odluku sprovedu na najefikasniji na cin (sredstva). Birokratska vlast donosi stvamo, a cesto i formalno obje vrste odluka uno actu. Ako se, medutim, ta dva tipa odluka mogu odvojiti tada ce, bez ikakvog gubitka u efikasnosti, koordinacija tehnickog izvodenja biti zasnovana na tehnickom autoritetu. A izabrana samoupravna tijela zanimat ce se pronalazenjem sistema vrednota koji najvise odgovaraju postojecim vrednovanjima clanova zajednice. U toj shemi ne postoji potreba za prinudom. Jer altemativa prinudi nije anarhija, vec sistem koji uziva nepodijeljenu osnovnu lojalnost, privrzenost istim osnovnim drustvenim vrednotama. Opce slaganje u osnovnom omogucava slobodno neslaganje u svemu ostalom. Ljudi prestaju biti predstavnicima birokratskih organizacija i umjesto toga pocinju predstavljati sebe kao slobodno razvijene Ucnosti. Razbijanjem koncentracije vlasti omogucava se stvaranje drustva u kome je slobodni razvitak svakog pojedinca uslov slobodnog razvitka za svett (Marx, 36, 63). 45

Odumiranje drzave polagah je proces koji prvenstveno zavisi od stope povecavanja materijalnog bogatstva koje zajednici stoji na raspolaganju. No kad jednom taj pro ces zapocne, proces klasne polarizacije zavrsava se i obrce u suprotnom smjeru. Klasno drustvo nastalo je kao rezultat povecane proizvodnosti rada. Uslijed istog uzroka ono ce i nestati.

5. RAD N ICK O SAMOUPRAVLJANJE U H ISTO R IJSKO J P E R S P E K T IV I Nakon veoma opcih generalizacija u prethodnim poglavljima, bit ce potrebno da se razmotre konkretni fciistorijski dogadaji. U prvom odjeljku ogranicit cemo se uglavnom samo na registriranje odrectenog broja historijskih dogadaja. N o cak i tako ograniceno razmatranje pokazat ce se dovoljnim za nasu svrhu. U drugom odjeljku uci cemo u analizu suvremene situacije.

Prva tr i talasa Kad se ispituje unutar pojmovnog okvira obradenog u prethodnim poglavljima, amorfni historijski kontinuum posljednjih dvaju stoljeca pocinje da dobiva odredenu strukturu i pojavljuju se pravilnosti koje su od izvanrednog znacenja za nas problem. Mozemo razlikovati cetiri talasa dogadaja koji su djelomicno sukcesivni a djelomicno superponirani jedan na drugi. Nasa historijska skica zapocinje s prvim talasom koji je dao grupu proroka novog drustvenog uredenja. Druga polovina X V III stoljeca bila je svjedokom pojavljivanja novog, kapitalistickog drustva. To novo dru stvo rodilo je novi klasni sukob i uskoro je eksploatirana klasa dobila svoje prve intelektualne branitelje. Treba biti nacistu da to nisu bill sasvim svjesni branitelji jer, kako Engels zapaza, oni isprva nisu tvrdili da zele emancipirati neku odredenu klasu, vec odjednom cijelo covjecanstvo. Najrazvijenije zemlje toga vremena dale su i najznacajnije od tih proroka. Za nasu svrhu bit ce dovoljno da se odaberu trojica, ona trojica koje Schum 46

peter (41) spretno oznacuje kao asocijativne1 socijaliste. To su Robert Owen (17711858), Britanac velskog podrijetla, te Charles Fourier (17721837) i Louis Blanc (1811 1882), dva Francuza. Sva trojica propovijedali su reorganizaciju drustva na bazi asocijacija proizvodaca. Owen, najslavniji od te trojice, zamisljao je buduce drustvo kao federaciju komuna kojima upravljaju proizvodaci. Do tog je gledista dosao nakon sto je dva decenija proveo kao direktor velike tekstilne tvomice u skotskom selu New Lamark, gdje je poboljsao stambene uslove svojih radnika, organizirao je obrazovanje za njihovu djecu, skratio je radno vrijeme i, opcenito, anticipirao je za vise od jednog stoljeca tretmari koji ce radnici jednom dobiti u nacionalnim razmjerima. Owenove ideje inspirirale su zadrugarski pokret. A pocetkom tridesetih bio je vodeca licnost u sindikalnom pokretu, koji se razvijao i koji je tek izronio iz ilegalnosti, a koji ce stimulirati formiranje samoupravnih radioriica. Pod utjecajem Owena novi sindikat gradevinara prertvoren je u ceh gradevinske industrije, cime su anticipirane buduce sheme francuskih sindikalista i britanskih cehovskih socijalista. Medutim, nakon sto je bio obrazovan Veliki nacionalni ujedinjeni sindikat (183334), poslodavci i vlada reagirali su brzo i u nekoliko mjeseci ovenski sindikalizam bio je unisten. Fourier je konstruirao falansterije u kojima bi zajedno zivjeli kapitalisti, radnici i ucenjaci u harmonijskoj zajednici zasnovanoj na radu koji bi bio tako organiziran da bi odgovarao licnim sklonostima i sposobnostima pojedinaca. Louis Blanc, najmanje originalan ali vjerojatno najrealisticniji od trojice, predlozio je da drzava poduzme obrazovanje druStvenih radionica ateliers sociaux kojima bi upravljali radnici. Kad ga je revolucija od 1848. neocekivano dovela u Provizomu vladu u Parizu, Blanc je pokusao da ostvari neSto od programa. No, sasvim prirodno, njegove burzoaske kolege brzo su ga uklonili iz vlade i zatim su spretno sterilizirali njegovu djelatnost. Blancov ideal bilo je egalitamo drustvo u kom bi se licni interes stopio s opcim dobrom. To je on sumirao uzrecicom a chacun selon ses besoms, de chacun selon ses facultes svakome prema potrebama,
1 Taj je termin ved ranlje upotrebio F. A. Neff, u 1956 (42), a prije njega L. H. Haney, u 1911 (43).

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od svakog prema sposobnostima koja je kasnije u Marxovim rukama postala glasovita kao formula komunizma. Asocijacionisti su bill utopijski socijalisti: umjesto da analiziraju stvame uslove razvoja oni su bill preokupirani konstruiranjem idealnih planova za preuredenje drustva. Zbog toga, kad se pokusalo s ostvarenjem tih planova a osnovan je niz owenovskih, furijeristickih i drugih slicnih zajednica neuspjeh je bio manje ili vise neizbjezan. No ideje asocijacionista ostavile su trajan efekat na razvoj kulture novog drustva. Pojava gorostasne figure Marxa na intelektualnoj pozomici oznacuje pocetak drugog talasa u Mstorijskom procesu koji ispitujemo. Marksizam je prvenstveno drustvena teorija vec emancipirane radnicke klase. Zbog toga se bitna oznaka novog talasa sastoji u zamjenjivanju izoliranih pojedinaca i njihovih sljedbenika sirokim pokretima: razvijena kapitalisticka proizvodnja druge polovine X IX vijeka rada sindikate i politicke partije radnicke klase. Oni se u pojedinostima razlikuju, ali njihovi su programi jednaki; oni zahtijevaju uklanjanje privatne kapitalisticke kontrole proizvodnog procesa. Dubok uticaj Marxove misli koja je, medutim, bila razlicito interpretirana na radnicke pokrete dobro je poznat i nema potrebe da se ovdje opisuje. No s obzirom na nasu glavnu temu, pracenje razvoja institucije radnickog upravljanja, bit ce korisno spomenuti posebno tri pokreta, od kojih se jedan smatrao marksistickim, a ostala dva ne. Iako su ti pokreti imali ozbiljne nedostatke, bavili se ponekad besmislenim idejama i bill prigodice prilagodeni stvamosti na donkihotski nacin, ipak su oni dobro izrazavali fundamentalne teznje radnicke klase. Krajem proglog stoljeca francuski sindikalni pokret, tada jos uvijek u svom djetinjstvu, dospio je pod jak uticaj ideje revolucionamog sindikalizma. Sindikalisti su htjeli da upravljanje industrijom preuzmu sindikati. Sin dikate je trebalo lokalno udruziti u burz& rada koje bi uspostavile monopol nad radom, a kasnije bi u zgodnom trenutku preuzele vlasnistvo industrije i nastavile da njome upravljaju preko lokalnih samoupravnih komuna. Sin dikalisti su odbacivali parlamentamu aktivnost, oslanjali se na svjesnu manjinu umjesto na brizljivo organizirane velike sindikate i nadali su se da ce postici svoj ciij 48

generalnim strajkom. Te cetiii karakteristike pokreta odmah objasnjavaju zasto su sindikalisti postali jednako mrski poslodavcima kao i ortodoksnim smdikalnim vodama, zasto su dezorganizirajuci ga u stvari nanijeli stetu radnickom pokretu1 i zasto nisu uspjeli da ostvare svoj cilj radnickog samoupravljanja. Industrijska borbenost francuskih sindikalista dostigla je vrhunac u periodu 19026, kasnije se smanjila, a nakon prvog svjetskog rata njihov je program bio bitno modificiran. U tom procesu nemalu ulogu igrala je cinjenica da su, kao rezultat rata, sindikati uvisestrucili svoje clanstvo i razvili se u velike birokratske organizacije. Iz Francuske sindikalizam se prosirio na Sjedinjene Americke Drzave gdje se razvio pod okriljem Americke socijalisticke radnicke partije, koju je vodio Daniel De Leon, i gdje je postao poznat kao industrijski sindikali zam. Americki se pokret zalagao za organizaciju svih radnika u jedan veliki sindikat sa sekcijama za svaku industriju. Industrijski sindikalizam na taj je nacin prevladao osnovnu slabost revolucionamog sindikalizma: koristio se politickom akcijom i snaznom sindikalnom organizacijom. Medutim, pokret je imao drugih slabosti, nikad nije vrsio velik uticaj na americke radnike i nakon prvog svjetskog rata se raspao. Revolucionami i industrijski smdikalizam prosirili su se na Australiju, Kanadu, Meksiko i neke druge zemlje ukljuciv Britaniju, gdje se uticaj tih pokreta odrazio u glasovitom manifestu velsldh rudara, 1912, The Miners' Next Step (Naredni korak rudara), koji je zahtijevao ukidanje kapitalistickog vlasnistva u rudarstvu i potpunu kontrolu od strane radnika. No u Britaniji se u to vrijeme poceo razvijati i jedan autohtoni pokret, cehovski socijalizam (guild socialism). Cehovski socijalisti suprotstavljali su se drzavnom upravljanju industrijom uz obrazlozenje da bi to vodilo u birokraciju i da se time drustveni polozaj radnika ne bi promijenio. No oni su shva1 I tako je sindikalizam, ili a n a r h o - rindik-alizaTnT kako ga ponekad zovu, postao pogrdna rijec u rjecniku radnicke klase. Od interesa je uo(3iti kako protivnici radnickog samoupravljanja stalno upotrebljavaju taj tennin da b i njime oznacili i ocrnili njegove pobomike iako ovi nemaju nikakve veze sa sindikalizmom. U tom pogledu poucno je analizirati rjecnik sovjetsko-kineske kritike jugoslavenskog radnikog upravljanja, kao i rjecnik slicne kritike ortodoksnih sindikalnih voda u zapadnim zemljama. 4 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drutvu

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tili da je drzava veoma vazna institucija koja bi se mogla veoma dobro upotrebiti: radnicka klasa treba osvojiti drzavu i upotrebiti je da industxiju prevede u javno vlasnistvo. Nakon toga parlament bi predao duznost upravIjanja nacionalnim cehovima (rarujun sindikatima) na osnovu parlamentame povelje. Cehovi, kao i komune i druge politicke i drustvene asocijacije, trebale su biti tako organizirane da omoguce svakom pojedincu da ucestvuje i na efikasan nacin izrazava svoje glediste. Sve je to ostro odudaralo od suvremene teorije demokracije koja, kako to rece G. D. H. Cole, vodeci teoreticar pokreta, daje obicnom gradaninu nesto malo vise od privilegija ... da bira svoje upravljace, a ne poziva g a ... da on sam upravlja (44, 13). Nacionalna liga cehova, osnovana 1915, izvrsila je veliki utjecaj na pokret radnickih povjerenika po tvomicama (shop stewards' movement) i na nekoliko sindikata. Za vrijeme i poslije rata stvoren je citav niz malih cehova. Najvazniji u tom pogledu bio je pokret da se reorganizira graflevinska industrija kao ceh u nacional nim razmjerima u kome su poslodavci trebali postati placeni cinovnici podlozni izboru od strane zaposlenih radnika. No kriza u 19223. slomila je pokret, a godinu dana kasnije cehovski socijalizam kao organizirani po kret bio je mrtav. Ako je prvi historijski talas donio individualne socijalisticke ideologe i izolirane grupe, a drugi organizirane pokrete, s trecim se pojavljuju i prva ostvarenja. Opcenito govoreci evropske revolucije od 1848. oznacuju vri jeme kad se radnicka klasa emancipirala i potvrdila kao posebna drustvena klasa. Moglo bi se pretpostaviti da ce u narednim revolucijama radnicka klasa pokusati uspostaviti industrijsku samoupravu. Ispitajmo tu hipotezu u svjetlu dogadaja koji su se stvamo desili. Epoha proleterskih revolucija zapocela je s Pariskom komunom u 1871. Komuna je izdala dekret kojim se indu strija reorganizira na zadruznoj osnovi, a poduzeca predaju na upravljanje radnicima. Slijedeca po redu, ruska revolucija iz 1905, rodila je tvomicke savjete koji su pokusali da upravljaju poduzecima. N o i pariska i ruska revolucija bile su razbijene, a radnicko upravljanje nije ih prezivjelo. 50

Drugacija je bila sudbina druge ruske revolucije, velike oktobarske socijalisticke revolucije iz 1917. Bila je to prva uspjesna proleterska revolucija. Ponovno uskrsli radnicki savjeti iz 1905. igrali su vodecu ulogu u anticipiranju i provofienju te revolucije1 Vec u novembru . 1917. dekretom o fabrickoj kontroli tvomicki komiteti dobili su pravo da u potpunosti kontroliraju poduzeca. Mefiutim, gradanski rat, s nestasicom i sabotazama koje su ga pratile, zahtijevao je striktnu centralizaciju i vojnicku organizaciju citavog drustvenog zivota, ukljuciv privredu. U 1918. komiteti su bili pretvoreni u organe sindikata, a 1920. izgubili su pravo ucestvovanja u uprav ljanju. Nakon toga ostaci radnicke kontrole odrzali su se jos izvjestan broj godina, isprva kroz praksu imenovanja crvenog direktora (radnik), a kasnije kroz upravljacki trokut: direktor partijski sekretar sekretar sindikalne podruznice. Koncem dvadesetih godina Staljin je uklonio i te posljednje ostatke proklamirajuci u pravom veberijanskom stilu da se bitan uvjet discipline i efikasnosti sastoji u tome da direktor ima apsolutnu i potpunu kontrolu poduzeca i da je podlozan samo narefienjima visih organa. Jed.inonaca.lije uprava jednog covjeka usvojeno je kao osnovni princip drustvene organizacije. Simptomaticno je da je kratko vrijeme poslije toga raspon izmedu radnickih nadnica i direktorskih placa povecan nekoliko puta. Radnicke kontrole nestalo je za dogledno vrijeme. Ruska revolucija snazno je utjecala na revolucionama previranja u ostalim evropskim zemljama i kao rezultat radnici su iznudivali ustavne i pravne reforme, a ponekad su preuzimali privremeno, dakako i upravu tvomica u svoje ruke. Najdramatskija od svih bila je madarska revolucija koja je rodila madarsku sovjetsku republiku u 1918. Ovdje su radnicki savjeti najprije formirani kao politicki organi, koji su se kasnije poceli baviti i upravom nacionaliziranih poduzeca. Medutim, uskoro je re1 Savjeti radniCkih deputata, zajedno sa Savjetima vojmdkih deputata, zadobili su politidku vlast i u stvari dali su ime novoj, sovjetskoj, drzavi. Zanimljivo je svjedocanstvo G. Gurvica koji je jos prije oktobar ske revolucije u 1917. g. udestvovao u formiranju radnidkih savjeta u ruskim poduzedima (npr. u poznatoj fabrici Putilov). Gurvid tvrdi da je Lenjin tada stao na stanoviste da su nemogudi planiranje i druStvena revolucija ako se ne zasnivaju na direktnom udestvovanju radnika, na radnidkom samoupravljanju. Taj je stav u5ao i u drugi program boljsevicke partije koji je, medutim, nakon stampanja uniSten. (66,6).

4*

51

volucija bila slomljena, a umjesto radnicke kontrole Madarska je dobila fasisticku diktaturu. Ista je bila sudbina narednog, spanskog gradanskog rata, kao sto je jednak bio i odnos prema radnickom upravljanju. U Kataloniji su poduzeca s vise od stotinu radnika (kao i neke druge kategorije poduzeca) bila socijalizirana. Dekretom od 1936. uvedeno je radnicko upravljanje u tim poduzecima. Ako revolucije rodene u suprotnostima privatnoga kapitalizma tako nepromjenjivo1 proizvode pokusaje uspostavljanja radnicke kontrole u poduzecima, moglo bi se ocekivati da ce u zemljama, u kojima je privatno vlasnistvo likvidirano, slicne drustvene eksplozije pokazivati istu tendenciju jos jasnije. Dogadaji u Poljskoj i Madarskoj u 1956, u kojima su tako istaknutu ulogu igrali radnicki savjeti, potvrduju takvo ocekivanje. Cesto se konstatira na Zapadu jednako kao i na Istoku da je radnicko upravljanje propalo svuda gdje se s njime pokusalo. U izvjesnom smislu to je tacno. No zakljucak da zbog toga radnicko upravljanje treba smatrati neostvarivom utopijom potpuno je pogresan. Ni u jednom Mstorijskom periodu nove drustvene institucije nisu bile uspostavljene odjedanput, bez ogorcene borbe s reakcionamim snagama i bez mnngih neuspjeha. Ono sto je znacajno u dogadajima koje smo prikazali nisu neuspjesi u postizavanju postavljenog cilja, vec njihovo stalno ponavljanje usprkos svim neuspjesima.

P o sljed n ji talas Tri do sada opisana talasa nuzno su izvrsila velik uticaj i pripremila mijenjanje onog relativno stabilnog i posvecenog obrasca drustvenog zivota koji nazivamo drustvenim poretkom. I sam drustveni poredak poceo se mijenjati, cime dolazimo do cetvrtog, povrsinskog sloja Mstorijskog trenda koji istrazujemo. Razlicite vrste radnickih i tvomickih savjeta prvi su sastavljeni samo od radnika i cesci su, dok drugi
1 Taj potpuno uniforman obrazac karakteristian je za evropske re volucije. Azijske revolucije odvijaju se ne5to drukcije. To se moze objasniti malom radnickom klasom u tim zemljama i cinjemcom da imaju druge kulturne tradicije.

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ukljucuju i predstavnike poslodavca stare su koliko i sindikalni pokret. Ti savjeti ili odbori bave se zalbama, socijaluim radom i uvjetima zaposlenosti; uvijek su savjetodavni, jer poslodavac zadrzava sebi pravo konacne odluke. No veoma dugo oni su se javljali samo sporadicno1 nisu predstavljali instituciju. Na slican nacin rad, nicko zakonodavstvo u vezi s nekim oblicima radnickog ucestvovanja u organizaciji rada u tvomici gotovo iskljucivo ogranicenog na probleme socijalne zastite moze se u nekoliko zemalja (u Prusiji i Austriji, na prim jer) pratiti unatrag do kraja proslog stoljeca2 To su ta. koder bili sporadicki dogadaji, a stepen radnickog upravljanja bio je neznatan. Prvi miljokaz u Mstoriji radnickog ucestvovanja u upravljanju predstavljaju prvi svjetski rat i ruska revolucija. Za vrijeme rata, u cilju povecanja ratne proizvodnje, britanska i njemacka vlada trazile su od sindikata da suraduju i ovi su pristali. Kao rezultat razvile su se razlicite forme suradnje radnika i uprave poduzeca. Dogadaji koji su se zbili u obje3 zemlje, toliko su znacajni da opravdavaju jedan kratak opis. Tri godine koje su prethodile izbijanju rata, predstavljale su jedan od najnemimijih perioda u Mstoriji britanske industrije, pise J. B. Seymour, Mstoricar tzv. Whitleyjevih savjeta. Na pocetku rata oko stotinu strajkova bilo je u toku (48, 9). Bio je to period kad je sindikalisticki uticaj u Britaniji bio najjaci i kad su, 1912, rudari i cetiri najjaca zeljeznicka sindikata, usvojili zahtjev za potpunom kontrolom industrije od strane
1 U Britaniji najstariji tvomicki savjet koji jos djeluje jest, koliko sam mogao ustanoviti, onaj u Bournvilleskom pogonu firme Cadbury Brothers Ltd. koja proizvodi cokoladu. U toj firm i tvornicki savjeti osnovani su poCetkom ovog stoljeca. Cilj uprave definiran je kao priblizavanje poslodavca i radnika (45, 2). 2 U cilju potpunosti navodim i jedan zanimljiv rani njemaki pokuaj. Industrijska komisija Revolucioname narodne skuptine, koja se sastala u Frankfurtu 1848, predlozila je rezoluciju kojom se trazi da tvornicki komiteti, sastavljeni od predstavnika radnika i poslodavaca, izdaju tvomicka pravila podlozna potvrdi kotarskih tvomickih savjeta izabranih od strane tvomickih komiteta u kotaru. Ta rezolucija m je nikada bila ozakonjena, jer se uskoro poslije toga revolucija slomila (46, 1). 1 Zahtjev za radnickom kontrolom bio je u britanskoj industriji najenergifinije postavljen u dvanaestogodisnjem periodu 19101922. Za veoma detaljnu analizu dogadaja tog vremena vidi rad B. Pribicevida (47). Za standardno djelo o slicnom njemackom pokretu vidi C. W. Guillebaud (46).

5S

radnika. Bio je to takoder period kad su se pojavili i prvi znaci buduceg pokreta radnickih povjerenika (strajk inzenjerskih radnika u Glasgowu). Prije rata radnicki povjerenici u tvomicama (shop stewards) bili su nizi funkcioneii koje je unenovao sindikat izmedu radnika iz tvomickih pogona sa zadatkom da se brinu o clanarini i organiziranju novodoslica. Oni nisu imali nikakvo ovlastenje da pregovaraju o zalbama radnika, a niti su ih uprave poduzeca sluzbeno priznavale (48, 10). I tada je dosao rat koji su, kako nam to C. G. Renold kaze na osnovu svog neposrednog iskustva kao poslodavac, siroki slojevi smatrali kapitalistickim ratom 1 zbog toga su bili veoma ozlojedeni ogranicenjima, kontrolom i raznim teskocama (49, 16). Dovoljno je da se doda da je, nakon sto su se 1915. jednim sporazumom s vladom sindikalni funkcioneri obai/ezali da nece odobravati strajkove za vrijeme rata neposlusnost sindikalnog clanstva postala neminovna. Ve lik i strajk inzenjerskih radnika Clydea u 1915, kad je strajkaski komitet dobio strajk ignorirajuci nadlezne sindikalne funkcionere, postavio je obrazac i inicirao je pokret koji je uskoro postao poznat kao pokret rad nickih. povjerenika1 Taj je pokret veoma razvio tvomicke . komitete. Sindikalizam, cehovski socijalizam, pokret tvomickih povjerenika, povecavanje broja dana izgubljenih u strajkovima usprkos svim ogranicenjima 2 milijuna u 1915, 2 1/2 milijuna u 1916, 5 1/2 milijuna u 1917 alarmiralo je vladu. U oktobru 1916. imenovan je odbor (poznat kao Whitleyjev odbor) sa zadatkom da ispita metode za obezbedenje stalnog poboljsanja u industrijskim odnosima.
1 ICarakteristicna za raspolozenje radnika bila je slijededa objavljena Izjava Clydeskih 5trajka5a: M i smatramo da su sicdikalni funkcioneri sluge, a ne gospodari, clanstva, i da je od vremena do vremena potreban izvjestan pntisak da ih se usmjeri na put kojim clanstvo zeli da se ide (50, 131). D. Kirkwood, jedan od vodedih ilanova Clydeskog radnifikog komiteta, rekao je na zboru u decembru 1915. predsjedniku vlade Lloydu Georgeu, koji je do5ao u posjete, da su organizirali strajk usprkos Vama, usprkos v l adi . . . i usprkos sindikalnim funkcionerima (47, 568). Slican britanskom pokretu tvomickih povjerenika bio je njemacki pokret tvornickih savjeta poslije 1918. A slidan proglasu Clydeskih Strajkasa bio je slijededi proglas metalaca koji su gtrajkali u Diisseldorfu u 1924: U velikom broju gradova smdikati su pristali uz generaini trajk koji su proglasili tvomicki savjeti. Gdje se to jos nije dogodilo, radnici ih moraju prisiliti da se pridruze pokretu. Vode sLndikata, koji se usprotive, treba izbaciti iz njihovih kancelarija# (46, 70).

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Iduce godine Whitleyjev odbor izradio je svoju shemu suradnje radnika i poslodavaca. Za svaku industrijsku granu trebalo je formirati zajednicM nacionalni savjet i oblasne savjete u cilju okupljanja poslodavackih organizacija i sindikata, a u pojedinim tvomicama zajednicki tvomicki komiteti trebali su postati priznatim instrumentom savjetovanja uprave i radnika. Medutim, shema nije funkcionirala osim u drzavnim nadlestvima. Poslodavci, kao organizacija, nisu nikad simpatizirali sa shem om ... Sindikalisti, koje je uplasio pokret tvomickih povjerenika, zgrazali su se od pomisli da daju vlast pokretu clanstva nezavisno od centralnih organizacija (48, 191). Od otprilike stotinu tvomickih komiteta formiranih na osnovu Whitleyjevih preporuka, do 1929. ostalo je u zivotu jedva jedna polovina. Nakon rata vlada je energicno odbacila zahtjeve rudara i zeljeznicara za nacionalizacijom i samoupravom. Prva poslijeratna kriza, koja je zapocela 1921, unistila je pokret tvomickih povjerenika i cehovske socijaliste. Situacija je opet bila normalizirana i kapitalisticka masina mogla je da funkcionira kao i ranije. Ali ipak ne sasvim; sjeme je bilo posijano. Za razliku od Britanije, Njemacka je bila porazena u ratu i dogadaji su se odvijali na drugi moguci nacin. Poraz i ogroman utjecaj ruske revolucije proizveli su njemacku revoluciju (1918). Radnicki i vojnicki savjeti pojavili su se po cijeloj zemlji. Nasmrt uplaseni poslodavci bili su spremni da podu veoma daleko samo da izbjegnu potpuni socijalizam. I tako se desilo da je Njemacka postala prva kapitalisticka zemlja u ciji je ustav (juli 1919) u osnovna pravaa gradana ukljuceno i slijedece pravo: Da bi zastitili svoje drustvene i ekonomske interese radnici i namjestenici imaju pravo da budu zastupljeni u radnickim savjetima u svakoj tvomici, kao i u regionalnim radnickim savjetima organiziraniin za svako industrijsko podrucje, i u saveznom radnickom savjetu (clan 165; 46, 10). Na osnovu ustava donesen je 1920. zakon kojim tvornicki savjeti (Betriebstrdte) postaju obavezni u svim poduzecima s 20 ili vise zaposlenih. Savjeti su trebali nadzirati funkcioniranje kolektivnih ugovora, sklapati sporazume o uvjetima rada i problemima koji nisu bili regulirani sirim sporazumima, paziti da namjestavanja i otpultanja; oni su takoder trebali savjetovati poslodavca 55

kako da poveca efikasnost i organizaciju proizvodnje. Medutim, ustavni zakoni predstavljaju mrtvo slovo na papiru ako ih ne podupiru aktivne drustvene snage. Njemacki radnicki pokret tog vremena bio je duboko rascijepljen i u svojoj sindikalnoj i u svojoj politickoj grani. Vecina, koja je drzala vlast, bila je neodlucna, kompromisna, oklijevala je. Drzavna birokracija bila je neprijateljski raspolozena. U takvoj su situaciji poslodavci dobili vremena za predah. Rezultati revolucije bili su postepeno potkopani u cemu je kriza od 1924. igrala nemalu ulogu i zatim likvidirali. Taj se proces zavrsio u maju 1933, kad su sindikati i radnicki savjeti ukinuti, sto je oznacavalo dolazak fagizma. U danasnje vrijeme neuspjesne ili poluuspjesne socijalisticke revolu cije kako izgleda da nas uci iskustvo Madarske, Njemacke i Spanije zavrsavaju u fasizmu. Sto se tice ostalih evropskih. zemalja, dovoljno je spomenuti da su u periodu 1919 1922. iz slicnih razloga slicni zakoni bili doneseni u Austriji, Cehoslovackoj, Norveskoj i drugdje. U Jugoslaviji zakon o zastiti radnika (1922) predvidao je izbor radnickih povjerenika u poduzecima sa zadatkom da stite radnicke interese i suraduju s poslodavcem. Stav poslodavaca i sindikata sveo je tu odredbu vrlo brzo na prostu formalnost (10, 22). Nakon jednog razdoblja strajkova do slicnog rjesenja dosla je vlada narodnog fronta u Francuskoj u 1936; radnickim delegatima (delegues o w n e rs) priznato je pravo da se sastaju s upravom svaki mjesec. U Sjedinjenim AmericTcim Drzavama sindikat i uprava zapoceli su nesto drugaciju suradnju u vezi s problemima proizvodnje na jednoj od zeljeznica u 1920. kad je sindikat nastojao da se smanje troskovi poslovanja kako bi se obezbijedio rad za zeIjeznicke radionice. Druge firme i sindikati eksperimentirali su sa slicnim idejama do 1919, kad je kriza unistila eksperimente te vrste. Decenij kasnije sindikat metalaca izradio je sasvim uspjegne planove suradnje u izvjesnom broju manjih poduzeca za proizvodnju i obradu celika. Te sheme prezivjele su rat i dalje su funkcionirale u nekih tridesetak firmi (51, 55). Drugi miljokaz u razvoju radnickog ucesca u upravIjanju predstavlja drugi svjetski rat. Slicno kao i prvi rat, on je inicirao ciklus, samo u znatno vecim razmjerima. Opet su vlade trazile suradnju s radnicima da bi 56

povecale ratnu proizvodnju te su zajednicki proizvodni komiteti formirani u raznim zemljama (Britaniji, Sjedinjenim Drzavama, Kanadi). I opet je Britanija bila pobjednik, a Njemacka porazena, uz spontani razvoj u prvoj zemlji i zakonodavne mjere u driigoj. I opet su britanski rudari ocekivali samoupravu; a dobili su zajed nicko savjetovanje umjesto toga. Medutim, bilo je i nekoliko sasvim novih momenata od kojih je najvazniji velike nacionalizacije u nekim zemljama i potpune nacionalizacije u izvjesnom broju drugih (u istocnoevropskim i dalekoistocnim zemljama). A u svim nacionaliziranim industrijama zajednicko savjetovanje izmedu radnika i uprave zavedeno je kao nesto sto se samo po sebi razumije. U Britaniji dva nacionalna sporazuma za vrijeme rata dali su obrazac za fonniranje tvomickih komiteta: komi teti su trebali da budu savjetodavni i da pruze mogucnost za redovnu razmjenu gledista izmedu poslodavaca i namjestenika o socijalnim i proizvodnim problemima uz ogranicenje da o uslovima zaposljavanja pregovara sindikat u ime radnika. U 1947. zajednicko nacionalno savjetodavno vijece preporucilo je poslodavackim organizacijama i sindikatima da uspostave savjetodavnu maSineriju gdje ona jos ne postoji. Preporuka je naisla na odaziv i nekoliko godina kasnije bilo je vise stotina tvomickih komiteta u Britaniji1 . U Njemackoj ne samo da je bilo ponovno ozivljeno zakonodavstvo weimarskog perioda, vec se otislo i korak dalje: od zajednickog savjetovanja k suodlucivanju (M itbestimmung). U dvije bazicne industrije industriji uglja i celika sindikati su postigli paritet za radnicke predstavnike u nadzomom odbora (Aufsichtsrat), tijelu koje imenuje upravni odbor. Stavise, jednog od obicrio tri clana upravnog odbora, personalnog direktora (Arbeitsdirektor), imenuje sindikat (zakon iz 1951). U dmgim industrijama radnicki predstavnici jos su u manjini, iako ta manjina (jedna trecina) moze biti veca nego u weimarskom periodu. Tvomicki savjeti (Betriebsrate), koji predstavljaju i radnike i sluzbenike, moraju se izabrati u svim
1 Istrazujudi problem zajedniCkog savjetovanja u britanskoj indu striji, Nacionalni institut za industrijskn psihologiju poslao je upitnike u 4.719 industrijsldli poduzeda koja su zapoSIjavala preko 250 ljudi. Odgovori su dobiveni od 751 poduzeda, od kojih su 545 imali zajedniiko savjetovanje (52, 21).

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poduzecima koja stalno imaju 5 3 1 vise zaposlenih (zakon 1 iz 1952). U svrhu promicanja suradnje izmedu tvomickog savjeta i poslodavca u poduzecima s vise od stotinu zapo slenih moraju se osnovati privredni odbori (Wirtschaftsauschuss), u koje svaka strana imenuje polovinu clanova. U Francuskoj zakonom iz 1946. obavezana su poduzeca s vise od 50 zaposlenih da formiraju tvomicke komitete comite dentreprise) koji zastupaju manuelne radnike i tehnicko osoblje. Svaku znacajniju odluku mora odobriti komitet. Ako dode do neslaganja, predmet se salje arbitrazi. Slicni zakoni doneseni su u Belgiji 1948. i u Holandiji 1950. U 1946. svedski sindikati i poslodavacka udruzenja postigli su sporazum kojim se sve firme s vise od 25 namjestenika obavezuju da formiraju savjete podu zeca. Zadatak ovih savjeta moze se u najsirem smislu oznaciti kao zajednicko savjetovanje o s v im vaznijim problemima. Bit ce od interesa napomenuti da, kad je u 1923. godini jedan kraljevski komitet predlozio formiranje slicnih zajednickih proizvodnih komiteta, i sindikati i poslodavci su se usprotivili i od prijedloga nije ispalo nista. Nakon drugog rata od 1950. poduzetni savjeti formirani su u 2.650 poduzeca koja zaposljavaju 600.000 radnika (42, 568). Slicni zajednicki savjetodavni komiteti uvedeni su u Norveskoj (1945) i Danskoj (1947) na osnovu sporazuma sindikata i poslodavaca, a u Finskoj posebnim zakonom (1946). U nizu drugih zemalja predratna praksa zajednickog savjetovanja nastavljena je i poslije rata, a tamo gdje ranije nije postojala uvedena je po prvi puta. U 1951. Medunarodni ured rada registrirao je vise od 30 zemalja sa stalnim organima radnickog ucesca u upravljanju. Konkretna praksa mijenja se od zemlje do zemlje, ali postoji jedna vazna zajednicka oznaka: osim nekoliko izuzetaka ucesce radnika ograniceno je na zajednicko savjetovanje.

K arakteristike razvoja nakon prvog svjetskog rata Bit ce korisno da sada pokusamo dati sumamu ocjenu zajednickog savjetovanja kako se ono razvilo u posljednja cetiri decenija. SMjedecih pet aspekata problema izgledaju mi vaznim. 58

(1) Motivacije za formiranje zajednicke savjetodavne masinerije mogu se svrstati u tri kategorije. Revolucionami pritisak odozdo prisiljava poslodavce i vladu da ublaze diktaturu. Kako se radi o ostrom sukobu interesa, rezultat borbe mora biti pravno sankcioniran da bi ostao stalnim (iako se pravne sankcije cesto pokazu kao fikcije). Njemacki slucaj tipican je za ovu situaciju. Nadalje, za vrijeme modemih totalitamih. ratova vlade su vitalno zainteresirane da povecaju proizvodnju te zbog toga konstruiraju i pomicu sheme zajednickog savjetovanja da bi premostile jaz izmedu poslodavaca i radnika. Taj je sluiaj tipican za britansku i americku praksu. Sto se tice ove posljednje, jedna studija Medunarodnog ureda rada kaze: Opca svrha radnicko-upravnih proizvodnih. komiteta bila je da se poveca kolicina i kvaliteta ratne proizvodnje zajednickim naporom radnika i uprave u svakom postrojenju (53, 197). U kojoj je mjeri taj cilj bio postignut vidi se iz slijedece ocjene iste studije: Iako ima malo sumnje da su komiteti dali znacajan doprinos proizvodnji pogona, izvjestan broj komiteta nije pomogao u onom stepenu u kom se to ocekivalo.. . (53, 257). Nekih 5.000 komiteta bilo je osnovano po pogonima s ratnim narudzbama. Najveci dio od njih nestao je po zavrsetku rata. Treci tip motivacije srecemo kod individualnih poslo davaca koji nisu prisiljeni zakonom da usvoje zajednicko savjetovanje. Oni ga usvajaju prvenstveno iz ekonomskih razloga. To dobro ilustiira izjava C. G. Renolda, koji je i sam poslodavac s uspjesnim zajednickim savjetovanjem u svom poduzecu: U prvom redu treba istaci da je citav razvoj imao svoje porijeklo u veoma prakticnoj potrebi potrebi koju je uprava osjecala za uzom vezom sa svojim ljudima u svrhu glatkog funkcioniranja posla (49, 100). Prilikom moje posjete Renoldu ispostavilo se da on niti jest niti se smatra socijalistom, ali da je duboko svjestan cinjenice da se u novim uvjetima nekadasnji zapovjednicki stav u poduzecu moze odrzati samo pod cijenu smanjenog poslovnog uspjeha. Potreba za regulamim kontaktom s radnickim predstavnicima pojavljuje 59

se npr. kad poduzece preraste upravu jednog covjeka1 . Ona postaje presna u uzburkanim vremenima rata i industrijskog nemira. A kad je jednom tvomicki savjet osnovan, vjerojatno je da ce nastaviti da djeluje i u kasnijim vremenima vojnickog i industiijskog mira. Jos jedan efekat rata valja zapaziti: rat povecava samosvijest eksploatirane klase i humanizira clanove visit, drustvenili slojeva stvarajuci tako psiholoski most izmedu ta dva svijeta2 Zatim, pojavljuje se i izvjestan mali broj poslo. davaca3 koji su zainteresirani za zajednicko savjetovanje kao takvo, buduci da ga smatraju institucijom koja humanizira. Taj ovenski tip poslodavaca, koji ranije prakticki nije postojao, vjerojatno ce se povecavati u omjeru u kom se suprotni drustveni pritisak njima socijalno jednakih i drustvenog sistema u cjelioi smanjuje. Primjer pojedinili poslodavaca, ponavljane intervencije vlade, stalno poboljsavanje obrazovnog standarda radnika, stvaraju postepeno atmosferu u kojoj zajednicko savjeto vanje postaje neophodan dio upravne rutine. Izgleda da se upravo to dogada u danasnjoj Britaniji, kako to pokazuje pojava jos jednog tipa poslodavaca. U vecini podu zeca koja je posjetila istrazivacka ekipa Nacionalnog instituta za industrijsku psihologiju izgledalo je da se zajednicko savjetovanje smatra modemom tehnikom za poboljsavanje odnosa izmedu radnika i uprave (52, 59). Konkurencija je sustina kapitalizma; dosljedno tome nista nece sprijeciti kapitalisticka poduzeca da konkuriraju cak i u oblasti poboljsanja odnosa s radnicima. To zvuci paradoksalno, ali isto tako su paradoksalni i uvjeti pune zaposlenosti pod kapitalizmom. Naravno, ako se bude provodila dosljedno, takva konkurencija mora konacno dovesti do razbijanja kapitalistickih odnosa, no to nece
1 U rnnQ gim sluCajevima ta se. ideja ofonnila u glavama pojedinih poslodavaca i direktora kad su se sucelili s brojem osoblja koji se brzo povecavao. Isprva je to trebalo da bude samo neka vrsta supstituta za direktan Ii6m kontakt koji se tako lako gubi kad se platni spisak produljuje i kad se omjer izmedu kvalificiranih i polukvalificiranih povedava. To je svjedocanstvo G. S. Walpolea, takoder jednog po slodavca (54, 39). 2 IstrazivaCka ekipa Nacionalnog instituta za industrijsku psiholo giju biljezi: N iz mladih rukovodilaca rekli su n a m da je njihovo odobravanje zajednifckog savjetovanja steCeno kroz iskustvo u vojsci za vrijeme rata (52, 69). 3 U Francuskoj oni su osnovali vlastitu organizaciju pod nazivom Union des Chefs d'Entreprises Action pour les Structures Humaines (UCEFACT).

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biti nista vise do paralela pojavi koju je jos Marx tako dobro opisao: razaranju profita konkurencijom koja je bila zapoceta sa svrhom da se povecaju profiti. Nacionalizirane industrije i nacionalizirane privrede predstavljaju poseban slucaj. Tu je zajednicko savjetovanje neophodan minimum da bi takvi sistemi uopce funkcionirali, tj. da bi bill drustveno prihvatljivi. Jedini daljnji razvoj koji ja mogu da zamislim jest stalno povecavanje ucesca radnika u upravljanju, bilo da im to vladajuca birokracija dobrovoljno omoguci, bilo da to radnici izbore revolucionarnim sredstvima. (2) Sto se desava s disciplinom u organizaciji u kojoj je izvrsna vlast potkopana time sto svako ima pravo i mogucnost da postavi pitanje ispravnosti naredenja odozgo pozivom na svoj vlastiti skup kriterija? To je upravo prvo pitanje koje ce nasa weberijanski nastrojena generacija postaviti u vezi s prakticnom ostvarljivoscu shema radnickog upravljanja. Ta zar nije tacno da efikasna organizacija zahtijeva poslusnost, kod cega se poslusnost moze definirati kao odabiranje takvog postupka da se sadrzaj zapovijedi moze smatrati da je kao takav postao osnova za akciju (Weber, 21, 300)? U stvari, medutim, literatura o zajednickom savjetovanju i radnickom upravljanju1 ukljucujuci i najdetalj, nije empirijske studije, ne pokazuje svjesnost o postojanju nekog problema discipline. Ne mogu da ucinim bolje nego da citiram svjedocanstvo dvaju poslodavaca2: Kad sam prvi put odlucio da uvedem zajednicko savjetovanje na veoma sirokoj osnovici u svojoj vlastitoj tvomici pise G. D. Walpole meni su mnogi od mojih drugova poslodavaca rekli da prodajem propusnicu neprijatelju, i da ce kao prvi rezultat tvomicka disciplina otici do
1 Up. W. H. Scott (55; 56), E. Jaques (30), G. S. Walpole (54), C. G. Renold (49), dvije studije Medunarodnog ureda rada (53; 57) i studiju Nacionalnog instituta za industrijsku psihologiju (52) za zajed nicko savjetovanje, a P. Kova i ). Miljevic (10), Kongres radnlCkih. savjeta Jugoslavlje (59) i jednu studiju MUR-a (58) za radnicko upravljanje. 2 Sto se tice jugoslavenskog iskustva, moze se citirati zakljucak vcoma seriozno pisstae studije Medunarodnog ureda rada: . . . dok je samoupravna masinerija za radne odnose smanjila raniju moc rukovodedeg personala, ne izgleda da je nanijela stetu njihovom autoritetu . . . Ona je nesumnjivo ojaCala polozaj kolektiva u odnosu ca rukovodstvo, ali ne izgleda da je potkopala radnu disdplinua (58, 203).

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ctavola. Nakon dvogodisnjeg iskustva ustanovio sam, naprotiv, da se tvornicka disciplina poboljsala da se gotovo ne da prepoznati i da se o svim ostalim legitimnim interesima vlasnistva vodilo racuna u stepenu za koji prije cetiri godiae ne bih vjerovao da je moguc: proizvodnja je porasla, izostanaka je manje, skart je smanjen, a dragocjeno vrijeme ustedeno (54,. 166). C. G. Renold objasnjava misteriju tog fenomena: Potreba da se direktorski autoritet zasniva na razumu, a ne na arbitramoj vlasti sto je implioirano u cijeloj filozofiji zajedniokog savjetovanja povecala je taj autoritet (49, 119). Jedva je potrebno dodati da isto vrijedi u jos vecem stepenu za filozofiju samoupravljanja. U nedostatku citata jer jos nijedna empirijska studija ne postoji bit ce mi vjerojatno dozvoljeno da poduprem tu tezu vlastitim iskustvom kao bivseg clana jednog radnickog savjeta. Samouprava supstituira razumijevanje za poslusnost, sporazumijevanje za vrsenje arbitrame vlasti. Eliminirajuci kapitalisticku ili birokratsku dualnost ili polarizaciju interesa ona smanjuje drustvene napetosti i poboljsava koordinaciju. (3) Vspjeh zajednickog savjetovanja bio je do sada prilicno ogranicen, a razloge za to nije tesko utvrditi. Uspjeh njemackih tvomickih savjeta weimarskog perioda Me Kitteric i Roberts ocjenjuju zapazanjem da su savjeti bili korisni u sticenju radnickih interesa, ali da nisu postigli stvamo nista na putu istinskog ucesca u upravljanju (60, 9). Za poslijeratni razvoj isti autori kazu: Gdje radnicki savjeti postoje opce je iskustvo da su namjestenici bili veoma zainteresirani za njihovu djelatnost... (60, 20). U Britaniji siroke mase radnika jos su uvijek apaticne, ali cetiii petine radnickih predstavnika u savjetima podrzavaju tu instituciju i zivo se za nju interesiraju (52, 64). Takoder je znacajno da je iskustvo u zajednickom savjetovanju navelo direktore, vise rukovodioce i radnicke predstavnike da zauzmu povoljnije glediste u 37, 48 odnosno 58% slucajeva, a nepovoljnije samo u 9, 5 odnosno 1% slucajeva, u poredenju s gledistem koje su isprva imali o zajednickom savjetovanju (52, 65). (4) Nadalje, tu je i problem osnovnog odnosa izmedu kapitala i rada. Te dvije suprotne strane odrazavaju se u 62

samom terminu zajednicko savjetovanje. Inicijativa poslodavaca da uvedu zajednicko savjetovanjeusvom poduzecu predstavlja dosta cesto smisljen pokusaj da se anticipira ili sputa razvoj sindikalne organizacije1 Pa cak i kad to . nije cilj, zajednicko savjetovanje povecava lojalnost pre ma poduzecu, a ta lojalnost i lojalnost prema vlastitoj klasi dvije su razlicite lojalnosti koje se cak i sukobljavaju2 Ta institucija proizvodi radnicke vode koji nisu . sindikalni funkcioneri i koji se na taj nacin nalaze van dohvata sindikalne masinerije. Prirodno je da sindikati nece biti entuzijasticki raspolozeni prema prijedlozima o ortakluku i cesto ce im se suprotstavljati3 S druge . strane, ako sindikat ili tvomicki povjerenici traze da ucestvuju u zajednickim komitetima, poslodavci ce se uplasiti da njihovi prerogativi ne budu okmjeni. Beznadnost situacije lezi u cinjenici sto su obje strane u pravu kada se plase. Kako se poslodavci u osnovi protive predavanju svoje arbitrame vlasti, a sindikati u osnovi nisu voljni da preuzmu odgovomost organizacije proizvodnje jer nista ne dobivaju, a gube svoju nezavisnost zajedno s kontrolom lojalnosti clanstva vjerojatno je da ce se status quo produziti i da de potencijalne promjene biti sprecene. Logika je situacije takva da sindikati zaje dno s poslodavcima kuju zavjeru protiv radnika, zavjeru
1 Opisujuci prilike u Sjedinjenim Drzavama vec citirana studija Medunarodnog ureda rada kaze: Znatan broj predratnih planova za zajednicke komitete u tvomicama izradila je prvenstveno uprava u cilju da zainteresira radnike za uspjesan rad tvomice, a u mnogim slucajevima smjeralo se na potkopavanje razvoja sindikalnog pokretaa (53, 185). 2 Dubok psiholoski sukob koji se javlja kod radnika, dobro je analiziran u ranlje citiranoj studiji Tavistock instituta: . . . izgledalo je kao da clanovi savjeta mogu drzati svoje glave uspravno samo onda kada je u toku bio sukob izmedu uprave i radnika; kada sukoba nije bilo oni su se osjedali krivima, kao da ne rade ono sto se od njih ocekuje (30, 122). . . . pozeljnost zaposlenja u odnosnom poduzecu navodila je radnike da se oslanjaju na upravu, a ne na sindikate, u pogledu sigurnosti zaposlenja, a kod radnikih voda izazvala je akutan sukob lojalnosti podijeljene izmedu poduzeca i sindikata (30, 179). 3 Slijededa statistika izgleda znaCajnom. U Britaniji je inicijativa za zapoSinjanje zajednickog savjetovanja u tri cetvrtine slucajeva dala uprava, a u svega 496 odnosno 496 radnici odnosno sindikati (52, 161). T i se postoci ne mogu objasniti na jednostavan i direktan nacin, ali u osnovi, izgleda, pokazuju da sindikati nisu zainteresirani da forsiraju radniCko udesce u upravljanju.

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koja postaje sasvim otvorena u uzburkanijim periodima1 . To baca novo svjetlo na dogadaje koje smo prikazali: strahovite drustvene snage suprotstavljale su se i suprotstavljat ce se radnickom ucestvovanju u upravljanju. (5) Sindikalni paradoks predstavlja jos jednu ilustraciju funkcioniranja birokratskili struktura. Da bi se zastitili u jednom svijetu polaxiziranih interesa, svijetu cije su institudje protiv njih, radnici izgraduju snazne birokratske organizacije: sindikate i partije. Kad su jednom te organizacije izgradene, one zadobivaju separatne interese koji su razliciti od interesa nnih na kojima se citava struktura zasniva. U tome nema nista eticki losega, to se ne dogada zbog toga sto su vode pokvareni; uz dane institucije takav je razvoj dogadaja neizbjezan. Izlaz iz corsokaka logicki je lagan. Organizaciju treba najprije upotrijebiti za uklanjanje osnovnog uzroka polarizacije inte resa u ovom slucaju za uklanjanje privatne kontrole proizvodnje. A zatim birokratski princip organizacije treba zamijeniti samoupravom. Medutim, nije vjerojatno da ce stvami sindikati i socijalisticke partije poci tim putem direktno i po svojoj vlastitoj inicijativi. Nakon sto su postali dio drustvenog sistema s jasno definiranom ulogom u njemu, oni nisu skloni da napuste rutinski zivot i da se bace u neizvjesnosti potpune socijalizacije. Samoupravljanje, s druge strane, predstavlja ideju koja je
1 Taj je zakljuCak generaliziran, ali, naravno, nije tesko ukazati na konkretne historijske situacije koje taj proces direktno odraiavaju. Odabrat < u njemacke tvornicke sayjete weimarskog perioda da il ustri5 ram tezu. U vezi s tim C. W. Guillebaud, njihov his tori car, ima da kaze slijedede: Za njemafike mase . . . radnicki savjeti zastupali su demokratizaciju industrijskog sistema i postizavanje, u ekonomskoj sferi, istih prava samoupravljanja i samoopredjeljenja koja su, kako su to mase mislile, one postigle revolucijom iz 1918. u politickoj sferi . . . No kad je doslo do prakticnog izvodenja osnovnog i, za individualne rad nike, najvaznijeg dijela zgrade radnlfikih savjeta, oni su ustanovili da se glavnina politickih voda radnika udruzila s poslodavcima u cilju sprecavanja prevelikog pro5irenja ovlastenja tih savjeta (46, 2123). Sindikati su se bojali da ce izgubiti vodstvo (s. 41) i zbog toga su nastojali da osiguraju da radnifiki savjeti ne postanu stvarno efikasni; njih i njihove politicke saveznike, vedinske socijaliste, podupirali su do krajnjih granica poslodavci, koji su se bar isto toliko mnogo brinuli da okuju radnicke savjete i da ih ogranide na djelovanje unutar sindikalnih organizacija. Ovih posljednjih poslodavci se nisu p la s ili. . . (s. 11).

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toliko strana duhu birokracije, da je jasno da ce naici na zestok otpor1 . Medutim, situacija ne moze ostati potpuno nepromijenjena. Nema razloga vjerovati da su privredni ciklusi izumrli. Ali ima nekoga razloga vjerovanju da vlade industrijskill zemalja u drugoj polovini naseg stoljeca ne mogu sebi dozvoliti da toleriraju veliku nezaposlenost, a da ne riskiraju velike drustvene erupcije. Lijecenjem krize u proces se unosi prvi odlucni elemenat promjene: povecana drustvena kontrola. Drzava blagostanja njen je simbol. Medutim, neprekinuta puna zaposlenost ima temeljito antikapitalisticki efekat: ona rada konkurenciju u poboljsanju odnosa izmedu uprave i radnika. Jer, poslodavci su vitalno zainteresirani da izbjegnu fluktuaciju radnika, da umaknu strajkovima i da prebrode otpor prema uvodenju nove tehnike, dok se radnici osjecaju sigurnima i zbog toga su aktivno svjesni svojih prava i mogucnosti2 Podizuci status radnika poslodavci postepeno .
1 Kao empiricku ilustraciju odabirem dva autoritativna izlaganja gledista radnickih sindikata i partije u Britaniji, iako bi se ekvivalentni primjeri mogli naci bez velikih teskoda i u drugim zemljama. Slijedecu izjavu g. Guntera u parlamentarnoj debati o zajednikom savjetovanju u 1950. Nacionalni institut za industrijsku psihologiju ocjenjuje kao veoma dobro izrazeno sindikalno gledistea: U izvjesnim dijelovima radnike klase doslo je do zapanjujuceg ozivljavanja starih sindikalistikih ideja o direktnoj radnickoj kontroli. Po mom misljenju nemoguce je predvidjeti ma kakav znacajan razvoj u sferi zajednlfikog savje tovanja ako zamisljamo da se ta stara, nebulozna ideja o radnickoj kontroli moze ostvariti. U krajnjoj instanci upravi treba dozvoliti da upravlja i donosi odluke, a ona mora prihvatiti odgovornost. Ono sto mi trazimo jest da njihove odluke i politika budu prevedeni radnicima tako da bi mogli razumjeti njihove ciijeve i time pomoci da se osigura suradnja koja bi rezultirala u mnogo boljoj i vecoj proizvodnji. Ne mogu ostaviti sindikalnu stranu a da ne izrazim svoje vjerovanje da vecina sindikalista ne zeli da vidi uspostavljanje radnicke kontrole, kako se ona ponekad zove (52, 82). Laburisticka partija u svom politickom dokumentu iz 1957. o nacionaliziranim industrijama u poglavlju o radnickom ucestvovanju postavlja pitanje: Direktno predstavnistvo? i odgo vara na njega negativno: Sindikalisticko glediste o industriji kojom upravljaju radnici, ili putem sindikata ili putem izabranih uprava, odbacio je laburisticki pokret prije mnogo godina (61, 39). Neka se uoci pozivanje na nsindikalizam u oba slucaja. 2 Up. H. A. Clegg: U svim industrijama danasnja industrijska disciplina nesto je sasvim drugo nego u predratnom periodu teske nezaposlenosti. Cesto se kaze da je to jedna od najvecih teskoca britanske industrije danas. U isto vrijeme puna zaposlenost ucinila je vise da industrija postane demokratskajom i da se podigne status radnika nego sto bi ma kakvo zakonodavstvo ili masinerija zajednickog savjeto vanja mogli uciniti (62, 78). Neka se, medutim, uoci da je zakljuna antiteza Hegga lazna, jer je uzrocnost razlifiita od implicirane. Demokratizacija industrijske organizacije rada zajednicko savjetovanje, a ne obmuto. Ako je tako, onda slijedi jos jedan direktan zakljucak. Kad 5 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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izrucuju svoju autokratsku vlast, cime njihova drustvena funkci^a.' gubi svoj sadrzaj. Na taj se nacin drugi element uMjucuje u proces: povecavanje stepena radnickog upravljanja. N ije vjerojatno da ce se proces uvijek odvijati glatko. N o u slucaju revolucije trend razvoja je, kako smo vidjeli, jos jasniji. U sto pedeset godina proteklih od prvog ovenovskog eksperimenta u New Lamarku odnosi izmedu poslodavaca i radnika stalno su se mijenjali. Te promjene u odnosima dobro su izrazene promjenama u karakteru sastanaka izmedu poslodavaca i posloprimaca, karakteru koji se, kako to tacno zapaza britansM Nacionalni institut za industrijsku psihologiju, u toku posljednjih 150 godina pokazuje MstorijsM razvoj od izaslanstva i pregovaranja do konzultiranja (52, 29) i, mogli bismo jos sa svoje strane dodati, do direktnog upravljanja na koncu. Ova posljednja faza razvoja prevazilazi dvostrani karakter sastanaka i ujedinjuje interese svih partnem u instituciji samoupravljanja. Cetiri posljednja decenija vec su dala prve pokusaje da se pode dalje od prostog savjetovanja. Njemacko suodlucivanje jedan je od primjera. A prve
je jednom opce primljenjeno, zajednicko savjetovanje postaje drustvena institucija i ne moze se ukinuti bez druStvenih potresa. A li isto se tako ne moze petrificirati u svojoj sadasnjoj formi kojom se paznja radnika usmjeruje na pitanje socijalnog staranja, dok uprava zadrzava pravo da sama donosi kljufine odluke. Vrlo brzo radnici de poceti da inzistiraju da se ta sklozetska demokracija zamijeni pravom demokracijom*. C. A. Myers nenamjemo opisuje neSto slicno u Svedskoj kad kaze: No ako komiteti ne pocnu da se bave stvamim problemima. . . 'stagnacija' se moze pretvoriti u nezadovoljstvo i odvratnost. 'Klozetska demokracija', kako je jedna osoba opisala tekucu brigu za bolje praonice, rasvjetu itd., moze dostajati za neko vrijeme, ali tesko da je to 'industrijska demokracija', za koju je radnicki pokret tvrdio da je trazi* (51, 71). Uzgred, ako je gom ja analiza tacna, ona daje dvije jednostavne konzervatorske fonnule za protagoniste stutus quoa. Da bi se sauvao privatni kapitalizam, drzava treba da prizna sindikate i da im pomogne da se razviju u stabilne birokratske organizacije. Dalje, ona mora izbjedi velike ratove, jer oni razaraju kapitalisticku druStvenu disciplinu. Konacno, ona mora sacuvati izvjestan ograniCeni obim nezaposlenosti da bi se disciplina odrzala neokmjena. Analogan skup uslova vrijedi za drzavnokapitalisticke sisteme. Da bi se odrzao takav sistem, drzava mora takoder izbjeci velike ratove i to iz istih razloga. Ona, zatLm, mora proiriti unutrasnju birokratsku strukturu prema dolje stavljajuci se u vecu birokratsku strukturu koja se naziva taboroma. Konacno, treba se opskrbiti i sigumosnim ventilom u nekoj blagoj form i zajednikog savjetovanja. Medutim, oba lijeka imaju samo kratkorocne efekte.

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pojedinacne firtne vec su pocele da se krecu cat i dalje prema stanju istinskog radnickog samoupravljanja1 . Vidimo da je u vrijeme zavrsetka drugog svjetskog rata ideja radnickog samoupravljanja vec visila u zraku; jos nije bila shvacena kao nesto izricito novo, jos nije bila sistematizirana i ukljucena u univerzitetske programe2 , ali je svejedno vec bila cvrsto utemeljena, kao sve one velike ideje koje oznacavaju epohu, a cije se znacenje uvazava tek kasnije. U svjetlu onoga sto smo naucili iz Mstorije te ideje mogli bismo biti ponukani da zamislimo slijedecu Mpoteticku situaciju. Pretpostavimo da negdje dode do drustvene revolucije koja ocisti sve tradicionalne zapreke i kao i prethodne revolucije postavi pitanje radnickog upravljanja. Pretpostavimo, zatim, da se u odnosnoj zemlji radnicko upravljanje razvilo prije nego sto je proces birokratizacije, koji proizlazi iz socijalizacije privrede, otisao tako daleko da polarizira drustvo dijeleci revolucionamu elitu od sirokih. masa. Ako se te dvije okolnosti dese, veoma je vjerojatno da ce radnicko samoupravljanje postati permanentna drustvena institucija. U stvari opisana situacija nije tako Mpoteticka. Ona se materijalizirala u poslijeratnoj Jugoslaviji. Odlucujuci period bio je prvih pet godina poslije revo lucije. Zakonom iz 1945. predvidalo se da radnicki povjerenici, kao legalni predstavnici radnika, uspostave kontakt s upravom poduzeca, drzavnim organima i sindikatom sa
1 Duisburger Kupferhiitte, gdje je predsjednik radnickog savjeta clan upravnog odbora firme jedan je njemacki primjer. Glacier Metal Company predstavlja izvanredni britanski primjer. U statutu tvornickog savjeta ovog poduzeca stoji: Funkcije savjeta jesu: . . . d a preuzme odgovomost u odlucivanju o principima i politici kojima treba da se rukovodi uprava poduzeda u svjetlu misljenja proizvodaca i rukovodstva, u svjetlu interesa potroSaca, dionicara i naroda u cjelini i u svjetlu citave politike kompanije* (30, 155). U nastojanju da se postigne taj cilj uprava da izruci arbitrarnu izvr5nu vlast, a radnici da umjesto toga razviju odgovomo i efektivno kolektivno odlucivanje i uprava i radnici morali su savladati ogromne poteskoce koje su proizlazile iz njihovih vlastitih naucenih stanovita i Iz potpuno neuskladenog institucionalnog sistema u kom su morali djelovati. Te poteskoce indiciraju duboke promjene u drutvenim odnosima do kojih dolazi samoupravljanjem. Drustveni i psiholoSki preobrazaj kroz koji je prosla Glacier Company izvanredno je opisan u studiji Tavistock instituta koja ima rjecit naslov: M ijetija se kultura jedne fabrike. (30) 2 U stvari akademski ekonomisti, jednako lijevi kao i desni, jo uvijek nisu svjesni njenog znacenja. Up. karakteristicno zapazanje J. Schumpetera dano u jednoj biljeSci: DivIje socijalizacije terznin koji je zadobio sluzbeni status jesu pokusaji radnika svakog pogona da istisnu upravu i da stvari preuzmu u vlastite ruke. To predstavlja m5ru za svakog odgovomog socijalista (63 , 226b).

5*

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zadatkom sticenja drustvenih i ekonomskih interesa radnika i pomaganja u unapredenju proizvodnje. Slijedece godine najveci dio privrede bio je nacionaliziran, a u 1948. nacionalizacija je zavrsena (izuzev poljoprivredu i zanatstvo). U meduvremenu radnicki povjerenici prestali su da postoje i umjesto njih sindikalne podruznice dobile su legalno pravo da izlaze s prijedlozima pred upravu. To je bio korak natrag od kontrole k savjetovanju, pomalo opasan korak koji je podsjecao na sovjetski razvoj u periodu 19171920. Mediitim, vec u 1949. dolazi do nove promjene: u izvjesnom broju poduzeca savjetovanje izme du uprave vecinom ljudi koji su i sami aktivno ucestvovali u revoluciji i radnika bilo je spontano uvedeno. Paralelno, brutalni napad Kominforma, zapocet sredinom 1948. i nastavljen kroz nekoliko iducih godina, djelovao je kao snaga koja je kocila polarizacioni proces. U jesen 1949. godine Politbiro CK KPJ usvojio je orijentaciju na neposredno prelazenje na samoupravljanje proizvodaca u privredi (65). U decembru iste godine vlada i sindikati zajedno izdaju instrukciju za fo rm i r an je radnickih savjeta kao savjetodavnih tijela. Savjeti su izabrani u 215 vecih poduzeca, ali uskoro su i druga poduzeca zahtijevala da se mogu koristiti istom privilegijom i do sredine 1950. vec je postojalo 520 savjeta. U junu 1950. Narodna skupstina donijela je zakon kojim se savjeti iz savjetodavnih pretvaraju u upravljacka tijela. Radni kolektiv svakog poduzeca izabire radnicki savjet koji, tako dugo dok uziva povjerenje biraca, predstavlja vrhovni organ za formiranje politike poduzeca. Savjet izabire svoj izvrni komitet, upravni odbor, cija je duznost da se stara o svakodnevnom sprovodenju politike savjeta; stvamo izvrsavanje direktiva, kao i posao rutinske koordinacije djelatnosti poduzeca, prepusteno je direktoru i strucnom tehnickom i administrativnom osoblju. Tim zakonskim aktom davnasnja antiteza uprava-radnik nije odjednom iscezla, ali su stvoreni uvjeti da bude razrijesena. Do 1950. vec je postalo prilicno jasno da, opcenito, birokratska organizacija dovodi do neefikasnosti i nezeljenih drustvenih odnosa te je tako uvodenje radnickog upravljanja ocistilo teren za niz institucionalnih promjena koje 68

su slijedile1 Daljnji razvoj u drugim sferama drustvenog . zivota pridonio je daljnjem ucvrScenju nove organizacije industrije. Samoupravljanje proizvodaca progireno je i van okvira neposrednog radnog mjesta time sto su svi predstavnicki organi od lokalnih pa do Savezne skupstine dobili drugi dom, vijece proizvodaca. U 1953. promjena ustava registrirala je nove institucije. Radnicko upravIjanje postalo je dio drustvenog sistema.

Ciiirana literatura 1 J. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes, Blackwell, . Oxford, 1951. 2. F. Engels, Principi komunizma, u K. Marx, F. Engels, Rani radovi, Kultura, Zagreb, 1953. 3. K. Marx, F. Engels, Predislovie k russkomu izdaniju Manifesta Komunisticeskoj partii, Socinenija, tom XV, Partizdat, Moskva, 1 935. 4. K. Marx, Kritika Gotskog programa; F. Engels, Kritika nacrta Erfurtskog programa, Kultura, Beograd, 1959. 5. E. F. M. Durbin, The Case for Socialisms, u Problems of Economic Planning, Routledge, London, 1 949. 6. Jugoslavensko udruzenje za sociologiju, Drustveno samo upravljanje u Jugoslaviji, Beograd, 1 966. 7. M. Novak, Vvod u politicku ekonomiju socijalizma, Ekonomski pregled, Zagreb, 1955. 8. N. Pasic, Javne Korporacije u Velikoj Britaniji i drugim zapadnim zemljama, Kultura, Beograd, 1 7. 95 9. A. Dragicevic, Potreban rad i visak rada, Kultura, Za greb, 1 957. 10. P. Kovac, D. Miljevic, Samoupravljanje proizvodaca u privredi, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1958. 11. F. Engels, Anti-Diihring, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1 946. 1 . V. Stanovcic, A. Stojanovic, ur., Birokratija i tehnokra2 tija, I knjiga, Sedma sila, Beograd, 1 966. 13. V. Stanovcic, A. Stojanovic, ur., Birokratija i tehnokratija II knjiga, Sedma sila, Beograd, 1966. 14. M. Pecujlic, Klase i savremeno drustvo, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1967. 1 . S. Stojanovic, Etatisticki mit socijalizma<t. Praxis 5 1 2/1967.
1 Za industrijsko samoupravljanje vidi Kovac i Miljevid (10). Za opde razmatranje institucije samoupravljanja i opis samoupravnih shema u ostalom dijelu sistema vidi L. Gerskovic (64).

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16. B. Horvat, Ekonomska teorija planske'privrede, Kultura, Beograd, 1 1. 96 17. K. Marx, Ekonomsko-filozofski rukopisi iz 1844a u K. Marx, F. Engels, Rani radovi, Kultura, Zagreb, 1954. 18. R. H. S. Crossman, Socialism and the New Despotism, Fabian Tract 258, London, 1956. 19. R. McKenzie, British Political Parties, Heinemann, Lon don, 1 955. 20. W. A. Lewis, The Administration of Socialist Enterprises<t, u Overhead Costs, Allen and Unwin, London, 1949. 21. M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organi zation, Hodge, London, 1947. 22. T. Bottomore, ^Higher Civil Servants in Frances, u Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology, Vol. II, International Sociological Association, London, 1954. 23. R. K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain, Routledge and Kegan, London, 1955. 24. R. Bendix, Higher Civil Servants in American Society, Univ. of Colorado Press, Boulder, Col., 1949. 25. J. D. Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy, Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1944. 26. H. H. Gerth, C. W. Mills, A Marx for the Managers, prestampano u R. K. Merton i dr. (ur.), Reader in Bureaucracy, Free Press, Glencoe, 1 1 1952. 1 ., 27. S. M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 1950. 28. A. K. Davis, ^Bureaucratic Patterns in the Navy Officer Corpse, prestampano u R. K. Merton i dr. (ur.), Reader in Bureaucracy, Free Press, Glencoe, I 11, 1 952. 29. R. K. Merton, ^Bureaucratic Structure and Personality^, ibid. 30. E. Jaques, The Changing Culture of a Factory, Dryden Press, New York, 1952. 31. W. R. Sharp, The French Civil Service: Bureaucracy in Transition, Macmillan, New York, 1931. 32. B. Horvat, Ekonomika jugoslavenske naftne privrede, Tehnicka knjiga, Beograd, 1 962. 33. E. Devons, Planning in Practice, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1 950. 34. W. Eucken, On the Theory of Centrally Administered Economy: An Analysis of the German Experiments, Economica, 1948. 35. K. Marx, Kritika Hegelove filozofije drzavnog prava, V. Maslesa, Sarajevo, 1960. . 36. K. Marx, F. Engels, Manifest Komunisticke partije, Kul tura, Zagreb, 1948.
70

37. W. F. Oakeshott, Commerce and Society, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936. 38. L. von Mises, Bureaucracy, Hodge, Glasgow, 1945. 39. W. H. Morris Jones, Socialism and Bureaucracy, Fabian Tract 277, London, 1949. 40. K. Marx, Gradanski rat u Francuskoj, Kultura, Zagreb, 1 947. 41. J. A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1955. 42. F. A. Neff, Economic Doctrines, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1950. 43. L. H. Haney, History of Economic Thought, Macmillan, New York, 1911. 44. G. D. H. Cole, Guild Socialism Re Stated, London, 1920. 45. A Works Council in, Being. An Account of the Scheme in Operation at BoumvUle Works, Publication Depart ment Boumville Works, 1921. 46. C. W. Guilleband, The Works Council, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1928. 47. B. Pribicevic, Demand for Workers Control in the Rail way, Mining and Engineering Industries 19101922, D. Phil. Thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford, 1 957. 48. J. B. Seymour, The Whitley Councils Scheme, King, Lon don, 1 932. 49. C. G. Renold, Joint Consultation over Thirty Years, Allen and Unwin, London, 1950. 50. H. Wolfe, Labour Supply and Regulation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1523. 51. C. A. Myers, Industrial Relations in Sweden, Technology Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1951. 5 National Institute of Industrial Psychology, Joint Con 2. sultation in British Industry, Staples Press, London, 1952. 53. International Labour Office, Labour Management Co-operation in United States War Production, Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 6, Montreal, 1948. 54. G. S. Walpole, Management and Men, Jonathan Cape, London, 1945. 55. W. H. Scott, Joint Consultation in a Liverpool Manu facturing Firm, Univ. Press of Liverpool, 1950. 56. W. H. Scott, hidustrial Leadership and Joint Consultati on, Univ. Press of Liverpool, 1 952. 57. International Labour Office, British Joint Production Machinery, Studies and Reports, Series A, No. 43, Mon treal, 1944. 58. International Labour Office, Workers' Management in Yugoslavia, Geneva, 1962. 59. A. Deleon, Lj. Mijatovic (ur.), Kongres radnickih savjeta Jugoslavije, Rad, Beograd, 1957.
71

60. T. E. M. McKitterick, R. D. V. Roberts, Workers and Management, Fabian Research Series No. 160, London, 1 953. 61. Public Enterprise, Labour's Review of the Nationalised Industries, London, 1957. 62. H. A. Clegg, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization, Blackwell, Oxford, 1950. 63. J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper, New York, 1950. 64. L. Gerskovic, DruStveno upravljanje u Jugoslaviji, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1957. 65. R. Colakovic i dr., Pregled istorije Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Institut za izuCavanje radniikog pokreta, Beograd, 1963. 66. J. Duvignaud, iGeorges Gurvitch: une theorie sociologique de l'autogestioiw, Autogestion, 1/1966.

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II PRELAZNI PERIOD I DIKTATURA PROLETARIJATA

U prvom dijelu ovog ogleda ispitivane su historijske pretpostavke drustva i stoga su sirokim potezima slikane opce tendencije drustveno-ekonomskog razvoja. Stigavsi tako do nase danasnje situacije pojavljuje se potreba da se promijeni metoda analize. Ona treba da postane mno go detaljnija i minucioznija, a siroke generalizacije bit ce sve vise zamjenjivane ispitivanjem konkretnih tokova dogadaja i njihove uslovljenosti. U tom kontekstu blize razmatranje zahtdjevaju prije svega teorija i praksa prelaznog perioda i diktature proletary ata. A zatim cemo, u svrhu ispravne orijentacije daljnjeg istrazivanja, pokusati ukratko sistematizirati etape nasega konkretnog poslijerevolucionamog razvoja koji se, kako ce se vidjeti, poklapa s Marxovim prelaznim periodom. 73

6. P R E L A Z N I PE RIO D Kad jednom pobjedonosna revolucija razrusi stari, kapitalisticki pored ak, ne moze se ocekivati da ce trenutno biti izgraden novi, socijalisticki poredak. Izmedu ta dva poretka pojavit ce se prelazni period u kom ce jednom sukcesijom revolucionamih preobrazaja kapita listicki sistem biti ukinut, prevaziden i nadomjesten socijalistickim. To je cuveni Marxov prelazni period. Prelazni period trebalo je da traje kratko i da izvrsi samo osnovne, kljucne preobrazaje kao sto su zauzimanje vlasti, smjena upravljackog aparata, ukidanje privatnog vlasnistva, izgradnja novog pravnog. poretka i si. Nakon toga socijalizam, prirodno, jos ne bi bio izgraden, ali bi bila izgradena njemu svojstvena osnova na kojoj bi mogao da se razvija. A taj sistem koji bi se razvijao na socijalistickoj osnovi, morao bi vec imati karakteristike socijalistickog sistema o kojima su govorili Marx i Engels: odumiranje drzave, nestajanje klasa i eksploatacije, slobodni razvoj covjekove licnosti i nesmetano stvaralacko ispoljavanje njegove individualnosti i tako dalje. Kad sistem koji se u stvarnosti razvio nije odgovarao tim karakteristikama, izvrsen je bio jedan quid pro quo i on je proglasen socijalistickim ne zato jer je to bio, vec zato jer je, npr., ukinuto privatno vlasnistvo. U isto vrijeme pojavila se tendencija da se socijalizam tretira kao prelazni period. Na taj nacin postalo je moguce da se Marxove teze o revolucionamoj diktaturi proletarijata primjene ne na prelazni period, vec na socijalizam u cjelini. Zavrsni cin ove revizije Marxove misli sastojao se u interpretiranju diktaiure proletarijata kao oblika vladavine, tj. kao nasilne nedemokratske, politicke diktature (a ne kao klasni sadrzaj, drzave tog perioda). Time je marksizam definitivno postavljen na glavu i kao socijalisticka mjera moglo je da prode sve sto je utvrdivalo vlast birokracije, a socijalizam je nakon ovih pragmatickih obrta cesto poprimao sadrzaj potpuno tud i u nmogocemu antitetican izvomom Marxovom socijalizmu. Iz tih razloga bit ce korisno da ukratko ispitamo izvorne stavove Marxa, Engelsa i Lenjina o problemu prelaznog perioda. 74

Marx, Engels i L en jin o prelaznom periodu Da bi se mogla pravilno interpretirati. Marxova i Engelsova postavka o prelaznom periodu, trebalo bi prije toga potpuno i iscrpno obraditi njen historijski razvitak. Zbog ogranicenog prostora taj ce Mstorijski razvitak biti samo skiciran. Jos u Njemacko-francuskim godisnjacima Marx nosiocem socijalizma oznacava proletariat. A misao o osvajanju vlasti od strane proletarijata narocito je jasno izrazena vec u Komunistickom manifestu. Tu se vec posve jasno odreduje ne samo klasna borba u kapitalistickom drustvu, nego i njene.nuzne konzekvence. Marx i Engels pisu da se: ... prvim korakom radnicke revolucije javlja pretvaranje proletarijata u vladajucu klasu. Proletarijat iskoristava svoje politicko gospodstvo zato da korak po korak burzoaziji istrgne sav kapital, da centralizira sva oruda proizvodnje u rukama drzave, tj. proletarijata organiziranog kao vladajuce klase, i da sto je moguce brze uveca sumu proizvodiiih snaga. (1, 27) Tu se (kao ni drugdje u Manifestu) jos ne govori konkretno o tom buducem komunistickom drustvu, vec se samo u najopcijim crtama postavljaju neposredni zadaci, odreduje se u najopcijim konturama perspektiva buduceg razvitka drustva. Jos ne postoje uslovi da se kaze nesto konkretnije. U gomjem citatu (kao i drugdje u Manifestu), iako jos nije izrecena ta rijec, radi se stvamo o diktaturi prole tarijata. U meduvremenu izbija u Francuskoj revolucija (1848. g.) i siri se po cijeloj Evropi. Marx i Engels aktivno ucestvuju u revoluciji i brizljivo je analiziraju. I tada se kqnacno iskristalizirao taj pojam koji je jos nedostajao. U svom radu Klasne borbe u Francuskoj od 1848. do 1850. g. zavrsenom u 1850-toj godini Marx je napisao. Burzoazija je prisilila pariski proletarijat na junski ustanak... Tada... se pojavila smjela revolucionama borbena parola: Obaranje burzoazije! Diktatura radnicke klase! (podvukao Marx) (1, 133). Taj socijalizam (revolucionami, H. B.) jest objava permanentne revolucije, klasna diktatura proletarijata kao neophodni prelazni stepen k unistenju klasnih razlika uopce, k unistenju svih pro-

izvodnih odnosa na kojima se te razlike temelje, k uniStenju svih drustvenih odnosa koji odgovaraju tim proizvodnim odnosima, k prevratu u svoj ideologiji koja proistice iz tih drustvenih odnosa.c (1, 133) A u svom glasovitom pismu Weydemeyeru 5. marta 1852. Marx pise: To novo sto sam ja uradio sastojalo se u dokazu slijedeceg: 1) da je postojanje klasa vezano samo s odredenim Mstorijskim fazama razvitka proizvod nje, 2) da klasna borba neophodno vodi k diktaturi proletarijata (podvukao Marx), i 3) da ta diktatura sama cini tek prijelaz (podvukao H. B.) k unistenju svih klasa i drustvu bez klasa. (3) Tu se, dakle, prvi put jasno i tim rijecima postavlja pitanje prelaznog perioda i njemu odgovarajuce politicke organizacije, diktature proletarijata, u najopcijim crtama odreduje se sadrzaj tog prelaznog perioda. Nesto konkretnije o prelaznom periodu a da to ne bude puko izmisljanje moglo se reci tek na osnovu analize praktickog iskustva. Kako je poslije 1848. g. nastupio 20-godisnji period relativno mimog razvitka kapitalizma, Marx u to vrijeme ne razraduje dalje problem prelaznog perioda. Godine 1871. izbija u Francuskoj nova revolucija, njeni prakticki rezultati prije svega Pariska komuna daju bogati materijal za daljnja teoretska uopcavanja. Marx i Engels, sasvim jasno, pazljivo prate i analiziraju tok dogadaja. Neposredni rezultat te analize su Marxove Adrese izdane pod naslovom: Gradanski rat u Fran cuskoj. Karakterizirajuci Komunu, Marx u tom svom radu pise: Stvama njena tajna bila je u tome, da je ona u sustini bila vlada radnicke klase, rezultat borbe proizvodne klase protiv klase prisvajaca, ona je na koncu bila politicka forma, kod koje se moglo izvrsiti ekonomsko oslobodenje rada, tj. da svi postanu radm'ci, a proizvodni rad da prestane pripadati izvjesnoj klasi. (1, 481) Dekreti Komxme pokazuju koje konkretne prakticke mjere treba poduzeti u svrhu ostvarenja tog cilja: radi se o komunalnom uredenju drzave, fabrike se predaju na upravljanje radnickim asocijacijama, staru ugnjetavacku 76

drzavnu masinu treba slomiti i odstraniti i postaviti vlastite cinovnike i deputate, a od te vlastite birokracije treba se osigurati time, sto ce ona biti stalno pod kontrolom masa, sto su svi cinovnici smjenjivi u svako' doba i Sto ni najvise cinovnicke place ne prelaze visinu radnicke najamnine. A sama birokracija, citava ta autoritativna drzavna masinerija, postaje zatim polako sve vise nepotrebna. U toj mjeri u kojoj iscezava anarhija drustvene proizvodnje dopxmjava Engels nekoliko godina kasnije svoju i Marxovu analizu odumire i politicki autoritet drzave. (1, 145) Problem prelaznog perioda bio je tim vec potpxmo odreden. No svoju klasicnu obradu dobio je on tek neko liko godina kasnije u Marxovoj K ritici Gotskog programa, napisanoj 1875. godine a izdanoj 1891. godine. Citati upravo iz toga rada s neobicnom se upomoscu krivo interpretiraju. Marxova klasicna definicija prelaznog peiioda glasi ovako: Izmedu kapitalistickog drustva i komunistickog drustva lezi period revolucionamog preobrazaja prvog u drugo. Njemu odgovara i politicki prelazni period i driava tog perioda ne moze biti nista drugo osim revolucionama diktatura proletarijata. (4, 35) Ovaj se citat cesto interpretira tako da se pod komunizmom razumijeva njegova druga faza pa je prema tome period izmedu kapitalizma i komunizma socijalizam. Medutim, Marx pod komunizmom razumijeva drustveno-ekonomski sistem razlicit od kapitalistickog sistema, pa je prema tome i socijalizam komunizam, upravo njegova niza faza, kako ga Marx definira nekoliko strana ranije (str. 24). Komunizam i socijalizam razlikuju se samo po stepenu svoje ekonomske zrelosti (Lenjin), a nisu razliciti sistemi. Mozda bi se moglo reci da se oni razlikuju otprilike tako kao kapitalizam slobodne konkurencije od kapitalizma monopola. I kao sto bi bilo besmisleno suprotstavljati monopolni kapitalizam feudalizmu i reci da je kapitalizam slobodne konkurencije prelazni period od feudalizma k monopolistickom kapitalizmu, isto tako bilo bi besmisleno Marxu podmetnuti slicnu distinkciju u vezi s komunizmom. Marx u K ritici Gotskog programa sasvim jasno stalno suprotstavlja kapitalizmu komunizam kao 77

sistem i zatim objasnjava da se u tom buducem sistemu mogu nazrijeti dvije faze: socijalizam i komunizam, a da izmedu tog sistema i kapitalizma lezi prelazni period sa drzavom koja je diktatura proletarijata. Odatle jasno izlazi da u socijalizmu nema vise diktature proletarijata, nema klasa, klasne eksploatacije itd., kao i to da je Staljinova postavka o diktaturi proletarijata u socijalizmu, samo jedna antimarxisticka teza vise u njegovoj reakcionamoj drzavno-kapitalistickoj ideologiji u kojoj dikta tura proletarijata ima realno znacenje diktature birokracije. Medutim, neka mjesta u K ritici mogu ipak izazvati izvjesne nejasnoce. Tako na str. 22 Marx pise: Ovdje imamo posla s komimistickim drustvom ne ovakvim kakvo se ono razvilo na svojoj vlasti toj osnovi, nego obmuto, onakvixn kakvo ono iz kapitalistickog drustva upravo izlazi; s komumstickim drustvom, dakle, koje u svakom pogledu, u ekonomskom, moralnom, duhovnom, nosi na sebi tragove starog drustva iz cije utrobe izlazi. I sad se taj stav tumaci: u socijalizmu treba da se izbrisu ti tragovi, socijalizam je, dakle, p re lazni period. Mectutim, Marx nekoliko redaka vise govori o tom drustvu, koje iz kapitalizma upravo izlazi, kao o drustvu koje pociva na zadruznim nacelima, gdje proizvodaci ne razmjenjuju svoje proizvode, gdje ne postoji kategorija vrijednosti. A sto se tice tragova, njih ce biti i onda kad drustvo zade vec duboko u komunizam. Iz kasnijeg teksta se vidi da se ekonomski tragovi k apitalizm a sastoje u nedovoljno razvijenom proizvodnom kapadtetu da zadovolji sve potrebe. Moralni tragovi su u tome, sto ljudi nece odjednom nauciti da rade za drustvo bez ikakvih nomii prava (Lenin, Socinjenija t. 25, 439), pa ce se po stojanje drzave otegnuti daleko u komunizam, jer joj ostaje funkcija cuvanja burzoaskog prava (svakome prema radu), sto opet znaci da je za potpuno odumiranje drzave nuzan i potpuni komunizam (Lenin, ibid.). Duhovni tragovi sastoje se u tome, sto i dalje postoji suprotnost izmedu intelektualnog i manuelnog rada, koja je jedan od najvaznijih izvora suvremene drustvene nejednakostia i koja ce takoder isceznuti tek u drugoj fazi komunistickog drustva (Lenin, ibid. 440). Izlazi da se radi 78

fakticki o komunistiokom drustvu, a ne o prelaznom periodu. O tome veli Lenjin u svojoj Drzavi i revoluciji slijedece: To, sto se obicno naziva socijalizmom, Marx naziva prvom ili nizom fazom komunistickog dru stva. Ukoliko sredstva za proizvodnju postaju zajednicko vlasnistvo, utoliko je rijec komunizam i tu primjenjiva, ako se ne zaboravi da to n ije potpuni komunizam. Veliko znacenje Marxovog razjasnjenja sastoji se u tome, sto on dosljedno primjenjuje i ovdje materijalisticku dijalektiku, ucenje o razvitku, razmatrajuci komunizam kao nesto sto se razvija iz kapitalizma... U prvoj svojoj fa z i... komunizam ne moze biti ekonomski jos potpuno zreo, potpu.no Slobodan o d tradicija ili tragova kapitalizma (podvukao H. B.). Odatle takva interesantna pojava kao sacuvanje uskog horizonta burzoaskog prava u^komunizmu u njegovoj prvoj fa z i... itd. (T. 25, A sta je onda s prelaznim periodom? Zasto se on u Marxovom opcem razmatranju ne istice, vec je preskocen, ili se mozda misli implicite? Jer prema gom jim citatima i Lenjinovoj interpretaciji vidi se da je Marx jednostavno mislio na socijalizam, a da prethodno nije govorio o pre laznom periodu. Cini se da su Marx i Engels drzali prelazni period daleko kracim nego sto ga pokazuje danasnja praksa. Razlika je u toliko veca, sto su socijalisticke revolucije buknule u relativno zaostalim zemljama, gdje je taj pre lazni period objektivno morao biti jos mnogo duzi: trebalo je naime pod diktaturom proletarijata izgraditi onaj industrijski potencijal i onu n rganiy.ar.ijn proizvodnje koju su naprednije zemlje izgradile pod diktaturom burzoazije. I zato nije slucajna slijedeca razlika u terminologiji izmedu Engelsa i Lenjina. U svom predgovoru jednom Marxovom radu, koji je napisao 1891. g., Engels veli: Ostvarljivo je novo druStveno uredenje, u kome ce nestati danasnjih klasnih razlika, i u kom ce m ozda p o s lije kratkoga (podvukao H. B.), vezanoga s izvjesnim lisavanjima, no u svakom slucaju u moralnom pogledu vrlo korisnog prelaznog vremena sredstva za zivot, sredstva za uzivanje, za razvijanje i primjenu svih tjelesnili i dusevnih sposobno sti u sve vecem izobilju biti stavljena na sveopce 79

raspolaganje, zahvaljujuci planskom iskoristavanju i daljnjem razvijanju vec postojecih ogromnih proizvodnih snaga svih filanova drustva uz za sve jednaku obavezu rada.a (1, 52) I dok Engels govori otprilike u tom smislu kako socijaMstdcka ekonomika, ako i nece biti izgradena odmah, a ono svakako poslije kratkog perioda, evo sad Lenjinove interpretacije iz 1919. g., tj. nakon dvije godine praktickog postavljanja prelaznog perioda: Taj cilj (socijalizam, tj. unistenje klasa i eksploatacije, H. B.) ne moze se ostvariti odjednom, on zahtijeva dovoljno trajan prelazni period od kapitalizma k socijalizmu i zato, jer je preorganizacija proizvodnje teska stvar, i zato, jer je potrebno vrijeme za korjenite promjene u svim oblastima zivota, i zato, sto velika sila navike na burzoasko i sitnoburzoasko gospodarstvo moze biti prevladana samo u dugoj, upomoj borbi. Stoga Marx govori o cijelom periodu diktature proleta ry ata, kao periodu prijelaza od kapitalizma u socijalizam. (6, 401) A godinu dana ranije, u januaru 1918. g., Lenjin pise da: . ..prijelaz od kapitalizma k socijalizmu zahtijeva duge porodajne muke, dug period diktature proletarijata, lomljenje svega staroga, bespostedno unistenje svih formi kapitalizma, suradnju radnika svih zemalja, koji treba da ujedine sve svoje napore, da osiguraju pobjedu do konca. (Treci sveruski kongres Sovjeta, t. 26, 429) (podvukao H. B.). Slicno Lenjin govori i u drugim svojim radovima kadsto cak i o epohi diktature proletary ata, sto ce biti istaknuto i u nekoliko kasnijih. citata. U gom jim Lenjinovim citatima ujedno je odreden i okvir prelaznog perioda. Dakako, sve to iz perspektive jako zaostale zemlje kakva je bila Rusija. Ovaj kratki prikaz najvaznijih. Marxovih i Engelsovih stavova o prelaznom periodu ne bi bio potpun, kad ne bismo posebno spomenuli i Lenjinovu interpretaciju tih stavova, o cemu je, uostalom, tokom izlaganja vec bilo govora. Najpotpunije je svoj stav prema tim postavkama izrazio Lenjin u svojoj knjizi Drzava i revolucija, koja upravo ima taj zadatak da da jednu pravilnu interpretaciju stavova klasika. N ije potrebno ovdje iznositi sve te 80

Lenjinove stavove neki su osim toga vec izneseni a neke cemo navesti nesto kasnije vec cemo konstatirati samo to, da je Lenjin zbog pravilnijeg objasnjavanja preokrenuo Marxov redoslijed izlaganja iz Kritike Gotskog programa te najprije govori o prelaznom periodu izmedu kapitalizma i komunizmaa (kod Marxa taj stav dolazi posljednji), a tek onda govori o tome da u tom buducem komunizmu mozemo razlikovati dvije faze. I u ostalim svojim radovima Lenjin sasvim precizno govori o prelaznom periodu kao onom historijskom pe riodu koji lezi izmedu pobijedenog ali jos ne unistenog kapitalizma i nastajuceg ali jos ne izvojevanog socijalizma. Da navedem samo neke stavove. Godine 1918. u clanku Naredni zadaci sovjetske vlasti Lenjin je pisao: Ako nismo anarhisti, moramo prihvatiti neophodnost drzave, tj. prisile za period od kapitalizma k socijalizmu.a (t. 26, 238) U vec citiranom pasusu iz Pozdrava madarsMm radnicima iz 1919. g. Lenjin pise da se unistenje klasa i klasne eksploatacije ne moze ostvariti odjednoma i da szahtijeva dovoljno trajan prelazni period od kapitalizma k socijalizmu! (6, 401). Prema tome socijalizam je vec besklasno drustvo, a zadatak prelaznog perioda jest da likvidira klasnu eksploataciju. To isto veli Lenjin i u svom clanku Ekonomika i politika u epohi ( ! ) diktature proletarij ata kad pise: I klase su ostale i ostat ce u toku epohe (!) diktature proletarijata. Diktatura nece biti potrebna kad isceznu klase. One nece isceznuti bez diktature proletarijata. (6, 449) Na Trecem sveruskom kongresu Sovjeta Lenjin je rekao: Nema ni jednog socijalista... koji ne bi priznavao tu ocevidnu istinu da medu socijalizmom i kapitalizmom lezi dugi (!), vise iU manje tezak prelazni period diktature proletarijata, i da ce taj period u svojim formama u mnogome zavisiti od toga, prevladava li sitno vlasnistvo ili krupno, sitna kultura ili krupna.a (tom 26, 415) I na koncu jedan citat gdje se kristalno jasno odbacuje kao nemarksisticke tvrdnje da izmedu kapitalizma i socijalizma nema prelaznog perioda (do cega se mora
6 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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doci ako se sam socijalizam identificira s prelaznim periodom). Kritizirajuoi Rikova Lenjin je na jedrioj partijskoj konferenciji u 1917. g. izjavio: Dalje drug Rikov govori da izmedu kapitalizma i socijalizma nema prelaznog perioda. To nije tacrio. To je raskid s marxizmom. (tom 24, 216) Kod Lenjina nema nedosljednosti u vezi s tim pitanjem. I u svim ostalim svojim radovima Lenjin zastupa gore izneseno misljenje, pa je nepotrebno daljnje citiranje.

Ak.tu.elna pitanja U dosadasnjem izlaganju radilo se uglavnom o pravilnoj inteipretaciji Marxovih postavki. Sad bi trebalo postaviti na diskusiju i nekoliko problema koji izviru iz danasnje stvamosti. Da postavimo jos jednom osnovno pitanje: Sto je Marxov prelazni period? To je period drustvenog raz vitka koji lezi izmedu kapitalistickog drustveno-ekonomskog sistema i komunistickog drustveno-ekonomskog si stema. Kad pocinje i dokle traje taj prelazni period? Cini mi se da bi se na to pitanje moglo odgovoriti ovako: prelazni period pocinje politickom revolucijom, u kojoj radnicka klasa osvaja vlast, a zavrsava ekonomskom re volucijom1 rtj. potpunim preuredenjem ekonomike na za, druznim nacelimaa (Marx). Naravno, to sto ja nazivam politickom i ekonomskom revolucijom samo su dvije strane jednog te istog procesa permanentne revolucije (Marx Lenjin), pretvaranja klasnog drustva u besklasno, stihijne anarhicne ekonomike u svjesno upravljanu i plansku. Kad kao rezultat drustveno-ekonomskog razvitka dolazi do socijalisticke revolucije u jednoj zemlji u kojoj radnicka klasa osvaja vlast, ona tu vlast sada upotrebljava za provodenje revolucionamih promjena u ekonomici svoje zemlje, cime stvara uslove za svoju vlastitu
1 To je u stvari Engelsov tennin. U svom pismu Turatiju 6. I I 1892. Engels se dotifie tog pitanja: *Na koji ce se nacin izvrsiti ova ekonomska revolucija? To ce zavisiti od uslova u kojima ce nasa partija osvojiti vlast, od momenta i natina kojim ce se to postici.<r (7, 134).

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likvidaciju i ostvarenje komunistickog drustva. To je, dakle, zadatak diktature proletarijata. Lenjin je 1922. g. rekao o tome slijedece: Dok postoje klase neizbjezna je klasna borba. U prelaznom vremenu iz kapitalizma u socijalizam neizbjezno je postojanje klasa i program R. K. P.. govori s najpotpunijom odredenoscu da mi cinimo tek prve korake od kapitalizma k socijalizmu. Zato i kompartija i sovjetska vlast, kao i sindikati, duzni su otvoreno priznati postojanje ekonomske borbe i njenu neizbjeznost do tog vremena, dok ne bude zavrsena, makar u osnovi, elektxifikacija industrije i poljoprivrede, dok time ne budu podrezani svi korijeni sitnoga gazdinstva i gospodstva trzista. (8, 746) Prelazni period je period zestoke borbe s ostacima star roga, kapitalistickog drustveno-ekonomskog sistema, bor be u kojoj ce pobjeda novog drustvenog uredenja biti osigurana tek nakon potpunog preuredenja ekonomike drustva. Samim zahvacanjem vlasti jos nije osigurana pobjeda socijalizma i onemogucena restauradja, kako to pokazuje slucaj SSSR-a, slucaj koji klasici nisu predvidjeli (naime mogucnost da radnicka partija osvoji vlast i ostane na vlasti, a da ipak dode do restauracije, ili mozda tacnije, do peipetuiranja klasnog sistema). Smatralo se a mnogi tako misle jos uvijek da kontrarevoluciju mogu zapoceti i povesti jedino snage srusenog poretka i u cilju restauracije tog poretka. Zbog toga se iskljuciva paznja posvecivala borbi s elementima sruse nog poretka. Medutim, pokazalo se da pobjedonosnoj revoluciji glavna opasnost prijeti s druge strane. U tom smislu, kako primjecuje Lj. Tadic, historija staljinizma je klasican obrazac modeme kontrarevolucije u socijalizmu (podvukao B. H.; 15). A maoizam, kako izgleda, produbljuje taj obrazac. A koji je onda kriterij za to da li se poslije politicke revolucije u nekoj zemlji stvamo izgraduje komunizam? Ako diktatura proletarijata u nekoj zemlji pokazuje tendenciju konzerviranja drzave i cak njenog jacanja, fetisiziranja politickog autoriteta, onda ona ocito ne izvrsava svoju zadacu, koja se sastoji u odumiranju politickih funkcija, i pretvara se iz diktature proletarijata u svoju suprotnost, diktaturu nad proletary atom, diktaturu birokracije nad narodom.
6~

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Marx, a prema njemu i Lenjin, govore o prelaznom periodu samo u vezi s proleterskom drzavom, znaci samo u toliko, ukoliko je potrebna organizirana, tj. drzavna prisila za interveniranje u ekonomici koju ona rjesava kapitalistickih okova. Odatle jasno izlazi slika takve ekonomike u kojoj ta organizirana prisila u borbi protiv kapitalistickih. ostataka postaje nepotrebnom. Poslije uspjesno zavrsene politicke revolucije drzava uzima u svoje ruke osnovni dio sredstava proizvodnje i u kratkom pe riodu drzavnog socijalizma stvara uslove za njihovo predavanje u ruke asocijacija neposrednih proizvodaca, za pretvaranje drzavne svojine u opcenarodnu imovinua (Kidric, 9, s. 6). U isto vrijeme putem stalnog jacanja planskii. elemenata u razmjerima cjelokupne privrede pocinje proces brzog savladavanja anarhicnosti proiz vodnje i njenog rezultata, disproporcionalnosti u ekono mici naslijedene iz kapitalizma. U vezi s tim pise Engels: U istoj mjeri u kojoj iscezava anarhija drustvene proizvodnje slabi i politicka vlast drzave.c (10, 300) Ukoliko taj proces dalje napreduje, drzava se sve manje mijesa u privredni zivot zenilje, asooijaoije neposre dnih proizvodaca preko visih udruzenja proizvodaca pocinju neposredno da rukovode privredom, klasnih razlika nestaje, proizvodnost rada ogromno raste, cijela je privreda organizirana tako da politicka prisila drzave gubi svoj objekt i odumire. Drustvo veli Engels u svom klasicnom stavu o odumiranju drzave koje ce po novome organizirati proizvodnju na osnovu slobodne i ravnopravne asocijacije proizvodaca, poslat ce drzavnu masineriju tamo, gdje ce joj tada biti pravo mjesto: u muzej starina zajedno s preslicom i broncanom sjekirom. Eto, to znaci da je izvojevana i ekonomska revolucija, da je zavrsen prelazni period, da su u ekonomici postali dominantni elementi jednoga novog drustvenog uredenja, besklasnog drustva, komunizma. Sad je restauracija dru stva klasnog izrabljivanja isto tako nemoguca kao i npr. restauracija robovlasnickog sistema u kapitalizmu. Zemlja u kojoj je bila izvrsena prva socijalisticka re volucija, Sovjetski Savez, posla je gore ocrtanim putem.
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ali se kod prvog koraka, podrzavljenja sredstava za proizvodnju, zaustavila i zbog toga se prelazni period razvio u jedan nov klasni sistem. Partijsko-drzavni aparat, koji je inicirao refonne, izdvojio se i osamostalio u odnosu na proletarijat i druge drustvene slojeve. A ukoliko drzavni izvrsni aparat uopce postaje jaci i nezavisniji od radnicke klase i radnih masa generalizira E. Kardelj utoliko se vise pretvara u samostalnu drustvenu snagu koja tezi da sacuva i dalje razvija drzavno-kapitalisticke drustvene forme i odnose. Drugim rijecima, u takvim uslovima proleterska revolucija sama proizvodi snagu koja je degradira na stepen despotije drzavno kapitalisticke birokracije (11, 284). Tako su u SSSR-u neizvrsavanjem ekonomske revoluoije likvidirane do daljnjega i tekovine politicke revolucije, a ta ciijjenica vrlo lijepo izrazava njihov medusobni odnos. Gomjim prikazom rjesavaju se i sva ona pomalo skolasticka pitanja o tome sto je izgradnja socijalizma, izgradeni socijalizam, prijelaz u komunizam i si. Socija listicka revolucija skida s vlasti burzoaziju i drustvo pocinje graditi socijalizam. U tom smislu, tj. buduci da se vise ne radi o daljnjem razvitku starog drustvenog si stema, kapitalizma, vec o pocinjanju izgradnje novog drustvenog sistema, socijalizma, mozemo termin socija lizam prosiriti i na taj period; tu se doduse radi o soci jalizmu koji tek nastaje, ali upravo zato i govorimo o socijalizmu, a ne vise o kapitalizmu, O tome je Lenjin na Trecem sveruskom kongresu Sovjeta rekao slijedece: ... mi smo tek zapoceli period prelaza k socijalizmu, do socijalizma jos nismo dosli. No vi cete pravilno postupiti ako kaiete da je nasa republika socijalisticka republika Sovjeta. V i cete postupiti isto tako pravilno kao i oni, koji mnoge burzoaske republike Zapada nazivaju demokratskim, iako je svakome poznato da nema ni jedne od najdemokratskijih republika koja bi bila potpuno demokratska... Tako i mi sada. Mi smo daleko cak i od toga da bismo makar zavrsili prelazni period od kapitalizma k socijalizmu. Mi se nikad nismo zavaravali nadom da demo ga moci zavrsiti bez pomoci medunarodnog proletarijata. Mi nikada rusmo bili u zabludi na racun toga i znamo kako je tezak put koji vodi od kapitalizma k socijalizmu, no m i smo obavezni reci da je nasa republika Sovjeta socijalisticka zato sto smo mi na taj put stupili. . . (t. 26, 422; podvukao H. B.) 85

U tom smislu, po mom misljenju, i Marx je pod socija lizmom razumijevao implicite i prelazni period, kako je to spomenuto u formi pitanja kod jednog ranijeg citata. Samo, naravno, takvo je shvacanje potpuno razlicno od onoga, po kom se socijalizam iscrpljuje u prelaznom periodu, tj. identificira se s njim. Sto znaci sizgradeni socijalizam vidjeli smo gore. Isto j e tako jasno i pitanje prelaza na visu fazu komunizma. Snr.ijali7.am je, naime, prosto komunizam u kom se jos zbog nedovoljno razvijenog proizvodnog potencijala ne moze prici direktnom prisvajanju predmeta potrosnje, vec postoji potreba da se mjeri rad i utvrduje njegov efekat, kako bi se dobio kriterij za raspodjelu zivotnlh. sredstava. I sad, ukoliko proizvodne snage vise rastu, Titoliko se sve vise stvaraju uslovi ne samo ekonomski, vec i drugi za prijelaz na raspodjelu po potrebama, tj. za komunisticku raspodjelu. Da postavimo sada jos jedno pitanje. Zasto uopce go-vorimo o prelaznom periodu od kapitalizma u komuni zam, a ne govorimo o prelaznim periodima i izmedu dnigih drustvemh sistema? Radi se o tome sto mi prelazni period vezemo neraskidivo uz pitanje diktature proletarijata. U svim dosadasnjim drustvenim sistemima nova klasa dolazila je na vlast tek nakon sto je prethodno ovladala ekonomikom zemlje, nakon sto je postala vlasnik sredstava proizvodnje. A u socijalistickoj revoluciji proletariat dolazi na vlast upravo zato sto ne posjeduje sredstva za proizvodnju. U svim dosadasnjim sistemima ekonomska revo lucija prethodi politickoj. Razlika je na koncu u tome, sto se predsocijalisticki razvitak drustva odvijao potpuno stiMjski, bice je anticipiralo svijest, a s izgradnjom socijalizma pocinju ljudi upravljati svojim drustvenim raz-vitkom; to su u pocetku tek nesigumi pokusaj i, ali se oni nii7.no razvijaju u tom pravcu da svijest sve vise anticipira bice, kada ce, kako veli Engels, ljudi sami i s punom svijescu praviti svoju historiju, kada ce drustveni uzroci koje ljudi budu stavljali u pokret imati kao posljedicu pretezno i u sve vecoj mjeri one ucinke koje oni zele. (10, 300). Te korjenite razlike ne smiju se nikad ispustiti iz vida kad se odrecluje Marxov termin prelaznog perioda iz kapitalizma u komunizam. Fakticno, izmedu svih drustvenih sistema postoje prijelazi, nigdje 86

ne postoji ostra granica, no bilo bi sasvim pogresno poistovetiti te prelaze s Marxovim prelaznim periodom. Ne radi se prosto o prijelazu, vec o sasvim osobitom prijelazu. Teoretski smisao Marxovog prelaznog perioda bio bi otprilike slijedeci: U prelaznom periodu ostvaruje se skok iz klasnog drustva u besklasno drustvo, sto, medutim, ne znaci da se brisu svi tragovi klasnog drustva, do cega dolazi tek u socijalizmu. I bas zato sto je socijalizam vec besklasno drustvo, on nije prijelaz na komunizam, vec je sam komunizam, njegova prva faza. Likvidiranje i posljednjili ostataka klasnog drustva ekonomskih, moralnih. i duhovnih (Marx) nije vise skok, jer je osnovna klasna kategorija, eksploatacija, likvidirana vec u prelaz nom periodu, kao sto je likvidirana osnovna ekonomska kategorija svih pretkomunistickih sistema: stihijnost i anarhicnost proizvodnje. Iako do potpune likvidacije stihijnosti ekonomike, sto bi znacilo da svijest potpuno anticipira bice, nece nikada doci, tj. to je vjecan proces koji ce se nastaviti i u potpunom komunizmu, kao i poslije njega, ipak mi mozemo govoriti o njenoj likvidaciji utoliko, sto je vec (ovdje vec oznacava i tendenciju trajanja) poceo proces njene likvidacije i utoliko to znaci skok koji se izvrsava u prelaznom periodu. Jos jedna primjedba. Ako se na komunizam ne gleda kao na sistem koji dolazi na smjenu kapitalizmu, koji upravo iz kapitalizma izrasta (Marx), koji je naredna etapa razvitka ljudskog drustva, vec ga se kao zavrsnu epohu razvitka suprotstavlja bivsoj klasnoj epohi, onda tu i socijalizam dobiva drugo znacenje, on onda prestaje biti nizom fazom komunizma i postaje prelazni period od klasnog drustva u besklasno. No to su staticke apstrakcije, koje t o t a l n o m klasnom suprotstavljaju tot a l n o besklasno drustvo i koje su Marxu i marxizmu, po mom misljenju, tude. Za jednu teoriju razvitka, kakva je Marxova, nikad se ne postavlja pitanje o totalitetu bez izuzetaka i tragova prijasnjeg stanja, pa da se tek tada odreduje nov kvalitet, vec se kod pojave u razvitku, dakle, gdje postoje i elementi staroga i elementi novoga, fiksiraju samo dominantne karakteristike, ono sto je osnovno. Promjena tog osnovnog v e c znaci promjenu kvaliteta, bez obzira na to sto tragovi ranijeg stanja j o s 87

nisu totalno izbrisani. I, dosljedno tome, socijalizam uza sve tragove vec jest besklasno drustvo, komunizam, a ne prijelaz na komunizam. Ovaj Marxov pojam prelaznog perioda Lenjin je dopunio time sto je drzavni kapitalizam (pod sovjetskom vlascu!) odredio kao prelazni stepen organizacije drustvene proizvodnje u pravcu socijalizma. Kako je Lenjin zamisljao taj drzavni kapitalizam, koji bi trebao biti ekonomskom stranom prelaznog perioda, kao sto je dik tatura proletarijata politicka strana, vidi se iz nekoliko narednih stavova. Polemizirajuci s Buharinom na zasjedanju VCIK-a 29. IV 1918. g. Lenjin je rekao: Buharin govori da pri sovjetskoj vlasti ne moze biti drzavnog kapitalizma. To je ocita besmislica. Cijeli niz poduzeca i zavoda koji se nalaze pod kontrolom sovjetske vlasti i pripadaju drzavi, vec samo to pokazuje prijelaz od kapitalizma k socijalizmu... Sada mi ne mozemo a da ne postavimo pitanje o drzavnom kapitalizmu i socijalizmu, o tome kako se vladati u prelaznom periodu tu kod sovjetske vlasti postoje zajedno komadic kapitalizma i komadic socijaIizma. (t. 27, 275) Tri godine kasnije, u clanku 0 porezu u naturi Le njin je pisao: Uko]iko mi jos nismo u stanju ostvariti neposredni prijelaz od sitne proizvodnje k socijalizmu, utoliko je kapitalizam neizbjezan u izvjesnoj mjeri kao stihijski proizvod sitne proizvodnje i razmjene i utoliko smo mi duzni iskoristiti kapitalizam (posebno usmjeravajuci ga u korito drzavnog kapita lizma), kao posredujucu kariku izmedu sitne proiz vodnje i socijalizma, kao sredstvo, put, nacin... povisenja proizvodnih snaga. (8, 7001) Iste godine Lenjin govori da na licnom dnteresu, licnoj zainteresovanosti, na privrednom racunu treba izgraditi najprije cvrste skele, koje vode u sitnoseljackoj zemlji kroz drzavni kapitalizam k socijalizmua. (8, 736). Karakteristicno je da ti Lenjinovi stavovi s kojima on upotpunjuje i konkretizira Marksov pojam prijelaznog perioda padaju u vrijeme poslije oktobarske revo lucije. Lenjin nam to sam objasnjava u svom referatu na X I kongresu R K P(b ) 1922. g., kad veli:

 . .. tamo (u starijim knjigama, H. B.) je napisano o tom drzavnom kapitaflzmu koji biva pri kapitalizmu, no nema nijedne knjige o tom drzavnom kapitalizmu koji biva pri komunizmu. Cak se ni Marx nije dosjetio da napise ijedno slovo o tome i iimro je ne ostavivsi nijednog tacnog citata i neopovrzljive upute. Zato se mi moramo sada snalaziti sami. (8, 765) U to je vrijeme vec i Buharin postao svjestan mogucnosti formiranja drzavnog kapitalizma, a s njim i klasne eksploatacije, pri sovjetskoj vlasti. Veoma je ilustrativan slijedeci odlomak: Mnogo je teze pitanje prelaznog perioda od ka pitalizma ka socijalizmu tj. perioda diktature pro letarijata. Radnicka klasa u trenutku kad pobjeduje ne predstavlja jedinstvenu masu... Ona dolazi do pobjede u uslovima opadanja proizvodnih snaga i materijalne nesigurnosti sirokih masa. Stoga mora da se pojavi i tendencija ka 'degeneraciji', tj. izdvajanju jednog rukovodeceg sloja u vidu klice klase. (12, 182) Buharin je ocekivao da ce tendencija restauriranja klasnog drustva biti paralizirana porastom proizvodnih snaga i ukidanjem monopola u obrazovanju. Medutim, desilo se da se birokracija konsolidirala mnogo brze nego sto su se razvile snage koje su bile u stanju da je kontroliraju ili sprijece njeno formiranje. Osam godina kasnije, 1930. godine, poznati sovjetski revolucionar K. Rakovski koji je i sam uskoro zaglavio u Staljinovim cistkama mogao je jos jedino da konstatira: Od proleterske drzave sa birokratskim deformacijama, kao sto je Lenjin definisao pohticki oblik nase drzave... mi se razvijamo u birokratsku drzavu sa proletersko-komunistickim ostacima. Pred nasim ocima se obrazovala i obrazuje velika klasa vladajucih, koja ima svoje unutrasnje potpodjele koje stalno rastu, koja se mnozi putem zainteresirane kooptacije i pomocu neposrednog i posrednog imenovanja... Kao oslonac ove originalne klase nalazi se isto tako originalna privatna svojina, tj. posjedovanje drzavne vlasti.a (12, 196) Navedeni citati zanimljivi su i kao svjedocanstvo da su vodeci sovjetski revolucionari bili svjesni opasnosti degeneracije diktature proletarijata u diktaturu nad proletarijatom, opasnosti perpetuiranja klasnog drustva. Oni 89

su pokusali i da se bore protiv te opasnosti, ali nisu uspjeli. Pritisak nerazvijene privrede i, njoj odgovarajuce, nerazvijene drustvene svijesti, bio je suvise velik. Ogroman valjak objektivno uslovljenog etatizma pregazio je subjektivne snage koje su pokusale da ga kontroliraju.

Prelazni period i drzavni kapitalizam Mogli bismo zakljuciti ovo nase razmatranje. Historija pokazuje da je drzavni kapitalizam doista najpuriija materijalna priprava socijalizmu... taj stupanj historijske ljestvice izmeflu koga i stupnja koji se zove socija lizam ... nema nikakvih medustupnjeva (Lenjin, 5, t. 25, s. 333). I zato zemlje koje su izvele revoluciju, prije nego sto su presle taj stupanj, prezivljavaju drzavni kapitaIizaxn pri komunizmu. S druge strane, zemlje koje su dosle ili dolaze do punog drzavnog kapitalizma pri kapitalizmu a to su danas najrazvijenije kapitalisticke zemlje te zemlje vec prije revolucije prezivljavaju svoj prelazni period i pod svojom kapitalistickom ljuskom pokazuju mnoge zacetke buduceg socijalistickog drustva. U prvom slucaju politicka revolucija priprema ekonomsku, u potonjem ekonomska evolucija priprema politicku. U oba slucaja karakteristicno je da obje nuzne komponente zasnivanja socijalizma nisu komprezentne. Zbog toga je u takvim slucajevima vjerojatno ispravnije ne govoriti o prelaznom periodu, vec o razvoju jednog posebnog medusistema, drzavnog kapitalizma, etatizma. Me dutim, u slucaju kad je neka zemlja dostigla istovremeno potrebnu ekonomsku i politicku zrelost, tako da u relativno kratkom roku svakako unutar zivota jedne generacije moze simultano izvrsiti ekonomsku i politicku transformaciju ranijeg kapitalistickog u novi socijalisticki poredak u tom slucaju mozemo govoriti o prelaznom periodu. Mislim da se moze tvrditi da tom klasicnom slucaju prelaznog perioda odgovara upravo zavrseno razdoblje poslijerevolucionamog razvoja nase zemlje. Test razlikovanja drzavnog kapitalizma od Marxovog prelaznog perioda sastoji se u utvrdivanju procesa odumiranja drzave. Ukoliko se neko drustveno uredenje razvija u pravcu drzavnog kapitalizma, onda, prirodno, ne moze biti ni govora o odumiranju drzave; naprotiv drzava 90

! 1

jaca i prozima sve pore drustvenog zivota. Drzavni kapitalizam, kao i svaki klasni sistem, ima svoju vladajucu klasu. To je birokracija. U analizi nastanka birokracije, vidjeli smo da se drzavna birokracija nikada ne svodi samo na cinovnicki aparat. U tom je i bila osnovna slabost Weberove analize. Birokracija je uvijek klasno obojena, cinovnici su uvijek neciji cinovnici. U potpuno razvijenom drzavnom kapitalizmu dolazi do potpunog stapanja dviju inace razlicitih grupa profesionalnih politicara, kao nosioca vlasti, i cinovnika u jednu jedinstvenu birokraciju. To je poznati proces srascivanja drzavnog i partijskog aparata u jedan totalni birokratski monopol. Drzavni kapitalizam, iako mozda ne u svojim ekstremnim formama, izgleda da predstavlja nuzni razvojni stupanj u evoluciji drustvenih sistema. Zbog toga su se pioniri socijalisticke revolucije (i kapitalisticke evolucije) zaglavljivali u tom sistemu i tek zemlje koje su se kasnije pojavljivale kao npr. Jugoslavija mogle su da ga eventualno preskoce. No ni drzavni kapitalizam nije neki okamenjeni sistem. I on, kao i liberalni kapi talizam, ima svoj motor unutrasnje destrukcije. To nije neka nova klasa koja ce mu biti grobarom, vec je to gubitak funkcionalnosti birokracije kao vladajuce klase uslijed cega ce ona u toku razvoja biti prosto eleminirana ili apsorbirana. Ovu evolutivnu cinjenicu uocava Mihajlo Markovic i u jednom efektnom odlomku zakljucuje: Borba birokratije za odrzavanje njenog privilegiranog statusa u post-kapitalistickom drustvu istovremeno je pripremanje uslova za njeno iscezavanje. Kako bi odrzala iluziju da istupa u ime progresivnih snaga drustva, ona u najvazniji c ilj revolucionamog pokreta pretvara ono sto je bilo sredstvo njegove realizacije industrijalizacija, povecanje produktivnosti, materijalno hlagostanje. Ma kakvim deformacijama to vodilo, tako se u sve vecoj meri stvara jedno stanje drustva u kome ce birokratija izgubiti i poslednji razlog svog opstanka.a (13, 65) A nakon ukidanja birokracije na vec stvorenoj osnovici ne-privatnog vlasnistva moze da se razvije jedino samoupravno drustvo, to jest socijalizam. 91

7. D IK T A T U R A PR O LE TAR IJATA Zapocnimo nase razmatranje s vec citiranim klasicnim Marxovim stavom iz Kritike Gotskog programa: Izmectu kapitalistickog drustva i komunistickog drustva lezi period revolucionamog preobrazaja prvog u drugo. Njemu odgovara i politicki prelazni period, i drzava tog perioda ne moze biti nista drugo osim revolucionama dik.ta.tura proletarijata. (4, 36) Taj stav predstavlja kondenzirano ponavljanje analize koje su Marx i Engels izvrsili jos u Komunistickom manifestu, odakle uzimam jos dva dodatna odlomka: Proletarijat ce svoju politicku vlast iskoristiti zato da postepeno oduzme burzoaziji sav kapital.,. Iz pocetka se to moze dogoditi naravno samo pomocu despotskog posezanja u pravo vlasnistva i u burzoaske odnose proizvodnje. Kad u toku razvitka budu iscezle klasne razlike i cijela proizvodnja bude koncentrirana u rukama udruzenih individuuma, javna vlast izgubit ce politicki karakter.,. Kad p roleta ria t... kao vladajuca klasa nasilno ukine stare odnose proiz vodnje, on ce s tim odnosima proizvodnje ukinuti i uvjete opstanka klasne suprotnosti, klasa uopce, a s time i svoju vlastitu klasnu vladavinu. (1, 27) Navedeni odlomci treba da nas podsjete na Marxovu teoriju diktature proletarijata i prelaznog perioda, a koja se moze svesti na slijedeca cetiii stava. 1. Ukoliko do rusenja kapitalistickog poretka dolazi nasilno, revolucijom sto je Marxu izgledalo najvjerojatnije socijalizam ne nastaje ni odmah ni automatski. 2. Prelazni period izmedu kapitalizma i komunizma, odnosno socijalizma kao njegove nize faze, karakterizira posebni tip drzave. 3. To je drzava revolucioname diktature proletarijata, sto znaci: (a ) da ta drzava zastupa klasne interese proletari jata, i (b ) da je rezim revolucionaran, tj. da se zasniva na prisili, na despotskom posezanju, na ogranicenju politickih sloboda. 92

4. Revolucionama diktatura proletarijata je privremeni rezim cija je jedina svrha da ukine stare odnose proizvodnje, a time i proletariat kao klasu s posebnim interesima. U ovom analitickom okviru i u nasem historijskom kontekstu moci cemo sada razmotriti odgovarajuci stav iz Programa SKJ: Antagonisticke snage jos nisu oslabljene do te mjere da bi prestale biti opasnost za opstanak socijalizma. Zato se radnicka klasa ne moze odreci oruzja svoje klasne borbe, diktature proletarijata i rukovodece uloge Saveza komunista Jugoslavije u borbi za prevazzlazenje ovih socijalnih i materijalnih faktora, koji u razlicitim oblicima jos vrse pritisak na drustvene odnose u nasoj stvamosti u smislu kapitalisticke restauracije odnosno birokratsko-drzavnokapitalistickih tendencija. (14, 235) Ova ocjena dana je prije osam godina, u razdoblju poslije prve ekonomske i drustvene afirmacije radnickog samoupravljanja. Osam godina nije dug period, ali u vremenima brzih druStvenih transformacija on je dovoljno dug da opravda preispitivanje te ocjene u svjetlu danasnje historijske situacije. 1. Prije svega kominformovski antagonizmi danas su donekle prevladani. Evropske socijalisticke zemlje, s izuzetkom Albanije, danas su nasi prijatelji, iako mogucnost iznenacfenja i dalje postoji. 2. Stavise, sve te zemlje vec izvjesno vrijeme intenzivno provode reforme koje imaju mnoge elemente puta koji smo mi vec prosli. Prema tome, radi se o neospornoj historijskoj tendenciji priblizavanja. 3. Opci vanjskopoliticki polozaj zemlje je povoljan. Na unutrasnjem planu brz privredni razvoj doveo je do znatnog povisenja zivotnog nivoa, koji je sada dvostruko visi nego prije osam godina.1
1 Korisno je trenutak porazmisliti sta zapravo znaci ova konstatacija. Decenije- su, pa i vjekovi, prosli prije no sto je zemlja postigla drustveni proizvod od oko 340 dolara po glavi stanovnika, cime je jos uvijek ostajala 'u grupi nerazvijenih zemalja. A sada je za svega osam godina dohodak- povedan na oko 650 dolara (po cijenama 1965. g.) i privreda je poprimila karakteristike srednje razvijenih privreda. Jugoslavija je danas znatno razvijenija no sto su bile najrazvijenije zemlje u vrijeme kad su.zivjeli Marx i Engels. Za mnoge ce vjerojatno biti veliko iznenadenje kad budu obavijeSteni da se Jugoslavija po stepenu privrednog razvoja priblizila predratnoj Francuskoj, da je razvijeni dio zemlje sustigao. predratnu Francusku, a Slovenija ju je osjetnije prestigla. Prema proracunima S. Stajica drustveni proizvod po glavi stanovnika

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Ekonomski i politicki zemlja je stabilnija nego ikada ranije. Ovo posljednje narocito se ispoljilo u lakoci kojom je likvidirana politicka policija. Ocigledno je da si stem ima svenarodnu podrsku. 4. Radnicko i drustveno samoupravljanje definitivno su se afirmisali i postali neunistiv pokretac drustvenih kretanja u zemlji. Na osnovu ovih cetiriju konstatacija trebalo bi izvesti zakljucak da je restauracija kapitalizma danas u nasoj zemlji nezamisljiva. To, naravno, ne znaci da je put u socijalizam sad ociscen od svih prepreka. Naprotiv, oci gledno je da sam razvoj stvara nove prepreke. Birokratizacija je jedna od njih i to izvanredno opasna. Ali to je deformacija koja nastaje na tlu socijalizma i nema nikakve veze s ranijim klasnim neprijateljem. Prema tome diktatura proletarijata nemocna je da tu ma sta ucini. Proletariat nije imun od birokratizacije, stavise, njegova vlastita drzava i partija mogu postati nosioci birokratskih tendencija, kako to pokazuje iskustvo niza zemalja. Nadalje, i na cisto teorijskom planu izgleda da nije sve u redu. Proletarijat je klasa najamnih radnika. Postoje H danas najamni radnici u Jugoslaviji? Ocigledno da ne postoje. Prema tome nekvalificirano upotrebljavanje termina diktatura proletarijata u danasnjim jugoslavenskim uslovima liseno je historijskog smisla. Izgleda da se postojanje diktature proletarijata veze s postojanjem rukovodece uloge Saveza komunista. Takva je interpretacija moguca, ali ona sasvim izlazi van okvira Marxove analize. Ma kakva bila uloga Saveza komunista,
iznosi u Jugoslaviji u 1966. godini 650 dolara, u Francuskoj u 1938. godini 880 dolara, (djen e iz 1965. g.). Neki podaci o poljoprivrednoj i industrijskoj proizvodnji tu cinjemcu lijepo ilustriraju: Francuska 1938. Jugoslavija Stvarno Uporedivo Elektroenergija, mrd. kwh Celik, mln tona Cement, mXn tona 2ito, mln tona 20,8 6,2 4.1 17,7 9,9 3,0 2,0 8,4 1965 15,5 1,8 4,0 10,6

Francuski podaci u drugom stupcu direktno su uporedivi s jugoslavenskim jer su reducirani faktorom 2,11 za razliku u broju stanovnika (prema SGJ-1966, i Statistical Yearbook of UN, 1951). Mogli bismo takoder redi da je po proizvodnji Jugoslavija danas tamo gdje su Italija i Austrija bile prije deset godina.

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ona se ne sastoji u sprecavanju kapitalisticke restauracije ukoliko smo se jednom slozili da je ta mogucnost prestala biti historijski aktuelnom. Zbog toga bi bilo dobro da se uloga Saveza komtmista ubuduce precizno definira s obzirom na zadatke koji stoje pred nama, a ne s obzirom na probleme koje smo rijesili. Nas zakljucak u pogledu ocjene historijske situacije mogao bi biti ovaj. U protekloj cetvrti stoljeca u Jugoslaviji je ostvaren prijelaz od kapitalizma u socijalizam. Osvojena je politicka vlast, izvrseno je despotsko posezanje u pravo vlasnistva i u burzoaske odnose proizvodnje, a cijela proizvodnja je koncentrirana u rukama udruzenih individuumaw.1 Diktatura proletarijata izvrsila je svoju historijsku misiju i treba da bude zamijenjena necim sto bismo mogli nazvati drzavom radnog naroda ili opcenarodnom drzavom.2 Naredni je zadatak da se malo podrobnije ispita kada je izvrsen ovaj prijelaz iz kapitalizma u socijalizam.

8. T R I ETAPE JUGO SLAVENSKE SO C IJALISTIC K E REVOLUCIJE Obicno se govori o jednoj revoluciji kojom se ruje prijelaz od kapitalizma na socijalizam. Ako, tim, pazljivo analiziramo proteklih cetvrt vijeka drustvenog razvoja, ustanovit cemo da smo mi ostvamedunaseg prosli

1 Moze se na prvi pogled Ciniti da individualna proizvodnja seljaka i zanatlije tome protivurijeci. U stvari tome nije tako, ne radi se ni o kakvom stranom elementu. Vidi poglavlje 15. 2 Buduci da pojedini termini s vremenom udu u svakodnevnu rutinsku upotrebu, javlja se velik psiholoski otpor njihovom mijenjanju cak i onda kad su se sadrzaji, koje oznacavaju, ved bitno promijenili. Ljudi i dalje upotrebljavaju iste termine, ali misle na potpuno razlicite sadrzaje. Tako npr. pazljivo ispitivanje jezika nase dnevne stampe, nedovoljno kriticne publicistike i istupanja politidkih lifinosti pokazuje da su tri kljudna stara termina zadobila ove nove sadrzaje: radnidku klasu predstavljaju svi radni ljudi koji su objektivno ili subjektivno zainteresirani za izgradnju socijalizma, dakle ogromna vecina Jugoslovena; klasni neprijatelj je nepiijatelj izgradnje socijalistickog drustva u Jugoslaviji, a to su politicki emigrant! te birokratski i deklasirani element! u zemlji; diktatura proletarijata je drzava radnicke klase kako je gore defmirana. Iz ovih definicija proizlazi da je u zemlji ostvaren jednoklasni sistem. Sto je to kontradikcija po sebi i sto je diktatura prole tarijata nespojiva sa socijalizmom u okviru Marxovog misaonog sistema, jesu odredene logifike teSkoce, koje, medutim, iscezavaju pred psiholoSkom ravnotezom koju omogucuju.

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kroz tri revolucionama prijeloma odnosno kroz tri etape revolucije, tacnije: treca je upravo zapocela. Naravno te revolucije nisu bile sasvim iznenadne i promjene su se neprestano odigravale. Medutim, nema nikakve sumnje da postoje tri kvalitativna skoka u tim promjenama. Prva revolucija poklopila se vecim dijelom s narodno-oslobodilackom borbom. Ona je ocistila zemlju od okupatora, srusila stari drustveno-ekonomski poredak i eliminirala eksploatatorske klase. Neprijatelj u toj revoluciji bio je jasno definiran. I ciljevi su bili precizni: drzavni socijalizam sovjetskog tipa. Tom razdoblju u politickoj sferi odgovara monolitna, centralisticka revo lucionama komunisticka partija. Konsolidacija tokova prve revolucije bila je u 1948. godini iznenada prekinuta napadima K o m in form a. Ispostavilo se da staljinizam i socijalizam nisu identicni i da drzavni socijalizam, izuzev kao kratkotrajna prelazna etapa, predstavlja contradictio in adjecto. Odjednom se utvrdilo da recept za izgradnju socijalizma ne postoji i da tek mi sami treba da ga izmislimo za svoje potrebe. Neprijatelj vise nije bio tako jasno definiran kao nekada, ali se ipak mogao prilicno lako utvrditi. To su bili nosioci staljinisticke dominacije izvana i deklarirani pristalice staljinizma iznutra, ovi potonji bili su objektivno u danoj situaciji izdajice svoje zemlje. Medutim, neposredni ciljevi bili su sve prije nego jasni; trebalo je kriticki analizirati cjelokupni dotadasnji prilaz izgradnji socijalizma. U tom procesu doslo je i do pogresnih akcija, kao sto je npr. administrativno forsirana kolektivizacija.1 No veoma brzo, osloncem na revolucionamu intuiciju masa, pronadena je orijentacija za cjelokupni daljnji razvoj: radnicko samoupravljanje. Partija tog pe rioda je partija transformacije. Na sestom kongresu 1952. godine donosi se historijska odluka o pretvaranju do1 U januaru 1949. g. I I plenum CK KPJ donio je zakljucak da se teziste rada baci na stvaranje seljackih radnih zadruga i da se u tom poslu pride sa vise smjelosti i brzim tempom; Usprkos sovjetskim iskustvima od te akcije ocekivalo se povedanje poljoprivredne proizvodnje, smatralo se da je to put izgradnje socijalizma na selu i htjelo se pokazati da autori Rezolucije Informbiroa nemaju pravo kad tvrde da jugoslavenski komunisti nisu spremni da sprovedu kolektivizaciju (18, 473). Uskoro su se u praksi pocele osjecati stetne posljedice tog kxirsa i on je pocetkom 1953. g. radikalno revidiran. sKritika prakse primijetio je jednom prilikom desetak godina kasnije V. Bakaric bila je brza nego naSa teoretska kritika* (19, 10).

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tada Masicne kompartije u Savez komunista. Isprva je promjena bila mala, ali se s vremenom povecavala. Par tija je i dalje bila monolitna i ne mnogo manje centralizirana nego ranije. U stvari centralisticka partija a to je jedna od protivurjecnosti tog razdoblja, protivurjecnost koja je izazivala stalne nesporazume i nerazumijevanja bila je zalog konzekventne i efikasne decentralizacije u svim ostalim sferama drustvenog zivota. Poredak s radnickim i drustvenim samoupravljanjem nije postojao nigdje u svijetu, nije bilo tudeg iskustva, obrazaca ni udzbenika. Islo se u nepoznato. Da se eliminiraju rizici ekscesa i kaoticnosti, procesom je morala rukovoditi dobro organizirana, jedinstvena i autoritativna politicka organizacija. To je bila partija odnosno Savez komunista razdoblja druge revolucije. Nije potrebno posebno isticati da gore opisana shema razvoja predstavlja ex post racionalizaciju. Nema sigumo nikoga ko bi tvrdio da je takav razvoj ocekivao 1945. godine, a da ne govorimo u 1941. Medutim, potrebno je da otkrijemo logiku u dogadajima, makar i ex post, da bismo dobili elemente za ekstrapolacije u buducnost. Da ta logika u operativnom smislu nije na vrijeme bila otkrivena, pokazuje IV plenum. I upravo zbog toga taj politicki dogadaj mozemo uzeti kao formalni pocetak nase trece revolucije. U jednom sirem okviru lanac dogadaja pokrenula je reforma koja je sad u toku. Ta je refonna po svim intend jama zapoceta kao privredna, no ubrzo je prerasla u veoma dalekoseznu dmstyeno-politicku reformu. Brionski plenum samo je najmarkantniji politicki faktor u transformaciji privredne reforme u opce-drustvenu. Ta treca i, vjerojatno, najteza i najslozenija od tri etape revolucije, razlikuje se bitno od prethodne dvije. Moguce alternative razvoja postale su veoma slozene i vise nije a priori jasno koja je najpozeljnija. Osim toga sada vise ni neprijatelj nije jasno definiran. To vise nije prvenstveno ni klasni neprijatelj ni inostrana dominacija. To su sad nas vlastiti konzervatizam, reakcionami dogmatizam i birokracija ponikli na nasem vlastitom, socijalistickom tlu. Njihove drasticne manifestacije ocitovale su se u zloupotrebama Sluzbe drzavne bezbjednosti. Izvjestavajuci Skupstinu o tim zloupotrebama Avdo Humo je naveo:
7 Ogled o jugoslavenskom druStvu *

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CjeIokupni rad i metod rada bio je montiran tako da sprecava samoupravljanje i neposrednu demokraciju izgradivanja ravnopravnih odnosa medu nasim narodima i narodnostima i afirmadju privredne i drustvene reforme. Sijali su sumnju u sve sto je progresivno i sumnjali su u svakoga koji nije mislio kao oni. Tako su razarali mnoge drzavne organizme i drustveno-politicke organiza cije da bi stvorili nemoc i demoralizaciju i na taj nacin paralizirali zarista progresivne demokratske misli i akcije.1 Sluzba drzavne bezbjednosti formirana je kao organ socijalisticke drzave sa zadatkom da obezbjeduje izgradnju socijalizma. Medutim, obezbjedujuci drzavu ta je sluzba, kako se vidi iz Humovog izvjestaja, podrivala socijalizam. Ova podrivacka aktivnost nije imala nikakve veze ni sa stranom intervencijom ni sa predratnom burzoazijom, ona je bila autohtoni produkt poslijerevolucionamog razvoja. Naravno, deformadje SDB nisu bile ni slucajne ni jedine. One se mogu razumjeti jedino u sirem sklopu drustvenih i politicMh zbivanja u zemlji sto cemo podrobnije analizirati kasnije. Antisod jalisticke tendencije i aktivnosti nisu se ispoljile jedino unutar drzavnog aparata, kako to pokazuje slucaj SDB. One su se pokazale i u rukovodedem politickom tijelu, unutar Saveza komunista. U opcoj predodzbi SKJ je bila monolitna organizacija koja je jedin-

1Borba, 10. decembra 1966. SDB je narocito razomo djelovala na Kosxnetu. U izvestaju o odgovomosti Clanova Pokrajinskog komiteta Kosova i Metohije u Sluzbi bezbjednosti kaze se: s . . . Sluzba bezbjed nosti . . . imala je . . . negativan stav i prema zivlju i kadrovima srpske I cmogorske nacionalnosti koji su . . . takoder biii pradeni, klevetani i maltretirani i za koje su otvarani dosjei, pogotovo kad se radilo o lju dima progresivnih stavova i shvatanjae (Borba, 14. okt. 1966, podvukao H. B.). DrastiCan je bio sluCaj tzv. prizrenskog procesa* na kom je, uz iskljuSenje javnosti, u 1956. g. osudeno devet Uca na kazne strogog zatvora od dvije do dvanaest godina za krivicna djela protiv naroda i drzave. U izvjeStaju komisije IzvrSnog vijeda Kosmeta jedanaest i po godina kasnije trazi se revizija prizrenskog procesa i konstatira se slijedece: Proces je vesto i perfidno aranziran od strane nekih pripadnika i funkcionera Drzavne bezbednosti. . . Nedozvoljenim i nezakonitim sredstvima i metodama koje su primenjivali u krivicnom postupku protiv okrivljenih, pripadnici Drzavne bezbednosti su nastojali da obe2 bjede i pribave iskonstruirane dokaze protiv vedeg dijela politiCkih i drzavnih rukovodilaca izraslih i odanih kadrova iz redova Siptara u Pokrajini, kako bi ove diskreditirali u odima Partije i naroda, s ciljem da stvore nepovjereoje medu narodima Kosova i Metohije i da razbiju jedinstvo u Savezu komunista. Organizatori procesa su u istrazi koristili lazne svedoke, poznate neprijateljske elemente, inace svoje suradnike, a prema okrivljenima sa primjenjivali drasticne metode mucenja, obniane, ucjena i montiranja iskaza da bi iznudili lazna priznanja. {Borba, 11. februara 1968).
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stvenom voljom ostvaxivala socijalizam i isto tako jedinstveno se borila protiv neprijatelja socijalisticke izgradnje, koji su, ocigledno, bili izvan SKJ. Pokazalo se da je ta predodzba postala pogresna. SKJ se nasao u zacaranom krugu fonnalnog jedinstva (E. Kardelj, 16, 430), pojavile su se konzervativne koncepcije u vrhu partije i doslo je do raskoraka izmedu proklamiranih principa i prakse (K . Crvenkovski, 16, ss. 238 i 245), rukovodeca politicka tijela dosla su u krizu (V. Vlahovic, 16, 729) i uslijed svega toga poljuljano je povjerenje narodnih masa u Savez komunista (Tito, 16, 136). Do takve situacije nije doslo iznenada; ona je pripremana nedovoljno kontroliranim razvojem dogadaja u posljednjih desetak godina. Anticipirajuci kasniju analizu, zadrzat cemo se ovdje samo na nekim vaznijim momentima. Od uvodenja radnickog upravljanja u 1950. godini moze se pratiti jedna prilicno kontinuirana linija izgradnje sodjalizma u nasoj zemlji, linija orijentirana na decentralizaciju, samoupravljanje i afirmaciju ljudske licnosti. Isprva je glavna paznja bila usmjerena na ekonomsku sferu. Od 1958. godine, s donosenjem Programa SKJ, koji po uzoru na Komunisticki manifest proklamira slobodni razvoj svakog pojedinca kao preduslov slobodnog razvoja za sve, akcenat socijalisticke izgradnje sve vise prelazi u politicku sferu. Osim toga samoupravne reforme se intenzifidraju. Slijedi pokusaj privredne reforme u 1961. godini1 novi Ustav 1963. godine> , zatim V I I I Kongres SKJ godinu dana kasnije s intencijama ozbiljne reforme unutar SKJ, ali koja je bila osujecena;2 u 1965. godini ponavlja se reforma iz 1961. go1 Ta reforma uglavnom nije uspjela i to djelomlCno zbog politickib otpora, no vecim dijelom zbog neznanja i nepoznavanja funkcioniranja mehanizma decentxallzirane privrede, uslijed cega je reforma rdavo pripremljena i lo5e sprovedena. Up. (17). Neuspjeh reforme doveo je doopetovanih napustasja petogodisnjeg plana i ta konsekvenca stalno izmice paznji do ozbiljnih polltiCkih komplikacija. 2 K. Crvenkovski da navedem jedno autoritativno svjedocanstvo istice kako su u pripremama za V I I I kongres dane vrlo ostre i u mnogo cemu opravdane kritike, pre svega na racun rada CK SKJ. Prilikom koncipiranja normi za Statut SKJ . . . bile su uzete u obzir te kritike, iako ne do kraja. Ali kasnije, ukoliko se Kongres priblizavao pocele su da dolaze do izrazaja druge tendencije i druge snage u Savezu komunista, tako da je platforma sire demokratije u SK i koncepcija o njegovoj ulozi u narednom periodu svedena na minimum. Crvenkovski zatim govori o tome kako su jedni principi proklamirani u partijskim dokumentima, a sasvim nesto drugo je sprovodeno u praksi, i zakljuSuje: Razume se, tesko se ta stvar moze pripisati

7*

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dine; ovaj puta s vise dosljednosti,1 a godinu dana kasnije Brionski plenum rascistio je put reorganizaciji . SKJ. Valja imati u vidu da je slicno koiacidiranju revolucije s narodnooslobodilackom borbom i proces samoupravne izgradnje koiaoidirao s otporom kominformovskoj intervenciji. Obje koiacidencije pojacavale su jedinstvenost koja je unutar Partije dugo vremena bila stvama. Cak i birokratski orijentirani pojedinci provodili su samo upravne reforme. Medutim, kad je nakon desetak godina pripremanja i uhodavanja samoupravljanje pocelo sasvim opipljivo da djeluje, pojavile su se nelagodnosti i otpori. A kad su se samoupravne reforme od 1958. godine na dalje po logici dogadaja intenzivirale, otpori su se pojacali, unutar Saveza komunista doslo je do diferenciranja na progresivne i samoupravne snage na jednoj strani i konzervativne, birokratske pa cak i otvoreno kontrarevolucioname na drugoj strani. Zapocela je borba.2 Ishod te borbe je poznat i na Brionskom plenumu prvi piit je u jednom partijskom dokumentu efcsplicitno konstatirano: U Savezu komunista postoje snage koje otvoreno zastupaju politiku 'cvrste ruke, koje pokusaT/aju da uspostave vlast nad Savezom komunista i da preko njega vladaju. Te snage su zatim blize odredene Isao birokratske, cehovske i monopolisticke sve do snaga otvorene kontrarevolucije. (16, 11) Postavlja se pitanje kako se boriti protiv takvih neprijatelja efikasno, kakvim politickim sistemom eliminirati opasnosti od takvih neprijatelja u buducnosti? Odgovor na to pitanje tek treba pronaci. Ocigledno je jedino da
samo jednoj izrazlto konzervativnoj koncepciji na vrhu, iako tu koncepciju i taj otpor ne treba potcenjivati. Ona je bila modna i uticajna. Vrh se zbog tog otpora nije mogao reorganizovati, pa je to imalo odraza i dolje. Ali, i konzervativizam je prodirao u organizaciju, hijerarhijski postavljenu, i onemogucavao da se baza suprotstavi takvim tenJencijama u vrhu (16, 238). 1 Ali jos uvijek s nedovoljnim ekonomskim znanjem, uslijed cega dolazi do naglog usporenja rasta proizvodnje, a u 1967. g. i do stagnacije, sto neminovno mora izazvati politicke komplikacije. 2 Borba se morala neminovno zaotravati konstatira V. Vlahovic izmedu onih snaga koje su nastojale da se radni ljudi drze sto dalje od donoSenja odluka, da se svedu na obicnu klijentelu . . . i onih snaga koje su tezile dubljim promjenama, poCev od nacina formiranja rukovodedih organa i nacina rukovodenja politi6kiin zivotom, pa do jasnog sagledavanja sustine politi6kog rukovodenja u sistemu samoupravljanja* (16, 729).

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se politicka partija razdoblja u koje upravo ulazimo mora bitno razlikovati od partije iz prethodna dva razdoblja. To vise nije partija koja se u nesocijalistikoj sredini bori za ostvarenje socijalizma. To je partija da je zasad uslovno tako zovemo koja se u socijalistickoj sredini bori za punu afirmaciju socijalizma, a protiv raznih deformacija i devijacija. U tom smislu likvidiranje politicke policije na Brionskom plenumu predstavlja simbolicki zavrsetak jedne epohe predsocijalistickog razvoja. Na taj nacin odreden je opci prilaz problemima jugoslavenskog drustva. Sada prelazimo na podrobniju analizu svakog od tri posebna aspekta tog drustva: ekonomskog, drustvenog u uzem smislu rijeci i politickog.

Citirana literatura 1. K. Marx, F. Engels, Izbrannye proizvedenija, tom I, OGIZ, Moskva, 1948. 2. Isto, tom II. 3. K. Marx, F. Engels: Izabrannye pisjma, OGIZ, Moskva, 1948. 4. K. Marx, Kritika Gotskog programa, Kultura, Zagreb, 1948. 5. V. I. Lenin, Socinenija, IV izdanje. 6. V. I. Lenin, Marks, Engels, marksizam, OGIZ, Moskva, 1946. 7. Druga intemacionala, Rad, Beograd, 1951. 8. V. I. Lenin, Izabrannye proizvedenija v dvuh tomah, IV izdanje, tom II, OGIZ, Moskva, 1946. 9. B. Kidric, uTeze o ekonomici prelaznog perioda u nasoj zemljia, Komunist, 6/1950. 10. F. Engels, Anti-DUring, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1 6. 94 11. V. Stanovcic, A. Stojanovic, Birokratija i tehnokratija, II knjiga, Sedma sila, Beograd, 1 966. 12. Isto, I knjiga. 13. M. Markovic, sSocijalizam i samoupravljanje, u Smisao i perspektive socijalizma, Praxis, Zagreb, 1 965. 14. Program Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Kultura, Beograd, 1958. 15. Lj. Tadid, sAktuelni problemi teorije komunisticke partije, Marx i Savremenost, knjiga II, IDN, Beograd, 1964. 16. M. Nikolic, ur., Savez komunista Jugoslavije u uslovima samoupravljanja, Zbomik tekstova, Kultura, Beograd, 1967.
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17. B. Horvat, Ekonomska nauka i narodna privreda, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1968. 18. R. Colakovic i dr., Pregled istorije Saveza komtmista Jugoslavije, Institut za izufiavanje radnickog pokreta, Beograd, 1963. 19. V. Bakaric, O poljoprivredi i problemima sela, Kultura, Beograd, 1960.

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Ill EKONOMSKA ORGANIZACJIA

Kako treba da bude organizirana socijalisticka privreda? Kao organization! principi suprotstavljaju se centralizatija i decentralizatija. Diskusija o centralizaciji i decentralizaciji vec se duze vrijeme vodi u nasoj zemlji. Od skora, ona se vodiiu drugim evropskim socijalistickim zemljama. Sire posmatrano, to je u stvari permanentna diskusija koju rada svaka drustvena organizacija. Centralizacija i decentralizacija medusobno se prozimaju i imaju veoma razlicite aspekte, tako da ovi termini ne bi trebalo da zavode svojom jednostavnoscu. Jedno grubo Mstorijsko poredenje dovoljno je da upozori na tu cinjenicu. U feudalizmu su, na primjer, uporedo postojali najstriktnija centralizacija na lenima feudalnih gospodara i krajnja decentralizacija i nepovezanost u privredi odredene zemlje ma kako je definirali u cjelini. Kapi103

talisticki razvoj je potpuno obmuo ove odnose. Feudalni centralizmi su slomljeni i zamijenjeni individualizmom koji je u privredi nasao svoj karakteristican izraz u slobodnoj konkurenciji. Taj individualizam, medutim, doveo je, putem trzista, do cvrstog povezivanja privrede unutar nacionalnih. granica, a zatim sve vise do svjetske privredne integracije. No, decentralizacija liberalnog kapitalizma se nije pokazala kao trajna organizaciona forma. Slobodna konkurencija spontano i stalno dovodi do koncentracije i centralizacije kapitala i tako do krajnje centralistickih privrednih struktura kao sto su monopoli. Drustvo se zatim od monopola brani jos totalnijim centraliziranjem privrednih funkcija u rukama drzave. Postavlja se pitanje: kakve se tendencije razvoja mogu ocekivati u planskoj socijalistickoj privredi? Odgovor na to pitanje bio je prilicno unison: centralisticke. Socijalisti su superiomost centralizma objasnjavali ekonomskom efikasnoscu centralizirane planske privrede. Protivnici soci jalizma su inferiomost socijalizma dokazivali centralizacijom koja negira licnost. Razlike izmedu socijalista i ne-socijalista javljale su se, dakle, u oblasti inteipretacije i vrednovanja. U pogledu privrednih cinjenica slaganje je bilo prilicno potpuno. Rezoniranje je otprilike ovakvo. Autonomne privredne jedinice i slobodna konkurencija na trzistu dovode do privrednih ciklusa. Sto se privreda vise razvija, to je slozenija; a sto je slozenija, to su ciklusi zesci i veca je nuznost drzavne intervencije. Ukoliko se privredna kolebanja zele potpuno da izbjegnu, treba uvesti centralizirano planiranje. Po uskladenom centralnom planu sve privredne jedinice dobivaju proizvodne zadatke otprilike .na isti nacin kao sto integrirana poduzeca rade po programu koji izgraduje centrala nekog trusta. Privreda je zamisljena kao jedno ogromno poduzece, a upravljanje privredom kao upraznjavanje administrativnih funkcija poduzeca. Kad je poslije oktobarske revolucije u Sovjetskom Savezu: zaveden takav sistem planiranja, on je uglavnom primljen i sa lijeve i sa desne strane kao nesto1 sto se ocekivalo. I prakticno, do danas je to ostalo jedno od Veoma rijetkih osnovnih pitanja u koine se socijalisticki i nesocijalisticki ekonomisti slazu. PostOje dva cista siste104

ma: kapitalisticki s privatnim vlasnistvom, trzistem i slobodnom konkurencijom i socijalisticki s drzavnim vlasnistvom, planiranjem i centralnim odredivanjem proizvndnih zadataka privrednim jedinicama. U posljednje dvije- decenije pojavili su se i razliciti oblici mijesanja ovih cistih. komponenti. U mjesovitim sistemima dolazi do vece ili manje drzavne intervencije (nacionalizacije, sveopce socijalno osiguranje i si.) u sferi kapitalistickih privredmh odnosa u svrhu ostvaiivanja drzave blagostanja. Od tri navedena tipa ekonomike, nas ovdje interesuje samo socijalisticM, a u tom okviru samo pitanje karaktera planiranja. U diskusijama povodom tog pitanja cesto .se vrse pozivanja na stavove klasika marksizma. Bice stoga korisno da se najprije navedu fragmenti iz radova Marxa i Engelsa, koji se odnose na pitanje o kome se raspravlja.

9. M A R X I EN G E LS 0 SOCIJALISTICKOJ P R IV R E D I Prva grupa stavova Poznato je da su Marx i Engels upomo odbijali da ma sta sistematski napisu o socijalistickoj ekonomiji. Smatrali su ocigledno s punim pravom da bi u njihovo vrijeme svaki pokusaj raspravljanja o tom pitanju bio nenaucan, utopijski, konstruiranje po hegelijanskom manning (1, 421). Zbog toga u citavom njihovom velikom opusu ima samo nekoliko fragmenata koji se odnose na pitanja socijalistickog planiranja, a u: njima se daju samo veoma opci stavovi. Karakteristicno je, osim toga, da su najpotpuniji fragmenti dani u dva izrazito kriticarska rada K ritici Gotskog programa i Anti-Diiringu sto pokazuje da su njihovi autori bili izazvani na diskusiju prije svega tudim teorijskim pogreskama, a ne zeljom da sami razviju odredene teze. 0 tim ogradama u citiranju i interpretaciji citata koji se vise navode, cesto se ne vodi dovoljno racuna. U O sn ivackom m an ifestu I internacion a 1e Marx u najopcijem obliku suprotstavlja kapitali105

sticku i socijalisticku ekonoxniju govoreci . .. o velikom sporu izmedu slijepe vladavine zakona ponude i potraznje, u kome se sastoji politicka ekonomija burzoazije, i drustvene proizvodnje kojom upravljaju drustvena predvidanja, u cemu se sastoji politicka ekonomija radnicke klase (2, 52). Medutim, kapitalisticka privreda priprema socijalisticku, i tu ideju razraduje Engels: U trustovima se konkurencija pretvara u monopol, a neplanska proizvodnja kapitalistickog dru stva kapitulira pred planskom proizvodnjom socijalistickog drustva na pomolu... Ovako ill onako oficijelni reprezentant kapitalistickog drustva, drzava, mora da preuzme upravu nad proizvodnjom... Modema drzava,- ma kakav bio njen oblik, u sustini je kapitalisticka masina.. . idealni ukupni kapitalist. Ukoliko vise produktivnih snaga preuzima u vlastitu svojinu, utohko vise postaje ukupni kapitalist... Odnos kapitala se ne ukida, naprotiv, on se sad jos vise zaostrava. Ali to zaostravanje dovodi do preokreta. Pretvaranje produktivnih snaga u drzavnu svojinu ne rjesava sukob, ali ono skriva u sebi formalno sredstvo, kljuc za rjesavanje. To rjesenje moze se sastojati samo u tome da se stvarno prizna drustvena priroda modemih. produktivnih snaga, dakle da se nacin proizvodnje, prisvajanja i razmjene dovede u sklad s drustvenim karakterom sredstava za proizvodnju. A to se moze postici samo na taj nacin sto ce drustvo otvoreno i bez zaobilazenja prisvojiti sredstva za proizvodnju koja su prerasla svaki drugi nacin primjene osim drustvenog (3, 29193). Preostaje da se poblize odredi smisao tog drustvenog prisvajanja: Prisvajanjem sredstava za proizvodnju od strane drustva u k l a n j a se r o b n a p r o i z v o d n j a (podvukao H. B.), a s njom i vladavina proizvoda nad proizvodacima. Anarhija u drustvenoj proizvodnji zamjenjuje se svjesnom organizacijom (3, 298). Time je odreden i nacin raspodjele: Kad se s danasnjim produktivnim snagama bude postupalo shodno njihovoj najzad spoznatoj prirodi, onda namjesto anarhije u proizvodnji dolazi drustveno i plansko reguliranje proizvodnje prema potrebama kako cjelme tako i svakog pojedinca. Onda kapitalistiCki nacin prisvajanja, u kome proizvod zarobljava najprije proizvodaca, pa zatim i samog prisvajaca, ustupa mjesto nacinu prisvajanja proizvoda zasnovanom na samoj prirodi modenuh 106

sredstava za proizvodnju: s jedne strane, direktno drustveno prisvajanje proizvoda kao sredstva za odrzavanje i prosirivanje proizvodnje, s druge stra ne, direktno individualno prisvajanje proizvoda kao sredstva za zivot (3, 294). Proizlazi da ce biti uMnuti trziste i kategorija vrijednosti, a s njim i robna proizvodnja: Jedina vrijednost koju poznaje_ ekonomija, jeste vrijednost robe. Sta je roba? Proizvodi izradeni u drustvu vise ili manje izoliranih privatnih proizvodaca, dakle, prije svega privatni proizvodk (3, 323). Marx dijeli to misljenje: prometna vrijednost je forma ispoljavanja proporcijalne podjele drustvenog rada u sistemu privatne razmjene individualnih proizvoda rada (4). Ukoliko se zeli izbjeci anarhija robnog trzista, potrebna je direktna kontrola alokacije drustvenog rada: U stvari, n i j e d a n drusstveni o b 1i k ne moze sprijeciti da one way or another raspolozivo radno vrijeme drustva regiilise proizvodnju. Ali, dokle god se ovo reguliranje ne vrsi putem direktne svjesne kontrole drustva nad njegovim radnim vremenom sto je moguce samo pri zajednickoj svojini^ nego kretanjem cijena robe, ostaje pri onome sto si Ti1 sasvim tacno rekao vec u Njemacko-francuskim godisnjacima (18, 11). U skladu s time je i naredni stav iz K a p i t a l a : Pri drustvenoj proizvodnji otpada novcani kapital. Drustvo rasporeduje radnu snagu i sredstva za proizvodnju na razne poslovne grane. Sto se mene tice, mogu proizvodaci dobivati papime uputnice na koie ce iz drustvenih rezervi potrosnje izvlaciti neku kolicinu koja odgovara njihovom radnom vremenu. Te uputnice nisu novae. One ne cirkuliraju (5a, 311). Kad nema trzista, nije potreban ni novae. No nuzno je i moguce voditi kontrolu o proporcijama utroska drustve nog radnog vremena. . . . poslije ukidanja kapitalistickog nacina pro izvodnje, a sa zadrzavanjem drustvene proizvodnje, ostaje odredenje vrijednosti predominantno u tom smislu, sto reguliranje radnog vremena i raspodjeljivanja drustvenog rada medu razlicite grupe pro izvodnje, najzad knjigovodstvo o tome, postaju vazniji nego ikada (5, 786).
i pNacrt za kritiku nacionalne ekonomljea, 1844. g.

107

Ista misao se ponavljai u K r i t i c i G o t s k o g p r o grama:

",

Unutar kolektivnog, na zajednickoj svojini sred stava za proizvodnju baziranog drustva, proizvodaci ne razmjenjuju svoje proizvode; ni rad koji jp utrosen na proizvode ne poja,vljuje se ovdje k a o v r i j e d n o s t till p r o i z v o d a kao neko materijalno svojstvo koje oni posjeduju, jer sad vec, suprotno onome sto imamo u kapitalistickom drustvu, individualni radovi postoje ne okolisno, nego neppsredno kao sastavni dljelovi cjelokupnog rada (6, 15). Zatim slijedi poznato odredivanje principa raspodjele prema radu, gdje se, roedu ostalim, kaze: ,' Prema tome, pojedini proizvodac dobiva nazad od drustva poslije odbitaka tacno ono sto'mu d a je ... On dobiva od drustva potvrdu da je dao toliko i toliko rada... i na osnovu te potvrde dobiva iz drustvenlh zaliha sredstvai potrosnje onu kolicinu predmeta potrosnje na koju je utroseno isto toliko rada (6, 16). Navedena razmatranja su izazvala medu socijalistickim ekonomistima zestoke polemike o postojanju ili nepostojanju robne proizvodnje u socijalizmu. Te polemike, kao i Staljinovo rjesenje o preobrazenom zakonu vrijednosti, dovoljno su poznate i ja se na njima ne bih zadrzavao. Sam proces drustvenog planiranja Engels ovako zamislja: Cim drustvo prisvoji sredstva za. proizvodnju i primjenjuje ih za proizvodnju kao neposredno socijaliziranu svaciji ra d ... postaje unaprijed i direktno drustveni rad. Kolicinu drustveidog rada koja se nalazi u nekom proizvodu, sad ne treba tek utvrdivati obilaznim putem; svakodnevno Lskustvo direktno pokazuje koliko je. rada prosjecho, potrebno... Ne moze mu [drustvu], dalde, padati na um da kolicine rada koje se nalaze u proizvodima, i koje su mu sad direktno i apsolutnO poznate, jo i dalje izrazava li nekoj samo relativnoj, kolebljivoj, neadekvatnoj mjeri, ranije' neizbjeznoj kao nuzno ispomaganje, . . . a n e u njihovoj prirodnoj, adekvatnoj, apsolutnoj mjeri, u r a d n o m v r e m e n u (podvukao E ngels). i . Korisniefekti razlicnih upotrebnih predmeta, uporedenih medusobno i s/Jcbh108

cinama rada potrebnim za njihovu izradu, konacno : ce odredivati taj plan [proizvodnje]. Ljudi ce onda sve svrsavati vrlo jednostavno, bez posredovanja cuvene Vrijednosti' (3, 3267). Ovdje mozemo nastaviti i jedan ranije prekinut Engelsov stav: uAnarhija u drustvenoj proizvodnji se zamjenjuje svjesnom organizacijom. Borba za individuakii opstanak prestaje. Tek time se covjek konacno izdvaja, u izvjesnom smislu, iz zivotinjskog carstva, prelazi iz zivbtinjskih. uslova za opstanak u stvamo covjecanske uslove. 2ivotni uslovi kojima su ljudi oknizeni i koji su dosad vladali nad ljudima, sad dolaze pod vladavinu i kontrolu ljudi, i sad ljudi prvi put postaju svjesni, istinski gospodari prirode, i to u onoj mjeri ukoliko postaju gospodari nad vlastitim druStvenim odnosima. Ljudi onda s potpunim strucnim znanjem primjenjuju zakone svog vlastitog djelovanja, koji su dotle prema njima stajali kao tudi prirodni zakoni, njihovi gospodari, i na taj nacin vladaju nad tim zakonima... Tek tada ce ljudi sami s punom svijescu praviti svoju historiju, tek tada ce drustveni uzroci koje ljudi budu stavljali u pokret, imati kao posljedicu pretezno i u sve vecoj mjeri one ucinke koje oni zele. To ce biti skok covjecanstva iz carstva nuznosti u carstvo slobodea (3, 298). Ovaj stav je posluzio svojevremeno sovjetskim ekonomistima za formiranje teze o planiranju kao (osnovnom) zakonu razvoja socijalisticke privrede i dfustva. U planiranju i provodenju plana pitanje centralizacije i decentralizacije moze se tretirati i kao pitanje odnosa autoriteta i autonomije. Diskusija o tom pitanju bila je aktuelna vec u Engelsovo vrijeme, pa jo j je on posvetio jedan manji clanak iz koga navodimo najvaznije stavove: . Neki su socijalisti proveli u posljednje vrijeme sistematski krizarski rat protiv onog sto oni zovu p r i n c i p a u t o r i t e t a . Oni misle da je za ovaj ili onaj cin dovoljno kazati da je autoritaran pa da bude osuden... Autoritet, u ovom smislu o koine j e ovdje rijec, znaci nametanje tude volje nasoi volji i s druge strane autoritet pretpostavlja podvrgavanje ... Ispitujuci ekonomske, industrijske i agrame odnose na kojima pociva navedeno burzoasko dru stvo, mi nalazimo da oni imaju tendenciju da sve vise zamjenjuju izoliranu akciju kombiniranom akcijom lju d i... Svuda kombinirana akcija, kompliciranje procesa koji zavise jedan od drugog, staje 109

na mjesto nezavisne akcije pojedinih individuuma. Ali kombinirana akcija znaci organizaciju, a da li je moguca organizacija bez autoriteta? n T mimo da je socijalna revolucija svrgla kapiT '/ taliste i da autoritet radnika upravlja proizvodnjom i raspodjelom bogatstva. Uzmimo, stavljajiici se potpuno na gledigte antiautoritarista, da su zemlja i sredstva za rad postali kolektivno vlasnistvo radnika koji ih upotrebljavaju. Da li ce u tom slucaju auto ritet isceznuti ili ce samo promijeniti oblik? Da vidimo. Uzmimo kao prim jer predionicu pamuka. Prije nego sto se pretvori u konce, pamuk mora proci kroz sest uzastopnih operacija.. . Rjesavala se ta pitanja odlukom delegata koji stoji na celu svake grane rada ili se rjesavala, kad bi to bilo moguce, vecinom glasova, volja pojedinaca se uvijek mora podvrgavati, a to znaci da se pitanja rjesavaju autoritamo... Zeljeti unistenje autoriteta u krupnoj industriji znaci zeljeti unistenje same industrije.. . Uzmimo drugi prim jer zeljeznicu. I tu je suradnja ogromnog broja ljudi apsolutno potrebna; ta suradnja se mora ostvariti u tacno odredenim satovima, da bi se izbjegli nesretni slucajevi. I tu je prvi uvjet posla gospodujuca volja, koja rjesava svako podredeno pitanje, bilo da tu volju predstavlja jedan delegat bilo komitet kome je stavljeno u duznost da izvrsava odluke vecine interesenata (8, 58081). Navedena razmatranja mogla bi, eventualno, posluziti kao osnova za izvlacenje zakljucaka o neophodnosti autoritame forme organizacije poduzeca. Kao sto se zna, takav zakljucak je izveden i poznat je pod imenom principa jedinonacalija. A u vezi s organizacijom privrede u cjelini mogao bi se izvesti zakljucak o neophodnosti centralizma. Poznato je da je i taj zakljucak izveden i teorijski i prakticno. Vecina navedenih stavova dobro je poznata, cesto je citirana i bila je predmet mnogih diskusija. Sabrani na jednom mjestu i poredani odredenim redoslij edom, oni daju odredenu sliku o organizaciji socijalisticke planske privrede. Ta slika nije, cini se, sasvim razlicita od organi zacije planiranja ukljucivsi i eksperimentiranje s nerobnom privredom u Sovjetskom Savezu u proteklih nekoliko decenija ili s nasom vlastitom vizijom planske privrede prije 1950. Bice, medutim, korisno da se sad da i jedan izbor stavova klasika koji su ranije bili rijetko navodeni i koji osvjetljavaju jedan drugi aspekt drustvenog planiranja.
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Druga grupa stavova Sta je smisao socijalizma? Nesumnjivo da je to bar sa stanovista jednog marksista oslobadanje covjeka od prirodne i drustvene neumitnosti, napustanje carstva nuznosti, oslobadanje dezalijenirane licnosti i afirmiranje njenog ljudskog integriteta. Kao 25-godisnji mladic, tada jos gradanski radikalni1 demokrat, Marx se zanosio idejom oslobadanja ljudskoga u Ijudima: Ljudi, to bi bila duhovna bica, slobodni Ijudi republikanci. Malogradani nece da budu ni jedno ni drugo... Sto oni hoce, zivjeti i razmnozavati se ... to hoce i zivotinje... Covjekovo osjecanje vlastite vrijednosti, slobodu, trebalo bi u grudima ovih ljudi tek probuditi. Samo ovo osjecanje, koje je s Grcima nestalo iz svijeta, a s kriscanstvom se izgubilo u nebeskom plavetnilu, moze iz drustva stvoriti opet zajednicu Ijudi za ostvarenje njihovih najvisih ciljeva, tj: demokratsku drzavu (9, 32). Ista misao, u svom zrelom obliku, javlja se nekoliko godina kasnije u zajednickom radu Marxa i Engelsa, K o m u n is tic k o m manifestu. Na mjesto starog burzoaskog drustva s njegovim klasama i klasnim suprotnostima stupa udruzivanje u kome je, slobodni razvitak svakog pojedinca uslov slobodnog razvitka za sve (10, 63). Taj, u stvari, centralni stav osnovnog programskog dokumenta suvremenog socijalizma bio je neko vrijeme kao zaboravljen. Njegovo insistiranje na razvitku licnosti kao preduslovu razvitka drustva suvise je odudaralo od autoritarnih shvacanja socijalizma po kojima je uslovIjenost upravo obmuta. Taj stav je u programu SK I dobio znacenje koje mu pripada2 . U vezi s tim ocigledno je kljucno pitanje odnosa prema drzavi. Marx primjecuje. Sloboda se sastoji u tome da se drzava iz organa koji je nadreden drustvu, pretvori u organ koji mu je potpuno podreden... (6, 24).
1 Biti radikalan za M a m je znaCilo zahvatiti stvar 11 korijenu. A korijen za Covjeka jest covjek sam (25, 81). 2 Bilo bi interesantno analizirati koliko programa drugih socijalistiCkih partija, koje se smatraju marksistickim, sadrze taj stav i u kojim uslovima je taj stav ulazio i izlazio iz partijskih programa.

in

O drzavi je narocito mnogo pisao Engels. Korisno je ponoviti jedan njegov klasican stav. Kad ne bude nijedne drustvene klase koju treba drzati u potcinjenosti, kad skupa s klasnom vladavinom i borbom za individualni opstanak, zasnovanoj na dosadasnjoj anarlriji proizvodnje, budu uklonjeni sukobi i ekscesi koji otuda proisticu, onda vise nema tko da se plasi, onda iscezava potreba _za drzavnom vlascu koja danas izvrsava tu funkciju. Prvi akt u kome drfava stvamo istupa kao predstavnik cijelog drustva prisvajanje sredstava za proizvodnju u ime drustva ujedno je i njen posljednji cin kao drzave. Mijesanje drzavne vlasti u drustvene odnose postaje malo-pomalo suvisno i onda samo od sebe prestaje. Mjesto vladavine nad ljudima dolazi rukovanje stvarima i upravljanje procesom proizvodnjea (3, 2945). . Ovo rezoniranje, ispravno interpretirano, predstavlja izvanredan obrazac analize. Medutim, moguce su a istovremeno se desavaju interpretacije koje sadrzavaju opasan non sequitur. Prisvajanje sredstava za proizvod nju u ime drustvaa p o t e n c i j a l n o eliminira sukobe i ekscese, ali ne i n u z n o . Mijesanje drzavne vlasti u drustvene odnose m o z e postati suvisno, ali za to treba pored osnovnog (drzavno-drustveno vlasnistvo) stvoriti i dodatne preduslove. Inace se isto tako mogu formirati novi parcijalni interesi, a drzavna prisila, daleko od toga da bude suvisna, biva angazirana u njihovu obranu. Mi danas znamo da to nije samo akademska mogucnost. No yec su i Marx i Engels uocili opasnost od birokratsklh struktura. U tom, pogledu oni su izvukli vazne zakljucke analizirajuci iskustva Pariske komune. Komuna je odmafa u pocetku morala priznati da radnicka klasa, dosavsi na vlast, ne moze dalje gazdovati sa starim drzavnim strojem ... da se mora osigurati protiv svojih vlastitih deputata i cinovnika, proglasavajuci da su svi oni, bez ikakvog izuzetka, smjenljivi u svako dob an (11, 18). Taj stav je nakon donosenja novog Ustava kod nas poznat kao princip rotacije. Nadalje, Komuna je znacila decentralizaciju: . ^ Pariska komuna je imala, razumiie se, da jd o sIu zi kao uzor svim velikim industrijskim sredistima Francuske. Cim bi u Parizu i u centrima drugog
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reda bilo uvedeno koimmalno uredenje, stara centralizirana vlast morala bi da u pokrajinama ustupi mjesto s a m o u p r a v i p r o i z v o d a c a (podvukao H. B .) (11, 62). Decentralizacija ne znaci partikularizam: Jedinstvo nacija nije imalo biti unisteno, nego, naprotiv, organizirano putem komunalnog uredenja; ovo je trebalo postati stvamost putem unistenja one drzavne vlasti koja se izdavala za utjelovljenje tog jedinstva, ali je htjela da bude od nacije nezavisna i da stoji nad njom (11, 62). Ovakvo komunalno uredenje takoder se stvara u Jugoslaviji. Na kraju treba odrediti i polozaj radnika proizvo daca. U vezi s tim Engels prenosi slijedecu Marxovu tezu: . . . radnik je S l o b o d a n tek onda kad postane vlasnik svojih sredstava za proizvodnju... (12, 351).

Napom ene i kom entari Navedene dvije zbirke fragmenata stavova Marxa i Engelsa pokazuju koliko je ispravna inteipretacija takvih stavova slozen problem. Takva inteipretacija ne zavisi samo o autom vec, vjerojatno u istoj mjeri, i o inteipretatoru. Iste rijeci s istim gramatickim smislom imaju u razlicitim drustvenim situacijama razliciti smisao1 A po. gotovo to vazi za izbor relevantnih stavova. Zbog toga se s izborom stavova i komentarima koji su ih pratili nije zeljela utvrditi neka apsolutna istina, vec prije svega ocrtati dva nacina rezoniranja koji, medutim, oba polaze od istih izvora. Polazeci gramaticki od Marxa, moguce je smisleno doci do veoma razlicitih rezultata. Veoma je vjerojatno da danas Mao Ce Tung sebe iskreno smatra autenticnim inteipretatorom Marxove misli, i da ga takvim smatraju i mnogi drugi. Isto tako izgleda mi vjerojatnim da su nekad Staljin i vecina delegata na X V I
i Na primjer Engelsov rad o autoritetu, vjerojatno se ispravnije moze interpretirati kao reakcija na neodgovorne napade na drustvenu disciplinu, nego kao inzistiranje na autozitamosti u odnosu na samoupravnost. 8 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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kongresu SKP (b ) smatrali narednu tezu majstorskim obrascem marristicke dijalektike: M i smo za izumiranje drzave. I mi smo zajedno s tim za jacanje diktature proletarijata koja pred stavlja najmocniju i najsnazniju vlast od svih drzavnih vlasti koje su dosad postojale. Sto jaci razvitak drzavne vlasti u cilju pripremanja uslova za izumiranje drzavne vlasti to je marksisticka formula. Da li je to protivurjecno? Da, to je protivurjecno. Ali ta je protivurjecnost zivotna i ona u potpunosti odrzava Marxovu dijalektiku (13, 127). Iz ovoga ne bi trebalo izvuci zakljucak o nekom agnostickom relativizmu. Naprotiv, mi mozemo tvrditi da z n a m o da Staljinovi i Maovi stavovi nisu marxisticki. Ali ne radi se o tome. Problem je u tome sto su citati kao takvi nepodesno orude istrazivanja. To posebno vazi za citate iz redova Marxa koji je nesumnjivo najtezi i najkompleksniji autor koji je do sada pisao na podrucju ekonomije. A kad se radi o socijalistickoj ekonomiji, pozivanje na klasike je osim toga, uz jedan ili dva izuzetka, stvamo bespredmetuo. To bi, naime, znacilo buduci da su Marx i Engels odbili svako konstruiranje socijalizma dvostruko Mpoteticku tvrdnju, da znamo sta bi oni mislili o ekonomiji socijalizma da su o njoj mislili. Medutim, svaki marksist duzan je da odredi svoj licni stav prema stavovima Marxa. To je implicirano u pojmu marksist. Pokusat cu s toga uz ograde koje su navedene da dam jednu interpretaciju, iako veoma grubu, fragmenata iz prethodna dva odjeljka. Dvije stvari mi se cine neospome. Prije svega iskustvo je pokazalo da je teza o likvidaciji trzista, robe i novca putem planiranja, bila pogresna. Ta teza s jedne strane odrazava neprevladane uticaje predmarksovskog utopijskog socijalizma, a s druge strane odrazava revolucionarni optimizam koji je znatno skracivao vremenske i institucionalne razdaljine buducnosti. A zatim, nemaju svi stavovi istu teorijsku i prakticnu vaznost. U sustini socijalizam ne karakterizira postojanje ili nepostajanje robe i novca, vec postojanje ili nepostojanje oslobodenog proizvodaca, oslobodene Ijudske licnosti. 114

Takoder u vezi s interpretacijama karakteristicne su f logicke pogreske zamjenjivanja nuznih i dovoljnih uslova. Ilustriramo to interpretacijom jednog poznatog stava iz K o m u n i s t i c k o g m a n i f e s t a:
Tfnm nni?am ne oduzima nikome moc da piisvaja sebi drustvene proizvode, on samo oduzima moc da se tim prisvajanjem sebi podjarmi tudi rada (10,51).

Eksproprijacijom sredstava za proizvodnju prestaje mogucnost da s e d i r e k t n i m prisvajanjem eksploatira tudi rad. Odatle se dugo vremena, a ponegdje jos i sada, izvlacio zakljucak da podrzavljenjem sredstava za pro izvodnju prestaje eksploatacija i dobiva se automatski socijalizam cija se autenticnost mjeri procentom podrzavljenja. No, to je non sequitur. Bez 'uMdanja privatne svojine nema uMdanja eksploatacije, ali ukinuta privatna svojina jos uvijek ne znaci da je i eksploatacija nuzno ukinuta. Eksproprijacija je nuzan, ali ne i dovoljan uslov socijalizma, odunairanja drzave itd. Mnogo vise od ovoga sto je receno ne bi trebalo zahtijevati. Traziti kod Marxa gotova rjesenja za socijalisticku privredu bilo bi ne samo bespredmetno vec po svemu sto o Marxu znamo antimarksisticki. Stavise, ne samo socijalisticki, vec ni bilo kakav drugi sistem ne treba traziti kod Marxa. On se sam potrudio da nas na to upozori: Techow sebi dalje predocuje, da sam skrojio 'sistem', iako sam ja sasvim obinuto i u M a n i f e s t u , koji je direktno bio namijenjen radnicima, odbacio s v e sisteme, a na njihovo mjesto stavio 'kriticno izucavanje uvjeta, toka i opcih. rezultata stvamog drustvenog kretanja. A takvo 'izucavanje' niti se moze za nekun ponavljati, niti se moze 'skrojiti' kao 'fiseklija'<t (14, 734). Marx je svojim analitickim kategorijama u skladu sa svojim opcim metodoloskim pristupom dao izrazito historijski karakter, one su bile namijenjene analizi jed nog sasvim odredenog drustveno ekonomskog sistema i po pravilu su neprikladne za analizu fenomena nekog drugog institucionalnog sistema. Prema tome nemarksisticki je mehanicko preuzimanje kategorija K a p i t a l a i njihova upotreba u politekonomiji socijalizma. U vezi s tim Marx 8* 115

je u posljednjem svom teorijskom radu pred smrt ocitao bukvicu njemackom ekonomistu Wagneru koji je pokusao da uradi upravo to: Po misljenju g. Wagnera, teorija vrijednosti Marxa predstavlia u g a o n i k a m e n n j e g o v o g s o c i j a l i s t i k o g s i s t e m a ' . Kako ja nikada nisam izradio 'socijalisticki sistem, to je samo fantazija W agnera... i tutti quanti (15, 456). A nesto kasnije slijedi ismijavanje teze da je teorija vrijednosti iz Kapitala primjenjiva u socijalizmu: . . . sve se to prosto svodi... na stav da u socijalistickoj drzavi Marxa v a z i njegova teorija vrijednosti izgradena za b u r z o a s k o drustvo ... (15, 476). Medutim, i za kategorije koje imaju teorijski ispravnu primjenu uzalud cemo kod Marxa traziti definiciju, kako nas upozorava Engels: Te primjedbe (P. Fireman, 1892) pocivaju na nesporazumu da Marx hoce da dade definiciju, tamo gdje izlaze, i da se kod Marxa uopce smiju traziti gotove i jednom za svagda utvrdene definicije. A razumije se samo po sebi da su tamo gdje se stvari i njihovi uzajamni odnosi ne shvacaju kao stalni vec kao promjenljivi i misaoni odrazi njihovi, noimovi, isto tako podlozni promjeni i preobrazaju; da se ne sabiju u cahure krutih definicija, nego da se izlazu u njihovom historijskom, odnosno logicnom procesu fonniranja (16, X X I). I jos jedanput Engels1 : No sva shvacanja (Auffassungsweise ) Marxa nisu doktrina vec metoda. On ne daje gotove dogme nego polazne tacke za daljnje istrazivanje i metodu za to istrazivanje. Na kraju od interesa je navesti i svjedocanstvo A. Bebela: Uzgred budi receno, nitko se ne bi jace usprotivio izrazu 'marksisticka teorija negoli sam Karl Marx, da je jos ziv (17, 339). t Moglo bi se postaviti pitanje: pa sta je onda ostalo od marksizma? Ostala je prije svega dijalekticka metoda istrazivanja. Upravo zato sto su eliminirane ogranice1 Pismo F. Engelsa V. Sombartu 11. marta 1895. (20, t. 39, s. 352).

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nosti sistema, krutih definicija, nepromenljivih pojmova, marksisticki nacin istrazivanja je gibak, adaptabilan, uvijek savremen, dijalektican. On se ne da nauciti memort ranjem citata i formulacija iz debelih knjiga, ne moze se za nekim ponavljati. On se moze usvojiti jedino k r it i c k i m i z u c a v a n j e m uvjeta, toka i opcih rezultata stvamog drustvenog kretanja, dakle ne ponavljanjem rijeci ucitelja, vec ponavljanjem ako se tako u nedostatku bolje rijeci moze reci njegovog djelatnog odnosa prema svijetu u kom djelamo1 A taj odnos je u osnovi . i prije svega kritican. Ono sto je dvadesetpetogodisnji mladic najavio: Ako konstruiranje buducnosti i zavrsavanje za sva vremena nije nasa stvar, onda je utoliko sigurnije, sto treba da izvrsimo u sadasnjosti. Mislimo na b e z o b z i r n u k r i t i k u s v e g a p o s t o j e ce g , dakako, bezobzimu kako u tom smislu, da se kritika ne boji svojih rezultata, a isto tako da se ne boji sukoba s postojecim silama (19, 38). to je zreo covjek izvrsio u svom zivotnom djelu, koje nosi drugi naslov: K r i t i k a p o l i t i c k e ekon o m i j e. Zbog toga je marksisticka dijalektika neshvatljiva za dogmaticare i niposto laka za primjenjivanje. No, ona nam pruza relativno prost i nepogresiv kriterij za razlikovanje marksista i marksista. Argumentiranje citatima, sporenje oko definicija i konstruiranje sistema to su karakteristike onih za koje je Marx svojevremeno rekao: Ja samo znam to, da ja nisam marksist (1, 420). Nama stoga preostaje jedino vlastito kriticko izucavanje nase, jugoslavenske stvamosti.
1 U kojoj je mjeri ta sustinska karakteristika marksizma nepoznata, neka ilustrira slijededa zgoda s jedne nedavne, medunarodne naucne konferencije. Od mene se trazilo da izlozim principe planiranja jugosla venske privrede. Izlaganje je bilo orijentirano na to da pokaze kako su naa sistemska rjesenja rezultat nase praktifine situadje. Taj spragmaticni zdravorazumski pristup Jugoslavena prisutnima se ocigledno svidlo, ali je na kraju diskusije jedan americki profesor uz mnogo izvinjavanja i uvjeravanja da ne treba da odgovorim ako mi je neprijatno, postavio pitanje: Kakve veze ima sve to s marksizmom? Moj odgovor, da je to kod nas cisti marksizam izazvao je buru aplauza ,i snnjeha. Bio je shvacen kao uspjela akademska dosjetka. A ipak je to bib najtacniji mogutfi odgovor.

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10. SAMOUPRAVLJANJE Jedinstvenost jugoslavenskog ekonomskog sistema Do oko 1951. godine agencije Ujedinjenih nacija i druga medunarodna tijela koja su pripremala periodicke izvjestaje o kretanju svjetske privrede ili privrede poje dirnh velikih regija nisu imali poteskoca u klasificiranju jugoslavenske privrede. Jugoslavija je bila klasificirana 3ajedno sa Sovjetskiin Savezom i drugim istocnoevropskiin zeniljama s planskom privredom. Kasnije, medutim, nastaju kolebanja. I na Zapadu i na Istoku jugoslavenska privreda je iskljucena iz- sovjetskog bloka, odnosno socijalistickog tabora, ali se nije znalo kuda spada. Ponelkad se klasifikacija vrsila na geografskoj osnovici, pa je .Jugoslavija uvrstavana u Zapadnu Evropu pomalo arbitramo ili u Juznu Evropu s nesto vise prava. Medutim, cesto je jugoslavenska privreda tretirana kao .grupa za sebe. Ove nevolje statistickih i ekonomsko-analitickih orga na medunarodnih organizacija daju nam povod da se vratimo na uvodno nazaacena pitanja o tipovima savremenih privreda. Postoje dva cista tipa, privatno-kapitalisticki s tzv. slobodnim trzistem, reprezentiran npr. u Sje in jenim Drzavama i centralisticko-planski s drzavnom d svojinom sredstava za proizvodnju reprezentiran npr. m Sovjetskom Savezu. Pored toga postoje i mjesoviti oblici s manje ili vise naglasenom jednom ili drugom 'komponentom, kao sto je to slucaj s privredama blago:stanja pojedinih zemalja zapadne Evrope u kojima je jak uticaj socijaldemokratskih partija. U koju od navedena tri tipa treba svrstati jugosla'vensku privredu? Od interesa je zapaziti da je ona svr5tana u svaki od ta tri tipa, vec prema prilikama i prema onome koji vrsi klasifikaciju. Ekstremni protagonisti privatnog vlasnistva malo se kolebaju u isticanju birokratskocentralistickog karaktera jugoslavenske privrede. Njima nasuprot kineskiorijentirani ekonomisti isto se tako mi malo ne kolebaju u proglasavanju jugoslavenske privrede kapitalistickom. Pored ovih ekstremnlh grupa, ciji stavovi nisu od nekog posebnog naucnog interesa, postoji velik broj ozbiljnih ekonomista koji su skloni da jugoslavensku privredu uvrste u mjesovit tip, tj. tip u 118

kome je doslo do odredenih simbioza izmedu privatne inicijative i drzavne intervencije. Teza koju u ovom ogledu zastupamo, jeste da nijedno od tri navedena misljenja nije naucno zasnovano. Jugoslavenska privreda ocigledno nije privatno-kapitalisticka, jer je ukinuto privatno vlasnistvo nad sredstvima za proizvodnju. Ona isto tako nije ni centralisticko-planska, jer su privredni akteri autonomni u svojim odlukama. Nadalje, a to je od kljucnog znacenja, ona nije ni mjesovita, eklekticka privreda u kojoj koegzistiraju privatno1 i drzavno vlasnistvo, jer su i kapitalisticko privatno vlasni stvo i drzavno vlasnistvo likvidirani (shvaceno kao proces koji je toliko napredovao da je postao ireverzibilan). Jugoslavenski privredni sistem nije eklektican, vec monistican, on se zasniva na svega jednom fundamentalnom principu: drustvenom vlasnistvu, i o datie njegova jedinstvenost. To je tip privrede koju bismo blize mogli odrediti kao asocijativni socijalizam. U tom kontekstu sada preostaje da se ispitaju meduodnosi samoupravnosti, centralizma i planiranja.

Horizontalna decentralizacija Privredne veze su horizontalne na odredenoj teritoriji bez obzira na raznolikost privrednih djelatnosti i vertikalne po privrednim djelatnostima bez obzira na teritoriju. Teorijski su sad moguce cetiri kombinacije u organizaciji privrede (i drustva): (1) horizontalna i vertikalna decentralizacija, (2) horizontalna decentraliza cija i vertikalna centralizacija, (3) horizontalna centralizacija i vertikalna decentralizacija i (4) horizontalna i vertikalna centralizacija.
1 Poljoprivreda i zanatstvo imaju jedan sasvim specifican polozaj koji je i teorijski nedovoljno istrazen i prakticki nedovoljno efikasno rijesen. Odatle nase st^ne poteskode u te dvije privredne oblasti. U analizi karaktera druStvene organizadje rada u te dvije oblasti trebalo bi simultano voditi racuna o dvije cmjenice: a) da proces podrustvljenja jos nije zavrsen i b ) da licni rad s vlastitim sredstvima proizvodnje nije kapitalisticki orgcinizirani rad i stoga u nacelu ne predstavlja stran elemenat u socijalistickoj privredi zasnovanoj na dmstvenoj svojini. Moze se, vjerojatno, bez pretjeranog pojednostavljenja reci da dok drzavna svojina predstavlja negaciju svakog oblika privatne svojine, druistvena svojina negira samo kapitalisticku privatnu svojinu.

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Prvo rjesenje odgovara privredi slobodne konkurencije s jakim kantonalnim elementima kao sto je to npr. slucaj u Svicarskoj. Do kraja provedeno drugo rjesenje u praksi nije mnogo vjerojatno. Ono bi znacilo nacionalizirane privredne grane uz lokalnu autonomiju. Trece rjesenje pretpostavlja centralisticki organiziranu drzavu uz slobodnu konkurenciju privrednih jedinica sto u ekstremnom obliku u praksi takoder nije mnogo vjerojatno. Cetvrto rjesenje odgovara centralistickom planiranju na bazi drzavne svojine. Ono na sta ova sistematika upucuje jeste da vertikalna organizacija predodreduje horizontalnu i time cjelokupnu privrednu (i drustvenu) organizaciju. Autonomne privredne jedinice preduslov su za teritorijalnu autonomiju i ukidanje autonomije privrednih aktera najvjerojatnije vodi ka birokatskom centralizmu generalno. Ova analiza, pretpostavljam, samo je primjena opcije marksisticke analize prema kojoj nacin proizvodnje odreduje odnose u proizvodnji, a ovi sve ostale odnose. U predsocijalistickoj epohi horizontalna je organizaci ja bila pretezno politicka, a vertikalna pretezno privredna. U socijalistickom drustvu, iako akcenti vjerojatno i dalje ostaju, prozimanje politickih. i ekonomskih. momenata neuporedivo je vece sto je put identifikacije i tako ukidanje politickog i ekonomskog. Jugoslavensko rjese nje, kao i svicarsko, pripada prvoj od navedenih. kategorija. No, medu njima postoji velika razlika koja se u ovoin kontekstu svodi na to sto jugoslavenska komuna ima znatno vece ekonomske ingerencije nego svicarski kanton i sto, s druge strane, jugoslavenski proizvodaci imaju znatno vece direktne politicke ingerencije (privredno vijece) nego upravljaci1 svicarskih privrednih organizacija. Uz navedene ograde, horizontalna decentralizacija po znat je historijski fenomen i stoga u ovom kontekstu nije potrebno da se na njoj dalje zadrzavamo. Vertikalna decentralizacija u smislu autonomije privrednih jedinica, produkt je liberalnog kapitalizma. Medutim, oblik koji nas interesira samoupravljanje proizvodaca produkt je tek asocijativnog socijalizma i zahtijeva da se o njemu nesto vise kaze.
1 UpravljaCi dakle vlasnici, menadzeri ne radnici; ne postoji odgovarajuti analogon jugoslavehskoj druStvenoj situaciji.

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Vertikalna decentralizacija Vjerojatno necu pogrijesiti ako konstatiram cinjenicu da su marksisti sve do nedavno bili 'vertikalni centralisti. Postavlja se pitanje: zasto? Uz ono sto je u uvodu receno, kao plauzibilno, namece se slijedece objasnjenje. U borbi za vlast odlucujucu ulogu igra efikasno organizirana radnicka partija. Stoga su marksisti oduvijek insistirali na organiziranju radnicke klase u klasu svjesnu svojih interesa, na organiziranju politicke partije te klase, a svako teritorijaliziranje radnickih interesa razvijanjem elemenata samoupravljanja u privrednim jedinicama u okviru kapitalistickog sistema nuzno je vodilo do slabljenja klasne solidamosti i tako smanjivanju udame snage klasne partije1 U tom smislu marksisti su vodili borbu . s anarhistima i sindikalistima dok je jos Marx bio ziv i neposredno poslije njegove smrti. Ispravnost tih stavova bila je historijski nesirmnjivo potvrdena uspjesnim proleterskim revolucijama u prvoj polovini ovog stoljeca. Medutim, bas ti uspjesi doveli su do intelektualne inercije, te je ono sto je bilo pravilno u kapitalistickoj situaciji mehanicki i automatski preneseno i u socijalisticku situaciju. Sve doskora mnogi marksisti jednako kao i mnogi nemarksisti2 smatrali su radnicke savjete anarho-sindikalistickim pojavama protiv kojih se treba ostro boriti. Na shvacanja kasnijih generacija marksista prirodno su velik uticaj svojim stavovima izvrsili Marx i Engels. Njihov osnovni interes bio je u analizi politickih preduslova uspjesne proleterske revolucije. Kad je prva re volucija Pariska komuna bila izvrsena 1871. g., Marksovu paznju su prije svega privukli prvi politicki akti Pariske komune. U tom kontekstu on je izvanredno istakao znacenje horizontalne decentralizacije stavovima koji su ranije bili citirani. Marksovoj paznji nije izmaklo ni fonniranje radnickih. savjeta u Parizu (11, ss 65 i 70), on nije ucinio pogresku suvremenih. marksista da ih osudi, ali im on ni tada ni kasnije nije pridao neku narocitu
1 Slicna se anaiiza moze izvesd i za sindikate. 2 Npr. pojedini mkovodioci britanskih sindikata.

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vaznosti1 U smislu nase sistematike iz prethodnog odjelj. ka, Marx je cini se naginjao drugom rjesenju, horizontalnoj decentralizaciji i vertikalnoj centralizaciji. Odatle pa do dvostnike centralizacije cetvrtog rjesenja kod nedovoljno kritickih sljedbenika nije bio velik korak. Ovdje valja uociti jednu vaznu uzrocnu usmjerenost koja ce nam omoguciti da odgovorimo na neka pitanja koja ce se postaviti u kasnijoj analizi. Do radnickog samoupravljanja nije doslo radi toga da bi se omogucila vertikalna decentralizacija. Obmuto, decentralizacija je bila nuzan uslov za istinsko radnicko samoupravljanje. Radnicko samoupravljanje je napadano i iz radnickih redova sa dviju razlicitih pozicija: a) kao utopijsko i prakticki nemoguce i b ) kao stetno za radnicki pokret. Ovaj potonji prigovor otpada kao non sequitur; kao sto smo vidjeli nesvjesno se i, naravno, sasvim neopravdano pretpostavlja da ono sto je stetno u kapitalistickoj situaciji, mora biti stetno i u socijalistickoj. Na prvi prigovor se jos prije nekih desetak godina odgovor mogao dobiti samo teorijski. Odonda nam je jugoslavensko iskustvo pruzilo nepobitan Mstorijski dokaz: radnicko samo upravljanje je ne samo prakticki moguce, jer ono u Ju goslaviji funkcionira vec jedan i po decenij vec je i ekonomski efikasno jer otkad je uspostavljeno, jugoslavenska privreda postize najvisu na svijetu stopu rasta.

(2 1 )
Medutim, iako je u svojoj potpunosti prvi put u Mstoriji realizirano u Jugoslaviji, radnicko samoupravlja nje nije jugoslavenski specificum. Ako je jedan privredni ili drustveni fenomen prakticki moguc, ako prolazi test ekonomske efikasnosti i ako se mogu utvrditi Mstorijske tendencije za njegovu realizaciju, onda je on s marksistickog stanovista ne samo moguc vec i n u z a n . U tom pogledu geneza radnickog samoupravljanja kao drustvenog fenomena predstavlja, mogli bismo reci, klasican slucaj. Ta se geneza odvijala u cetiri faze, kako je to obradeno u poglavlju 5.
1 No ne treba previdjeti ni ovu Engelsovu interpretaciju iz uvoda Gradanskom ratu u Fr a n cu sk o j: . . . d a je najvainiji dekret Komune naredivao organizaciju krupne industrije i dak manu facture, organizaciju koja bi se zasnivala ne samo na udruzenjima rad nika u svakoj pojedinoj tvomici nego je imala da ujedini sva ta udruzenja u jedan veliki savez; ukratko takvu organizaciju koja, kao sto Marx u G r a d a n s k o m r a t u sasvim taCno kaze, mora najzad do ves ti do komunizma . . ( 1 1 , 17).

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O autoritetu Diskusije o autonomy i i decentralizaciji postavljaju i danas, kao i u Engelsovo vrijeme, u prvi plan problem autoriteta. To je veoma slozen problem koji znatno prevazilazi e k o n o m s k u analizu, medutim, zbog njegove vaznosti ga ne mozemo preskociti. Ogranicit cemo se stoga, na indikacije osnovnih karakteristika tog problema. Bez autoriteta nema efikasne organizacije, bez organizacije nema efikasnog privredivanja. Cesto se, medutim, grijesi pretpostavljajuci da je autoritet autoritet, tj. da postoji samo jedna vrsta autoriteta. To je veoma ozbiljna pogreska koja dovodi do potpuno naopakih zakljucaka u pogledu nuznih osobina drustvene i ekonomske organizacije. Smatram da je potrebno razlikovati bar cetiri vrste autoriteta1 . Kriterij za razlikovanje prvih dviju vrsta autoriteta jest prisustvo ili odsustvo vrednovanja. U demokratski orijentiranom drustvu u Marksovom smislu, dakle u drustvu koje predstavlja asocijaciju slobodnih i razvijenih licnosti, ne postoji osnova da se vrednovanjima nekih pojedinaca ili grupa prida veca vaznost nego vrednovanjima drugih pojedinaca (ili grupa). Prema tome, u socijalistickom drustvu u pogledu vrednovanja svaki pojedinac ima samo jedan glas. Medutim, postoje drustvene funkcije u kojima nema vrednovanja (ili bar ona nisu predominantna). Kada smo bolesni i odemo do lijecnika, a on nam prepise odredeni lijek, u normalnom slucaju necemo osporavati njegovu odluku. U ovome slucaju demokratsko pravilo je bespredmetno i mi se bez pogovora pokoravamo s t r u c n o m autoritetu. Slicno cemo se ponasati u skoli, na sportskom treningu, u automobilskom servisu itd. U razvijenoj privredi razvijena je i podjela rada, odnosno profesionalna specijalizacija i ona se s privrednim razvojem i dalje prosiruje. Stoga strucni autoritet igra sve vecu ulogu. Ovo razmatranje direktno je relevantno za analizu funkcioniranj a institucije radnickog samoupravljanja. Najcesca kritika ove institucije tvrdi da je autoritet rukovodstva doveden u pitanje i da to smanjuje efikas1 Mogude je i drugacije rascJanjavanje pojma autoriteta. Tako npr. Erich Fromm za potrebe svoje analize razlikuje racionalrd i iracionalni, te otvoreni i anonimni autoritet (22, 108 12).

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nost poslovanja. Doista, autoritet je doveden u pitanje, ali koji? Ne strucni autoritet, vec autoritame odluke u podrucju vrednovanja: samovoljno primanje, otpustanje i premjeStanje s posla i uopce samovoljnost u pogledu personalnih odnosa; visina i odnosi platnih stavova; rizici kljucnih. odluka u orijentaciji poduzeca i si. Ako se autoritarnost, dakle, samovoljnost u toj oblasti eliminira, to moze samo doprinijeti kompaktnosti kolektiva i tako efikasnosti gazdovanja. Ono sto u praksi cini poteskoce jeste nepostojanje ostre granice izmedu strucnih odluka i demokratskih odluka, podrucja strucnog i demokratskog autoriteta. Postoji jedna zona u kojoj se ta dva autoriteta i ta dva tipa odluka ispreplicu. Medutim, to nije neka poteskoca koja je specificna samo za taj slucaj. Nigdje u privredi i drustvu ne p'ostoje ostre granice i o tome treba voditi racuna da bi se izbjegla zbrka koja proistice iz identifikacije te meduzone i cijelog podrucja. Kriterij za razlikovanje drugih dviju vrsta autoriteta jeste prisustvo ili odsustvo drzavne prisile. To nas vodi diskretno u analizu problema drzave, sto je sasvim van okvira ovog ogleda. Za nase svrhe dovoljno je da utvrdimo da postoji politicki autoritet zasnovan na prisili (u uobicajenom smislu rijeci) i drustveni autoritet za snovan na drustvenom pritisku, uvazavanje ili prijekor, afirmacija ili bojkot i si. tj. na potencijalnim sankcijama koje proisticu iz zivota u drustvenoj zajednici. Notoma je cinjenica da je u klasnim i uopce heterogenim drustvima politicki autoiitet jaci, a ponekad i pored svog naduvavanja ne moze spiijeciti druStvene eksplozije. U homogenim drustvima raste znacenje drustvenog auto riteta.1 Ovo, drugo, razlikovanje tipova autoriteta direktno je relevantno za problem centralizacije i decentralizacije. Jedna nacionalizirana privredna grana kojom rukovodi drzava moze formalno biti organizirana na isti nacin fcao i u sistemu radnickog samoupravljanja. Centralizam tamo ____________ ' ' '
1 T o ne treba brkati s drustvenim konfonnizmozn koji predstavlja sasvim razliiitu pojavu. Idealno socijalistidko drustvo je zajednica nekonformistjckih linosti koje uskladuju svoje odnose na bazi druStvenog autoriteta. Od interesa je uociti da se konformizam za koji tako efektno Erich Fromm pokazuje da predstavlja krajnje otudenje licnosti (22, 158 i dalje) ponekad reklamira kao model socijalistidkih odnosa; ne valja 5trcati. .

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 centralizam ovdje. Pa ipak postoji sustinska razlika. U prvom slucaju se radi o politickom autoritetu koji nareduje; u drugom o drustvenom autoritetu kome se radni kolektivi dobrovoljno podvrgavaju shvatajuci svoj ekonomski i drustveni interes. Time nas analiza dovodi do pitanja 'fjoduzetnistva i njegove uloge u privredi jugoslavenskog tipa, odnosno sire, u asocijativnom socijalizmu.

11. K O L E K T IV KAO PO D U Z E TN IK U privredi koja se sastoji od samoupravnih tijela, izvrsavanje upravnih funkcija nije stvar neke posebne klase individuuma, vec je to stvar kolektiviteta clanova privrednih organizacija, koje cemo nazivati radnim kolektivima. Drustvena vrednovanja i snosenje rizika (takoder jedan aspekt vrednovanja) izricite su funkcije kolektiva. Nadziranje je dvosmjemi proces u kom sudjeluje svaki clan kolektiva. Preostala funkcija, koordinacija, cisto je tehnicka i kao takva je prepustena tehnickim ekspertima koji su i sami clanovi kolektiva. Na taj nacin dolazimo do prvog vaznog zakljucka: Kolektiv se kvalificirao za izvrsavanje poduzetnicke funkcije.1 Koordinativna aktivnost nije po sebi cisto tehnicka aktivnost, drugim rijecima, ona nije nezavisna od drustvenih odnosa. Kad je nadziranje jednosmjemi proces, tj. kad se radi o birokratskom nadziranju, efikasnost koordinacije opada. A jasno je da su promjene u efikasnosti od ogromnog znacaja za ekonomsku teoriju. Mozemo dakle zastati za trenutak da se malo poblize upoznamo s problemom. Efikasnost koordinacije svodi se na problem centrali zacija nasuprot decentralizacija. Birokratska vlast zahti1 Taj zakljucak moze se ilustrirati statistickom snimkom kolektiva-poduzetnika u akciji u posebnim jugoslavensklm uvjetima u 1956. godini. U toj su godlni dnevni redovi sastanaka radnickih savjeta sadrzavali karakteristicne stavke u slijedecim proporcijama: planovi proizvodnje i investicija, troskovi proizvodnje i prodaje, izvjestaji upravnog odbora, slobodna upotreba fondova 40H; radni odnosi, disciplina, privredni kriminal 1996; tarifni stavovi, norme i prolzvodnost rada, raspodjela dobiti 1796; socijalna pitanja i kadrovi 1396; razno 1196 (67, 11). U 1956. prosjecna neto dobit realizirana i podijeljena medu ^Ianove kolektiva iznosila je oko 1096 standardnog platnog fond a (pre ma podacima iz Statistidki godtitijak FNRJ 1958, ss. 103 i 106).

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jeva striktnu centralizaciju. A to znaci kako je to von Hayek znao spretno upotrijebiti u svom plediranju za slobodno kapitalisticko trziste da se postojeci i potencijalni resursi rasipaju uslijed proste nuzde da se kondenzira poznavanje cinjenica. Jer postoji vrsta znanja koje po svojoj prirodi ne mo2e udi u statistiku. i zbog toga se ne moze predati centralnoj vlasti u statistickoj. formi. Do statistickih podataka, koje bi takva centralna vlast morala upotrijebiti, moralo bi se doci upravo apstraMrajuci manje razlike izmedu stvari, grupiranjem, kao da se radi o resursima iste vrste, stavaka koje se razlikuju u pogledu lokacije, kvalitete i drugih pojedinosti na nacin koji moze biti od velikog znacenja za neku specificnu odluku (26, 524). Da bi se osigurala najbolja upotreba resursa poznatih ma kom clanu dru stva, von Hayek predlaze da se dozvoli funkcioniranje mehanizma cijena. I nema sumnje da u izvjesnom po gledu trziste pruza mnogo efikasniji komunikacioni mehanizam nego sto je to administrativna Mjerarhija. N o to je samo jedan aspekt problema; ostala dva jesu: koordinacija trzisnih izbora jer do njih dolazi u vremenu i prostoru i komunikacija ispod nivoa poduzeca. Da bismo efikasno rijesili problem koordinacije, moramo ga rijesiti u njegovoj ukupnosti. Ukoliko ostale stvari ostaju nepromijenjene, nezavisnost u donosenju odluka povecava efikasnost. Tada to ne znaci cijepanje i razbijanje organizacije i prema tome neekonomicnu i anarhicnu usitnjenost. Ono naprotiv znaci maksimalnu ekonomicnost u radu prepustanjem neposredne inicijative i neposredne odgovomosti neposrednim izvrsiocima, radnicima i nizim rukovodiocima na nivou poduzeca, kolektivima na nivou narodne pri vrede. Administrativna kontrola i rukovodenje ne moze brzo i uspjesno reagirati na promjene i probleme koji nicu u neposrednom radu, a ta sporost i grubo globalno reagiranje uzrokom su velikih gubitaka. Unutar podu zeca hijerarhijski odnosi djeluju deprimirajuce na individualne izvrsioce, koce inicijativu, potkapaju radni elan, stvaraju otpor, ukratko, smanjuju radnu efikasnost1 Zbog .
1 Na tom su polju empiiicka istrazivanja tek zapoceta. Dosada izvrsene studije pokazuju da je proizvodnost rada vjerojatno znacajno nlza u uobicajenim uvjetima autokratskog poslovnog rukovodenja nego sto je to u potencijalniin uvjetima u kojima radnici imaju mogudnost da

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toga inicijativu i odgovomost treba prepustiti ljudima koji su u neposrednom dodiru sa zadatkom koji treba izvrsiti. Razna drustvena uredenja omogucavala su zadovoljenje tog zahtjeva u razlicitim stepenima. A sistem radnickog samoupravljanja u tom pogledu sigumo nadmasuje bilo koju drugu postojecu altemativu. Uporedena s privatnim kapitalizmom drzavno-kapitalisticka organizacija pokazala se znatno efikasnijom, mjerena stopom rasta proizvodnje, jer se mogla posluziti planiranjem na nacionalnom nivou. Uporedena s drzavnim kapitalizmom socijalisticka organizacija bit ce efikasnija, jer je nakon uklanjanja klasnih antagonizama u stanju da bolje koristi postojece znanje, kao i intelektualnu i emocionalnu energiju clanova drustvene zajednice1 . Iako autonoman u velikom stepenu kolektiv, naravno, ne moze biti potpu.no autonoman. Kad se radi o vrednovanjima koja bitno utjecu na interese nekih drugih kolektiva jedno vise predstavnicko tijelo mora donijeti odluke. To je veoma ozbiljan i malo istrazivan problem.
sudjeluju u donosenju odiiika koje se ticu njihovog rada. Nacionalni institut za industrijsku psihologiju (N . X. X. P.) referira o jednom americkom eksperimentu u nekoj tekstilnoj tvomlci gdje je diferencijalna proizvodnost u tom pogledu bila 5461 (uobicajeni nadin rukovodenja) prema kasnije postignutih 7686 jedinica (sudjelovanje radnika) (27, 217). U drugom ameridkom eksperimentu u nekom konfekcijskom pogonu Coch i French su utvrdili odnosne proizvodnosti s otprilike 50 prema otprilike 70 jedinica, dok je sfluktuacija i agresivnost bila inverzno proporcionalna stepenu sudjelovanjaa (28, 524). Treba spomenuti i pionirske radove, koji osim toga imaju i opcije znacenje, K. Lewina i drugova o razlikama izmedu autokratskog, demokratskog i laissez-faire rukovodenja (29; rezimirano, ukljuciv i dalje istrazivanje, u 30) i K . Lewina o efektima grupne odluke (31). Moze se takoder podsjetiti i na poznate Hawthorne eksperimente. Opce znacenje tih eksperimenata dobro je rezimirao R. Bendix: Kontrolirano promatranje malih radnih grupa kroz niz godina pokazalo je da je povecana proizvodnja u cjelini vjerojatno viSe vezana za moral grupe nego za bilo koju drugu varijablu (kao to su razliito postavljene radne stanke, doruSak, veda placa, varijacije u rasvjed, temperaturi itd.) koja je bila ispitivana. Moral je opet bio vezan za poboljsani nadzor, za prestiznu poziciju svakog clana ispitivane grupe i za povecanu paznju koja se pridavala individualnim problemima, misljenjima i prijedlozima (32, 78). 1 Gornji je odjeljak vedim dijelom reproduciran iz jedne studije o sovjetskoj, americkoj i jugoslavenskoj organizaciji naftnog poduzeda koju sam 1952. radio za jedno nase veliko naftno poduzede (33, 22). Kasnije sam iste teze provjeravao analizom slabosti centralizacije u ju goslavenskoj privredi. U poslijeratnoj jugoslavenskoj ekonomskoj orga nizaciji mogu se razlikovati dva odjelita perioda prvi, administrativni, jest period koga karakterizira striktna centralizacija i koji se zavrsava u 1951; u drugom, koji traje otada, razvilo se slobodno trziste i radnicko upravljanje koji predstavljaju gotovo laboratorijske uvjete za testiranje zakljucaka do kojih smo gore doSli. Na zalost, do sada nije izradena nijedna studija za privredu kao cjelinu. Vidi takoder

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no mi ga ovdje ne mozemo razmatrati. U stvarima koje nas prvenstveno zanimaju zavisnost kolektiva prema gore bit ce uglavnom tehnicke prirode. Idealno bi bilo da se odvoje regulativne od operativnih funkcija pa da se prve ostave predstavnickim organima dok bi se dnigima bavili radni kolektivi i njihova udruzenja. Na taj bi nacin vrhovna koordinacija, ukljuciv Drustveni plan zajedno s instrumentima za njegovo izvrsavanje, bila ostavljena Skupstini1 Treba, medutim, naglasiti da ce se koordi . nacija djelomicno morati vrsiti i na lieu mjesta pomocu specijaliziranog drzavnog aparata, u kom slucaju regu lativne funkcije postepeno prelaze u operativne. To uplitanje drzavnog aparata moze biti veoma naglaseno u prvim danima novog sistema. No s odvijanjem procesa normalizacije i institucionalizacije ono se moze poste peno reducirati uglavnom na rutinske aktivnosti. Banke igraju posebnu ulogu u toj sveopcoj koordinaciji time sto kombiniraju uobicajene poslovne kiiterije s intencijama Drustvenog plana. Konacno, planski organi snabdijevaju poduzeca relevantnim podacima koji pruzaju elemente za formiranje njihove ekonomske politike. Podu zeca izvjestavaju o svojim vlastitim vaznim odlukama, sto omogucava plans kim organima pripremanje nove gar niture podataka za sve kojih se to tice. Drustveni plan, banke i raspolozivost informacija predstavljaju efikasni koordinativni mehanizam koji omogucava da privreda glatko funkcionira bez centralnog upravljanja. Krajnji efekat svega toga jest da'su rizici i neizvjesnosti mini
kraci rad R. Bidanida (34). Ja sam potanko ispitivao samo jednu industriju (naftnu). Ovdje navodim podatke o proizvodnosti rada. Centralizacija upravljanja uglavnom je zapoCeta 1947, dostigla je vrhunac u 1950. i, u vezi s uspostavljanjem radnickih savjeta, bila je bitno smanjena od 1952. dalje. S takvom opdom pozadinom proizvodnost rada u naftnoj industriji (prolzvodnja i busenje) kretala se ovako: 1941 100, 1946 74, 1947 96, 1948 63, 1949 70, 1950 59, 1951 78, 1952 111, 1953 163 (35, Pregled 9). Iako te cifre ni u kom slufiaju ne reprezentiraju cijelu privredu iz niza razloga naftna je industrija znatno osjetljivija nego ostale industrije, a formula koju sam konstruirao za mjerenje proizvodnosti rada nije mogla sasvim eliminirati utjecaj prirodnih uvjeta one ipak ocrtavaju impresivni trend. 1 Slidnu misao izrazili su Clegg i Chester kad su razmatrali buducnost britanske nadonalizacije: Parlamenat treba da odludi koje funkcije mogu i treba da budu izvrsavane na podrudju slrem od individualnog poduzeda i da ucini odgovomim samo za te funkcije regionalne i nadonalne vlasti (36, 200). Autori isticu da . . . bududnost nadonali zacije ovisi o otkrivanju i upotrebi sredstava koja de nacionalno vlasnistvo i nacionalno planiranje uCiniti kompatibilnim s detaljnim vodejem poslova na lieu mjesta (36, 211).

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mi rani i da se zbog toga poduzetnicka funkcija pojavljuje u sasvim novom svjetlu. U ostvarivanju ekonomskih. planova glavni se zadatak planskih. organa sastoji u ocuvanju normalnih trzisnih odnosa. Ukoliko se fluktuacije cijena mogu izbjeci, bit ce takoder izbjegnuti konjunktumi dobici i nezasluzeni gubici (u tome, dakako, vanjska trgovina predstavlja tezak problem). A u onoj mjeri u kojoj je postignuta stabilnost, dobici i gubici poduzeca ovise o proizvodnim doprinosima njihovih kolektiva. Slijedece pitanje odnosi se na raspodjelu dohotka. Ne postoji nikafcva nuznost da citav iznos dobiti koju ostvari neki kolektiv ujedno njemu i pripadne. Dio dobiti koji treba podijeliti clanovima kolektiva, funkcija je stimuliranja koji on pruza. U opcem slucaju zelimo maksimirati ponudu poduzetnistvaa i to postizavamo institucionaliziranjem odredene skale raspodjele koja je univerzalno prihvacena kao pravedna. Tako se bruto dobit cijepa u dva dijela: neto dobit koja se kao nagrada cla novima kolektiva upotrebljava za stimuliranje ponude proizvodnog faktora poduzetnistvo i ostatak, ako ga ima,, koji po svojoj prirodi predstavlja rentu i kao takav treba. da, bude apsorbiran porezom. Kad govoiimo o do biti kao cijeni za poduzetnicke usluge mi cemo, dakle, implicirati neto dobit, tj. onaj dio dobiti koji ostaje na slobodnom raspolaganju kolektivu. Negativna dobit, ili gubitak, zahtijeva slicni postupak. Unutar odredenog intervala ona ce se smatrati kao trzisna kazna za propust davanja prosjecne kolicine poduzetnistva. U tom smislu i tretirajiici apsolutni gubitak samo kao specijalni slucaj potpuno opceg oportunitetnog gubitka poduzetnicka funkcija kolektiva ukljucuje snosenje rizika kao jednu od svojih komponenti, sto donekle podsjeca na Knighta. Medlitim, reduciranje platnog fonda ispod odredenog nivoa smatrat ce se dnistveno nedopustiviin. Tada ce drzava ili komuna morati da intervenira i slicno kao sto je prije porezom odnijela super-dobit sada ce subvencionirati super-gubitak. Moze se takoder dogoditi da neki pothvat nije ispao rentabilan, a da kolektiv nije za to bio subjektivno odgovoran, i bit ce zato potrebna ili permanentna subvencija ili cak i likvidacija. U svim tim slucajevima rizik snosi vlasnik kapitala, tj. drustvena zajednica, sto odrazava Schumpe9 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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terov slucaj u kom je snosenje rizika bilo iskljuceno iz poduzetnicke funkcije. Dolazimo tako do naseg drugog i konacnog zakljucka. Kolektiv-poduzetnik stalno je aktivan u procesu tehnoloskih, komercijalnih i organizational poboljsavanja, tj. ponasa se u sustmi kao inovator. Ponuda inovacija automatski je regulirana sistemom materijalnih nagrada 1 kazna. Omogucavajuci ljudima da slijede svoje materijalne interese, ta institucija snazno motivira iako, naravno, to nije jedina motivacija koja djeluje u istom smjeru da se stalno povecava efikasnost koja rezultira u vecoj proizvodnji koja opet povecava blagostanje zajednice uopce. Analiticki ta institucija uspostavlja poseban faktor proizvodnje, cija je cijena dobit

12.
Promasena polem ika o centralizm u

GENTRALIZAM

Centralizam, kao i sve rijeci koje se mnogo upotrebljavaju, ima visestruko znacenje sto dovodi do zbrke u diskusiji. Pored toga taj termin ima i jaku emocionalnu konotaciju, sto zbrku jos vise povecava. Danas je modemo biti decentralist, kao sto je. nekada bilo modemo biti centralist. Za to, kao sto demo vidjeti, ima objektivnih opravdanja. Medutim, kao sto nekada nije svaki cen tralizam bio pozitivan, a decentralizam negativan, tako ni danas svaki decentralizam nije odraz naprednog stava, a svaki centralizam odraz birokratske reakcije. Naivna shvacanja o privrednoj decentralizaciji na nacin liberalnog kapitalizma sredine proslog vijeka kod cega, naravno, protagonisti tih shvacanja nisu svjesni tog doktrinamog identiteta jednako su ekonomski deplasirana i politicki stetna kao i isticanje centralistickili rjesenja staljinistickog perioda. Veoma cesto se argumentacija u korist ekonomskog centralizma zasniva na ovom rezoniranju. Djelatnost mrtogobrojnih privrednih jedinica treba uskladiti. Za to je potreban centralni plan, a za njegovo provodenje centralni organ vlasti, tj. drzava. Decentralizacija onemogucava nerazvijenim krajevima zemlje sustizanje; stavise. 130

ona pospjesuje otvaranje jaza izmedu razvijenih i nerazvijenih podrucja. Decentralizirane odluke autonomnih. privrednih aktera dovode do rasipanja drustvenih sred stava. Dokaz: nekoristenje kapaciteta, dupliranje investicija u nekim oblastima i nedovoljne investicije u drugirru Veoma cest odgovor na ovu argumentaciju jeste da privredne organizacije same znaju sta je za njih najkorisnije i da ce one stoga svoja sredstva najrentabilnije iskoristiti. Zbog toga treba izbjegavati plansko usmjeravanje, jer plan moze da bude pogresan, a sredstva treba maksimalno decentralizirati da bi se sprijecile pogresne centralne intervencije. Rasipanje drustvenih sred stava je u doba centralizacije bilo znatno vece. Dokaz: politicke fabrike, niska produktivnost rada, neekonomske investicije. Obje argumentacije sadrzavaju po zmo istine kao i tacne navode sto se tice statistickih mjerljivih. pojava. No one su isto tako pune dvosmislenog upotrebljavanja termina i prostih non sequitura. Da navedemo samo neke. U centralistickoj argumentaciji tacno je da postoji potreba koordiniranja privredne aktivnosti i da je nuzaa centralni, tj. opci drustveni plan. Ali iz toga ne slijedi da je taj plan obavezan (u smislu administrativne obaveznosti) niti da ga treba provoditi drzava. Ocigledno je da postoji potreba za autoritetom, ali iz toga ne slijedi da to treba da bude iskljucivo politicki autoritet. Tacno je da nekontrolirana trzisna privreda rada tendenciju polariziranja razvijenih i nerazvijenih podrucja. No zasto bismo taj proces ostavili bez kontrole kad su poznati efikasni i sa decentralizacijom potpuno kompatibilni instrumenti za njegovo reguliranje? Tacno je da je u procesu decentralizacije kod nas dolazilo i dolazi do rasi panja drustvenih sredstava, ali to nije rezultat decen tralizacije kao takve, vec a) lose provedene decentrali zacije i b) neizbjeznih neuskladenosti u prelasku iz jednog: organizacionog rezima u drugi. U decentralistickoj argumentaciji tacno je da su privredni subjekti inotivirani na najefikasnije gazdovanje kad rade vlastitim sredstvima. Ali iz toga ne slijedi da je maksimalna rentabilnost pojedinaCnog poduzeca ujedno i maksimalna d r u s t v e n a rentabilnost. Razlike mogu biti veoma velike. Tacno je da drustveni plan ne 9* 131

moze biti obavezan za poduzece i drzava ne moze administrativnim mjerama derogirati autonomiju radnog kolektiva, jer bi to bio kraj radnickog samoupravljanja. Ali iz toga ne slijedi da ne treba insistirati na tome da .se ciljevi drustvenog plana postizu i da se to osigurava ekonomskim (dakle ne administrativnim) usmjeravanjem. Veoma je vjerojatno da bi drustveni plan detaljiziran do poduzeca bio pogresan1 ali odatle ne slijedi da , bi zbroj autonomnih. planova poduzeca predstavljao najbolje rjesenje za privredu u cjelini. Naprotiv, sigumo je da je drustveni plan na razini narodne privrede bolji od ma cega sto moze da sagleda pojedinacno poduzece. Centralisticko-decentralisticka polemika bila je narocito ziva kod nas u periodu 19611963. Bilo je to vrijeme priprema za donosenje novog ustava, kad su vrsene znacajne reforme u pravcu daljnje decentralizacije i demokratizacije naseg privrednog i drustvenog zivota. I upravo u tom periodu doslo je do naglog usporenja tempa pri vrednog razvoja. Psiholoski je razumljivo da je ta koincidencija navela izvjestan broj ekonomista na jos jedan non sequitur: buduci da je nakon decentralizacionih reformi doslo do usporavanja rasta, to decentralizacija koci privredni razvoj. Srecom takvi zakljucci nisu utjecali na mijenjanje kursa unutrasnje politike zemlje. Analiza mehanizma usporavanja u 1961 1962. u tzv. 2 u t o j k n j i z i (23) sredinom 1962. g. i zagrebackom savjetovanju ekonomista u januaru 1963. godine pokazala je da je do usporavanja rasta doslo prvenstveno iz ovih raz loga: a) prethodni period razvitka ostavio je u nasljede izvjesne disproporcije koje su oslabile privrednu strukturu (zaostajanje izvoza, poljoprivrede i teske industrije), b ) u takvoj situaciji izvedeno je nekoliko radikalnih pri vrednih reformi (u oblasti raspodjele dohotka, te kreditnog, bankarskog i vanjsko trgovinskog sistema); c) svaka bi od tih reformi zasebno predstavljala znacajno dodatno opterecenje privredne masine, a pogotovo je to vazilo u situaciji njlhovog siinultanog provodenja, negativni efekti bill su potencirani nedovoljnom strucriom i organizacionom pripremom refonni, d) zavladala je opca privredna nestabilnost i neizvjesnost; poduzeca su smanjivala svoje proizvodne programe cekajuci da se situacija razbistri i
1 Kad b i se npr. planirala proizvodnja dvadesetak hiljada. proizvoda kao sto je to bio slufiaj u sovjetskoj planskoj -praksi.

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uslovi privredivanja stabiliziraju, privredna masina se zaribala i njen tempo opao je na polovinu ranijeg. Me dutim, nakon sto su u privrednoj politid povucene potrebne pouke i primijenjene adekvatne mjere, privreda se u 1963. godini vraca na svoj raniji trend razvoja da bi ga u 1964. godini, premasila. Na taj nacin, nakon sto su prelazne poteskoce prebrodene, decentralizacija nije zakocila privredni razvoj vec, naprotiv, stvorila je potencijalne preduslove da u narednom razdoblju bude brzi nego ranije. No, valja odmah dodati da aktueliziranje tih potencijala nije nimalo jednostavan zadatak, kao sto to pokazuje ponovno usporavanje privrednog rasta u godinama 1965 1967.

Centralizam pocetne privredne izgradnje U izvjesnom smislu situacija u socijalistickim zemlja ma nakon revolucije, odnosno preuzimanja vlasti bila je slicna situaciji u kolonijalnim zemljama nakon sticanja nezavisnosti. U jednom i u drugom slucaju trebalo je rusiti stari aparat vlasti i izgradivati novi. U jednom i u drugom slucaju valjalo je provoditi radikalne privredne (agrama reforma, nacionalizacija), a u socijalistickom slucaju i drustvene reforme. I u jednom i u drugom slu caju postojao je akutan nedostatak rukovodnih kadrova na koje bi se novi rezimi mogli osloniti. U takvoj situaciji zahtjev za decentralizacijom bio bi reakcionaran zahtjev sracunat na likvidaciju tekovina revolucije i nacionalnog oslobodenja.1 U takvoj situaciji jedino ispravno rjesenje je najstriktnija i politicka i privredna centralizacija. Centralizacija u ovom slucaju znaci velike kompetencije centralnih drzavnih organa, ogranicenu lokalnu autonomiju, direktnu intervenciju drzave u privredi administrativnim mjerama. U Jugoslaviji su upravo opisani uslovi vladali u prvih pet godina nakon oslobodenja. U to vrijeme je bila izvrsena agrama reforma, te prva i druga nacionalizacija, bila su organizirana ministarstva i direkcije za privredne
1 Pocesto nasi gosti iz novoosloboSenih azijsko-africkili zemalja nailaze na velike teskcxfe, kad, u svojoj zelji da se koriste jugoslavenskim iskustvima u planiranju, intervjuiraju jugoslavenske ekonomiste i utvrduju da je sve Ito im se prica manje-vi5e neprimjenjivo u njihovim zemljama. -

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grane i njihove grupacije, zavedeno centralisticko planiranje i donesen prvi petogodisnji plan; bio je izgraden novi administrativni aparat i udareni temelji novom drustvenom i politickom sistemu. Sve je to moglo da se provede tako radikalno i u tako kratkom periodu -zahval j u j u c i strLktnoj politickoj i privrednoj centralizaciji. To je bilo vrijeme kad je s pravom bilo modemo biti centralist. Duzina centralistickog perioda varira, naravno, od zem lje do zemlje. Ona ovisi o dubini prethodnog revolucionamog preobrazaja, stupnju privrednog i kulturnog razvoja i o mectunarodnoj ekonomsko-politickoj situaciji. No sam period je neizbjezan i on, u socijalistickim ze mljama, odgovara dobro poznatom Marxovom periodu diktature proletarijata. Postavlja se pitanje: nakon sto je u osnovi izvrsen prelaz iz jedriog sistema u drugi u smislu iniciranja ireverzibilnog razvojnog procesa, tj. na kon sto su osnovne institucije starog sistema razbijene i zamijenjene adekvatnim novim institucijama sta sad treba da se radi? Na to je pitanje jugoslavenska praksa dala sasvim odreden odgovor, odgovor identican s vizijom Marxa i Engelsa. Centra lism nije cilj, vec sredstvo. Cilj je ostvarenje prelaza iz jednog sistema u drugi. Nakon sto je prelaz izvrsen, treba odabrati novo sredstvo, adekvatno novom cilju. Taj novi cilj je izgradivanje socijalistickog drustva. Praksa u Jugoslaviji i drugim zemljama pokazala je da je centralizam veoma rdavo sredstvo za ostvarivanje tog cilja. Pokusalo se s formiranjem demokratskog centralizma. No evolucija je bez izuzetka isla ovim putem: d e m o k r a t s k i centralizam, d e m o k r a t s k i c e n t r a l i z a m , demokratski centralizam i na koncu samo c e n t r a l i z a m koji je znacio opasnu birokratsku stranputicu. Stvar nije u dobroj ili losoj namjeri pojedinih vodecih licnosti ili grupa vec u zakonitom ponasanju birokratskih striiktura. Historijsko iskustvo je pokazalo dva osnovna defekta centralizma: politicki i ekonomski. Oni se medusobno uvjetuju i prozimaju. Na politickom planu centralizam neizbjezno dovodi do birokratizacije cjelokupne drustvene strukture i poznatih staljinistickili ekscesa. U takvoj situaciji fundamentalni Marxov socijalisticki postulat slo134

bodnog razvitka svakog pojedinca kao uslova slobodnog razvitka za sve postaje neostvaiiv. Na ekonomskom planu zbog sputavanja licne i lokalne samoinicijative i destimuliranja razvijanja ogromne ali latentne emocionalne i intelektualne energije drustva efikasnost privredivanja i tempo privrednog razvoja, a prije svega standard zivota trudbenika ni2i su nego sto bi to. objektivno u socijalistickom drustvu mogli biti1 . Zbog toga s novim sistemom treba da pocne i proces privredne i politicke deceritralizacije. On znaci odumiranje drzave, tj. zamjenjivanje politickog autoriteta drustvenim, drzavne masine drustvenim samoupravljanjem. Bilo je potrebno tesko historijsko iskustvo da se ta jednostavna istina, koju su klasici teorijski predvidali i prakticki uvidi i provede. U stvari to i ne bi trebalo da nas cudi. Potreban je veliki intelektualni i emocionalni napor i kompaktna politioka organizacija da se provede striktna centralizacija privrede samo zato da bi se, kad je postignut najveci stepen njene efikasnosti, pocelo s njenom likvidacijom. Moglo se ocekivati da ce za obrtanje ovog procesa drustvene organizacije biti potreban neki snazan drustveni pritisak.

Centralizam suvremene privrede Prividna paradoksalnost situacije nije iscrpljena zavrsnom konstatacijom prethodnog odjeljka da je jedini zadatak centralizacije da pripremi decentralizaciju. Ona je potencirana cinjenicom da ta decentralizacija treba da znaci jedan efikasni centralizam. To 'je izvor novih nesporazuma u diskusijama oko centralizacije i decentralizacije. O cemu se radi? Priroda tehnoloskili procesa i organizacija proizvodnje i distribucije cini suvremenu privredu nuzno centralist ckom. Sismondizeun nije vise bio moguc ni u proslom stoljecu, a pogotovo to nije danas. Potrebno je regulirati ne samo transportni i energetski sistem, sto je prilicno
1 Stoga je naivno rezoniranje protagonista centralizacije kad nas uvjeravaju da se poboIjSanjem organizacije rasipanje druitvcnih sred stava moze sprijeciti. Stvar je u tome Sto centralizam ima odrefienu svoju birokratsku logiku koja se niim ne da >poboljad. Stoga je, ceteris paribus, razina efikasnosti centralistiSkog sistema n e i z b j e z * n o i u v i j e k cuza od objektivno mogue..

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ocigledno, vec i vanjskotrgovinsku razmjenu, rezim na unutrasnjem trzistu, alokaciju investicija, proizvodnju citavih grana. Ukoliko se to ne radi, posljedice su privredni ciMusi i krize, ili u najmanju ruku kolebanja i inflacione spirale. U tom pogledu nista se bitno ne mijenja ako jednu privredu nazovemo socijalistickom. Trzite je inherentno nestabilno, kako je to pokazao jos Marx u svojim shemama reprodukcije, kao sto to m o zemo pokazati suvremenom tehnikom ekonomskog modeliranja, i kao sto to prakticki znamo na bazi historijskog iskustva. Stoga je i nekontrolirana, decentralizirana, trzisna privreda inherentno nestabilna i podlozna privrednim ciklusima. Naglasak je ovdje na kontroli; kako je postici? U trazenju odgovora mozemo se i opet pozvati na jugoslavensko iskustvo. Nakon sto je ranije centralisticko planiranje sve vise bilo eliminirano, a privredne organizacije postajale sve autonomnije, postepeno je pocelo dolaziti do pucanja veza izmedu postavljanja planskih zadataka i njihovog izvrsavanja. To je postalo narocito ociglednim u 1961. i 1962. godini. Plan se odjednom nasao u vakuumu. Kritike koje su se tada srusile na sastavljace planova, bile su dobrim dijelom neosnovane. N ije stvar bila u tome sto su planovi bili lose sastavljeni u smislu planskog bilansiranja resursa i proizvodnje ili da su bili prenapregnuti. Planovi su bili bar tako dobri kao i prije tih godina. Stvar je bila u tome sto se s i s t e m planiranja, shvacen u sirem smislu, tj. kao sastavljanje i pr o v o d e n j e planova, nije izmijenio iako su se izmijenili uslovi privredivahja. Neuskladenost sistema planiranja 1 sistema privredivanja prevladavana je putem Sluzbenog lista, i ad hoc administrativnim intervencijama,1 sto, prirodno, nije doprinosilo efikasnosti privredivanja. Odsustvo serioznog naucnog rada u toj oblasti imalo je ozbiljnih negativnih posljedica. No praksa je na kraju i opet pomogla. Upravo u to vrijem e pocinje da se snazno razvija jedna nova organizaciona forina koja ce doprinijeti ponovnom uspostavljanju veza izmedu planiranja i provodenja planova. To je privredna i n t e g r a c i j a .
1 Kao dobar indeks stvamog stepena decentralizacije i deadministracije. moglo bi se uzeti obim godisnjih izdanja Slu2benog lista i- broj intemih uputstava banke u toku godine.

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Kad je c e n t r a l i z a m o d o z g o oslabio, trebalo ga je nadomjestiti c e n t r a l i z m o m o d o z d o . I to je smisao integracionili kretanja u jugoslavenskoj privredi. Integracija je jos uvijek jedan Od onih fenomena koji izazivaju mnogo nesporazuma. Pocesto se o integraciji misli kao o fuziji poduzeca. Medutim, fuzija je samo jedan od mnogobrojnih mogucih i ostvarivanih oblika integracije. Pocesto se integracija narocito fu zija ostvaruje politickim pritiskom, a to je stetno jer negira sustinu integracije kao depolitiziranog centralizma. Praksa pokazuje da takve isforsirane integracije pokazuju slabe poslovne rezultate. Medutim, ako ne teorijski, a onda iskustvom nesporazumi se eliminiraju i integraciona kretanja dovode do sve novih i raznovrsnijih oblika privredne kooperacije ciji spektar na jednoj strani zapocinje ugovomim odnosom izmedu centralnog poduzeca i kooperanata i zavrsava fuzijom, a na drugoj strani obuhvata proizvodnu kooperaciju od dva ill svega nekoliko poduzeca, pa sve do integrativnili projekata na nivou privredne grane.1 Integracija se vrsi u svrhu specijalizacije proizvodnje, racionalnije distribucije nastupanja na vanjskom trzistu, zajednickog finansiranja investicione izgradnje. Integracione zajednice izrastaju tamo gdje je potrebno centralizirati donosenje privrednih odluka na nivou vecem od
1 Ilustrativan je u tom pogledu dvadesetogodisnji historijat organizacije jedne tipicno centralisticke grane, industrije nafte. U 1945. godini fonniran je u Zagrebu Kombinat za naftu, koji je obuhvatio svu pro izvodnju i preradu nafte u zemlji. Razvojem shematiziranog drzavno-privrednog centralizma dolazi u 1947. godini do rasfonniranja Kombinata i formiranja generalnih i glavnih direkcija savezne i republicke vlade. Procesom decentralizacije od 1951. do sredine 1952. godine .likvidirane su direkcije i inaugurirana trzigna samostalnost i konkurencija. Osamostaljena poduzeda pocinju odmah ostvarivati polulegalne i legalne kontakte, stvaraju se razna strucna i poslovna udruzenja, sekcije komora, uiljufiuje se i naftna trgovina. Ta kretanja i trazenja zavrsavaju se pocetkom 1964. godine formiranjem u Zagrebu novog Kombinata, koji je obiihvatio oko dvije tredine grane (na teritoriji jedne republike), a kod ostatka grane integrativna kretanja su se nastavila. Proizlazi kao da se krug zaustavio tamo gdje je zapocet prije 19 godina. N o nije tako, ne radi se o krugu vec o spirali. Prvi Kombinat osnovala je drzava makar i revolucionama; drugi Kombinat osnovali su samoupraviii kolektivi makar i uz izvjesnu politicku asistenciju (ali ne centralnu). Prva i zavrsna tacka spirale odvojene su razmakom od d\dje decenije u kom je akumulirano dragocjeno iskustvo koje je ne samo tehnicki poboljsalo organizaciju vec je i na odredeni nacin formiralo svijest neposrednih proizvodaca upravljaca. No joS uvijek su ostale neprevladane republidke granice. 5to je opdenito znak nedovrSenosti dosadasajih integracionih kretanja. (Nakon Sto je ovaj ogled bio vec napisan i umnozen formiran je i drugi Kombinat za naftu u Vojvodini.)

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pojedinacnog poduzeca. Na taj nadin nasuprot centralnim organima ekonomske politike pojavljuje se umjesto velikog broja: pojedinacnih razjedinjenih. poduzeca jedan nmogostruko manji broj privrednih subjekata. Privreda vise nije atomisticka vec dobiva sve odredeniju organizacionu strukturu. Izgradivanjem te strukture popunjava ,se organizaciona praznina izmedu drustvenog plana i .autonomy e poduzeca. U mjeri u kojoj se razvijaju integrativni procesi opada potreba administrativne intervencije drzavnih organa. Kad ti procesi budu u osnovi zavrseni, u privredu ce biti ugradeni samoregulativni mehanizmi koji ce drzavnu intervenciju svesti na minimum. Centralizam ovog sistema bitno se razlikuje od centralizma sistema o tom e smo ranije govorili i na koji se, sticajem historijskih okolnosti, obicno m isli kad se govori o centralizmu. Razlika nije u tome kako se donose odluke one se donose centralno u jednom i u .drugom slucaju razlika je u tome na koji autoritet se te odluke oslanjaju. U prvom slucaju to je politicki autoritet drzave, u drugom slucaju to je drustveni auto ritet asocijacije .samoupravnih organizacija. Prirodno, u ovom sistemu i sistem planiranja dobiva bitno nove odlike. U stvari posao na izradivanju tog sistema jos predstoji. O tome ce biti govora u zavrsnom dijelu ovog ogleda.

D v ije opasnosti Samoupravljanje i decentralizacija nisu univerzalni lijek za sve probleme socijalisticke izgradnje. Centrali zam, koji je u odredenoj fazi razvoja bio neizbjezan, nosio je u sebi potencijalnu opasnost birokratizacije i smanjenja efikasnosti. Ta opasnost, kao sto znamo, nije ostala samo potencijalna, vec se u nizu zemalja aktualizirala. Decentralizacija, koja je neophodna u sadasnjoj fazi razvoja, takoder ima svoje rizike. Spomenucemo dva: monopol i profiterski mentalitet. Nakon sto je u 1950. godini inaugurirano radnicko samoupravljanje, a u naredne dvije godine likvidirane generalne i glavne direkcije, proces decentralizacije zapocet je s jednom veoma uproscenom i rigidnom shemom. Jedan od postulata te sheme bio je: jedno podu138

zece jedan radnicki savjet. Samoupravni organi ispod i iznad razine poduzeca nisu bili predvicteni. Zeljelo se s jedne strane ocuvati integritet poduzeca od cijepanja po pogonima, a s druge strane sprijeciti da glomaznost privredne organizacije ne onemoguci funkcioniranje istinskog radnickog samoupravljanja. Ovo posljednje bilo je u skladu s drugim postulatom: potpune konkurencije. Konkurencija je s jedne strane trebalo da privredne organizme, navikle na administrativno upravljanje, gume na put poslovne samostalnosti i inicijative, a s druge strane trebalo je da sprijeci pojavu monopola. Kooperacija je bila moguca jedino kroz privredne komore; pojedine privredne grane na primjer naftna odrzavale su polulegalne sastauke u svrhu uskladivanja poslovanja, trgovina je bila striktno odvojena od proizvodnje; a tek kasnije mogucnost Iegalne kooperacije pojavila se stidlji.vo kroz propise o tzv. strucnim udruzenjima. Ekonomski instrumentarij se sastojao prakticki od svega jednog instrumenta, tzv. stopa akumulacije i fondova. To je gruba slika 1952. i 1953. godine. Ubrzo se ispostavilo da ovu rigidnu i simplificisticku shemu treba uciniti mnogo fleksibilnijom i kompleksnijom. I zivot je poceo da se modificira. Organizacione forme samoupravljanja prosirene su ispod razine poduzeca na pogone i ekonomske jedinice i iznad razine poduzeca na privredne formacije koje mogu ukljucivati poduzeda locirana u raznim krajevima zemlje. U skladu s tim zabrana udruzivanja zamijenjena je stimuliranjem, dime je otpoceo ranije opisani integracioni proces. A stope akumulacije i fondova zamijenjene su mnogo adekvatnijim i bogatijim instrumentarijem koji se i dalje povecava i usavrsava. Medtutim, nesumnjivo je da u trzisnoj privredi integracija znaci ne samo povecanu efikasnost vec i povecanu privrednu moc. Na ovo posljednje mislimo kad govorimo o monopolu. Povecana privredna moc moze biti upotrebljena u drustveno korisne, ali i u drustveno stetne svrhe. Kod toga se i opet ne radi o dobroj ili Iosoj namjeni vec o logici situacije. Zbog toga je u privredu potrebno ligraditi automatske korektive. Mi takve korektive vec imamo. To su SKJ, sindikati i javno mnjenje s jedne strane, te komisije za drustveni nadzor, sud casti, komore i ured za cijene s druge strane. Da li su oni dovoljni, ostaje da se vidi. 139

Monopolisticke zloupotrebe u jiigoslavenskoj privredi izgleda da su za sada kvaiititativno bez veceg znacaja. One se javljaju prije svega u obliku nabijanja djena i pritiska na slabije partnere. Medutim, za sada jos nije napisana seriozna naucna studija o tom problemu i bilo bi koiisno da se izrada takve studije sto skorije poduzme. Druga opasnost jeste u fonniranju profiterskog mentaliteta. Finansijska rentabilnost poslovanja i materijalna stimulacija ocigledno su samo sredstva, a ne cilj socijalisticke izgradnje. Cilj je sto potpunije zadovoljenje potreba drustva. Medutim, nedovoljno kontrolirano insistiranje na sredstvu ponekad dovodi do zamjene sredstva i cilj a u svijesti ljudi i njihovoj motivaciji i vrednovanju. Ovakav quid pro quo bio bi veoma stetan, jer bi zakocio formiranje s o c i j a l i s t i c k i h drustvenih odnosa, a vezan s negativnim efektima monopola mogao bi izazvati potrebu za jacanjem drzavne intervencije, sa svim konsekvencama koje iz toga slijede. Prisustvo ove opasnosti ucinili su neki kriticari jugoslavenskog sistema osnovom svoje kxitike. Jedna od najinteresantnijih kritika te vrste potice od americkog marksista P. Sweezyja. (24) Njegova argumentacija je u sustini ova. Formiranje materijalne zainteresiranosti. i iskljuciva orijentacija na motivaciju zaradama na trzistu nuzno dovodi do formiranja profiterskog mentaliteta. Ti me se u drustvu ograduje jedan sistem vrednovanja koji ocigledno nije socijalisticki. Procjenjivanje drustvene korisnosti profitom, karakteristicno je za kapitalisticki si stem. Zbog toga kad sadasnja generacija, koja je izvela revoluciju, napusti komandne polozaje u drustvu, nestat ce presudnog subjektivnog faktora koji je sprecavao restauraciju, a nove genera.cije odgojene u duhu trzisnog individualizma i egoizma, nede biti u stanju da se odupru degeneradji u pravcu kapitalistickih drustvenih od nosa. Sweezy vec vidi pocetak tog procesa degeneracije u nestajanju revolucionamih socijalistickih ideala kod omladine, i u tendenciji da se svatko bavi samo svojim sitnim licnim problemom sto udobnijeg zivota. Kao lijek protiv tih deformacija Sweezy preporucuje znatno reduciranje drustvene vrijednosti koja se piidaje financijskom uspjehu, isticanje nefinancijsMh oblika stimuliranja kao sto su takmicenje, plakati i novinski clanci o najbo140

ljim radnicima, kampanje na bazi aktuelnih politickih parola i intervenciju drzave koja treba da nadomjesti profitersko trzisno reguliranje proizvodnje i u osnovi sprijeci pojavu monopola svake vrste. Ako ostavimo po strani arbitrame ocjene o jugoslavenskim deformacijama,. Sweezy nam preporuca recept koji mi veoma dobro poznajemo, a koji se u praksi svodi na to da se slobodne odluke proizvodaca zamijene birokratskim naredenjima, a kriticko ispoljavanje vlastitog misljenja razradom direktiva. Te konsekvence Sweezy licno sigumo ne zeli, on se, stavise, zalaze za uspostavljanje radnickih savjeta. Medutim, radnicki savjeti su isto tako strano tijelo u sistemu drzavnog vlasnistva kao i u sistemu privatnog vlasnistva. Radnicki savjet kao institu cija uklapa se potpuno jedino u sistem drustvenog vla snistva i pretpostavlja deetatizaciju i autonomiju neposrednih proizvodaca. Sweezy je dovoljno marksist da bi zapazio fundamentalnu razliku izmedu jugoslavenske i kapitalisticke situacije u odsustvu privatne svojine. Me dutim, to ga navodi samo na to da ospori kineska tvrdenja o postojanju kapitalizma u Jugoslaviji i da ih zamijeni tezom o kapitalistickoj degeneraciji. Korisno je ovdje upozoriti da za Marxa kapital nije akumuladja profita inace bi kategorija kapitala postojala u svakoj trzisnoj privredi vec v l a s t nad radom i njegovim proizvodima. (7, 167). N ije li autonomno radnicko samoupravljanje upravo najdjelotvomija moguca antiteza vlasti nad' tudim radom? I ne cini li se da smjena privatnog vlasnistva drzavnim ne mijenja mnogo cinjenicu vlasnistva nad radom i njegovim proizvodima? Sweezyjeva kritiia omogucila nam je da ispitamo izvjesne piigovore koji se mogu uciniti sistemu samoupravnosti. Ta kritiia ocigledno nije odrziva i vjerojatno je rezultat sasvim nedovoljnog autorovog poznavanja sustinskih zbivanja u ovoj zemlji. No sam problem negativnih uticaja trzista na eticku sferu socijalistickog drustva postoji i zasluzuje da bude pazljivo i seriozno prostudiran. Na kraju, radi potpunosti, jos jedna napomena. Cjelokupna dosadasnja analiza. polazi od jugoslavenskog iskustva. U nekoj drugoj zemlji, ili u ovoj zemlji u nekom drugom vremenu, histoiijska situacija determinirat ce drugacija rjesenja i zakljucke. Na primjer, u nekoj zernlji s velikom demokratskom tradicijom i s radnim nayikama 141

koje odgovaraju industrijaliziranoj sredini stimulativno djelovanje decentralizacije i opasnosti od centralistickih deformacija nece biti tako veliM kao u jugoslavenskoj situaciji. Slicno, s brzdm porastom drustvenog standarda ekonomski stimulansi postepeno ce gubiti svoju efikasnost u postizavanju drustvenih ciljeva i bit ce zamjenjivani neekonomskim stimulansima. U toj situaciji bit ce i podjela rada i specijalizacija znatno veci, a s njima se prosiruje i djelokrug strucnog autoriteta. Vjerojatno je da ce tada centralna drustvena administracija moci dobiti znatno sire polje rada bez bojazni od zloupotrebe u oblasti vrednovanja i od birokratskih deformacija.

13. Pogresne d ihotom ije

P LA N IR A N JE

Izvjesne polemike o karakteru planiranja u Jugoslaviji mogu se prikladno sazeti u ove tri alternative1 : (1) Treba li da plan bude prognoza ili obaveza za akciju? (2) Da li kod planiranja na raznim nivoima treba da postoji odnos ravnopravnosti ili subordinacija? (3) Da li se drustveni plan izvodi iz lokalnih i parcijalriih planova ili ovi potonji treba da se dobijaju razbijanjem centralnog drustvenog plana? Upada odmah u oci da se ove alternative uklapaju direktno u polemiku oko decentralizacije i centralizacije. Ocigledno je da ce prva altemativa u svakom od navedena tri para biti zastupljena u ekstremno decentralistickim gledistima i da ce stoga preostale tri alternative predstavljati postulate isto tako ekstremnih centralisticMh gledista. Nakon svega sto je dosad receno ocigledno je takode da su sve te alternative pogresne k a o t a k v e . Umjesto formalno-logickih dihotomija izrazenih s i l i i l i treba se orijentirati na dijalekticka rjesenja koja impliciraju i i: i obaveza i prognoza; i subordinacija i ravnopravnost; i nzlayni i silazni tok plEiniranja. Da ukratko prokomentiramo ove teze.
1 Ovu sistematizaciju dugujem drugu R. Davidovidu.

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(1) Plan koji ni za koga nije obavezan ne 'bi bio plan vec intelektualna vjezba. Plan treba da bude striktno oba vezan za organe ekonomske politike: privredne sekretarijate (odnosno uopce sekretarijate ukoliko se radi o d r u s t v e n o m planu) i, u odredenom, precizno definiranom smislu, za. banke. Oni su predstavnickim tijelima odgovomi za provodenje intencija plana. Sa stanovista autonomnih privrednih organizacija plan je samo prognoza i to vjerojatnija prognoza sto je sistem planiranja uskladeniji, a samo planiranje na visem strucnom nivou. Plan je prognoza i u tom smislu sto nitko nece inzistirati na njegovom stoprocentnom ispunjavanju. Nove okolnosti mogu zahtijevati promjenu plana, koju onda treba provesti po utvrdenoj proceduri, koja, medutim, ne moze mimoici predstavnicke organe. (2) Ravnopravnost je preduslov samoupravljanja. S ukidanjem ravnopravnosti efektivno bismo likvidirali samoupravljanje. Bilo bi to prihvatanje nekonzistentne Sweezyjeve pozicije, o kojoj je ranije bilo govora. Me dutim, to ne znaci da treba anatemizirati s v a k u subordinaciju. Subordinacija je kategorija koja proistiCe iz autoriteta. I dok je politicka subordinacija (u smislu administrativnih naredenja poduprtih drzavnom silom) apsolutno neprihvatljiva, drustvena subordinacija, koja vodi racuna o javnom mnjenju, sasvim je na mjestu. Isto tako nije kontradiktomo isticati strucni karakter plana, koji su izradili najbolji eksperti zemlje i pridavati vecu drustvenu vaznost vrednovanjima predstavnickih tijela u odnosu na pojedinacne privredne subjekte. Ukratko, sa nepovredivoscu autonomije kompatibilno je insistiranje na drustvenim interesima. Presudno je kako se to insistiranje vrsi. Osim toga moguca je i klasicna administrativna subordinacija unutar pojedinih resora. (3) Drustveni plan niti je mehanicki zbir lokalnih. i parcijalnih planova, a niti je od njih nezavisan. U izradi drustvenog plana treba ostvariti stalno strujanje informacija odozdo gore i obmuto, i zajednicko rjesenje problema stvame ili pretpostavljene divergencije interesa. 143

Mehanizam planiranja To je velika tema koja izlazi daleko van okvira ogleda. Sve sto mogu uraditi jeste da se ogranicim na neke osnovne momente i da ih formuliram u obliku devet teza. (1) Prije svega od fundamentalne je vaznosti da se uoci da sastavljanje plana nije samo s t r u c n i p o s a o vec i d r u s t v e n i akt . Obje komponente su od jednake vaznosti za efikasnost planiranja. Sto se tice strucne mozda bi trebalo reci i naucne? komponente, to je savrseno ocigledno. U vezi s drustvenim aktom korisna je jedna napomena. Ako plan treba da bude ne samo donesen vec i proveden, onda on treba da sadrzi motivaciju za svoje provodenje. To znaci da privredni akteri treba da aktivno shvate intencije plana i, u isto vrijeme, da njihovi interesi ne budu u suprotnosti s tim intencijama. Zbog toga planiranje pretpostavlja neprestane kontakte s privrednim subjektima, konzultacije i razmjene misljenja, dogovora i zajednicka rjesenja. Zbog toga, i integracioni procesi znatno olaksavaju planiranje. Plan koji proizide iz takvog rada, dobrim dijelom oisigurava i svoje izvrsenje. (2) Dodatnu motivaciju za izvrsenje plana predstavlja njegova realisticnost. Ukoliko se planska predvidanja obicno dobro poklapaju s ostvarenjima kod cega ta predvidanja ne moraju biti sami zadaci odredeni zakonom, vec mogu biti, i u najvecem broju slucajeva treba da budu, elementi dokumentacije koja prati plan plan ulijeva privrednicima povjerenje da ce se stvamo i desiti ono sto je predvideno. Prema tome u njihovom je vlastitom interesu da se sto bolje uklope u predvidene okvire. (3) Potrebno je razlikovati kratkorocni i dugorocni aspekt plana. Razlika.je u tome sto se u prvom slucaju kapaciteti uzimaju kao dani, jer se bitno ne mogu mijenjati, i ekonomska politika se koncentrira ria tekucu pro izvodnju. U drugom slucaju osnovni problem predstavlja mijenjanje privrednih kapaciteta, tj. velicina, struktura i alokacija investicija. (4) Kad su kapaciteti dani, efikasno reguliranje pro izvodnje postizava se uobicajenim ekonomsko-financijskim instrumentima kao sto su krediti, kamate, irenta, doprinosi, porez na promet proizvoda, unutrasnje i vanj144

skotrgovinske premije i subvencije, devizni paritet, garantirane cijene, drzavne rezerve. Ukoliko su potrebne drasticnije intervencije, upotrebljavaju se mjere fizicke kontrole: fiksiranje cijena, uvozne i izvozne kvote, alokacija deficitnih. materijala. Stabilnost i uskladenost privrednog sistema moze se mjeriti stepenom odsutnosti mjera potonje kategorije. (5) U vezi s privrednim rastom kljucno je pitanje investicija. Upravo u tom pogledu socijalisticka privreda pokazuje znacajnu superiomost nad kapitalistickom. Od tri investiciona aspekta, tehnicki se najprostije rjesava obim investicionih sredstava. Ukoliko su investicije pretjerano velike, mogu se oporezovanjem zakociti. Ukoliko su manje nego sto je potrebno, dodatna sredstva potrebna za fmansiranje mogu se prikupiti najpogodnijim instrumentima iz prethodne tacke. (6) Mnogo je teze rijesiti problem optimalne strukture i alokacije investicija. Taj problem kod nas jos uvijek nije rijesen na zadovoljavajuci nacin i u stvari, pored raspodjele dohotka, predstavlja osnovni predmet svih polemika o privrednom sistemu. Nekada se smatralo da centralno treba kontrolirati prakticki sve investicije da bi se postigla njihova optunalna struktura i alokacija i ostvario maksimalni privredni razvoj. U jugoslavenskoj praksi ispostavilo se da je dovoljno kontrolirati raznim mvesticionim fondovima direktno oko jedne trecine ukupnih investicija sto je manje nego na primjer u Francuskoj, a jos uvijek ne predstavlja objektivno moguci minimum pa da se postigne izvanredno visoka stopa rasta. (0 optimum!m a ne mozemo govoriti, ali ne zbog velicine kontroliranih investicija ni 100% ne bi pomoglo vec zato sto ne znamo gdje su ti optimumi!) Objasnjenje treba traziti u heterogenosti investicionih projekata. Ima proizvodnih grupacija u kojima su minimalni kapaciteti relativno veliki u odnosu na drustveni proizvod zemlje. Za takve objekte jedina je solucija finansiranje iz centralnih fondova, a isto tako odluke o velicini kapaciteta, tehnoloskom postupku i lokaciji treba donositi centralno. Da bi se izgradile hidrocentrale Derdap i zeljezara Skopje, treba angazirati citavih nekoliko procenata godisnjeg drustvenog proizvoda kao i elite inzenjera i ekonomista. Medutim, ima proizvodnih grupacija
10 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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u kojima su minimalni rentabilni kapaciteti mali na primjer pojedine grupacije u metalnoj i drvnoj industriji __i tu su centralisticka rjesenja deplasirana. Ima proizvodnih grupacija koje nose privredni razvoj, na primjer energetika, teska industrija i, djelomicno, saobracaj i kemija. U tom podrucju potrebna je veca drustvena intervendja. Medutim, vecina proizvodnih grupadja je heteronomnog karaktera i bez vecih poteskoca se prilagodava potrebama trzista. To vrijedi za industriju tekstila i obuce i uopce za proizvodnju potrosnih dobara, gdje su aktivizacioni periodi kratki, rentabilnost obicno visoka i minimalni rentabilni kapaciteti ne suvise veliki. Taj privredni sektor moze sam da se brine o svojim investicijama. I na koncu (makro) lokacija je presudna za ekstraktivnu industriju i grupacije koje preraduju kabaste sirovine, te tu treba osigurati drustvenu kontrolu. U vecini proizvodnih grupacija pojedinacni investitori su dovoljno kompetentni da sami utvrde lokaciju. (7) Kao sto postoje instrumenti kratkorocnog usmjeravanja, tako postoje i instrumenti dugorocnog usmjeravanja. To su ucesca u investicionom finansiranju, cime se podrucje kontrole prosiruje i na dio sredstava iz decentraliziranih. fondova; favoriziranje investidja u grupacijama koje zaostaju i kocenje u onima koje pretjeruju, oslobadanjem od nekih obaveza za odredeni pocetni pe riod, odnosno prohibitivnim oporezovanjem suvisnih investicija. Kao mjera fizicke kontrole moze se koristiti dozvola za gradnju. (8) Kao poseban problem javlja se razvoj nerazvijenih krajeva. Po pravilu investicije u tim podrucjima manje su rentabilne nego u razvijenim podrucjima (zbog nepostojanja adekvatne infrastrukture, nedostatka kvalificirane radne snage i nepostojanja ekstemih ekonomija). Stoga se u trzisnoj privredi stalno javlja tendencija kanaliziranja investicija u razvijena podrucja cime se povecava jaz izmedu razvijenih i nerazvijenih i dezintegrira narodnu privredu. Te tendencije korigiraju se izdvajanjem odredene mase drustvenih investicionih sredstava pod posebni rezim na primjer u Fond za nerazvijene krajeve uz obavezu da se utrose iskljucivo u nerazvijenom podrucju. Pored toga mogu se koristiti i instru menti iz t. 7. 146

(9) Kad se u prethodnim tackama govorilo o potrebr druStvene kontrole, to nije nuzno impliciralo kontrolu od strane drzavnih organa. U socijalistickoj privredi a taj proces u stvari zapocinje vec u kapitalizmu i banka se moze iskoristiti kao organ drustvene kontrole. Time sistem postaje jos fleksibilniji, a privreda u jo vecoj mjeri deetatizirana.

Zavrsne napomene Preostaje da se jos ucine tri napomene. Prva napomena odnosi se na dosta cestu zbrku u pogledu obaveza i odgovomosti. Decentralizirana privreda nije privreda bez obaveza i odgovomosti. Naprotiv, one su nacelno potpimo jasne, a trebale bi to biti i u konkretnoj praksi. Instruktivno je u tom pogledu ovo rezoniranje. Buduci da su privredni subjekti autonomni, oni su odgovomi i za s v e posljedice svojih odluka. Ako negdje dode do dupliranja kapaciteta, onda je to zbog toga sto su kolektivi ili rukovodstvo nedovoljno drustveno odgovomi i treba ih apeliranjem i politickim metodama dovesti na pravi put. Ako su negdje licni dohoci pretjerano visoki, (iako je, npr. i produktivnost rada visoka i fondovi visoki), onda je to takoder znak drustvene neodgovomosti, koji zahtijeva politicke mjere. Ako na nekom sektoru proizvodnje dode do poremecaja, onda su najvjerojatnije krivi proizvodaci. Ukratko i pomalo karikirano za sve nevolje kriva je nedovoljna svijest. Blisko ovakvim shvacanjima je i stanoviste centralista po kom su ovakvi poremecaji n u z n a posljedica decentralizadje. N ije potrebno posebno upozoravati na voluntarizam ovakvih objasnjenja, pa da se uvidi zasto su ona pogresna. Naravno, u situaciji kad je sistem jos neizgraden i neuskladen, subjektivni faktori igraju izvanredno znacajnu ulogu. Zbog toga ne samo da nije potrebno odreci se metoda uvjeravanja, politickog rada i slicno vec ih naprotiv treba maksimalno koristiti. No to je jedna stvar, a sasvim je druga stvar utvrdivanje sustinske odgovornosti za pojedine odluke i njihove posljedice. U nacelu svako moze biti odgovoran samo u okviru svog djelokruga rada. Radni kolektiv j e d n o g p o d u 10* 147

z e c a ne moze biti odgovoran za j u g o s l a v e n s k u p r i v r e d u jer on niti je kvalificiran niti ima mogucnost da sagleda sta je hajkorisnije za privredu u cjelini. Ono sto se od kolektiva trazi jeste da postojece uslove poslovanja iskoristi za ostvarivanje maksimalnog prosperiteta svog poduzeca legali-iim sredstvima i potujuci odredene drustvene norme. Ako kod toga dode do privrednog poremecaja, za to nije odgovoran radni kolektiv vec netko drugi. Takoder, odgovomost se moze pripisati pojedinom radnom kolektivu jedino za pojedinacne greske (ili uspjehe). Ako citave grane posluju rdavo (ili ostvaruju ekstra licne dohotke), odgovomost snosi netko dru gi. Taj netko drugi jesu organi ekonomske politike i, prije svega, drzavni aparat. Drzavni aparat odgovoran je za ostvarivanje takvih uslova privredivanja u kojima ce se normalni interesi privrednih organizacija poklopiti u drustvenim interesima, tj. u kojima normalno poslovno ponasanje privred nih organizacija ne moze izazvati privredne poremecaje i rasipanje drustvenih sredstava. To je izvanredno tezak zadatak i izvanredno velika odgovomost; u tom pogledu drzavni aparat u jugoslavenskoj privredi nalazi se u mno go tezoj situaciji nego aparat bilo neke kapitalisticke bilo neke administrativno planirane privrede. U prvoj po definiciji d r z a v n i aparat ne odgovora za djelatnost p r i v a t n i h proizvodaca iako treba konstatirati da su u tzv. privredama blagostanja shvacanja u tom po gledu znatno evoluirala u potonjoj hijerarhijska disciplina omogucava direktnu intervenciju u slucaju poreme caja. U nasoj privredi drzavni aparat se nalazi u prividno paradoksalnoj situaciji da odgovara za akcije subjekata koje ne kontrolira jer su autonomni. Paradoksalnost je prividna zato jer nemogucnost a d m i n i s t r a t i v n e , b i r o k r a t s k e kontrole ne znaci i nemoguc nost kontrole u o p c e . No problem je u tome sto je neadministrativna kontrola iako potencijalno efikasnija nesravnjivo slozenija, i sto je potrebna ne samo znatno veca strucnost vec i veliki psiholoski napor da a d m i n i s t r a t i v n i aparat ostvari n e a d m i n i s t r a t i v n u kontrolu1 U tom podrucju cini se treba nastaviti s teorij.
1 Od interesa je uoiti prirodnu sklonost administracije da ili odustane od kontrole ili provodi striktnu administrativnu kontrolu. Time mozemo donekle o'bjasniti jos jedan prividni paradoks da se u ist(7

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skim i prakticnim istrazivanjima i nije iskljuceno da ce: nam buducnost donijeti znacajne institucionalne pro-mjene. . . _ U sirem smislu u uslove privredivanja ulazi i adekvatni sistem informacija. Da bi privredne odluke bile ispravne, nije dovoljno da postoji ispravna motivacija, po trebno je da privredni subjekti u svakom momentu i z n a j u sta je najprobitafinije za njihove interese. U tom pogledu postojeci sistem informacija daleko je od toga da zadovoljava bilo institucionalno tko je nadlezan za koju informaciju, odnosno kod koga se neka informacija moze dobiti bilo tehnicki kad se uzmu u obzir ogromne neiskoristene moguciiosti suvremene informativne tehnike. Zavrsna napomena sastoji se u konstataciji jedne ozbiljne disproporcije sadaSnje faze razvoja. Citava dosadasnja analiza pokazuje da je jugoslavenski tip privrede znatno slozeniji od tipova koje smo ranije poznavali. Po red toga to je nov tip privrede za koji ne postoje strana iskustva koja se mogu kopirati. Jedno i drugo cini da su zadaci koji se postavljaju pred rukovodece drustveno-politicke i drzavne organe, izvanredno slozeni i odgovorni. Mnogi prpblemi sadasnje etape razvoja ostali su otvoreni i nerijeseni. S daljnjim veoma brzim privrednim raz vojem problemi planskog socijalistickog usmjeravanja privrede i drustva postajade nuzno jos sloienijim. T i za daci i problemi mogu se efikasno rjesavati samo oslanjanjem na naucno-istrazivacki rad najviseg ranga. Drustveno-privredna masina ocigledno je neuporedivo slozevrijeme Cuju mnogobrojne kritike o pretjeranoj decentralizaciji i jos mnogobrojnije ialbe o nedovoljnoj decentralizaciji. X jedno i drugo je taSno, a interpretacija je ova. Pod spretjeranom decentralizacijomi misli se u stvari na odsustvo koordinacije, 5to ima za posljedicu nered, zbrku u kompetencijama, neodgovomost, rasipanje. ,Nedovoljna decentralizacija* znafii postojanje nepotrebnih. zapreka za ostvarivanje samoupravnih prava sa slifinim negativnim posljedicama. Procedura oko dobivanja zajmova je toliko komplicirana, skupa i neefikasna da dovodi do ozbUjnih Steta; ponekad se mjesecima ceka na odobrenje minimalnih deviznih iznosa uslijed fiega propada mogudnost mnogostniko; vede realizacije;. poneke.privredne.akcije .zayisne su.od raznih odobrerija, koja se 5etaju od orgaiia do organa s velikim gubitkom vremena; banke su mnogo vi5e administrativne nego poslovne ustanove i si. Odatle-'bpravdani- zahtjevi" da se decentralizacija dosljedno- provede do kraja i tako normalizuju nslovi poslovanja za priyredne organizacije.

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nija od ma koje masine u oblasti tehnike. Medutim, toj slozenoj privredi stavlja se na raspolaganje samo veoma prixnitivno organiziran naucni rad u oblasti drustvenih nauka i, posebno, u oblasti ekonomije. Iskustvo _1961. i 1962. predstavlja upozorenje da ta disproporcija nije ni akademska ni neopasna. A sto privreda postaje kompleksnija, teze su i potencijalne konsekvence.

Citirana literatura Jl. Pismo Engelsa K. Schmidtu 5. avgusta 1880; K. Marx, F. Engels, Izbrannye pisjma, OGIZ, Moskva, 1948. 2. K. Marx, lOsnivacki manifest medunarodnog udruzenja radnikaa, Prva intemacionala, Rad, Beograd, 1950. 3. F. Engels, Anti-Diihring, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1946. -4. Pismo Marxa Kugelmannu 11. jula 1868. K. Marx, Pisma Kugelmannu, Kultura, Beograd, 1951. .5. K. Marx, Kapital, sv. Ill, Kultura, Zagreb, 1947. !5a. K. Marx, Kapital, sv. II, Kultura, Zagreb, 1947. 6. K. Marx, Kritika Gotskog programa, F. Engels, Kritika nacrta Erfrutskog programa, Kultura, Beograd, 1959. '7. K. Marx, Ekonomsko-filozofski rukopisk; K. Marx, F. Engels, Rani radovi, Kultura, Zagreb, 1953. '8 F. Engels, 0 autoritetua, 1873; K. Marx, F. Engels, Izabrana . djela, tom I, Kultura, Zagreb, 1949. 9. Pismo Marxa Rugeu 1843; K. Marx. F. Engels, Rani radovi, Kultura, Zagreb, 1 953. 10. K. Marx, F. Engels, Manifest komunisticke partije, Kultura, Zagreb, 1948. 11. K. Marx, GraAanski rat u Francuskoj, Kultura, Zagreb, 1947. 12. Pismo Engelsa E. Bersteinu 25. oktobra 1881. K. Marx, F. Engels, Izbrannye pisjma. 13. Golunski-Strogovic, Teorija drzave i prava, Zagreb, 1947. 14. K. Marx, Gospodin Vogt, Kultura, Zagreb, 1955. 15. K. Marx, sZamecemja na knigu Adolfa Vagnera, Socinenija, P'artizdat, 1935, tom XV, Moskva. 16. F. Engels, Predgovor III svesci Kapitalaa, K. Marx, Ka pital III, Kultura, Zagreb, 1949. 17. A. Bebel, Napadi na osnovne poglede i takticko stajaliste partije, 1899, u Marksizam i revizionizam, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1 958. 18. Pismo Marxa Engelsu 8. januara 1868; K. Marx, F. Engels, Prepiska, IV tom, Kultura, Beograd, 1960.

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19. Pismo Marxa Rugeu septembra 1843; K. Marx, F. Engels, Rani radovi, Kultura, Zagreb, 1953. 20. K. Marx, F. Engels, Socinenija, II izdanje, Moskva. 21. B. Horvat, Note on the Rate of Growth of the Yugoslav Economy, Papers and Monographs No. 4, JIEI, Beograd, 1963. 22. E. Fromm, Zdravo drustvo, Rad, Beograd, 1963. 23. Grupa ekonomista, Vzroci i karakteristike privrednih kretanja u 1961, i 1962. g. Savplan, DAM-7, Beograd, 1962. 24. ^Peaceful Transitions from Socialism to Capitalism?, Monthly Review, mart 1964, 56990. 25. K. Marx, Uz kritiku Hegelove filozofije pravaa, u: K. Marx, F. Engels, Rani radovi, Kultura, Zagreb, 1 953. 26. F. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society^, American Economic Review, 1945, 51930. 27. National Institute of Industrial Psychology, Joint Consulta tion in British Industry, Staples Press, London, 1952. 28. L. Coch, J. R. P. French, ^Overcoming resistance to Changea, Human Relations, 1 948. 29. K. Lewin, R. Lippit, R. K. White, ^Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created Social Climatesa, Journal of Social Psychology, 1 939. 30. R. Lippit, R. K. White, An Experimental Study of Leader ship and Group Life, u G. E. Swanson i dr. (ur.). Readings in Social Psychology, Holt, New York, 1951. 31. K. Lewin, Group Decision and Social Changes, ibid. 32. R. Bendixe, Higher Civil Servants in American Society, Univ. of Colorado Press, Boulder, Col. 1949. 33. B. Horvat, Organizacija preduzeca za eksploataciju nafte i plina u nekim zemljama i kod nas, Organizacija rada, 1 i 12/1952. 1 34. R. Bicanic, ^Economic Growth under Centralized and Decentralized Planning: Jugoslavia, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1957. 35. B. Horvat, Ekonomika jugoslavenske naftne privrede, doktorska disertacija na Ekonomskom fakultetu u Zagrebu, 1954. 36. H. A. Clegg, T. E. Chester, The Future of Nationalization, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953.

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IV

PROIZVODNI RAD, DRUSTVENO VLASNISTVO I STRUKTURA JUGOSLAVENSKOG DRUSTVA

14. PROIZVODNI RAD U SOCIJALISTICKOM DRUSTVU

Veoma je raSireno glediste da je Marx odredio proizvodni rad kao rad u proizvodnji materijalnih dobara. Taj na oko; Cisto akademski stav dovodi do prilicno dalekoseznih posljedica. Tako se kao drustveni proizvod odre-' duje i statistlcki i pojmovno samo materijalni dio pro izvodnje. Usluge se ne ukljucuju, Sto znaci da se o njima cesto i ne vodi nikakvo seriozno drustveno racunovodstvo. Medutim, u suvremenoj privredi broj zaposleriih u sektorii usluga raste brze nego u sektorn materijalne proizvodnje,tako da zivotni standard, privredna stabilnost itd. u prilicno odluchijucoj mjeri zavisi o tome Sto se deSava s proizvodnjom usluga. Nadalje, terrain proizvodan<t iina i odreden emocionalni sadrzaj. Dobro je.biti proizvodan i nezgodno je biti neproizvodan. Na toj osnovi nicu cak i politicke teoiije o proizvodacima<c ili neposrednim pro153

izvoctacimaa koji postaju nosiocima drustvenog sistema i na neki nacin su automatski progresivni za razliku od ponesto dubioznih imeproizvodaca*1 Sve to ukazuje na . veliko teorijsko i prakticno znacenje ispravnog odredenja pojma proizvodnog rada. Kod toga rijec ispravana ne treba interpretirati kao istinit jer definicije po svojo j prirodi nisu ni istinite ni lazne vec kao prikladan ili adekvatan s obzirom na jedan siri teorijski okvir u kom pojam proizvodnog rada treba da ima odredenu kategorijalnu funkciju. Mozemo odmah ovdje na pocetku upozoriti da materijalnost kao kriterij proizvodnosti nema nikakvog teo rijsko g smisla ili opravdanja i da Marx proizvodan rad nije svodio na rad u oblasti materijalne proizvodnje. Stavise, Marx je takvo identificiranje okarakterizirao kao teorijsku besmislicu. Da vidimo, dakle, o cemu se radi.

M a rx o proizvodnom radu Marx, dosljedan kako je on to bio u svom teoretskom misljenju, nije se zanimao neMstorijskom teorijom, teorijom proizvodnog rada uopce. Nigdje u njegovom obimnom opusu ne moze se naci pokusaj da se formulira takva vjecno vazeca teorija (drugo su, naravno, neke opce definicije, a i te su vrlo rijetke). On je teoriji pro izvodnog rada prisao historijski, njega je interesirao problem proizvodnog rada samo u vezi s ekonomskom epohom koju je studirao i za koju je nastojao formulirati jednu sveobuhvatnu politicku ekonomiju. To je bila epoha kapitalisticke proizvodnje. Njegova polazna tacka identicna je sa stanovistem tipicnog kapitalistickog poduzetnika. Kapitalista interesira rentabilnost njegovog posla, on pokusava maksimirati razliku izmedu cijene i troskova. Ako je to tipicno ponasanje tipicnog proizvodnog subjekta u kapitalistickom sistemu, onda to treba uzeti kao kriterij
1 Tako je npr. Savezna konferencija SocijalistiSkog saveza radnog naroda Jugoslavije SSRNJ u svom dokumentu od 27. maja 1967. calla za potrebno da pozove na idejno-politiku borbu za formiranje samoupravljaCke svijesti o karakteru obrazovanja, nauke i kulture: Time < e se suzbijati i ona shvadanja da su ove djelatnosti svojevrsni parazit S koji zivi od viska rada, a ne nerazluivi dio ukupne druStvene reprodukdje bez kojeg ne moze biti brzeg sveopdeg napretka zajednice i njene produktivnosti i bez kojeg se ne mogu zadovoljavati potrebe radnog 5ovjeka (1, 13).

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proizvodnosti rada u tom sistemu. Rad je proizvodan kad proizvodi visak vrijednosti1 . Ono sto je sa stanovista drustva dohodak, to je bruto dohodak sa stanovista kapitalista. Sto ovaj potonji smatra neto dohotkom, odgovara dohotku zajednice umanjenom za nadnice. Medutim je i dohodak zajednice, bruto dohodak, apstrakcija utoliko sto se citavo druStvo, na osnovi kapitalisticke proizvodnje, stavlja na kapitalisticko stanoviste pa stoga kao cisti dohodak smatra samo dohodak koji se rastvara u profit i rentua. (3, 776) U gom ja dva odlomka formulirana je sustina Marxovog problema. U nastavku mi cemo razmotriti sistematicnije neke vaznije aspekte tog problema. Jedino mjesto gdje Marx raspravlja o problemu sistematski jest poglavlje o pojmu proizvodnog rada u prvom svesku Teorija 0 visku vrijednosti (kritika Smitha) i dodatak tom svesku (Marxovi pozitivni pogledi). Prema tome ta dva poglavlja pruzit ce vecinu potrebnih citata. Buduci da ovdje valja plivati protiv struje, bit ce potrebno da se poduzmu izvjesne mjere opreza. Da bih izbjegao prigovor da svoje vlastito shvacanje pripisujem Marxu, ogranicit cu se na kratke komentare ostavljajuci Marxa da govori sam. Zapocnimo s poznatom i cesto navodenom definicijom iz Kapitala, kojom se proces rada definira nezavisno od njegovih historijskih oblika kao proces izmedu covjeka 1 prirode: Ako citav proces [rada, H. B.] promatramo sa stanovista njegova rezultata, proizvoda, onda se oba, i sredstvo za rad i predmet rada, ispoljavaju kao sredstva za- proizvoanju, a sam rad kao pro izvodan rad. (1, 137) Da ne dode do zabune do koje, medutim, ipak neprestano dolazi Marx odmah dodaje i slijedecu biljesku ispod teksta: Ova definicija proizvodnog rada, kakva izlazi sa stanovista jednostavnog procesa rada, nikako nije dovoljna za kapitalisticki nacin proizvodnje.a (1, 137)
J Taj stav ne karakterizira samo kapitaliste Marxova vremena; identidna shvadanja zastupaju i suvremeni, recimo americki, kapitalisti: Drzava je nemocna da stvori ma sto u smislu u kom privreda proiz vodi bogatstvo, a individuumi ideje i izum e. . . (Sutton i dr,, The American Business Creed, s. 195, citirano prema Galbraith, 2, 184).

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Za kapitalisticki nacin proizvodnje potrebna je drugacija definicija, koju Marx preuzima od Smitha1 Smith, kao . sto se to njemu cesce dogadalo, imao je u stvari dvije medusobno nedosljedne teorije. Prema prvoj, koju Marx smatra tacnom2 rad je proizvodan kad proizvodi kapital. , Prema drugoj, kriterij se sastoji u proizvodnji materijalnih dobara (nasuprot neproizvodnom radu utrosenog na nematerijalne usluge). Ta druga Smithova definicija danas se naziva marksistickom definicijom drustvenog proizvo da. Tesko da ce nekog obrazovanog ekonomista zacuditi. da je Marx i sam, kao i drugi ekonomisti, podvrgnuo kritici slabosti druge Smithove definicije. U sistemu proste robne proizvodnje proizvoctac razmjenjuje svoje proizvode za sredstva izdrzavanja. Kapita listicki nacin proizvodnje kida veze izmedu rada i vlasnistva na sredstva za proizvodnju i izmedu razmjene rada i potrosnih dobara umece masineriju kapitalisticke. proizvodnje. Proizvedena dobra mogu ostati ista, ali je drustveni sadrzaj proizvodnje sada drugaciji.
1 Zbog toga izgleda da nije samo Marxu potrebna obrana od sovjetskih ekonomista, ve<5 da i Smitha treba braniti od njihovih zapadnih kolega. Tu je obranu dao na izvrstan nacin A. W. Lewis. UklopivSi osnove klasicnog prilaza u dva svoja rada (5; 6), profesor Lewis interpretira Smitha na isti nafiin kao i Marx (iako, koliko mi je poznato, on sam ne poznaje Marxovu interpretaciju), kao Sto se moze vidjeti iz slijededih odlomaka: Kako je Smith postavio distinkciju, dva su elementa proizvodnog rada. Prvo, njegov se proizvod sastoji od nadnigoihdobara (dobra koja ulaze u potroSnju radnika, B. H .) i iskljuuje usluge. Drugo, proizvodni rad proizvodi viSak iznad nadnica i zato ima vedi prosjecni proizvod nego neproizvodnl rad. Ta je distinkcija ucinjena i upotrebljavana jedino u svrhu analize- akumulacije kapitala.< BiljeSke: &Striktno govoredi, Smithova definicija razlikuje dobra i uslu ge. Ali naSa modema distinkcija izmedu nadnikih dobara i ostale proizvodnje izgleda da je stvarno ono na Sto je on ciljao i sto najbolje pristaje njegovoj analizi.g Neoklasini ekonomisti napadali su tu di stinkciju sa stanoviSta teorije vrijednosti, all kako ona nije bila miSljena za taj kontekst, napad je. irelevantan.c I konaino: *KIasicni eko nomisti prilazili su analizi akumulacije preko potroSnje nadnifikih do bara. Oni su podijelili potroSace u tri klase: (1) kapitaliste i zemljoposjednike, (2) proizvodafie usluga i predmeta luksuza i (3) proizvoda5e nadnicnih dobara. U Sirem smislu, potroSnja proizvodada nenadnifikih dobara. bila je dio potroSnje kapitalista i zemljoposjednika, buduci da su oni smatrali da klasu ( 2 ) izdriava klasa ( 1 ) za svoju zabavu itd. iz viSka iscijedenog iz klase (3). Na taj naCin, kad su oni govorili o Stednji kapitalista, om su ponekad mislili na smanjenje njihove line potroSnje nadni&rih dobara, ali 5eS6e su prosto Tniglil? da se ima manje Iicne posluge i da je tako reduciran broj izdrzavanih u klasi ( 2 ). ( 6, 4 -5 ) 7 2 Razmotrimo najprije prvu, taCnu definiciju. Proizvodan rad u smislu kapitalistidke proizvodnje je najamni rad, koji u razmjeni :za promjenljivi dio kapitala ne samo reproducira ovaj dio kapitdla7 . . . nego oshn toga proizvodi i viSak vrijednosti za kapitalista . . . Proizvo dan je samo onaj hajarimi rad koji proizvodi kapital* (?, 239).

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_ Rezultat procesa kapitalisticke proizvodnje niti. je sam proizvod (upotrebna vrijednost) niti rob a, to jest upotrebna vrijednost koja ima odrectenu prometnu vrijednost. Njegov rezultat, njegov pro izvod se sastoji u stvaranju viska vrijedxiosti za kapital, te stoga u stvamom pretvaranju novca ili robe u kapital.. . A ovaj specfficni proizvod procesa kapitalisticke proizvodnje kapital postize samo u razmjeni za rad, koji se zato zove proizvodni rad.i (7, 377) Definicija proizvodnog rada slijedi direktno: Proizvodan rad je, dakle u sistemu kapita listicke proizvodnje takav rad koji za onoga tko ga upotrebljava proizvodi visak vrijednosti, ili koji pretvara objektivne uslove rada u kapital, a njihovog sopstvenika u kapitalista; dakle, rad koji svoj sopstveni proizvod proizvodi kao kapital.a Ako, dakle, govorimo o proizvodnom radu, onda govorimo o drustveno odredenom radu, o radu koji pretpostavlja sasvim odredeni odnos izmedu kupca i prodavca rada. (7, 373 4)

I dosljedno tome neproizvodan rad odreduje se po istom kriteriju kao i proizvodan te nema rdkakve veze s nematerijalnim uslugama. Ako se proizvodni rad odreduje kao rad koji se neposredno razmjenjuje za kapitaU onda je. time ujedno apsolutno utvrdeno sta je neproizvodan rad. To je rad koji se razmjenjuje ne za kapital vec neposredno za dohodak. . .a (7, 244) Isti zakljucak ponovljen je jos jednom u Kapitalu: Kao god sto robe koje kapitalist kupuje jednim : dijelom viska vrijednosti za svoju vlastitu potrosnju, ne sluze njemu kao sredstva za proizvodnju i oplodivanje vrijednosti, tako isto ni rad koji on ku puje radi zadovoljavanja svojih prirodnih i drustvenih potreba nije proizvodan rad. Mjesto da kupovinom onih roba i rada pretvara visak vrijednosti u kapital, on ga naprotiv trosi ili izdaje kao dohodak. (4, 517) Ocigledno sa tog je stajalista irelevantho da li rad rezultira u materijalnim dobrima ili nematerij alnim uslugama:
1 U KuIturinom prijevodu pogresno stoji proizvodni kapital*.

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Iz prethodnoga proizlazi da biti proizvodan rad jeste odredba rada koja prije svega nema nikakve veze s odredenom sadrzinom rada, ni s njegovom posebnom korisnoscu ill osobenom upotrebnom vrijednoscu u kojoj se predstavlja. Ista vrsta rada moze da bude proizvodna ili neproizvodnai (7, 378) Tako npr., krojac koji je zaposlen u krojackom poduzecu, proizvodan je radnik. S druge strane, krojacki pomocnik (koji radi u mojoj kuci) nije proizvodan radnik, iako njegov rad daje meni proizvod, caksire, a njemu cijenu njegovog rada, novac. (7, 379) Medutim, kako stoji stvar s klasicnim neproizvodnim radnicima, kao sto su npr. umjetnici? Marxov je odgovor nedvosmislen: Pjevacica, na primjer, koja na svoj sopstveni rizik prodaje svoje pjevanje, neproizvodni je radnik. Ali ista pjevacica, koju angazuje neki poduzetnik da pjeva na koncertima da bi zaradio novaca, proizvo dan je radnik, jer ona proizvodi kapital.c (7, 378) Da zakljucimo: Karakteristicno je za sve vrste neproizvodnog rada da se ja mogu njima u toliko viSe koristiti kao i kupovinom sve druge robe u svrhu potrosnje ukoliko vise eksploatisem proizvodne radnike... Dok, obratno, moja moc da upotrebljavam proizvod ne radnike ne raste niposto u srazmjeri u kojoj upotrebljavam neproizvodne radnike, nego obratno, ona u istoj srazmjeri opada. (7, 382) Svoju teoriju proizvodnog rada Marx je veoma pregledno sazeo u jednom odlomku Kapitala. Nakon Sto je ustanovio da podjela rada prosiruje pojam proizvodnog rada, Marx istice da ga kapitalisticka proizvodnja na specifican nacin suzuje: Kapitalisticka proizvodnja nije samo proizvod nja roba, ona je u snstini proizvodnja viska vrijednosti. Radnik ne proizvodi za sebe vec za kapital. Zato nije vise dovoljno da on samo proizvodi. On mora proizvoditi visak vrijednosti. Proizvodan je samo onaj radnik koji proizvodi visak vrijednosti za kapitalista, koji dakle sluzi samooplodivanju ka pitala. Ako nam je slobodno izabrati primjer izvan materijalne proizvodnje, onda je neM ucitelj pro izvodan radnik kad ne radi samo na obradivanju djetinjih glava, nego kad i sam izdire radi bogacenja poduzetnika. Ovaj se odnos ni u cemu ne mijenja time sto je kapital plasiran u tvomicu 158

znanja umjesto u tvomicu kobasica. Prema tome se u poimu proizvodnog radnika nikako ne sadrzi samo odnos izmedu djelatnosti i korisnog ucinka... nego i specifican drufitveni odnos proizvodnje, nastao u historiji. . . (4, 442) I to je onda Marxova teorija proizvodnog i neproizvodnog rada. Medutim, Marx cini jos jedan daljnji korak. Njega sada interesira da ustanovi da li se i u kojoj mjeri druga Smithova definicija moze smatrati aproksimacijom prve. Ako se to moze uciniti, njegov model kapitalistickog sistema bio bi malo pojednostavljen a da ne izgubi ni jednu od svojih bitnili oznaka. On pocinje generalizacijom empirickog svjedocanstva svog vremena: ujer takav je zakon ekonomskog razvitka da funkcije raspodjeljuje medu razna lica, i da se zanatlija ili seljak, koji proizvodi sopstvenim sredstvima za proizvodnju, postepeno pretvara u malog kapitalista, koji eksploatise i tud rad, ili gubi svoja sredstva za proizvodnju... i pretvara se u najamnog radnika. Takva je tendencija drustvenog oblika u kome preovladuje kapitalisticki nacin proizvodnje. Pri razmatranju sustinsMh. odnosa kapitalisticke proizvodnje... moze se dakle pretpostaviti da je cio robni svijet, da su sve oblasti materijalne proizvod nje proizvodnje materijalnog bogatstva potcinjene (formalno ili stvamo) kapitaHstickom nacinu proizvodnje. Pri toj pretpostavci, koja izrazava cilj (lim it), i koja se, dakle, sve vise priblizava apsolutnoj tacnosti, svi radnici uposleni u proizvodnji robe najamni su radnici, a sredstva za proizvodnju istupaju prema njima u svim ovim oblastima kao kapital. A u tom slucaju moze se uzeti kao karakteristicno za proizvodne radnike, tj. za radnike koji proizvode kapital, to da se njihov rad ostvaruje u robi, u materijalnom bogatstvu. I tako bi proizvodan rad, pored svoje glavne karakteme crte, koja nema nikakve veze sa sadriinom rada i od nje je potpuno nezavisna, dobio drugu, od prve razlicitu, sporednu karaktemu crtu. (71, 385, podvukao H. B.) Preostaje da se vidi da li se mogu zapaziti neke teniencije na podrucju duliovne proizvodnje. Kod nematerijalne proizvodnje, i onda kad se ona obavlja iskljucivo radi razmjene, dakle kad proizvodi robu, moguce su dvije stvari: 1. Ona rezfultira u robi, u upotrebnim vrijednostima, koje posjeduju od.proizvodaca i potrosaca odvojeno samostalno oblicje; koje, dakle, mogu
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postojati u vremenskom razmaku izmedu proizvod nje i potrosnje, i u ovom razmaku mogu cirkulirati kao prodajna roba, kao npr. knjige, slike, ukratko, svi proizvodi umjetnickog stvaranja samih umjetnika. Tu se kapitalisticka proizvodnja primjenjuje samo u veoma ogranicenoj m jeri (podvukao H. B.). Ukoliko, na primjer, neki pisac za neko zajednicko djelo recimo enciklopediju iskoriscuje mnoge druge .kao pomocnike... 2. Proizvodnja je neodvojiva od cina proizvodenja, kao kod svm egzekutivmh umjetnika, glumaca, ucitelja, ljekara, popova itd. I tu se kapitalisticki nacin proizvodnje obavlja samo u nekim oblastim a ... Sve ove pojave kapitalisticke proizvodnje u ovoj oblasti toliko su beznacajne uporedene s cjelokupnom proizvodnjom, da se mogu potpuno zanemariti. (podvukao H. B.; 7, 3867)

Proizlazi slijedeci zakljucak: po Marxovu misljenju bitne osobine kapitalistickog nacina proizvodnje mogu se ustanoviti analizom proizvodnje materijalnih dobara, koja je u tom sistemu najvecim dijelom organizirana na kapitalistickoj osnovici i koja obuhvaca najpretezniji dio cjelokupne proizvodnje. One vrste rada koje se ne fiksiraju u robi cesto po prirodi svojoj ne mogu biti podvrgnute kapitalistickom nacinu proizvodnje* (7, 279) te tako nisu od veceg interesa za Marxovo istrazivanje. U tom smislu Marx je organizirao i svoja istrazivanja u Kapitalu, gdje se uglavnom govori o robama, tj. o materijalnim proizvodima. I to je sve.

Smisao revizije Marxove teorije proizvodnog rada Moguca je jos jedna interpretacija. Marx je mogao pobrkati stvari i previdjeti da ova njegova specijalna teorija protivurijeci njegovim filozofskim pogledima i njegovoj opcijoj teoriji razvoja drustveno-ekonomskih sistema. Upravo to implicitno pretpostavljaju svi oni autori koji izvode marksisticku definiciju druStvenog proizvoda iz Marxovog filozofskog materijalizma i iz -Marxove teorije o. odnosu izmedu haze i nadgradnje. Sto se tice filozofskog .materijalizma, mozemo odmah ustano viti da materijalnost u filozofskom smislu osim u vulgamoj filozofiji nije identicna's opipljivoscu,. opredmecenoscu, sto je upravo kriterij materijalistickih defi16.0

nicija drustvenog proizvoda koje se pozivaju na Marxa. Prema tome povezivanje Marxove filozofije i predmetnog sadrzaja proizvodnje nedopustivo je. Sto se tice povezivanja s teorijom baze i nadgradnje, najrazradenija meni poznata verzija te doktrine potice iz pera sovjetskog ekonomista J. A. Kronroda, od koga cu posuditi nekoliko citata radi ilustracije. Drustveni proizvod je rezultat materijalne pro izvodnje, rezultat proizvodnog rada. U proizvodu se ispoljavaju rezultati ljudskog rada, kojem je svrha reproduciranje materijalnih uslova za zivot drustva, tj. prisvajanje prirodnxh dobara, koja zadovoljavaju ljudske potrebe. Ali upravo zbog toga, rezultati duhovne proizvodnje ne stvaraju proizvod u ekonomskom smislu, nego su samo odraz procesa materijalnog zivota. ... Brkanje materijalne i duhovne proizvodnje dovodi do nemarksistickog brisanja razlike izmedu baze i nadgradnje, dovodi do identificirahja rezultata materijalne proizvodnje, koji stvaraju proizvod, i rezultata duhovne proizvodnje, koji predstavljaju odraz materijalnog procesa zivota. (8, 9) Marx je drzao da odnosi ljudi u proizvodnji ekonomski odnosi predstavljaju najvazniju determinantu strukture svakog poznatog drustva. Govoritno o feudalnom, kapitalistickom itd. drustvu zbog feudalnih, kapitalistickih itd. ekonomsMh odnosa u tim drustvima. Ideologije, ili opgtije, kulture tih drustava odrazavaju njihove ekonomske osnovice i kao takve predstavljaju nadgradnju. U svakom klasnom drustvu kultura je kultura vladajuce, tj. posjednicke, klase. Posjednicka klasa stvara svoju kulturu bilo direktno, kao duhovni proizvodaci, bilo indirektno, kao kupac. U svakom slucaju vlasnici i lica koja o njima ovise, zive od rada nevlasnika. Sve sto slijedi iz te do krajnosti pojednostavljeno izlozene materijalisticke koncepcije historije jest fundamentalna socioloska razlika izmedu ekonomske sfere i ideoloske sfere dru stva. Dovoljno je baciti jedan pogled na predgovor Priloga kritici politicke ekotiomije pa da se ustanovi da Marx nije mogao poistovetiti nacin proizvodnje materijalistickog zivota, tj. bazu, s opipljivom materijalnom proizvodnjom. Za njega je ta materijalna osnovica drustva sinonim za ekonomsku strukturu. Razlikovanje baze i nadgradnje ne pruz-a nikakav kriterij za razlikovanje izmedu dobara i usluga sto je osnovica marksisticke definicije dru:
11 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

stvenog proizvoda. Gdje treba klasificirati usluge brijaca, bolnicarki i cistaca ulica? Treba li ih ukljuciti u baza ili nadgradnju drustva? Izgleda da je Kronrod svjestan poteskoce pa predlaze da u takvim slucajevima treba proanalizirati konkretnu funkciju rada u pogledu njegove proizvodnosti (s. 15), ali ne daje upute na koji nacin to treba uraditi. Nadalje, ni odnos izmedu materijalne i duhovne proizvodnje ne odreduje odnos izmedu-proizvodnog i neproizvodnog rada. Vidjeli smo da je prema Marxovoj definiciji nmni rad umjetnika i pisaca, ukoliko je organiziran na kapitalistickoj osnovici, jednako proizvodan kao i rad radnika, dok je predmeceni rad krojackog zanatlije u kapitalistickom sistemu neproizvodan. U koliko ne pretendiramo na to da pouamo Marxa sto je trebalo da misli, moramo prihvatiti definiciju proizvodnosti u smislu u kom je on sam upotrebljava. A iz gornjih. navoda ocigledno je da je Marx definirao proizvodnost u smislu akumulacije kapitala, tj. u smislu drustve nih odnosa koji postoje kod kapitalistickog nacina pro izvodnje. To nema nikakve veze s problemom odnosa izmedu baze i nadgradnje, a niti s odnosom materijalne i nematerijalne proizvodnje. Nakon sto je prva nedosljednost ukljucena, ostale nuzno slijede. Vidjeli smo da prema Marxovom misljenju kad govorimo o proizvodnom radu, onda govorimo o drustveno odre&enom radu. Slijedi da ce isti fizicki agregati dobara i usluga imati razlicite sadrzaje proiz vodnog rada ovisno o tome da li je privreda kapitalisticka ili socijalisticka. Ignorirajuci tu neposrednu logiku protagonist! marksisticke definicije drustvenog proiz voda propisuju ista statisticka pravila za izracunavanje drustvenog proizvoda u obim privredama, naime, ukljucivanje materijalnih dobara i iskljucivanje nematerijalnih usluga. U vezi s tim jedno profinjavanje zasluzuje kratak komentar. Neki autori nastoje razviti svoj marksizam. jog jedan korak dalje pa postuliraju nesto malo drugaciju formulu za socijalizam. Time dolazimo do naredne tacke. Od vremena Adama Smitha od kraja X V III vijeka razlikovanje proizvodnog i neproizvodnog rada imalo je uvijek jednu izrazenu klasnu i politicku notu. Kako je to Marx formulirao. Smith je u stvari svrstao drzavne 162

funkcionere, advokate i popove u istu kategoriju s lakrdijasima, prostitutkama i sluzincadi. Taj postupak nije mogao a da ne izazove ostre proteste od strane onih prvih. Karakteristican je slucaj Malthusa. Trebalo jegom je drustvene slojeve uciniti proizvodnima. Moglo bi se ocekivati da ce se apologetika ponovno pojaviti i u diskusijama oko togpredmeta sredinom X X vijeka. Kronrod nas spremno snabdjeva s teorijom kakva. se samo moze pozeljeti: S druge strane, socijalizam rada nove proizvodne funkcije... Funkcija socijalisticke drzave,. funkcija partije kao rukovodece snage socijalistickog drustva jesu neposredno proizvodne funkcije,. buduci da drzava i partija vrse privredno-organizatorsku ulogu neposredno rukovodeci i organizirajuci sav proces materijalne proizvodnje u socijalistickom drustvu. (8, 39) Za Marxa je, dakako, drzavni aparat bio prototip dru stvenog parazitizma i teza o odumiranju drzave u socija lizmu dovoljno je poznata da bi zahtijevala ma kakav daljnji dokaz. Citat sluzi kao ilustracija cinjenice da marksizam i Marxovo teoretsko nasljede nisu nuznojedna te ista stvar1 . Preostaje da se da odgovor na pitanje o porijeklir marksistickea definicije drustvenog proizvoda i da seobjasni jedinstvena solidamost dvaju antagonistickih tabora nemarksista i marksista u vezi s tim problemom. Izmedu razlicitih mogucih objasnjenja kao osnovicu za svoje vlastito odabirem iskusano marksistickotretiranje teorije kao drustveno uslovljene. Buduci da je marksisticka definicija ili arbitrama ili vodi do teoretski besmislenih rezultata, antimarksisticki autori nisu mogli imati nista protiv nje. Politicki pritisak ili pristrasnost posljednje citirane Kronrodove postavke ocigledni su. Sto se tice ostaloga, identificiranjeproizvoda s materijalnim proizvodom moze biti djelomicno uslovljeno utjecajem J. Staljina i njegovog primitivnog.
1 Nesto pazljivije formulirana izjava Notkina predstavlja jos jedan slucaj iste doktrine (9, 83b). Medutiin, treba dodati da sovjetski statisti^ari nisu posluiali savjete svojih kolega ekonomista i da oni ne izracunavaju usluge drzave i partije kao dodatak dni^tvenona proizvodu.

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filozofskog materijalizma1 No, izgleda da je to identifici. ranje prvenstveno rezultat ekonomskih uslova u Sovjetskom Savezu u vrijeme kad je planiranje uspostavljeno u toj zemlji. Za ljude koji su se angazirali u procesu brze industrijalizacije, izgledalo je ociglednim da su ono sto je vazno celik i ugalj, tj. opipljiva materijalna dobra, kojima su oni nastojali povecati proizvodno bogatstvo zemlje2 Radu u tom podrucju drustvene aktivnosti pri. dana je, svjesno ili nesvjesno, aureola posebne koristi ili uzvisenosti. Sugestivan Smith-Marxov termin proizvodni rad odlicno je zadovoljio emocionalne potrebe situacije, a autoritet Marxova imena mogao je samo pojacati ukup ni utisak. Kad se jedanput prode kroz taj proces, postavka postaje sama po sebi ocita i tako izmice logickoj an ali zi. Prosto se zna da su fabricki radnici proizvodni, a univerzitetski profesori da nisu i da zive od rada prvih. Posljednje dvije recenice generaliziraju licno iskustvo autora.

Proizvodan rad u socijalizm u Ako pokusamo Marxovu analizu prosiiiti i na socijalisticku privredu, to se moze uraditi na slijedeci nacin. Marksisticki prilaz ekonomskoj analizi u sustini znaci historijsko odredivanje ekonomskih kategorija, znaci utvrdivanje njihove drustvene zavisnosti. A ako zelimo ukljuciti drustvene odnose u definiciju proizvodnosti rada, onda poslije razmisljanja postaje jasno da filozofska materijalnost ili distinkcija baze i nadgradnje ne pruzaju direktno zeljeni kriterij i da se taj problem najprikladnije rjesava na nacin kako je to uradio sam Marx: postavljanjem pitanja o osnovnoj orijentaciji odnosnog dru stveno-ekonomskog sistema. Rezultat procesa kapitalisti cke proizvodnje jest kapital i prema tome, zakljucuje Marx, u tom sistemu proizvodan je samo onaj rad koji proizvodi kapital. To vrijedi jednako za materijalni<t kao
1 Tako Kronrod potkrepljuje svoje stavove citiranjem ovakvih Staljinovih filozofskili refleksija: Da bi ljudi mogli da zive, treba da imaju hranu, odjedu, obucu, stan, ogrjev i si., da bi imali ta materi jalna dobra, treba ih proizvoditi (8, 3). 2 Kronrod piSe: Veliki zadaci, koji su u novom petogodisnjem planu postavljeni nasoj zemlji, zahtijevaju da se jos vise poveca udio rada, koji je zaposlen u sferi materijalne proizvodnje . . . (8, 3940).

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i za duhovni sektor proizvodnje. Ako na slican nacin postavimo pitanje o tome sto je rezultat procesa socijalisticke proizvodnje, moramo nedvojbeno doci do zakljucka da su to upotrebne vrijednosti. U drustvu, u kom se poklapaju neposredni i krajnji cilj proizvodnje, funk cija kapitala kao agensa za organizaciju proizvodnje postaje izlisna te tako proizvodnja profita prestaje biti kriterijem proizvodnosti. U tom se drustvu proizvodnja organizira ne u svrhu zarade profita ili akumulacije kapi tala, nego u svrhu zadovoljenja ljudskih potreba. Prema tome proizvodan je svaki onaj rad koji proizvodi dobra i usluge za zadovoljavanje potreba ljudi, tj. svaki rad koji povecava blagostanje drustvene zajednice. Medutim, ne bi trebalo uciniti pogresku pa svaki dru stveno priznat rad proglasiti proizvodnim. U socijalizmu kriterij proizvodnosti sastoji se u zadovoljavanju potreba, a te potrebe nisu apstraktne, nacionalne, drustvene, historijske, vec sasvim konkretne, licne, individualne. Blago stanje drustvene zajednice vece je ili manje zavisno od toga sto se desava s blagostanjem svakog pojedinog cla na te zajednice. Van blagostanja konkretnih ljudi nema nikakvog drugog blagostanja. A u tom kontekstu jedna vrsta rada doprinosi povecanju blagostanja, dok druga vrsta ne mijenja blagostanje vec jedino stvara uvjete za realizaciju blagostanja, predstavlja na neki nacin troskove proizvodnje. Prva vrsta rada je proizvodna, druga je neproizvodna. U prvu vrstu mozemo ubrojiti rad koji proizvodi robe, obrazovni i naucni rad, zdravstveni i kultumi rad; u drugu vrstu mozemo ubrojiti rad drzavne administracije, policije, vojske, rad politicara. Karakteristicno je za socijalizam kao drustveni sistem da stimulira rad prve vrste i da ogranicuje rad druge vrste. A to u nasem teorijskom okviru znaci da stimulira proizvodni i ogranicuje neproizvodni rad. U tom pogledu funkcioniranje socijalizma formalno je istovetno s funkcioniranjem kapitalizma, i jedan i drugi sistem oslanjaju se na proiz vodan rad i ogranicuju neproizvodan rad. Medutim, sadrzaji proizvodnog i neproizvodnog rada prilicno su razliciti. 165

Ne bi trebalo uciniti ni jos jednu pogresku. To sto su materij'alizirani i nematerijalizirani rad. jednako proizvodni ne znaci da mectu njima nema nikakve drustveno-ekonomske razlike. Ta razlika ne sastoji se, naravno, u vulgamom razlikovanju materijalnih roba i nematerijalnih usluga i dosljedno tome u klasificiranju opancara u proizvodne radnike, a brijaca u neproizvodne kako to npr. radi jugoslavenska sluzbena statistika. Razlika je u tome sto se neke robe i usluge prodaju na trzistu, a druge obrazovne, zdravstvene i slicne usluge ne. Cinjenica je da u prvom sektoru dominiraju materijalne robe, a drugi se sastoji gotovo iskljucivo iz nematerijalnih uslu ga. No to su sekundame, izvedene osobine, koje mogu sluziti u svrhu aproksimiranja a ne kao fundamentalni teorijski kriterij razlikovanja. Od interesa je uociti da netrzisna proizvodnja (bez usluga drzavnog aparata) u nasoj zemlji sacinjava vec jednu osminu ukupne pro izvodnje i da se povecava brze od trzisne proizvodnje. Proizvodnja za trziste i za neposredno zadovoljavanje potreba, tj. privreda i neprivreda da upotrebimo uobicajene termine uslovljavaju odredeno drustveno grupiranje o cemu ce biti govora u jednom od kasnijih poglavlja. To kao i razlika u ekonomskoj organizaciji cini to razlikovanje vaznim i teorijski interesantnim. Medu tim, to razlikovanje, kao sto je vec receno, nema nikakve veze s utvrdivanjem kriterija drustvene proizvodnosti rada. Kad bi, naime, postojala veza, onda bi trzisnost odredivala proizvodnost rada u socijalizmu, sto je, narav no, apsurdno. Mogli bismo na kraju rezimirati rezultate nase analize. Ukupan drustveno potreban rad u socijalistickom drustvu dijeli se na proizvodan i neproizvodan. Prvi doprinosi blagostanju, potonji sluzi za odrzavanje drustvenih okvira proizvodnje. Proizvodan rad moze se odvijati u trzisnoj i netrzisnoj sferi. U prvom slucaju rad rezultira najvecim dijelom u materijalnim robama, u potonjem u nematerijalnim uslugama. Sve ove razlike nisu samo apstraktno-teorijske vec se mogu i statisticki fiksirati, a rezultati odnosnih kategorija rada izmjeriti.1
1 U stvari to je vec uraduno u Jugoslavenskom institutu za ekonomska istrazivanja. Vidi B. Horvat (10).

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15. IN D IV ID U A L N O

I DRU STVEN O V LA SN IS TV O

U S OCIJALIZM U Postavljanje problem a Vlasnistvo je jedna od osnovnih kategorija u analizi drustvenih fenomena. Kaze se da se kapitalizam zashiva na privatnom vlasnistvu1 a socijalizam na drustvenom. , Sto to precizno znaci? Tesko bi se moglo tvrditi da su problemi u ovom podrucju razjasnjeni i rijeseni. Osim toga vlasnistvo mozda jos i vise nego proizvodan rad ne predstavlja samo akademski problem, vec je najdirektnije uklopljeno u drustvenu organizaciju i drustvenu praksu. Vulgariziranje problema vlasnistva i naivni dogmatizam u vezi s time nanijeli su vec velike stete socijalistickoj izgradnji i kod nas, a po svoj prilici jos i vece u drugim socijalistickim zemljama. Drustveno-ekonomska teorija socijalizma pocela se stvarati u vrijeme kad socijalizma jos nije bilo. Osnovni motiv koji je socijaliste, teoreticare i prakticne radnike rukovodio, bio je revolt na drustvene defekte kapitalistickog sistema i uvjerenje da je i moguce i nuzno izgraditi jedan bolji drustveni sistem. Oni su zbog toga prije svega bili orijentirani na kritiku i rusenje postojeceg drustvenog sistema. Marxov Kapital nosi podnaslov: Kritika politicke ekonomije kapitalizma. N ije stoga cudno sto se socijalizam dugo vremena definirao negativno, kao negacija i antiteza kapitalizma. U kapitalizmu postoji anarMcno trziste prema tome u socijalizmu nema trzista. U kapitalizmu privredne odluke donose same proizvodne jedinice, poduzeca prema tome u socijalizmu ne moze biti autonomije poduzeca, vec se privredne orga nizacije moraju pokoravati centralnim odlukama drzavnog plana. Kapitalizam se zasnivao na individualnoj inicijativi prema tome individualna inicijativa je nesto lose i treba je zamijeniti drustvenom inicijativom olicenom u drzavi. U kapitalizmu postoji privatno vlasnistvo, koje je uzrok kriza, eksploatacije itd. prema tome socijali zam mora ukinuti privatno vlasnistvo i zamijeniti g i drzavnim. Mi danas znamo na osnovu praktickog isku1 Vec u kapitaiizmu vlasnistvo prolazi kroz odredene metamorfoze 'Ogranicenja vlasnifikih prava, obezlicenja i dezintegracije. Vidi o tome inteligentan i koncizan tekst M. Pedujlida (11, 3747).

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stva u kojoj mjeri su te antinomije naivne i lazne. Trziste ne mora biti anarhicno; planiranje ne mora biti centralno administrativno; individualna inicijativa nije nuzno losa, a drzavna inicijativa nije jedina altemativa; pored privatnog i drzavnog vlasnistva moguce je, nesto trece, drustveno vlasnistvo. Upravo ova posljednja antinomija bit ce predmet naseg blizeg ispitivanja. Prethodno da upozorimo da se u meduvremenu razvila i jedna stvama antinomija, izmedu Marxove drustveno-ekonomske teorije i vulgamog marksizma koji s prvom nema nista zajednicko osim frazeologije.1 Dogma o identitetu privatnog vlasnistva i kapitalizma te drzavnog vlasnistva i socijalizma kao i to da drzavno vlasnistvo pretvara kapitalizam u socijalizam, netacna je, kao sto danas znamo, zbog najmanje tri razlicita razloga. Prije svega u prostoj robnoj proizvodnji postoji privatno vlasnistvo, a ipak to nije kapitalizam; u antickim despotijama, kao sto istice Marx, postojalo je drzavno vlasni stvo a da to nije imalo nikakve veze sa socijalizmom. U fasistickim zemljama drzava je temeljito regulisala drustveni i privredni zivot pa ipak su to bile kapitalisticke zemlje.
1 Na vulgami marksizam mozemo nadovezati i vulgami socijalizam uopce. Tako su vulgami socijalisti iskljucivali i licno posjedovanje potroSnlh dobara vlastiti automobil ili vlastita kuca smatralo se, a ponegdje se jos uvijek smatra, izrazom burzoaskih prohtjeva te se zahtijevalo i zahtijeva se, zajednicko posjedovanje potrosnih dobara i kompletno reglementiranje licnog zivota. U svim ovakvim teorijama nije tesko otkriti njihovu suStinu: malogradanski mentalitet. Kao obiCno, i o toj pojavi Marx ima neSto da kaze. On je naziva prim itivnim komunizmom, koji kao prvo pozitivno uJddanje privatnog vlasnistva. . . samo je, dakle, pojavni oblik podlosti privatnog vlasnistva, koje hoce da se postavi kao pozitivna zajednica.a U jednom izvanrednom odlomku Marx pie: Komunizatn je . . . prije svega opce privatno vlasnistvo . . Neposredan fizicki posjed njemu je jedini cilj zivota i postojanja; posao radnika se ne uJdda, nego prosiruje na sve ljude . . . Taj komu nizam time sto svagdje negira Covjekovu licnost upravo je samo konzekventan izraz privatnog vlasnistva, koja je sama ta negacija. Opca zavist, koja se konstituira kao sila, samo je skriveni oblik, u kom se lakomost uspostavlja i zadovoljava samo na drugi nacin. Misao svakog privatnog vlasnistva kao takvog upravljena je barem protiv bogatijeg privatnog vlasnistva, kao zavist i teznja za niveliranjem . . . Primitivni komunist samo je dovrsenje te zavisti i te nivelacije s obzirom na predodeni minimum . . . Kako to ukidanje privatnog vlasnistva ima malo veze sa stvarnim prisvajanjem, dokazuje upravo apstraktna negacija 5itavog svijeta obrazovanja i civilizacije, povratak neprirodnoj jednostavnosti Covjeka siromaSna i bez potreba, koji nije prevladao privatno vlasniStvo, nego do njega jo5 nije ni dospio (12, ss. 22526, podvlacio K . M .).

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Nadalje, radi se o utvrdivanju sustine kapitalizma odnosno kapitala. Ova se ne sastoji u privatnom vlasnistvu vec u tome kako je to Marx izvanredno fonnulirao jos na pocetku svoje naucne i politicke aktivnosti, a kasnije i tu odredbu. samo dalje razradivao sto je kapital . .. vlast nad radom i njegovim proizvodimaa.1 Vlast nad radom kao odredba kapitalisticke privatne svojine izgleda mi boljom i preciznijom nego uobicajeno odredivanje pojmom eksploatacije. Eksploatacija je dvosmislen pojam i to u doslovnom smislu rijeci, tj. ima dva smisla.2 Kako treba odgovoriti na slijedece poznato pitanje: tko eksploatira, privatnik ili socijalisticko poduzece, ako privatnik placa radnika 100.000 din. a poduzece samo 80.000 din? A sto je s eksploatacijom poljoprivrednih proizvodaca od strane zadruge, o cemu govori seljak Bradic (v. s. 278)? Eksploatacija moze da znaci zakidanje u nagradivanju za izvrseni rad. Takva eksploatacija po stoji svugdje gdje postoje monopoloidne situacije. Zbog toga se cesto u ekonomskoj teoriji na Zapadu predlaze da se stupanj monopola uzme kao jedina objektivna mjera eksploatacije. U tom smislu zbog veoma neujednacenih uslova poslovanja ekonomski povlasteni radni kolektivi eksploatiraju one druge, arbitrame odluke drfave i banaka dovode do eksploatacije i, naravno, koristenje odn. stvaranje monopolskih situacija na trzistu znaci eksploataciju jednih kolektiva od strane drugih.3 To je veo ma ozbiljan i kod nas gotovo sasvim neistrazen problem. N o eksploatacija moze oznacavati i specifican drustveni odnos u kom jedna klasa pojedinaca, posredstvom privatnog vlasnistva ili drzavne vlasti, ekonomski potcinjava drugu, i znatno vecu, klasu. Ova potonja klasa predstavlja najamne radnike. Oni prvi imaju vlast nad radom. Ocigledno je da ta vlast ne nestaje zamjenom privatnog vlasnistva drzavnim vec, stavise, ona moze da se poveca, da postane totalna vlast drzave nad radom i njego vim proizvodima, proces alijenacije moze da postigne svoj apsolutni limit. Ne mora, ali moze, a historij a po1 K. Marx, Ekonomsko-filozofski rukopisi iz 1844. godine (12, 1671. 2 Dva smisla pojma eksploatacije uocio je i R. LuJdd, iako ih neSto drugacije analizira. Vidi Eksploatacija kao element dnistvene klase. (13, 36973.) 3 U clanku Raspodjela prema radu medu kolektivimaa (14) pokazao sam kako populama parola, da lini dohoci u poduzecu treba da rastu proporcijalno povedanju produktivnosti rada, negira raspodjelu prema radu i tako dovodi do eksploatacije.

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kazuje da do toga stvamo i dolazi. Za razliku od vulgarnog marksizma olicenog u staljinistickoj dijalektici jaSanja drzave, stvamo marksisticko rasudivanje bilo bi otprilike ovakvo. U kapitalizmu vlast nad radom pociva na (neogranicenom) privatnom vlasnistvu nad sredstvima za proizvodnju. Prema tome osnovni preduslov za izgradnju socijalizma gdje ce svaka vlast nad radom prestati i time biti iniciran proces dezalijenacije sastoji se u likvidiranju (neogranicenog) privatnog vlasnistva na sredstva za proizvodnju. Medutim, to je, kako bi matematicari rekli, samo nuzan ali ne i dovoljan uvjet za ukidanje kapitalizma, odnosno za izgradnju socijalizma. Drugim rijecima, time sto je ukinuto privatno vlasnistvo ne znaci da je stvoren ili da se stvara socijalizam. Potrebno je joS nesto vise od toga. Treci razlog za netacnost gore navedenih identiteta sastoji se u slijededem. Promjene drustvenih. institucija dovode do metamorfoze ekonomskih kategorija. Kao sto u uslovima proste robne proizvodnje privatno vlasnistvo ne dovodi do uspostavljanja vlasti nad radom iako moze dovesti kada i u koliko postoje uvjeti za razvoj kapitalisticke robne proizvodnje tako ni u uslovima socijalisticke privrede privatno vlasnistvo ne mora do voditi do kapitalistickih odnosa vec moze biti potpuno integrirano u razvoj socijalizma i socijalistickih odnosa. Kako i na koji nacin pitanje je koje treba istraziti i na koje jugoslavenska praksa daje vec odredene odgovore.

S o cija listick i ili nesocijalisticki karakter proizvodnje individualnog proizvodaca Pocnimo od jednog poznatog prakticnog primjera: polozaja zanatstva u jugoslavenskoj privredi. Polazedi od dogmatskog shvacanja da je individualno zanatstvo termin individualni upotrebljavam namjemo da bib. izbjegao negativno emotivno znacenje termina privatan u sustini nesocijalisticko, lokalni, i ne samo lokalni, organi primjenjivali su mjere administrativnog pritiska i sputavanja. Kao rezultat broj zanatsklh radnji poceo se smanjivati. Napustali su svoje radnje prije svega oni pojedinci koji nisu bili spremni da dopuste drustvenu diskriminaciju svog rada, da trpe insinuacije da su oni 170

spekulantski i antisocijalisticki elementi. Ostajali su, po red starijih i-stoga nemobilnih zanatlija, oni kojima je socijalizam i drustveno etiketiranje bilo irelevantno i koje je jedino interesirala zarada bez obzira kako i na koji nacin se do nje dolazilo. Buduci da se u isto vrije me nasa privreda brzo razvijala, potrebe za zanatskim uslugama rasle su nezadrzivo bez obzira na drustvene teorije nasih lokalnih organa. Stvoren je tako eldorado za spekulantske elemente, uradeno je ono sto su oni samo mogli i pozeljeti: dan im je ekonomski monopol. Kad se to jednom desilo, administrativne sankcije malo su koristile. Porezi su povecani preko realnih mogucnosti oporezovanih. Opet su radnje napustali oni posteniji, koji nisu mogli izdrzati pritisak; ostajali su i nadolazili1 spekulanti koji su i tu prepreku znali savladati. Mono pol ovih posljednjih jos se vise ucvrstio. Na taj nacin nasi teoreticari dozivjeli su ono sto su i ocekivali: ispoIjavanje privatnog vlasnika kao poreskog prevaranta i spekulanta. Bila je to empirijska potvrda pravilnosti njihove teorije i politike, a nisu zapazali da ta politika ne samo da nije ogranicavala antisocijalisticke pojave vec ih je masovno proizvodila. Prije rata zanatlija je bio .covjek sa skromnim prihodima, bez nekih politickih ambicija i s odredenim tradicionalnim cehovskim poslovnim postenjem; vise od polovine zanatlija nije moglo zivjeti od zarade u svom zanatu, a svega 2% zanatskih radnji zaposljavalo je vise od 4 pomocnika. (17, 1246) U razvijenim kapitalistickim zemljama zanatlija jedva da se razlikuje od radnika, konkurencija je velika, a broj bankrotstava zanatskih. radnji shvacenih u sirem smi slu tako da ukljucuju i trgovine, usluge i si. ogroman je. Kod nas su poslije rata zanatlije prvi poceli kupovati automobile, graditi vile i banciti po nocnim lokalima sto su tri atributa novopecenih. bogatasa u siromasnim sredinama. Prije dvanaestak godina prisustvovao sam jednoj neprijatnoj sceni u kojoj je, prilikom obracuna za izvrseni
i Karakteristicno je da su obrtnici drustvena grupa s najmanjom stopom samoobnavljanja: samo 92% obrtnicke djece i sami postaju obrtnicima. Jednako je tako karakteristicna i unutargeneracijska pokretljivost lica koja su bila aktivna 1939. i 1960. g.: manje od jedrie tredine sadasnjih obrtnika bili su to i prije rata, jedna polovina regrutirala se od predratnih radnika, a 1% od predratnih seljaka (V . Milid).

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rad, jedan postariji elektroinstalater dobio srcani napad jer su mu, onako iz navike, rekli da je spekulant i da nabija cijene. Kad se oporavio, covjek je poceo da se zali i da predbacuje: Po cemu je on spekulant? Zar on nije posteno i dobro uradio svoj posao? Zar nije obracunao rad tacno onako kako je propisano? Zar on ne placa posteno poreze toj zemlji? Zar on ne voli ovu zemlju isto kao i svaki drugi gradanin? Zasto ga stalno docekuju s uvredama, zasto stalno dovode u pitanje njegovo postenje? Po cemu on nije jednako posten i vrijedan kao i svaki drugi radnik ili sluzbenik u nekom drzavnom poduzecu? Zasto on mora da bude neposten zato sto je privatnik? Na- sve ovo moze se odgovoriti da ne valja generalizirati iz jednog slucaja, da se ne moze biti sentimentalan kad se radi o drustvenim transformacijama i da je ovo tipican slucaj sitnovlasnicke psihologije koja nije u stanju da razumije drustvene promjene. Me dutim, sto onda ako se nije radilo o sitnovlasnickoj psihologiji, vec o pogresnoj teoriji? Nemarksistickoj i antimarksistickoj, kao sto su i antinomije koje su gore navedene? U proteklih dvanaestak godina, ja sam, prateci nas drustveni razvoj, cesto pomisljao na onog postarijeg elektroinstalatera sa sitnovlasnickom psihologijom. Mozda je i bila sitnovlasnioka, ali njeno jezgro je bilo rad kao kriterij ljudske vrijednosti. A takav kriterij je nesumnjivo socijalisticki. 0 cemu se zapravo radi?

Individualno vlasnistvo kao integralna kategorija socijalistickog drustveno-ekonomskog sistema Vratimo se Marxovoj odredbi kapitala, jer ona pruza jednostavno i sigurno rukovodstvo za rasudivanje. Da li poljoprivrednik koji sa familijom obraduje 10 hektara, ili elektroinstalater koji sa sinom popravlja nase kucne elektricne uredaje, ostvaruju vlast nad tudim radom? Nesumnjivo ne. A da li to po nekoj odredenoj unutrasnjoj ekonomskoj ili drustvenoj logici mogu poceti ostvarivati eventualno u buducnosti? Dok poljoprivrednik i elektroinstalater rade sami ili s familijom, nesumnjivo da opasnosti za takav razvoj nema. A ako zaposle po jednog pomocnika? Vjerojatno da ni tada. Koliko pomocnika se moze tolerirati? To ovisi o prakticnoj ocjeni. 172

a kriterij je slijedeci: tako dugo dok vlasnik sam radi i taj direktan rad je njegova osnovna funkcija, nema opasnosti od kapitalistickog razvoja. Medutim, onog mo menta kad prvenstvena funkcija postane poduzetnistvo, tj. organiziranje tudeg rada, onda i po definiciji on vise nije radnik, vec postaje kapitalist. Tu se pojavljuju dva problema koji traze objasnjenje. Da li je u slucajevima kad privatno vlasnistvo ne do vodi do kapitalistickih odnosa, sama ta cinjenica dovoljna da se privatno vlasnistvo tolerira? Odgovor je kategoricki negativan. Kapitalisticki odnosi nisu jedini kiiterij koji drustvo treba da uzme u obzir. Mi smo npr. ukinuli privatnu lijecnictu praksu. Zdravstvena zastita je socijalizirana i u nekim drustveno zrelijim kapitalistickim zemljama. Stvar je u tome sto je zdravstvena zastita podrucje u kome ne samo da se ne mogu tolerirati kapita listicki odnosi, vec se ne mogu tolerirati komercijalni robno-novcani odnosi uopce. Zdravlje, obrazovanje i kul tura nisu robe koje mogu biti predmet kupoprodaje iz medu potrosaca i proizvodaca; u tom podrucju raspodjela je prema potrebama, a ne prema plateznoj sposobnosti. Tacnije, u socijalizmu bi tako trebalo da bude. Drugi problem odnosi se na latentno stetan efekat privatnog vlasnistva koji proizlazi iz privredne dinamike. Trziste putem konkurencije dovodi do diferencijacije, neke proizvodne jedinice propadaju, dok druge ekspandiraju. Mi bez nekih teskoca mozemo ograniciti broj pomocnika koje individualni proizvodac moze zaposliti i tako formalno onemoguciti stvaranje kapitalistickili odnosa. No kad proizvodna jedinica naraste do tog limita, a sposobna je da i dalje ekspandira, pojavit ce se pritisak da se pravne norme zaobidu, a privatni vlasnik da se od radnika pretvori u poduzetnika. Poznato je da se takvi slucajevi stalno desavaju. Rjesenje tog pitanja ne valja onda traziti u poostrenju sankcija jer, kad se jedan negativan privredni fenomen stalno ponavlja, on dezorganizirajuci djeluje i krivicne sankcije ni najmanje ne otklanjaju stetne efekte na privredni i drustveni si stem. Ocigledno je da tada nesto u sistemu nije uskladeno, a u takvim slucajevima rjesenje treba traziti u institucionalnim promjenama, a ne u krivicnom pravu. Medutim, iz toga ne slijedi da je jedina altemativa uki173

danje ili bar ozbiljno potiskivanje privataog vla snistva, kao sto se to do sada cesto zakljucivalo. Put koji po mom misljenju treba odabrati, jest transformacija privatnog vlasnistva u socijalisticku kategoriju vlasnistvo zasnovano na licnom radu i integriranje individualnih proizvodaca u privredni i drustveni sistem kao sastavnih i funkcionalnih dijelova tog sistema, a ne da oni ostanu strana tijela sa ozbiljnim disfunkcionalnim efektima. Indikacije kako se to moze i treba uraditi, takoder daje nasa praksa, i ja cu se na to pitanje vratiti nakon sto raspravim jos jedan vazan problem, naime problem velicine sredstava u privatnom vlasnistvu. U vrijeme automatizacije kriteiij individualnog rada nije dovoljan da bi onemogucio stvaranje vlasti nad radom. Takva vlast moze se ostvariti i posredno, putem trzista, ukoliko se posjeduje dovoljno velik kapital, koji cu da bi se izbjegle negativne konotacije zvati sredstvima. Prema tome radni kriteiij treba nadopuniti ogranicavanjem velicine sredstava za proizvodnju u individualnom vlasnistvu. Kljucno kod toga nije to sto se kapital oploduje. Stedise dobivaju kod nas, jednako kao i u drugim zemljama, kamate na svoje uloge u bankama i stedionicama ili rezu kupone s obveznica drzavnog zajma. Prema tome i njihov se kapital oploduje, a ipak, pretpostavljam, nitko nece u tome vidjeti nista antisocijalisticko. Ukoliko jedni stede, a drugi trose preko svojih prlhoda putem potrosackih kredita ovi potonji placaju prvima odstetu u vidu kamate naravno ne direktno, vec preko bankarskog mehanizma i privredna ravnoteza se ostvaruje u okviru potrosnje.1 U stvari osnovni smisao stednih uloga i jest akumuliranje u svrhu potrosnje. Drugacije stoji sa stednjom u svrhu proizvodnih ulaganja. Jedan spediter, koji svoju ustedevinu sistematski ulaze u kupovinu novih kamiona, koje daje u najam, ili seljak koji to isto radi s novokupljenom zemljom ili traktorom, ne zaposljavaju di rektno radnu snagu, ali ipak ostvaruju vlast nad radom neposredno, preko trzista. Slicno stoji i s veletrgovcem koji s nekoliko pomocnika moze obrtati milijardske iznose. Koliko i kakvo treba da bude to ogranicavanje posjedovanja proizvodnih sredstava ili trgovackog ka1 Teorijski je taj problem obraden potanko u mojoj knjizi Ekonomska teorija planske privrede (15, 6591).

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pitala, stvar je prakticne ocjene. Moze se odrediti da netko .moze posjedovati svega jedan ili dva stana pored vlastitog i iznajmljivati ih, a moze se odrediti da s traktorom ill automobilom vlasnik moze jedino sam raditi, a ne moze ih davati u najam. Dolazimo tako do zakljucka da je individualno posjedovanje sredstava za proizvodnju, s kojima vlasnik sam radi, ne samo kompatibilno sa socijalizmom, vec pred stavlja integralnu kategoriju socijalistickog nacina piivredivanja. Socijalizam je drustveno-ekonomski sistem koji se zasniva na licnom proizvodnom radu. Stoga sve sto doprinosi afirmaciju licnog rada kao kriterija dru stvene vrijednosti predstavlja socijalisticki faktor, sve sto vodi kontroli ili degradaciji individualne radne inicijative predstavlja antisocijalisticki faktor. U tom smislu individualno vlasnistvo nad sredstvima za proizvodnju predstavlja socijalisticku kategoiiju ukoliko zadovoljava slijedeca tri uslova: (1) ako vlasnik i dalje ostane prvenstveno radnik, a ne postane prvenstveno poduzetnik tj. ukoliko je zaposljavanje tude radne snage adekvatno ograniceno, (2) ukoliko je velicina proizvodnih sredstava adekvatno ogranicena i (3) ukoliko se piivredivacka, komercijalno orijentirana djelatnost, ne obavlja u podru cjima koja zbog svoje drustvene funkcije moraju biti izdvojena iz direktnlh kupoprodajnih odnosa, kao sto je to slucaj s obrazovanjem ili zdravstvenom zastitom.1

K olek tivno i drustveno vlasnistvo Socijalizam pretpostavlja visoko razvijenu privredu i stoga ne moze da se zasniva na individualnom vlasni stvu nad sredstvima za proizvodnju podvrgnutom gore navedenim trostrukim ogranicenjima. Socijalizam se oci gledno zasniva na drustvenom vlasnistvu, a individualno vlasnistvo igra perifemu ulogu. No perifema uloga nije ujedno i beznacajna uloga. Na kraju krajeva polovina naseg aktivnog stanovnistva predstavlja individualne via1 To ne znai da npr. odnos izmedu bolnlce i socijalnog osiguranja, skole i poduzeda, i si. ne treba regulirati na bazi privrednog raduna. To samo znafii da se komercijalni motivi ne mogu unijeti u odnose izmedu pacijenata i lije5nika, uCenika i ufiitelja. Cesti nesporazumi nastaju kad se previdi ova fundamentalna razlika.

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snike i veoma je vazno na koji cemo ih nacin kao proizvodace uklopiti u proces socijalisticke izgradnje. U sukobu s ekonomskim procesima, krivicno-pravna ogranicenja izazivaju velike privredne stete i ozbiljne drustvene deformacije. Primjeri su poznati. Radi se stoga o tome da se ekonomski proces ekonomski kanalizira u pozeljnom pravcu, tj. u pravcu socijalisticke izgradnje. Ranije smo konstatirali da ce uspjesne proizvodne jedinice nastojati da probiju ill zaobidu postavljena ogranicenja kad u svom razvoju do njih dodu. Ukoliko bismo kod toga ostali, individualno vlasnistvo ostalo bi strano tijelo u socijalistickoj izgradnji, nesto sto na sitnovlasnickoj osnovi stalno rada kapitalisticke tendencije. Ukoliko bi smo pojacali sankcije, ponovili bismo historiju zanatstva. Prema tome ocigledno je da se jedini pravilan put sastoji u ostvaiivanju prijelaza preko postavljenih ogranicenja, u ostvaiivanju jednog jedinstvenog kontinuiranog razvoja od individualnog do drustvenog vlasnistva, od male zanatske radnje do modeme fabrike. Da razmotrimo taj problem na jednom ilustrativnom primjeru. Mlad majstor mehanicar seljak, spediter, konobar itd. naslijedio je radnju imanje, vozilo, ugostiteljsku radnju, itd. od svog oca. Momak je sposoban i poduzetan, razvio je posao i zaposlio pomocnike. U tom momentu izvrsi neki piraktican mali izum koji patentira (izum se moze sastojati i u upotrebi novog sjemena, u originalnoj organizaciji prijevoza, dobro organizovanoj turistickoj propagandi, iako se izumi takve vrste ne mogu patentirati). Nas majstor moze naci kupca za svoj pa tent recimo da je to brava za osiguranje automobila protiv krade i da vuce patentnu rentu. No on nije rentijerski raspolozen, on hoce da sam proizvodi svoj proizvod i da ga dalje razvija. I tako ce doci u iskusenje da se sukobi sa zakonom. Druga, i mnogo cesca altemativa, jest da nas majstor nece uspjeti da plasira svoj patent. Poznato je da izumitelji imaju ogromnih poteskoca kod nas da nadu realizatora za svoje pronalaske. Mnogi od tih pronalazaka ostaju neiskoristeni i privreda od toga ima velike stete. Sto bi u ovakva dva slucaja trebalo uraditi? Ocigledno treba stvoriti institucionalne mogucnosti da nas proizvodac sto efikasnije ostvari potencijalnu proizvodnju. Buduci da to vise ne moze sam, on ce se na bazi individualnog vlasnistva uortaciti s jos 176

jednim ill dva majstora, a kad i taj okvir postane pretijesan potrebno je ostvariti prijelaz na iducu prvu srodnu kategoriju vlasnistva. No jos i prije no sto je doslo do prijelaza moguce je, i nuzno, uvesti elemente samoupravlj anj a.1 Ta prva iduca kategorija jest kolektivno vlasnistvo; nazovimo njenu organizacionu formu zadrugom. Kad nas postoje proizvodacke zadruge. Neke od tih zadruga imaju i po nekoliko stotina zaposlenih. Sa stanovista problema koji nas ovdje zanima, to je ekonomska besmislica. No u praksi to ima svoj smisao, bar za one koji osnivaju takve zadruge. Zadruge su do sada imale odredene povlastice u odnosu na poduzeca. Zbog toga se tehnoloski mace primitivna proizvodnja, neka vrsta manufakture, organizirala u obliku velikih zadruga. U takvim slucajevima zadruga ne predstavlja oblik kolektivne svojine, vec pravnu formu za primitivno organiziranu proizvod nju. To vjerojatno predstavlja anahronizam i moze se predvidjeti nestajanje takvih zadruga.2 Kod zadruge, slicno kao i kod inokosne radnje, moze se predvidjeti ogranicenje u broju zaposlenih i velicini angaziranih sredstava. Kolika su ta ogranicenja, stvar je prakticne ocjene, a kriterij za njihovo utvrdivanje mogao bi se odrediti na osnovu postavke da zadruga treba u sustini biti prelazni oblik izmedu zanatske radnje i potpuno raz1 U vezi s tim ilustrativna je kratka vijest Borbe iz oktobra 1966. g. koju citiram doslovno: Opstinsko vece u Somboru zakljucilo je nedavno jedan nesvakidasnji ugovor sa samostalnim zanatlijom Anom Kreko, tkaljom iz Bezdana, po kome ce se u ovoj zanatskoj radnji primenjivati naCela poslovanja i samoupravljanja koja vaze za zanatske radnje u drustvenoj svojini. Preciznije: u ugovoru se istice da ce u ovoj radionici biti uvedeno drustveno samoupravljanje od strane rad nika clanova radne organizacije. Osim toga primenjivade se slobodno stupanje u radnu organizaciju i istupanje iz nje, na osnovu odluke cla nova ovog kolektiva, dok < e svi imati jednaka prava i obaveze. NajS vaznije je, medutim, da de i o raspodeli dohotka i sredstava za licne dohotke odlucivati takoder svi clanovi radne zajednice. Na ovaj korak, kako kaze Ana Kreko, odludila se . 'radi potpunijeg iskoriscavanja m o gucnosti poslovanja i prosirenja materijalne osnove zanatske radnje'. 2 Uopde oblast zanatstvo u nasoj ekonomskoj klasifikaciji vec odavno nema nikakvo funkcionalno znacenje i nepotrebno otezava i e k o nomsku analizu i ekonomsku politiku i planiranje. Zanatske zadruge, koje proizvode kao i svako poduzede, trebalo bi ukljuciti u one pri vredne grane i grupacije u koje po proizvodnji i pripadaju. Medutim, svakom pokusaju takve reforme energi6no su se suprotstavljali zanatske komore i drugi zanatski forumi. Jedan zanatski funkcioner mi je to objasnio: Ekonomski bilo bi ispravno. Ali tada bi se oblast zanatstva svela na privatno zanatstvo. A zanatski funkcioneri ne zele da ib se smatra predstavnicima privatnikal 12 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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vijenog poduzeca. Prema tome kriterij bi bio vrijeme potrebno da se taj prijelaz psiholoski i organizaciono pripremi. Poseban slucaj predstavlja poljoprivreda. Tu je u kooperaciji pronaden jedan od efikasnih prijelaza na vise forme vlasnistva. Nije, medutim, jasno zasto se seljacke radne zadruge zanemaruju i njihov se broj smanjuje. U nekim zemljama zadruge su se veoma dobro razvile pa nema razloga da do toga ne dode i kod nas. Kod opcih poljoprivrednih zadruga stice se utisak da se cesto radi vise o umjetnim administrativno stvorenim lokalnim monopolima, nego o jednom prirodnom meduclanu u drustvenoj organizaciji poljoprivredne pro izvodnje. Ukoliko je taj utisak tacan, onda to znaci ekonomsku stetu. Na kraju, kad proizvodnja preraste zadruzne okvire, odredenim postupkom zadruga se pretvara u samoupravno poduzece sa suvremeno organizovanom i opremljenom proizvodnjom. Daljnji razvoj odvija se kroz razne forme kooperacije i integracije uz ogranicenja kojima se spreCavaju monopoli. U diskusiji povodom ovih razmatranja bile su istaknute sumnje da se prelazni oblici izmedu inokosne radnje i potpuno razvijenog poduzeca s krupnom pro izvodnjom (j. ortakluk i zadruga) nece koristiti, jer je privatnik zainteresiran samo za zaradu, a ta zarada mu izmice prelaskom na zadrugu ili poduzece. Takav zakljucak je i psiholoski i ekonomski pogresan. Psiholoski zato, jer su organizatorski talenti motivirani prije svega ekspanzijom organizacija kojima rukovode a ne nekim ekstremnim povecanjem zivotnog standarda, za sto im po pravilu nedostaje vremena. Nadalje, unosenjem elemenata samoupravljanja u inokosnu radnju cega dosad, zbog dogmatskog inzistiranja na koncepciji o licnom radu kao ostatku kapitalizma, nije bilo stvaraju se psiholoske predispozicije i drustveni preduslovi da se s rastom proizvodnje prelazi na ortakluk, zadrugu i po duzece izvedu neosjetno i u okviru istog drustvenog ambijenta. I na kraju, zarada ne samo sto ne izmice pre laskom na oblike udruzenog rada, vec postaje sigumija. Tako dolazimo do ekonomskog razloga. Ekonomski razlog u korist ekspanzije inokosne pro izvodnje i stoga prihvacanja sukcesivnih drustveno-orga178

nizacionih oblika vrlo je prost i proizlazi iz prirode robne proizvodnje. Naime, konkurencija stalno ugrozava egzistenciju onih koji zaostaju. A zaostaju oni koji su slabi, sitni, izolirani, siromasni. Prema tome, nuznost ocuvanja egzistencije diktira svakom robnom proizvoctaCu okrupnjavanje proizvodnje i povecanje financijskill sredstava, te ga na taj nacin tjera na udruzivanje, ma sta on o tome subjektivno mislio. Ukoliko je radin i sposoban, nas mehanicar ce zapoceti svoju radnu karijeru kao vlasnik jednosobne radionice, a zavrsit ce kao direktor velike suvremene fabrike. U svim fazama svog razvoja on ce se osjecati i djelovati kao socijalisticki trudbenik. N i u jednom momentu njegov proizvodacki moral nece doci u sukob sa socijalistickim moralom. Od prvog dana on je stimuliran na razvijanje proizvodnje i dobiva drustveno i materijalno priznanje za postignute rezultate. Vlasnistvo se tu nikada ne javlja kao cilj cilj je radni efekat vec kao sredstvo, kao pravna forma organizacije proizvodnje na odredenim razvojnim stadijima ili u odredenim funkcionalnim situacijama.1 I u tom smislu sva tri oblika vlasnistva predstavljaju jednako, radom uvjetovano, socijalisticko vlasnistvo. Prirodno, relativno mali broj pojedinaca proci ce upravo opisani put. Neke ce konku rencija izbaciti iz stroja vec na startu, neki ce se pokazati kao odlicni organi/atori rada na nivou od pet zaposlenih radnika, a kao veoma losi organizatori na nivou od 100 ili vise radnika. No, s jedne strane, oni koji uspiju, ostvarit ce proizvodnju koja bi inace bila izgubljena za drustvo, a s druge strane konsistentnost i uskladenost sistema doprinijet ce opcoj koheziji naseg socijalistickog drustva. Vaznost ovog posljednjeg efekta za daljnji razvoj demokratizacije i humanizacije drustvenih odnosa tesko se moze precijeniti. Zakljucna razmatranja Sva tri oblika vlasnistva imaju jednu zajednicku karakteristiku o kojoj do sada nije bilo govora. Po njoj se socijalisticko vlasnistvo ekonomski i principijelno
1 Sitna trgovina, sitno ugostiteljstvo, raznovrsne usluge i si. na dana5njoj etapi druStveno-ekonomskog razvoja mnogo se efikasuije obavljaju putem individualne inicijative, nego posredstvom glomazrdh pdduzeca.

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__ razlikuje od kapitalistickog. Radi se o principu da su sredstva za proizvodnju, ma tko njima upravljao i ma kako bila stecena, u osnovi drustvena. Prema tome svatko tko iz potencijalnog opcedrustvenog fonda sredstava izuzima jedan proizvodni kapacitet, treba da plati odredenu cijenu za privilegiju Sto taj kapacitet koristi on a ne netko drugi. Ta cijena je kamata i nju bi na angazirana sredstva trebalo da placaju jednako i zanatlije i zadruge i poduzeca. Drustveno vlasnistvo na sredstva za proiz vodnju medu ostalim znaci i to da socijalisticko drustvo raspolozive proizvodne snage alocira tako da se postizu maksimalni proizvodni efekti. U tom smislu jedan od instrumenata alokacije je uniformna kamata. Drugi iristrumenat je renta. Svi proizvodaci treba da placaju granicnu kamatu i rentu koje upravo izjednacuju traznju sredstava za proizvodnju s ponudom, sto u nacelu indicira optimalnu raspodjelu. Onaj proizvodac koji nije u stanju da podmiri granicnu kamatu i rentu, ne bi smio dobiti ekonomsku dozvolu da se koristi drustvenim fondom proizvodnih sredstava, jer izuzimanjem iz tog fonda lisava drugog proizvodaca mogucnosti da ta sredstva ko risti efikasnije i tako bolje zadovoljava drustvene potrebe. To sto je nabavka takvih sredstava proizvodnje financirana iz vlastitog dohotka individualnog, zadruznog ili poduzetnog a ne iz kredita, ne mijenja nista na stvari. Insistiranje na vlastitim sredstvima u tom smislu, znaci operiranje s jednom nesocijalistickom kategorijom. U posljednje vrijeme cesce se govori o potrebi da se uMne kamata na osnovna sredstva, jer ona navodno destimulira uvodenje nove tehnike. Takva je teza i teorij ski i prakticki pogresna. Ukoliko je kamata dobro odmjerena u skladu s iznesenim principima ona ne moze destimulirati uvodenje nove tehnike ako ta tehnika znaci stvarno povecanje drustvene rentabilnosti u odredenoj situaciji. No, sve sto je novo nije nuzno najrentabilnije, ili bar ne u svakoj situaciji. A ako naidemo na neke ocigledne anomalije, onda tome ne moze biti kriva kamata, vec rdavo odredeni drugi instrumenti: zakovane cijene, prekratki rokovi otplate, neadekvatna amortizacija ili nesto drugo. Ukidanje kamate znacilo bi uvodenje elemenata privatnog vlasnistva u nas sistem. To bi znacilo priznanje da poduzece moze sa svojim 180

sredstvima raditi sto ga je volja: investirati u projekte substandardne rentabilnosti, ne koristiti raspolozive kapacitete i si. U socijalistickom drustvu takav stav prema proizvodnom procesu izgleda mi savrseno neprihvatljivim. U prakticnoj primjeni bit ce, prirodno, potrebne razlicite adaptacije navedenih nacela. Bit ce odstupanja i izuzetaka uvjetovanih tehnoloskim, organizacionim i drugim karakteristikama proizvodnog procesa. O njima ovdje ne mozemo raspravljati. Ostaje, medutim, da se izvuce jedan vazan teorijski i prakticki zakljucak. Kamata i renta ne predstavljaju samo instrumente alokacije,1 to su ujedno i instrumenti ekonomske eksproprijacije i u tom smislu bitni za funkcioniranje drustvenog vlasnistva. Radni kolektivi mogu prisvajati samo onaj dio proiz vodnog dohotka, koji je iznad minimuma drustvene ren tabilnosti angaziranih sredstava, dakle onaj dio koji je na neki nacin proizvod njihovog rada, a ne cinjenice sto raspolazu sredstvima. U nasoj praksi nesto slicno iako veoma nekonzistentno i teorijski neosmisljeno vec po stoji. Kamate na osnovna sredstva se ubiru. A cijena zemljista, zbog ubiranja rente, znatno je niza nego prije rata, sto odrazava proces ekonomske eksproprijacije. Na taj nacin zavrsili smo nase istrazivanje u jednom, na prvi pogled paradoksalnom krugu. Zapoceli smo ga argumentacijom teze da u odredenim uslovima i individualno vlasnistvo ima socijalisticki karakter i da stoga individualnu proizvodnju treba stimulirati jednako kao zadruznu i preduzetnu. Zakljucili smo ga konstatacijom da socijalizam implicira drustveno vlasnistvo, a drustveno vlasnistvo pretpostavlja ekonomsku eksproprijaciju svih konkretnih vlasnika sredstava za proizvodnju. Paradoks je, naravno, prividan. Ovo potonje uvjetuje ono prvo. Time je ujedno analiticki odreden sadrzaj kategorije drustvenog vlasnistva. Od interesa je napomenuti da u ovoj raspravi nije otkriveno sustinski nista novo. Svi fenomeni o kojima smo raspravljali vec postoje u nasoj privredi. Medutim, kako primjecuje Hadzi Vasilev, kada se polazna osnova analize jednog drustva postavi glavacke, onda se to mora platiti u teoriji i praksi. Mi to i placamo... time sto
1 U poreskoj terminologiji oni se mogu pojaviti pod banalnim nazivima poreza na kapital i poreza na zemlju.

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omogucujemo da nam se na podrucju sustinskih odnosa nametnu stihijnom snagom objektivnih. zakona izvjesna rjesenja, koja neizbezno nose pecat prakticizma i improvizacije, a ne svesne socijalisticke prakse.a (18) U tom smislu ucinjen je pokusaj uspjesan ili neuspjean, to je stvar naucne diskusije da se vec poznati fenomeni interpretiraju u okviru jednog jedinstvenog, konzistentnog i marksisticki zasnovanog teorijskog pristupa. Kod toga se ne radi o tome da se preporuci jedan pragmatican pristup problemu kao sto je slijedece rasudivanje. Zbog neravnomjemog drustvenog i privrednog razvoja u svakom drustvenom sistemu postoje ostaci iz ranijih sistema, u kapitalizmu o'staci feudalizma, u socijalizmu ostaci kapitalizma. Individualni seljak, ugostitelj, piljar i zanatlija kao i individualni advokat, umjetnik itd. su takvi ostaci kod nas. No djelatnost tih ljudi je korisna kao dopuna dmstvenoj proizvodnji i zato ih. treba tolerirati. Radi se o tome da ti radni ljudi a oni sacinjavaju polovinu aktivnog stanovnistva nase zemlje jesu, ili bi bar to trebalo da budu, isto takvi graditelji socijalizma kao i oni u fabrikama i uredima i da ih kao takve treba, ne tolerirati, vec integrirati u nas drustveni sistem. U tom pogledu nas samoupravni sistem olaksava sagledavanje i rjesavanje problema. Samoupravljanje zna ci da neposredni proizvodaci sami organiziraju svoj rad i autonomno raspodjeljuju dohodak koji proistice iz tog rada. To nacelo viijedi za kolektive koji broje nekoliko hiljada radnika, ali ono ne samo da viijed i nego je upravo najdirektnije primjenjivo i na individualnog proizvo daca. N o ne radi se samo o tom individualnom proizvodacu. Pored njega iz kapitalizma smo naslijedili i zadruge kao i drzavno poduzece. Treba li njih tolerirati? Oci gledno je da nijedan od ta tri tipa proizvodne organiza cije ne treba tolerirati kao relikt proslosti, kao strano tijelo, vec ih treba transformirati i neposredno ukljuciti u jedinstvenu socijalisticku organizaciju proizvodnje. Medutim, cinjenica je da se problem vlasnistva, posebno individualnog vlasnistva, smatra delikatnom temom o kojoj nije politicki oportuno mnogo raspravljati. Taj oportunizam uzrok je, koliko ja mogu da vidim, tome sto ne samo da nije izgradena adekvatna teorija, vec u praksi dolazi do lutanja, kolebanja, nesporazuma te znacajnih politickih i materijalnih steta. Karakteristicna je 182

u tom pogledu reakcija na uredbu iz 1953. godine kojom se predvidalo da i grupa gradana moze osnovati podu zece. sNajzivlje i najtipicnije su reagovali pisao je tim povodom Milentije Popovic (19, 769) na jednoj strani reakcionari ... a na drugoj strani komunisti, cak i rukovodeci ljudi u srezovima i gradovima... Dok su reakcionari pozdravljali ovu odredbu, neki komunisti su bili odlucno protiv n je ... Oni komunisti su u stvari ovu famoznu grupu gradana shvatili takoder kao grupu kapitalista odnosno i kao mogucnost za ozivljavanje i rehabilitaciju kapitalizma.. . Treba da je jasno da gru pa gradana znaci grupu radnih ljudi, a ne kapitalista. Danas grupe gradana vise ne uzbuduju duhove - iako, na zalost, spomenuta uredba nije dovela do neke znacajnije nove inicijative, jer se u proteklim godinama administrativna inicijativa smatrala nekako najvise socijalistickom. N o i danas razgovori o seljackim traktorima1 i individualnim ugostiteljima izazivaju podozrenje da se radi o prikrivenim i neprikiivenim tendencijama restauracije kapitalizma. Odatle i veliki licni rizik da ostane neshvacen i bude napadnut za svakog tko nacinje tu temu. Odatle i zakonitost u izbjegavanju te teme.

16. V E R T IK A L N A S TR U K TU R A JUGOSLAVENSKOG DRU STVA: S T R A TIF IK A C IJA U nasoj zemlji mozemo uociti mnostvo slojeva i grupa medu kojima postoje razlike, napetosti i sukobi interesa uslijed stvamih ili zamisljenih suprotnih interesa ili prosto kao rezultat razlicitim faktorima uslovljene grupne psihologije. Tako mozemo razlikovati seljake, seljake,-radnike, radnike i obrtnike. Zatim kvalificirane i nekva1 Prije desetak godina takva su shvacanja bila dominantna, kako to pokazuje slijedei stav iz Kardeljeve knjige o politici na selu: Druga neophodna administrativna mjera jeste zabrana kupovanja osnovnih sredstava za krupnu proizvodnju, kao sto su traktori i slicni strojevi. Ta sredstva . . . mogu sluzid samo za pruzanje usluga drugima ili za neke nepoljoprivredne djelatnosti. Drugim rijecima, ta sredstva uko liko b i se u vedoj mjeri pojavila u privatnim rukama mogla b i da postanu izvor za jaanje kapitalistickili tendencija na selu. U svakom slucaju, tolerisanjem takvog stanja podsticali bismo antisocijalisticke tendencije na selu i stvarali prepreke za ostvarivanje nase sopstvene socijalistike politike na selu< (61, 31011).

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lificirane radnike; ovi potonji se u velikoj mjeri poklapaju sa seljacima-radnicima. Unutar privredne organizacije javljaju se grupiranja na radnike, rutinske sluzbenike i rukovodece osoblje. U institucijama prosvjete, nauke i kulture kolektivi se sastoje iz kreativnih radnika te strucnog, administrativnog i pomocnog osoblja. Po stoje razlike izmedu fizickog i intelektualnog rada, grada i sela. Javljaju se odnosi subordinacije izmedu sefa i potcinjenog u jos uvijek hijerarhijski struktuiiranoj dr zavnoj administradji. Drzavni cinovnici narocito ako nisu samo hijerarhijskom strukturom opredijeljeni nosiod cina, vec su i nosiod vlasti suprotstavljeni su grupama u vandrzavnoj 'sferi. Kao i u svakoj zemlji po stoje i razlicite interesne grupe.1 Postoje i cisto psiholoske opreke. Agresivan i dinaxnicni poslovni covjek razlikuje se od kriticnog, kontemplativnog i sistematicnog naucnog radnika, a ovaj opet od bptimistickog, improvizatorskog i na kompromis orijentiranog politicara. Sve ove razlike radaju drustvene napetosti. No te razlike predstavljaju struktume prereze na veoma razlicitim razinama i veoma razlicitog znacenja. Stoga ce biti potrebno unijeti odredenu sistematicnost u nase istrazivanje.

Drustvena stratifikacija u Jugoslaviji Drustveno diferenciranje, pa stoga i strukturiranje, moze biti horizontalno i vertikalno. Horizontalno dife renciranje vec po definiciji postulira razlike medu pojedinim grupama, a te razlike mogu dovoditi i stvamo dovode i do sukoba interesa. No ti sukobi nisu antagonisticki. Ovi potonji karakteristicni su za vertikalno diferencirano drustvo, a vertikalna diferendjacija, opet, svojstvena je svim klasnim drustvima. Do horizontalnog grupiranja dolazi zbog razlicitosti drustvenih uloga, kao posljedice podjele rada. Do vertikalnog grupiranja dolazi uslijed razlicitosti statusa pojedinih drustvenih grupa.2 Status neke osobe mozemo, zajedno sa Stoetzelom (23, 363), takoder definirati kao
1 Up. J. Bordevii (20, ss. 264 66). 2 Up. M. Popovic (21, 34) i V. Milic (22, 338).

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skup svih ponasanja prema njoj sto ih ona moze s pravom ocekivati od drugih osoba, a ulogu kao skup svih ponasanja sto ih druge osobe s pravom ocekuju od nje. Na taj nacin skup svih statusa i uloga nekog drustva sacinjavao bi drustveni sistem. U ovom poglavlju razmatrat cemo statusnu, tj. vertikalnu drustvenu diferencijaciju. Drugim rijecima, ispitivat cemo kako se grape razlikuju po tome sto imaju razliciti polozaj u drustvenoj hijerarhiji, kako se ti polozaji medusobno odnose kao visi i nizi, uslijed cega grupe predstavljaju slojeve, stratume, a drustveno diferenciranje pojavljuje se kao proces stratifikacije. Slojevi se nikad ne razlikuju na osnovu svega jedne jedine znacajke. S druge strane, pojedine znacajke koje ulaze u odredenje sloja, nisu medusobno apsolutno korelirane te stoga ne odreduju sloj potpuno precizno. Imajuci to u vidu mislim da se slojevi mogu prikladno odrediti na osnovu: a) razlika u drustvenom ugledu, prestizu, koji je opet najvecim dijelom rezultat narednih dviju karakteristika, b) imovinskog statusa1 i c) drustvene moci koja se ocituje u mogucem i realnom donosenju znacajnih drustvenih odluka.2 Kako su empirijski radovi u ovom podrucju na zalost jos uvijek veoma rijetki i cesto nereprezentativni, u analizi slojevitosti jugoslavenskog drustva morat cemo se oslanjati na iskustvo, intuiciju, analogiju i odredene opce prihvacene predodzbe. Sa te heterogene i, s naucnog stanovista, ne narocito impresivne osnove moze se u ovom trenutku sagledati slijedeca hijerarhija drustvenih grapa. 1. Drzavno-politicki, privredni i neprivredni rukovodioci. Pripadnici te grape donose najvaznije drustvene odluke, kao grupa imaju najvi.se dohotke, i, po oba osnova, kao grapa imaju najvisi prestiz. 2. Intelektualni radnici u privredi, neprivredi i drzavnoj administraciji. Ta grapa poklapa se uglavnom s fa1 Istrazivanje koje je P. Novosel izvrSio na 350 gradskih i seoskili ispitanika, pokazalo je da izmedu ranga pojedinih zaniipanja po drustvenom ugledu i po dohotku za koji se smatra da bi bio ispravan postoji korelacija 0,80,9. Kod toga je interesantno da su svi ispitanici bez obzira na socio-ekonomski status (s jedinim izuzetkom seljaka) dali priblizno iste rang-liste (koeficijenat korelacije 0,91), (24, 62223). 2 Slicno trodimenzionalno odredenje drustvene stratifikacije, inspirirano Weberom, daje K . Mayer (25, 33031). Mod Weber odreduje kao sposobnost kontrole ponasanja drugih, a Mayer kao kontrolu koju su odredene grupe u stanju da vre nad zivotxmn sansama drugih..

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kultetski obrazovanim licima. No ima i izuzetaka. Tako na primjer ovamo vjerojatno treba ukljuciti i ucitelje. A s druge strane, svi fakultetski obrazovani nisu nuzno i obrazovani, tj. intelektualci. S obzirom na svoj polozaj u drustvenoj podjeli rada inteligencija se dijeli na tri. prilicno jasno izdiferencirane podgrupe: tehnicko-privrednu inteligenciju ( tehnokraciju), vise administrativno upravne sluzbenike (birokraciju) i inteligenciju u uzem ili klasicnom smislu (humanisticku inteligenciju). 3. (Rutinski) sluzbenici odgovaraju sloju koji se u zapadnim drustvima naziva radnicima bijelih. ovratnika. Taj sloj predstavlja nasu srednju klasu i ponekad daje osebujan pecat drustvenim zbivanjima (vidi analizu geneze cinovnickog mentaliteta u Partiji u gl. 19).. Sluzbe nici se dijele na tri stratuma: sluzbenike sa srednjim i ni7.im obrazovanjem i pomocne sluzbenike. 4. Radnici se kao sloj dosta jasno diferenciraju u tri ili cak cetiri podsloja: a) visokokvalificirane, b) kvalificirane, c) polukvalificirane ili priucene i d) nekvalificirane koji ukljucuju i prelaznu kategoriju seljaka- radnika. Izmedu prve dvije i druge dvije kategorije pojavljuju se znacajne drustvene razlike.1 5. Obrtnici predstavljaju rezidualnu kategoriju te po red obrtnika u uzem smislu (vlasnici radnji u materijalnoj proizvodnji i uslugama) treba da budu obuhvaceni
1 Karakteristicni su u tom pogledu rezultati istrazivanja A. Todorovida na osnovu anketiranja 5.012 radnika. Na pitanje da li ste zadovoljni sto ste radnik dobiveni su ovi odgovori:
% u danoj kategoriji Vrlo zadovoljan Nezadovoljan Visokokvalificirani Kvalificirani Polukvalificirani Nekvalificirani 4U 22,5 19,4 15,8 5.4 11,4 17,9 ,24,0

Blizu polovine visokokvalificiranih radnika veoma su zadovoljni svo jim statusom, jedna detvrtina nekvalificiranih radnika uglavnom ili sasvim su nezadovoljni (ostali odgovori su: puglavnom zadovoljni<r, ssve jedno mi je ). Vidi (26, 165). Nadalje prve dvije grupe uiestvuju dvaput vise u radnickim savjetima no Sto iznosi njihova proporcija u broju radnika, i, dosljedno tome druge dvije grupe ucestvuju dvaput manje u 1960. g. (SZS, Bilten 230 s. 9). Iz jedne ankete ID N proizilazi da ni jednom nisu bili dlanovi radnidkog savjeta manje od polovine visokokvalificiranih radnika i oko devet desedna polukvalificiranih i nekvalificiranih radnika. S druge strane oko polovine N K V i PKV radnika posjeduju zemlju prema 2938% kod V K V i K V radnika (27, ss. 42 i 910 ).

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i svi ostali privatni privrednici u drugim djelatnostima (izuzev u poljoprivredi). Karakteristicno je za ovu grupu da ima najnizi postotak samoobnavljanja: svega 9,2% svih lica obrtnickog porijekla ostaju u toj drustvenoj grupi (prema 21% kod nekvalificiranih radnika, 32% kod sluzbenika i 64% kod seljaka). Obrtnicka djeca najvise postaju kvalificiranim i visokokvalificiranim radnicima (26%). Proizlazi da je obrtnicki sloj u danasnjoj dru stvenoj situaciji podlozan neprestanom rastvaranju i ne pokazuje nikakve tendencije konzerviranja.1 6. Seljaci, koji se danas diferenciraju po regijama, ali ne vise po podslojevima kao nekada. Gomja lista zahtijeva odredene komentare. Slojevi su navedeoi redoslijedom od visih prema nizim. Taj redoslijed postaje nesiguran jedino kod obrtnika kod kojili se rangiranje po drustvenom ugledu i po dohotku znatno razilazi; drustveni ugled je nizak, odmah iznad statusa seljaka, a dohodak je relativno visok. Kad ta drustvena grupa bude bolje integrirana u jugoslavensko drustvo, njen status ce se vjerojatno poklopiti sa statusom' kvaliEiciranih visokokvalificiranih radnika koji i medugeneracijski i unutargeneracijski od svih grupa najvise ucestvuju u fonniranju obrtnickih kadrova. Uostalom indikacije u tom smislu daju i dosad izvrsena empirijska istrazivanja, koja pokazuju da visokokvalificirani i kvalificirani radnici smatraju obrtnike najblizom drustvenom grupom.2 Jedan empirijski test vertikalne slojevitosti jugoslavenskog drustva proizlazi iz vec spomenute studije Vojina Milica (16, 213).3 Mozemo pretpostaviti da ce visem dru stvenom statusu nekog sloja odgovarati manja medugeneracijska pokretljivost, tj. djeca ce vise nastojati da ostanu u druStvenoj grupi svojih roditelja nego kad je status te grupe nizak. Ako je stratifikacija veoma znacajna, razlike izmedu najnizeg i najviseg sloja bit ce
1 Vidi (16, ss. 202 i 206). Podaci se odnose na definiciju obrtnika SZS. 2 U isto vrijeme poltikvalificirani i nekvalificirani radnici smatraju da su im najblizi seljaci Sto je i razumljivo s obzirom na to da oni s preko dvije tredine potjeu iz seljafikih porodica. Vidi M. Hid (28, ss. 82 i 286). 3 Dodatne informacije daje jedna anketa 1DN prema kojoj 8096 mdustrijskih radnika zadovoljni su sto pripadaju radnikoj klasi, 7096 smatra da se kod nas cijene i uvazuju radnici, 9596 smatra da je radnicka klasa vladajuca, ali ipak 8596 zele da im djeca budu sluzbenici (27, 43).

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veoma velike. Pogledajmo sada tri niza Milicevih indeksa asocijacije (omjer opazene i teorijske frekvencije koja odgovara savrsenoj pokretljivosti). Indeksi iznad jedinice pokazuju da socijalno porijeklo olaksava ulaz u neku kategoriju i obmuto za indekse ispod jedinice. Prvi niz pokazuje koliko djeca ostaju u drustvenoj kategoriji svojih roditelja vise no sto odgovara savrsenoj pokretlji vosti: seljaci 1,30, nekvalificirani i polukvalificirani rad nici 2,23, kvalificirani i visokokvalificirani radnici 2,32, rutinski sluzbenici 4,03, strucnjaci i rukovodeci kadrovi 8,82. Drugi niz pokazuje pokretljivost na vise, tj. kolike su sanse tih lica da iz nizih drustvenih slojeva dospiju u grupu strucnjaka i rukovodilaca; lica seljackog porijekla 0,45, radnickog porijekla 0,84 1,07, iz porodice rutinskih sluzbenika 4,01, iz porodice strucnjaka i rukovo dilaca 8,82. Proizlazi da radnicka djeca imaju 9 puta manju sansu, a seljacka djeca 20 puta manju sansu da stignu do vodece kategorije strucnjaka i rukovodilaca nego to je to slucaj s licima rodenim u toj drustvenoj grupi. Pokretljivost na nize, koju mozemo ilustrirati trecim nizom iz tabele Milicevih indeksa asocijacije, nailazi, iz razumljivih razloga, na jos vece zapreke. Odliv lica rodenih u najvisoj druStvenoj grupi u ostale grupe karakteriziraju ovi indeksi: u rutinske sluzbenike 4,93, u radnike 0,450,22, u poljoprivrednike 0,13. Prema tome, u poredenju sa sansom da ce ostati u vlastitoj drustve noj grupi za ta lica vjerojatnost da ce postati radnici je 20 puta manja, a da ce postati poljoprivrednici 70 puta manja. Valja imati u vidu da stratifikaciona ljestvica nije diskontinuirana, slojevi medusobno nisu odvojeni jazovima vec se, naprotiv djelimicno prekiapaju: visi dijelovi nizih slojeva prekiapaju se s nizim dijelovima visih slojeva. Visokokvalificirani radnici izdizu se visoko iznad donje granice stratuma rutinskih sluzbenika, vrhunski intelektualni kadrovi izdizu se do prvih redova sloja ruko vodilaca. To preklapanje, neostro diferenciranje i kontinuitet veoma su znacajni s obzirom na posljedice stratifikacije, o cemu ce kasnije biti rijeci. Jedino ako zamislimo da svaki stratum ima neku vrstu tezista, m o guca je diskontinuirana MjerarMjska klasifikacija sest stratifikacionih tezista kako je gore navedeno. 188

Vidi se zatim da je s izuzetkom prvog sloja, stratifikacija funkcija obrazovanja. Sto je obrazovanje vise to je i drustveni status visi. Vise obrazovanje cini rad vise mtelektualrum; za polupismene ostaju samo manuelna zanimanja. Odatle i cesta konstatacija da manuelni rad per se ima nizi, a intelektuaini visi drustveni status. U stvari status fizickih i intelektualnih radnika izveden je iz statusa obrazovanja, a po sebi ne sadrzi nikakvo hijerarhijsko razlikovanje. Drugim rijecima, ni po cemu fizicki rad nije inherentno inferioran. Nema tezeg fizickog rada od vrhunskog sporta, ni prljavijeg fizickog rada od ratovanja, a ipak oba rada kotiraju vrlo visoko na ljestvici drustvenih vrednovanja. Udamicki rezultati na omladinskim radnim akcijama od ucesnika su vrednovani bar toliko kao i iznadprosjecni uspjeh na studijama. Stvar je u tome sto ni jedno dosadasnje drustvo nije raspolagalo s dovoljno privrednih resursa da svima om o guci sustinski jednako obrazovanje. A obrazovanje je, s jedne strane, nuzno za obavljanje slozenih drustvenih poslova,1 a s druge strane daje ocigledne i opipljive prednosti svojim vlasnicima u svakodnevnoj zivotnoj borbi za mjesto u drustvu. Stoga slojevi kojima je obrazovanje pristupacno, koji stoga imaju monopol na obrazovanje, zauzimaju u svim drustvima vise polozaje u drustvenoj hijerarhiji. Ovdje mozemo dodati da u situacijama kada svojina pocinje gubiti znacenje u vertikalnom diferenciranju sto postaje karakteristicno za suvremena dru stva obrazovanje postaje kljucnom polugom drustvene stratifikacije.2
1 Obrazovanje cini i odnos pojedinca prema jugoslavenskom drustvu pozitivnijim. Ispitujudi stepen drustvene integriranosti pojedinih kategorija radnika (borba protiv nedostatka u komuni i poduzecSu, ucelde u radnickom i drustvenom samoupravljanju, politicka pripadnost, zadovoljstvo statusom) M. Ilic dolaa do zakljucka da se . . . nivo kvalifikacija radnika nalaTi u upravnoj srazmjeri sa stepenom integriranosti, op. d t. s. 93. 2 U tom kontekstu ono sto se desava u naiem visokom obrazovanju tnzistirauje, iz kvazidemokratskih razloga da se na studije prime svi koji zele, bez obzira na radne i inteldstualne kvalitete, uz istovremeno smanjivanje broja stipendija dovodi do petrificiranja hijerarhijske strukture. Kriterij dolaska na univerzitet postaje imovinski (i obrazovni) status roditelja. T i negativm efekti se donekle ublazuju poveianjem broja gradova s visokim skolama.

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Ako pokusamo opisane slojeve i kvantitativno Odrediti, dobit cemo za 1961. godinu klasicnu drustvenu piramidu1 Rukovodeci kadrovi Intelektualni radnici Sluzbenici: sr. sprema' . niza sprema . pomocni . . Radnici: visokokvalificirani kvalificirani . . priuceni . . . nekvalificirani . Obrtnici Seljaci 343 410 82 835 hiljada ili 163 843 426 1032 2464 hiljada ili 30,0% 292 hiljada ili 4408 hiljada ili 3,5% 53,6% 10,1% 60 hiljada ili 170 hiljada ili 0,7% 2,1%

Ukupno aktivno stanovnistvo . . 8229 hiljada ili 100,0%

1 Kao jedan od kriterija za odredivanje broja rukovodeceg osoblja moze se uzeti licni dohodak veci od 70.000 din. mjesecno u 1963. godini cime bi bilo ukljuceno oko 2 1/296 statistickog obtihvata zaposlenog oso blja u drustvenom sektoru ( Indeks, 11/1966, s. 46). U 1963. godini pojedine kategorije ostvarivale su ove prosjedne licne dohotke u hiljadama dinara: direktori industrijskih i gradevinskih poduzeda 77 i 75, predsjednici i potpredsjednici gradova, kotareva i op cina 76 i 62, funkcioneri drzavne uprave 76, savezni i republiiki sekretari 92 i 90, predsjednici sudova i javni tuzioci 72 i 83, rukovodioci komora 77, direktori trgovinskih zastupstava i DOZ-a 80 i 66. Kao uporedenje navodimo da su: dohoci umverzitetskih profesora i uditelja iznosili 76 i 35 hiljada dinara (SZS, Bilten 400, ss 2051). SZS registrirao je u 1961. godini 93.366 lica. kao rukovodede osoblje po ovim kategorijama: ( 1 ) stalni clanovi predstavnickih tijela 2110 (2) funkcioneri drzavne uprave 2270, (3) nacelnici i inspektori u drzavnoj upravi 12.672, (4) rukovodioci ustanova 10.800, (5) pomodnici rukovodilaca. ustanova i nacelnici 13_269, ( 6) direktori privrednih preduzeda 27.175, (7) tehnicki direktori 8.942, ( 8) komercijalni i fmancijski direktori 2.648, (9) os tali 13.480 {Bilten 312, s. 89). Taj je obuhvat ocigledno preSirok. Izdvojimo li kategorije (3), (5), (7) i ( 8) ostaje ukupno 55.835 lica. Uzmemo li u obzir iz svih kategorija samo lica sa srednjim, vi5im i visokim obrazovanjem preostaje 61.012' lica. Na osnovu ovih razmatranja broj rukovodedih kadrova ocijenjen je sa 60.000. Od interesa je uoditi da se obrazovni nivo rukovodedeg osoblja brzo povecava: po obuhvatu SZS u 1953. godini od 51.911 lica fakultetsko obrazovanje imalo je 9%, a srednju spremu 21%; u 1961. godini od 93.366 lica 2996 ima vise ,i visoko, a 3696 srednje obrazovanje. (Bilten 73, s. 10). Rukovodedi kadrovi regrutirani su sa 29.000 iz redova inteligencije i sa 31.000 iz redova sluzbenika srednje spreme, sto znafii da su te dvije kategorije za iste brojeve umanjene. Intelektualni' radnici predstavljaju lica s visokim i visim obrazovanjem, a njihov broj uzet je iz istog izvora kao i broj sluzbenika i radnika ( Bilten 312, S . 88). Obrtnici predstavljaju rezidualnu kategoriju: u navedenu brojku ulazi

190

Kako statisticka istrazivanja u ovoj oblasti dosad nisu vrsena, a raspolozivi statisticki podaci su i nepotpuni i neuporedivi, to inace veoma pozeljna komparacija mijenjanja drustvene strukture po periodima nije moguca bez obimnijeg statistickog rada.1 Mozemo jedino dodati da je u razdoblju od sest godina (1957 1963), za koje postoje uporedivi podaci, broj radnika povecan za 58%.2 Kad bi se takav tempo razvoja nastavio i ubuduce, do 1970. godine radnici bi sacinjavali oko polovine aktivnog stanovnistva Jugoslavije. Na osnovu oskudnih. i razbacanih podataka mozemo zakljuciti da je nase drustvo otvorenije riego druga dru stva na slicnom stupnju privrednog razvoja: pokretljivost izmedu pojedinih stratum a je veca. Narocito to vazi za najvisi stratum,3 sto je ocigledno neposredni rezultat re volucije. Medutim, opca drustvena pokretljivost, pa stoga i otvorenost, jos uvijek nije dostigla stupanj drustvene pokretljivosti najrazvijenijih industrijskih drustava. Pre ma Milicevim podachna u pojediniin zemljama ostvareni
152.000 privatnih proizvodnih i usluznih obrtnika kao i 139.000 privatnika angaziranih u drugim privrednim oblastima, narocito u trgovini i ugostiteljstvu (Bilten 312, s. 23). Seljaci predstavljaju aktivne poljoprivrednike koji nisu radnici ili sluzbenici (Bilten 312, ss 22 i 23). 1 Od interesa je navesti djelomicno uporedive podatke. I. Vinskog o socijalnoj strukturi Jugoslavije 1938. g. (The Distribution o f Yugo slavia's National Income by Social Classes in 1938, referat na sastanku Internacional Association for Research in Income and Wealth, Maynooth, Irska, 1967): Visoki drzavni sluzbenici, poduzetnici. rufcovodece osoblje poduzeda Slobodne profesije Sluzbenici u privredi i drzavnim sluzbama Obrtnici, segrti, sitni poduzetnici Radnici i nezaposleni Seljaci i poljoprivredni radnici Kucna posluga Aktivno stanovniStvo ukupno

110 20
357 366 583 5428 63 69271

biljada

ili

1,6
0,3 5,1 5^ 8,4 78,5 0,9 100.0H

hiljada ili

Uporedenje s tabelom iz teksta pokazuje kako se zemlja u toku cetvrt stoljeda pretvorila iz seljacko-obrtnicke u poluindustrijsku. Ucesde radnika u aktivnom stanovnistvu povedalo se gotovo cetiri puta, uiesde seljaka smanjilo se za jednu tredinu. Broj seljaka znatno se smanjio i apsolutnoJ za jednu cetvrtinu, dok je broj radnika porastao preko' detiii puta. 2 Jugoslavia 19451964, s. 60. 3 Ta teza se moze uvjerljivo potkrijepiti Milicevim podacima o drustvenom porijeklu sluzbenika (16, 209): Zanimanje oca Poljoprivredno Manuelno Nemanuelno 84,2 Sluzbenici pomodni . i s nizom spremom 55,1 29,1 15,8

191

su slijedeci proceriti od teorijski moguce pokretljivosti: Francuska 49%, Svicarska 51%, Zapadna Njemacka 60 63%, Jugoslavia 65%, Svedska 66%, SAD 68% (16,226). Medutim, ni postojeca drustvena piramida ni. sadasnja pokretljivost ne bi trebalo da zavaravaju. Oni odrazavaju trenutnu situaciju koja ce se mijenjati kao funkcija tempa privrednog razvoja. Narocito sigumo moze se prognozirati mijenjanje piramidalne strukture. Prije svega, baza seljaci veoma brzo se smanjuje. Osim toga, uporedo s brojcanim smanjivanjem, seljaci se transformiraju u socioloski veoma razlicite grupe farmera i radnika. Nadalje, nakon sto se jednom migracija sa sela uspori, doci ce do apsolutnog smanjivanja broja nekvalificiranih radnika. Broj kvalificiranih radnika, rutinskih sluzbenika i intelektualaca povecavat ce se apsolutno i relativno. Na taj nacin piramidalna struktura postepeno ce se pretvoriti u loptastu s ne jako izrazenim ekstremima na polovinama i s osnovnom masom drustva koncentrisana oko ekvatora. Obrazovanje eliminira stratume bez kvalifikacija. Najnizi, seljacki sloj transformirat ce se i nestajati kao funkcija privrednog razvoja. Najvisi, upravljacki sloj, ukoliko se sadasnji drustveni trendovi nastave, rastvarat ce samoupravne institucije i polako pretvarati u profesionalnu grupu adxninistratora. U tom drustvu raspodjela obrazovanja mogla bi se dobrim diSluzbeaici sa srednjom i viSom spremom Sluzbenici s visokom spremom Rukovodeci kadrovi (definicija SZS) / 31,9 64,9 33,0 48,9 27,2 61,6 ^ 36,7 24,9 38,4 21,7 51,1 35,1

Vidi se jasno pravilno opadanje uceca manuelnih grupa porijekla ukoliko se nemanuelni radnici (prvenstveno sluzbenici) nalaze na viem polozaju u drustvenoj slojevitosti. Pravilnost se prekida kod rukovodecili kadrova. No, treba imati u vidu da je stopa samoobnavljanja kod rukovodecih kadrova jedna od najvisih (36,2% ) i da 6e se kao i u drugim druStvima javljati snazna tendencija da se ona povisuje sto je vie udaljujemo od vremena revolucije.

192

jelom poklopiti s prirodnom distribucijom inteligencije, a imovinske razlike bile bi neznatne.1 Postavlja se sada pitanje: u kakvom su odnosu drustvena stratifikacija i klase u nasoj zemlji?

Drustvene klase Klase predstavljaju jedan od onih pojmova koji se mnogo upotrebljavaju, a koji nisu precizno odredeni. Gotovo svaki autor ima neko svoje odredenje klase. Bit ce stoga potrebno da najprije dodemo^do jednog odredenja prikladnog za nasu analizu. Prije svega korisno je uociti da se tenmin klasa upotrebljava u najmanje dva veoma razlicita smisla. Marxos dictum da je cjelokupna dosadasnja historija bila historija klasnih borbi daje primjer za upotrebu u smislu sustinski bivalentne drustvene strukture u kojoj borba dviju antagonistickih klasa (ili klasnih grupacija) predstavlja motor historije. Te dvije klase jesu klasa vlasnika i klasa nevlasnika. U drugom smislu klasa se upotrebljava da bi se oznaCfia razlika u odnosu na stalez i kastu. Ovi potonji su i>zatvoreni, dok je klasa otvorena grupa determinirana jedino ekonomskim momentima, tj. privatnim vlasnistvom.2 U tom smislu klase posto je jedino u kapitalistickom drustvu. .U daljnjem tekstu upotrebljavat cu pojam -klase. u oba smisla bez izricitog specificiranja jer ce iz konteksta biti vidljivo o cemu se radi. Postavlja se sada pitanje: a sta se desava s klasama poslije kapitalizma? Ukoliko je vlasnistvo kljucni kriterij za odredenje klase, odgovor je nekada bio a kod mnogih sociologa je i danas vrlo prost. Dok postoje tri
1 Pretvaranje piramidalne u Ioptastu strukturu danas je empirijska cinjenica u industrijski najrazvijenijim drustvima. To proizlazi iz pro-, m jena' u ukupnoj raspodjeli narodnog dohotka, podizanju opceg nivoa obrazovanja i smanjivanja dohodovnih raspona. Ovo potonje vrlo impresivno ilustriraju podaci koje prenosi R. Supek o realnom dohotku francuskog drzavnog savjetnika i americkog kvalificiranog radnika. Pocetkom ovog stoljeca savjetnikov dohodak je pet puta veci. Otada se on smanjuje, a radnikov dohodak raste tako da sredinom ovog stoljeca americki kvalificirani radnik zaraduje vise od francuskog drzavnog savjetnika (29, 111). 2 Tako npr. Max Weber istice da . glavni cinilac koji dovodi do stvaranja klasa jesu ekonomski interesi, i to oni koji su vezani za postojanje trzistaa. (63, 306)
13 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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vrste vlasnistva (privatno, zadruzno i drzavno) postoje i tri klasne grupacije. Daljnjim razvojem prve dvije vrste vlasnistva bit ce eliminirane, a time i klasno drustvo, jer drzavno vlasnistvo pruza osnov za formiranje svega jedne klase koja tako postaje identicna s drustvom. Mi danas na osnovu historijskog iskustva znamo koliko je to shvacanje bilo naivno i netacno. Ukoliko pojam klase upotrebljavamo u prvom smislu, onda je i na osnovu drzav nog vlasnistva moguca klasna polarizacija klasa (indirektnih) vlasnika zove se birokracija kao i na osnovu ranijih vrsta vlasnistva. Uostalom, i Marx je o etatisticTcim drustvima starog Orijenta govorio kao o klasnim drustvima. Na taj nacin vlasnistvo i klasno drustvo predstavljaju sijamske blizahce i teorijski se postizava potpuna konzistentnost. Teskoca nastaje s drustvenim vlasnistvom. Ali to nije samo socioloska teskoca. I pravnici imaju grdnih. muka da odrede drustveno vlasnistvo. Zbog toga se srecemo s misljenjem da je drustveno vlasnistvo contradictio in adjecto. Drustvo obuhvaca sve clanove drustva, a vlasni stvo se moze odrediti jedino u odnosu na nekoga koji je iskljucen. Moglo bi se doduse drustveno vlasnistvo odrediti kao nacionalno vlasnistvo, tj. u odnosu na druge narodne privrede, no to u okviru nase analize nema operativne primjene. Stoga je vjerojatno najprikladnije da se drustveno vlasnistvo shvati kao ukinutost vlasnistva. Sad nasa teorija moze ukljuciti i ovaj slucaj: drustvo, cija se organizacija proizvodnje zasniva na drustvenom vlasnistvu, predstavlja besklasno drugtvo. Mogli bismo zatim u nas teorijski pristup unijeti i jedan evolutivni elemenat. U pretkapitalistickim drustvi ma stratumi se sve vise otvaraju (kaste stalezi klase) i privatno vlasnistvo postaje sve vise dominantni princip organizacije drugtvene proizvodnje. Taj razvoj postizava svoju kulminaciju u kapitalizmu, gdje se javljaju klase u onom drugom smislu, a zatim te klase trpe daljnje transformacije. U postkapitalistickim birokratskim strukturama mozemo govoriti o kvazi-klasama.1
1 Taj termin posudujem od M. Pefiujlida, koji cini mi se sasvim ispravno rasuduje da birokraciju ne bi trebalo identificirati s klasom jer, iako ona ima monopol upravljanja, nema ga na osnovu vlastitog svojinskog prava, vec na osnovu delegadje prava. Upravo razdvajanje svojine od upravljanja je historijski osnov zasnivanja birokracije i njenog razlikovanja od klase.a (30, 14)

194

Svojinski odnosi igraju, kao sto se zna, kljucnu ulogu u Marxovom odredenju klasa. U zapocetom poglavlju o klasama u trecem svesku Kapitala, Marx je pisao: Vlasnici gole radne snage, vlasnici kapitala i zemljovlasnici, kojima najamnina, profit i zemljisna renta sacinjavaju odredene izvore dohotka, dakle najamni radnici, kapitalisti i zemljovlasnici, sacinjavaju tri velike klase modernog drustva koje pociva na kapitalistickom nacinu proizvodnje (3, 816). Time je dan sazet opis relativno proste strukture engleskog drustva od prije stotinu godina. Od onda su se stvari znatno komplicirale i zbog toga nam je potrebna jedna razradenija definicija klasa. Jedna od najpotpunijih je poznata Lenjinova definicija (31, 162). Lenjin navodi cetiri obiljezja klasa: 1) klase su grupe koje se razlikuju po svom mjestu u historijski odredenom sistemu drustvene proizvodnje, tj. i same su historijski odredene, 2) razlikuju se po svom odnosu prema sredstvi ma za proizvodnju (svojinski kriterij), 3) po svojoj ulozi u drustvenoj organizaciji rada i 4) po nacinu dobijanja 1 velicini udjela u drustvenom bogatstvu. Tim obiljezjima treba dodati jos dva: 5) na osnovu 1 4 klase se razlikuju po drustvenom utjecaju i posebno, po polozaju u sistemu politicke moci i 6) od klasa po sebi postaju klase za sebe kad razviju svijest o svojim klasnim interesima i o svom historijskom identitetu, sto zapravo i omogucava klasama da vrse svoju drustvenu ulogu. Nakon sto je utvrdena definicija, nama jos uvijek preostaje da odredimo onaj osnovni faktor koji drustvenu grupu pretvara u klasu s gom jim znacajkama. Mislim da se taj faktor sastoji u monopolu donosenja znacajnih dru stvenih odluka. Sto se u pojedinim drustvima smatra drustveno znacajnom odlukom, moze se empirijski utvrditi. Drustvena znacajnost ovisi o tome sta o njoj misle clanovi konkretnog drustva kao i o sustinski egzistencijalnom znacenju odluke. U pogledu ovog potonjeg mozemo ici i korak dalje u rasudivanju. Ukoliko je covjekova radna djelatnost sustina njegove egzistencije kao covjeka, onda monopol nad uslovima rada predstavlja nuzan i dovoljan uvjet za klasnu diferencijaciju.1 Odatle odmah proizlazi da npr. jedno birokratizirano staljinisticko drustvo
1 To je zaklju&ak i M. Pecujlida: Ako je svrsishodna djelatnost osnovica ljudske egzistencije, tada je i vlast (monopol) nad uslovima rada inilac koji bitno odreduje polozaj u produkcionom odnosu (30, 8).

13*

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predstavlja klasno drustvo s klasicnom dvoklasnom strukturom. Medutim, identificiranje nije uvijek tako jednostavno. Bit ce zbog toga potrebno da, slicno kao i u matematici, odredimo operativni test za utvrdivanje slucajeva kad je uslov monopoliziranja vaznih drustvenili odluka zadovoljen. Taj test sastoji se iz dva zahtjeva. Prvo, u idanom drustvu mora postojati prestizna diferencijacija. 'To znaci da visi sloj (ili slojevi) ima (ili imaju) ono sto se opcenito smatra veoma pozeljnim (bogatstvo, obrazoTanje, politicku moc i si.) u izrazito vecoj mjeri nego nizi sloj (slojevi). Da bi se status viseg sloja sacuvao i perpetuirao, mora postojati neka barijera koja pripadnicima nizeg sloja onemogucava prodiranje u rezervat viseg sloja i ucestvovanje u njegovim blagodatima. Prema to me, javlja se i tendencija institucionalnog sprecavanja drustvene mobilnosti i razvija se svijest o suprotnosti interesa (buduci da je obim pozeljnih stvari ogranicen). Drugo, svaka prestizna diferencijacija nema nuzno klasni Tiarakter. Talentirani umjetnici uzivat ce uvijek veci drurstveni ugled nego netalentirani umjetnici. To nema nikakve veze s klasnim suprotnostima, jer ni jedan umjetnik ne moze osigurati svome sinu da takoder bude talentirani umjetnik. Da bi prestizna diferencijacija dovodila do navedenih posljedica, ona se mora zasnivati na naslijedenom a ne na stecenom statusu.1 Prema tome, drugi osnovni uslov za klasnu diferencijaciju jest postojanje dovoljno visoke korelacije izmedu rodbinskih veza i dru stvenog statusa. No problem nasljedivanja zahtijeva kracu dopunsku analizu. Prije svega uocimo evolutivnu stranu nasljedivanja drustvenog statusa. U feudalizmu npr. direktno se nasljedivao politicki odn. drustveni polozaj, sto je dolazilo do izrazaja u pripadnistvu relativno zatvorenim stalezima i nasljedivanju plemicke titule. U kapitalizmu direktno se nasljeduje jos samo imovina, ali je i to sasvim dovolj no da se stvore klasne barijere. U nekom postkapitalistickom birokratskom sistemu ne nasljeduje se ni politicki polozaj ni kapital, sto ukazuje na proces daljnjeg slabljenja klasnih barijera. No bilo bi pogresno pomisliti da su one beznacajne.
1 Uporedi takoder ^ascribed status i achieved status kod R. Lintona (Status and Role 32, 2023).

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Uzmimo jedno uporedenje. Direktno nasljedivanje imovine samo po sebi nije dovoljno da osigura medugeneracijsko perpetuiranje burzoaskih porodica. Dovoljno su poznati slucajevi u kojima su kapitali steceni u jednoj generaciji protraceni u narednoj sto je neminovnn dovodilo do gubitka burzoaskog statusa. Da bi se taj status odrzao, kapitale treba produktivno investirati po svim pravilima kapitalistickog poretka. Kod toga je irelevantno da li se to investiranje vrsi u fabrike, u dionice ili u vlastito obrazovanje ili, sto je najcesce, u neku kombinaciju svega toga. Nesto slicno desava se i u birokratskom sistemu. Funkcioneri privredni, politicki, drzavni ne mogu svoju funkciju predati u nasljede svojoj djeci. Ali zato mogu preporuciti svoje potomke svojim prijateljima, takoder funkcionerima, kad dode vrijeme da im se nade mjesto u drustvu. Ukoliko postoji centralisticki vodena kadrovska politika, sto se moze uzeti kao pravilo, onda se javlja fenomen koji bismo mogli oznaciti kao kvazi-nasljednost. To naravno ne znaci da su nekim birokracicima polozaji apsolutno zagarantirani. Oni slicno kao i njihove kapitalisticke kolege moraju zadovoljiti neke preduslove sistema. Moraju imati odredeni minimum kvalifikacija za obavljanje namjeravane funkcije i moraju je obavljati u skladu s pravilima birokratskog kodeksa. No, jedno i drugo u velikoj je mjeri zagarantirano kucnim odgojem. Cak i kad nema nikakve zloupotrebe veza sto je, naravno, akademska pretpostavka potomci su formirani u duhu sredine u kojoj se krecu roditelji i vec zbog same te cinjenice prihvatljiviji su za tu sredinu oni su povjerljivi, pouzdani, komunikativni, kooperativni itd. od drugih kandidata. Zbog toga mladi birokrat vec na samom startu ima znacajne prednosti u odnosu na svoje konkurente iz drugih drustvenih slojeva slicno kao sto je to slucaj i sa mladim poduzetnikom koji zapocinje s ocevim kapitalom; i jedan i drugi nasljeduju svojevrsni kapital. Takvo je klasno diferenciranje to jace sto su privilegije birokracije vece (uslijed cega je pozeljnost ostajanja u toj sredini veca), sto je obrazovni obuhvat stanovnistva uzi, sto je politicki sistem manje demokratican i sto je privredna razvijenost zemlje niza. I dok kapitalist ucestvuje u raspodjeli drustvenog viska rada 197

proporcionalno svom kapitalu, birokrat ucestvuje proporcionalno svom statusu u hijerarhiji vlasti. Na taj nacin zavrseno je izradivanje kriterija za utvrdivanje postojanja ili nepostojanja klasne diferencijacije u Jugoslaviji. Stratifikaciona struktura o kojoj je ranije bilo rijeci nije ni po cemu specificna za Jugoslaviju i isto tako ni po cemu ne predodreduje odgovor na postavljeno pitanje. Od iste startne strukture razvoj moze poci u pravcu formiranja klasa i u pravcu prevladavanja klasnih ostataka. Kojim pravcem ce se taj razvoj odvijati zavisi iskljucivo o tome da li drustveni sistem rada kohezione sile, koje ce cementirati pojedine stratume, ili naprotiv rada sile koje ce ih. razbijati. No, prije no sto predemo na definitivnu ocjenu nase .situacije, potrebno je upozoriti na jednu cestu gresku. Iz razlicite funkcionalnosti organizatorskog i izvrsnog rada kao i iz cinjenice da je prvi danas i kod nas rangiran vise nego potonji, izvlaci se zakljucak o inherentnoj hijerarhicnosi te dvije vrste rada i stoga tendenciji da se dru stvo diferencira na rukovodioce i rukovodene. Ta tendencija doduse postoji, ali podjela rada nije nuzno hijerarhicna. Organizatorski rad trazi prosto specificne kvalifikacije i specificne sposobnosti kao i svaka druga vrsta rada. U sredinama s razvijenom naucnom tradicijom dekani fakulteta, predsjednici univerziteta i direktori instituta nisu najbolji naucenjaci vec najbolji organizatori, ili licnosti s drustvenim vezama. Oni ni izdaleka nemaju najvisi drustveni prestiz; stavige, smatra se da naucni radnik, cak i kad je dobar organizator, svoje vrijeme ne treba da trosi na administraciju, za sto se mogu upotrijebiti i ljudi sa skromnijim sposobnostima. Takoder u svijetu postoje zemlje s dugotrajnim i razvijenim demokratskim tradicijama u kojima general!, funkcioneri i ministri imaju samo umjereni prestiz i dohotke. I na koncu sasvim prosto, placeni upravitelj imanja, iako organizator, nesumnjivo nije nadreden vlasniku imanja. Opreka izmedu organizacionog i izvrsnog rada isto je tako historijska opreka kao i mnoge druge s kojima smo se sretali i ona je odredena drustvenim sistemom. Stvar je u tome sto u odredenim historijskim drustvima organizacioni rad pruza mogucnost akumuliranja drustvene moci to vece sto je veca organizacija kojom se rukovodi i to postaje osnovica za prestiznu diferencijaciju. U takvim situacija198
7

ma organizatori uspostavljaju i monopol na upravljanje tacnije: posjedovanje tog monopola upravo ih i upucuje da se specijaliziraju za organizaciju a izvrsni rad, od koga je otudeno svako odlucivanje o uslovima rada, javlja se kao najamni rad. Precizan odgovor na pitanje u kojoj mjeri su pojedini slojevi jugoslavenskog drustva kompaktni ili dezintegrirani mogu dati jedino empirijska istrazivanja. Ovdje cemo se zadrzati samo na utvrdivanju odrectenih procesa. Tako npr. centralisticki vodena kadrovska politika dovodi do zatvaranja prvog stratuma i jacanja klasnih elemenata. Na rukovodece mjesto dolazi se po politickom kriteriju1 a to znaci da kandidat odgovara shvacanjima apa , rata. Kako je na taj nacin egzistencija pojedinaca vezana za uklapanje u MjerarMjsku strukturu, oni doista i nastoje da se uklope. Tako dolazi do izjednacavanja stavova, shvacanja, ponasanja i interesa. Prvi stratum se intemo homogenizira a ekstemo se odvija od ostalih stratuma2 Jedna od empirijskih indikacija zatvaranja .
1 S. Mozina referira kako su potencijalni kandidati za direktore pitani kojim kriterijima daju prednost oni koji odlucuju o izboru na direktorska mjesta i kako je cetiri petine istaklo da su to politicki kriteriji, a svega jedna desetina smatrala je da su to strucni kriteriji (33, 359). 1 Empirijska istrazivanja na lokalnom nivou pokazuju da rukovodeci kadrovi biraju svoje prijatelje u tri cetvrtine slucajeva izmedu sebe, dok od Tnzih funkcionera svaki drugi ubraja medu svoje prijatelje nekoga od visih. U vezi s tim zakljucuje Z. Mlinar razumljiva je karakteristika da oni koji vec imaju najvisi polozaj u datoj zajednici ne mogu stvarati kontakte za neki stepen vise na vertikalnoj ljestvici strukture zajednice. Zato relativno utoliko vise jaca njihovo intrakategorijalno druzenje sa sebi jednakima, a time postaju srazmjemo najzatvorenija (podvukao B. H .) stnikturaa kategorija stanovni2tva (34, 934). Do slicnog zakljucka u svom istrazivanju dolazi i V. Rus: Legalizacija samovolje, uvaiavanje izolacionisticke politike i neefikasnost javne kontrole cak i u kaznenim prestupima vodedih ljudi (godine 1965. na vodedim mjestima u nasoj republic! nalazilo se 1.500 lica koja su bila kaznjena zbog zloupotrebe sluzbenog polozaja) sve to navodi nas na pretpostavku da se pojedine meritokratske grupe neprimjetno povezuju u vise ili manje homogen drultveni sloj, koji vec sada ima prilicnu drustvenu mod, posto mu cak ni sudovi vise nista ne mogu (35, 1094). Meritokracijom Rus naziva udruzivanje menadzerskog vrha s vodstvom drustveno-politickih organizacija*. V. Vlahovic istice fetisiziranje istupanja ljudi na visokim rukovodecim funkcijama i dodaje: Mi govorimo o fetisiziranju funkcija, sto je doprinijelo da se manje gledaju ljudi koliko vrijede i znaju . . . a vise na kakvoj se funkciji nalaze. Prema funkcijama se stvarao i odnos prema ljudima* (58, 729). Mlinarevo, Rusovo i Vlahovicevo zapazanje odrazava fenomen birokratskog otudenja covjeka, za koje M. Markovid efektno veli: . . . birajudi one sa kojima ce zeleti da odrzava bliske odnose njemu nede biti primamn gta drugi covek jeste nego kakvu funkciju ima. Funkcija ce se udruziti sa funkcijom, a ne covek sa covekom* (36, 57).

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prvog stratuma sastojala se u poznatoj tendenciji kumuliraiija funkcija; jos jedna u tendenciji da se izdvojeno stanuje u odredenim kvartovima u gradovima. S druge strane institucija samoupravljanja vrsi stalne i bezbrojne vertikalne presjeke stratifikacione strukture spajajuci ranije otvorene krajeve rukovodeceg vrha s izvrsnom bazom uzlaznim 1 jama samoupravruh odluka ini cime se stratum dezintegriraju horizontalno d integriraju vertikalno u radne kolektive. Ti integrativni mehanizmi funkcioniraju to uspjesnije to je intenzitet stratifikacije slabiji u pocetnoj fazi za to se kod nas pobrinula re volucija i sto je manji stepen mijesanja izvana. Zakljucci su prilicno ocigledni. Drustvena otvorenost (intergeneracijska mobilnost) zagarantirana ujednacenim mogucnostima obrazovanja, samoupravna integracija i politicka demokracija razaraju slojevitost, eliminiraju klasne ostatke i pripremaju put besklasnom drustvu.

17. H O R IZ O N TA LN A STRU KTU R A JUGOSLAVENSKOG DRUSTVA: KV A Z I-PR O FE SIO N A LN E GRUPE Vec je istaknuto da samoupravljanje stvara vertikalne presjeke u drustvenoj piramidi i dovodi do integriranja pojedinih stratuma. S druge strane funkcionalna podjela rada u drustvenom zivotu dovodi do formiranja grupa koje se razlikuju po svojim funkcijama a ne po polozaju u drustvenoj hijerarhiji. Te grupe mogu imati i u stvamosti uvijek imaju razlicite interese, no ti interesi po prirodi stvari nisu antagonisticki, polarizirani. Kriticari marksisticke teze o mogucnosti i nuznosti razvoja besklasnog drustva isticali su da u svakom stvamom drustvu mora postojati drustvena pa stoga i klasna diferencijacija. No to je non sequitur.'j U svakom razvijenom drustvu mora postojati neka dTferencijacija, ako zbog nicega drugog, a ono zbog podjele rada. No samo vertikalna, statusna diferencijacija, stratifikacija, pred stavlja klasnu diferencijaciju. Horizontalna diferencija cija na kvazi-profesionalne grufie karakteristicna je za novo, besklasno druStvo. 200

U horizontalnoj strukturi jugoslavenskog drustva mo zemo razlikovati ove cetiri grupe: seljastvo, ostale proizvodace za trziste, ra dnike neprivrRdnih djelatnosti i drzavni aparat. Od ove cetiri grupe, seljastvo je grupa zajednicka i vertikalnoj i horizontalnoj strukturi. Formiranje te grupe historijski je uslovljeno i ona danas dozivljava najvece od svih grupa kvalitativne i kvantitativne transformacije. Da zapocnemo nasu analizu s razmatranjem drustvenog polozaja seljastva u Jugoslaviji.

Seljastvo Seljaci sacinjavaju jos uvijek blizu polovine stanovnistva nase zemlje. No ta cinjenica ne mora nas mnogo alarmirati, jer je to staticki aspekt problema. U toku je intenzivan odlazak aktivnog stanovnistva sa sela i iz poljoprivrede tempom od oko 2% godisnje. Prije dvije decenije tri cetvrtine Jugoslavena bili su seljaci; u toku zivota ove generacije udio seljastva past ce na nekih petnaestak procenata, kao sto je to slucaj i u drugim razvijenim zemljama. Seljaci predstavljaju nesmnnjivo najkonzervativniju drustvenu grupu u nasoj zemlji. Treba, medutim, odmah istaci da njihov konzervatizam ne proizlazi iz toga sto su sitni posjednici kako se to opcenito misli vec iz drugih razloga. U stvari populama predodzba o tome kako se potpuno iracionalno motiviran seljak grcevito drzi zemlje, fanaticki vjeruje u vlasnistvo i anarhoidno se odupire progresu predstavlja brkanje uzroka i posljedice i u flagrantnoj je suprotnosti s cinjenicama. Jedna anketa u hrvatskim seoskim skolama pokazala je da niti 1% osmoskolaca generacije 1963/64. ne zeli ostati na roditeljskom posjedu (59, 74). Razlozi za osebujno seljacko drustveno ponasanje mogu se, pretpostavljam, svesti na slijedeca cetiri osnovna: (1) Kultuma zaostalost, neobrazovanost, cak nepismenost1 Historijski uvjetovano ideolosko nasljede u pri. mitivnim i konzervativnim vjerovanjima, tradicijama i
1 U 1961. g. nepismeno je bilo 4,5% radnika i sluzbenika i 29% ostalog stanovnistva starijeg od 15 godlna. Ovaj potonji procenat moze se uzeti kao reprezentativan za nepismenost selja5tva (rekonstmirano prema Statisticki bilten 312, s. 210; Jugoslavia 19451964, ss. 44 i 45.) Prema tome nepismen je svaki treci seljak.

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shvacanjima, u patrijarhalnosti i drugim opterecenjima sacuvalo se u odredenoj mjeri i do danas. Razlog sto je negativno nasljede proslosti kod seljaka jace nego kod drugih grupa i teze se prevladava, treba traziti u naredne tri karakteristike njihove danasnje situacije. (2) Egzistencijska vezanost za zemlju. U situaciji kad ne postoji neogranicena mogucnost produktivnog zaposljavanja van poljoprivrede, a u poljoprivredi viskovi rad ne snage iznose do jedne trecine aktivnog stanovnistva (60, 106), posjedovanje vlastite zemlje, borba za zemlju i ekonomsku nezavisnost predstavljaju racionalan nacin osiguranja vlastite zivotne egzistencije. (3) Jednosmjema drustvena mobilnost u uskoj je vezi s prethodnom tackom. U fabrike se slijevaju ljudi i sa sela i iz grada. Razmjena misljenja i iskustava je ziva, onemoguceno je okostavanje stavova i gledanja, sprijecene su pojave kultume ogranicenosti. Sa sela ljudi odlaze, ali u nj ne dolaze; seljakom se ostaje, ali se ne po staje. Pored toga masovni exodus sa sela mijenja brzo starosnu strukturu u korist starijih generacija, koje su po prirodi stvari konzervativnije. (4) Privredna zaostalost i komunikaciona izoliranost sela. Produktivnost rada na selu znatno je niza nego u nepoljoprivrednim zanimanjima1 U 1960. godini jos uvi. jek se na 46% seljacMh polja zanje srpom, a na daljnjih 38% polja kosom. Zbog poznatih razlika izmedu sela i grada selo zaostaje u opcem drustvenom razvoju i sto ga se javlja kao neka vrsta drustvenog balasta. No situacija na selu se brzo mijenja/ u pogledu sva cetiri aspekta. A u vezi s tim nikakve sum nje... nema da ce se i seljak sam izmijeniti ako mu socijalisticki razvitak obezbijedi stabilnije i povoljnije izvore prihoda, visi zivotni standard, kultumiji zivot (Kardelj, 61, 180). Odlucni poticaj drustvenoj transformaciji dao je narodnooslobodilacki rat u kom su seljaci masovno ucestvovali. f Obrazovanje je seljaku danas mnogo pristupacnije nego nekada, iako, valja reci u tom pogledu se moglo i mnogo
1 U 1955. g. za milion dinara trzisne vrijednosti bilo je u poljopri vredi potrebno utrositi 10 radnik-gotUna, a u industriji svega 3 raduik-godina (up. B. Horvat, 37, 519). Nesto manje od 4 milijuna jugoslavenskih seljaka prehranjuju 20 milijmia stanovnika u poredenju s npr. 7 milijuna americkih farmera koji prehranjuju 200 milijuna. Dok je jugoslavenska poljoprivreda sest puta manje produktivna od arnericke, industrija je svega tri i po puta manje produktivna (Podaci S. Stajica).

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vise uraditi. Produktivnost poljoprivrednog rada i u Jugoslaviji kao i u drugim zemljama povecava se brze od produktivnosti rada u industriji. Razlike u zivotnom standardu izmedu sela i grada se smanjuju. A krupna poljoprivredna gospodarstva tmose ne samo elemente modeme tehnologije u dotadasnju tradicionalnu proizvodnju vec i novu organizaciju rada i odjeke drustvenili procesa koji se zbivaju u gradu. Razni oblici kooperacije izmedu se ljaka i velikih gazdinstava cine da su drustveni efekti suvremeno organiziranog sektora poljoprivrede veci no sto to proizlazi iz procenata povrsine ili proizvodnje koji na taj sektor otpadaju. Ovdje treba da se vratimo na problem licne (privatne) svojine kao automatskog kriterija za progresivnost. Seljak nije reakcionaran zato sto je sitni posjednik. Gore smo konstatirali da je taj reakcionami seljak iznio na svojim lectima narodnooslobodilacki rat i drustvenu revoluciju i to ne samo kod nas nego i u Alziru, Vijetnamu i drugdje. Izgleda da se po pravilu brkaju efekti privat nog vlasnistva u kapitalizmu s efektima koji se mogu ocekivati u nasem institucionalnom sistemu. U kapita lizmu seljastvo je podlozno stalnom raslojavanju. Manji broj seljaka bogati se i pretvara u zemljoposjednike koji eksploatiraju tudu radnu snagu. Izvjestan broj seljaka siromasi, gubi posjede i proletarizira se. Najveci broj se ljaka nastoji da se odrzi stalno strahujuci da ce se proletarizirati i prizeljkujuci da se prebaci u klasu poljoprivrednih kapitalista. Nista slicno ne desava se u Jugoslaviji. Agrami maksimum onemogucuje aktivnost u pravcu eksploatacije tudteg rada. Odlazak sa posjeda ne znaci proletarizaciju. U stvari stvoreni su uvjeti u kojima licno posjedovanje zemlje postaje pravna fikcija, a sustinski drustveni polozaj individualnog proizvodaca nije drukciji od polozaja udruzenog proizvodaca. Prva konstatacija vidljiva je, npr. iz propisa o agrotehnickom minimumu. Nadalje, ako tre ba ekspropriirati rentu sa zemlje, to se moze uciniti porezom po katastarskom prihodu. Ako treba privatna sred stva proizvodnje tretirati kao drustveni kapital, kamate na osnovna sredstva ili poslovni fond mogu se takocJer aproksimirati odredenim porezom. Zemlju i osnovna sred stva prodaju i kupuju jednako individualni i udruzeni proizvodaci. Druga konstatacija proizlazi iz cinjenice sto 203

je radnik u Jugoslaviji i proizvodac i upravljac. Ako to vrijedi za udmzenog proizvodaca, to je pogotovo tacno za individualnog proizvodaca. U vezi s raspravljanim problemom a to vaii i za. problem individualnog proizvodaca u drugim sektorima proizvodnje od interesa je da se uoci kako je u nasoj svijesti doslo do neke vrste mistifikacije kolektiva. Kolektivno organizirana proizvodnja automatski je progresivna i socijalisticka, a individualno organizirana proiz vodnja je sitno sopstvenicka* i nesocijalisticka. Ta predodzba, koja je stekla cvrstinu dogme, ima svoj korijen u drustvenom iskustvu kapitalistickog sistema, odakle j e nekriticki prenesena u- nove institucionalne uvjete. Jer,. revolucija se ne oslanja na sitne vlasnike, vec na nevlasnike; a kolektive je mnogo lakse organizirati i pokrenuti u akciju za rusenje sistema, nego individualce. Od interesa je'takoder uociti da su individualni proizvodaci, stoga i seljaci, istinski antisistemski elementi u jednom staljinistickom sistemu. Takav sistem tezi totalnoj kontroli licnog rada pojedinaca, a taj cilj se najefikasnije postizava likvidiranjem svake samostalnosti i ukljucivanjem svakog pojedinca u odredenu hijerarhijskL organiziranu, dakle, birokratsku strukturu. Na kraju trebalo bi seljackim grupama pored raznih minus a dati i bar jedan drustveni plus. Nase asocijativno drustvo je bipolamo; jedan dio drustvene aktivnosti odvija se na radnom mjestu i orijentiran je na rad, drugi dio odvija se u mjestu stanovanja i zivljenja i orijenti ran je na zadovoljavanje drugih covjekovih potreba. U prvom slucaju radi se o radnim, u drugom o komunalnim zajednicama. Kao individualni proizvodac i u mjeri u kor joj je samo individualni proizvodac, seljak je diskvalificiran za radne zajednice. No na tome se socijalizam ne zavrsava. Postoje indicije da su u komunalnim zajedni cama seljaci aktivniji od ostalih drustvenih grupa.1
1 Vrseci empirijska istrazivanja u kraljevskom srezu K. Kilibarda dolazi do zakljucka da seljaci daju vedi broj prijedloga koji se ticu opcine i direktno su joj upuceni nego industxijski radnici. Kilibarda tu vedu druStvenu angaziranost objasnjava slijedecim razlozima: 1. Radnik u okviru svoje radne organizacije moze zadovoljiti vise svojih interesa nego seljak na radu. 2. Problemi koje hode da rijeSi jedno selo vrlo cesto bitno zadiru u pitanja drugog sela ili vise sela, a cesto, znaci, i opstine kao asocijacije sela. 3. Seljaci u zimskom periodu godine imaju i relativno vi5e vremena da se upoznaju, prodiskutuju, kritikuju, traze i daju prijedloge za rjesenje pitanja svoje opStine nego industrijski rad-

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Mozemo zakljuciti da je i individualni seljak potenc ijalni socijalisticki proizvodac. Sto to on nije u stvamosti, uvjetovano je s ona cetiri razloga. No privredni razvoj automatski transformira selo u pravcu sve vece identifikacije sa ciljevima socijalizma. Mogli bismo parafrazirati poznatu Lenjinovu izreku, pa konstatirati, da socijali zam zasnovan na radnickom samoupravljanju svakog casa rada socijalisticke tendencije cak i u onim svojim sektorima koji su ranije bili nesocijalisticki.

N eseljacki proizvodaci za trziste (radnicka klasa) Radnicka klasa je jedan od najvise upotrebljavanih politickih termina kod nas. No ne moze se reci da je taj termin i precizno odreden. Cak je i program SKJ propustio da utvrdi sta treba podrazumijevati pod radni ckom klasom o kojoj inace mnogo govori. Ponekad se radnici identificiraju s manuelnim radnicima (38, 41). To poistovecenje je neprecizno i velikim dijelom liseno smisla jer i daktilografi su manuelni radnici, a to su i seljaci; po kvantumu manuelnili operacija kirurzi i pijanisti ne razlikuju se od radnika opticke ili elektronske industrije; a osim toga tehnoloski progres sve vise potiskuje manuelni rad, ali ne u istoj mjeri i radnike. Nadalje, prosta podjela na manuelne i umne radnike dovodi do ociglednih besmislica. Proizlazi da je jedan kvalificirani mehanicar, koji dijagnosticira kvar na nasem automobilu, manuelni radnik, a portir drzavnog nadlestva je umni radnik! Vise smisla ima podjela na intelektualne i rutinske radnike, a ovih posljednjih na manuelne i nemanuelne radnike. Medutim, i tu treba biti oprezan. Sa marksistickog stanovista fizicke osobine nekog fenomena malo su relevantne za drustvenu analizu. Kljucni za analizu jesu drustveni odnosi i to se cesto zaboravlja. Cini se da
nici.a 4. Radnici na opcinske organe uticu posredno, preko svoje radne organizacije, a poljoprivrednici mogu to uraditi samo neposredno. 5. Poljoprivrednici su samostalniji nego radnici. SeIjak privatnik se na svom imanju cesto osje<5a. . . manje zavisan od opgtinskih organa nego rad nik u odnosu na rukovodioce u radnoj organizaciji. Prvi se ne mora plasiti otkaza i sliCnih osveta od strane nosilaca socijalne modi cije interese moze da pogodi dati prijedlog.a 6. SeIjaci, izgleda, vise poznaju ljude pa i probleme u opstinskim organima nego radnici. To je posljedica vede komunikacije u vezi s raznim pitanjima zbog kojih radnik i ne mora da ide u optinu.<r (62, 46).

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se najrasprostranjenija metodska zabluda sastoji u tome primijetio je Gramsci govoreci o intelektualcima i proleterima sto se kriterij razlikovanja trazio u samoj prirodi intelektualne djelatnosti a ne u cjelokupnoin sistemu u kome su se one (a, prema tome, i grupe koje ihotjelovIjuju) nasle u opcem sklopu drustvenih odnosa. Doista, radnika ili proletera, na primjer, ne karakterizira posebno manuelni ili instrumentalni rad, nego taj rad u odredenim uslovima i odredenim drustvenim odnosima... (39, 312). Cesto se srece defmicija po kojoj radnicku klasu sa cinjavaju proizvodaci koji rade s dmstvenim sredstvima za proizvodnju.1 Prije svega, karakteristicno je da ova defmicija isklju- cuje radnike privatnog sektora, tj. upravo one koji su najblizi klasicnom pojmu radnicke klase. Ocigledno je da se implicitno pretpostavlja i intuitivno osjeca da se danasnja i nekadasnja radnicka klasa prilicno razlikuju. Nadalje, razumijevanje navedene defmicije zavisi o znacenju rijeci proizvodac. Zdravorazumski, stvar je prosta: proizvodac je onaj koji stvara proizvod, dakle, nesto opipljivo. Da li su radnici u transportu takoder proizvo daci? Vecina ljudi ce se vjerojatno sloziti da jesu. A trgovacki pomocnici? Tu ce misljenja vec biti podijeljena.2 Sta je, zatim, sa sluzbenicima u bankarstvu i osiguranju? Tu ce se, pretpostavljam, vecina sloziti da se ne radi ni o radnicima ta zato ih zovemo sluzbenicima niti 0 proizvodacima. Medutim, banka nije nista drugo do trgovina novcem, pa sto vazi za trgovacke pomocnike vazi 1 za bankarske sluzbenike. Nadalje, kuda spadaju na pri mjer bolnicari? U srednje klasea zajedno s uciteljima, knjigovodama i drugim radnicima bijelih kaputa i ovratnika? Sto to precizno treba da znaci u nasem drustvenom okviru? Ocigledno je da naslijedeni kategorijski aparat nije vise narocito upotrebljiv. Ovdje bill htio upozoriti na ranije obradenu, veoma prosirenu teoriju o proizvodnji, po kojoj je proizvodan samo rad u tzv. materijalnoj proizvodnji, a sav ostali rad je neproizvodan. Za ove svrlie u materijalnu proizvodnju ukljucuju se i transport i trgogovina, a nasa statistika dodaje jos i ugostiteljstvo. U tom slucaju trgovacki pomocnici, konobari i sobarice bili bi takoder ukljuceni u radnicku klasu. Po mom misljenju
1 Tu definiciju prihvaca i Program SKJ, v. ss. 118 i 125. 2 Marx trgovacke pomocnike ukljucuje u Dajamne radnike (3, 255).

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oni tu i treba da budu ukljuceni, ali ne zbog navedene teorije o proizvodnom radu. Razlikovanje proizvodnosti drustveno-ekonomski fenomen na osnovu materijalnosti koja je fizicki fenomen teorijska je besmislica. Vidjeli smo kako je jos Marx sasvim nedvosmisleno istakao da fizicki isti rad moze biti ekonomski i proizvo dan i neproizvodan. Naredno pitanje odnosi se na radna mjesta unutar dane grane proizvodnje. Covjek koji radi za masinom u jednoj fabrickoj hali nesumnjivo je radnik. No da li i njegov poslovoda pripada radnickoj klasi? Tu ce misljenja vec biti podijeljena.1 A sluzbenik komercijalnog sektora ocigledno vise nije radnik. S druge strane, kakva sustinska razlika postoji ukoliko uopce postoji izmedu nekvalificiranog rezijskog radnika i pomocnog sluzbenika? I opet prepoznajemo nekriticko prenosenje kapitalistickih drustvenih odnosa. Ukoliko se proizvodnja fabrike mora smanjiti, radnik za masinom bit ce otpusten; po slovoda i komercijalist nece, jer oni predstavljaju fiksne troskove, reziju. Radnici za masinama, u neposrednoj proizvodnji, moraju se stoga organizirati u sindikate i njihovi interesi postaju razliciti od interesa rezijskog osoblja koje se identificira s poslodavcem. Osim toga kapitalisticka fabrika je hijerarhijski organizirana s radnicima kao bazom i poslovodama, kontrolnim i drugim upravljackim osobljem kao nadgradnjom. Poslodavac je stoga vitalno zainteresiran da se njegov upravljacki aparat identificira s njegovim interesima. U jugoslavenskoj fabrici sva ta razlikovanja postaju velikim dijelom bespredmetna. Sluzbenici se ne identificiraju s poslodavcem, jer taj ne postoji, a radnici se ne organiziraju u sindikate da bi stitili neke svoje pcisebne klasne interese. U jugoslavenskoj fabrici postoje, naravno, svakojaki sukobi; ali oni su drugog karaktera. Radi se o sukobima imutar kolektiva koji se u odnosu na vanjski svijet ne pojavljuje kao neki aglomerat protivurjecnih i polaiiziranih interesa, vec upravo kao jedna drustvena cjelina, kao kolektiv koji ulazi u interakcije s drugim kolektivima. Empirijska proucavanja jugoslavenske fabrike tek su zapoceta pa stoga generalizacije treba vrsiti i prihvacati
1 M. PeSujlid, npr. poslovodu zajedno s tehniSarom uvrstava u preIazne kategorije (27, 38).

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s velikom dozom opreza. Jedna od mogucih generalizacija odnosi se na unutrasnje grupiranje u poduzecu. Ako se clanovi kolektiva grupiraju na osnovu utjecaja koji imaju na rad i odluke radnickog savjeta pojavljuju se tri jasno izdiferencirane grupe1 (1) rukovodioci poduzeca i eko: nomskih. jedinica i strucnjaci, (2) neposredni rukovodioci, sluzbenici i kvalificirani radnici i (3) polukvalificirani i nekvalificirani radnici. Ono sto je toliko znacajno u ovom grupiranju jest to da poslovode, sluzbenici i kvalificirani radnici imaju podjednak utjecaj, sto znaci da je eliminiran klasican jaz iz kapitalisticke fabrike.2 Nadalje, jednako je znacajno da radnici nisu niposto homogena grupa vec se ostro diferenciraju na osnovu kvalifikacija. To se potpuno slaie i s rezultatima ranije navedenog empirijskog istrazivanja po kome su nize dvije kategorije rad nika znatno nezadovoljnije svojim polozajem kao radnika (kod nekvalificiranih ima gotovo pet puta vise nezado-voljmh nego kod visokokvalificiranih). Ti se nalazi takoder slazu s podatkom da u manjim obustavama rada, koje su vecinom usmjerene na administraciju poduzeca, prevladavaju polukvalificirani i nekvalificirani radnici (42, 202). Na kraju, cini se da mozemo zakljuciti i to da se grupiranje u jugoslavenskoj fabrici vrsi gotovo iskljucivo na osnovu kvalifikacija i stepena obrazovanja. Odatle opet jednom proizlazi da obrazovanje ima prvorazredno znacenje u prevladavanju grupnih napetosti i drustvene stratifikacije. U organizacionoj strukturi jugoslavenske privredne organizacije jedna funkcija jos uvijek predstavlja kamen spoticanja. To je funkcija direktora. Ta je funkcija inherentno kontradiktoma. Kad je zapocet proces eliminira1 Istrazivanje su izvrsili J. 2upanov i A. S. Tannenbaum (40, 121) anketirajudi radnike (89W clanovi SK ) s dvogodiSnjih kurseva na Radnickom sveucilistu u Zagrebu. Utjecaj je bodovan s 1 = nikakav do 5 vrlo jak. Grupiranje je moje.
rukovod. poduzeca 4,7 strudnjaci 4,1 rukov. ek. jedin. 3,4 neposredni rukovod. sluzbenici visokokvalif. radn. kvalificir. radn. 2,7 2,7 2,5 polukvalif. radn. 1,6 nekvalific. radn. 1,5

2,2 2 Zanimljiva je i informacija koja trazi daljnju analizu da u

organima upravljanja brojdano dominiraju kvalificirani radnici i sluzbe nici sa srednjom strucnom spremom. Te su naime dvije kategorije u odnosu na svoje ucesce u radnoj snazi znatno iznadprosjedno zastupljene m organima upravljanja. Redoslijedom sve vedeg zaostajanja ispotprosjedno su zastupljeni: sluzbenici s VSS, PKV radnici, sluzbenici s NSS, N K V radnici (41, ss. 222 i 225).

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nja administrativnog upravljanja privredom, direktor je postavljen kao cuvar drustvenog interesa u poduzecu i zbog toga je postavljen izvana. Ta strazarska funkcija ostala je direktoru i u kasnijoj fazi punog razvoja samoupravljanja. No tada su se pojavili pritisci u pravcu zaStite samoupravnili prava kolektiva i rjesenje je nalazeno u sve vecem ogranicavanju operativnih kompetencija direktora. Na taj nacin bastardna uloga koja pokusava spo jiti dva divergentna sistema, administrativni i samoupravni, rezultira s jedne strane u znacajnom smanjenju operativne efikasnosti, a s druge strane cini od direktora tudi element u kolektivu. Direktor se jos uvijek u vecini slucajeva namece1 kolektivu izvana i to na osnovu tzv. politickih kriterija. Iz oba razloga dolazi do negativne selekcije, pa se na tim mjestima odrzavaju ljudi s izrazito niskim strucnim kvalifikacijama. Podaci o porazavajuce niskom stepenu obrazovanja rukovodecih kadrova dovoljno su poznati da bi ill trebalo navoditi. Da bi se odrzali, takvi direktori se povezuju s politickim faktorima van poduzeca i stvaraju klike ljudi sa slicnim profilom unutar poduzeca. Socioloske studije pise u svojoj lucidnoj raspravT Veljko Rus pokazuju da su grupe s nizim stepenom obrazovanja manje naklonjene suradnji s ostalim radnim grupama; manje spremne za kriticno komuniciranje; manje zainteresirane za tacne informacije, manje spremne da korigiraju nepravilne stavove visih organa i mnogo osjetljivije na hijerarhijske razlike. (35, 1086) Klikastvo onda postaje izvor sukoba kojima obiluje nasa dnevna stampa.2 S druge strane iz sustinski istih razloga ma koliko to u prvi mah izgledalo paradoksalno upraznjena mjesta direktora ostaju ponekad dugo nepopunjena. Kvalificirani kandidati ili su neprihvatljivi za razne neformalne grupe ili opet odbijaju da se izloze maltretiranju tih grupa.
1 Vrseci em pirijska istrazivanja u jednom velikom kolektivu K . K ilibarda utvrduje da bLizu 60% smatra da ne mogu bitnije utjecati na izbor direktora, a oko cetiri petine clanova S K i neclanova traze neposredniji i jaci uticaj na izbor direktora (62, 11920). 2 Analizirajuci 1965-o godiste Detavske po litik e V. Rus (35, s. 1082)

dolazi do zakljucka: Nosioci samovolje su, po pravilu, direktor i druge vodece licnosti u radnoj organizaciji. . . dok su zrtve samovolje u ma* njim radnim organizacijama najfiesce kvalificirani radnici, a u vecim poduzecima strucnjaci . . . Nasilna, samovoljna i protivzakonita kadrovska ^ 011^ 8* vodecih ljudi prema kvalificiranim radnicima i strucnjacima uzgred nam razotkriva i strucna inferiornost hegemonistickih grupa u radnim organizacijama.
14 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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Napetosti i sukobi u jugoslavenskom poduzecu imaju, prema tome, prilicno jasne uzroke. Ti uzroci imaju malo sta zajednicko s drustvenom situacijom u kapitalistickom poduzecu, a razvojne tendencije ocigledno su usmjerene na njihovo eliminiranje. Mislim da uza svu nezavrsenost postojeceg sistema i sve deformacije koje se povremeno javljaju, nakon decenije i po postojanja radnickog upravljanja i nakon sto je sto tine hiljada zaposlenih proslo kroz Skolu upravljanja, mozemo konstatirati da je postavljeni cilj poceo da se realizira. Ranije heterogeni, cak antagonisticki elementi, stopili su se ili se istapaju u jedan jedinstveni kolektiv. Raznovrsnost interesa unutar kolektiva od sekundarnog je znacenja u odnosu na zajednicke interese prema vanjskom svijetu. Ukoliko je ova analiza tacna, onda proizlaze izvanredno znacajne konzekvence. Klasican pojam radnicke-Maseizgubio je ili gubi drustveni sadrzaj. To je u izvjesnom smislu i ocigledno. Radnioka klasa bila je oduvijek klasa najamnih radnika. U mjeri u kojoj najamni rad iscezava kao drustvena kategorija nestaje i radnicke klase.1 Preostaju radni ljudi, radni narod ili radnici kao sinonim za aktivno stanovnistvo.2 Proizlazi, ukratko, da se u nasoj drustvenoj situaciji radnicka klasa transformira integrirajuci i druge grupe (sluzbenike i tehnicku inteligenciju) s kojima su1 Korisno je uociti da je u jednom staljinistickom sistemu radnicka klasa i dalje sacuvala svoj drustveni sadrzaj. 2 Do slidnog zakljufika dolazi i H. Hadziomerovic ( Pregled, 6/1964, ss 599600). To intuitivno osjecaju i nasi politicki radnici pa gotovo nikad ne govore o radnickoj klasia iskljucivo vec obicno o radnickoj klasi i svim radnim ljudimaa. Isto tako, za razliku od ranijih statuta, vec Statut SKJ donesen 1958. g. pocinje rijecima Savez komunista Jugoslavije je organizirana politicka snaga radnicke klase i radnog naroda Jugoslav ije (podvukao B. H .). Naredni statut iz 1964. g. zapodinje s identicnom formulacijom da je SKJ organizacija radnicke klase i svih radnih ljudi Jugoslavijea (podvukao B. H .). Tako se pojam radnicke klase proSiruje na svo aktivno stanovniitvo osim, eventualno, seljaka i obrtnika: Na taj nacin dxuStveni rad danas obuhvaca i povezuje u samom procesu rada ljude od nekvalificiranih radnika do onih koji rade u institutima, bolnicama, prosvjetnoj sluzbi, upravnim organima itd. Zbog svega toga po jam radnicke klase se mijenja i dobiva siri znacaj. Tim pojmom se, u stvari, obuhvacaju svi radni ljudi koji ucestvuju u drustvenom procesu rada i socijalistickim ekonomskim odnosima. Svi oni imaju zajednicke ciljeve: vedu produktivnost, razvitak proizvodnih snaga, povecanje pro izvodnje, raspodjelu prema radu i sve siri razvoj druStva kao zajednice proizvodada (E. Kardelj, 43, 7T). Ovo shvadanje blisko je, ali nije identicno Marxovom prosirenju pojma proizvodnog radnika kao posljedice kooperativnog karaktera rada (4, 441).

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raduje u procesu proizvodnje u jednu kvazi-profesionalnu drustvenu grupu koju bismo mogli nazvati proizvodacima koji proizvode za trziste.1 .Ti proizvodaci zivotno su zainteresirani za ocuvanje i daljnji razvoj svoje autonomije i za prevladavanje sukoba unutar kolektiva. U tom smislu njihovi interesi identicni su s interesima razvitka i afinriacije socijalistickog besklasnog drustva. A buduci da kontroliraju proizvodne resurse drustva, oni predstavljaju i glavnu motomu snagu socijalistickog raz voja.

R adnici neprivrednih djelatnosti (in teligen cija ) U tehnickom smislu u inteligenciju treba ukljuciti i inzinjera koji radi u fabrici i pravnika iz drzavnog nadlestva i profesora filozofije i ucenjaka. U drustveno-ekonomskom smislu njihov polozaj je veoma razlicit i zato ih treba posebno grupirati. Ovdje cemo pod inteligencijom podrazumijevati visokoobrazovane radne ljude u oblasti zdravstva, prosvjete, nauke i kulture. Valja odmah uociti da je ovo razlikovanje veoma neortodoksno. Uobicajeno je da se inteligencija podijeli u dvije grupe, kreativne i reproduktivne radnike ili, kako ih naziva americki filozof Hodges (45, 428), u intelektualce i strucnjake (professionals). U prve treba ubrojiti ucenjake, umjetnike, filozofe i sve one koji stvaraju kulturu, za koje su ideje i kultura ciljevi, a ne sredstva. U
1 Na isti nacin rasuduje i M. PeCujlic: Duboke promene koje se zacinju u karakteru drustvene podele rada, u samom produkcionom odnosu, izaziva razlaganje svih starih odnosa i slojeva. Nasledene razlike izmedu slojeva. . . podinju da se narusavaju . . . Smanjuje se jaz, dru stvena daljina izmedu ranije ostrije polariziranih, odvojenih i hijerarhijski rasporedenih dru5tvenih slojeva. Dolazi do tesnjeg povezivanja, prozimanja, ititegracije radnicke klase u starom smislu reci i, narocito, njetiih najrazvijenijih delova, sa slojevima tehnicke intellgencije. Oni pocinju da se ponasaju na slican nacin. U tom pravcu deluje i razvitak modeme tehnologije . . . No, u tom smeru jos neposrednije deluju drustveni uslovi u kojima proizvodaci rade, radna situacija u kojoj se nalaze. . . tokovi preovladavanja razlika izmedu upravljackog i izvrsilackog umnog i fizickog rada (posredstvom samoupravljanja) vode konstituiranju moderne klase fizickih i umnih proizvo&aca u uslovima samoupravljanja i samoraspodele. To je ono Sto pocinje da karakterise suvremenu radnicku klasu u uslovima samoupravljanja . . . (44, 2829). Nije, medutim, jasno, zasto PeSujlid ovu novu kvazi-profesionalnu grupu naziva vklasoma, kad je to suprotno njegovoj vlastitoj teoriji klasa (30) i kad se smisao socijalizma sastoji u ukidanju a ne u formiranju klasa? Imam utisak da je i PeCujlic svjestan toga i da su razlozi za takvu terminologiju prakticno-politicke a ne naucne prirode.

14*

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potonje spadaju inzenjeri, lijecnici, novinari i svi oni prakticari kojima je posao da primjenjuju i rasprostranjuju kulturu. U tom smislu D. Pejovic nalazi da se beskrajno razlikuje djelatnost npr. filozofa i knjizevnika od svakog inzenjera i lijecnika (36, 267). Nemam nainjeru da osporim realnost ovih distinkcija, a niti njihovu relevantnost u analizi, na primjer, formiranja kulture nekog drustva. Medutim, u analizi drustveno-ekonomskog polo zaja pojedinih. grupa u jugoslavenskom drustvu takva klasifikacija bila bi sasvim proizvoljna i stoga neupotrebljiva. Mozda se u nekom smislu djelatnost filozofa i lijecnika doista beskrajno razlikuju. U pogledu drustveno-ekonomskog uslovljavanja egzistencije odnosnih ljudi u nasem drustvu to su istovrsne djelatnosti. Otkad se u drugoj polovini proslog stoljeca pojavio u Rusiji, termin inteligencija imao je uvijek pomalo subverzivno znacenje. Mislim da se moze otvoreno reci da su prema inteligenciji komunisticke partije bile tradicionalno nepovjerljive, pa se ostaci tog stava osjecaju i da nas kod nas.1 Razloge tom stavu naci cemo vjerojatno najbolje eksplicitno objasnjene kod Lenjina.2 Nitko ne moze poreci da se inteligencija, kao zaseban sloj modernih kapitalistickih drustava, odlikuje, opce uzevsi, bas individualizmom i nesposobnoscu za disciplinu i organizaciju; po tome se, izmedu ostalog razlikuje i to u negativnom smislu, taj ^drustveni sloj od proletarijata; u tome se sastoji jedno od objasnjenja intelektualske mlitavosti i nepostojanosti koju proletarijat tako cesto osjeca; i ta osobina inteligencije u nerazdvojnoj je vezi sa svakidasnjim uslovima njena zivota, uslovima njena rada, koji se u mnogome i mnogome priblizivaju uslovima sitno-burzoaske egzistencije (individualan rad ili rad u veoma malim ko!ektivima). (46, 3789).
1 T i se uticaji odrazavaju, iako u blagoj formi, i u odgovarajucim formuJacijama u Programu SKJ. Up. s. 145. 2 Kako primjecuje Lj. Tadic (36, 279), Lenjin je svoje teze o inteli genciji preuzeo od Kautskog. No jos davno prije fonniranja komunistifikih partija na antiinteleVtijaliVaTT^ nailazimo u radnickom pokretu kod anarhista. Karakteristicna je u tom pogledu kritika Bakunjina uperena posebno protiv naucnih radnika: Po svojoj biti ufienjak je sklon svakoj vrsti umnog i moralnog razvrata, a najvedi njegov porok je u tome 5to on precjenjuje svoje znanje, svoj vlastiti urn i prezire sve one koji nisu uceni. Dajte mu samo upravu u ruke i on ce postati najsuroviji tiranin, je r je ucenjacki ponos odvratan, uvredljiv i najvise od svih vrsta ponosa ogranicava slobodu . . .(47, 119).

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Na ovu ocjenu inteligencije reagirala je Rosa Luxem burg i bit ce od nesumnjivog Mstorijskog i teorijskog interesa da se navede njena kritika, makar i u nesto poduzim citatima.1 Prema Lenjinu, ova odbojnost da se pokori apsolutnoj vlasti Centralnog komiteta se srece kod intelektualca koji je ostao individualist i sklon anarhiji, cak i kada je pristupio socijalizmu, dok pravi i istiniti proleter u svom klasnom nagonu crpi jednu vrstu sladostrasca sa kojom se predaje vlasti jake uprave i svim strogostima jedne neumitne discipline... Pocnimo primjecujuci da uzdizanje urodenih sklonosti kojima su proleteri obdareni u pogledu socijalisticke organizacije i nepovjerenje prema intelektualcima, nisu samo po sebi (u sustini) izraz 'revolucionamog marksistickog nacina misljenja; naprotiv lako se moze dokazati da su ovi argumenti bliski oportunizmu ... Bez sumnje, ne moze se poreci da, u najvecem dijelu socijalistickih partija Zapadne Evrope, postoji spona izmedu oportumzma i intelektualaca, kao i izmedu oportunizma i decentralistickih tendencija. Ali nista nije tako suprotno duhu marksizma, njegovom Mstorijsko-dijalekticnom metodu mislje nja, kao odvajanje pojava od historijskog tla od.akle one poticu i stvaranje od njih teoretskih sema od apsolutnog i opceg znacenja. Rasudujuci na apstraktan nacin, moze se jedino priznati da intelektualac, kao drustveno bice koje je proizaslo iz burzoazije i strano proletarijatu mo ze da pristupi socijalizmu ne na osnovu vec protiv svoje klasne svijesti. Zbog toga je on vise izlozen oportunistickim kolebanjima nego proleter koji u svom klasnom nagonu nalazi veoma siguran revolucionami oslonac ... Autonomisticke i decentralisticke tendencije ... treba dakle objasniti, ne kao sto to cini Lenjin, neuravnoteznim karakterom intelektualca, vec potrebama burzoaskog parlamentamog politicara, ne psihologijom intelektualca', vec oportunistickom politikom ... Ako bismo se, polazeci od Lenjinovog stava, po red toga uplasili svakog uticaja intelektualaca u radnickom pokretu, za nas bi najveca opasnost za rusku socijalisticku partiju bili jedino organizacioni planovi koje je Lenjin predlozio. NiSta ne bi moglo sigumije da potcini radnicki pokret, jos tako mlad.
1 Pitanje 1837).
organizacije ruske socijaldemokracije, citiramo iz (48,

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jednoj intelektualnoj eliti, zednoj vlasti, kao ovaj birokratski oklop, koji ga motivira i pretvara u automat kojim upravlja 'komitet'. I, obmuto, nema efikasnije garancije protiv oportunistickog rovarenja i licnih ambicija; od samostalne revolucioname aktivnost proletarijata, zahvaljujud kojoj on stice smisao politicke aktivnosti. Polemika izmedu Lenjina i Rose Luxemburg vodila se 1904. godine, dakle davno prije no sto je i jedna radnicka partija definitivno dosla na vlast. T takvoj situaciji deJ centralisticke tendencije bile su objektivno stetne po tok borbe, narocito ilegalne,. koja je trazila cvrstu i centraliziranu organizaciju. Zbog toga je Lenjin, bez obzira na tacnost ili netacnost njegove argumentacije, mogao izraziti izvjesno nepovjerenje prema inteligenciji. T JugoslaJ viji, medutim, danas zivimo cetvrt vijeka nakon otpocinjanja uspjesne socijalisticke revolucije. T takvoj situa J ciji decentralisticke tendencije ne samo da nisu nepozeljne, vec, stavise, predstavljaju osnovnu liniju daljnjeg razvoja, najefikasniju garanciju protiv oportunisti ckog rovarenja i licnih ambicija. Ova posljednja konstatacija Rose Luxemburg u kontekstu suvremenih politickih zbivanja i IV plenuma zvuci pomalo prorocanski.1
1 Pored historijskih primjera koje su razmatrali Lenjin i Rosa Luxem burg, korisno je sagledati i po neki suvremeni historijski primjer. Karakteristifina su antiintelektualna osjedanja u suvremenim burzoaskim partijama i sredinama. U Americi intelektualce zovu jajoglavcima, u Engleskoj je bivsi laburisticki lider Gaitskel na mitlnzima obicavao skidati kaput i kravatu, kako bi dokazao da on nije ukrudeni intelektualac, zasto su ga objedivali. To su vjerojatno u dobroj mjeri malogradanski antagonizmi, ali ima i sustinskijih razlika. Ako se u danaSnjoj Americi kao jedan od kriterija progresivnosti dru5tvene grupe uzme stav prema ratu u Vijetnamu, onda jajoglavci ispadaju kao jedina progresivna grupa. Radnicka klasa drzi se pasivno uz povremene antikomunisticke demonstracije. Krupna burzoazija je otvoreno agresivna. Ta situacija ne iznenaduje. Svojevremeno je makartisticki teror bio upravljen takoder prvenstveno protiv americke inteligencije. Zanimljivu analizu korijena antiintelektualizma daje u clanku Intelektualci i vlast austrijski komunist E. Fischer: . . . 'jajoglavcu' najtromiji dvonosci zamjeraju odlucno da je 'faktor uznemiravanja', da nije 'politicki svjestan', da nije 'povezan s narodom' nego 'nepouzdan, nestalan, neodgovoran'; . . . Njegovu znanju nedostaje obzir prema taktickim zahtjevima, pouzdanost vjernog sljedbenika, nerazoriva odanost obicna covjeka. Antiintelektualizam, ne okrece se protiv strucnjaka koji izvrsava naredenja, vec protiv intelektualca koji postavlja pitanja i stavlja na diskusiju tabue. Medutim, onaklonost ne malog broj a intelektualaca da sluze svim gospodarimac nastavlja Fischer u kriticnim trenucima olaksava antiintelektuaHzmn zadacu da izazove u narodu, ili medu dlanovima neke partije, neke organizacije, averziju protiv intelektualaca. Posmatrano iz historijske perspektive karakteristidno je da jo posljednjih tridesetak go

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Inteligencija, u suzenom smislu te rijeci kako je gore definirana, orijentirana je na posebno podrucje covjekove aktivnosti. Dok trzisni proizvodaci stvaraju izvanjske elemente za covjekovo blagostanje, zapravo stvaraju materijalnu bazu tog blagostanja, inteligencija je okrenuta covjeku neposredno, njena djelatnost je neposredno humanisticka. To vrijedi za zdravstvene radnike, koji se brinu za odrzanje covjekovog fizickog zivota, za prosvjetne radnike kojima je zadatak da razviju covjekov intelekt, za kultume radnike, umjetnike i filozofe, koji otkrivaju smisao zfvota i uoblicavaju vrednovanja svog vremena. Cak i naucni radnici, cija otkrica koristi privreda ili armija, prevazilaze utilitaristicki karakter svojih patenata nastojanjem da prije svega otkriju i utvrde naucnu istinu. Iako bi vjerojatno bilo netacno tvrditi da inteligencija predstavlja1 savjest i svijest svog vremena, ima malo sumnje da ona svojim aktivnostima odrazava, eksplicira i uoblicuje savjest i svijest svog vremena. To odrazavanje i ekspliciranje moze biti tacno ill iskrivljeno, te korisno ill opasno po vladajuce krugove i vladajuce klase. Zbog toga se u svim rezimima aktivnosti inteligencije poklanjala posebna paznja i nisu manjkali pokusaji da se ona u ovom ili onom pogledu kontrolira. Kako u tom pogledu stoji stvar kod nas?
dina prosloga stoljeca, kad se poceo javljati pojam 'intelektualci', on nije htio biti toliko sinonim za 'unrne radnike', koliko podrugljiv zbimi naziv za svijet koji je branio Dreyfusa, simpatizirao s proletarijatom, stao na stranu modeme umjetnosti. Antiintelektualizam se mijesao s antiracionalizmom, antimarksizmom, antisemitizmom, sa svakojaldm reakcionarnim pokretima i ideologijama. U nacistickom zargonu intelektualac je bio definiran kao bestija inteligencije'. U najvecem broju zemalja antiintelektualizam se prosirio, da bi poprimio agresivno obiljezje u svakom razdoblju krize; on je zarazio, negdje vise negdje manje, i radnicki pokret i zemlje zauzete izgradnjom socijalizma (49, 102935). S druge strane korisno je uociti da su najotvoreniji otpor staljinistickom rezimu u Cehoslovackoj dali intelektualci i da su akcije Cehoslovackih knjizevnika u 1967. g. pokrenule dogadaje koji su doveli do smjenjiveuija reakcionarnog partijskog rukovodstva i ispravljanja ranijih devijadja u izgradnji socijalizma. Takoder nije slu caj an izrazito negativan stav prema progresivnim intelektualcima rezima onih. pet zemalja koje su izvrsile invaziju CehosIovake. 1 Njihov (inteligencije) je posao da budu savjest i svijest svojega vrem ena. . . (D. Pejovid, 50, 261). W. Mills, poznati americki sociolog i nepostedni kriticar svog dru5tva, konstatira: Kao tip drustvenog dovjeka intelektualac nema neki politiiki smjer, ali rad svakog covjeka od znanja ima sasvim odredenu vrstu politickog znadenja: njegova politika je na prvom mjestu politika istine, jer mu je duznost odrzavanje adekvatne definicije stvam osti. . . Intelektualac treba da bude moralna svijest svog druStva, bar u pogledu vrijednosti istine, jer u krajnjoj liniji to jeste njegova politikac (51, 31).

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Mogu se, mislim, uociti slijedeca tri momenta: (1) Daleko najveci dio danasnje inteligencije preko tri cetvrtine1 formirao se poslije rata, dakle vec na tlu socijalisticke izgradnje. (2) Kako je visoko obrazovanje besplatno i, bar u nacelu> svima pristupacno, intelektualni kadrovi regrutiraju se iz svih drustvenih slojeva pa se moze govoriti o narodnoj inteligenciji. (3) Inteligencija je veoma aktivno ucestvovala u predratnom revolucionamom pokretu2 u narodnooslobodila, ckoj borbi i poslijeratnoj izgradnji tako da su se i mnogi predratni kadrovi ne samo identificirali sa socijalizmom, vec predstavljaju i najaktivnije nosioce socijalistickog razvoja. Mogli bismo zakljuciti da jugoslavenska inteligencija ima najsiru drustvenu osnovicu i danas predstavlja jedan od oslonaca sistema. Moguci su, naravno, pojedinacni ekscesi kao sto je to, uostalom, slucaj i u fabrikama ali su sasvim nemoguce masovne devijacije. Sada bi se u analizi mogao uciniti korak slican onom kod razmatranja polozaja trzisnih proizvodaca. Kao sto se s interesima radnika identificiraju i svi oni koji rade u fabrikama, tako se s interesima inteligencije identifi ciraju i svi oni koji rade u ustanovama. U bolnicama i skolama rade profesionalno i inace heterogene grupe. N o u uslovima samoupravljanja te grape ipak predstavljaju jedinstvene radne kolektive. Zbog toga je vjerojatno adekvatnije da se danas i u ovom kontekstu umjesto o inteligenciji govori o radnicima neprivrednih djelatnosti. Potrebno je odmah objasniti zasto neprivrednih. Iako u nacelu bolnica, skola, kazaliste, muzej itd. mogu prodavati svoje usluge na trzistu, skoro ni u jednoj civili1 Prema popisu stanovnistva 1948. g. bilo je u toj godini ukupno 79.000 Ijudi s diplomama fakulteta ili visoke skole. U razdoblju 1945 1965. na fakultetima, visokim i visim Skolama diplomiralo je 222.000 studenata. U meduvremenu izvjestan broj starijih intelektualaca su umrli (S G I 1955, s. 59; Jugoslavia 19451964, s. 303, S G I 1965, s. 500). 2 N ije bez interesa uociti da na slican nacin, vjerojatno jos nugla.senije, inteligencija igra revolucionarnu ulogu u suvremenim nerazvij L nirn zemljama. U vezi s tim engleski sociolog T. B. Bottomore konstatira: U skoro svim azijskim i africkim zemljama intelektualci su imali istaknute uloge u borbama protiv kolonijalnog upravljanja. Studenti univerziteta bili su Cesto udama snaga pokreta za nezavisnost, a oni koji ,su studirali u inostranstvu stvorili su ili pomogli da se stvore nove nacior nalne partijei (52, 109).

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ziranoj drzavi oni to ne rade osim izuzetno. Zdravlje, obrazovanje, nauka i kultura suvise su znacajni za zivot drustva, a da bi se ostavili automatizmu trzista. Osim toga, mjerenje proizvodnje u tim djelatnostima mnogo je teze izvrsiti nego u privrednom sektoru, a ponekad je to i principijelno nemoguce. Koliko vrijedi jedan spaseni ljudski zivot ili Einsteinova teorija relativnosti? Ovo sto je upravo receno, naravno, ne znaci da nikakav privredni racun nije moguc ili nije potreban. Izvjesno novcano mjerenje efekata i moguce je i neophodno jer se time stvara osnovica za financijsku samostalnost neprivrednih djelatnosti, a preko toga i za njihovu stvamu autonomiju. Univerzitet ill naucni institut, koji iskljucivo zivi na drzavnom budzetu, nuzno dolazi u situacije kad mu zelje i interesi kontrolora budzeta, a ne naucna istina, postaju kriteriji njegova rada. Medutim, ma kako organizirali financiranje neprivredniti djelatnosti, ono se nikada ne moze svesti na mehanizam ponude i potraznje atomiziranih subjekata na trzistu. Uvijek je pot-rebno donosenje odredene drustvene odluke ciji je pak financijski izraz neka vrsta poreza ili doprinosa (za socijalno osiguranje, za skolstvo itd.). Kako taj porez treba da se ubere u trzisnom sektoru, dolazi do izvjesnog sukoba interesa radnika privrednih i neprivrednih djelat nosti. U tom sukobu ovi posljednji su, kao primaoci, u nepovoljnijem polozaju. Zbog toga licni dohoci u neprivrednom sektoru pokazuju kronicnu, a u ovom momentu i drasticnu, tendenciju zaostajanja u odnosu na dohotke u privrednom sektoru. To krsenje nacela svakome prema radu uzrok je onda politickLh neraspolozenja i izvjesne hiperkriticnosti. S druge strane vazno je uociti da se samoupravljanje historijski razvilo najprije u neprivrednom sektoru. Jos u srednjem vijeku univerziteti su izborili svoju autono miju i odonda pa sve do dan as sacuvali su i razvijali samoupravnu organizaciju odupiruci se uspjesno nasrtajima drzavne birokracije.1 Humanisticki karakter nepriv rednih djelatnosti cini nosioce tih djelatnosti veoma osjetIjivim na klasne i drustvene razlike te stoga oni daju
1 U tom kontekstu nedavni univerzitetski otpor diktaturi u Argentmi samo je prirodan izraz jednog vjekovnog trenda. U sliCnom smislu treba interpretirati studentske pokrete u cijelom nizu evropskih i americkih zemalja.

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spontani otpor birokratskim pritiscima i isto tako spontano razaraju hijerarhijske drustvene strukture. U istom pravcu djeluje i visoka obrazovanost radnika tih djelatnosti. Ako socijalizam treba da znaci drustvo bez klasa, drustvo organizirano kao zajednica udruzenja individuuma, kao velika depolitizirana asocijacija radnih. kolektiva i pojedinaca, onda inteligencija kao i svi radnici neprivrednih. djelatnosti predstavljaju u najvecoj mogucoj mjeri aktivnu drustvenu snagu u socijalistickoj izgradnji. To je, uostalom, i lako razumljivo. Obrazovanje, kultura i humanisticke aktivnosti i orijentacije bili su uvijek karakteristicni za napredne sisteme i pokrete.

D rzavni aparat (b iro k ra cija ) Opasnost od birokracije javlja se u svim velikim dru stvenim organizacijama, u v elikim poduzecima, sindikatima, partijama i drzavnom aparatu. Zato bez obzira na istaknuto jediastvo interesa radnog kolektiva, bilo bi i naivno i opasno zaboraviti na analizu i borbu protiv birokratskih tendencija. Nadalje, sektorske birokracije imaju odredene zajednicke interese i pokazuju tendencije karteliranja s drzavnom birokracijom. U kakvu situaciju ulaze u tom pogledu suvremena drustva pokazuje jednom izvanrednom parabolom Maurice Duverger: Umjesto jednog jedinog tiranina i nekoliko njegovih pomagaca, nailazimo na mnostvo malih tirancica. Svaki od njih ima svoj djelokrug. Ali pritisak svih njih paraozira u vecoj ili manjoj mjeri slobodu kretanja ljudi koji pomalo podsjecaju na Gulivera koga su za zemlju vezali Liliputanci idljadama niti, od kojih je svaka pojedinacno neznatna, ali sve skupa imaju snagu prinude. Suvremena drzava postepeno tezi da vise ne bude samo skup sefova, vlada, administratora, koji pojedinacno zloupotrebljavaju svoju vlast. Ona po staje ogromna masina, cije globalno funkcioniranje prevazilazi aktivnost svakog od njenih sefova. Sam njen mehanizam je tlaciteljski, nezavisno od namjera ljudi koji je sacinjavaju. Ovu pojavu nazivamo birokracijomt(. Ona se ne ogranicava samo na drzavu, tj. na vlast u naciji, ona se prostire na sve oblike vlasti u velikim suvrp.mp.nim zajednicama: na dzinovske firme, politicke partije, masovne orga nizacije itd. Iako apstrcLktno, mehanicki, bez strasti, bez fizickog nasilja, tlacenje koje potice od biro218

kracije nije nista manje tesko od onoga koje proizlazi od zudnje sefova za moci. To je vjerojatno jedan od osnovnih faktora antagonizma u visoko razvijenim drustvima. Uko liko se priblizavamo nivou izobilja, klasne borbe i suparaistva medu gradanima se smanjuju (pod rezervama koje smo iznijeli). Nasuprot tome, sukobi izmedu vlasti i gradana se zaostravaju. (53, 172) Iako se pojedini stavovi Duvergera mogu osporavati Hi kiitizirati, neospoxno je da je u cjelini slika koju on crta realisticna. Ako izuzmemo faraonovu ili kinesku administraciju, koje su, uostalom, bile sasvim specificne, birokracija je kao masovni drustveni fenomen sasvim novog datuma. Ona je cedo naseg stoljeca. A od svih birokracija najslozenija je i najopasnija drzavna biro kracija. Ona se od ostalih razlikuje po jednom bitnom atributu, po tome sto se oslanja na fizicku silu.1 Zbog toga ovdje izdvajam drzavni aparat kao posebnu drustve nu grupu. U drzavni aparat ukljucujem drzavnu administraciju, policiju, vojsku i profesionalne politicare. ^ U razvijenim zemljama na kljucnim pozicijama u drzavnom aparatu obicno stoje ljudi s visokim obrazovanjem, dakle inteligencija u tehnickom smislu. Kod nas to nije sasvim tako ali, ukoliko ima odstupanja, ona ocigledno prije prosiruju nego sto suzuju drustvenu bazu iz koje se regrutiraju drzavni funkcioneri. To je takoder jedan od rezultata nase revolucije. Po svom porijeklu i po svojoj ranijoj aktivnosti drzavni cinovnici, jednako kao i privredni i neprivredni radnici, predstavljaju napredne elemente. Ali za razliku od potonjih, koje njihova vlastita drustvena situacija neprestano revolucionira, slu zbenici drzavne uprave, kao nosioci vlasti i ziveci u strogo hijerarhijskim drustvenim strukturama, izlozeni su strahovitim konzervativnim i antisocijalistickim pritiscima odnosno situacijom uslovljenim stremljenjima koja dovode do deformacija u svijesti, do deformacije u ponasanju, do poznatih birokratskih pojava od kojih je antisocijalisticka aktivnost policijske grupe oko Rankovica samo najsvjeziji primjer.
1 Neki autori smatraju da je posjedovanje vlasti osnovno svojstvo birokracije te stoga ona i moze biti jedino drzavna. U tom slucaju birokraciju. u privredi nazivaju tehnokracijom. Up. J. Dordevic (47, X V X X V III).

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Nije stoga takoder cudno sto je do uspostavljanja samoupravljanja u drzavnim organima doslo najkasnije, da se tu samoupravljanje razvija najsporije i da je for miranje jedinstvenog kolektiva najteze. Ocigledno je da je integriranje u jedan kolektiv ministara i njegovih cinovnika, generala i redova, sefa nekog drzavnog nadlestva i njegovih sluzbenika, mnogo teze nego sto su analogni procesi u jednoj fabrici ili naucnoj ustanovi. ^Drzavni aparat je od svih druitvenih grupa koje smo razmatrali, brojcano najmanji. No zbog cinjenice da ta grupa drzi u svojim rukama vlast (makar i pod odredenom kontrolom), drustveni efekti njenog ponasanja mnogostruko premasuju znacenje njene brojnosti. Da li i u kojoj mjeri vlast korumpira isto kao i novac ne bill htio ovdje raspravljati.1 No nekoliko opservacija mozda nece biti neinteresantne. M. Duverger navodi da smo od srednjovjekovnih teologa naslijedili klasifikaciju osnovnih Ijudskih nagona na seksualni nagon, zelju za saznanjem i zelju za dominacijom. Ova potonja, concupiscentia dominandi, posebno nas zanima. Hobbes je tvrdio da je zudnja za moci opca sklonost svih ljudi (54, 83) i to objasnjava cinjenicom sto ljudi imaju istu teznju za srecom, a kako nema dovoljno bogatstva za sve, dolazi do borbe u kojoj bolje prolazi onaj koji ima vecu moc. U suvremenoj psihoanalizi Adler te2nju za afirmacijom uzima kao jedan od dva kljucna pojma svoje individualne psihologije. Ta teznja proistice iz osjecaja inferiomosti djeteta u odnosu na odrasle i ona nagoni dijete da postavi sebi cilj, kako bi izgledalo nadmocno nad svojom okolinom (55, 55). Kod Adlera zelja za moci ima iskljucivo racionalni karakter, naime da stiti od opasnosti koje poticu iz infe riomosti. Fromm (56, 13568), medutim, upozorava na iracionalne elemente ovog nefizioloskog nagona koji za njega predstavlja samp jedan pol jedinstvenog simbiotickog odnosa ciji je drugi pol zelja za potcinjavanjem. Kad su s razvojem kapitalizma pojedinci bili izbaceni iz svojih drustvenih sklopova, oni su bili ne samo oslobodeni ranijih spona, nego su se ujedno osjetili usamljeni.
1 Francuzi imaju karakteristicnu uzrecicu koja, s obzirom na njihovo isknstvo u toj oblasti, ima snagu narodne poslo^dce: homme elu, homme foutu (izabran covjek, propao covjek).

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bez uporista, nemocni, nistavni i puni tjeskobe. Prevladavanje nepodnosljive tjeskobe izoliranosti i povratak u izvjesnost bio je moguc uspostavljanjem simbiotickog odnosa s drugim pojedincima putem ostvarivanja dominacije ili vlastitog potcinjavanja, vec prema situaciji. Mogli bismo jos dodati empirijsku cinjenicu da se i u zivotinjskim kao i u ljudskim zajednicama javljaju individue koje domioiraju i da se za te dominirajuce polozaje vodi neprestana borba. Navedena zapazanja poput kamencica u nepotpunom mozaiku omogucuju da se nasluti slika cjeline. Tu sliku ja vidim otprilike ovako. U Mstorijskim drustvima egzistencija svakog pojedinca je ugrozena, vodi se neprestana borba za opstanak.1 U toj borbi snaga, vlast, moc igraju kljucnu ulogu. Sto je pojedinac mocniji, to je veci njegov udio u ogranicenom bogatstvu drustva, to je vise osigurana i egzistencija njega licno i njegovih potomaka. Oni koji nisu u stanju da sami osiguraju dominaciju nad drugima, odnosno u mjeri u kojoj to nisu u stanju, nalaze probitacnim da se potcine mocnijem od sebe pa da zajedno pljackaju slabije. Na taj nacin teznja za dominacijom i za potcinjavanjem predstavljaju komplemente jedne jedinstvene teznje za osiguranjem egzistencije. Ta je teznja zatim pojacana iracionalnim komponentama, na koje je upozorio Fromm, a koje proizlaze iz psiholoske nepodnosivosti osamljenosti do koje dolazi u suvremenom klasnom drustvu. Na taj nacin drustvena situacija formira odredeni tip ponasanja koje je toliko intenzivno da lici na fizioloski nagon, i koje predstavlja jedan od onih ostataka kapitalizma u svijesti ljudi koga se veoma tesko rijesiti. Moze se dodati da licne karakteme osobine mogu vise pogodovati zauzimanju stava dominacije ili potcinjavanja kao i da pojedine drustvene strukture mogu pogodovati ili kociti razvoj takvih odnosa. Ocigledno je, dakle, da bilo zbog licnih predispozicija bilo zbog drustvene uslovljenosti kod izvjesnog broja pojedinaca postoji veoma aktivna teznja za dominiranjem. Ta teznja moze se zadovoljiti u sportu, drustvenim aktivnostima ili na radnom mjestu u smislu da se bude prvi ili najbolji. Uspjeh se nagraduje drustvenim pre1 Korisno je upozoriti da glasovita koncepcija borbe za opstanak nije nastala u prirodnim vec u dru^tvenim naukama. Biolog Darwin preuzeo ju je od svog zemljaka ekonomista Malthusa.

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stizom ili materijalnim beneficijama. U ovakvim slucajevima licni i drustveni interesi se najvecim dijelom poklapaju. Uspjeh se doduse moze postici i na prijevaraii nacin, no male su mogucnosti da se prijevara perpetuirai Kad se radi o vlasti, situacija je bitno drugacija. Uvijek: je prisutna mogucnost zloupotrebe koja, ukoliko sankcijei kontrola nisu dovoljno efikasne, biva i realizirana sto dovodi do sputavanja tude slobode, do nametanja vlastitih shvacanja, zelja i interesa, do odredenih, ponekad drasticoih, oblika eksploatacije pojedinaca i grupa. Historijski primjeri su naravno, suvise dobro poznati, a da bi ih trebalo ponavljati. Ukoliko je nasa analiza tacna, onda za razliku od kolektiva u privrednim i neprivrednim djelatnostima drzavni aparat ne mozemo smatrati autohtonom socijalistickom snagom. Naprotiv, mozemo ocekivati da ce se u toj drustvenoj grupi pojavljivati snazne konzervativne i birokratske tendencije. Ne radi se, kao sto je istaknuto, o dobrim ili losim namjerama pojedinaca koji obavljaju drzavne funkcije. Marksisticko stanoviste, koje razvijanje ekonomske drustvene formacije shvaca kao prirodno-historijski proces, moze manje nego ikoje drugo baciti na pojedinca odgovornost za prilike cija je on socijalna. tvorevinaa (4, L III). Drustvo se zbog toga efikasnom kontrolom mora osigurati od neprijatnih iznenadenja. To nase drustvo vec i radi. Rotacija, deprofesionalizacij a politicara, difuzija vlasti (komimalno uredenje i drugi oblici decentralizacije), jacanje kontrole predstavnickih. organa, likvidiranje i posljednje- zatvorene- organizacije (sluzbe bezbednosti kao politicke policije), primjeri su svjesne i sistematske akcije. No mnogo jos preostaje da se uradi, narocito u stvaranju odgovornog, demokratski formiranog i aktivnog javnog mnjenja koje.,predstavlja najefikasniji instrument za sprecavanje zloupotrebe vlasti. Naravno, naivno bi bilo ocekivati" da ce u drzavnom aparatu elementi vlasti bilo brzo, bilo lako, bilo potpuno biti eliminirani ili ucinjeni bezopasnim. Uostalom zato i govorimo o odumiranju drzave kao dugom i mucnom procesu. No nesumnjivo je da ce drzavni' aparat u mjeri u kojoj bude gubio atribute vlasti i pretvarao se u strucnu sluzbu drustva, da ce se u istoj mjeri ta drustvena grupa od potencijEilno konzervativne i antisocijalisticke pretvoriti u jedan od nosilaca drustvenog progresa. 222

Zak lju cci Posmatramo li proces drustvene proizvodnje s ekonomskog stanovista dakle, kako se zadovoljavaju potrebe clanova tog drustva, kako se povecava njihovo ekonomsko blagostanje on da cemo lako ustanoviti da privredne i neprivredne djelatnosti daju pozitivne doprinose tom cilju, dok rad drzavne administracije ostaje doduse neophodan, ali ne poboljsava nicije blagostanje vec ima karakter drustvenog troska. Ocigledno, sto je manja drzavna administracija, to vise sredstava ostaje za zadovoljenje materijalnih i nematerijalnih potreba cla nova drustva. Na taj nacin uocavamo jos jedan aspekt posebnog polozaja drzavnog aparata u procesu drustvene proizvodnje, o cemu je vec bilo govora prilikom zasnivanja teorije proizvodnog rada. S druge strane, iz grupe proizvodaca privrednih i neprivrednih izdvojili smo seljake koji se razlikuju prvenstveno zbog svog historijskog nasljeda. Vidjeli smo da ima znacajnih razloga zasto se privredni i neprivredni proizvodaci ne mogu tretirati kao jedinstvena drustvena grupa. Njihovi materijalni interesi mogu se cak sukobljavati. Medutim, te dvije grupe predstavljaju i prirodne protuteze. Trzisni proizvodaci mogu pozitivno utjecati na korigiranje izvjesnili nerealnih i, s materijalnim mogucnostima zemlje neusaglasenih, programa i shvacanja svojih humanistickih drugova, koji su ponekad skloni idealiziranjima. Radnici iz neprivrednlh sektora, medutim, imaju i interesa i mogucnosti da podvrgnu drustvenoj kritici deformacije koje se javljaju kao posljedica robno-novcanih odnosa (birokratske i monopolitisticke tendencije, nekontrolirana trka za zaradom, malogradanski mentalitet i si.). Na taj nacin nase istrazivanje dovelo nas je do zakljucka o postojanju, odnosno nastajanju cetiriju drustvenih grupa u Jugoslaviji na sadasnjem stepenu razvoja. Dvije od tih grupa neseljacki proizvodaci u privrednim i neprivrednim djelatnostima predstavljaju nosioce socijalistickog razvoja. Jedna od tih grupa seljaci predstavlja nasljedeni konzervativni elemenat. Ta je gru pa brojcano najjaca, ali je njen drustveni utjecaj mali i osim toga, kao posljedica privrednog razvoja, unutar grupe odvijaju se veoma intenzivni procesi drustvene 223

transformacije. Druga od tih grupa drzavni aparat predstavlja takoder konzervativni elemenat, iako drugog tipa. Kod nje se ne moze ocekivati da ce je privredni razvoj automatski transformirati u socijalistickom smislu, vec je nuzna efikasna drustvena kontrola. U istrazivanju starao sam se da utvrdim kako su se pojedine drustvene grupe razvile iz ranijih klasicnih obli ka klasa i slojeva. Mislim da je ocigledno da te klase i slojevi nisu iscezli, da se negdje vise negdje manje mijesaju, preplicu ili stapaju s novim oblicima i da citavo nase drustvo jos uvijek prolazi kroz intenzivan proces drustvenog transfonniranja i prestrukturiranja. No evolutivne veze su vidljive. Krajnja slika je veoma neortodoksna. N i razlike u visini dohotka, ni razlike izmedu umnog i fizickog rada uz jedini izuzetak razlika izmedu grada i sela a pogotovo ne razlike u imovini ili nasljednom statusu, sto su sve klasicni uzroci dekomponiranja drustava u klase i slojeve nisu vise bitno operativne u strukturiranju suvremenog jugoslavenskog drustva. I to ne treba da nas cudi. Grupne lojalnosti odredene su polozajem u procesu drustvene proizvodnje. Institucijom samoupravljanja ta je proizvodnja neposredno podrustvljena, cime je eliminirana osnovica za formiranje klasa i stvoreni preduslovi za odumiranje tamo gdje postoje. Umjesto klasa pocinju se formirati neke vrste profesionalnih grupa. I nije takoder slucajno sto ta nova drustve na struktura u odredenoj mjeri nalazi svoj odraz u strukturi Savezne skupstine, vrliovnom politickom arbitru zemlje.1 Na kraju mogli bismo nase rezultate i kvantificirati. Struktura aktivnog stanovnistva po razmatranim grupama izgledala je u godinama popisa stanovnistva ovako.2
1 Iako, u svjetlu gornje analize, ne vidim opravdanja za postojanje adininistrativno-politickog vijeca. 2 Podaci su samo priblizno tacni zbog nedovoljne rasClanjenosti i direktne netacnosti nase demografske statistike. Tako npr. u istoj publikaciji (SZS, Bilten 312, ss. 22 i 23) u grupu sdrzavna uprava i pravosudea u 1953. g. je ukljuceno vojno osoblje, a 1961. nije i to nigdje nije istaknuto. Tako proizlazi da se drzavni aparat smanjio, dok se u stvari povecao. Broj seljaka je dobiven tako da su iz aktivnog poljoprivrednog stanovnistva iskljuceni radnici i sluzbenici ( Bilten 312, ss. 22 i 23). Ostali privrednici su rezidualna kategorija. Broj neprivrednika (kulturno-prosvjetne, naucne i zdravstveno-socijalne djelatnosti) povecan je u 1953. g. za 28.000 lica zaposlenih u masovnim organizacijama, strucnim udruzenjima, slobodnim profesijama i vjerskim organizacijama (SZS, Bilten 73, s. 9), a u 1961. za 53.000 lica sto predstavlja aproksimaciju za iste kategorije dobivenu na taj nacin sto su ukljucena lica iz sostalih dje-

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Seljaci Ostali privrednici Neprivrednici Drzavni aparat Aktivno stanovnistvo

1953: Hiljada % 67,8 5.003, 26,2 1.943 3,0 224 3,0 220 7.390 100,0

1961 Hiljada % 4.408 55,4 2.887 36,3 408 5,1 257 3,2 7.960 100,0

Vidi se da se struktura veoma brzo mijenja i to u pravcu smanjenja ucesca privrednika i povecanja ucesca neprivrednika. Apsolutno se smanjuje broj seljaka, dok drzavni aparat zaostaje za opcim porastom. Sve su ove tendencije (s izuzetkom posljednje) poznate i iz razvoja drugih zemalja samo su ti procesi ranije bili znatno sporiji. Kad bi se dosadasnji tempo privrednog razvoja pa prema tome i drustvene transformacije nastavio i u narednih osam godina, koncem ove decenije ostali privrednici postal! bi dominantna grupa i obuhvatili bi vise od polovine aktivnog stanovnistva, ucesce neprivredriika poraslo bi na jednu desetinu (dok bi se apsolutni broj skoro udvostrucio), a proporcija seljackog stanov nistva pala bi ispod 40%.*
Iatnostia bez zaposlenih. u privrednim udruzenjima (6559) i vojnih lica, za Ciji broj, u nedostatku podataka, pretpostavljamo da se nije povecao 'u odnosu na 1953. g. ( Bilten 73, s. 9; Bilten 312, ss. 22, 23, 169). Drzavni aparat za 1953. g. preuzet je od SZS, a za 1961. g. povecan je za vojna Iica (75.000 sto odgovara stanju iz 1953. g., Bilten 73, s. 9). Bez JNA, diji je kadrovski sastav uvjetovan medunarodnom -situacijom, drzavni aparat se u osmogodinjem periodu povecao ovako ( Bilten 73, s. 9; B il ten 312, s. 169): 1953 1961 Indeks Savezni organi 4.443 17.191 388 Republicki organi 9.661 24.772 256 .Ostali organi i pravosude 130.859 139.910 . 107 Ukupno: : 144.963 181.873 125

1 lako je socijalni sadrzaj pojedinih kategorija bio veoma raziicit p rije rata, radi ocjene navedene ekstrapolacije bit ce informativno da se aktivno stanovnistvo iz 1938 g. grupira u iste grupe. Dobiva se ova slika (na osnovu podataka I. Vinskog, op. cit.): Hiljada % Seljaci 5428 78,5 Ostali privrednici 1211 17,4 Slobodne profesije 20 . 0*3 Drzavni sluzbenici 268 3,8
Aktivno stanovnistvo 6927 .100,0

Aktivno stanovnistvo smanjeno je za lica van djelatnosti i lica nepoznate djelatnosti ( Bilten 312, ss. 22 i 23). 15 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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U daljnjem toku socijalisticke izgradnje u nasoj zemlji mozemo, pored nestajanja seljastva i transformiranja drzavnog aparata, ocekivati i povecanje drustvene homogenosti unutar pojedinih grupa. Tri snazna faktora djeluju u tom pravcu. Jedan se sastoji u sistematskom smanjivanju raspona licnih dohodaka. Ta je pojava registrirana u svim zemljama za koje postoje podaci, a posebno u zemljama koje napustaju kapitalisticki nacin proizvodnje (57, 1629). Drugi faktor predstavlja postepeno izjednacavanje obrazovnog i kultumog standarda. Treci faktor se sastoji u integrativnim efektima drustvenog samou pravljanja. Na taj nacin izgraduje se besklasno drustvo u Jugoslaviji.

Citirana literatura 1. Savezna konferencija SSRNJ, Drustveno-politidka kretanja i djelovanje Socijalistickog saveza poslije Sestog kongresa, Borba, Beograd, 1967. 2. J. K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, Hougton Mifflin, Boston, 1958. 3. K. Marx, Kapital, sv. Ill, Kultura, Zagreb, 1948. 4. K. Marx, Kapital, sv. I, Kultura, Zagreb, 1947. 5. W. A. Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, Manchester School, 1954. 6. W. A. Lewis, ^Unlimited Supply: Further Notes, Manchester School, 1958. 7. K. Marx, Teorije o visku vrijednosti, sv. I, Kultura, Beo grad, 1953. 8. J. A. Kronrod, Osnovna pitanja marksisticko-lenjinistickog ucenja o proizvodnom radu u kapitalizmu i socijalivnu, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1948; prijevod rada objavljenog u Izvestija Akademii nauk SSSR, No. 1, 1947. 9. A. I. Notkin, OSerki teorii socialisticeskogo vosproizvodstva, OGIZ, Moskva, 1948.
Uporedivost nije potpuna, jer su mnogi radnici iz neprivrede prije rata bili drzavni sluzbenici (prosvjetni i zdravstveni radnici i dr.). Zbog toga se drzavni aparat na osnovu gornjih podataka ne da izolirati, vec treba promatrati neprivrednu sferu u cjelini. Ako izuzmemo seljake, na raiun ijeg ue3ca ostale dvije kategorije povecavaju svoje uceSde, onda proizlazi da se relativna ekspanzija ukupne neprivredne sfere blago ubrzava. U petnaestogodilnjem razdoblju 19381953. broj privrednika (bez seljaka) odn. neprivrednika (s drzavnim aparatom) pov^cao se za 6196 odnosno 5494; u daljnjem osmogodiSnjem razdoblju, 19531961, ta su povecanj a 4896 odnosno 5094.

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10. B. Horvat, iAn Integrated System of Social Accounts for an Economy of the Jugoslav Typed, referat na konferenciji International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, Maynooth, Irska, 1967; Review of Income and Wealth, 1968. 11. M. Pecujlic, Klase i savremeno druStvo, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1967. 12. K. Marx, F. Engels, Rani radovi, Kultura, Zagreb, 1953. 13. R. Lukic, uEksploatacija kao element drustvene klase, Socijalizam, 3/1966. 14. B. Horvat, iRaspodjela prema radu medu kolektivimaa, Nasa stvamost, 1/1962. 15. B. Horvat, Ekonomska teorija planske privrede, Kultura, Beograd, 1961. 16. V. Milic, uOsvrt na drustvenu pokretljivost u Jugoslavijia, Statisticka revija, 3 4/1960. 17. K. Micic, uProfesionaLni moral zanatlija sitnih sopstvenika<t, Sociologija, 3/1965. 18. M. Hadzi Vasilev, Fenomen privatne svojine u socijalizmua, Komunist, 5. maja 1 966. 19. M. Popovic, Drustveno-ekonomski sistem, Kultura, Beograd, 1964. 20. J. Borflevic, Socijalizam i demokratija, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1962. 21. M. Popovic, Jedan teorijsko-hipotetiiki okvir za proucavanje stratifLkacione strukture socijalistickog drustva<t, Sociologija, 1 2/1966. 22. V. Milic, Jedan pojmovno-hipoteticki okvir za proucavanje drustvene strukturea, Sociologija, 2/1960. 23. J. Stoetzel, i>Psihologija interpersonalnih odnosaa, u G. Gurvitch, Sociologija, sv. II, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1966. 24. P. Novosel, i>Dru5tvena strattfikacija i norma o prihodua, Nase teme, 3/1966. 25. K. Mayer, The Theory of Social Classes, u R. K. Merton i dr.. Reader in Bureaucracy, Free Press, Glencoe, 1952. 26. A. Todorovic, Drustvena svijest radnika i klasna stratifikacija, Sociologija, 3/1965. 27. M. Pecujlic, Promene u socijalnoj strukturi lugoslavije, VSPN, Beograd, 1963. 28. M. Ilic (ur.), Socijalna struktura i pokretljivost radnicke klase Jugoslavije, IDN, Beograd, 1963. 29. R. Supek, Sociologija, Skolska knjiga, Zagreb, 1963. 30. M. Pecujlic, Teorijski okvir za proucavanje klasnih promjena u socijalizmua, Sociologija, 1 2/1966. 31. V. I. Lenjin, j>Velika inicijativa^, Izabrana djela, tom II/ III, Kultura, Zagreb, 1950. 32. T. Parsons et al.. Theories of Society, Vol. I, Free Press, Glencoe, 1962. 15* 227

33. S. Mozina, Ucesce rukovodecih i strucnih kadrova u radnickom samoupravljanjua, Gledista, 3/1966. 34. Z. Mlinar, Neki struktumi aspekti vlasti u lokalnoj zajednicid, Gledista, 6 7/1966. 35. V. Rus, Klike u radniin organizacijama, Glediste, 8 9/ 1 966. 36. Smisao i perspektiva socijalizma, Zbomik radova drugog zasjedanja Korculanske Ijetne skole 1964, Praxis, Zagreb, 1 965. 37. B. Horvat, uRadna vrijednost proizvodnje jugoslavenske poljoprivrede i industrijea, Ekonomist, 4/1961. 38. Institut za proucavanje radnickog pokreta, Drustveno-politicki sistem socijalistickih zemalja, Beograd, 1964. 39. A. Gramsci, Izabrana dela, Kultura, Beograd, 1 959. 40. J. Z u p a n o v , A. S. Tannenbaum, sDistribucija utjecaja u nekim jugoslavenskim indnstrijsTdm organizacijama kako je vide clanovi till organizacija, Ekonomski pregled, 23/1966. .41. 2. Tomic, uStruktura radnickih savjeta, u: Jugoslavensko udruzenje za sociologiju, Drustveno samoupravljanje u Jugoslaviji, Beograd, 1966. 42. B. Kavcic, 0 protestnim obustavama rada, Gledista, 2/1966. 43. E. Kardelj, Novi ustav SFRJ, u Prednacrt Vstava SFRJ, Komunist, Beograd, 1962. 44. M. Pecujlic, Klasa i politicka avangarda u savremenim uslovima borbe za socijalizanw, u: Aktuelni problemi reorganizacije i daljeg razvoja SKJ, VSPN, Beograd, 1967. 45. D. C. Hodges, sAnti-Intellectualism in a Society of Eggheads, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 4/1966. 46. V. I. Lenjin, Korak naprijed, dva koraka nazada, Izabrana djela, II/2, Beograd, 1950. 47. V. Stanovcic, A. Stojanovic (ur.), Birokratija i tehnokratija, I knjiga, Sedma sila, Beograd, 1966. 48. Lj. Tadid, T. Indie, Partija proletarijata, Sedma sila, Beo grad, 1966. 49. E. Fischer, slntelektualci i vlast, Nase teme, 10/1966. 50. D. Pejovic, Protiv struje, Mladost, Zagreb, 1965. 51. W. Mills, Znanje i moc, V. Karadzic, Beograd, 1967. 52. V. Stanovcic, A. Stojanovid (ur.), Birokratija i tehnokratija, I I knjiga, Sedma sila, Beograd, 1 966. 53. M. Duverger, Uvod u politiku, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1966. 54. T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Kultura, Beograd, 1961. 55. A. Adler, Poznavanje covjeka, Kosmos, Beograd, 1 958. 56. E. Fromm, Bekstvo od slobode, Nolit, Beograd, 1 964. 228

57. B. Horvat, Ekonomska teorija planske privrede, Kultura, Beograd, 19 1 6. 58. M. Nikolic (ur.), Savez komunista Jugoslavije u uslovima samoupravljanja, Zbomik tekstova, Kultura, Beograd, 1967. 59. S. Suvar, uOsnovne karakteristike i uvjeti procesa podrustvljavanja zemlje u Jugoslaviji, Sociologija sela, 1 12/1966. 1 60. I. Klauzer, Viskovi radne snage u poljoprivredi Jugoslavije, Sociologija sela, 78/1965. 61. E. Kardelj, Problemi socijalisticke politike na selu, Kultura, Beograd, 1 959. 62. K. Kilibarda, Samoupravljanje i Savez komunista, Socioloski institut, Beograd, 1966. 63. M. Buric, Sociologija Maxa Webera, Matica Hrvatska, Zagreb, 1 964.

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TRANSFORMACIJA PARTIJE U SAVEZ POLITICKIH AKTIVISTA

Kao marksisti mogli smo ocekivati da ce uspostavljanje radnickog samoupravljanja dovesti do znacajnih promjena u proizvodnim odnosima, i da ce ove promjene sa svoje strane usloviti i zahtijevati isto tako znacajne promjene u politickoj nadgradnji. Pitanje sadrzajnog usaglasavanja politickog sistema bilo je samo pitanje vremena. To usaglasavanje vrsi se zapravo vec odavno i tako su sazrijevali preduslovi za jednu radikalniju reformu. Nadalje, kao sto je zavodenje radnickog samoupravlja nja bilo docekano sa skepsom i kritikom da se radi o neizvodljivom i utopijskom poduhvatu, slicne manifestacije nepovjerenja zapazaju se i u vezi s predstojecom politickom reformom. Na socijaldemokratskom Zapadu govorilo se da radnicko samoupravljanje nije uspjelo 231

nigdje gdje je do danas pokusavano, da ono razara neophodnu radnu disciplinu, da ce ono usporiti pri vredni razvoj jer ce radnici sav dohodak potrositi umjesto da jedan dio akumuliraju. S kominformovskog Istoka stigao je prigovor da radnicko samoupravljanje slabi diktaturu proletarijata i u suprotnosti je sa jedinstvenim planiranjem socijalisticke privrede.1 Danas se govori da drustvo bez politickih partija nije jos nigdje bilo organizirano, da bi nepostojanje jedne ili vise snaznih, dobro organizovanih politickih partija, nuzno dovelo do kaosa u drustvenom zivotu, da odumiranje drzave i odumiranje partije predstavlja utopiju i znaci smrtnu opa snost za socijalisticku izgradnju, Mozda su te kritike vise karakteristicne za inostranstvo nego za domacu drustvenu scenu. Mozda je za potonju vise karakteristicna izvjesna zbunjenost, koja potice otuda sto ne postoji jasno razradena teorija izuzev nekoliko nacelnih postavki na osnovu koje bi se brzo i lako mogla sagledati adekvatna rjesenja. U svakom slucaju je nesumnjiva potreba za razradom teorije partije na sadasnjoj etapi.2

18. Nastanak p o litick ih partija

P O L IT IC K E PA R TIJE

Kao i obicno, bit ce koristan historijski prilaz nasem problemu. Politicke partije ne postoje oduvijek, pa je razumno ocekivati d a . ce imati svoj kraj kao sto su imale i svoj pocetak. U stvari, mi smo toliko navikli na postojanje politickih partija u suvremenom svijetu, da obicno i ne-pomisljamo da su se te partije izuzev nekih, rudimentarnih pocetaka na historijskoj pozornici pojavile tek u proslom stoljecu paralelno s usponom nove drustvene klase, burzoazije, koja je organizirala
1 Up. npr. A. Rumjancev, (1, 1134). Sa svog stanoviSta Rumjancev je bio potpuno u pravu: radnicko samoupravJjanje slabi diktaturu birokracije i ukida u krajnjoj konsekvenci svaku diktaturu. Takoder likvidira administrativno planiranje.
2 Tu potrebu istakao je V. Bakaric na prvom sastanku za reorganizaciju' SKJ. .

232

svoje partije u borbi za vlast i razbijanje feudalizma. Interesima burzoazije odgovarala je i izvjesna politicka demokratizacija, pa dolazi do sirenja .prava glasa, iako uz razna ogranicenja kao sto su test pismenosti i imovinski cenzus. Pod pritiskom radnickih organizacija, sindikata i partija, koji su se u evropskim zeriiljama pojavili uz neznatne izuzetke tek u drugoj polovini proslog stoljeca, dolazi postepeno do ostvarivanja opceg prava glasa. Medutim, zene su dobile pravo glasa tek negdje pred prvi svjetski rat, a u jednoj civiliziranoj zemlji u srcu Evrope nemaju ga jos ni danas. Mi smo se i s postojanjem opceg prava glasa, jednako kao i s partijama, u toj mjeri sazivjeli da obicno zaboravljamo na njegovu relativno kasnu pojavu i spor razvoj. Taj relativno spor razvoj omogucio je u zapadnoevropskim zemljama postepenu demokratizaciju politickog zivota bez vecih drustvenih potresa. Stvorene su tako odredene tradicije, navike i obicaji koji omogucuju da se politicki sporovi rjesavaju bez opasnih ili suvise brutalnih drustvenih sukoba. Nase zemlje su u tom pogledu zakasnile. Pred jedva nesto vise od sto godina ukinuto je kmetstvo i to ne u svim krajevima a nacionalno ujedinjenje postignuto je pred manje od 50 godina. Stoga nije bilo dovoljno vremena da se razviju demokratske tradicije niti da, ucestvovanjem u politickom 2ivotu, gradani steknu kako bi to Veljko Vlahovic rekao1 demokratsku kulturu. Opca privredna nerazvijenost i neobrazovanost sirokih masa jos su vise ogrardcavali i sputavali spomenuti proces. O tim cinjenicama neophodno je voditi racuna. Nadalje, politicke partije ne samo da su se kasno pojavile, nego su u meduvremenu prosle i odredeni evolutivni proces. Prve stranke razvile su se iz izbomih odbora koji su se stvarali prilikom svakih izbora sa zadatkom da podupiru kandidate i organiziraju agitaciju. Modeme stranke nastale su onda kad su se ti izbomi odbori udruzili u nacionalnim razmjerima, kad se vise nisu poslije izbora raspustali nego su postali stalni i kad su se organski povezali s parlamentarnim grupama (2, 90). U izbome odbore okupljani su drustveno ugledni i bogati gradani koji su mogli financirati izbomu kam1 Vidi govor na V I plenumu Saveza komunista Cme Gore.

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panju i koji su svojim drustvenim statusom vrsili odredeni utjecaj na lokalne birace. Tu tradicionalnu patricijsku osnovicu zadrzale su u Evropi sve do danas kon zervativne, liberalne i radikalne stranke. U drugoj polovini proslog stoljeca radnicki pokret uvodi znacajnu inovaciju u politicke organizacije osnivanjem masovnih radnickih partija. Tradicionalne patiicijske partije, pise M. Duverger (on ih naziva kadrovskim), nodgovarale su razdoblju sukoba izmedu aristokracije i burzoazije: te dvije malobrojne klase mogli su savrseno predstavljati njihovi ugledni pripadnici. Ogranicen opseg stranaka odrazavao je ogranicenost politic kog polja i osnovno obiljezje te demokracije iz koje je najveci dio naroda bio prakticki iskljucen. Naprotiv, masovne stranke odgovaraju prosirenju demokracije, koja postaje pristupacna tako reci cjelokupnom stanovniStvu: ono se moze sluziti svojim pravima samo onda ako se ne ogranici na to da glasa jedanput u cetiii ili pet godina nego ako stvamo i trajno sudjeluju u upra vljanju drzavom. (2, 34) Radnicke partije, ciji je model bila njemaCka socijaldemokratska stranka u cijem razvoju su ucestvovali i Marx i Engels, trudile su se da politicki aktiviraju sto veci broj clanova radnicke klase i kroz politicki i teorijski rad u sekcijama skolovale su u stvari svoje clanstvo za politicku borbu. Da bi bile efikasne, te su stranke morale biti cvrsto organizirane sto nije bio slucaj sa tradicionalnim burzoaskim partijama. Odatle centralizam. No s druge strane te su se stranke borile za socijalizam, pa su morale njegovati demokraciju, 3to se ocitovalo u sirokoj razmjeni misljenja i izboru svih rukovodilaca tajnim glasanjem. Odatle demokracija, kako je to istaknuto i u nazivima tih par tija. Na taj nacin i prije no sto je bio skovan sam termin, radnicke partije primijenile su demokratski centra lizam kao svoj organizacioni princip. N i jedan tip stra naka da navedem opet ocjenu M. Duvergera (2, 34) nije u demokratizaciji otisao tako daleko kao socija listicke stranke.c No svega jednu stranu dalje isti autor konstatira da je unutrasnja demokracija zapravo veoma ogranicena, da se rukovodioci regrutiraju uglavnom kooptiranjem, da je njihov izbor zapravo samo ratifikacija i da profesionalci mogu manipulirati izborima kako im odgovara. Ova je ocjena interesantna zbog toga jer u njoj 234

prepoznajemo mnoge nase danasnje probleme i jer se prirodno postavlja pitanje: ako je to najvisi stupanj unutarpartijske demokratizacije, kako tek onda stoje stvari s demokracijom u drugim partijama? Uslovi ilegalne borbe radnicke klase doveli su pocetkom ovog stoljeca do formiranja jos jednog tipa radnicke partije. To je Lenjinova kadrovska partija, koja ce se kasnije nazvati komunistickom partijom. Za kompartije je karakteristican veci centralizam, striktna disciplina i tokovi direktiva odozgo prema dolje. Oba tipa radnickih partija nastala su u borbi za osvajanje politicke vlasti. Odatle njihovi organizacioni oblici dobivaju svoju funkcionalnost. Nas problem je, medu tim, u izgradnji partije nakon sto je osvojena vlast i nakon sto su ostvareni preduslovi za izgradnju socijalizma, dakle u formiranjn partije odnosno politicke organizacije koja taj socijalizam treba najdirektnije da izgraduje. Drugim rijecima znamo kako izgledaju i funkcioniraju radnicke partije kojima je zadatak osvajanje vlasti. Znamo takoder, kako izgledaju partije koje treba da odrze vlast. No historija nas jos nije poucila kako treba da izgledaju partije kojima se postavlja za datak unistenja vlasti.

Visepartijski i jed n opa rtijski sistem ..Osnovno opravdanje visepartijskih sistema sastoji se u tvrdnji da oni osiguravaju politicke slobode. Politicke slobode su, prirodno, nesto sto je vrijedno samo po sebi. No moguce je i pragmaticnije objasnjenje. Odredeni mi nimum politickih sloboda nuzan je da bi se osigurala stabilnost drustvenog sistema.'Autokratski rezim pociva na vulkanu. I zato je obicno kratkotrajan. Prirodnim odabiranjem visepartijski sistemi pokazuju se kao zivotno sposobniji, jer omogucuju povremena praznjenja, i tako izbjegavaju visoke pritiske. Politicka partija osniva se ne zato da bi se osigurala sloboda uopce, vec svoja sloboda, tj. da se osvoji vlast. Da bi- se osvojila vlast, partija mora biti dobro organizirana, mora imati svoj profesionalni aparat, materijalna sredstva itd. Stvara se tako jedna birokratska struktura s oligarhijskim karakteristikama.''Tu pojavu uocio je jos 235

prije pola stoljeca ,R. Michels i fommlira je u svom cuvenom gvozdenom zakonu oligarhije.'Zbog podjele rada u velikim organizacijama kao i zbog psiholoske potrebe clanova velikih organizacija za usmjeravanjem i vodenjem rasuduje Michels pojedinci koji se nalaze na rukovodedim polozajima, niti jesu niti po prirodi stvari mogu biti kontrolirani od strane onih koji se nalaze na nizim polozajima. Rukovodioci su ograniceni samo u onom smislu u kom su i kipari ograniceni: prirodom materijala s kojim rade (3). Govoreci o relativno demokratskoj laburistickoj partiji poznati britanski politikolog R. McKenzie zakljucuje: . ..godisnja partijska konferencija ima pravo da bude konzultirana, pravo da podstice i pravo da upozorava. No to ne znaci da clanovi masovne organizacije u britanskom parlamentamom sistemu imaju pravo da kontroliraju ili usmjeruju akcije svojih parlamentamih voda. (4, 583) c Oligarhij a unutar stranaka dovodi do oligopola u politickom zivotu zemlje uopce. U najstabilnijiin zapadnim demokracijama broj stranaka sveo se na dvije, koje mohopoliziraju cjelokupni politicki zivot zemlje. Usprkos postojanju politickih sloboda, prakticki je nemoguce organizirati novu partiju, gotovo je nemoguce za nezavisne pojedince da se uspjesno kandidiraju na izboiima,va poslanici koji su izabrani na nekoj partijskoj listi, ako kasnije pokazu tendenciju da budu nezavisni, definitivno reskiraju svoju politicku karijeru. v'Partijske oligarhije povezuju se onda s drugim oligarhij ama u drustvu, a gradanin pojedinac uza sva svoja politicka prava nema fakticki nikakvog utjecaja na funkcioniranje modeme drzavne masinerije.'Na te efekte u zapadnim zemljama superponiraju se jos efekti privatnog kapitala. ..Sredstva informacija u nacelu su pristupacna svima i slobodna su od drzavne kontrole, ali nisu slobodna od kontrole novca. A sredstvima informacija u suvremenoj drzavi form ira se javno m njenje.' Instruktivan primjer nemoci gradanina da se odupre suvremenom Leviathanu i onda kad ga dovodi do ruba katastrofe jest neuspjeh svih akcija progresivnih intelektualaca u SAD da primoraju ili uvjere (? !) vladu na obustavu rata u Vijetnamu. l,to-se-tice-jednopartijskog sistema, u-opcem-slueaju moze se_reci- da-ima-sve negativne-osobine^visepartij skih sistemar- ali- b ez - nj ihovih- -pozitivnih *osobina. 236

Medutim, privremeno, jednopartijski sistem moze se pokazati kao najefikasnije rjesenje u ostvarivanju prijelaza od kapitalizma u socijalizam. Socijalizam se, naravno, moze izgradivati i pomodu visepartijskog sistema. No tu se onda javljaju konzervativni otpori. Socijalizam implicira odumiranje drzave, difuziju vlasti, razbijanje birokratskih. struktura, neposrednu demokraciju. Postojanje vise partija implicira egzistiranje partijske masinerije, borbu za vlast i posrednu demokraciju. Stoga visepartijski sistem, koji je posluzio kao poluga za ubrzani razvoj kapitalizma, moze da se pokaze kocnicom u izgradnji socijalizma. Moze, ali ne mora. i'1 U nasoj konkretnoj historijskoj situaciji pored ovih opcih razmatranja relevantne su i odredene cinjenice. Pretpostavimo da je zauzet kurs na formiranje vise partija. Tada bi se, sudeci po dogadajima posljednjih nekoliko godina, sadasnji jedinstveni komunisticki po kret vjerojatno pocijepao na konzervativno i progresivno krilo. Nadalje, s obzirom na brojnost seljastva i na nekadasnje tradicije seljackih stranaka, pojavila bi se vje rojatno i jedna seljacka partija. A ta bi po prirodi stvari bila konzervativna. Nadalje, jos uvijek znacajne razlike u nerazvijenosti pojedinih krajeva cine prirodnu osnovicu za formiranje politickih stranaka s razlicitim interesima. Na kraju Jugoslavija je i visenacionalna zemlja s jos neizivljenfm nacionalnim antagonizmima i znacajnim nacionalno-kulturnim razlikama.1 Po svim tim osnovima
1 Jedno skorasnje ispitivanje stavova studenata, izvrSeno u Institutu drustvenih nauka, pokazuje zanimljivu i punu implikacija cinjenicu da je socijalno porijeklo sasvim drugostepenog karaktera u odnosu na nacionalno-kultume razlike. Socijalno porijeklo je na svim nivoima procjene druStveno-politickog sistema gotovo irelevantan cinilac, dok se znatna odstupanja u misljenjima mogu uociti kod studenata porijeklom iz razllditih nacionalno-kultumih sredina.c Nadalje, da razvijenija sredina ima i vii nivo aspiracija: studenti iz dru5tveno-ekonomski i kulturao slabije razvijenih centara (Skopje, Sarajevo) imaju obicno nesto pozitivnije stavove prema ovom drustvu, dok vecu kriticnost ispoljavaju studenti iz razvijenijih drustveno-kulturnih sredina (Slovenija,- Hrvatska). I na kraju, da nacionalna pripadnost igra izuzetnu ulogu; a . . . konstatirano je da nacionalnost. . , uslovljava najvedu diferencijaciju stavova prema idealima, odnosno da na strukturu ideala studenata utice znatno vise nego druga obiljezja njihove licnosti. Drugo mjesto u rang-listi. znadajnosti pojedinih obiljezja dijele obiljezja Clanstvo u SKJ i vrsta fakulteta. Zatim dolazi spol, religioznost, socijalno porijeklo i t d (Brofiic i dr., 5). Kako su studehti kulturno mobilniji od drugih kategorija stanovnistva, to se moze ocekivati da < e uoene pojave biti jos izrazitije 5 kod drugih druStvenih grupa. Dodajmo i jedan statistiCki podatak: u Sloveniji ima 1,8% nepismenih, na Kosmetu 4196. SliCni su rasponi i kod drugih pokazatelja piivrednog, kuiturnog i zdravstvenog standarda.

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xnogle bi se formirati stranke. A, ako se dva ili vise osnova poklope, stranke bi se, po prirodi stvari mogle razviti u zestoko neprijateljske grupacije. Tako su npr. seljaci najbrojniji u privredno nerazvijenim republikama, a najrazvijenije republike sacinjavaju manjinu stanovnistva. U takvim uslovima visepartijski sistem bi zemlju najvjerojatnije bacio u teske nacionalisticke sukobe, kakvi su se, uostalom, i javljali prije rata. Socijalizam i privredni razvoj otisli bi u drugi plan, medunaxodni prestiz Jugoslavije sveo bi se na predratni balkanski nivo, a umjesto stvame demokratizacije imali bismo razbuktavanje borbe za-vlast. Iz tih razloga visepartijski sistem ocigledno nije-pozeljna altemativa. Jednopartijski takoder ne. Preostaje bespartijski. Ovaj potonji trebalo bi da sacuva pozitivne strane visepartijskog sistema a da izbjegne negativne strane. Na koji nacin se to moze ostvaiiti?

19. R E V O LU C IO N A R N A PA R T IJA I G E N E ZA B IR O K R A T S K O G M E N T A L IT E T A Prije no sto pokusamo odgovoriti na upravo postavljeno pitanje, potrebno je analizirati neke procese unutar Partije nakon sto je osvojila vlast. U stvari potrebno je objasniti kako je doslo do Brionskog plenuma Centralnog komiteta SKJ u 1966. godini i koje sustinske probleme treba da rijesi predstojeca reforma partijske organizacije.

Revolucionam a partija i partija na vlasti

Jedna politicka organizacija, da bi odgovorila svojim zadacima, mora se mijenjati zajedno s drustvenim uvjetima u kojima djeluje. To naxocito vrijedi u drustvu u kom su promjene tako intenzivne kao Sto su u nasem drustvu. Danas se prilicno opcenito uzima kao cinjenica da je izmedu proklamirane i stvame uloge Saveza ko238

munista doslo do podvajanja, da Savez kao politicka organizacija nije adekvatan zahtjevima vremena1 Uslijed . toga su partijski forumi i donijeli odluku o reorganizaciji Saveza. Da bi ta reorganizacija bila uspjesna, potre bno je utvrditi: a) kako Savez komunista treba da djeluje, koje drustvene funkcije treba da obavlja, i b ) kako i zasto je doslo do danasnjeg stanja koje je ocijenjeno kao nezadovoljavajuce. Prvi zahtjev odnosi se na definiranje drustveno saobrazenog zadatka, sto cemo raspraviti u narednom poglavlju. Drugi zahtjev odnosi se na otkrivanje unutrasnje zakonitosti, uzroka poznatih pojava. I to je u stvaii preduslov za uspjesno rjesenje prvog zadatka. U analizi koja slijedi ja cu poci od hipoteze da je razvoj birokratskog mentaliteta osnovni razlog operativne neefikasnosti, ideoloske neadekvatnosti i izvjesnog otudenja SKJ kao politicke organizacije od osnovnih tokova nase stvamosti imajuci, medutim, uvijek u vidu da je upravo SKJ inicirao i dobrim dijelom organizirao te tokove. Pod mentalitetom podrazumijevam shvacanja, vrednovanja, ponasanja. Mentalitet je samo djelomicno funkcija organizacije; vecim dijelom on je odreden opcom drustvenom situacijom. Zbog toga usko shvacena reorganizacija SKJ a mi smo reorganizacija imali i do sada ne bi mnogo pomogla. Ukoliko je postavljena Mpoteza tacna, onda se nasa analiza svodi na utvrdivanje geneze cinovnickog mentaliteta. Poznavanje geneze trebalo bi da omoguci da se taj mentalitet prevlada, u cemu je, cini mi se, osnovni zadatak reorganizacije SKJ. Predratna komunisticka partija u Jugoslaviji, kao i u vecini drugLh zemalja, morala je da djeluje u dubokoj ilegalnosti. Ti uslovi borbe zahtijevali su veoma specificnu organizaciju, cije su osnovne karakteristike: striktna centralizacija, cvrsta disciplina, potpuno akciono i ideolosko jedinstvo, monolitnost. Rukovodeci polozaji nosili su ne beneficije, vec obmuto odgovomost i veliku licnu opasnost; zbog toga hijerarhija koja je proizasla
1 Na primjer u zakljuCcima V I plemuna CK SKJ ukazuje se ana to da je struktura Saveza komunista Jugoslavije u mnogocemu prevaziden a demokratskim i samoupravnim razvitkom druStva (24, 19).

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iz centralizacije nije dovodila do birokratizma1 Disciplina . je bila preduslov opstanka i zbog toga to nije bila disci plina kasame, vec disciplina svjesnih i cjelovitih licnosti, upravo bila je disciplina a ne poslusnost. Iskustvo je pokazalo da su frakcije kao rak unistavali partijsko tkivo, zbog toga je preduslov uspjeha bila savrsena monolitnost. Zadaci su bili relativno jasno definirani, neprijatelj poznat, alternative ocigledne. Stoga je ideolosko i akciono jedinstvo bilo kompatibilno s demokraticnosti koja je bila sustinska, iako ne uvijek i formalna. Razlicita gledista i individualne preferencije blijedili su do beznacajnosti u poredenju s velicinom cilja o kome je postojalo potpuno slaganje. Na taj nacin jedinstvo nije bilo ni nametnuto ni formalno; ono je proizlazilo iz egzistencijalnih uslova tadasnje politicke organizacije. Ta je or ganizacija ili bila jedinstvena i postizavala zeljene ciljeve, ili nije bila jedinstvena i tada je beznadno propadala. Moraine kvalitete clanova organizacije hrabrost, iskrenost, principijelnost, drugarstvo bile su isto tako egzistencijalno uslovljene. Organizacioni principi kompartije i uslovi njene borbe odgajali su heroje. Ova fotografija Komunisticke partije Jugoslavije mozda ce se uciniti malo idealizirana; ipak, pretpostavljam da je vjema; na kraju krajeva, radi se o historijski utvrdenim cinjenicama. No u tom slucaju prilicno je izvjesno da se danasnji Savez komunista u mnogocemu razlikuje od svoje prethodnice2. U vezi s tim najcesce se postavljaju eticka pitanja: Sto se desilo s nekadasnjim herojima? Kako to da danasnja politicka organizacija ne od1 sNormalno ce rukovodioci pise M. Markovic postati oni koji u najvedoj mjeri imaju line kvalitete potrebne za uspjesno rukovodenje i koji-se isticu najuspjesnijim tumacenjem i primjenom programa par tije. Otud spremnost da se direktive prihvate kao svoje, otud .svjesna identifikacija pojedinaca s kolektivnom voljom organizacije kojoj pripada. (6, 10) 2 U tom pogledu izvrSeno je ved bar jedno empirijsko istrazivanje. K . Kilibarda nalazi da; ugled SKJ sistematski pada od vremena oslobodilacke borbe na ovamo (27*, 21617 i 234). Medutim, seriozno empi rijsko istrazivanje toga 5to fa k tick i predstavljaju Savez komunista i njegovi clanovi u svijesti ljudi i naioj stvamosti nije jo5 IzvrSeno. Jedan iznenadujuci podatak, koji zahtijeva daljnje ispitivanje, dala je prethodna rudnska anketa Radnickog univerziteta prilikom jednog mog predavanja u jednoj velikoj beogradskoj privrednoj organizaciji: polovina od pedesetak anketiranih komunista izjavila je da clanovi SKJ pred stavljaju poseban drustveni sloj slicno kao sto su to radnici, seljaci, zanatlije, intelektualni radnici i rukovodeci kadrovi. U odgovoru na naredno. pitanje samo 8% anketiranih izjasnilo se za clanove SKJ kao najvise cijenjeni drustveni sloj, dok su radnici dobili 32% glasova.

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gaja licnosti s istim moralnim kvalitetama? Zbog cega ; komunisti jednoglasno prihvacaju zakljucke s kojima se ne slazu pa ih i ne sprovode? Zbog cega se komunisti ne suprotstavljaju pojavama za koje znaju da su stetne ako bi to malo poremetilo njihovo napredovanje u sluzbi? Sto se desilo s drugarstvom, kad ne reagiramo na nepravde koje su ocigledne? Nekada smo bili spremni da odlazimo na robiju za svoja uvjerenja, a danas ta uvjerenja brizljivo cuvamo za sebe. Kuda su se djeli principijelnost i licna hrabrost? 1 Odgovarajuci na ova pi tanja istice se da se heroji stvaraju u ratu, a ne u mini; da je generacija, koja je iznijela revoluciju, sada mnogo starija pa stoga i opreznija, konzervativnija; da se od ljudi ne moze ocekivati asketizam i da je normalno da zele uzivati u rezultatima svoje borbe, da traze nagradu za zasluge. Nadalje, vladajuca partija privlaci karijeriste, a robnonovcani odnosi i fetisiziranje zivotnog standarda nagrizaju moral. Vjerojatno u svim tim odgovorima ima ponesto istine. No pirhvacanje takvih odgovora kao objasnjenje bio bi defetizam, jer oni ne ukazuju na moguc nost prevladavanja postojece situacije.

Putovi birokratizacije
Svaka pojava ima svoju razvojnu historiju, pa to vazi i za ovu koja nas ovdje zanima. Jedan dogadaj bio je u tom pogledu vazniji od ostalih: napad Kominforma u 1948. godini. Vec smo istakli da je taj dogadaj ubrzao sazrijevanje drustvene i politicke svijesti jugoslaveriskih komunista i da je ubrzo bio iniciran jedan proces od fundainentalnog znacenja: proces decentralizacije i sa1 Eticki problem kod nas najcesce postavljaju-filozofi vjerojatno i kao odraz profesionalnog interesa: >Kao da je dovoljno pita npr. D. Grlic da ponekad isti covjek koji je zbog istine bio u stanju izloziti goli zivot samo pomisli kako zbog smionije rijcci ne bi mogao postati akademik ili narodni poslanik .ili sef .nekog instituta pa da ti sitni' drustveni privilegiji budu dovoljan razlog za njegov- konformizam, za sutnju ili za lukave svim mastima kamuflaze namazane formularije,' vjeCno taktiziranje, dvosmisleno istrazivanje ili mudro cekahjes (7, 40).;,Iako mi samo postavljanje problema izgleda ispravno, rjeSenja koja proizlaze iz dosadasnjih filozofskih diskusija ne izgledaju ini uvijek realjsticna: Mada pojedine licnosti' inogu utjecati na druStvene procese, a visoko moraine licnosti doprinose podizanju opce inoralne razine,-ipak je mnogo relevantnija cinjenica: da drustveni procesi modeliraju licnosti pa tako i njihove eticke osobine. 16 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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moupravljanja. No 1948. godina inicirala je i jedan paralelni proces, koji dosad nije bio podvrgnut analizi i koji je za razliku od progresivnosti prvog procesa na opcem ekonomskom i drustvenom planu predstavljao regresiju na moralnom planu. Ukratko, te je godine prvi put policija usla u Partiju i komunisti su poceli da sumnjaju u komuniste. Sam taj dogadaj pokazuje da Partija nije bila idejno pripremljena za svu slozenost mimodopske izgradnje s pozicija vlasti; Hrabrost i vjera u autoritete odveli su izvjestan broj ljudi u izdaju, a ideologija discipline i monolitnosti stavila je vecinu ostalih u psiholoski protivurjecnu situaciju u kojoj se jedna partija, dakle manjina, suprotstavila svim ostalim partijama, dakle vecini. S vremenom su te situacije bile prevladane, ali od posljedica etickog soka partijska organizacija se nije nikad oporavila. U tom pogledu 1948. godina predstavlja izraziti diskontinuitet izmedu ranije i kasnije partije. Kolektivi su se pretvorili u agregate privatiziranlh individuuma, iskrenost i otvorenost zamijenila je rezerviranost i proracunatost, umjesto drugarstva razvio se egotisticki oportunizam, piincipijelnost je supstituirana konfonnizmom, hrabrost kaiijerizmom .1 A poli cija, kad je jedanput usla u partijsku organizaciju, iz nje vise po svojoj inicijativi nije izlazila. Utoliko vise sto toj praksi nije bilo nekog ozbiljnijeg suprotstavljanja. Drzavnim i partijskim organima sasvim je odgovaralo da bez posebnih naprezanja i odgovomosti dolaze do provjerenih informacija o svemu i svacemu, a svijest o konzekvencama takvog oportunistickog stava nije bila do voljno razvijena. Komunisti su postajali tzv. suradnici ne protiv vanjskih neprijatelja i unutrasnjih diverzanata, sto je samo po sebi stvar patriotizma, vec za dojavljivanje o svojim vlastitim drugovima. Uporedo s oficijelnom partijskom organizacijom, koja je naoko funkcioni1 U zivom sjecanju ostao mi je je dan dogadaj od prije nekoliko go dina sa sastanka jedne teritorijalne osnovne organizacije. Diskutiralo se 0 korupciji. Zasto se uopce poteze to pitanje objasnio je svoj stav jedan diskutant, inace funkdoner SDB pa mi svi dajemo bakSiSe da nam se svr5e stvari. Ono sto me impresioniralo u toj zgodi nije to 5to je jedan degenerirani birokrat izgubio osjecaj za osnovne moraine distinkdje, ved 5to od pedesetak prisutnih komunista nitko. nije reagirao na njegovu izjavu i sto je taj dovjek kasnije izabran u sekretarijat organizadje. Poslije Brionskog plenuma ociscen je i iz Saveza komunista 1 iz Sluzbe driavne bezbjednosti.'

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rala kao i ranije, stvarana je neoficijelna, policijska, organizacija koja je uzurpirala pravo da besprizivno ocjenjuje patriotizam i politicku ispravnost svakog gradanina, ukljuciv i konmnista. Po prirodi stvari, policijska kontrola neprekidao se sirila dok nije postignuto, kako se to tehnickim terminom kaze, potpuno pokrivanje i dok, nakon namjestanja mikrofona najuglednijim licnostima naseg javnog zivota, taj gnojni cir na drustvenom tkivu nije prsnuo i zatim na Brionskom plenumu bio kirurski odstranjen. Iako prodor policije u partijsku etiku objasnjava mnoge deformacije u nasem drustvenom i politickom zivotu, on ne objasnjava sve. Stavise, i njega bi trebalo objasniti. Napad Kominforma pruzio je povod i vjerojatno ubrzao proces. No u drugim zemljama nije bilo takvog povoda, pa su poceli da se razvijaju slicni procesi, cak i sa mnogo tezim posljedicama. O cemu se, dakle, radi? Centralizirana i hijerarhizirana komunisticka partija predstavljala je potencijalno jednu birokratsku struktu ru. U uslovima ilegalne borbe i narodno-oslobodilackog rata ta je organizacija bila funkcionalna i, iz razloga koje smo naveli, nije se ponasala birokratski. Medutim, kad se Partija nasla na vlasti, pojavila se mogucnost da se birokratski potencijali realiziraju. Prije svega, prve godine izgradnje zahtijevale su centralizaciju u kojoj je doslo do stapanja partijske i drzavne Mjerarhije.1 Na dalje, novi drustveni sistem zahtijevao je da se rukovodeca mjesta u drzavnom aparatu, privredi i neprivredi popune politicki pouzdanim ljudima. Rukovodeci kadrovi su zbog toga odabirani po politickim, a ne strucnim kriterijima. Da bi aparat dobro funkcionirao, potrebna je disciplina. No to, naravno, nije vise revolucionama disci1 Opasnost koja proiziazi iz srastanja partijskih i drzavnih vrhova uocena je relativno rano. Jos 1950. g. E. Kardelj je u Skupstmi upozorio: BOrganizaciono pitanje je istovremeno i politicko. Mi imamo sada takvo stanje na terenu da je, po pravilu, sekretar partijskog komiteta bio ujed no biran i za predsjednika ili sekretara, to jest rukovodede lice, u sreskom narodnom odboru. Posledica toga bila je da je partijski komitet u neku ruku srastao s aparatom sreskog narodnog odbora. Na taj je nain nestao ili bar bitno oslabio onaj drustveni faktor koji treba da kontroliSe drzavni aparat, da ga kritikuje u ime naroda, u ime Partije (24, 388). Iako nije reeno eksplicitno, m oie se pretpostaviti da je postojala svijest i o tome da negativne posljedice proizlaze iz srastanja drzavnog i partijskog aparata i na razinama visim od sreske.

16*

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plina, vec cinovnicka disciplina, drugim rijecima: poslusnost1 . Kod radikaliuh drustvenih promjena, kao sto je revolucionama smjena jednog drustvenog sistema drugim, od kljucne je vaznosti osigurati odredeni red u odvijariju drustvenog zivota. Osnovni mehanizmi odrzavanja dru stvenog reda tradicija, institucije, navike, mentalitet disfunkcionalni su, ukoliko potjecu od starog sistema. Hi ne postoje, ukoliko se radi o novom sistemu. Kao jedini raspoloziv privremeni supstitut javlja se konfor mizam odlukama revolucionamih rukovodecih tijela. To je, uostalom, drugi aspekt poznatog zakljucka o neophodnosti diktature proletarijata. Konformizam tako postaje veoma pozeljan politicki, a drustvenim vrednovanjima opcenito dominiraju politicki kriteriji. Medutim, od privremenog sredstva konformizam jednim quid pro quo mehanizmom lako moze postati i historijski cesto stvamo postaje trajnim ciljem, cime se diktatura pro letarijata pretvara u diktaturu nad proletary atom, a revolucionarnost se transformira u oportunizam. U vezi s tim procesima i smisao politickog kriterij a prolazi kroz evolutivne faze. Politicki kriterij najprije znaci izbor kadrova odanih revoluciji, zatim izbor onih na koje se visi organi mogu osloniti i na kraju onih koji slusaju, jer se na takve aparat moze osloniti. Vazno j e uociti da central izirana kadrovska politika uopce, a u politic! posebno, pogorsava kvalitetu kadrova na svim
1 Ovu cinjenicu, kao i postojanje sasvim jasne svijesti o njoj, dobro ilustrira slucaj koji u 1964. g. navodi S. Kavcic. Prilikom prijema neko liko novih clanova sekretar neke osnovne organizacije SK u Sloveniji govori: Sada niste vise ono sto ste bili ranije; jedan dio slobode, koju ste do sada imali, morate ostaviti napolju kada ulazite u Savez komunista.a U svom komentaru Kavcic primjecuje da je ocigledno kako ovakvi primjeri nisu tako rijetki (24, 459). Da oni zaista nisu rijetki potvrduje empirijsko istrazivanje K . Kilibarde u drugom dijelu zemlje (Kraljevski srez). Autor je i sam iznenaden svojim nalazom pa ga pokusava nekako opravdati: Istrazivanje indicira postojanje netainih i nepotpunih gledanja, pa fiak i predrasuda (sic!) o stanju inicijative u Savezu komunista. Na ovom pitanju se razlikuju clanovi Saveza komunista i neSIanovi, npr., neCIanovi rijetko navode inicijativnost kao osobinu koja je najpptrebnija da se bude Clan SKJ i rukovodilac u njemu. Stavise, ima shvatanja da su potrebne osobine suprotne inicijativi da bi se bilo clan Saveza komunista, a pogotbvo rukovodilac u njemu. Tako se smatra da je za ovu ulogu potrebna izvjesna poslusnost dak i u onom klasiinom smislu rijei (27, 50). .

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razinama. Ne izabiru se najbolji, vec mediokriteti.1 Rukovodilac moze imati potpuno povjerenje samo u nekoga tko je od njega manje sposoban.2 Prirodno, takva kadrovska politika brani se i objasnjava potrebama drzavne bezbjednosti3 Tokom vremena pojavljuju se novi ka. drovi, koje je formirao sistem i koji objektivno zadovoljavaju ne samo politicki vec i strucni kriterij; oni tako postaju konkurenti ranijim rukovodecim kadrovima. Ovi potonji, da bi se odrzali, ulaze u razne klikaske aranzmane i povezuju se s rukovodstvima drustveno-politickih organizacija .4 KlikastVo rada besprincipjelnost i neminovno dovodi do teskih drustvenih ekscesa.5 Na kraju, da bi se poslusnost nizih stratuma sto vise osigurala, da bi Mjerarhijski aparat mogao sto nesmetanije funkcionirati, potrebno je ucvrstiti autoritete. Rukovodeci kadrovi su isticani, uzdizani, opisivani u super1 Znacajno je zapazanje V. Bakarica da karijerizam i orijentacija na osrednjost zapocinju vec u omladinskim organizacijama (24, 176). 2 Nakon sto je naveo historijske primjere, J. Schumpeter primjecuje: Kao sto svaki politidki rukovodilac zna, samo kod mediokriteta moze se racunati na Iojalnosta (8, 281). 3 Ilustrativan je slijedeci primjer koji se odnosi na americku drzav-. nu birokraciju, ali koji bi se, mutatis mutandis mogao odnositi i na ma koju drugu nacionalnu birokraciju, ukljucivsi i nasu. W. Mills citira J. Hallea, clana staba za politidko planiranje pri Ministarstvu inostranih poslova: Nadajmo se da ce americka publika najzad uvidjfeti da je rijec 'pouzdan sa gledista drzavne bezbjednostd' postala eufemizam. Ta kadrovska politika se u stvamosti svodi na primitivno politifiko nastojanje, sprovodeno tokom posljednjih pet godina, da se iz drzavne sluzbe eliminiraju ljudi intelektualno i moralno eminentni i da se,' umjesto njih, drzavna sluzba popuni politicki prijatnini ljudima, tj. takvim na koje ne moze pasti sumnja da su intelektualno ili moralno superiomic (9, 275). 4 Za spajanje oba vxha pie "V. Rus analizirajuci clanke u Delavskoj politicic naroiito su zainteresirane one vodede grupe u poduzecima koje nemaju dovoljno strucne sposobnosti ni dovoljno uspeha u vodenju poduzeca. Svoj autoritet ne mogu legalizirati ni po strucnoj ni po radnoj liniji; zato pokusavaju da ga legaliziraju po politickoj liniji. Udruzivanje s rukovodstvima drustveno-politickih organizacija u takvim sludajevima postaje kljucno sredstvo za konsolidaciju dominantnih pozicija (11, 1091). 5 Neposredno poslije Brionskog plenuma Tito je, misleci ocigledno na Rankovica, je4nom prilikom primijetio da uslovi u kojima se Covjek nalazi i radi mogu ponekad da dovedu do toga da on iznevjeri samog sebe i da pode putem na koji ne bi smio ni da pomisli. Ne radi se . . . ovdje o jednom covjeku. Radi se o ljudima koji su doli na odgovorna mjesta, a nisu im doraslia (24, 139). Subjektivizam u kadrovskoj poiitici S K . zakljuCuje o istom problemu V. Vlahovid doveo je dotle da oni kadrovi koji nisu sposobni da se upustaj u u borbu misljenja, koji se ne mogu osloniti na sopstveno znanje i sposobnost ili ne shvataju tokove drustvenog razvitka, stvaraju Iogiku i mehanizam zatvorenih grupa, neku vrst politidkog podzemlja, izolovanog od suda javnostia (24, 732).

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lativima i njihovi likovi su postepeno zadobivali sasvim nerealne dimenzije. Davanje zadrugama, ulicama i gradovima imena pojedinih funkcionera, samo je jedan od drasticnijih odraza tog procesa (sto je, uostalom, uoceno vec prije nekoliko godina pa su poduzete i odredene korektivne mjere). M i smo godinama imali takvu pojavu istice K. Crvenkovski da su se pojedini ljudi uzdizali do najvisih visina bas putem tog iracionalnog autoriteta. To znaci^na jednoj strani vlast, a na drugoj strail. A, ako idemo jos dalje u analizu, to znaci ucvrscivanje birokratskog mentaliteta i karijeristicke psihologije u redovima SK. (10, 132) Fetisiziraju se istupanja ljudi iz uzeg rukovodstva CK, kao da smo mi jedini koji mislimo u drustvua. (V. Vlahovic, 24, 729) Postoje dva mjerila, dva kriterija u Savezu komunista: jedan prema onima gore i drugi prema onima dolje. (Tito, 24, 133) Za razliku od rata i ilegalne borbe mimodopski zivot ne pruza .samo dvije jasno izdiferencirane alternative s isto tako jasnim posljedicama. Alternative su mnogobrojne, difuzne, iznijansirane, a posljedice nemaju ocigledni, ili bar ne javno, eticki sadrzaj. S brojem altemativa raste i broj konfliktnih situacija, pojedinac sad obavlja veci broj razlicitih uloga u drustvu koje medusobno ne moraju biti u harmoniji. ( 6 , 1516) U ratu je covjek ili patriot ili izdajica, tj. nalazi se na jednoj od dvije jasno odijeljene strane. U m ini su moguci neprimjetni postepeni prijelazi od visokog stepena moralnog integriteta pa do amoralnosti i nemoralnosti, kod cega ljudi imaju vremena za psiholoske adaptacije kao .i da sacuvaju castan izgled. Zatim, rat predstavlja izuzetno, kratkotrajno stanje; mir traje citav zivot. Covjek nije sklon da stalno stavlja na kocku svoju buducnost i zato ce ce sto rasudivati: ako se zamjerim visim forumima, ako steknem reputaciju nezgodnog covjeka, ako mi zapisii negdje nesto u nekakav dosje mogu upropastiti karijeru. A u zivotu ima toliko dobrih stvari, pa zasto covjek da bude namjemo nesmotren? No sve su to sa mo vanjske okolnosti koje jos nista ne predodreduju. Za ponasanje pojedinaca kljucna su drustvena vredno vanja. U tom pogledu birokratski sistem spontano rada kao osnovnu vrlinu poslusnost, a kao naj tezi grijeh na246

pad na hijerarhiju .1 Kad je to jednom uslo u svijest ljudi, onda se nepridrzavanje tog sistema vrednovanja cini donkihoterijom. Covjek ide na barikade jer u tome ima podrsku svojih drugova, drustveno priznanje. Covjek ne kritikuje svog pretpostavljenog, ne i 7 )3 7 1 u javnost s neoficijelnim idejama, ne suprotstavlja se odlukama koje ne misli izvrsavati, nije savjestan vise no sto je to apsolutno riuzno, odnosno nesavjestan je ukoliko je to korisno, ne reagira na nepravde, ne bori se protiv nepravilnosti2 i ne smatra potrebnim da se angazira za svoja uvjerenja jer, kad bi sve to radio, ne bi naisao na drustvenu podrsku, smatrali bi ga cudnim i neprilagodenim, a najcesce i stetnim elementom. Ukoliko se radi o komunistu, smatrali bi ga antipartijskim elementom. Birokratski sistemi imaju svoju gvozdenu logiku; dobre zelje tu nista ne pomazu. Partija je organizirala drzavu, a drzava je etatizirala Partiju konstatirao je u jednom clanku E. Redzic. (13, 190) U takvoj situaciji prosirio se prostor za djelovanje najkonzervativnijih snaga u partiji i drustvu. (V. Vlahovic, 24, 730)

S ocijalna struktura SKJ Da .bi se bolje razumjeli opisani procesi formiranja birokratskog mentaliteta, potrebno je poblize ispitati koji su slojevi bili nosioci tog mentaliteta. Drugim rijecima, potrebno je istraziti socijalnu strukturu clanstva
1 Reagirajuci na Hegelovu tezu da hijerarhija osigurava od zloupotre be vlasti Marx izvanredno karakterizira ponasanje birokracije: . . . kao da hijerarhija nije glavtm zloupotreba i kao da se nekoliko licnih grijehova koje pocine cinovnici mogu uporediti s grijehovima koji nuzno proizlaze iz te hijerarhije; hijerarhija kaznjava dinovnika ukoliko on grijesi protiv hijerarhije ili ukoliko je za hijerarhiju ucinio suvisan grijeh; ali ona njega uzima u zastitu cim sama hijerarhija grijesi preko njega: uostalom, hijerarhija se tesko ubjeduje o grijehovima svojih dlanova . . . (12, 72).
2 Kad je pozitivno odredivanje stava prema zivotu drutveno blokirano, a utilitarizam podignut na razinu osnovnog kretanja aktivnosti/ onda se ruse moraine barijere i zloupotrebe postaju sastavni dio svakodnevnog zivota. U tom konteksu valja promatrati i slijededu konstatadju K . Crvenkovskog: Ogroman broj zalbi i molbi gradana, upuden organima vlasti, Savezu komunista, drzavnim i partijskim funkcionerima, bio je ved predmet rasprava cak i u najvisim predstavnickim tijelima. Taj problem .ovdje i mi sada pokrecemo, pre svega zato sto se ljudi zale na komuniste i Sto se komunisti zale na povredu njihovih ne samo gradanskih prava vec i prava koja imaju kao dlanovi SKJ (24, 221).

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SKJ. Na zalost, partijska statistika je veoma manjkava,1 : a prethodna istrazivanja u toj oblasti uopce nisu vrsena (ili bar nisu pristupacna naucnoj javnosti), tako da. cei nasa analiza biti veoma fragmentama. Pocetkom 1967. godine Savez komunista brojio je vise od milion clanova, sto znaci da je obuhvatio jednu jeda-. naestinu odraslog stanovnistva zemlje. To je ogromna potencijalna snaga. Broj clanova najbrze se povecavao u prvom poslijeratnom periodu do 1952. godine (od 258.000 u 1946. g. na 773.000 u 1952. g.) a zatim ponovno brzo raste u periodu 19561960. (od 649.000 na 1,006.000), tj. u vrijeme drugog petogodisnjeg plana kad je postignut najbrzi poslijeratni tempo privrednog razvoja uz relativno najvecu drustvenu, politicku i privrednu stabilnost. U periodu 19521956. dolazi do rasformiranja seljackih zadruga, napustanja perspektivnog planiranja i pretvaranja KPJ u SKJ i broj clanova opada od 773.000 na 649.000. Od 1961. godine na dalje, u razdoblju s poznatim privrednim i politickim problemima, broj clanova stagnira. Naredni podaci rezixniraju razvoj Partije u poslijerevolucionamom razdoblju: Socija ln i sastav Saveza komunista 1946 000 / o Radnici Seljaci Ostali zaposleni (sluzbenici) Stiidenti, vojnici, penz. i ostali Ukupno . 71 130 27 30 27,6 50,4 1952 000 % 249 331 32,2 42,8 18,9 6,1 1966 000 % 355 77 408 206

33,9 7'4 39,1 19,6

10,3 146 11,7 47

258 100,0

773 100,0

1.046 100,0

Ako se u kategoriju sluzbenika ukljuce i profesionalni vojnici i dio penzionera, onda su pocetkom 1967. godine oko polovina svih clanova bili sluzbenici. Prema tome, proizlazilo bi da je Savez komunista bio prven1 Prvi statisticki podaci o razvoju SKJ objavljeni su tek 1967. g., Sto je samo po sebi simptomatiCno. Gotovo iskljuCivo na osnovu tih podataka, koje je pripremio S. Filipi (24, ss. 74688), radena je i nnali?^ koja slijedi.

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stveno sluzbenicka, a ne radnicka organizacija. A kako je opcenito mentalitet sluzbenika zbog uslova drustve ne situacije blizi birokratskom mentalitetu nego men talitet radnika, to bi se mogla postaviti hipoteza da su birokratski procesi u SKJ, drzavi i drustvu uvjetovali mijenjanje socijalne strukture SKJ u pravcu sluzbenicke predominacije, a ova je sa svoje strane pogodovala daljnjoj birokratizaciji. Zbog potpunog odsustva emipirijskih istrazivanja ovu Mpotezu ne mozemo defimtivnije ni potvrditi ni odbaciti. Mozemo je, medutim, nesto podrobnije ispitati. U tu svrhu nastojat cemo iscijediti maksimum informacija iz objavljenih statistickLh podataka. Za utvrdivanje tacnosti impresije o sluzbenickom karakteru SKJ mozemo primijeniti slijedecih sedam kriterija: (1) apsolutni i relativni broj sluzbenika, (2) relativno povecavanje broja sluzbenika, (3) socijalna struktura clanstva u najrazvijenijoj republici kao indikacija inherentnih tendencija buduceg razvoja u cijeloj zemlji, (4) procentualno ucesce clanova SKJ u pojedinim kategorijama zaposlenih, (5) primanje i iskljucivanje clanova, (6) napustanje SKJ i (7) socijalna struktura partijskih rukovodstava. Zatim treba ispitati i strukturu samih sluzbenika. I na koncu valja posebno razmotriti problem seljaka. Prvi kriterij vec je razmotren. Sto se tice drugog iz tabele proizlazi da se u toku dvije poslijerevolucijske decenije broj radnika u SKJ povecao pet puta, a broj sluzbenika petnaest puta ili tri puta brze. U tom po gledu cijelo razdoblje nije homogeno, vec ga treba podijeliti u dva perioda: period KPJ do 1952. godine i pe riod SKJ 1953 1966. Valja takoder imati u vidu da je od 1953. godine na dalje primjenjivana drugacija metodika socijalnog razvrstavanja1 U prvom periodu broj . radnika se povecao 3,5 puta, a broj sluzbenika 5,4 puta ili 1,5 puta brze; u drugom periodu broj sluzbenika povecavao se samo 1,1 puta brze2 Brze povecavanje sluzbe . nika u odnosu na radnike u prvom poslijerevolucijskom periodu logicno je i trebalo je ocekivati, jer je to bilo vrijeme stvaranja novog aparata vlasti i nove admini1 Te godine izvrsena je revizija socijalnog sastava, koji se do tada registrirao prema zanimanjii koje je Sian SKJ imao prilikom prijema u SKJ. Kao rezultat broj radnika i seljaka u evidenciji smanjen je za 45.000 i 93.000 i za toliko je povedan broj sluzbenika i ostalib. 2 Faktor brzeg porasta se odnosi na period 1954 -1966, jer za 1953. g. ne postoje podaci.

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stracije. Medutim, slicna tendencija, iako oslabljena, nastavlja se i dalje. Osim toga valja zapaziti da se. dugo vremena sluzbenicka pozicija pojacavala na racun apsolutnog i relativnog smanjivanja broja seljaka uz postepeno pojacavanje pozicije radnika. Medutim, od 1961. godine, kad dostize maksimum od 37%, i ucesce radnika se stalno smanjuje. Ukoliko se moze pretpostaviti da Slovenija, koja je danas otprilike dvaput privredno razvijenija od Jugoslavije u prosjeku, reprezentira cijelu zemlju u neposrednoj buducnosti, onda evolucija socijalne strukture clanstva Saveza komunista Slovenije moze dati odredene indikacije za buduce promjene socijalne strukture SKJ ukoliko se u drustvenoj situaciji nista bitnije ne bi izmijenilo. U 1946. godini radnici su sacinjavali 43% svih clanova SK Slovenije, a taj se procenat do 1948. godine kad je postignut maksimum popeo na 57%. Otada se ucesce radnika stalno smanjuje, te u 1966. godini iznosi 33%. Ucesce sluzbenika (bez profesionalnih vojnika i penzionera), medutim, povecalo se od 8% u 1946. go dini na 48% na kraju perioda. Razliciti drustveni slojevi i razlicite kategorije zapo slenih. razlicitom brzmom ekspandiraju (ill se smanjuju) u toku privrednog .razvoja. Zbog toga nije dovoljno di rektno usporedivanje povecanja pojedinih socijalnih kategorija clanova, vec ta povecanja treba staviti u odnos s promjenama u broju zaposlenih. U 1966. godini od svih. zaposlenih bilo je uclanjeno u Savez komunista Jugo slav!je:
sluzb. sluib. sluzb. sluzb. sa sa sa sa viJom spremom visokom spremom srednjom sprem. niiom spremom" 58,796 43,696 39,396 37,096 visokokvalificiraniji radnika 34,896 kvalificiranih radnika 20,696 polukvalificiranih radnika 12,096 nekvalificiranih radnika 5,096

u prosjeku 21,596

Ono sto je najmarkantnije u ovim podacima a to je vjerojatna i najpreciznija indikacija koju nam cijela objavljena statistika moze dati jest to da su sve ka tegorije sluzbenika iznad prosjeka i sve kategorije rad nika ispod prosjeka, da cak i medu sluzbenicima s nizom strucnom spremom ima vise clanova SKJ nego medu visokokvalificiranim radnicima. Zbog avangardne uloge SKJ u drustvu prirodno je ocekivati da ce nivo kvalifikacija clanova biti znatno iznad drustvenog pro250

sjeka. Iz istog razloga, kao i zbog povisavanja opceg obrazovnog nivoa stanovnistva, moze se ocekivati povecavanje ucesca kategorija s visim kvalifikacijama. I doista je za proteklih osam godina, za koje postoje po daci, u grupi "radnika clanova SKJ ucesce visokokvalificiranih radnika podvostruceno, ucesce kvalificiranih rad nika ostalo je nepromijenjeno, a ucesca polukvalificiranih i nekvalificiranih su se smanjila; u grupi sluzbenika jedino ucesce onih s nizom strucnom spremom se smanjilo, dok ostale kategorije povecavaju ucesce. No sluz benici kao grupa ekspandiraju brze nego radnici kao grupa. Ipak, moze se ocekivati da ce kroz koju godinu biti u Savezu relativno vise visokokvalificiranih radnika nego sluzbenika s nizom strucnom spremom. No, kako su do sada stajale stvari, moze se, vjerojatno, zakljuciti da je prema Partiji postojao veci afinitet kod rutinskih sluzbenika nego kod radnika i da je Partija pokazivala veci afinitet1 prema rutinskim sluzbenicima nego prema radnicima. A zbog cega upravo sluzbenici s visom (a ne npr. s. visokom) spremom stoje uvjerljivo na celu liste, predstavlja ukoliko je statistika S. Filipija tacna interesantno pitanje, koje zahtijeva daljnje istrazivanje. U pogledu prijema i iskljucivanja u posljednjoj deceniji, za koju su objavljeni uporedni podaci, pokazuju se ova kretanja: ucesce radnika u novoprimljenima opada, a u iskljucenjima raste;2 ucesce sluzbenika u novoprimljenima naglo raste (od 18,9% u 1958. g. na 29,3% u 1965. g.), a u iskljucenima stagnira (izmedu 19%- i 20%). Kretanja kod primanja i iskljucivanja su dakle dvostruko obrnuta: unutar svake grupe kao i kod jedne grupe u odnosu na drugu. Osim toga, iz cinjenice sto se radnici primaju u priblizno istom procentu kao i sluzbenici, a iskljucuju se u dva i po puta vecem procentu, moze se izvuci zakljucak da su radnici manje vezani za sadasnji SKJ nego sluzbenici, da sa stanovista postojece partijske prakse predstavljaju nestabilniji element. Taj zakljucak pojacava se podacima o svojevoljnom napustanju organiza1 Radi ispravne ilustradje rezultata analize treba imati u vidu da se ne radi o subjektivnim zeljama, vec o objektivno uslovljenim Cinjenicama. 2 Primanje radnika postizava maksimum u 1959. g. s 43,OH svih primljenih i minimum u 1966. g. s 30,1%. Iskljufiivanje raste od 24,5W u 1951. g. do 57,196 svih iskljudenih u 1965. g.

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cije. U 1966. godini 7.640 clanova napustilo je SKJ; 53,6% (u 1965. g. 61,4%) bill su radnici. Preostaje jos da pogledamo socijalnu strukturu partijskih rukovodstava. U 1963. godini radnici i seljaci cine 20% clanova opcinskih i 13% clanova kotarskih komiteta SKJ (24, 693). Za visa rukovodstva nisu objavljeni podaci, ali ocigledno je da procenti moraju biti jos nizi. Dobivamo prema tome ovakvu sliku. Radnici sacinjavaju manjinu u Savezu komunista i, posebno, malu manjinu u rukovodstvima Saveza. Organizacijom, i narocito njenim rukovodstvima, dominiraju sluzbenici. Sve ispitivane razvojne tendencije dovode do produbljivanja tog stanja. Ako se tome doda i cinjenica da su odnosi u Savezu bili nhijerarhijski i poluvojnicki (M. Todorovic), onda postaje ociglednim koliko je strasan bio pritisak birokratizacije u Savezu komunista Jugoslavije. Nakon radnika i sluzbenika valja pogledati sta se de silo sa seljacima. Poznato je da su seljaci iznijeli na svojim ledima narodnooslobodilacku borbu, a s njom i revoluciju. Zbog toga je prirodno sto su seljaci odmah poslije rata sacinjavali polovinu svih clanova Partije. Ako bismo htjeli mijenjanje socijalne strukture Partije nekako oznaciti po fazama, mogli bismo red da je to bila seljacka faza, koja se poslije 1952. godine nastavlja u sluzbenicku. Buduci da se ucesce seljaka u stanovnistvu smanjuje i to utoliko brze ukoliko je brzi privredni razvoj, trebalo je ocekivati smanjivanje ucesca seljaka u partijskom clanstvu. Ono sto je karakteristicno za ovaj razvoj nije to sto je doslo do procentualnog smanjivanja, vec to sto je doslo do drasticnog apsolutnog smanjivanja broja seljaka komunista. Prvih godina nakon rata broj seljaka u Partiji se povecava, racuna se na kolektivizaciju, koju ti aktivisti treba da sprovedu. Kad se politika kolektivizacije pokazala pogresnom, doslo je u 1953. godini do rasformiranja zadruga.1 U vezi s tim iste go dine iz Partije je iskljuceno 39.500 seljaka (prema 25.400 i 19.600 u prethodne dvije godine), a primljeno je svega 8200 seljaka (prema 54.000 i 63.400 u prethodne dvije
1 Zairimljivo objasnjenje otpora kolektivizaciji daje 2. Vidakovic: . . . masovno ucesce seljaka u oruzanom delu revolucije i uspostavljanju revolucionarne politicke vlast! doprinelo je neuspehu etatisticko-birokratskog podrustvljavanja poljoprivrede, jer drustveno-politicki aktivno seljastvo nije podanicki prihvatilo administrativne metode- kolektivizacijea (26 , 42).

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godine). Odonda broj seljaka u Partiji uz izuzetak malog povecanja u 19571959 stalno opada, te je u 1966. godini bio upola manji nego na pocetku poslijerevolucijskog razdoblja. U odnosu na ukupan broj aktivnih lica seljaci su u SKJ danas obuhvaceni dvaput slabije nego nekvalificirani radnici i petnaestak puta slabije ne go sluzbenici s nizom spremom. Ocigledno je da se radilo o sektaskom stavu prema seljacima koji je proizlazio iz dogmatskih shvacanja drustvenog bica seljaka.1 Ta shvacanja nisu mogla zamisliti individualnog seljaka kao socijalistickog graditelja. Ona su pod socijalistickim zamisljala jedino grupe proizvodaca ukljucene u svedrzavni liijerarliijski sklop i podvrgnute neposrednom administriranju i komandiranju. Sve sto je izmicalo takvoj drustvenoj to jest birokratskoj kontroli bilo je nesocijalisticko. I zbog toga, kad je administrativno 1 formiraiia kolektivizacija napustena, smatralo se da je socijalisticki preobrazaj sela do daljnjega odgoden, a individualni seljak prepusten je uglavnom sam sebi. Do 1966. godine u seoskim partijskim organizacijama broj seljaka sveo se na jednu trecinu clanstva. Na selu su kao partijski punktovi ostali organi vlasti i administrai Zanimljivo empirijsko istrazivanje o komunistima na hrvatskom selu objavio je V. Cvjeticanin. Na kraju clanka bez komentara je navedeno izlaganje seljaka Bradica u jednoj partijskoj diskusiji u Velikoj Gorici. Slijedeci izvadak iz tog izlaganja sazeto opisuje situaciju na selu: oEvo ja sam vec deset godina aktivista u svim druitveno-polititickim forumima i rukovodstvima, imam vi5e funkcija i rukovodilac sam u selu. Ali do danas u Donjem Hrusevcu i ovim krajevima nije nitko odrzao predavanje o V I I I kongresu SK, o V kongresu SSRN Hrvatske, Statutu opcine, Jugoslavenskom ustavu. Ne znamo sto je Statut, ne znamo sto su privredne mjere. Niti ja znam, niti znaju drugi. Nikome se tamo ne da. Nitko nece odrzati predavanje o zdravstvu, veteiinarstvu, stocarstvu, svinjarstvu, ratarstvu, itd. Jo5 do danas nije traktor uzorao brazdu u Donjem Hrusevcu, a mi samo pricamo kako treba unaprijediti stocarstvo, vinogradarstvo, peradarstvo i sve o stalo. . . Imamo zadrugu koja . . . prodaje ugalj po 80 dinara, a mi prodajemo za 40 dinara. To je izrabljivanje poljoprivrednog proizvodaca. . . A mi to svi gledamo i to svaki dobro znade. A onda se kaze to su nasi, neka radea, a onaj seljak ima 10 jutara zemlje i nabijes mu p o rez. . . A zadruga vara seljaka. Pa kako bi onda bio komunista . . . Ja imam 50 ljudi koji bi htjeli. biti komunisti, a ne ?nam zasto? Imam jabuke ali gnjiju i svinje ih jedu. Imas sljivu a nemaS kome prodati. Nije to samo u Donjem Hruseycu nego i Strezevu i drugdje. Imamo skolu, a ona se iskrivila; Basa djeca idu na pasu, ona koja bi trebala da idu u osmoljetku . . . Ides kupiti gnojivo u zadrugu, a tu ti svi lazu . . . Ako traziS [gnojivo] za proljece, onda ce ti dati ono za jesen i tvrditi kako je to bas za proljece. . . Medutim, agronom kod koga sam ja bio, on je napisao da. je ovo za to, a ono za to; ovaj u zadruzi prodaje za sve. Onda mi varamo poljoprivreduike. Kako bi onda iSli u organizaciju SK, kako bi onda mogli biti organizirani na selu . . . ? (25, .13).

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cije opclh zemljoradnickih zadruga, kojima je dan komercijalni monopol. Politicki zadatak tog sluzbenickog aparata sastojao se u tome da se kontrolira nepouzdani individualac, a negdje je taj zadatak shvacen i kao ogranicavanje privredne djelatnosti seljaka. Zapazamo opet suprotstavljanje sluzbenika proizvodacima ovaj puta u sasvim eksplicitnoj formi. Na taj nacin birokratske tendencije u Partiji dobivale su daljnje snazne podsticaje. Poznato je kolike je politicke i privredne probleme stvorila takva politika prema selu i seljacima.1 Preostaje jos da se razmotri i starosna struktura. Po prirodi stvari, Partija stari, narocito njeno rukovodstvo. Broj clanova mladih od 25 godina smanjio se od 40% u 1950. godini na 12% u 1966. godini. Broj clanova starijih od 40 godina povecao se od 10% na 30% u istim godinama. Kao sto vidimo u razdoblju od sesnaest godina dvadesetogodisnjaci i cetrdesetogodisnjaci zamijenili su mjesta. Starenje je doduse prirodan proces i ne da se izbjeci, no ono ima i znacajne negativne posljedice. Sta riji ljudi su konzervativniji, a buduci da su formirani u razdoblju kad je u zemlji bilo vise etatizma, a manje samoupravnosti, to oni pokazuju sklonost da konzerviraju etatisticke strukture. Odatle i cinjenica da starenje Partije takoder doprinosi razvoju birokratskih tendencija. Potrebno je, medutim, da se sad nasa analiza u jednom vaznom aspektu ucini preciznijom. Radi se o kategoriji koju smo do sada uslovno zvali sluzbenicimatt. U jednom kapitalistickom ili drzavno-kapitalistickom (staljinistickom) sistemu sluzbenici uglavnom predstavljaju
i Moglo bi se postaviti pitanje: A kako bi trebalo da izgleda jedna adekvatnija politika prema selu? Retrospektivno je to mnogo lak^e utvrditi nego unaprijed. Osnovni elementi takve politike trebalo je vjero jatno da budu ovi: Gradedi na politidkom kapitalu iz rata sprovesti agramu reformu s ogranicenjem velicine posjeda i zap o 5 j avanj a tude 1 radne snage (Sto je i uradeno). Ranije veleposjede pretvoriti u drzavna dobra, opremiti mehanlzacijom, uciniti rasadnicima nove tehnologije i doves ti u kooperantske odnose s individualnim seljadma (to je uradeno samo djelomidno). Koristedi postojedu tradiciju stimulirati spontane oblike zadruznog privredivanja. To nije uradeno; stavise, jos i danas se spontano udruzivanje naziva divljim zadrugamaa i progoni. Jasnim propisima i ekonomskim instrumentima stimulirati ekspanziju i transformaciju individualne proizvodnje preko zadruzne u poduzetnu. Eliminirati nepismenost (nakon Cetvrt vijeka socijalisticke izgradnje joS uvijek je tredina seljaka nepismeno) i organizirati specifidan program masovnog prosvjecivanja i obrazovanja na selu. Sistematski ukljucivati progresivne seljake-proizvodace, koji su stekli dru5tveni ugled u svojim zajednicama, u SKJ. Osloboditi i stimulirati privrednu inicijativu i vrednovati rezultate proizvodnog rada kao socijalisticke/a ne kao kulacke.

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aparat vlasti i upravljanja. Zbog toga se vjerojatno ne cini velika analiticka pogreska, ako se kao citava grupa suprotstavljaju radnicima i seljacima.. U drustvu koje razvija samoupravljanje slika se mijenja, dolazi do znacajne diferencijacije unutar sluzbenicke grape. Sve veci broj sluzbenika pocinje se distancirati od ranijega gazde privatnog vlasnika ili drzave i pocinju razvijati drustvenu lojalnost, kako smo to ranije podrobno ispitali, prema drugim grupama s kojima su, objektivnom uslovljenoscu samoupravne organizacije rada, stavljeni u istu ili slicnu egzistentnu situaciju. I upravo u tom smi slu moze se govoriti da je institucija samoupravljanja bitno smanjila birokratske pritiske u Savezu i omogucila da se, usprkos svim otporima, pride reorganizaciji SKJ. U tom kontekstu mogli bismo, cini mi se, obmuti ranije navedeni Redzicev dictum tako da glasi: Partija je uspostavila samoupravljanje, samoupravljanje je preporodilo Partiju. Nasu analizu sprovest cemo tako sto cemo clanove SKJ grupirati u kvazi-profesionalhe grupe (up. pogl. 17) tj. ispitivat cemo horizontalnu socijalnu strukturu clanstva. Uporedenje horizontalne strukture aktivnog stanovnistva i partijskog clanstva u 1961. godini (za 1953. godinu ne postoji partijska statistika pa je usporedenje nemoguce) pruza ovu sliku. Aktivno stanovnistvo i clanstvo SKJ po kvazi-profesionalnim grupama u 1961. godini (u hiljadama) Aktivno stanovnistvo u hiljadama Seljaci Ostali privrednici Neprivrednici Drzavni aparat Ukupno: 4.408 2.887 408 257 7.960 Clanovi Ucesce clanova SKJ u aktivnom stanovnistvu

%
99 560 105 155 919 2,2 19,5 25,8 60,4 11,5

Objasnjenje: Privrednici obuhvacaju radnike i sluzbenike materijalnih djelatnosti, te stambeno-komunalne i financijske djelatnosti. Neprivrednici obuhvacaju osoblje kultumo-prosvjetne i socijalno255

-zdravstvene djelatnosti kao i organa drustveno-politickih organizacija. U drzavni aparat ukljucena je drzavna administracija, pravosude i profesionalna annija. Daleko najvise, clanova Partije ima u drzavnom aparatu, medu seljacima gotovo ih. i nema, a privreda i neprivreda stoje negdje po sredini. Te cinjenice odrazavaju kljucnu usmjerenost Partije na kontrolu organa vla sti. Kao sto je vec konstatirano takva usmjerenost je prirodna u razdoblju neposredno poslije revolucije, kada izgradnju novog drustvenog poretka treba obezbijediti od svih eventualnosti. Medutim, tokom vremena takva usmjerenost pocinje davati sasvim specifican cinovnicki pecat citavoj partijskoj organizaciji, a hijerarMjski mentalitet organa vlasti s kadrovima cije su kvalifikacije znatno iznad prosjeka pocinje se nametati partijskoj organizaciji snagom koja je van svih proporcija spram fizickog ucesca sluzbenika drzavne administracije u ukupnom stanovnistvu. U ovom kontekstu bilo bi veoma vazno utvrditi koliko je partijska organizacija prodrla u pojedine drustvene slojeve. Tacni podaci ne postoje, ali na. osnovu dosad navedenih statistickih pregleda oni se mogu priblizno rekonstruirati. Ako slojeve navedemo redoslijedom od najviseg prema najnizemu, onda je od pripadnika pojedinih dru stvenih slojeva u SKJ uclanjeno rukovodeceg kadra preko intelektualnih radnika oko rutinskih sluzbenika oko visokokval. i kvalif. radnika oko polukvalif. i nekvalif. radnika oko seljaka oko 60% 50% 40% 25% 7% 2%

Proizlazi, kao sto se moglo ocekivati, da se najvise partijskih kadrova regrutira iz najvisih drustvenih slojeva. To je karakteristicno za partiju na vlasti. Time sto vise drustvene slojeve obuhvaca u znatno vecoj mjeri nego nize, partija na vlasti osigurava perpetuiranje svoje vlasti kao i politicku kontrolu. No samim time djeluje u pravcu konzerviranja slojevitosti, konzerviranja drzave, dopiinosi politizaciji i birokfatizaciji svog vlastitog clanstva kao i globalnog drustva. U mjeri u kojoj se ti.pro.cesi razviju partija se od avangarde pretvara u elitisticku organizaciju.
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I upravo u tom smislu od kljucnog je znacenja da u SKJ pored sluzbenika bude i dovoljan broj radnika i seljaka. Navedene konstatacije trebalo bi modificirati dinamickom analizom, tj. utvrdivanjem tendencija mijenjanja horizontalne i vertikalne strukture. Na zalost partijska statistika ne dozvoljava da se ide unatrag dalje od 1958. godine i to samo za horizontalnu strukturu. Struktura clanstva SKJ po kvazi-profesionalnim grupama u 1958. i 1966. godini. 1958. 1966. u hiljadama Seljaci Os tali privrednici Neprivrednici Drzavni aparat Ukupno 122 401 67 148 738 77 539 129 154 899 Povecanje ( + ) Smanjenje ( ) % + + + 37 35 93 4

+ 22

U posljednjih osam godina doslo je do drasticnog smanjivanja broj a seljaka-komunista, sto smo vec ranije utvrdili. Kao posljedica smanjivanja broja radnika od 1961. godine dalje, u posljednjih pet godina doslo je do smanjivanja broja komunista i u neseljackoj privredi. Cini se opravdanim zakljucak da su privredna nestabilnost i nejasnoce u prakticno-politickoj orijentaciji SKJ u po sljednjih pet godina imale svog odraza u smanjivanju partijskog uticaja medu privrednicima. No najinteresantnija je informacija tabele o stagnaciji drzavnog aparata i izvanredno brzom porastu broja komunista u neprivredi. Prvo je ocigledno rezultat svjesne politike ogranicavanja ekspanzije drzavnog aparata i predstavlja veoma pozitivnu pojavu. Uzroci potonjeg fenomena nisu tako ocigledni. Moguca je pretpostavka da su razvoj samouprav ljanja do koga je u neprivredi doslo tek u posljednjoj deceniji i sa znatnim zakasnjenjem u odnosu na privredu i opca demokratizacija drustvenog i politickog zivota pogodovali ekspanziji SKJ u neprivredi. Nagla ekspanzija broja komunista u neprivredi u od nosu na drzavni aparat mogla bi izazvati pojavu odredenih napetosti izmedu te dvije kvazi-profesionalne grupe. Te
17 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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napetosti mogle bi na prvi pogled izgledati kao neka vrsta borbe za vlast, dok se u stvari radi o sukobu dva razlicita mentaliteta i o borbi za utjecaj na partijsko javn'o mnjenje dviju grupa podjednako visokih kvalifikacija. Daljnji privredni razvoj najvjerojatnije ce dovesti do slabljenja utjecaja drzavnog aparata, jer neprivreda nuzno ekspandira brze od drzavnog aparata. Kad se jednom privreda stabilizira i vrati na visoku stopu rasta, broj komunista u privrednim djelatnostima pocet ce se povecavati, cime ce utjecaj aparata i dalje slabiti. U istom pravcu djeluje i neprestano povisavanje kvalifikacija pri vrednih kadrova. Vjerojatno se razdoblje 1960 1966. moze smatrati prelaznim razdobljem u kom je Partija orijentirana na vlast i pod snaznim utjecajem vlastitog aparata vlasti pocela da se transformira u organizaciju politickih aktivista orijentiranu na to da postane drustvena avangarda, da se distancira od vlasti i da vlast supstituira samoupravnim strukturama. I upravo zato sto je to prelazmo razdoblje u kome stare strukture vise nisu funkcionalne, a nove jos nisu izgradene, poceo se tako neprijatno osjecati teret disfunkcionalnosti birokratskog men taliteta.

Znacenje institucije samoupravljanja i dem okratizacija S K J

Ukoliko je tafino da je birokratski mentalitet poceo blokirati aktivnost Saveza komunista kao drustvene avangarde, onda se postavlja pitanje odakle je Savez nasao snage da se uspjesno bori s konzervatizmom i, posebno da se obracuna s glavnim izvorom birokratizma, politickom pblicijom? Jedno od mogucih objasnjenja jest da je medu komunistima bilo uvijek dovoljno autonomnih licnosti koje su bile u stanju da prevladavaju deformacije siste ma. Nemam mogucnosti da ocijenim u kojoj mjeri je to objasnjenje tacno, a osim toga ne vidim kako bi se takva teza mogla naucno tj. tako utvrditi da ne predstavlja tautologiju. No moguce je ovo pitanje: zasto takvih licnosti nije bilo dovoljno u drugim partijama, cak ni u onima koje su same izvele drustvene revolucije? Trazeci odgovor 258

na o'vo pitanje mozda je uputnije orijentirati se ne na licnosti vec na institucijama uvjetovane drustvene situa cije i procese. U tom slucaju ocigledno je da samoupravIjanje predstavlja osnov vitalnosti jugoslavenskog drustvenog sistema. Samoupravlianie Ae_direktna suprotnost hijerarhicnosti birokratsMh sistema. Usporedo postojanje ovih dvaju oprecnih sistema organizacije drustva dovodilo je, kao sto znamo, do mnogih nedoumica, zabuna, protivurjecnosti i sukoba. Medutim, razvojem samoupravljanja pritisak na birokratske strukture bio je sve veci, a mogucnost njihovog nametanja drustvu sve vise ogranicavana. Stavljanje birokratskih procesa pod kontrolu bilo je omoguceno dvama faktorima: konsolidacijom jugoslavenskog drustvenog sistema na samoupravnoj osnovi i ostvarivanjem mogucnosti stalnog uporedivanja samoupravnih. i birokratskih aktivnosti. Na taj nacin politicka stabilnost, drustveni pritisak i poznate alternative omogucili su da se izvojsti pobjeda nad konzervativnim snagama. Time je ujedno naden izlaz iz situacije i dan putokaz za daljnju akciju. Ukoliko se nesto desilo samo zato sto postoje neke licnosti, onda se ubudude moze desiti nesto drugo ako budu postojale drugacije licnosti. Ukoliko pozeljni drzavni tokovi ovise samo o dobrim rukovodiocima, onda odgoj tih dobrih rukovodilaca, ako oni vec ne postoje, predstavlja nerjesiv zadatak kao sto su to otkrili vec francuski enciklopedisti. Medutim, ukoliko jedna institucija spontano rada pozeljne efekte, onda se citav posao svodi na razvoj te institucije. Do sada je samoupravljanje bilo prvenstveno orijentirano na radnu organizaciju. Na visim razinama intervenirali su partijski i drzavni aparat. Ta faza naseg razvoja ocigledno je zavrsena. Stecena su potrebna iskustva i formirana odredena samoupravna svijest. U narednoj fazi samoupravljanje treba da se prenese na globalnu zajednicu. Tim procesom Savez komunista bit ce u stanju da rukovodi jedino ako svaki clan S.aveza bude u stanju da se u nj ukljuci potpuno samostalno i da djeluje na osnovu licne odgovomosti i licnog poziva, a ne na osnovu direktive s viseg mjesta. Preduslov za to je demokratizacija Saveza komunista, a osnovno je u demokratizaciji 17* 259

Saveza likvidiranje njegovog hijerarhijskog poluvojnickog odnosa. (M. Todorovic, 24, 679) To znaci da Savez treba da se pFetvori od organizacije s centraliziranom inicijativom u organizaciju s decentraliziranom inicijativom, od organizacije gdje iskljucivo rukovodstva kontroliraju clanstvo, u organizaciju gdje i clanovi imaju mogucnost kon trole rukovodecih organa, a u procesu odlucivanja komunikacije i direktive cirkuliraju i po silaznoj i po uzlaznoj liniji. Sadasnja uloga Saveza komunista kaze se u zakljuccima V I plenuma CK SKJ nuzno zahtijeva vecu demokratizaciju unutrasnjih odnosa u njemu sto, prije svega, podrazumijeva otvorenost Saveza komunista prema svim stvaralackim i progresivnim drustvenim inicijativama . . . (24, 20) Navedeni treba i zahtijeva nisu neki moralni ili apstraktno politicki postulati, vec odraz potreba usaglasavanja s neminovnim drustvenim procesima Tikoliko Savez hoce zadrzati ulogu drustvene avangarde. Demokratizacija i otvorenost jedina su raspoloziva garancija protiv pucastickog grupasenja u buducnosti i jedino efikasno sredstvo da se privid dogmatskog jedinstva prevlada stvamim jedinstvom u pogledima i akcijia. (V I plenum) U svemu tome bit ce vjerojatno srazmjemo malo cisto organizacionih promjena. Organizacioni okviri relativno su uski i iste organizacione forme mogu sluziti za veoma razlicite svrhe. Ono sto ce se bitno promijeniti odnosno sto treba bitno promijeniti nije usko shvacena organizacija vec opci pristup rjesavanju drustvenib problema. To se, prirodno, ne moze postici preko noci.1 Ali upravo zbog toga od osnovne je vaznosti da se utvrde razvojne tendencije i otkriju korijeni pojava.
1 Situaciju u kojoj se SKJ nasao poSto je Brionski plenum inaugurirao reorganizaciju, opisuje M. Hadzi Vasilev ovako: Ako se izuzme aktivnost Tazvijenlh organizacija SK, koje su se snasle u no vim uslovima za drustvenu praksu vecine organizacija karakteristiSno je : l ) tanak sloj komunista deluje na stari, birokratski nacin, jer su na takvim pozicijama da mogu uzurpirati samoupravnu praksu ili srastati i dalje sa vlaSdu; 2 ) velika mas a komunista . . . zatvara se u svofu organizaciju . . . uz precutno saznanje da se sklanjaju od stvamih odnosa, da de stvaraa druStvena akcija organizadje izostati a problemi ostati i dalje otvoreni i u njoj i van nje; 3) pasivizacije sve veceg broja komu nista . . . (24, 358). Nemam mogucnosti naucnog provjeravanja u kojoj m jeri je ova ocjena stanja tadna. Lidnost autora kao i publikacija. u kojoj je objavljena sugeriraju da je treba uzeti kao ozbiljno svjedo danstvo.

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20. FU N K C IJE I ORGANIZACIJA SAVEZA K O M U N IS T A JUGOSLAVIJE Cjelokupna dosadasnja analiza bila je nuzna da bismo utvrdili koje funkcije treba da obavlja politicka organizacija na sadasnjem stupnju naseg drustveno-ekonomskog razvitka. Politikolozi razlikuju dvije vrste politickih organizacija: partije kojima je cilj da osvoje ili ucestvuju u vlasti, i grupe za pritisak, koje u cilju ostvarivanja svojih interesa uticu na one koji drze vlast. Partije su produkt kapitalizma, grupe za pritisak postojale su u svim sistemima. Politicka organizacija koju zahtijeva nasa historijska situacija, ocigledno vise nije partija. No ona ne moze biti ni grupa za pritisak, jer se ne radi o tome da se utjece na nosioce vlasti, narocito ne da se ostvare neki parcijalni interesi, vec se radi o radikalnoj transformaciji te vlasti. Proizilazi da ce slicno kao i teorija privredne organi zacije i teorija politickih organizacija dobiti jednu novu kategoriju. Fizicari bi tu kategoriju vjerojatno nazvali antipartijom jer, kao rezultat procesa, treba da dode. do anihilacije partije. Mi bismo je mogli nazvati savezom politickih aktivista. Koje su, dakle, osnovne funkcije takve politicke organizacije kod nas danas? Osnovni zadatak postojece organizacije, Saveza komu nista Jugoslavije, jest, nesumnjivo, da ubrza i osigura zapocetu drustvenu transformaciju do trenutka kada ce, kao nepotrebna, isceznuti. U stvari Savez komunista bit ce u izvrsavanju tog zadatka uspjesan tacno u onoj mjeri u kojoj bude uspijevao da se ukida kao politicka organi zacija. Savez komunista ne posjeduje, kako se to ponekad na jednom primitivnijem teorijskom nivou implicira, gotovu formulu socijalizma, koju sad samo treba realizirati slamajuci razne neprijateljske otpore. U danasnjoj slozenoj situaciji nije uvijek jasno tko je i gdje je neprijatelj kao i sta je otpor a sta socijalisticka orijentacija. Stvar je drustvene prakse i nauke radi se o naucnom socija lizmu da neprestano iznova utvrduju, korigiraju, poboljsavaju i izgraduju tu socijahsticku formulu. Savez komunista imao bi, koliko ja mogu da vidim, cetiri osnovne funkcije, odnosno dva para komplementamih funkcija: funkcije prevladavanja historijski naslijedenih suprotnosti 261

i moralno-politickog integriranja jugoslavenskog drustva te funkcije prevladavanja politickih sukoba na tlu soci jalizma i izgradnje demokratske kulture.

Prevladavanje historijski naslijedenih suprotnosti is u k o b a

Jugoslavija je kultumo i ekonomski veoma heterogena zemlja. Dohodak po glavi stanovnika u najrazvijenijim krajevima nekoliko je puta veci nego u nerazvijenijim. Razlika u razvxjenosti izmedu Kosmeta i Slovenije je isto tako velika kao npr. izmedu Nigerije i Grcke. Razlike u privrednoj razvijenosti uvjetuju isto tako velike razlike u zivotnom standardu, produktivnosti rada, obrazovanju, kultumom nivou itd. Jugoslavija se po relativnom broju studenata nalazi pri vrhu svjetske ljestvice, a u isto vri jeme jos uvijek je jedna petina stanovnistva nepismena. Razlike izmedu grada i sela, umnog i fizickog rada tako der su znacajne. Nadalje, jugoslavenska privreda postizava jednu od najbrzih stopa rasta na svijetu. Time se ostvaruje ne samo izvanredno brza privredna nego i drustvena transformacija. Jedan od odraza tog procesa je masovni prijelaz seljaka u gradove. Jos jedan odraz je i neprestano mijenjanje privrednog sistema. U takvoj situaciji velikib potencijalnih i stvamih napetosti, neizgradenosti institucionalnog sistema i brzih i intenzivnih promjena, zemlji je potrebna jedna organizirana drustvena snaga koja ce djelovati stabilizirajude i koja ce biti u stanju da kontrolira i usmjerava sve ove slozene procese.1

Moralno-politicko integriranje jugoslavenskog drustva

Dok se prva funkcija ogranicuje uspostavljanjem proste drustvene ravnoteze, sto je osnovni poduslov za funkcioniranje svakog drustvenog ili uze, politickog sistema,
1 Jedno zanimljivo ispiti.van.3e javnog nmijenja iz 1964. godine poka zuje da tri cetvrtine ankedranih podjednako u svim druStvenim slojevima smatraju da utjecaj komunista na rad organa samoupravljanja treba da jaSa i to objaSnjavaju prije svega time sto bi se poboljSao rad i bili bi bolji odnosi u poduzedima i ustanovama. Regionalno najmanje se inzistira na povedanju utjecaj a komunista u Sloveniji, svega 60,2% anketiranih (Dzinid, 14, 259).

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dotle se sada radi o ostvarivanju permanentne drustvene integracije, koja postaje osnovica za drustvenu samoreprodukciju. Poznato je da u svakom drustvu moral igra takvu integrativnu funkciju. Poznato je takoder da je moral historijska, odnosno drustvena kategorija i da ce stoga u jednom heterogenom drustvu, kao sto je naSe, koegzistirati vise, mozda cak i konfliktnih, morala. Medutim, ma kako vazan, moral ne iscrpljuje drustveno ponasanje, na sto se, u nedostatku boljeg tennina, odnosi atribut politicko u naslovu. Drustveno ponasanje pred stavlja kompleksan sistem drustvenih reakcija pojedinaca i grupa uvjetovanih naslijedenim i stecenim sistemima vrednovanja i predodzbama o etickim i egzistencijskim komponentama covjekovog zivota, licnim iskustvom, nacinom interpretiranja znakova komuniciranja. Cak i kad interesi izmedu pojedinih drustvenih grupa nisu suprotni, u jednom heterogenom drustvu moze lako doci do prekida u mogucnostima komuniciranja sto se onda moze iskoristiti za razne demagoske svrhe. Takva se mogucnost povecava kad su interesi stvarno suprotni ili ih grupe takvima smatraju. Drustveno ponasanje odredeno je drustvenim karakterom. Da bi opstalo primjecuje E. Fromm (15, 229)1 svako drustvo mora tako uobliciti karakter svojih clanova da ovi zele da ucine ono sto moraju. uciniti: njihova dru stvena funkcija se mora u njih ugraditi i pretvoriti u nesto sto cine iz unutamje potrebe, a ne zbog prinude. Drustveni karakter intemalizira vanjske potrebe te tako fizicku, intelektualnu i emocionalnu energiju covjeka orijentira na zadovoljavanje potreba danog drustveno-ekonomskog sistema. (17, 259) U analizi osnovnih tipova dru stvenog ponasanja mozemo se koristiti Riesmanovom (18, 8) tipologijom druStvenih karaktera, kod cega treba dodati da se Riesman ocigledno koristio rezultatima analize E. Fronnna. (17) Medutim, toj tipologiji dat cemo drugu teorijsku osnovicu i ponesto promijeniti termine i sadrzaj pojedinih kategorija. Drustveni karakter je onaj dio ka raktera koji je zajednicki pojedinim drustvenim grupama i koji je proizvod iskustva grupe. Riesman razlikuje tri historijska tipa karaktera, koje cemo zvati tradicijski
1 Up. takoder E. Fromm, (16, 945).

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usmjeren, individualisticki i kolektdvisticki1 i koji u mojoj shematici odgovaraju pretkapitalistickoj fazi sporog raz voja, liberalnom kapitalizmu i organiziranom odnosno drzavnom kapitalizmu.2 U pretkapitalistickim i, opcenito, privredno nerazvijenim drustvima dominira drustveni karakter za kojega je znacajno da je u svemu formiran rigidnim tradicijama koje tacno propisuju vanjske forme ponasanja. Na taj nacin drustvena konformnost se postizava time sto se ljudi u svemu prosto drze tradicije. Privrednim razvojem drustvo postaje i sve slozenijim i sve vise podlozno promjeni. Tradicija, kao predominanta integrativna snaga, postaje kocnica razvoja i stoga mora biti napustena. Razvoj novcane privrede razbija ranije primame grupe i formira porodicu kao osnovnu drustvenu jedinicu, a konkurencija trzista stvara individualizam. Taj individualisticki karakter formira se odgojem u porodici na osnovu vrednovanja koja odgovaraju klasnom karakteru porodice. Na taj nacin novim gradanima od najranije mladosti usaduje se specificni klasni ziroskop koji im omogucuje samostalnu pilotazu u toku citavog zivota. Ta usmjerenost prema unutra, prema sebi, prema skupu vrednovanja i ciljeva interioriziranim u ranoj mladosti, predstavlja osnovnu snagu drustvenog konformizma u individualistickim drustvima klasicnog ka pitalizma. Medutim, privredni razvoj ne samo da se i dalje vrsi vec se i ubrzava, a s njime i slozenost drustva i tempo drustvenih promjena. Bezobzima konkurencija i klasna beskrupuloznost klasicnog kapitalizma postaju opasni po drustveni sistem jer izazivaju zestoke reakcije u vidu revolucije. Pored proizvodnje i profita potrebno je misliti i na ljude. Stavise, izvanredno slozena podjela rada cini da kooperacija drugih individua postaje od presudne vaznosti i u najrazvijenijim industrijskim drustvima pocinje se javljati novi tip drustvenog karaktera, koji je sad
1 Za razliku od termina mdividualni i kolelctiV3lia term ini indlvidualistidkia i kolektivistidki imaju u nasem jeziku pejorativno znacenje, sto u ovom slucaju i zelim izraziti. 3 Uporedujudi tu tipologiju s npr. Gurvitchevom tipologijom morala moze se konstatirati da prvi tip odgovara tradicionalnom moralua, drugi izvjesnoj kombinaciji imperativnog<t i utilitaristickog morala, a treci kombinaciji utilitaristickog morala i morala naknadno donijetih sudova. Up. Problemi sociologije moralnog zivota u G. Gurvitch. (19)

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usmjeren prema vani, prema drugima. Ponasanje je odredeno time sto drugi misle i ocekuju, njihovim preferencijama, ono je odredeno kolektivnim, masoynim predodzbama, shvacanjima. Konformizam nije sada indirektna posljedica vec neposredni cilj ponasanja i odatle onaj poznati fenomen bezidejnog i amoralnog konformizma u drustvima takozvane masovne kulture.1 Prirodno je da u takvoj situaciji unutrasnji ziroskop da se jos jednom posluzi Riesmanovim terminima postaje beskoristan i on biva zamijenjen radarom koji otkriva i najslabije signale u ponasanju i raspolozenju okoline i tako omogucuje brzu i svrsishodnu adaptaciju. Na prvi pogled kolektivisticki karakter izgleda kao neka dijalekticka negacija ostala dva oblika i na taj nacin vracanje u drustvo na jednom visem nivou, na nivou kozmopolitizma u odnosu da raniju primarnu grupu. U stvari, medutim, kolektivisticki tip covjeka nije drustveno mtegriran. U takmicenju za naklonosti drugih on se neuporedivo vise napreze da stekne naklonosti onih koji odlucuju nego naklonosti onih koji o njemu zavise. On je tako duboko prozet osjecajem hijerarhije i, kad god mu to okolnosti dozvoljavaju, ispoljava se kao beskrupulozni birokrat. On se nalazi u stanju antagonisticke kooperacije. On predstavlja totalno otudenu licnost.2 On ostaje jadno i bespomocno izolirana jedinka u gomili. Odatle i uspjeli rezime drustvene egzistencije suvremenog zapadnog covjeka u naslovu Riesmanove knjige: Vsamljena gomila.
1 Ja moram da cinim ono Sto svatko cini opisuje E. Fromm taj konformizam prema tome, moram da se saglasim, ne smijem da budem drukciji, ne smijem da strcim' moram da budem spreman i voljan da se mijenjam prema promjenama standarda; ne smijem da pitam da li sam u pravu ili nisam, vec da li sam se prilagodio, da nisam nesto 'izuzetno', nesto razlicito . . . Nitko nema modi nada mnom izuzev gomile, ciji sam ja dio i kojoj sam potcinjavan (16, 158).
2-UkoUko je 'dovjek onakav kakvog ga zele' dovjek nije licnost; on je zabrinut, zavisi od odobravanja drugih, stalno nastojeci da ih zadovolji. Otudena osoba se osjeca inferiomo kad god sumnja da nije na liniji. Posto se njeno osjecanje sopstvene vrijednosti zasniva na odobravanju kao nagradi za komformizam, ona se prirodno osjeca ugrozena u osjedanju svoga 'ja1 u samopostovanju, bilo da se radi o nekom , osjecanju ili misli, ili akciji, koji se mogu protumaciti kao odstupanja. Ali ukoliko ona jest ljudsko bice, a ne automat, ne moze da izbjegne odstupanje i zbog toga cijelo vrijeme osjeca strah od neodobravanja . . . Osjecanje snage i sigumosti ne pruza joj glas njene savjesti, vec osjedanje da nije izgubila vezu sa hordom. Fromm, (16, 201).

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Ovdje je vazno uociti da usamljena gomila, kao dru stveni fenomen, nije karakteristicna samo za visoko razvijeni kapitalizam. Ona je karakteristicna i za staljinisticke sisteme, koji taj kapitalizam imitiraju ne samo. u proizvodnom vec i u drustveno-organizacionom pogledu. Zbog toga kolektivisticki mentalitet, kojim se cesto toliko paradira, jos ni po cemu ne mozemo smatrati indikacijom socijalizma. A standardna teorijska obrazlozenja i po svojo j terminologiji i po svom sadrzaju duboko su antimarksisticka. Tako npr. fundamentalna staljinisticka teorija o partiji koja preko transmisija rukovodi masama nije nista drugo do varijanta prastare u vremenskom rasponu od Platona do Paretoa elitisticke teorije o drustvenoj organizaciji. Od elite pa do kulta licnosti nije vise daleko. I doista, kao jednu podvrstu ekstemo orijentiranog, kolektivistickog karaktera mogli bismo, uz potrebne modifikacije, uzeti Frommov autoritami karakter. Kad uslijed nekih razloga drustveni sistem ne funkcionira kako treba, kad dode do suvise velikog raskoraka izmedu ocekivanja i stvamosti, kad osjecanje nacionalne ili drustvene ugrozenosti prede neke granice kod pojedinaca se potenciraju osjecanja tjeskobe, neizvjesnosti, licne beznacajnosti i nistavosti i razvija se jedan specifican mehanizam bjekstva od te psiholoski nepodnosljive stvamosti. Radi se o mehanizmu odbacivanja licne slobode, stapanja s gomilom i teznja da se covjek potcini jednom apsolutnom autori tetu, autoritetu Partije i vode, koji pruza potpunu izvjesnost. Uslijed toga Partija, tj. CK, nikad ne smije pogrijesiti, pa doista nikad i ne grijesi, kako to proizilazi iz kratkog kursa historije SKP (b ). Uslijed toga voda od samog rodenja mora pokazivati nadnaravne revolucioname osobine, kako to proizilazi iz istog kratkog kursa i objavljenih biografija Staljina. Ovdje je vazno uociti da je malo relevantno sto su spomenute knjige svjesno iskiivljavale stvamost i sto je Staljin bio rdav covjek iako je i to tacno, kao sto je to vec Lenjin uvidio. Stvar je u tome Sto je drustvena situacija uoblicOa autoritami 266

karakter1 i tada se morao naci odgovarajuci voda, a svi izrazi skepse i kriiike nuzno su se prikazivali i bez obzira na montiranost moskovskih procesa kao kontrarevolucionama aktivnost i izdaja. Daleko od toga da SKP (to) svjesno i nepogresivo rukovodi preobrazajima sovjetskog drustva, kako se to opcenito vjerovalo, i SKP (b ) i sovjetsko drustvo prolazili su kroz teske konvulzije stihijskog razvoja uz zrtve koje su danas opcenito poznate, Nakon ovih obrazlozenja potrebno je da se vratimo nasoj situaciji. Tradicijski usmjeren drustveni karakter nalazimo na selu, u onim malim naseljimau kojima svatko svakoga pozna, gdje je nivo obrazovanja nizak, kontakt s vanjskim svijetom slab, a ljudi jos uvijek zive u primamim grupama. Kratkotrajni razvitak kapitalizma u jugoslavenskim zemljama doprinio je razvoju individualistickog karaktera. Administrativni socijalizam i relativno dugogodisnji politicld monopol rukovodecih kadrova uz forsiranu konformizaciju od strane Sluzbe drzavne bezbjednosti doveli su do razvoja kolektivistickog karak tera i odgovarajuceg mentaliteta. U vezi s time mozemo uociti tri znacajne cinjenice. 1. Prijelaz od jednog morala na drugi ili, sire, od jednog drustvenog karaktera na drugi, ne vrsi se odjednom. U meduvremenu nastaje period anomije kad ranije norme prestaju da vaze, a novi sistem normi jos nije prihvacen ili jos nije izgraden. To su veoma opasni periodi padanja drustvenog morala i popustanje drustvene disciplinea. Ti su periodi utoliko opasniji ukoliko su drustvene transformacije burnije. A drustvene transformacije predstavljaju funkciju tempa privrednog rasta koji je u Jugoslaviji bio jedan od najbrzih. na svijetu. 2. Ocigledno je da nijedan od tri analizirana tipa dru stvenog karaktera ne moze posluziti kao osnovica za
1 Iste karakteroloske osobine prepoznajemo kod nasih vlastitih p r o pagatora politike cvrste ruke koja treba da zavede red. Ukoliko nisu to birokrati koji se bore za ocuvanje svojih pozicija, onda su to dezorijentirani pojedinci zbunjeni neprestanim promjenama sto ih donosi naS druStveni razvoj, pojedinci, koji svoju nesigurnost nastoje prevladati izvjesnosdu dogmatizma a otudenje svoje licnosti simbfotigkirn odnosom prema nepogreivom autoritetu. Taj autoritativni tip covjeka dobro opisuje i Duverger (2, s. 29); Ovakvo politicko ponasanje karakteristiCno je naroCito za nesigurne licnosti koje nikada nisu uspjele da izgrade sopstvenu lifinost, da je stabiliziraju; za lifinosti koje sumnjaju u sopstveno 'jaJ i u sopstveni identitet. Oni se grCevito hvataju za spoljne okvire, jer u sebi ne nalaze nikakvog osionca.a

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izgradnju socijalistickog drustva. Prema tome potrebno je razmotriti da li nam stvamost pruza indikacije za formiranje jednog adekvatnijeg, cetvrtog, tipa drustvenog karaktera koji jos nije historijski realiziran, ali koji bi mogao biti i, stoga, morao biti realiziran. 3. Ukoliko se drustveni razvoj bude u ovom podrucju odvijao stihijski kao sto se to najvecim dijelom desavalo do sada, onda se moze ocekivati jacanje kolektivistickog karaktera. A sta bi to znacilo prilicno plasticno opisuju Riesman i Fromm u svojim knjigama. Kao pozeljnu altemativu karakteru usmjerenom prema drugima Riesman navodi autonomni karakter. Autonomna licnost je u stanju da se prilagodi normama ponasanja svog drustva, ali to ne cini mehanicki vec je slobodna da odabere da li ce i kako ce to uciniti. Riesman, medu tim, nije u stanju da pokaze koje drustvene institucije u zapadnom svijetii proizvode autonomne licnosti. Ocigledno je da takvih institucija za sada nema i autonomne lic nosti ostaju izuzetni pojedinci i kao drustveni tip predstavljaju nedostizni ideal. Ja bih kao altemativu predlozio asocijativni karakter, koji predstavlja pozitivnu definiciju autonomnog karak tera. Asocijativna licnost postizava puno integriranje s drustvenom zajednicom, ali to ne na nesvjestan, neosmisljen i stoga prinudan nacin kao individue u primamirrt grupama nerazvijenih drustava, vec kao slobodna, autononrna licnost svjesnim izborom koji omogucuju osnovni uslovi njene drustvene egzistencije time sto realiziraju pretpostavke njerie drustvene prilagodenosti. A kao instituciju koja spontano rada preduslove za formiranje asocijativnog karaktera, ja vidim instituciju samoupravljanja u svim oblastima drustvenih, privrednih i neprivrednih aktivnosti. Drustveni karakter je u izvjesnom smislu samo drugo ime za druStvene odnose. Asocijativna Hcnost samo je drugo ime za socijalisticku licnost. Formiranje socijalistickih drustvenih odnosa moze se usporiti ili ubrzati. Stihijski razvoj sigumo nije najbrzi mogiici razvoj. Taj razvoj ce biti ubrzan ukoliko je drustvo u stanju da foxroira jednu avangardu koja ce se sastojati od asocijativnih licnosti. Za razliku od elite, avangarda nije pozvana da vlada, vec da djeluje; ne: diferencira se od masatt, vec ukljucuje druStveno najzrelije pojedince iz pojedinih jasnp 268

artilculiranih drustvenih grupa; ne oslanja se na politicki vec na moralni autoritet. U tom smislu m o ralni standard clanova Saveza komunista igra presudnu ulogu u ostvarivanju njegove moralno-integrativne funkcije. A time je ujedno predodredena i politika regrutiranja clanova Sa veza.

Prevladavanje p o litick ih sukoba na tlu socijalizm a Iako ostaci klasnog drustva nisu jos iscezli,1 mi vec dugo vremena nemamo nikakvih ozbiljnih problema s klasnim neprijateljem. Jedine dvije doista ozbiljne politicke krize koje je zemlja prozivjela nakon sto je oruzana faza revolucije bila izvojevana, bile su krize unutar vladajuce partije: Kominform 1948. i policijska konspiracija 1966. To jasno pokazuje da sada sukobi nastaju na socifalistickom tlu. Organizaciono, a jos vise koncepcijski i ideoloski, Savez komunista bio je lose pripremljen da prevladava sukobe te vrste. U slozenim uslovima osvojene vlasti formalno jedinstvo pokazalo se kao sasvim nedovoljno. Da bi se osigurao od slicnih iznenadenja ubudude, Savez komunista morat ce izgraditi odredene mehanizme i staviti ill u pokret obicno se to naziva demokratizacijom partije mehanizme koji do sada nisu postojali ili su slabo funkcionirali. Da bi Savez komunista mogao uspjesno obavljati svoju prvu funkciju, on mora biti cvrsta organizacija politickih aktivista; da bi bio cvrst, mora biti sustinski jedinstven; da bi bio jedinstven, mora biti duboko dempkratican. Time smo stigli i do cetvrte funkcije.

Izgradnja demokratske kulture Jugoslavija nema iza sebe stoljece i po mimog razvoja u nacionalnoj drzavi~kad^niEmpkratska~kultufargradana mogla raa~se2izgradi~po~s~tepend~i^na odredeni, gotovo bih rekao, prirodmllacirP^- kao'sfo je to bilo u Frincuskoj
1 To je prilicno spor proces. Na primjer u Engleskoj se burzoaska revolucija odlgrala u X V II stoljedu,. a ostaci feudalizma sacuvali su se i danas. Jasno je, medutini, da nikome ne pada na pamet da Englesku smatra feudalnom zemljom ili da upozorava na opasnost od restauracije feudalizma u toj zemlji.

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ili Engleskoj ili u Skandinavskim zemljama. A riiti sebi mozemo dozvoliti luksuz da proces izgradnje demokratske kulture pfotegnemo naTiducih stoljede i po. MeflutEn7ocigledno je da demoEr^im~neZmoze^unkcioHirati-akQ-se_. gradani svojim demokratskim pravima ne_sluze^na.-6dgovoran nacin. Meprijatna je cmjenica..da kod _nas_j_os_ nema kritike vrhovnih drzavnih i partiiskih organa, ndnnsno pojediTiihlviaokili-fimEcionera. A u ^ dsustvu kritike razvija se proces birokratizacije i MjeraxSjskog struktuiranja drustva.. Interesantni su i razlozi zasto te kritike nema. Otpori prema kritici javUi su se u radnidkim partijama vec vrlo rano. Karakteristicna je u tom pogledu jedna reakcija Engelsa1 od p.rije osam decenija: Radnicki po kret zasniva se na najostrijoj kritici postojeceg drustva. Kritika je njegova zivotna stihija; kako on sam moze izbjegavati kritiku, teziti da se zabrani diskusija? Zar mi od drugih. zahtijevamo slobodu govora za sebe samo radi toga da bi je unistili u svojim sopstvenim redovima. Meflutim, partija, kao i svaka birokratska organizacija, nuzno rada otpore prema kiitici objasnjavane opcim mteresima borbe i ti su otpori to jaci, sto je organizacija centraliziranija. To vazi i za mimodopsku partiju, koju ima u vidu Engels, ali to vazi jos vise za ilegalnu partiju, koja je objektivno u takvim uslovima da se kritika mora svesti na minimum. Desava se zatim, da se navike stecene u ilegalnim uslovima prenose kasnije i u situacije koje su bitno drugacije. Iz konteksta toga, kao i drugLh Engelsovih pisama, ocigledno je da bi njegova reakcija bila jos zesca da se nije radilo o opozicionoj partiji vec o partiji koja vlast cvrsto drzi u svojim rukama. K od nas se odsustvo kritike obicno obj asnjava time,
^to_linosti kpie . su potencijaliii objekti takve kritike

svim snagama nasto. e da ie spriiece. Poznate su intervenj cije kod urednika listova i radio-emisija kao i preko partijskih foruma. lako ne mislim negirati tu empirijsku cinjenicu, njena interpretacija izgleda mi i jednostrana i naivna. I te licnosti utjecu na svoju sredinu mnogo ma nje nego sto su same produkt te sredine. Osnovno objasnjenje, koliko ja mogu sagledati, lezi u opcoj negemokrattoj~tooiferi koju smo naslijedili i __
1 Pismo Engelsa Hersonu Triru, 18. decembra 1S89. citirano prema (20, 109).

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koju smo mozda ucmiU joJ^ vise _nedemokratskom. Zbog toga ce kritika centralnog fawniteta ill vlade hiti npAmitH'" shvacena kao napad na rezjpi i na sqcijaTizam- Ukoliko drzava ne reagira na kritiku, onda ce se smatrati da je kritizirana Ucnost zavrsEa svoju politicku karijeni i da j e kritika u stvari potekla iz sluzbenih izvora i predsta vlja samo nagovjestaj smjenjivanja.1 Ukoliko se ni to ne Brrdesllo, onda .bL kriticar i urednik odnosnog sred stva informacija dobili odgovarajuce zabiljeske u svo jim policijskim dosjeima, a mozdaT bF bili pozvani i ha razgovor. Medutim, i kritika nasiiFbirokratskiK vrhova, predsjednika opcine ili sefa ustanove, imala bi lose po sljedice i to za obojicu: za kriticara i kritiziranog. Desavalo se da su clanovi SKJ kaznjavani cak i kad nisu izricito kritizirali, vec su prosto iznijeli neko neuobicajeno misljenje koje se razlikovalo od standardnih stereotipa. A ostavke, kao izraz neslaganja, bile su u politickom zivotu prakticki nepoznate. U takyoj _situaciji.kritike nije nestalo, vec se transformirala: postala je neodgoyjama Ili zakulisna ili oboje. Kad se kritika ne njeguje u svakodnevnim odnosima meclu ljudima, onda lju dTn e^ju j^giK nostfjia^s^nau ceslu ziti kritikom.~(33atIi~one~5idne, destruktivne, neprovjerene i totalno neodgovome kritike pojedinaca i institucija koje' od vremena do vremena izlaze^ pred javnost. Odatle i one nmogbbroj ne spletke, taj ne inforrnacij e i denuncijacijeT koje su subsituirale' otvorenu demokratsku borbu mislje^aTOdatle i ona odvratna pojara tibmo duplexa, moralno-psiholoskog tipa koji je totalno suprotan slobodnoj stvaralackoj licnosti socijalizma. U posljednjih nekoliko godina stvaii su pocele da se mijenjaju. Stampa, radio i televizija odigrale su ogromnu ulogu u razvijanju te demokratske kulture. Likvidiranje politicke policije uklonilo je najvazniju prepreku da se taj proces dalje razvija. Stigli smo dotle da jedan lokalni list moze bez vecih nesporazuma kritizirati upravu neke fabrike, a Borba moze podvrci kritici rad nekog opcinskog
1 Meni izgleda konstatira K . Crvenkovski da jos . . . smatramo da je javna . . . primjedba nekom funkcioneru, jednoj licnosti u redovima Saveza komunista Jugoslavije u odnosu sa njegove poglede i shvadanja. . poetak ujegovog kraja, atak na njegov polozaj, proces njegove degradacije. M i uopce nismo navikli da mozemo ulaziti u slobodne dijaloge, ne slagati se medusobno . . . Ja bih ak rekao da je ovaj mentalitet. . . daleko izrazitiji gto se penjemo prema # gore# iako , ne bi moglo da se kaze da ga nema i 'dole's (10, 13132).

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komiteta. Meflutim, nismo jos ostvarili kritiku na istim nivoima,_a jos manje Jmtiku odo^cTprema gore. IT jednoj paririjarhalnoj^sredini, kakva_prevJadaya._u zemlji kojaT je tek nedavno izasla iz seljacke kolibe, ovo potonje smatrajse^ rusenjem autoriteta koje se ne moze tolerirati. Patrijarhalna sredina nije navikla da odmjerava argumente; ona se upravlja iskljucivo prema licnostima. U logici se to naziva pogreskom u zakljucivanju argumentum ad hominemg. Sto je niza razina u logickoj kulturi i logickoj disciplini misljenja covjeka, objasnjava sovjetski logicar Asmus, (21, 373) tim je manje on sposoban odijeliti dokaznu snagu argumenata od cuvstava, simpatija i predrasuda koje mu se namecu ... Na nesrecu ne radi se samo o pogresci uslijed nedostataka logicke kulture. Realna drustvena situacija je takva da autoritet dodaje argumentaciji takav fakticki, iskustvom provjereni, ponder da logicki sadrzaj odlazi u drugi plan. Postoji i drugi aspekt demokratske kulture. a _tp_. je 'irdciiativaf PatrijarEalna sredina stvara autoritete da bi se njime koristila. U istoj mjeri u kojoj birokrat zeli vlast, patrijarhalna sredina mu je i namece. To je zatvoren i konzistentan sistem. Gradanin u tom sistemu nece ili ne zna, sto izlazi na isto da se sluzi svojim demokratskim pravima. Kao nekad bogu, on se sada za provorijek l zastitu obraca visem forumu. Njemu ne pada na pamet da vlastitom inicijativom trazi rjesenje svog problema putem nekog samoupravnog mehanizma on zna da je to naivno, da svijet tako ne moze fiinkcionirati, vec trazi presudu autoriteta vlasti. Mene, recimo, okolina. prisiljava da budem vlast zabiljezio je novinar S. Dukic konstatacije sekretara Opcinskog komiteta Saveza ko munista Vranja (Borba, 9. oktobar 1966, s. 4). A sto je naa administracija tehnicki neefikasnija u nerazvijenoj zemlji to je pravilo to je nas konzervativni gradanin i fakticki vise u pravu. Da bi se ostvarila zakonom garantirana prava, potrebne su intervencije. Intervencije uslovljavaju mehanizam VIP-a, a ovaj predstavlja najvecu zapreku za efikasno funkcioniranje mehanizma samoupravljanja. Proizlazi da pitanje kritike i pitanja samoupravne l^diatiTC _m ie'pri^to raTanie~aa.se kritita aozvBli~ili da se inicijativa ustavno zagarantiraa, iako su to, naravno,^juchi~predujIova. Budud da se radi o jednoj tradici272

jama cementiranoj socijalno-psiholoskoj strukturi, tom pasivnom dozvolom jos nista ne bi bilo uradeno. S druge strane kritika moze u nekritickoj sredini nanijeti veliku stetu. I najumjesnija kritika moze u jednoj kriticki nekultiviranoj sredini izazvati pogresne inteipretacije, cime ta kritika gubi smisao. Nadalje, u takvoj situaciji inzistiranje na samoupravnoj inicijativi moze a to se i desava biti shvaceno kao hipokrizija. No odumiranje drzave nezamisljivo je u sredini u kojoj gradani nisu naucili da se u punoj m jeri i s najvecom odgovomoscu sluze svojim gradanskim pravima. Koriscenja gradanskih prava ne mo ze biti u sredini u kojoj postoji kult autoriteta, u kojoj nema kritike. Kritike ne moze biti u sredini u kojoj se gradani ne sluze svojim pravima. Taj birokratsko-p'atrijarhabni obrud m ole efikasno raskinutisamo jedna politidka snasa koia ie bar dielomicno van w/'ega.-Stoga u ostvarivanju preduslova za formiranje Jednog dernokratskog i samoupravnog drustva Savez komunista moze i treba da igra presudnu ulogu. Na taj nacin kultiviranje kritike i samoupravne inicijative, kao osnove za razvoj demokratskih odnosa i skolovanje gradanina za koriscenje svojih politickih sloboda, predstavlja jedan od izvanredno vaznih zadataka Saveza komunista. Komunisti ce taj zadatak najefikasnije rijesiti ako najprije demokratsku kulturu razviju u potpunosti u svojim vlastitim redovima.

D em okratski centralizam Iz funkcija partije saveza politickih aktivista proizlazi, kao sto je receno, i njena organizacija. Obicno se kaze da je osnovni organizacioni princip Saveza komu nista demokratski "centralizarn. No time je malo sta receno. Demokratski centralizam znaci demokratsko donosenje .odIuK7^^ntralmrainb tj. jedinstveno sprovodenje. Treba podsjetiti da je taj prmcip priinijenjen w c kod socijaldemokratskih partija, ceritraliziranija varijanta primijenjena je kod komunistickih partija i, u stvari, u mnogim drugim organizacijama naci cemo razne varijante tog principa. Problem ie u tome da li fe akcent na demokratskom ili na o>centralizmu i kakb se kombiniraju te cLviJe' komponteT'I^iirakratski centralizam^iz^vremena
18 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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rata ili ilegalne borbe, danas ocigledno vise ne odgovara:. Joi manje odgovara demokratski centralizam kako ga shvaca npr. Mao Ce Tung: Potrebno je postaviti organizaciju iznad pojedinaca, vecinu iznad manjine, vise par tijske funkcionere iznad nizih, a Centralni komitet iznad cijele Partije. To je demokratski centralizam u Partiji. (22, 84) Da vidimo sada kakav demokratski centralizam bi mogao odgovarati u sadasnjim uslovima. Prije svega jasno je da odluke treba donositi vecinom glasova. Prema tome manjina se mora pokoravati vecini. 'Nadalje, ta manjina ne moze seorganiziratipermanentno, jer bi to bila frakcija, a to je slicno kao da je osnovana druga partija. Medutim, odumiranje drzave implicira odumiranje partije. Prema tomemanjine i vecine formiraiu se ad hoc za pojedine odluke i njihov se.perpnalni sastav stalno mijenja. Na taj nacin misljenje pojedinca a ne kao'ranije~sefova parfijlkog aparata dolazi do izrazaja. U svemu tome shvacanja su prilicno jedinstvena. Razilazenje pocinje_ kod pitanja: kako manfina trebaj~da se ponasa kod sprovodenj a odluka ? ^ M ogu&...sn, getiri odgovorar da sprovodi _i suti; da sprovodi i nastavlja diskusiju; da ne sprovodi; da se bori protiv sprovodenja. U normalnim usiovima posljednja dva rjesenja ne dolaze u obzir. A sto se tice prva dva, inzistiranje na jednom ili drugom izgleda mi dogmatski, sve zavisi o prilikama. Ako je neka vazna odluka donesena s vecinom od jednog glasa, vecina ce vjerojatno mudro uraditi ako odustane od sprovodenj a te odluke. A ako se za neku odluku izjasni 90% komunista, onih 10% trebalo bi pomno da preispitaju svoje stavove prije no sto se odluce da obnove diskusiju. Ako se radi o izuzetno vaznim odlukama, kao sto su npr. borba protiv nacionalnog sovinizma ili, svojevremeno, borba protiv Kominforma, onda je, prirodno, potpuna jednodusnost apsolutno neophodna. No, najcelce, odluke nece biti niti tako fundamentalne, niti tako ocigledne, i onda je, pretpostavljam, pozeljno da se dozvoli mogucnost stalnog preispitivanja donijetih od luka paralelno s njihovim izvrsavanjem. Koja odluka spada u koju kategoriju, ne moze se unaprijed propisati. To je takoder stvar demokratske kulture. U krajnjem slucaju moze se nekom kyalificiranom vecinom u svakoj pojedinoj prilici odluciti da li ce se preispitivanje odluke tolerirati ili ne. 274

Najslozenija nastaje situacija kad dode do neslaganja nacelnijeg karaktera, npr. u pogledu programskilv formulacija ili statutamih odredbi. Uobicajeno objainjenje u ovom slucaju jest: u Savez komunista ulazi se dobrovoljno; time se primaju i sve obaveze te organizacije, posebno program i statut; ako se netko s time ne slaze, treba da napusti SKJ. Mislim da se ovo objasnjenje ne moze prihvatiti, jer znaci konzerviranje partijske organi zacije i implicira direktan poziv na osnivanje drugih par tija ili organizacija. Savez komunista nije jedna od partija pa ako netko nije zadovoljan, moze se upisati u~drugu vec je to jedina organizacija u kojii se uclanjuju najaktiviiijrbofci za socijaJizamT Buduci j i a nitko ne posjeduje definitivnu formulu izgradnje socijalizma kao sto nfEEon5e~zna~apsolutnu istinu Savez mora biti dovoljno sirok da apsorbira razlicita misljenja. Kod toga se ne radi o nekoj apstraktnoj pravdi ili nekoj apstraktnoj slobodi, vec o veoma realnom interesu radnog covjeka da se izbjegnu nepotrebne devijacije ili da se ubrza pronalazenje najefikasnijih rjesenja. Kad se radi o novim shvacanjimax yecina ni izdalekajpije najsigumiji kriterij niiEove ispravnostL.. Zapravo,. po prirodi_..stvari, jiosidci novih shvacanja su uvijek pojedinci, ili manjinske grupe, koji onda razvijaju siroku aktivnost da bi vecinu uvjerili u ispravnost svojih. pogleda. Nasilno sprecavanje. takvih akcija znacilo bi yeliko teorijsko i ideolosko osirpmasenje Savera.ijrusenje, njegoye .aymgardnejiloge. Bilo bi interesantno znati kakvo bi stanoviste zauzeli Marx i Engels prema upravo pokrenutom pitanju. Kao naucni radnici i politick! aktivisti oni su cesto dolazili u polozaj da se za svoje stavove bore protiv misljenja vecine. Karakteristican je u tom pogledu slucaj Kritike Gotskog programa, koja se danas smatra jednim od klasicnih Marxovih politickih radova. Medutim, partijski rukovodioci na Kongresu ujedinjenja njemacke socijaldemokracije u Gothi 1875. nisu Marxovu kritiku prihvatili niti su nasli za shodno da Kongres sa tom kritikom upoznaju. Marx je to ocekivao, u pismu kojim je spis poslao Brakeu1 najavio je da ce se on i Engels ograditi od Kongresa i zatim je dodao: . .. moja je duznost da program koji je, po mom misljenju apsolutno neprihvatljiv i koji
1 Pismo Marxa Brakeu 5. maja 1875. Citirano prema (23, 9).

18*

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demoralizira partiju, ne priznam cak ni diplomatskim cutanjema. Nakon 15 godina Engels je dosao do zakljucka da je vrijeme da se taj spis objavi. Medutim, partijsko rukovodstvo se cak i tada tome usprotivilo. Engels zatim nedvosmisleno izlaze svoj stav. u pismu Bebelu1 . . ..otkad ste pokusali da objavljivanje silom sprecite i od kad ste Neue Zeitu uputili upozorenja da ce u slucaju ako se nesto takovo ponovi mozda biti i partijsM podrzavljen i stavljen pod cenzuru, uzimanje u posjed cijele nase stampe od _ strane partije mora da mi se ukazuje u cudnoj svjetlosti. Cime se vi razlikujete od Putkamera [pruski ministar unutrasnjih poslova, B. H.] ako u svojim vlastitim redovima uvodite zakon protiv socijalista? Meni licno moze to biti prilicno svejedno, ni jedna partija ni u jednoj zemlji ne moze me osuditi na cutanje ako sam se rijesio da govorim (podvukao B. H ) ... partiji potrebna je socijalisticka nauka, a ova ne moze da zivi bez slobode kretanja. Tu se s neprijatnostiina treba pomiriti, a to se najbolje cini s dostojanstvom... U citiranim odlomcima ne radi se, kako bi npr. staljinisti ili maosti rekli o malogradan skom anarholiberalizmu vec o jedinom mogucem stavu proleterskih naucnih radnika. Mozda se nekome moze uciniti da ovako veliko razilazenje izmedu nauke i Partije danas nije vise vjerojatno. No takvo shvacanje bila bi opasna zabluda. Evo ilustracije. Vratimo se unatrag petnaestak godina i zamislimo naucnog radnika, ili grupu naucnih radnika, koje su njihova istrazivanja dovela do zakljucka da u narednoj deceniji treba ukinuti centralno planiranje, razviti trziste, osamostaliti banke, uvesti kamate, liberalizirati vanjsku trgovinu, dakle uraditi sve ono sto je danas karakteristicno za jugoslavensku privredu. Ti bi ljudi nesumnjivo bili proglaseni burzoaskim ideolozima, klasnim neprijateljima i antipartijskom grupom i bez mnogo ceremonija bili bi izbaceni iz Partije. U stvari dogmaticari unutrasnji i vanjski jos i danas smatraju da se kod nas vrsi javno svetogrde i po onoj fihteovskoj to gore po cinjenice jos uvijek tvrde da je socijalisticka robna proizvodnja contradictio in adjecto...
i Pismo Engelsa Bebelu 1/2 maja 1891 (23, 56!).

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Slicno nerazumijevanje moze se, dakle, uvijek ocekivati uz napomenu da se, kako izgleda, centar dogmatizma sada. pomice iz oblasti ekonomije u oblast politike. Za, to ima ndretfenih ray.lnga. Nekada se smatralo da se naj-, brzi i naj stabilniji privredni rast moze postici centralnim planiranjem; prosto naredis i svi slusaju. Zatim smo ustanovili da administrativno planiranje nije najefikasnija vec najprimitivnija forma planskog usmjeravanja so cijalisticke privrede. A nasi susjedi danas utvrduju da centralno planiranje znaci stalno padanje stope rasta. Politicki centralizam zasniva se na slicnim/ predrasudamaDdja5aISziicitih-mIsIje5j^a~iifterpritira^sj^a(^opasno razaranje_jedinst3za,-JuSeiije neophodnih autorit~eta~ Y n e dopustivo slabljenie politicke organizaciie. U stvari, obrnuto, ntvorenn iznosenje misljenja jaca politicku organizaciju jer svi problemi odmah izlaze na. povrsinu i blagovremeno se.mogu -poduzeti-adekvatne miere za niihoyo_rjesavanje; jnace oni ostaju zamaskirani formalnim jedinstvqm, a pritisci se akumuliraju pa dolazi do eksplozlia. Tu postoji sasvim odredena, go.tovo -funkcionalna, meduzavisnost. Sto je politicka organizacija demokrat'skija/'to'su manji pritisci na osnivanje frakcjja ill novih 'g a rtija ,3 K ^ U j O a j n i h . A sto su manji pritisci, to je moguca veca demokraticnost. Sva politicka vjestina sa stoji se u tome da se tim procesom efikasno upravlja, . Na kraju treba spomenuti ulogu koju u raspravljanoj problematici ima partijska stampa. Ta je stampa danas uglavnom direktivna. Kao takva ona naginje konzervatizmu, sto je slucaj opcenito kod organa partija koje se nalaze na vlasti. No ako Savez komunista zeli biti avangardan, on mora imati i avangardnu stampu. U sadasnjoj situaciji pojava nekog novog shvacanja u nekom partijskom organu bila bi opcenito shvacena kao nova direktiva, a ne kao individualno misljenje autora (izuzev u rubrici Pisma urednistvu). Zato partijski listovi odbijaju takve radove i oni odlaze u druge casopise i listove. A s tim radovima odlaze i nove tj. avangardne ideje. Iako partijska stampa i ubuduce mora imati djelomicno direktivni karakter, nema razloga zasto se ne bi velika paznja posvecivala iznosenju i raspravljanju novih ideja, kritici i polemici. U stvari to je nasusna potreba. Ako clanovi Saveza treba da prerastu nivo razrade gotovih direktiva i postanu politicki aktivisti koji samostalno 277

pronalaze najadekvatnija rjesenja u svom svakodnevnom radu, onda bi partijska stampa morala postati popriste najzivljih. diskusija o svim teorijskim i praktickim pitaojim a naseg drustvenog zivota.

N eki organizacioni problem i

Na osnovu dosadasnje prakse i dosadasnjih. diskusija izgleda da su se neka organizaciona rjesenja definitivno askristalizirala. Zapocnimo s njima. 1. Buduci da SKJ nije klasicna politicka partija kojoj je jedina briga prikupljanje izbomih glasova, vec zeli da bude avangarda koja ce transformirati drustvene odnose i svijest, to osnovna organizacija treba da bude vezana za radna mjesta, a ne za mjesto stanovanja. Iz istog razloga partijski sastanci su po pravilu otvoreni. Kao komplementami, teritorijalni, princip politicke organiza cije ostvaruje Socijalisticki savez. 2. Buduci da se SKJ bori protiv profesionalnih rukovodilaca, to u nacelu svaki clan SKJ mora biti clan jedne osnovne organizacije. Primanje, kaznjavanje i iskljucivanje clanova vrsi osnovna organizacija. 3. Buduci da se Savez komunista deklarirao za smanjivanje i, zatim, konacno eliminiranje elemenata vlasti iz svoje organizacije, sprovodi se striktno odvajanje Sa"veza od drzavnog aparata, te partijski rukovodioci ne mogu u isto vrijeme biti i drzavni funkcioneri i obmuto. 4. Zbog 2. i 3. primjenjuje se takoder i sistem rotacije na svim razinama. Clanovi rukovodstva odgovaraju svojim biracima i mogu u svako doba, po utvrdenoj proceduri, biti opozvani. No isto tako mogu zbog neslaganja Hi drugih razloga na vlastitu inicijativu davati ostavke, a da to nema posljedica po' njihov partijski status. 5. Savez komunista nije organizacija iznad drustva niti ima pretenzije da drustvu silom namece svoja shvacanja. On djeluje uvjeravanjem, primjerom i svojom organiziranoscu. Posebno, SKJ nije ni van ni iznad SSRNJ vec djeluje unutar Socijalistickog saveza radnog naroda. Neki organi, kao npr. komisije, mogu biti zajednicki. 6. Buduci da je u zemlji proklamirana teiitorijalna decentralizacija (komunalni sistem), to se Savez komu-

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nista ne povezuje samo vertikalno i utice na vladu i Skupstinu, vec oagovarajuci komiteti odrzavaju odredene veze na svim razinama upravne organizacije. Do sada su to cesto bile veze naredivanja. Ubuduce bi trebalo da se pretvore u politicke konsultacije. Osim toga lokaini komiteti morali bi imati mnogo vecu samostalnost i ispoljiti mnogo vise inicijative u analizi politicke situacije na terenu i zauzimanju adekvatnih stavova. 7. Do sada je f unkcijn prikupljanja i analize politic kih informacija uglavnom vrsila sluzba bezbjednosti. Pokazalo se da je to radeno na krajnje primitivan i nesolidan nacin i da su posljedice bile uzasavajuce. Ta je praksa likvidirana. Ocigledno je da tu funkciju treba da preuzmu partijske organizacije i komiteti zajedno sa SSRNJ i uz puno angaziranje partijske i druge stampe. Osim toga ne vidim razloga zasto najveci dio tog rada ne bi bio lisen dosadasnje konspirativnosti i zasto ne bi bio vrsen pred ocima javnosti. U stvari to je neophodno ukoliko zelimo odgojiti politicki zrele gradane.' Narednih nekoliko stavova izgleda da jos uvijek nisu opcenito prihvaceni: 8. Za prikupljanje i analizu politickih informacija komiteti treba da imaju strucan stab profesionakdh politikologa, sociologa, ekonomista, psihologa. Te funkcije, na ravno, nisu podlozne rotaciji. No rukovodece politicke funkcije trebalo bi da se postepeno deprofesionaliziraju. 9. Komiteti na svim razinama trebalo bi da imaju komisije koje bi okupljale sirok krug clanova SKJ pa i neclanova s potrebnim sposobnostima i izrazenim interesom za rad na odnosnom podrucju. Posebno bi ko miteti morali da se oslanjaju na naucne organizacije u cjelini a ne samo na pojedince koji su clanovi komisija. Do sada je u tom pogledu vladalo uvjerenje da naucne organizacije treba da financira drzava, a komiteti se ponekad mogu koristiti ponekom uslugom. Kao rezultat, sistematski naucni rad u nizu vitalnih podrucja nije bio organiziran. Redovno pracenje teorijskih strujanja u zemlji i inostranstvu u oblasti drustvenih nauka i umjetnosti, proucavanje radnickog pokreta, istrazivanja politickih. pojava i drustvenih procesa i slicno mogao bi direktno financirati i na taj nacin organizirati Centralni komitet. No i opcinski komiteti morali bi imati fondove za naucni rad. Ti fondovi sluzili bi, ako ni za 279

sto drugo, a .ono za to da se od vremena do vremena na kvalificirari nacin provedu i obrade aakete o raznim lokalnim politickim i drustvenim problemima. U stvari moguce je uraditi mnogo vise, npr. prouciti zasto samo upravljanje ne funkcionira u nekim poduzecima;" zasto dolazi do napetosti kod nekih drustvenih, nacionalnih. ili religioznih grupa; zasto stanovnistvo reagira negativno ili pozitivno na neke mjere i si. Opcenito, nase drustvo postaje sve slozenije i u tim uslovima Savez komunista morao bi se oslanjati na nauku mnogo vise no sto je to bio slucaj do sada. 10. Da bi se sprovelo nacelo pravi covjek na pravo mjesto ne moze se vise ostati na dosadasnjem centraliziranom rasporedivanju kadrova. Osim toga, stvame unutarpartijske demokratizacije ne moze biti tako dugo dok su rukovodeci kadrovi za svoj izbor obavezni visim forumima, umjesto da budu obavezni svojim biracima i osnovnim organizacijama. Dosadasnji izbori bili su mnogo vise kooptiranja ratificirana glasanjem nego pravi izbori. Pri rodno, kad je tako bilo u Savezu komunista, ta negativna praksa bila je jos vise karakteristicna za drzavne izbore. Ukoliko doista zelimo ostvariti socijalisticku demokraciju, onda je apsolutno neophodno da komunisti najprije na odgovarajuci nacin urede vlastitu organizaciju. 11. Siroke mase ce suditi o Savezu komunista prije svega po tome kakvi ljudi ulaze u Savez iz njihove vlastite sredine. Prema tome, najsigumiji kriterij kod regrutiranja novih clanova jest utvr divanje da li se kandidat u svojoj sredini istakao. Ako se radi o radniku, da li je racionalizator ili novator, da li premasuje normu, da li se istakao u organima upravljanja i svojim drugovima sluzi za ugled. Ako se radi o seljaku, da li je uzoran privrednik. Kod studenata vazne su ocjene, kod umjetnika talenat, kod naucnog radriika stvaralastvo. Prirodno, pored profesionalne efikasnosti, svi ti ljudi moraju imati i odredeni moralni lik da bi ih njihova sredina postovala. U stvari moralni lik kandidata dobiva na sadasnjoj etapi kljucno znacenje. U dosadasnjoj politici primanja clanova kljucni kriterij bio je drustveno-politicka angaziranost. Taj kriterij odrazava orijentiranost na politicko drustvo, na upravljanje drustvom putem vlasti. Neposredno po slije < revolucije, u vrijeme KPJ, ta je orijentacija bila funkcionalna; danas u vrijeme SKJ, ona je disfunkcional280

na i dovodi do gubitka ugleda i znacenja Saveza komu nista. Kilibardino anketiranje 775 ispitanika pokazalo je da blizu polovina njih smatraju da je kriterij za piijem u SKJ nizi no sto bi trebalo da bude. Ispitivanje politike prijema u dvije velike radne organizacije u 1965. godini pokazalo je da je 29% novih clanova primljeno na osnovu drustveno-politicke aktivnosti, po 22% na osnovu rada i izrazene zelje i 13% na osnovu moralnih kvaliteta. A anketiranje clanova SKJ i neclanova o tome kakva bi trebala da bude politika prijema dalo je inverziju krite rij a s moralnim kvalitetama naglaseno na prvom mjestu, radom na drugom i drustveno-politickom aktivnosti na posljednjem. (27, 198203) Rezultati ove potonje ankete dobro odrazavaju potrebe nove situacije. Ako Savez zeli biti drustvenom avangardom, onda njegovi pojedini clanovi moraju tu funkciju vrsiti u svojim sredinama. To je takoder jedan od aspekata po kom se Savez komu nista razlikuje od klasicne politicke partije, koja ne pretendira na to da okuplja najbolje ljude zemlje, vec samo na to da okuplja najbolje politicare zemlje. Ukoliko je ovo rasudivanje tacno, onda je kadrovska politika posljednjih godina bila prilicno neuspjesna. Napustanje1 Saveza od strane dobrih ljudi i odbijanje veoma pozitivnih ljudi da udu u Savez, uz objasnjenje da su u Savez usli, odno sno ostali ljudi koji nemaju, odnosno koji su izgubili drustveni ugled jedna je od indikacija ove pojave. 12. Da bi se osiguralo da izbori doista budu izbori, svi izbori za partijska rukovodstva treba da budu tajni s brojem kandidata bar za npr. 50% veci od broja mjesta. Za mjesto sekretara treba da budu bar dva kandidata. Kandidature s obrazlozenjima treba da budu objavljene na odredeno vrijeme unaprijed da bi biraci mogli da se pripreme za odabiranje najboljih. Da bi se omogucila inicijativa odozdo, kandidature mogu podnositi i nizi forumi i osnovne organizacije kao npr. u aikademijama nauka. Cjelokupni rezultati izbora moraju se objaviti. I na kraju nove mogucnosti:
1 Ova ozbiljna pojava jos uvijek nije sistematski studirana. T ri podatka bacaju. odredeno svjetlo: najvise napustaju SKJ radnici (v ile od polovine svih koji svojevoljno odlaze), najvedi procenat napustanja je u najrazvijenijoj republici Sloveniji (2,1% od Clanstva u 1966 g. ili tri puta vise od jugoslavenskog prosjeka) i napuStaju clanovi s duzim stazom ( 68% sa stazom duzim od pet godina) (24, 784).

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13. U jednom samoupravnom sistemu inicijativa treba da dolazi odozdo i to ne samo za rjesavanje lokalnih. vec upravo svih drustvenih problema. Sto do sada samoupravljanje i neposredna demokracija nisu efikasnije funkcionirali i opet treba, bar djelomicno, objasnjavati time Sto ih, mutatis mutandis, nije bilo u Savezu komunista. Tu je osnovna organizacija samo primala, razradivala i izvrsavala direktive. Osnovna organizacija nije davala inicijativu niti je uopce utjecala na formiranje politike Saveza; to se vrsilo u centru. Ako centar nije neprekidno slao direktive kao sto se desavalo posljednjih godina, sto je, naravno pozitivno na terenu je dolazilo do dezorijentacije i pasivizacije i zamirao je svaki rad. Po mom misljenju osnovna organizacija morala bi najaktivnije sudjelovati u drustveno-politickom zivotu i svoje sredine i zemlje 'u cjelini. Neke probleme bit ce u stanju da rijesi sama i direktno. Neki problemi prelazit ce njen djelokrug i zato mora imati mogucnosti da ih na organizirani nacin stavi na rjesavanje na slijedecem visem nivou, u opcini. Slicno tome neki problemi bit ce republickog ili opce-jugoslavenskog karaktera. Npr. neka osnovna organizacija moze uociti odlazak naucnih i strucnih kadrova iz zemlje uz odredene indicije da -je tome razlog neodgovomi pritisak sluzbe bezbjednosti ili nepravilan politicki odnos prema tim ljudima ili nepravilna kadrovska politika. Ili organizacija moze smatrati da je u njenoj komuni, ili u zemlji u cjelini, nepravilan politicki kurs prema individualnim proizvodacima. Ili osnovnoj organi zaciji moze izgledati da se provokacije Zapadne Njemacke vise ne mogu tolerirati i da treba primijeniti neke sankcije. Ili, na osnovu iskustva svojih clanova i njihovih znanaca moze doci do zakljucka, da pravosudni sistem zaostaje za potrebama zemlje. Ti stavovi i zakljucci mogu biti objektivno tacni ili netacni. To u ovom momentu nije bitno. Bitno je da su se oni javili i da ih treba raspraviti. Osnovna organizacija ce najprije svoj problem dostaviti opcinskom komitetu. Ukoliko se opcinski komitet uvjeri u njegovu opravdanost, dostavit ce ga dalje; ukoliko ne, duzan je da ga dostavi na razmatranje nekoj opcinskoj partiskoj konferenciji, najvjerojatnije godisnjoj konfeTenciji, gdje ce delegati ostalih osnovnih organizacija imati mogucnosti da ga ocijene. Ukoliko konferencija prihvati rezoluciju osnovne organizacije, poslat ce je 282

visem forumu, gdje ce postupak ponoviti s time sto ce predstavnik osnovne organizacije imati mogucnosti da da usmeno obrazlozenje. Na taj naan pojedine rezolucije inogu da stignu i do partijskog kongresa. 14. No partijski kongresi odrzavaju se svake cetvrte godine. Da bi ovaj sistem funkcionirao kako treba, trebalo bi da se sastanci odrzavaju cesce, recimo jedanput godisnje. Mi takve sastanke vec imamo na nivou osnovne i opcinske organizacije u vidu godisnjih (dvogodisnjih) konferencija. Sada bi trebalo jos uvesti i godisnju opcepartijsku konferenciju. Potrebno je dodati da bi pored te uzlazne linije inicijativa osnovnih organizacija mogla biti vezana i za rad komisija na svim nivoima. Na taj nacin sastanci komisija i godisnje konferencije pretvorili bi se u prave politicke tribine umjesto ranije uspavljujuce jednolicnosti kojima ne bi promicao ni jedan vazniji drustveno-politicki problem i koje bi politicki aktivirale najsire partijske i ne samo partijske mase. A to je, prirodno, takoder preduslov da Savez ispuni svoju avangardnu ulogu i da se gractani pripreme za odgovoran politicki zivot. Ovih cetmaest problema ocigledno ni iz daleka ne iscrpljuju organizacionu problematiku Saveza komunista. Oni su tako odabrani da predstavljaju osnovne organizacione.preduslove da bi SKJ mogao izvrsiti svoje funkcije koje su ranije analizirane.

Citirana literatura 1. A. Rumjancev, Socijalisticeskaja dejstviteljnostj i teorii tov. E. Kardeljaa, Komunist, br. 18, 1956. 2. M. Duverger, uSociologija politickili stranaka, u G. Gurvitch (ur.), Sociologija, sv. II, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1966. 3. R. Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modem Democracy, Free Press, Glencoe, 1949, prijevod s originala iz 1911. g. 4. R. T. McKenzie, British Political Parties, Heinemann, London, 1955. 5. M. Brocid i dr., uStudenti i sorijalizamff, Godisnjak IDN 1965. 6. M. Markovid, Moralni integritet liinosti u socijalistickom drustvu, Filozofija, 1/1965. 7. D. Grlid, Licnost i hrabrosta, Filozofija, 1/1965. 283

8. J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper, New York, 1950. 9. C. W. Mills, Elita vlasti, Kultura, Beograd, 1964. 10. K. Crvenkovski, Demokratizacij a drustva i demokratizacija SKJ, Aktuelni problemi reorganizacije i daljeg -razvoja SKJ, V5PN, Beograd, 1967. 11. V. Rus, i>K Jxke u radnim organizacijama, Gledista, 8 9/ 1966. 12. K. Marx, Kritika Hegelove filozofije drzavnog prava, V. Maslesa, Sarajevo, 1960. 13. E. Redzic, Protivrjecne tendencije u socijalnoj strukturi Saveza komunista, Pregled, 3/1966. 14. F. Dzinic, Javno mnenje o uticaju komunista na rad organa samoupravljanjas, u Drustveno upravijanje u Jugo slavia, Jugosl. udruzenje za sociologiju, Beograd, 1966. 15. D. T. Suzuki, E. Fromm, Zen budizam i psihoanaliza, Nolit, Beograd, 1964. 16. E. Fromm, Zdravo drustvo, Rad, Beograd, 1963. 17. E. Fromm, Bekstvo od slobode, Nolit, Beograd, 1964. 18. D. Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1966. 19. G. Gurvitch (ur.), Sociologija, sv. II, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1966. 20. Druga intemacionala, Rad, Beograd, 1951. 21. V. F. Asmus, Logika, OGIZ, Moskva, 1947. 22. Mao Ce Tung, Govori i eland, Trideset dana, Beograd, 1949. 23. K. Marx, Kritika Gotskog programa, F. Engels, Kritika nacrta Erfurtskog programa, Kultura, Beograd, 1959. 24. M. Nikolic (ur.), Savez komunista Jugoslavije u uslovima samoupravljanja, Kultura, Beograd, 1967. 25. V. Cvjeticanin, i>Komunisti u selua, Sociologija sela, 16/1967. 26. 2. Vidakovic, Promene u strukturi jugoslavenskog drustva i Savez komunista, Sedma sila, Beograd, 1967. 27. K. Kilibarda, Samoupravljanje i Savez komunista, Socioloski institut, Beograd, 1966.

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VI

EVOLUTIVNE PERSPEKTIVE
Analiza osnovnih. komponenti nase sadasnje drustvene situacije zavrsena je u okvirima postavljenim ovim ogledom- Preostaje jos da se baci jedan pogled u buducnost. U drustvenim naukama uz izuzetak ekonomije veoma je nepopulamo prognoziranje buducnosti. Taj je stav vjerojatno uvjetovan cinjenicom sto su te nauke i opet uz izuzetak ekonomije veoma malo egzaktne. Medutim, sagledavanje evolutivnih. perspektiva od kljucne je vaznosti za racionalno vodenje drustvenih poslova. Meni licno izgleda da postoje elementi za sagledavanje tih perspektiva. N ije iskljuceno da ja u tom gledanju mogucnosti svoje uze naucne oblasti, ekonomije, nedovoljno kriticno projiciram na ostale drustvene nauke i na fenomen drustvenog u njegovom totalitetu. Medutim, dok netko ne dokaze suprotno, ostat cu uvjeren da je moguce 285

programirati ne samo industry sku proizvodnju vec, mutatis mutandis, i drustveni razvoj. Na kraju bez takve mogucnosti naucni socijalizam gubi svaki smisao. Zapocnimo s onim sto je najizvjesnije, s privredom. Vise od jedne decenije drustvena proizvodnja Jugoslavije povecavala se po stopi od preko 8% godisnje po stanovniku. Takav porast znaci podvostrucenje per capita proizvodnje a s njom i privredne razvijenosti i zivotnog standarda svakih devet godina. U 1965. godini per capita drustveni proizvod Jugoslavije iznosio je 2.400, a SAD 9.300 novih dinara1 To znaci da bi uz nepromijenjenu . ekspanziju u buducnosti jugoslavenska privreda nakon nekih 18 godina postigla nivo razvijenosti danas najrazvijenije zemlje na svijetu. To znaci da bi danasnja generacija Jugoslavena mogla ocekivati da ce postici americki zivotni standard. Na prvi pogled moglo bi se pomisliti da je to samo jedan proizvoljan aritmeticki primjer. No taj obracun je mnogo vise od toga: on je realna mogucnost. Nekada se opcenito vjerovalo a mnogi nedovoljno obrazovani ekonomisti vjeruju u to jos danas da s povisenjem stupnja razvijenosti dolazi nuzno do smanjivanja stope rasta. Ta je teza oborena i empiiijski i teorijski. Teorijska argumentacija neodrzivosti retardacione teme prilicno je slozena i zahtijeva usko specijalizirano predznanje te tako izlazi van okvira ovog ogleda.2 No empirijska verifikacija vrlo je prosta. Dovoljno je da se usporede stope rasta svih razvijenih zemalja u poshjeratnom periodu s odgovarajucim periodima u prethodnih stotinu godina, pa da se ustanovi da su danasnje stope iako se radi o znatno razvijenijim privredama osjetno vise. Nadalje, ako napravimo listu od 13 najekspanzivnijih privreda na svijetu, utvrdit cemo da su sve to razvijene privrede s donjom granicom razvijenosti predstavljenom Jugoslavijom, Bugarskom i Rumunijom (1). Prema tome postoji mogucnost da se privredna ekspanzija od jedne decenije produzi i na naredne dvije decenije. No mogu cnost nije i nuznost; o toj distinkciji treba brizljivo voditi racuna kad se ispituju evolutivne perspektive.
1 Jugoslavenske cijene iz 1961. g. i druStveni proizvod po definiciji Saveznog zavoda za statistiini. ObraCun je u Jugoslavenskom institutu za ekonomska istrazivanja izvrsio moj kolega S, Stajic i ja nxu se zahvaljujem za pomoc. 2 Zainteresirani Citalac nadi ce rjesenje problema u mojoj knjizi (2, gl. 9).

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Brz privredni razvoj pozeljan je sam po sebi jer omogucuje povisenje zivotnog standarda. No privredna ekspanzija je ujedno kljucni preduslov za rjesavanje drugih drustvenih problema. Jedan od njih je i nacionalno pita nje. Ranije je istaknuto da velike razlike u razvijenosti izmedu pojedinih republika i pokrajina predstavljaju pennanentan izvor drustvenih napetosti. Navedeno je da su ekstremne razlike izmedu Kosmeta i Slovenije toliko velike kao razlike izmedu Nigerije i Grcke. Ukoliko bismo te razlike zeljeli eliminirati u toku zivota jedne generacije, onda bi uz visoku stopu opce ekspanzije, kosmetska privreda.morala da se razvija po stopi dvaput vecoj od slovenske. To je tezak, ah ne i nemoguc zadatak. No uko liko bi se jugoslavenska privreda razvijala po niskoj stopi, Kosmet bi morao postici stopu rasta tridesetak puta vecu od slovenske (3). To je, naravno, sasvim nemoguce. Prema tome posljedica sporog razvoj a bila bi produzavanje uklanjanja razlika u privrednoj razvijenosti na ne koliko generacija. Nije potrebno imati nmogo maste da se zamisli u kojoj bi mjeri nacionalne osjetljivosti bile stavljene na kusnju takvim beskonacnim produzavanjem procesa ekonomskog a s njim i opce drustvenog ujednacavanja polozaja naiih naroda i narodnosti. Naredno pitanje odnosi se na promjene u stratifikacionoj strukturi drustva. Ranije je pokazano kako pri vredni razvoj pretvara pirainidalnu strukturu u loptastu i tako smanjuje drustvena odstojanja. Taj je proces direktna funkcija privrednog razvoja i moze biti ubrzart ili usporen zavisno od toga da li je privredni razvoj ubrzan ili usporen. U uskoj vezi s time je i problem obrazovanja. Pokazano je da u nasem drustvu hijerarhicnost drustvenih stratuma u bitnoj mjeri ovisi o stupnju obrazovanja. Sto vile obrazovanja neki pojedinac dobiva, to su vece njegove sanse da ce se probiti u vise drustvene stratume. Ocigledno je stoga da je univerzalizacija obrazo vanja kljucan preduslov za povecanje drustvene mobilnosti i smanjenje drustvenih razlika. No da bi se svi stupnjevi obrazovanja ucinili jednako pristupacnim svim clanovima drustva, potrebna su daleko veca sredstva nego sto su ona kojima raspolaze nase druStvo. Prema tome u krajnjoj liniji privredna ekspanzija predstavlja kljucni iako ne i jedini preduslov univerzalizacije obrazo vanja i na taj nacin stvaranja pretpostavki za besklasno 287

drustvo. Znacenje obrazovanja za razvoj socijalistickog drustva toliko je veliko da zahtijeva da mu posvetimo bar jos nekoliko komentara. U poglavlju o drustvenoj stratifikaciji naveo sam Miliceve indekse asocijacije iz kojih proizlazi da radnicka djeca imaju 9 puta manju sansu, a seljacka djeca 20 puta manju sansu da stignu do vodece kategorije strucnjaka i rukovodilaca u porectenju s licima roctenim u toj drustvenoj grupi. U kojoj mjeri ce se te drustvene nejednakosti smanjivati u buducnosti zavisi o tome kakve su sanse za obrazovanje djece razlicitih drustvenih slojeva danas. Prema podacima V. Tomanovica (4, 678) u 1961/62. skolskoj godini od djece srednjoskolskog uzrasta ukljuceno je u skole drugog stupnja gotovo svako dijete iz sluzbenickih porodica, svako trece iz radnickih i svako sedmo iz seljackih porodica.1 Ako se iskljuce skole za kvalificirane radnike, tako da ostanu samo srednje skole koje pripremaju djecu za nemanuelna i intelektualna zanimanja, i ako se pomocni i nizi sluzbenici izdvoje iz kate gorije sluzbenika, onda proizlazi da radnicka djeca, u odnosu na sluzbenicku, imaju pet puta manju sansu da
1 Iza ovih statistickih podataka tesko je vidjeti zive.ljude, Veliki je nedostatak naucnih tekstova, u odnosu na mnjetnicke, Sto svojim nume* rickim apstrakcijama koje predstavljaju uslov za rigoroznost analize u stvari unistavaju sadrzaj fenomena koji ispituju. Desilo se tako da sam upravo ovog dana, kad je pisan ovaj tekst, u B orbi (23. jula 1967.) procitao slijedede citirano pismo Omladinskoj redakciji RadioBeograda, pismo koje vraca sadrfaj podatku svako sedmo; Ove godine zavrSila sam osmi' razred u osnovnoj 5koli 'Vuk Karadzid' u Konaku gde i Svim sa roditeljima. M oji roditelji su siroma5ni zemljoradnici. Imaju dvanaest lanaca zemlje, ali u nasem srezu sve zemlje su vrlo nerodne. Pored toga, usevi stradaju od prirodnih' nepogoda. Nekada je godina su5na, nita ne rodi.- Nekada je godina kisna, opet nista ne rodi. Prosle godine u Rumuniji se izlio Tamis i potopio njive koje su se nalazile blizu granice. Tu su bili boldnski, surjanski, konacki i drugi atari. Mnoge zemljoradnike i drzavna dobra prosla godina je uvalila u bedu. Nama je voda potopila devet lanaca zemlje. Imam jednu sestru koja je ove godine zavrsila peti, i brata koji je zavrsio prvi razred osnovne skole. Ja imam zarku zelju da nastavim skolovanje a mojim roditeljima mozda bi to znacilo propast. Bila sam stalno odlicna ucenica. Za vreme mog osomogodisnjeg skolovanja imala sam cetiri cetvorke i to iz srpskohrvatskog i. ruskog jezika u V i V I razredu. Cetiri razreda sam i51a u madarsku skolu, u peti razred sam preSla u srpsku skolu, pa mi je bilo teze nego mojim drugovima i drugaricama koji su od podetka ili u srpsku Skolu. Mad a Ima malo izgleda da du ici dalje u Skolu konkurirala sam u Hemijsko-tehnolosku tehnidku Skolu u Zrenjaninu. Dvadesetog juna bili smo obaveSteni ko je primljeh. B ila sam presredna kada sam saznala da sam polozila prijemni ispit. Dalje u skolu mogla bih da idem samo ako bih dobila stipendiju. Pomozite mi! Bidu vam uvek zahvalna. Verujem da me; nedete razocarati. Unapred vam zahvaljujem.*

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steknu srednjoskolsko obrazovanje. Na univerzitetskom nivou razlike se, prirodno, i dalje povecavaju. Omladina radnickog porijekla ima 8 puta manju sansu, a seljackog porijekla 13 puta manju sansu da se upise na visu ili visoku skolu u poredenju s omladinom sluzbenickog1 pori jekla. Vidi se da su ovi probabilitetai indeksi veoma slicni onima na bazi Milieevih indeksa asocijacije. Kad se tome doda i Tomanoviceva konstatacija da poslije 1959. godine socijalna struktura srednjoskolske omladine vise ne po kazuje pozitivnih promjena, a da se na univerzitetu nejednakosti u zastupljenosti drustvenih slojeva najvjerojatnije povecavaju (4, 679), onda to zahtijeva da se zvoni na uzbunu. Umjesto apstraktnih parola o rukovodecoj ulozi radnicke klase i afirmiranju prava radnih ljudi po trebno je radnicima i drugim radnim ljudima dati realne mogucnosti da podignu svoj drustveni status i da tako emancipirajuci sebe emancipiraju i drustvo u cjelini. Valja do dati da se period, u kome Tomanovic zapaza stagnaciju u pozitivnim promjenama socijalne strukture daka i studenata, poklapa s periodom usporavanja privrednog rasta i izvjesnim anarhoidnim tendencijama u oblasti neprivrednih djelatnosti, ukljucujuci i obrazovanje. Ako se nesto kao refren ponavlja kroz ovaj ogled, onda je to nesumnjivo teza da kljucni princip organizacije naseg drustva predstavlja samoupravljanje. U stvaxi jugoslavenski socijalizam stoji i pada sa samoupravljanjem. Ukoliko se radi o samoupravljanju na pocetnoj razini, u fabrici, mozemo, mislim, utvrditi da je prevaljen veliki put od autokratskog jedinonacalija kapitalisticke i sovjetske fabrike. No preostaje jos uvijek veliki put do realizacije stvamog samoupravljanja. Danas se nalazimo vje rojatno negdje na sredini izmedu starta i cilja sa strukturom utjecaja, koju V. Rus, pozivajuci se na empiiijska istrazivanja, karakterizira kao oligarhijsku strufcturu. (5, 209) Daljnji razrvoj samoupravljanja u velikoj mjeri ovisi o tempu privrednog rasta. U vezi s tim mogu se uociti Cetiri preduslova ostvarenja samoupravljanja, kako ih je veoma uspjelo formulirao M. Markovic. (5, 66) To su: 1. Tehnicki automatizacija udruzuje individualne radove ciji se pojedinacni efekti vise ne mogu mjeriti. Ja
1 Razlike u odnosu na porodice strucojaka i rakovodiJaca bile bl vece jer Tomanovic u sluzbenike ukljuSuje i rutinske i pomocne sluzbenike.
19 Ogled o jugoslavenskom drustvu

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bih jos dodao i ono klasicnozapazanje da.mehanizacija i automatizacija prljavih i teskih fizickih radova eliminiraju. sve vise kategoriju nekvalifieiranog fizickog rada> pa stoga i radnike koji objektivno.nisu u stanju da. uspje sno participiraju u samoupravljanju.. -2. Ekonomski samoupravljanje se moze uspjesno razviti samo u relativno bogatom drustvu u kome su elementame zivotne potrebe ljudi vec zadovoljene, i u kome je svaki pojedinac dostigao takav stepen ekonomske sigumosti da ne mora strepiti zbog mogucih ekonomskih represalija u slucaju svog drustvenog angazovanja. Mo2e se jos dodati da se s ekonomskim razvojem povecava i slobodno vrijeme neophodno za druStvena angaziranja. Takoder, ekonomski ra zvoj smanjuje raspone lif.nib dohodaka i tako ujednacava drustveno-ekonomske pozicije samoupravljaca. 3. K ultum i usarno obrazovni, kultivisani radnici, svesni svoje istorijske-uloge, mogu uspjesno ucestvovati u rukovodenju drustvenim procesima. A za kulturu su, pored ostalog> potrebna i sredstva. 4. Politicki pretpostavka je odumiranje drzave. Ovaj preduslov zahtijeva dodatno razmatranje. Ma kako nesavrseno, samoupravljanje vec funkcionira na pncetnim razinama. Da bismo mogli govoriti o samoupravnom drustvu potrebno je da se samoupravljanje razvije i na svim visim razinama drustvene organizacije. Prilicno je ocigledno da je to jedan od osnovnih zadataka naredne etape naseg drustvenog razvoja. Takoder je pri licno ocigledno da izgradnja samoupravljanja prema gore nije neki neposredni efekat privrednog rasta. U stvari direktna funkcionalna veza izmedu tempa privrednog rasta i nekih strateski vaznih drustvenih promjena ovdje se prekida. Tacno je, doduse, da priyredni rast ucvrscuje samoupravljanje u fabrici, a odatle se onda pojacavaju drustveni pritisci na stvaranje samoupravnog druStva u cjelini. No ukoliko taj proces nije stimuliran i kontroliran jos i na neki drugi nacin, on moze da potraje mnogo duze i da se odvija mnogo neefikasnije nego sto je to objektivno mogucno. Taj drugi nacin nije ekonomski, vec politicki, i odatle kljucna vaznos.t politickog preduslova. A taj preduslov svodi se u nasem drustvu u osnovnom na efikasno funkcioniranje Saveza komunista. Funkcije Saveza komunista analizirane su potanko .ra nije i ovdje nema potrebe da se zakljucci ponavljaju. Da 290
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bi SKJ mogao efektivno rukovoditi procesom izgradnje samoupravnog drustva, potrebno j e. ne samo da svoju unutrasnju strukturu saobrazi tom drustvu, vec i da u pogledu demokraticnosti bude uvijek bar jedan korak ispred. Zaostajanje bi imalo kobne posljedice. Ukoliko bi unutarpartijska demokratizacija zaostajala za samoupravnim tokovima u drustvu, javila bi se tendencija da se ti tokovi koce. U stvari mi smo takve tendency e vec realno dozivljavaliu periodu neposredno prije privredne reforme. To znaci da bi interesi hijerarhije SKJ i drzavnog aparata kao egzekutivnog organa dosli u sukob s interesirna drustva u cjelini. Taj sukob mogao bi se onda rijesiti na dva nacina. Ili bi se aparat nametnuo drustvu putem drzavne vlasti. Ill bi se javili pritisci za osnivanje nove partije ili novih partija. U prvom slucaju imali bismo svojevrsnu restauraciju drzavnog kapitalizma, u drugom svojevrsnu restauraciju burzoaske formalne demokracije, u oba bitnu reviziju dosadasnjeg jugoslavenskog puta u socijalizam i bitno usporavanje socijalisticke izgradnje. Utvrdujuci ovdje na konkretnom jugoslavenskom primjeru da je razvoj proizvodnih snaga osnovni nosilac drustvenog progresa, kojeg politicki faktor moze ubrzati Hi usporiti, nismo naravno otkrili, nista novo. To saznanje pripada abecedi marksizma. Takoder je poznato da uslovljenost nije samo jednosmjema, vec je obostrana. Univerzalniji i efikasniji obrazovni sistem1 brzi i smisljeniji , razvoj samoupravljanja, odsustvo nacionalnih sukoba, drustvena stabilnost i progresivni politicki sistem omogucuju i brzu privrednu ekspanziju. U jednadzbi privrednog rasta raspolozivi materijalni resursi. predstavljaju samo jednu od nezavisnih varijabli, ostale varijable su ove upravo nabrojene. (2, 232) Navedena povratna sprega izmedu nadgradnje i baze postaje mnogo znacajnija u drustvenom sistemu u kom postoji odredena mogucnost programiranja nadgradnje sto bi trebalo da bude karakteristicno za socijalizam. Ovo razmatranje dovodi nas od1 Danas u gradu gotovo svako dijete .zavrsava .osmogodinju skolu, a na selu niti polovina upisane djece (4, 676). Velike nejednakosti u skolovanju prema socijalnom porijeklu navedene su ranije. Medutim, talenti i mediokriteti radaju se podjednako i u gradu i na selu, i u radnickim i u sluibeniildiQ porodicama. Ocigledno je stoga do kakvog rasipanja nacionalnog talenta dovodi neselektivno obrazovanje. Danas postoje metode da se ti.gubici u talentima i precizno izmjere ( 8), samo nijedan nadlezni forum nije dosad pokazao interesa da financira takvo istrazivanje.

19*

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mah do zakljucka da postignuta stopa rasta od oko 8% po stanovniku nije maksimmn koji se moze posticL Objektivno su moguce i vise stope rasta, sto se moze sasvim egzaktno dokazati cak i na bazi analize cisto ekonomskih fenomena. Tako su ekonomska istrazivanja otkrUa da jugoslavenska privreda prolazi kroz prilicno pravilne cikluse. (6) Ti privredm ciklusi i njihov mehanizam ostali su nepoznati tvorcima ekonomske politike. Uslijed toga donosene su pogresne mjere ili se interveniralo u pogresno vrijeme i na pogresan nacin sto je sve umanjivalo objektivno mogucu stopu rasta. Medutim, nas problem ne iscrpljuje se opservacijom da je stopa Tasta mogla biti visa. On je u stvari nmogo ozbiljniji. Nasuprot mogucnosti ubrzane ekspanzije stoje stvamost usporavanja privrednog rasta. To je usporavanje zapocelo u 1961. godini, a drasticne razmjere je postiglo u -ovoj godini. U nasoj, kao i u svakoj drugoj privredi, industrija je nosilac privrednog rasta. Dugorocna stopa rasta jugoslavenske industrije iznosi negdje oko 13% godisnje. Ta je stopa u 1966. godini pala na 41 % , a ove p godine se spustila ispod nuie sto se nije desilo od vremena kominfonnovske blokade. Sta se to dogada s jugoslavenskom privredom? Jesu li impulsi rasta presahnuli? Radi li se o nepredvidenim i nepredvidivim iznenadenjima? Je li to nsporavanje bilo objektivno nnzno? Odgovor je da ono nije bilo nuzno, da se moglo izbjeci, da nije bilo neocekivano i da se, fakticno, predvidalo. Od 1952. godine u jugoslavenskoj privredi odvija se stalan proces decentralizacije, formiranja trzisnih odnosa, povecavanja nezavisnosti privrednih subjekata. Taj proces bio je pracen odredenim adaptacijama drzavnog aparata. Me dutim, promjene u aparatu, strucno izgradivanje kadrova, modifikacije u metodama planiranja i kontrole privrednih procesa, izucavanje funkcioniranja samoupravnog privrednog mefaanizma i, kao rezultat, mogucnost predvidanj a i usmjeravanja privrednih kretanja zaostajali su za potrebama privrede. To zaostajanje bilo je potencirano bumim privrednim rastom rezultatom oslobodene inicijative samoupravnih. proizvodaca koji je u toku osam godin a podvostrucio ukupnu i gotovo potrostrucio industrijsku proizvodnju. Raskorak izmedu mogucnosti organa ekonomske politike i potreha privrede povecavao se i do prvog loma doslo je u 1961. godini prilikom inauguiiranja 292

novog privrednog sistema koji je rdavo funkcioniraa i demantirao tri verzije srednjoroenog plana. Naucni radnici upazoravaju na opasnost produzavanja takvog stanja i predlazu odredene mjere1 ali odgovomi organi i forami , nemaju dovoljno razvijen sluh za ova upozorenja. Nastavlja se s prakticistickim prilazom izgradhji privrednogsistema i vodenju ekonomske politike, privredna kretanja izmicu svjesnoj kontroli dmstva, ciklusi konjunkture se produbljuju, nezaposlenost se povecava, rast se usporuje. Stagnacija indnstrijske proizvodnje iz 1967. godme nece se; naravno, zadrzati. Doci ce do ponovnog ciklickog nspona, no prosjecna stopa rasta bit ce ni7a nego ranije i znatno niza no sto je to objektnmo moguce ukoliko se planiranju i vodenju ekonomske politike ne pristnpi na jedan naucniji nacin. A to sto znamo u osnovi objasniti mehanizam kretanja, sto smo neke momente u tim kretanjima bili u stanju predvidjeti i sto znama prognazirati daljnja kretanja pokazuje da vladamo osnovmm pretpostavkama za. jedno efikasnije vodenje privrede u buducnosti.2 Medutim, opet jednom mogucnost jos ne znaci i ostvarenje. Iz ranije anaMze proizlazi da cento se sukobiti s velikim poteskocama u nasem drustvenom. razvoju ukoliko ne uspijemo ponovo ubrzati privredtri. rast. Ukoliko pak postignemo raniji, ili cak i visi, tempo rasta, to jos uvijek ne mora znaciti da cemo svoje drustvene probleme rjesavati na zadovoljavajuci nacin. Veza izmedu privrednog rasta i dobro orgatriziranog drustva nije sasvim jednoznacna. Im a u svijetu zemalja koje su privredno znatno razvijenije od nase, a cije drustvene profile ne bismo zeljeli kopirati. Zbog toga nije- jedino vazno da se ostvari privredni rast, vec je isto tako vazno kako se on ostva1 Tako je npr. u 1962. godini tadaSnje Odjeljenje za ekonomska istrazivanja i metodologiju plarriranja Saveznog zavoda za privredno planiranje mnnozilo- jedan memorandum 11 kom j e npozoravalo: S porastam proizvodnih snaga privreda- postaje sve slozenija, inidjativa je decentralizirana, konaCna rezultanta slobodno donesenih odluka hiljada privred nih subjekata nije onaprijed ocigledna, prwredha poEtika zahtijeva Citav arsenal, izdiferenciranih instrumenata a metode usmjeravanja postaju indirektne i kriteriji za donoSenje odluka izvanredno slozeni.. Slozenost privrednog mehanizma i delikatnost njegovog funk cioniranj a bez poremedaja zahtijeva in ten zivan naucno-istrazivackr i analitidki rad na svim nivoima i u najraziicitijim privrednim institucijama. A za to je potrebno skolovanje posebno- specijaliziranih kadrova . . . 2 To sam pokuSao pokazati n svojoj knjizi Ekonomska, nauka. i tulTodna privreda. Tu je iscrpno analiziran mehanizam privrednih kretanja u razdoblju 19601965 (7).

293

nije. .Veoma dugorocno gledano izmedu ta dva cilja ne moze biti sukoba: najprogresivnije drustvo ostvarit ce i najveci privredni progres. I obmuto, ona zemlja koja privredno zaostaje, morat ce mijenjati svoj drustveni sistem. To je jedan od zakona drustveno-ekbnomskog raz voja. No u svakodnevnom zivotu lako se gubi perspektiva i cesto neposredni efekti zamagljuju dugorocne stete, koje je kasnije tesko popraviti. Tako na prim jer, ako bi se vrednost poduzeca trajno cenila samo prema uspehu u realizaciji dohotka, upozorava M. Markovic, i ako bi se potpuno ustalilo da osnovni interes radnika bude sticanje sto vece licne zarade, to bi imalo duboke posledice na mentalitet i moral radnika i svih ostalih radnih. ljudi. Tip ljudi koje bi ovakvo drustvo stvaralo ne bi se bitno razlikovao od tipa ljudi koje stvara kapitalizam. To bi bili ljudi cija je celokupna delatnost namerena motivom sticanja i posedovanja materijalnih dobara.. To bi bili ljudi koji teze da sto vise imaju, a ne da sto vise budu. Na taj nacin. bi se odrzao isti -Onaj duhovni pauperizam koji je svojstven kapitalistickom drustvu i cije je ukidanje, po Marxu, bio jedan od ciljeva komuiiizma. (5, 70) Srecom nema nikakve nuzde da se komercijalizam uzdigne na nivo vrhovnog principa drustvene organizacije kako bi se postigla ekonomska stimulacija i raspodjela prema r'adu. I jedno i drugo je moguce uz davanje komercijalnim odnosima onog mjesta koje im pripada u organizaciji trzista. A trziste, naravno, ne samo sto nije identicno s drustvom, vec predstavlja svega jednu od mnogobrojnih institucija kojima se drugtvo sluzi u organiziranju svog zivota. No iz toga sto ne postoji nuzda komercijaliziranja morala naseg drustva ne slijedi da ne postoje tendencije da se to desi. U stvaii te su tendencije veoma izrazene kod cega primitivizam u prilazenju drustveno-ekonomskim fenomenima i nepoznavanjii funkcioniranja mehanizama drustvenog i privrednog zivota i opet igraju znacajnu ulogu i Markovic s pravom zvoni na uzbunu. Jer socijalizam se ne sastoji ni u zivotnom standardu, ni u nekoj drzavnoj velicini, ni u nacionaliziranju sredstava za proizvodnju. Socijalizam je prije svega drustvo slobodnih, razvijenih, autonomnih Ucnosti koje su u stanju da kontroliraju svoje drustvene odnose. I zbog toga sve sto dovodi do otudenja hcnosti, znaci direktno razbijanje socijalisticke izgradnje. 294

Razmotrili smo. strateske faktore buduce izgradnje naseg drustva.-Preostaje da zakljucimO. Ocigledno .je da nista nije predodredeno. Postoje naravno drustvene zakonitosti koje djeluju autonomno i koje se ne mogu ignorirati. Mi o njima vec podosta znamo. Ali postoje i. najrazlicitije otvorene mogucnosti. Na nama je da te mogucnosti iskoristimo na inteligentan nacin. U tom pogledu zadatak danasnje generacije nije nista manji od 'zadataka generacije koja je izvela revoluciju i dovela zemlju pred vrata socijalizma. Zadatak je vjerojatno slozeniji, jer je i drustvo slozenije. No i nase znanje .je vece. I tako predstoji fascinirajuca borba za pretvaranje mogucnosti u stvamost, za svjesnu izgradnju socijalistickog drustva. A zatim, u jos daljnjoj perspektivi? Iskrsnut ce, naravno, novi problemi. Jedan od njih vec sasvim jasno naziremo. U sadasnjem razdoblju nasa nastojanja su usmjerena na to da izjednacimo startne mogu cnosti svakog clana drustva i da svakoga vrednujemo prema rezultatima rada. Na taj nacin uklanjaju se klasicne klasne razlike. Ali ne uklanjaju se sve drustvene razlike medu ljudima. U stvari jednako je slucajno i jednako nepravedno sto se jedan rodio bogat, a drugi siromasan kao I to sto se jedari rodio inteligentan,; drugi kao mediokritet. Zapravo ova; potonja razlika inoze psiholoski biti jos mnogo teza: u klasnom drustvu ugnjeteni nalaze psiholoski izlaz u objasnjavaju svog polozaja nepravednoscu drustvenog uredenja. i. u borbi protiy te nepravednosti i protiv tog drustva. N o kakvog smisla ima optuzivati prirodu za nepravednost i boriti se protiv nje? Ta nova grupa privilegiranih u jednom besklasnom drustvu, grupa koja se ne oslanja na svoje porijeklo vec na svoje sposobnosti, dobila je vec i ime, to je meritokracija. (9) Drustvo ce morati reagirati na pojavu meritokracije jednako kao sto j e ranije reagiralo' na ppjayu birokracije, plutokracije i aristokracije. I nacin reagiranja yec se .nazire. Diferenciranje dohodaka nuzno je u jednom siromasnom drustvu gdje se na taj nacin ostvaruje stimulacija za povecanje drustvene proizvodnje. S .povecavanjem drustvenog bogatstva ekonomski .stimuli, postaju sve manje operativni i to omogucava i uslovljuje smanjivanje raspona licnih. dohodaka. Taj proces je defmitivno empiiijski utvrden. Socijalisticko drustvo, u kom su klasne barijere uklonjene i drustvena mobilnost pribli295

zena teorijski mogucoj, po prirodi stvari je bogato dru stvo. Prema tome i rasponi dohodaka bit ce mali. Naredna faza razvoja moze se sastojati u eliminiranju svih raspona i potpunom ekonomskom izjednacSavanju svih clanova dru stva. M i u tome odmah prepoznajemo Marxovu visu fazu komunizma. Uklanjanjem ekonomskih razlika drustveni polo2aj meritokracije dobiva sasvim druge dimenzije cime ce vjerojatno i problem meritokracije prestati biti drugtveno znacajnim. Zamijenit ce ga sigumo neki nov, jos suptilniji problem drustvene ili prosto interpersonalne nejednakosti. To de zahtijevati nova rjesenja, izazvati novu evoluciju... i tako dalje ad infinitum. Ovdje sad ocigledno zavrsavaju mogudnosti naucne analize i zapocinje podrucje maSte.

Citirana literatura
1. B. Horvat, Note on the Rate of Growth of the Yugoslav Economy, Jugoslavenski institut za ekonomska istrazivanja. Papers & Monographs No. 4, Beograd, 1963. 2. B. Horvat, Ekonomska teorija planske privrede, Kultura, Beograd, 1961. 3. M. Bazler, Klasifikaciia jugoslavenskih podrucja po stepenu ekonomske razvijenosti sa posebnim osvrtom nd nerazvijena podrudja, magistarska teza branjena na Jugoslavenskom institutu za ekonomska istrazivanja, Beograd, 1967. 4. V. Tomanovic, Socijalne nejednakosti uslova za obrazovanjea, Gledista, 5/1967. 5. Smisao i perspektive socijalizma, Zbomik radova drugog zasjedanja KorCulanske Ijetne Skole, Praxis, Zagreb, 1965. 6. B. Horvat, BPrivredni ciklusi u Jugoslavijw, Ekonomist, 1 4/1967. 7. B. Horvat, Ekonomska nauka i narodna privreda, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1968. 8. P. de Wolff, K. Hamqvist, ^Reserves of Ability: Size and Distribntiona, u A. H. Halsey, ur., Ability and Educational Opportunity, OECD, Pariz, 1961, ss. 1 5 3 175. 9. M. Young, The Rise of Meritocracy, Penguin, London, 1963.

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R E G IS T A R POJMOVA

c.

Administradja, administrativni aparat 26, 2935, 41 Aktivno stanovnistvo 191, 196, 255 Asocijacija proizvodaca 47, 83, 84 Autoritet 109, 110, 113, 123125, 113, 143 Avangarda 268, 269 Baza i nadgradnja 160, 161 Belgija 58 Birokracija, birokratski aparat, birokratska struktura 2545, 6468, 77, 78, 83, 85, 89, 91, 94, 97, 100, 134, 186, 218, 219, 241, 242, 247, 249, 270 drzavna 219 Blagostanje 165 Brionski plenum 100, 101 Centralizacija, decentralizacija (privrede) 103, 104, 109, 110, 113, 119122, 124, 125, 126, 130138, 141, 142, 145, 146, 149 Centralno planiranje 277 Cijene 126 Cin, iSinovnik 26, 29, 31, 32, 34, 37, 4244, 76, 91 fetiSizam cina 25, 26, 29 Danska 58 Decentralizacija 292 Demokratija 270 Demokratski centralizam 273, 274 Dijalekticka roetoda istrazivanja 116, 117 Diktatura proletarijata 74 83, 86, 88, 89, 9295, 114 Direktor 51, 208, 209 Disciplina (tvorniSka) 6062

Dohodak 155, 157 bruto 155 neto 155 Dru5tvena kontrola 145, 146 DruStvene grupe 185 DruStveni proizvod 153, 161163 DruStveni razvoj 1 17 4 DruStveni sistem 1 16, 18, 23, 4 185 DruStveni slojevi 185 DruStveni status 189 Driava 2022, 38, 39, 40, 45, 7 -, 7 78, 8185, 89, 92, 98, 104 106, 111115, 128, 130133,-135, 140, 148 Dizavna intervendja 118, 119, 126, 138 Drzavni aparat 163, 218225, 255, 256, 258 Egzistendja 221 Ekonomska eksproprijadja 181 Ekonomski odnosi 161 Eksploatacija 169 Etatizam 22, 90 Falansterije 47 Feudalizam, feudalci 1315, 27, 103, 104 Filozofski materijalizam 160, 164 FetiSizam cina 25, 26, 29 Francuska 17, 32, 35, 36, 49, 50, 56, 58, 75, 76, 93, 94 Hijerarhija 3034, 37, 38, 4044 inherentna 198 Holandija 58 Horizontalne privredne veze 119, 120

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horizontalna decentralizacija 119122 horizontalna centralizacija 119, 120 Industrija 24 Industrija nafte 137 Informacije 149 Inicijativa 272, 273 Inteligencija 186, 211216 Javno mnjenje 222 Jedino nalicje 51, 110 Jednopartijsld sistem 236, 237 Kadrovi 244, 245 rukovodeci 190, 244246, 252 Kamata 180, 181 na osnovna sredstva 180, 181 Kapital 169 Kapitalist 173 Kapitalizam 13 15, 1827, 39, 42, 43, 60, 7478, 83, 94, 95, 104 108, 118120, 127, 136, 140146, 167170, 182, 264 drzavni 2025, 3942, 8891/ 127 monopolni 24 Kina 16 Klasa 193195 vladajuda 1216, 22, 24, 31, 32, 37, 38, 75, 89, 91, 92 radnifika 12, 13, 17, 18, 2124, 31, 4850, 5359, 61-67, 75, 82, 89, 9294, 113, 121, 205, 206, 210 eksploatisana 12, 15, 16, 37 drustvena 14,- 16, 76, 81, 83, 89, 193 Klasna borba 14, 20, 75, 76, 83 Klasna eksploatacija 11, 12, 2022, 115 Klasna polarizacija, diferencijacija 20, 36 41> 46 Klasno-besklasno drustvo 12, -14, 16, 22, 24, 38, 41, 76,. 81, 82, 87, 89, 92 Kolektivizacija 96 Komiteti 279 Komuna 44, 45, 120 Komunisti 242, 249, 250, 252, 254-^-258, 281 Komunisticka partija 243, 251,. 254, 256, 266 Komunisticki manifest 17, 75, 92, 111, 114 Komunizam 7779, 82, 83, 86 88, 114

Konformizam 265 Konkurencija 104, 106, 120, 139 Koordinacija 125, 126, 128 Kritika 271273 Kritika gotskog programa 77, 78, 81, 92, 108 Kultura 161 Marksizam, marksisti 48, 74, 112114, 116, 117, 120, 121 Materijalna dobra 157, 160 Materijalne usluge 157 Meritokracija 295, 296 Monopol 104, 138, 139141 Moral 263, 267 Nasljedivanje 196, 197 Naufine organizacije 279 Neprivreda 166, 217 Netrzisna proizvodnja 166 Njemacka 17, 18, 55, 57', 64 Novae 26, 27, 107, 114 Norveska 58 Obrazovanje 189, 192, 287, 288 Obrtnici 186, 187, 190 Odumiranje drzave 38, 46, 77, 78, 84, 90, 114, 115, 135 Oligarhija 236 Oslobodenje lifinosti (proizvo daca) 111, 114 Osnovna sredstva 183 Pariska komuna 44, 45, 50, 76,
112 , 121

Partija politicka 23, 24, 43, 44, 232, 234, 235, 261 radnicka 234, 235 Planiranje 104 106, 108110, 114, 118, 127132, 136, 138, 142146, 168 Planska privreda 22, 25 Poduzece 137 139, 147, 148 Poduzetnistvo, poduzetnik 125, 128, 129, 130 Politicki sukobi 269 Poljoprivreda 178 Porezi 171 Poslodavci 5360, 6367 Predmet rada 155 Prelazni. period 7490, 92, 95, 134 Princip imenovanja 42, 43 Princip rotacije 112 Prinuda 38, 45 Privreda 166, 293 Privredna integracija 136 139

298

Privredna reforma u SFRJ 9799, 132, 133 Privredni dklusi 104, 136 Privredni rast- 292, 293 Proizvodne snage 14 Proizvodni odnosi 20, 25 . Proizvodnja 160 drustvena 182, .286 duhovna 162 individufllna 204 kolektivna 204 kapitalisticka 154, 156, 158, 160, 164 nematerijalna 161, 162 prosta robna 168, 170 robna 106108, 114, 120, 156 Proizvodnost 1214, 46, 126128, 162, 166, 207 Proizvodac 206, 223 Prometna vrijednost 156 Prvobitna zajednica 11, 12, 14 Rad 12, 13, 22, 24, 108, 155, 166 nematerijaliziran 166 neproizvodni 156 159, 162, 165, 166 proizvodni 153 160, 162, 164 166 Radnici 186, 190192, 205207, 211, 223, 250252 intelektualni 190 najamni 159 naucni 276 Radnifild savjeti 5156, 68 Radni kolektiv 125 130, 147, 148 Raspodjela dohotka 129, 130 Ratovi 60, 66 Renta 180, 181 Revolucija 1821, 83, 9597 ekonomska 8386, 90 proleterska 50, 51, 85, 92 socijalisticka 1722, 32, 56, 79, 8286 njemacka 55 madarska 51 spanska 52 ruska 19, 20, 83 francuska 19, 21, 75 RobovlasniStvo 12, 14, 15 Rotacija 222 SAD 15, 16, 17, 49, 56, 63, 118 Samoupravljanje 52, 53, 61, 64, 6569, 94100, 121123, 127, 135, 138, 139, 141, 143, 178, 182, 217, 232, 255, 258

Savez komunista Jugoslavije 94101, 139, 238240, 248250, 252, 257, 259261, 269, 273, 275, 278282 Seljaci 190, 192, 201205, 223, 252-254 Sindikati 23, 24, 42, 4750, 5358,. 6368 Sluzba drzavne bezbednosti 97, 98 Sluzbenici 186, 190, 192, 250252, 255 Socijalistifika privreda 164, 165 Socijalizam 1822, 39, 44, 74 88, 9199, 101108, 111119, 122, 123, 127, 134136 140146 asocijativni 39, 44, 46, 47, 119, 120, 125 cehovski 49, 50, 5355 drzavni 21, 22, 84, 96 utopijski 47, 48 Sredstva za proizvodnju 155 Sredstva za rad 155 SSSR 17, 36, 39, 50, 51, 83, 84, 85, 88, 104, 110, 118 Staljinizam 96, 134 Stratifikacija 184, 189 Stamps 277 Stednja 174 Strajkovi radnika 54 Svicarska 120 Svedska 58, 66 Tebnokratija 186 Trzisna privreda 136, 139, 146 Trziste 13, 19, 21, 23, 107, 114, 126, 131, 136, 141, 168 Tvornicki poyjerenici 5355, 5765 Tvornicki savjeti 5355, 5765 Upotrebna vrijednost 156, 165 Velika Britanija 17, 18, 32, 36, 39, 40, 49, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65 Verdkalne privredne veze 119, 120 vertikalna decentral fzacij a 119122 vertikalna centralizacija 119122 ViSak vrijednosti 155, 157 Visepartijski sistem 235, 237, 238 Vlasnici 195 Vlasnistvo 167, 179, 182, 189, 193, 194 drustveno 119, 141, 167, 168, 175, 181, 194

299

drzavno 118, 119, 168, 169, 194 individualno 167, 172, 175, 176, 181, 182 kolektivno 175, 177 privatno 20, 24, 115, 118, 168, 169, 173, 174 sncijallsticko 179 Vlast 27, 28, 29, 43, 45, 65, 74, 75 centralizarija, decentralizacija 35, 36, 42, 44, 99, 113, 120

karizmadcna 29 racionalna upravna 28, 29 tradicionarna 27, 28 Vrijednost, teorija vrijeduosti 107, 114, 116 Zadmge 117, 178 Zanatlije 171, 172 Zanatstvo 170, 171, 177 Zaposlenost nezaposlenost 65,
66

300

R E G IST A R AUTORA

Adler, A., 220, 228 Aristotel, 12, 14 Asmus, V. F.f 272, 254 Bakarid, V., 96, 232, 245 Bakunjin, M. A., 712 Bazler, M., 296 Bebel, A., 116, 276 Bendix, R .t 127 Bicanid, i^., 128 Blanc, L 47 Bottomore, T. B., 31, 216 Bradic, 169, 253 Brake, 275 Brocid, M 237, 283 Chardon, M., 35 Chester, 128 Clegg, 128 Coch, 127 Cole, G. D. H., 50 Crossman, R. H- S., 23, 43 Crvenkovski, K., 99, 246, 247, 271, 284 Cvjeticanin, V., 253, 284 Darwin, Ch., 221 Davidovid, R., 142 Davis, A. K,, 33 Devons, E., 36 Dragidevid, A., 21 Durbin, E. F. M., 18 Duverger, M., 218, 219, 220, 228, 234, 267, 283 Dzinic, F., "262, 284 Dordevid, F 184, 219, 227 Bunic, S., 272 Buric, M., 229 Einstein, A., 217

Engels, F., 17, 18, 22, 38, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 84, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116, 121, 122, 134, 234, 270, 275, 276 Eucken, W., 36 Fichte, 276 Filipi, S., 248 Fischer, E., 214, 228 Fourier, C., 47 French, 127 Fromm, E., 123, 220, 221, 228, 263, 265, 266, 268, 264 Galbraith, J. K 155, 226 Gerth, 32 Gramsci, A., 206, 228 Grlic, D.j 283 Guffleband, C. W-, 64 Gunter, 65 Gurvitch, G., 51, 264, 284 Hadziomerovid, H., 210 Hadzivasilev, M., 181, 227, 260 Halle, I., 245 Haney, L. H 47 Hamquist, K., 296 Hayek, 126 Hegel, G. W. F 45, 247 Hobbes, T-, 220, 228 Hodges, D. C 211, 228 Horvat, B., 166, 199, 202, 227, 229, 296 Humo, A., S7, -9 8 Ilid, M 187', 189, 227 Indiid, T 228 Jaques, E., 61 Kardelj, E., 85, 99, 183, 202, 210, 228, 229, 243

301

Kautski, K., 212 Kavcic, B., 228, 244 Kidric, B., 84 Kilibarda, K., 204, 209, 229, 240, 244, 281, 284 King, G., 39 Kingsley, J. D., 31, 40 Klauzer, I., 229 Knight, F., 12 KovaS, P., 22, 61 Kreko, A., 177 Kronrad, I. A., 161, 162, 163, 164, 226 Lansbury, G., 32 Lenjin, V. I., 22, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 90, 195, 205, 212, 213, 214, 227, 228, 235, 266 Lewin, K., 127 Lewis, A. W., 25, 156, 226 Linton, R., 196 Lipset, S. M., 32 Lukic, R 169, 227 Luxemburg, R., 213, 214 McKenzie, R. T., 24, 236, 283 . McKitteric, 62 Mai thus, 91, 163, 221 Mao Ce Tung, 274, 284 Markovid, M 199, 240, 283, 289, 294 Marks, K., 17, 18, 21, 24, 27, 32, 38, 42, 44, 45, 48, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 84, 86, 87,.88, 92, 105, 107-, 111, 113, 115, 116, 121, 134, 136, 153, 156, 158, 164, 167, 168, 169, 172, 193, 194, 195, 206, 207, 210, 222, 226/ 234, 247, 275, 284, 294, 296 Mayer, K 185, 227 Merton, R. K., 33 Michels, R., 236, 283 Midic, K 227 Milic, V., 171, 187, 188, 191, 227, 288, 289 Mills, W 32, 215, 228, 245, 284 Miljevic, B., 22, 61 Mises, L. von, 39, 40, 41 Mlinar, Z 199, 228 Morris-Jones, W. H., 44 Mozina, S., 199, 228 Myers, C. A., 66 N eff, F. A., 47 N iio lic, M., 229, 284

Novak, M., 21 Novosel, P., 185, 227 Notkin, A. I., 163, 226 Owen, R., 47 Pareto, V., 266 Parsons, T., 45, 227 PaSid, N 21 Pecujlid, M 22, 167, 194, 195, 207, 211, 227, 228 Pejovic, p., 212, 215, 228 Platon, 266 Popovid, M 22, 183, 184, 227 Rakovski, R., 89 Redad, E., 245, 255, 284 Renold, C. G., 54, 59, 61, 62 Riesman, D 263, 265, 268, 284 Roberts, 62 Rumjancev, A., 232, 283 Rus, V., 199, 209, 228, 245, 284, 289 Schumpeter, J., l i , 46, 67, 245, 284 Scott, W. H., 61 Seymour, J.B., 53 Smith, A., 155, 156,' 159, 162, 164 Stajic, S., 93, 202, 286 Staljin, J. V., 27, 78, 108, 114, 163, 266 Stanovcic, V., 228 Stoetzel, J., 184, 227 Stojanovid, A., 228 Stojanovid, S., 22 Supek, R., 193, 227 Sutton, 155 Suzuki, D. T., 284 Sweezy, P., 140, 141, 143 Suvar, S., 229 Tadic, Lj., 212, 228 Tannenbaum, A. S., 208, 228 Tito, J. B., 245 Todorovic, M., 186, 227, 252, 260 Tomanovic, V., 288, 289, 296 Tomic, 2., 228 Velsal, R. R 31 1 Vidakovid, 2., 252, 284 Vinski, I., 191, 225 Vlahovic, V., 99, 100, 199, 233, 245, 246, 247 Walpole, G. S., 60, 61 Weber, M., 26, 27, 28; . 29, 30, 31, 42, 43, 45, 46, 185, 194 . Wolff, P. de, 296 Young, M., 296 2upanov, J., 208, 228

302

BILJESKA O PISCU Branko Horvat roden je 1928. u Petrinji. Osnovnu skolu i gimnaziju polazi u Slav. Pozegi. Sa sesnaest godina napusta gimnaziju da bi se borio u narodnooslobodilackom ratu protiv fasisticke okupacije. Predsjednlk je omladinske organizacije u svom gradu. Studira tehniku, ekonomiju i filozofiju na Zagrebackom sveucilistu od 194652. Diplomirao ekonomiju na Zagre backom sveucilistu 1952. Doktorirao prvi put u Zagrebu 1955, a zatim na University of Manchester u Engleskoj 1958. U 1959. g. postaje naslovni docent Zagrebackog sveucilista. Suradivao je u Institutu za naftu i Ekonomskom institutu u Zagrebu. Po prelasku u Savezni zavod za privredno planiranje osnovao je s grupom naucnih radnika u 1958. g. Odjeljenje za ekonomska istrazivanja i metodologiju planiranja. Iz Odjeljenja se u 1963. g. razvio Jugoslavenski institut za ekonomska istrazivanja kojhn, kao direktor, nikovodi i danas. U 1962. g. izabran je za profesora Beogradskog univerziteta, a od 1963. g. kao profesor ekonomije predaje na Poslijediplomskoj skoli Instituta. U 1964/1965. kao stipendist Fordove fondacije B. Horvat boravio je na M. I. T. i Harvardskom sveucilistu,_a u 1968. g. predavao je kao profesor u posjeti na Michiganskom sveucilistu. Pozivan je kao predavac na vise od trideset sveucilista u nasoj zemlji kao i u Austriji, Bugarskoj, Cehoslovackoj, Kubi, Engleskoj, Finskoj, Njemackoj, Italiji, Nizozemskoj, Poljskoj, SAD i Svedskoj. B. Horvat bio je clan Ekonomskog savjeta, a sada je clan Komiteta za trziste i cijene Saveznog izvrsnog vijeca. Ucestvovao je u delegacijama jugoslavenskih. planera u Polj skoj i Sovjetskom Savezu. Vodio je jugoslavensku delegaciju na prvom zasjedanju Komiteta Ujedinjenih nacija za industrijski razvoj. B. Horvat je clan vise domacih i medunarodnih strucnih udruzenja i, povremeno, njihovih uprava. Urednik je casopisa Ekonomska analiza. Do sada jeobjavioviseodstotinu clanaka u domacim i stranim naucnim casopisima, kao i slijedece knjige: Historija jugoslavenske naftne privrede (tri toma), 1956 65. Ekonomika jugoslavenske naftne privrede, 1962. Eko nomska teorija planske privrede, 1961; englesko izdanje 1964. Medusektorska analiza, 1962. Ekonomski modeli, 1962. Ekonomska nauka i narodna privreda, 1968. Privredni ciklusi u Jugoslaviji, u stampi. Dvije knjige i niz clanaka prevedeni su na engleski, ruski, njemacki, talijanski, madzarski, ceski, slovacki, spanjolski ili francuski. Profesionalni interes: Ekonomsko planiranje i politicka ekonomija socijalizma.

303

Korektori Marija Molnar i Vera Baric * Izdavacko knjizarsko poduzece Mladost Zagreb, Ilica 30

j;.

RRIVREDNI SISTEM I EKONOMSKA POLITIK A JUGOSLAVIJE

BRANKO HORVAT

PRIVREDNI SI3TEM I EKONOMSKA POLITIKA JU G O S LA M

Knjiga prof. B> Horvata Privredni sistem i ekoflomska politika Jugoslavije treca je u seriji Studije, koju izdaje Institut ekonomskih nauka u Beogradii. U ovome radu prikazan je ne samo razvoj jugoslovenskog privrednog sistema i ekonomske politike u posleratnom razdoblju nego se po prvi put u nas institueionalne promene tretiraju povezano s razvojem u oblasti ekonomske teorije. N a taj nacin privredni sistem i jugoslovenska ekonomska misao dobijaju sazetu i preglednu sliku svoga dosadasnjeg razvoja. Specificnost toga razvoja pobudila je veliko interesovanje u svetskoj jav nosti. U stvari toj javnosti je bilo namenjeno prvo, englesko izdanje ove studije. Pokazalo se, medutim, da bi jedna takva knjiga mogla da popuni ne malu prazninu u ovoj ob lasti nase ekonomske literature. O to , jugoslovensko izdanje treba da posluzi u pravo vreme. Pored gjpomenutog, kombinacija bronoloskog i problemskog nacina izlaganja jeste jos jedna vrlina ove knjige. Sirok spektar privrednih problema i niz teorijskih kontroverzi koje ih prate onemogucio je B. Horva ta da detaljnije polemise sa pojedinim stavovima, ali autor ipak nije propustio ni jednu priliku da iznese i svoje misljenje, ostajuci dosledan STom kritickom pristupu.

B E L E S K A O P IS C U Branko Horvat roden je 1928. u Petrjnji. Osnovnu skolu i gimnaziju ucio je u Slav. Pozegi. U sedamnaestoj godini napusta gimnaziju da bi se borio u narodnooslobodilackom ratu. Bio je predsednik omladinske organizacije u svom gradu. Studira tehniku, ekonomiju i filozofiju na Zagrebackom sveucilistu od 1946. do 1952. Diplomirao je ekonomi ju na Zagrebackom sveucilistu 1952. Doktorirao prvi put u Zagrebu 1955., a zatim u Engleskoj 1959. na Univer sity of Manchester. U 1960. god. postaje naslovni docent Zagrebackog sveucilista. Saradivao je u Institutu za naftu i Ekonomskom institutu u Zagrebu. Po prelasku u Savezni za-

1 5 'l'ldoU t'L ^

E K O N O M S K E

S T U D I J E

BR.

'

PRIVREDNI SISTEM I EKONOMSKA POLITIKA JUGOSLAVIA

P R O B L E M !, T EO R IJE, B ran ko O STV A R EN JA , H o rv a t PROPUSTI

S e n g le s k o g p r e v e li: B O S K O M IL O S A V L J E V I6 i n a t a S a s u h o t in

IN S T IT U T E K O N O M S K IH N A U K A

B E O G R A D
1 9 70.

O S T A L I R A D O V I OD IS T O G A U T O R A : Ekonomika jugoslavenske naftne privrede Industrija nafte u Jugoslaviji Sv. I Sv. I I -Sv. I l l Proizvodnja nafte Prerada nafte Dstribucija

Ekonomska teorija planske privrcde Medusektorska analiza Ekonomski modeli Ekonomska nauka i narodna privreda Ogled o Jugoslavenskom drustvu Privredni ciklusi u Jugoslaviji Integralni sistem drustvenog racunovodstva za jugoslavensku privredu

.it*

Stampa:

.SRBOSTAMPA

Beograd,

Dobracina

6 8

PREDGOVOR JUGOSLAVENSKOM IZDANJU

Opet se vode rasprave o daljnjem razvoju privrednog sistema. Jugoslavenski privredni sistem razvija se brzo i dinamicno. Zbog toga je ocigledna potreba da se taj razvoj podvrgne analizi kako bi se sto jasnije uocile zakonitosti kretanja i izbjegle pogreske u ekonomskoj politici. Posebno se cinilo potrebnim i korisnim pokusati povezati institucionalne promjene s razvoj em u oblasti ekonomske teorije i uspjesima i promasajima u prakticnoj primjeni. Medutim, za takvo jedno istrazivanje nisu se mogla dobiti financijska sredstva, niti naci izdavaci koji bi iz svojih sredstava publicirali gotov rad. I tako se desilo da je ova monografija najprije napisana na engleskom, a kod nas se pojavljuje kao prijevod s malim izmjenama. Prije nekoliko godina je, naime, Americko udruzenje ekonomista odlucilo da za osam zemalja sa zanimljivim ekonomskim sistemima publicira monografije o poslijeratnoj ekonomskoj poli tici. Od mene je zatrazeno.da pripremim odgovarajucu studiju o jugoslavenskoj ekonomskoj politici. Studija je bila zavrsena krajem 1969. godine, do kada je ujedno obradena postojeca literatura i obuhvaceni relevantni dogadaji. Nastojao sam da obradim cjelokupnu jugoslavensku strucnu literaturu, kao i najvaznije strane autore. Na taj nacin, ovaj rad predstavlja ujedno prvi pregled razvoja poslijeratne jugoslovenske ekonomske teorije u oblasti pri vrednog sistema i ekonomske politike. Atribut jugoslavenski treba protumaciti u dva smisla: on obuhvaca jugoslavenske teoreticare kao i strane teoreticare jugoslavenskog tj. samoupravnog privrednog sistema. Rad je ogranicen uslovima u kojima je nastao. Prije svega, zbog unaprijed odredenog obima pisan je krajne sazeto. Zatim, dvije znacajne oblasti poljoprivredna i regionalna politika nisu mogle biti obradene. Nadalje, monografija bi se sigurno mogla poboljsati i u pogledu obuhvata i u pogledu kvalitete da je postojala mogucnost ekipnog rada kod cega bi autori obradili poglavlja iz svojih uzih specijalnosti. I na kraju, rad je morao biti

in

prilagoden potrebama inostranih citalaca. Zbog ovog posljednjeg neke nase unutrasnje polemike prikazane su vjerovatno s nedovoljno kriticke ostrine. Buduci da se radi o analazi i evaluaciji nase ekonomske politike kako u njenom teorijskom tako i u primjenjenom aspelctu ova se studija ne svodi samo na opise i prikaze vec je prije svega orijentirana na kriticko ocjenjivanje. Starao sam se, medutim, da stavove pojedinih ekonomista kao i institucionaliziranih inicijatora i izvrsilaca pojedinih reform i prikazem objektivno, tj. sa stanovista autora prikazivanih shvacanja i nezavisno od toga u kojoj m jeri ta shvacanja smatram pravilnim ili nepravilnim. Na citaocu je da prosudi koliko sam u tome uspio. Registar autora izradili su asistenti C. Ocic i N. Zelic i ja im se zahvaljujem. Branko Horvat Beograd, jula 1970.

rv

SADRZAJ:
u vod
I. T R I D R U S T V E N O -E K O N O M S K E R E FO R M E 1. Centralno planirana privreda (a) Institucionalni razvoj (b) Diskusija 9 9 9 11 14 14 17 20 20 22 27 27 31 33 33 36 38 41 41 45 49

2. Decentralizacija (a) Institucionalni (b) Diskusija 3. Samoupravni

razvoj

socijalizam

(a,1 Institucionalni razvoj (b) Diskusija II. P L A N IR A N J E 4. C etiri petogodisnja plana 5.. Rast i ciklusi

6. P olitika razvoja i m etode planiranja (b) Institucionalni o k vir

(a) R azvoj na politika i funkcije drustvenog plana

(c) Ostali problem i III. SAM OUPRAVNO

PR E D U ZE C E

7. Sam oupravljanje 8. Preduzece

9. Polem ika o drustvenom vlasnistvu

TRZlSTE I CENE
10. Politik a cena 53 55 59 59 64 67 67 70 72 76 81 81 81 83 85 91 95 100

(a) A dm inistrativno odredene cene (bl R azvoj trzista

11. P olitika raspodele

(a) P olitik a licnih dohodaka (b) Ostali problem i

12. Spoljnotrgovinska politika (a) Osnovna kretan ja (b) P rolog

(c) T r i koraka ka slobodnoj trgovin i

(d) Polem ika o tome sta da se dalje radi N O V AC, B A N K A R S T V O I J A V N E F IN A N S IJ E 14. Bankarstvo i monetarna politika

(a) Bankarstvo za centralno planiranu privredu (bl Ucenje kroz praksu :

(c) Bankarstvo za samoupravnu privredu (f) Finansiranje investicija (e) Monetarna politika

15. Javne finansije i fiskalna politika (a) Budzet za centralno planiranu (b) Eksperimentisanje porezim a

privredu

100
102

(c) Budzet za samoupravnu privredu (d,) Kom unalna privreda

16 0^
110
115

(e) Fiskalna politika

S A M O U P R A V L J A N J E I S O C IJ A L IS T lC K A R O B N A P R O IZ V O D N J A _ Literatura Registar autora

117 121 131

TABELE
Strana 5.1 5.2 10.1 13.1 13.2 Rast jugoslovenske p rivrede u periodu 1946 1968. godine 31 32 57 88

K oriscen je radne snage i sredstava i tehnicki progres u Jugoslaviji Prom ene u nivoim a cena u procentim a po godinama Banke u Ju goslaviji

Sastav investicija u osnovnim sredstvim a prem a izvoru finansiranja (iskljucujuci privatne in vesticijel B roj teritorijalnih jedinica mesne samouprave (na kraju godine) Budzetski izdaci u 1966. godini

94 112 114

14.1 14.2

G R A F IK O N I 5.1 6.1 P rivred n i ciklusi u Jugoslaviji 33 36

Institucionalni m odel jugoslovenskog privrednog sistema

U V O D
Za Jugoslaviju je jedan indijski diplomat rekao da .je jedna zemlja sa dve azbuke, tri veroispovesti, cetiri jezika, pet nacija i sest federalnih drzava zvanih republike. Moglo bi se dodati da ta zemlja ima dvadeset miliona stanovnika i da lezi u srcu Balkana, sa svim svojim istorijskim prizvucima. Vekovima su se na Balkanu sretale tri svetske kulture i tri mocne religije: rimokatolicki zapad, pravoslavni istok i muslimanski jug. Sluzeci se modemim ekonomskim jezikom mogli bismo ih nazvati i kapitalisticki. zapad, centralno-planski istok i nerazvijeni jug. Svi su se ti uticaji osetili ovde. Sasvim se opravdano moze ocekivati buran zivot u jednoj zemlji koja je tako locirana i koja ima sve te karakteristike. Sadasnja generacija Jugoslovena je iskusila sva tri poznata moderna ekonomska sistema: kapitalizam pre rata, centralno planiranu privredu posle rata i samoupravni socijalizam u najnovije vreme. Ovaj poslednji sistem je njihova sopstvena inovacija i do sada je jedini ovakve vrste u svetu. Ta ista generacija je takodte iskusila sva cetiri moderna politicka rezima: gradansku demokratiju (u obliku ustavne monarhije i visepartijskog sistema) pre rata, fasizam za vreme rata, jednopartijsku drzavu-odmah posle rata/i samoupravnu demokratiju koja je sada u procesu razvoja. Ona je takode:prezivela partizanski narodnooslobodilacki rat i revoluciju. Posle rata namesto centralizovane kraljevine dosla je federativna republika, a za dve decenije zemlja je promenila tri. ustava. Naposletku, ta ista generacija je prosla kroz tri razne ekonomske epohe: predindustrijsku fazu pre rata, brzu industrijalizaciju u toku dve decenije posle rata, i nedavno zapocetu fazu moderne industrijske privrede koja se priblizava zapadnoevropskom nivou. Pre rata, 77 odsto stanovnistva sacinjavali su seljaci a 40 odsto ih je bilo nepismeno. Nekoliko ekonomskih indikatora ce biti dovoljni da ilustruju ovaj privredni razvoj:

J u g o sla via Pi-e rata Proizvodn ja po g la v i stanovnika: Elektricna energija u K W casovima S irovi celik, u kg Cement, kg Pamucno predivo, u kg Energija, u kg usl. uglja Vestacko dubrivo, u kg Secer, u kg. Zalihe na 1000 stanovnika: Radio aparati 9 1

Zapadna Evropaa)

1968. J u g o sla via

80 17 60 1.3 180 3 5

500 1300 150 300 100 190 5 20 24 11 65 47

1000 92 190 5 1030 96 25

2100 4300

110 200 17 50

160 20

Autom obili

a ) F ra n c u s k a , N em aC ka, S v ed sk a , V e lik a B r ita n ija Izv o ri: SGS 1969.; U N , S ta tis tic a l Y e a rb o o k , 1956.

Nepismeni jos uvek sacinjavaju blizu jedne petine odraslog stanovnistva, ali u isto vreme sa osam univerziteta i brojem studenata na 1000 stanovnika Jugoslavia je dospela veoma blizu vrha na svetskoj listi. Takav tempo' promena je tako reci unistio sve tradicije, ali je takode stvorio i novu, tradiciju odbacivanja tradicija, tradiciju promena. U skladu s time, program Saveza komunista naslednik Komunisticke partije Jugoslavije od 1958. godine zavrsava se sledecim recima:
Nista sto se stvorilo ne sme da bude toliko Eveto za nas da se ne moze prevazici i ustupiti mesto onome sto je jos progresivnije, slobodnije, humanije.

U takvim okolnostima ekonomska diskusija je poprimila izvesne neobicne karakteristike koje unekoliko otezavaju formalnu prezentaciju. Do oko 1960. godine vecina diskusija ili se nije stavljala na papir ili se nije objavljivala. Osim toga, u profesionalnim Slancima se tako reci nisu koristile reference. Postojalo je osecanje potpunog raskida sa prosloscu, i stoga nije imalo na sta da se poziva. U tom istom periodu strucna literatura bila je skoro potpuno deskriptivna. To je bilo delimicno usled toga sto su prvi ekonomski fakulteti bili osnovani tek posle rata. Kaze se da 90 odsto svih naucnika koji su ikad postojali zive danas. Sto se tice jugoslovenskih ekonomista, ovaj procenat je skoro 100 posto. Drugi razlog za nedostatak analiticke literature je u cinjenici da tako reci nije bilo vremena za analize. Ekonomisti su imali pune ruke posla oko menjanja organizacije, institucija i politike i jedva
6

su uspevali da odrzavaju korak sa svim tim promenama. Osim za one koji bi zeleli da se posvete ekonomskoj istoriji, nije vredelo angazovati se na nekom dugorocnom istrazivackom projektu. Pre nego sto bi knjiga izasla iz stampe, sistem bi se vec izmenio. Na taj nacin prilicno dugo vremena profesionalni ekonomisti su samo opisivali ono sto se desavalo. No deskripcije uvek dolaze pre analize. Najzad, do nedavno paznja je uglavnom bila usredsredena na ono sto jugoslovenski ekonomisti zovu ekonomski sistem. Eko nomska politika u tradicionalnom smislu koriscenje niza mera radi postizanja zeljenih rezultata u jednom datom okviru jedva da je postojala. Problemi koji su nastajali obicno su se resavali time sto se menjao sam institucionalni okvir. Veoma dugo vremena, a u izvesnoj meri cak i danas, ekonomska politika se sastojala od beskrajnog niza reorganizacija. Trazenje jednog pogodnog ekonomskog sistema bila je glavna preokupacija ekonomske politike. Posle 1960. godine privredne organizacije pocele su da dobijaju stalniji oblik a ekonomska diskusija je pocela da ide poznatijim linijama. Od onda se koriste reference u clancima, uspostavljaju se veze sa prosloscu i sa ostalim delom sveta, ekonomske rasprave postaju sadrzajnije i zivahnije, povecava se strucnost i pocinje da se kristalise jedna specificno jugoslovenska teorija ekonom ske politike.

TRI DRUSTVENO-EKONOMSKE REFORME

1. CENTRALNO PLAN IR AN A PRIVREDA (a ) Institucionalni razvoj Od svih evropskih drzava pod fasistickom okupacijom, jedino se Jugoslavia sama oslobodila svojim sopstvenim snagama. Narodnooslobodilacki rat se odvijao u isto vreme kad i istinska socijalna revolucija. To je znacilo dve stvari: neverovatno visok moral, spremnost da se jurisa na nebo kao sto je rekao jedan pesnik ali isto tako i neverovatno visok stepen unistenja zemlje. Oko 1.7 miliona ljudi izginulo je u bitkama, koncentracionim logorima, kroz kaznene ekspedicije i od strane domacih kvisliriga. Na taj nacin nestao je svaki deveti stanovnik. Skoro dve petine preradivacke industrije su unistene ili ozbiljno ostecene. Oko tri i po miliona ljudi, od ukupnd petnaest miliona, ostalo je bez krova. Gubitak nacionalnog bogatstva iznosio je 17 odsto ukupne ratne stete pretrpljene od strane osamnaest zemalja zastupljenih na Pariskoj konferenciji o reparacijama 1945. godine [1, str. 27 29]. Pored svega ovoga, finansijski sistem zemlje bio je u baoticnom stanju: razdeljena i olcupirana od strane raznih agresivnih suseda,. zemlja je ostala sa sedam vrsta novca (nemacke marke, italijanske lire, madarske penge, bugarski levi, albanski franci, srpski dinari i hrvatske kune). Prvi zadatak nove vlade je bio da sto pre popravi ratom osteceno i da organizuje privredu na onome sto se tada smatralo socijalistickim principima. U tom cilju centralizovana su sva raspoloziva ljudska i materijalna sredstva, i uz ogromne napore i veliko odusevljenje, vec 1947. godine dostignuta je predratna proizvodnja. Program socijalistickog preobrazaja izvrsen je putem zakonskih i politickih delatnosti. Jugoslavija je bila poljoprivredna zemlja. Seljaci su masovno ucestvovali u narodnooslobodilackom ratu. Agrarna reforma, zapoceta jos na zavrsetku prvog svetskog rata, nije nikad bila do kraja izvedena zbog protivljenja vladajucih klasa. N ije ni cudo sto je 9

jedan od prvih poteza nove drzave bio da preduzme radikalnu agramu reformu. Zemlju je trebalo dati onima koji je obraduju. Za manje od tri meseca posle zavrsetka rata izglasan je zakon kojim je oduzeta od zemljoradnika-posednika sva obradiva zemlja preko 35 hektara, a od nezemljoradnika iznad tri hektara. Veleposednici su izgubili zemlju bez kompenzacije. Zemlja koja je na taj nacin stecena bila je razdeljena siromasnim seljacima, koji su dobili oko polovinu ukupne zemlje, zadrugama i drzavnim dobrima [4, str. 53 54], Sledeca prelomna akcija, preduzeta 1946. godine, bila je nacionalizacija privatnog kapitala u industriji, rudarstvu, saobracaju, bankarstvu i trgovini na veliko. Godine 1948. nacionalizacija je prosirena na trgovinu na malo i ugostiteljstvo, a 1958. godine na zgrade sa vise od tri stana. Otprilike jedna polovina jugoslovenske privrede, izuzimajuci poljoprivredu, bila je u vlasnistvu stranog kapitala. Od ostatka, znatan deo je posedovala kraljevska vlada, koja je drzala rudnike uglja i gvozda, sume i najveca poljoprivredna dobra, drzala monopol nad maloprodajom duvana, soli, sibica i petroleja; i bila je najveci trgovac na veliko, prevoznik, uvoznik i izvoznik, bankar, gracfevinski preduzimac i zemljoposednik [2, str. 78], Posto je izvestan broj privatnih trgovaca saradivao sa fasistickim okupatorom i kvislinskim vladama, njihova imovina je bila konfiskovana.Oni koji su ucestvovali u pokretu otpora a clanovi Komunisticke partije su to ucinili kao partijsku obavezu vrlo cesto su davali svoju imovinu ne trazeci kompenzacije. Osim toga, kao sto smo vec spomenuli, mnoga poslovna preduzeca su bila unistena ili ostecena. U takvim okolnostima potpuna nacionaliza cija je bila politicki moguca, relativno laka da se izvede i nije predstavljala veliki finansij ski teret. Sledeci korak je bio da se ozakoni planiranje u junu 1946. godine. Planove je pripremila Savezna planska komisija, direktno odgovorna saveznoj vladi. Sve je bilo spremno za novi Ustav koji je bio usvojen 1946. godine, a ciji je clan 15. glasio: U cilju zastite zivotnih interesa naroda, podizanja narodnog blagostanja i pravilnog koriscenja svih privrednih mogucnosti i snaga, drzava daje pravac privrednom zivotu i razvitku putem opsteg privrednog plana, oslanjajuci se na drzavni i zadruzni privredni sektor, ostvarujuci opstu kontrolu nad privatnim sektorom privrede. Ovaj odeljak moze se smatrati kao definicija i pocetak jednog specificnog drustveno-ekonomskog si stema, koji je kasnije postao poznat kao administrativni socijalizam ili etatizam. Godina 1947. donela je prvi petogodisnji plan koji je trebalo da polozi temelje za buducu, industrijalizovanu i razvijenu Jugoslaviju. Plan je bio veoma ambiciozan nacionalni dohodak je trebalo da se udvostruci u odnosu na predratni nivo pa ipak u toku prvih osamnaest meseci sasvim se uspesno izvrsavao. Izgledalo je kao da je prosao period zestokih revolucionamih bura i da je zemlja krenula dobro definisanim i poznatim putem ekonomskog i socijalnog razvoja. 10

Medutim, za Jugoslaviju istorija je uvek imala poneko iznenadenje u rezervi. Ovog puta iznenadenje je bilo vise nego neocekivano: bio je to potpun udarac. U prvoj polovini 1948. godine, Staljin je optuzio jugoslovenske partijske rukovodioce za revizionizam i antisovjetizam. Jugosloveni su odbacili optuzbu i uskoro posle toga kominformovske zemlje su zapocele opsti politicki i ekonomski napad. Jugoslovenska Komunisticka partija bila je ekskomunicirana iz porodice bratskih partija, razni ugovori bili su jednostrano ukinuti, zajmovi za razvoj ponisteni, trgovina sa Jugoslavijom (koja je iznosila otprilike jednu polovinu njene ukupne spoljne trgovine) smanjena na skoro nista do sredine 1949. godine, i bio zaveden potpun ekonomski bojkot. Prvo reagovanje sa jugoslovenske strane bilo je, pomalo naivan ali razumljiv pokusaj da se dokaze da su Staljin i drugi po svoj prilici neobavesteni, da niko nije dovodio u pitanje ortodoksnost u organizovanju socijalisticke privrede, da su drzavno vlasnistvo i centralno planiranje glavni stubovi sistema. Motivisan ovakvim obzirima, u januaru 1949. godine Centralni komitet partije je odlucio da ubrza kolektivizaciju poljoprivrede. Vec je u zakonu o porezima, koji je bio usvojen u avgustu 1948. godine, bilo receno da stopa oporezivanja treba da bude takva da stimulise seljacke radne zadruge putem nizih poreza. Zakon o zadrugama, usvojen juna 1949. godine, dao je zakonski okvir za razne tipove zadruga. Individualni seljaci nisu morali da se ukljuce u zadruge ako nisu hteli. Ali politickom propagandom i raznim administrativnim ,i finansijskim merama, vlasti su vrsile jak pritisak na njih da stupe u zadruge, i oni su pristupali u velikom broju. U meduvremenu organizacija privrede bila je modelirana po sovjetskom uzoru. Drzavni budzet je agsorbovao najveci deo nacionalnog dohotka. Drzavni aparat je rukovodio privredom direktno putem ministarstava i direkcija. Vec 1950. godine organizacioni raz voj je dostigao fazu u kojoj se jugoslovenska privreda mogla smatrati kao model administrativno upravljene ili centralno planirane privrede [3, str. 126 70]. To je takode bila i kulminacija. Vec 1950. godine poceo je nov razvoj. Sledece godine privredni sistem je bio potpuno izmenjen i do kraja 1951. godine centralno planirana privreda je pripadala istoriji. (b ) Diskusija Ideje i teorije koje su sluzile kao smemice u organizovanju jugoslovenske privrede odmah posle rata imaju korena u predratnim diskusijama medu jugoslovenskim marksistima. Oni su se drzali dobro poznatog ortodoksnog gledista prema kome socijalizam znaci drzavno vlasnistvo kao i centralno planiranje. Odmah posle rata bilo je toliko posla da je malo vremena ostajalo za razmisljanje. Osim toga, sve je izgledalo sasvim jasno, i teorijski i prakticno, i moglo se oslanjati bilo na marksisticku literaturu ili na iskustvo Sovjetskog saveza, prve socijalisticke zemlje. U tim 11

danima najvaznije je bilo postici brz ekonomski rast. A Sovjetski savez je pokazao kako da se on postigne. Ali kopiranje sovjetskog uzora nije bas donelo ocekivane rezultate. Osim toga, barbarski napad kominformovskih zemalja pri. morao je ljude da preispitaju svoje ideoloske pozicije, i to iz temelja. I tako su stvoreni preduslovi za nastajanje jugoslovenske verzije socijalizma. U ekonomskim diskusijama pre 1952. godine dominirale su dve teme: planiranje radi brzog rasta i trazenje autenticnog soci jalizma. Posto ce se o prvoj temi govoriti u poglavlju o planiranju, mi cemo ovde usredsrediti paznju na onu drugii. Starija teorija je tvrdila da u socijalizmu nece biti trzista ni cena. Posle revolucije, . Jugoslavia je presla kroz prelazni period izmedu kapitalizma i so cijalizma. U ovom periodu robno-novcani odnosi su jos uvek bili potrebni zbog postojanja privatnog vlasnistva i zato sto je radna sriaga jos uvek bila heterogena. [5]. Boris Kidric drzavnik1 koji ) je dominirao ekonomskom mislju zemlje do svoje prerane smrti 1952. godine tvrdio je da je samo drzavno vlasnistvo istinski socijalisticko [6, str. 8], da je drzavni sektor najvisa forma drustveriog vlasnistva. . . [6, str. 95]. Isto misljenje ima vecina ekonomista u sovjetskoj uticajnoj sferi. U Jugoslaviji ono se nije odrzalo posle 1950. godine. U skladu sa ovim rezonovanjem bilo je i uzdizanje znacaja drzavnog planiranja. R. Uvalic [51, str 20], B. Kidric [5, str. 42], S. Kraigher [52, str. 12] i drugi ponavljali su poznatu tezu sovjetskih ekonomista o planiranju kao osnovnom zakonu socijalisticke privrede. Nekoliko godina kasnije ova ce se teorija nazvati voluntaristickom utopijom. Ponovno proucavanje Marksa i Engelsa: pokazalo je mogucnost velike zbrke u tumacenju. Marks i Engels su pisali retko i vrlo malo o socijalizmu. Ono sto su oni pisali moze se podeliti u dve grupe: jedna se bavila organizacionim oblikom socijalisticke pri vrede, a druga bitnim drustvenim karakteristikama socijalistickog sistema. Marks i Engels su tvrdili da ce robno-novcani odnosi i trziste nestati zajedno sa privatnim vlasnistvom; da ce sve biti podredeno svestranom planiranju; da ce se proizvodnja i distribucija organizovati bez posrednicke uloge novca. U toku mnogih decenija bilo je prihvaceno da svestrano planiranje znaci centralno planiranje od strane vlade i da odsustvo privatnog vlasnistva znaci drzavno vlasnistvo. Godine 1950. otkrilo se da Marks uopste nije ni doneo ovaj poslednji zakljucak. U stvari, i tu su oni raspravljali o bitnim karakteristikama socijalizma, Marks i Engels su se izjasnili protiv drzave, tvrdili da ce ona odumreti u besklasnom drustvu, govorili o samoupravljanju proizvodaca, i tvrdili da je radnik Slobodan tek onda kad postane vlasnik svojih sredstava proizvodnje. Marksovo insistiranje na slobodi individue pronaderio je u stavu, koji' je kasnije usao u partijski program, i koji glasi: Namesto starog burzoaskog drustva sa njegovim klasama i klas1) O n je u sk o ro p o sta o p re d s e d n ik P riv re d n o g s a v e ta v la d e i p r e d s e d n ik S av ezn e p la n s k e k o m isije . O n je ta k o d e bio c la n v rh o v n o g p a r tijs k o g ru k o v o d stv a .

12

nim suprotnostima stupa1 udruzivanje u kome je slobodni razvitalc svakog pojedinca uslov slobodnog razvitka za sve. [7, str. 105 17], Drzavno vlasnistvo, daleko od toga da bude istinski socijalisticko, pokazalo se da je samd ostatak kapitalizma, karakteristican za zaostale zemlje koje grade socijalizam i sposoban da stvara'opasna birokratska skretanja [4, str. 16 18]. Kidric je pisao 1950. godine: Drzavni socijalizam predstavlja . .. samo prvi i najkraci korak socijalisticke revolucije . . . Ustrajanje na pozicijama drzavnog (birokratskog) socijalizma . . . neizbezno se povezuje s porastom, jacanjem i privilegovanjem birokratije kao drustvenog parazita, gusenjem . . . socijalisticke demokratije i opstom degeneraci-. jom sistema u .. . drzavni kapitalizam . .. Stvama socijalisticka izgradnja kategoricki trazi razvijanje socijalisticke demokratije i smelo pretvaranje drzavnog socijalizma u sjobodnu asocijaciju neposrednih proizvodaca [8, str. 5 6]. Uskoro su ovakvu poziciju prihvatili skoro svi jugoslovenski ___ jstveni naucnici. M. Novak je pisao da bi zadrzavanje drzavnog vl^snistva znacilo . . . ne ukidanje proleterijata nego pretvaranje syah ljudi u proletere, ne ukidanje kapitala vec nj_egovu opstu vladavinu u kojoj se moze razviti, a i nuzno razvija eksploatacija svoje vrste [9, str. 92]. Prilazeci ovom problemu sa jednog drugog stanovista, N. Pasic je dosao do sledeceg zakljucka: Nekada je drzavna intervencija u privredi bila pogresno izjednacavana sa socijalizmom. Kad bi se primenio na nekoliko poslednjih decenija, taj kriterij bi doveo u socijalisticke redove sve istaknutije kapitalisticke politicare novije ere, od Baldvina i Ruzvelta do Hitlera i de Gola [10, str. 11]. A. Dragicevic je pisao: Nacionalizacija sredstava za proizvodnju i planska privreda jesu pretpostavke so cijalizma, ali samo pretpostavke i nista vise. Da bi se doista radilo o potpuno izgradenom socijalizmu, potreban je, pored toga, jos citav niz drugih faktora, u prvom redu socijalisticki razvitak politickih odnosa i ekonomske strukture drustva [11, str. 218]. Na isti nacin, P. Kovac i D. M iljevic su primetili da drzavna svojina i drzavno upravljanje sami po sebi malo ili gotovo nikako ne menjaju polozaj proizvodaca u proizvodnji i njegovo pravo na ucesce u upravljanju privredom . . . U zemljama gde je pobedila socijalistic ka revolucija, drzava, umesto da postane organ radnih ljudi, moze da postane i postaje organ drzavnog i partijskog aparata koji upravljaju u ime radnih ljudi [12, str. 13]. Milic primecuje da drzavni socijalizam u SSSR-u kroz birokratski socijalizam prerasta u drzavni kapitalizam . .. [3, str. 21], Ove izjave nisu tako nove kao sto mogu da izgledaju. Jos pre pola veka Z. Fabri, u vezi sa jednom Lenjinovom knjigom, je pisao: Ako se drzava takode pretvori u vlasnika, onda cemo imati drzavni kapitalizam, a ne socija lizam .. . U drzavi-vlasniku svi bi proleteri postali najamnici drzave umesto najamnika privatnih kapitalista. Drzava bi bila eksploatator, a to znaci, citava gomila visih i nizih upravljaca i citava birokratija sa svim svojim hijerarhijskim rodovima, stvorili bi aovu 13

vladajucu i eksploatatorsku klasu. Izgleda da se nesto slicno stvara u R u s iji. . . [13, str. 164]. U poslednje vreme postoji tendencija da se drzavni kapitalizam zameni emocionalno neutralnim izrazom etatizam [14, str. 328 36], [15]. Najradikalniji u tom pogledu je S. Stojanovic, po profesiji filozof: Etatizmom treba nazvati sistem zasnovan ria drzavnoj svojini- sredstava proizvodnje i drzavnom upravljanju proizvodnjom i ostalim drustvenim delatnostima. Drzavni aparat predstavlja novu vladajucu klasu. Kao kolektivni vlasnik sredstava za proizvodnju on uposljava radnu snagu i eksploatise je. Licni udeo pripadnika vladajuce klase u raspodeli viska vrednosti proporcionalan je polozaju u drzavnoj h ijera rh iji. . . [16, str. 33]. Ako je drzava institucija strana socijalizmu, ko treba da organizuje ekonomski proces? Jasno, jedina moguca alternativa je da taj posao preduzmu sami proizvodaci. Centralizacija kao princip organizacije treba da se zameni decentralizacijom, centralno rukovodena privreda samoupravnom privredom. Sredinom 1950. godine usvojen je zakon kojim su stvoreni radnicki saveti. Nacrt zakona je bio predlozen Saveznoj skupstini u jednom govoru predsednika Tita, koji je rekao: Parola fa b rik e radnicima, zemlja seljacima nije neka apstraktna propagandna parola, vec parola koja ima dubok znacaj. Ona sadrzi u sebi citav program socijalistickih odnosa u proizvodnji i isto tako u pogledu drustvene imovine i prava i duznosti radnika, i stoga se moze i mora ostvariti u praksi ako zaista zelimo da izgradujemo socijalizam [citirano prema 33, str. 69]. Vec 1952. godine, novi ekonomski sistem je bio u punom zamahu.

2. DECENTRALIZACIJA (a ) Institucionalni razvoj Priprema za N ovi privredni sistem tako je bio nazvan zapocela je donosenjem Zakona o upravljanju drzavnim poslovnim preduzecima i privrednim udruzenjima od strane radnickih kolektiva, usvojenim u julu 1950. godine, a zavrsila se ustavnim zakonom o nacelima drustveno-politickog sistema Jugoslavije, koji je usvojila Savezna skupstina 1953. godine. N ovi privredni sistem je stupio na snagu 1952. godine. On je bio privremenog karaktera i trajao do 1960. godine. Za vreme till osam godina zemlja je postigla najvisu stopu rasta na svetu: per capita bruto nacionalni proizvod je rastao po stopi od 8,5 procenata godisnje, poljoprivredna proizvodnja po stopi od 8,9 odsto, industrijska proizvodnja 13,4 odsto [17; 18, str. 363 64]. Zakonom je propisano da radnicki kolektivi rukovode svim delatnostima svojih preduzeca kroz samoupravne organe: radnicke savete i upravne odbore. Radnicki savet birali su svi namestenici jednog preduzeca tajnim glasanjem. J. A. Schumpeter je primetio

na jednom mestu: D ivlja socijalizacija - izraz koji je postao zvanican oznacava pokusaje radnika jedne fabrike da smene upravu i uzmu stvari u sopstvene ruke. Ovi pokusaji predstavljaju bauka za svakog odgovom og socijalistu [19, str. 323]. Takav bauk je sada postao ozakonjen i obavezan jednim aktom beogradske narodne skupStine. Princip samoupravljanja proizvodaca, objasnjava E. Kardelj, je polazna tacka svake demokratske socijalisticke p olitik e. . . Revolucija koja ne otvori vrata takvom razvitku neizbezno m o ra . . . stagnirati u drzavnokapitalistickim oblicima i u birokratskom despotizmu [30, str. 17]. Godine 1951. vlada je rasturila aparat centralnog planiranja sa svojim ministarstvima, direkcijama i administrativno utvrdenim cenama. Poslednje direkcije su nestale 1952. godine. Zakon o planskom rukovodenju nacionalnom privredom usvojen je 30 decembra 1951. godine. On je zamenio centralno planiranu proizvodnju planiranjem tzv. osnovnih proporcija kao sto su stopa akumulacije i raspodela investicija. Preduzeca su stekla veliki stepen samostalnosti. U 1951. godini postojale su mnoge kategorije trzisnih i planiranih cena. Sve je to bilo zamenjeno jednom jedinstvenom strukturom cena koja je uz izvesne izuzetke imala da se regulise trzistem. Kurs dinara je ucinjen realisticnijim time sto je devalviran sest puta. I tako u januaru 1951. godine privreda je bila spremna da pode novim putem decentralizacije. Kad se jednom uvidelo da se bitne karakteristike socijalizma nalaze u individualnoj slobodi i autonomiji samoupravnih kolektiva nastale su dve vazne posledice. Prvo, politicki monopol drzave i partijskog aparata postali su nespojivi sa ovako shvacenim drustvenim sistemom. Drugo, da bi bili stvamo riezavisni, radni kolektivi su morali da imaju potpunu kontrolu nad ekonomskim faktorima koji odreduju njihov polozaj. Ona prva posledica dovela je do postepenog pretvaranja Komunisticke partije iz klasicne politicke partije u, sto bill ja nazvao, udruzenje politickih aktivista [7, str. 261]. Ovaj proces je bio zapocet 1952. godine kad je na Sestom kongresu partije promenjeno njeno ime u Savez Komuni sta. Druga posledica je dovela do trzisne privrede sa, nadajmo se, minimum drzavne intervencije. Godine 1952. i 1953. usvojeno je nekoliko zakona kojima se regulise osnivanje, rukovodenje i ukidanje poslovnih preduzeca. Preduzeca mogu da osnuju cak i grupe gradana. Postavljanje direktora vrsi putem konkursa jedna zajednicka komisija koja se sastoji od predstavnika radnickog saveta i mesne drustveno-politicke zajednice. Nerentabilna preduzeca se ostavljaju da padnu pod stecaj. U poljoprivredi kampanja kolektivizacije je povecala broj seljackih radnih zadruga, ali je usled prinudnog otkupa, administrativnih kontrola i ostalog proizvodnja opala [20, str. 99, 111]. 15

Indeks proizvodnje 1930-^-1939. 1948. 1949. J.950. 1951. 1952. 1953. 1954. 1955. 1956. 1957. 1964. 100 103 103 75 106 75 106 94 116 97 140 170

B roj zadruga

'

1217 6238 6913 6804 4225 1165 896 688 561 . 507 16

Kad je jednom napustena ideja svemocne administrativne drzavne kontrole, bilo je beskorisno. insistirati na kolektivizaciji u poljoprivredi, narocito zbog slabih ekonomskih rezultata. Z. Vidakqvic daje sledece objasnjenje: . .. masovno ucesce seljastva u oruzanom delu revolucije i U uspostavljanju revolucionarne politicke vlasti doprinelo je neu'spehu etatisticko-birokratskog podrustvljavarija poljoprivrede, jer drustveno-politicki aktivno seljastvo nije podanicki prihvatilo administrativne metode kolektivizacije [21, str. 42]. Godine 1953., Zakon o reorganizaciji seljackih radnih zadruga omogucio je seljacima da napuste zadruge i vecina je iskoristila tu priliku Oni koji su1ostali bili su najcesce siromasni se. ljaci, a to je znacilo da preostale zadruge nece biti rentabilne. Da se to ne bi desilo, i takode da bi se .onemogucila polarizacija dohotka u selima, dva meseca kasnije vlada je izvela novu agramU reformu kojom je smarijen maksimum zemlje na 10 hektara. Posto su pre rata skoro. devet desetina svih seljackih poseda bili manji od 10 hektara, nova reforma nije naisla na veliko protivljenje. Ali time nisu otklonjene. stetne posledice rariije politike. U Jugo slaviji postoji duga tradicija poljoprivrednih zadruga. Prisilna kolektivizacija je ucinila mnogo da diskredituje zadruge. Kasnije su j opste poljoprivredne zadruge, koje su bile administrativno uspoI stavljene i koje su dobile monopol u seoskoj trgovini, takode doprinele potiskivanju istinskog zadruznog pokreta. Posle svih tih izmena, sest godina stari etatisticki Ustav postao je sasvim nepogodan, dok vreme jos nije bilo sazrelo za jedan novi ustav. Problem je bio resen ustavnim zakonom usvojenim 1953. godine. U njegovom clanu cetvrtom se kaze: Drustveno vlasnistvo nad sredstvima za proizvodnju, samoupravljanje proizvodaca u privredi i samoupravljanje radnog naroda u opstini, gradu i srezu jesu osnove drUstvenog i politickog uredenja ze m lje .. . Kao posledica samoupravljackog nacela, u ustavni zakon je usla jos jedna veoma vazna novina. Ona je poznata kao nacelo fuzijei politicke i ekonomske suverenosti radnog naroda. Ovaj princip je ostvaren uspostavljanjem Veca proizvodaca kao novog doma 16

u Saveznoj skupstini. Vece se sastoji od predstavnika kolektiva poslovnih preduzeca. U narednim godinama drzava se angazovala na prvom mestu na usavrsavanju monetarnog i fiskalnog sistema. Primenjene su kamatne stope i eksperimentisalo se sa investicionim licitacijama. Poslovne banke su pripojene tadasnjoj sveobuhvatnoj Narodnoj banci. Uvedene su obavezne rezerve. Mesni organi vlasti su stekli finansijsku autonomiju. Prvi petogodisnji plan (1947 1951) bio je produzen za godinu dana ali nije nikad stvarno bio zavrsen. Period izmedu 1952. i 1956. godine bio je ostavljen samo sa godisnjim planovima. Posle uspostavljanja Novog ekonomskog sistema, lansiran je drugi Peto godisnji plan za period 1957 1961. On je bio izvrsen za manje od cetiri godine. (b ) Diskusija Dok su prethodni period uglavnom karakterisale diskusije o tome sta nije socijalizam, sada je teoretski pristup postao pozitivniji. Diskusije su zapocele razmenom misljenja o tzv. prelaznom periodu i zavrsile sa analizom tzv. samoupravnog ili asocijativnog socijalizma. Marks je pisao da se revolucionarni preobrazaj kapitalistickog u komunisticko drustvo ne moze izvrsiti odmah. Izmedu ta dva drustveno-politicka sistema mora da postoji kratak prelazni pe riod, a drzava bi u tom periodu trebalo da bude organizovana kao diktatura proleterijata. Marksova analiza je izgledala verovatna i u stvari je predvidela ono sto se desilo u Jugoslaviji tokom prve dve decenije posle rata [7, glava I I ], Oko 1952. godine a i kasnije sa prekidima, jjlavna tema debate je bila da li socijalizam (koji se smatra kao prva od dve faze Komunistickog drustva) treba ukljuciti ili iskljuciti iz prelaznog perioda [23, 9, 24, 47, 49, 50]. Debata je bila veoma apstraktna, no' pitanje je bilo od ogromnog prakticnog znacaja. Ako se diktatura proleterijata tumaci kao oblik politickog rezima, a ne kao klasna sadrzina vlade (sto je Marks imao na umu), poistovecivanje socijalizma sa prelaznim periodom ce dovesti do komandnog drustva. Ako je politicki rezim demokratican, ali se prelazni period prosiri i na socijalizam, razvoj besklasnog drustva moze da se oduzi beskrajno. Stvar je bila resena na indirektan nacin posto su razradene bitne karakteristike samo upravnog socijalizma. Uporedujuci stari (administrativni) i novi (samoupravni) ekonomski sistem, R. Bicanic2 je sumirao situaciju nabrajajuci ) razlike u ciljevima, nosiocima i sredstvima [2, str. 44 47]. Ciljevi starog sistema bili su da se postigne socijalizam putem drza2) B ica n ic je zavrSio sv o ju s tu d iju u p o c e tk u 1961. godine. B itn o is tu k o m p a r a tiv n u a n a liz u v ec je b io izvrSio M. P o p o v ic 1952. g o d in e (29). OCevidno, siste m se ra z v ija o n a d o sle d an nad in .

17

vne vlasti, da se izjednaci polozaj radnika u odnosu na proizvodna sredstva u drzavnoj svojini i da se postigne novi drustveni pore-, dak radi njega samog. Individualni interesi .proizvodaca, i potrosaca bili su podredeni bezlicnim i nadljudskim ciljevima ekonom^ skog sistema, a drzavni aparat, kome je bilo povereno da postigne taj cilj, bio je u stanju da moze da eksploatise narod. N ovi sistem pretpostavlja odumiranje drzave, upravljanje podrustvljenom imovinom od strane radnika, i postavlja kao glavni cilj licno zadovoljstvo svakog pojedinca. Sto se tice nosilaca, u starom sistemu postojalo je centralizovano drzavno upravljanje putem hije.rarhijski organizovanog drzavnog aparata. Direktive su odasiljane na autorativan nacin sa vrlo malo ili bez ikakve nezavisnosti za preduzece. U novom siste mu drzavni aparat ne moze da se mesa u poslove pojedinih preduzeca, koja su postala autonomna. Decentralizacija se primenjuje ne samo na ekonomski vec i na drustveni i politicki zivot. Autoritarizam se zamenjuje samoupravljanjem kao glavnim nacelom ekonomske i drustvene organizacije. S r e d s t v a ova dva sistema ovako prikazuje Bicanic: Drzavna svojina prema drustvenoj svojini; centralno planiranje prema drustvenom planiranju; administrativna raspodela robe prema trzistu; administrativni propisi prema finansijskim instrumentima; administrativno fiksirane plate prema slobodnom raspolaganju dohotkom radnih kolektiva; sveobuhvatni.drzavni budzet prema budzetu drzavne administracije, decentralizovanom i pdv'ojenom od privrednih tokova; potrosnja kao rezidualni faktor prema potrosnji kao nezavisnom faktoru razvoja; kolektivizacija prema poslovnoj saradnji seljaka i krupnih poljoprivrednih dobara. U ovom periodu ekonomisti su poceli da intenzivno proucavaju literaturu o ekonomici socijajizma, narocito zapadnih autora. Ova literatura je dotle bila takoreci nepoznata. I. Maksimovic [54], F. Cerne [55] i B. Horvat [25] iznose obirrine kriticke osvrte na raniju ekonomsku literaturu. Cerne je pokusao da da jednu prihvatljivu definiciju socijalizma. Po njegovom misljenju socijalizam karakterisu sledeca tri elementa: (1 ) Jednaka prava clanova zajednice kao proizvodaca. To podrazumeva drustveno vlasnistvo. Ele ment (1 ) je preduslov za (2) jednaka prava u raspodeli dohotka. To opet podrazumeva raspodelu prema radu. I (1 ) i (2 ) su neophodni za ostvarenje' (3 ) ravnopravnosti u politickom zivotu. Kao gradani clanovi zajednice moraju da uzivaju politicku demokratiju Cerne misli na socijalisticku demokratiju [55, str. 281]. Reklo bi se da je socijalizam u osnovi filozofija ravnopravnosti. Cerneova definicija, mada nikad nije izricito citirana - reference nisu popularne u ovoj zemlji moze se smatrati kao siroko prihyiacena medu ekonomistima i drugim drustvenim naucnicima. Na manje apstraktnom planu, u jedriom vaznom claiiku objavljenom 1953. godine, R. Uvalic je izneo glavne intencije novog ekonomskog sistema [53]. U administrativnom periodu proizvodnja se prosirivala bez obzira na troskove. Sada pak je cilj da se odrzi brz porast, ali troskovi igraju vazriu ulogu u odredivanju 18

strukture proizvodnje. Zakon vrednosti, tj. trziste ima da se pobrine za to. Ali dejstvo zakona vrednosti je ograniceno u dva vazna pogleda: raspodela dohotka i formiranje kapitala moraju biti pod koptrolom. Inace, upozorava Uvalic, eksploatacija i anarhija na trzistu ce se ponovo pojaviti. Ove ideje su dominirale ekonomSkom politikom u toku naredne decenije. Ali nespretna birokratska i cesto nekompetentna kontrola raspodele dohotka i formiranja kapi tala postajali su sve nepodnosljiviji. Odnos izmedu trzista i planiranja postaje stalna tema u ekonomskim diskusijama. Obicno se trziste i planiranje smatraju za dva razlicita mehanizma. Po misljenju F. Cernea, mehanizam pla niranja treba koristiti za dugorocne i opste odluke, dok se kratkorocne i delimicne odluke mogu ostaviti trzisnom mehanizmu [55, str. 11], Slican stav zauzeo je I. Lavrac [48], B. Jelic je detaljnije ispitao institucionalne aranzmane potrebne da se usklade trziste i planiranje. On tvrdi da neravnomerni rast ponekad zahteva intervencije cak i izvan opsteg okvira koji daje plan [56], Pri kraju ovog perioda, novi ekonomski sistem je dobio svoju prvu teoretsku racionalizaciju i u jednoj knjizi od ovog autora [25], Posto je drustveno-ekonomski sistem zamisljen kao udruzenje (poslovnih, politickih itd.) asocijacija, ja sam predlozio da se on nazove asocijativni socijaiizam. Istakao sam da ranija suprotnost izmedu trzista i planiranja nije nista drugo nego ideoloska zabluda. Trziste je samo jedan i pritom veoma efikasan instru ment drustvenog planiranja. Integracija trzista i planiranja, drustvene svojine i poslovne autonomije preduzeca stvara sistem sa interesantnim novim prakticnim kao i teoretskim karakteristika ma. Prva reagovanja na ovu knjigu bila su negativna [26], Smatralo se da insistiranje na potrosackom suverenitetu predstavlja (negativan) uticaj zapadnih ekonomija blagostanja. Smatralo se da je insistiranje na rigoroznoj tehnickoj analizi liseno drustvene sadrzine i stoga antimarksisticko. Smatralo se da insistiranje na trzisnoj ekonomiji odrazava uticaj zapadne teorije slobodnog takmicenja. Za analizu formiranja cena, u kojoj su kamata i renta igrale odredenu i jasno definisanu ulogu, govorilo se da predstavlja burzoasku teoriju. Slicnu kritiku izneli su i neki strani socijalisticki ekonomisti. E. Mandel je tvrdio da postoji definitivna nekompatibilnost iz medu socijalizma ili drukcije receno besklasnog drustva i visokog stepena drustvene jednakosti i ekonomske efikasnosti i proizvodnje robe [17]. To je tako jer robna proizvodnja neizbezno proizvodi drustvenu neravnopravnost i dovodi do rasipanja ekonomskih resursa. Citaocu nije receno zasto bi to moralo da bude neizbezno. U ovoj debati B. Ward je mozda dosao najblize istini. Sto se tice metoda analize on kaze: U teoriji vrednosti Horvat uspeva da proizvede manje-vise marksisticke rezultate iz manje-vise neoklasicnih pretpostavki [28, str. 519]. Sto se tice sustine
2*

19

teorije, on zakljucuje: Sasvim prirodno, ovaj rezim je u sustini socijalisticki; nije za cudo stoga sto on jako lici na Jugoslaviju. Ono sto iznenaduje je da sadrzi vise od ocekivane mere plauzibilnosti . . . [18, str. 509]. Vecina ideja razradenih u ovoj kfijizi 1958. godine dosad su vec apsorbovane i danas izgledaju ocevidne. Najnovija reforma je zasnovana na vodecim nacelima mehanizma trzista i dobrobiti pojedinaca kao proizvodaca i potrosaca.

3. SAMOUPRAVNI SOCIJALI^AM (a ) Institucionalni razvoj Poslednja faza jugoslovenskog posleratnog drustveno-ekonomskog razvoja bila je pripremljena nizom politickih, ekonomskih i ustavnih reformi u penodu 1958 1963. Ovaj burni period bio je inagurisan novim Programom Saveza komunista 1958. godine. Ovde je socijalizam definisan kao . . . drustveni sistem zasnovan na podrustvljenim sredstvima proizvodnje u kojima drustvenom proizvodnjom upravljaju udruzeni neposredni proizvodaci, u kojoj se vrsi raspodela dohotka prema ucinjenom radu i u kome, pod rukovodstvom radnicke klase, koja se menja kao klasa, svi dru stveni odnosi se postepeno oslobadaju klasnih antagonizama i svih elemenata eksploatacije coveka covekom [31, str. 133]. Na taj nacin bi jugoslovenska varijacija socijalizma podrazumevala drustvenu svojinu, samoupravljanje u privredi, nepriznavanje dohotka koji nije stecen radom i odsustvom eksploatacije. Izraz radnicka klasa, kao sto je nekoliko godina kasnije objasnio E. Kardelj, treba da znaci svi radni ljudi koji ucestvuju u drustvenom procesu racfa i u socijalistickim ekonomskim odnosima [32, str. 1511]. Vec 1960. godine uspesno je zavrsen i drugi petogodisnji plan. Privreda je bila u punom napretku. Samoupravljanje u preduzecima se vec dosta ucvrstilo. Program je otvorio put ubrzanom tempu promena. Pripremao se novi petogodisnji plan. Drustvo se osetilo spremno za nov i vazan korak napred. Godine 1961. izvrsene su tri radikalne reforme. Da bi se povecala efikasnost trzisne organizacije i poboljsao kvalitet proizvedene robe, dotle tako reci zatvorena privreda imala je da se sve vise izlozi uticajima svetskog trzista. Da bi se to postiglo, sistem visestrukih kurseva zamenjen je carinskom tarifom, dinar je devalviran, spoljna trgovina je do izvesne mere liberalizovana a zemlja je postala pridru2eni clan GATT-a. Posto je razvoj na podrucju novca i bankarstva zaostajao za opstim institucionalnim promenama, preduzeta je rekonstrukcija celokupnog finansijskog sistema. Najzad, izgledalo je nepogodno da sindikati nastave da kontrolisu nivoe plata i razlike u platama u samoupravnim preduzecima, te je ova kontrola ukinuta. Otada je na ovom polju trzisna konkurencija otisla dalje nego u bilo kojoj drugoj modernoj privredi. Ove tri reforme su 1961. godine najavile pocetak trece faze privrednog razvoja. 20

U to vreme zemlja je vec bila institucionalno spremna za novi Ustav, koji je proklamovan 1963. godine. Objasnjavajuci ciljeve Ustava, E. Kardelj, jedan od njegovih glavnih tvoraca, rekao je da je on ne samo Ustav drzave vec i posebna drustvena povelja koja ce pruziti materijalnu bazu, politicki okvir i stimulus za dalji unutrasnji razvoj sistema drustvenog samoupravljanja i neposredne demokratije [32, str. 1533]. Samoupravljanje je prosireno ne samo na privredu vec i na neprivrfedne organizacije. On je definisan kao nacelo samoupravljanja koje treba primenjivati u svim podrucjima ekonomskog, drustvenog i politickog zivota. Da bi se to . postiglo, Ustav je izmislio jednu novu instituciju: radnu organizaciju. Kad god se ljudi udruzuju da bi zaradivali za zivot, oni stvaraju radnu organizaciju i predstavljaju radnu zajednicu koja uziva ustavom zagarantovana osnovna samoupravna prava. Rdne organi- 3 zacije su preduzeca i druge poslovne ustanove, kao i~prosvetne, kultume, zdravstvene, socijalne i druge drustvene ustanove. Kao posledica toga, princip fuzije iz ustavnog zakona od 1953. godine prosiren je na sve ractne zajednice, a Skupstina je dobila tri veca radnih zajednica: Privredno vece, Prosvetno-kultumo.vece i Socijalno-zdravstveno vece. Tri reforme od 1961. godine bile su slabo pripremljene, delimicno nedosledne i lose sprovedene. Kao sto se moglo ocekivati, osetljiva trzisna privreda je ostro reagovala. Sve je poslo naopako: u jednoj godini stopa rasta industrijske proizvodnje je smanjena na polovinu svog nivoa od 1960. godine, uvoz je naglo porastao, izvoz je stagnirao, plate su otisle daleko ispred produktivnosti. Reformatori, naviknuti na sporu poluadministrativnu privredu, nisu se tome nadali. Planeri su povecali ciljeve za 1962. godinu da bi sustigli izvrsenje petogodisnjeg plana, i, naravno, gorko su se razocarali. Recesija se produbila. Postalo je jasno da ce plan morati da bude napusten. Drzavni i politicki forumi bili su duboko uznemireni. Konzervativni politicari i ekonomisti objasnjavali su neuspeh trzisnim sistemom i trazili da se ponovno uvede centralno planiranje. Pustanje velikih kolicina novca u promet pomoglo je da dode do poboljsanja u drugoj polovini 1962. godine. Naredne godine privreda se vratila na normalni put svog rasta. Uspon se nastavio u godini 1964. i zavrsio konjunkturom uz jaku inflaciju i veliki deficit u bilansu placanja. Nova recesija je donela i novu reformu. U toku 1964. godine skupstine su diskutovale o nacelima nove reforme [34]. Pocetkom 1965. godine drzavna administracija se bacila na posao. Do meseca maja zavrsene su tehnicke pripreme. U julu Savezna skupstina je izdala- paket zakona kojim je inaugurisana reforma [35]. Znacajno je da se resenje ekonomskih nevolja trazilo u daljoj decentralizaciji, u usavrsavanju samoupravne auto nomy e, u razvoj u konkurentnijeg trzista i u ukljucenju u medunarodnu podelu rada. Rezultat toga je licio na drugo, radikalnije i doslednije izdanje reforme od 1961. godine. Reforma je zapocela kao ekonomska, ali vrlo uskoro je proizvela i vazne drustvene i 21

politicke posledice. Policentricno planiranje nije moglo a da ne dovede do pluralistickog drustva. Reforma je u sustini postala nova faza revolucije, po recima V. Bakarica, predsednika Saveza komunista Hrvatske [62, str. 231]. Samoupravna autonomija postala je cvrsto ukorenjena u socijalistickom poretku.

(b ) Diskusija Reforma od 1961. godine takode poznata kao N ovi ekonomski sistem ( I I ) obelezila je pocetak istinske akademske diskusije o ekonomskim pitanjima. Do tog vremena institucionalne promene su bile prebrze a ekonomista je bilo suvise malo, te je rigorozna analiza i diskusija bila zamenjena deskripcijom. Diskusija je zapqceta raspravom izmedu Uvalica i Bicanica. Uvalic je ponovio svoja gledista da se regulisanje raspodele dohotka i formiranja kapitala ne mogu ostaviti trzistu. Do tada je raspodela prema radu nailazila na ozbiljne teskoce. Trziste kapitala, kao instrument za formiranje i raspodelu kapitala, bilo je neprihvatljivo jer bi dovelo do grupne svojine. Drustvena rentabilriost i individualna rentabilnost su dve razlicite stvari. Individualni interes jednog kolektiva je nizeg stepena i mora da ustupi pred drustvenim interesom [57], Bicanic tvrdi da Uvalic ne pravi jasnu razliku izmedu tzv. ekonomskog sistema i plana. Ekonomski sistem (opsti uslovi privredivanja) bio je instrument plana; sad su se odnosi izmenili (U stvari, na kongresu partije dve godine kasnije izricito se zatrazilo da plan postane instrument sistema umesto da se sistem prilagodava planu) [59, str. 29]. Uvalic ne daje predloge kako da se zamene trzista radne snage i kapitala. On u stvari ima na umu centralno planiranje sa slobodom dejstva za planere i politicare a disciplinom za ostale. Bicanic smatra da je ovo neprihvatljivo. Moderna privreda je u sustini policentricna a ne monocentricna [58]. U decembru 1962. godine Savez ekonomista je organizovao debatu u Beogradu o nacrtu novog ustava [60], Neki od ucesnika R. Davidovic, M. Macura, N. Cobeljic, K. Mihajlovic smatrali su da se uloga planiranja potcenjuje u nacrtu ustava. Macura je objasnio da je razlog tome to sto se ekonomskim problemima pristupa sa tacke gledista preduzeca, cak i pojedinca, a ne sa stanovista privrede kao celine [60, str. 462]. C obeljic'je smatrao da ce u buducnosti planska trzisna privreda biti zamenjena trzisnom planskom privredom [60, str. 473]. Mihajlovic je smatrao da dok trzista potrosacke robe i repromaterijala funkcionisu dobro, trzi sta investicione robe i kapitala su notorno slaba i zahtevaju striktnu kontrolu [60, str. 500], Debata je dostigla kulminaciju na sastanku mesec dana kasnije u Zagrebu. Dalja diskusija je bila podstaknuta neuspehom reforme. Pri vreda je duboko utonula u depresiju (u odnosu na uobicajene jugoslovenske prilike). Od pocetka 1961. do sredine 1962. godine, godi22

snja stopa rasta industrijske proizvodnje spala je sa 12 na 4 odsto. Vlada se zabrinula i zatrazila od jedne grupe ekonomista okuplje-' nih oko jednog naucnog instituta da iznadu sta se desilo. Ovaj postupak je stvorio presedan u stavu vlade prema upravljanju eko,nomskim poslovima. Za nekoliko meseci ova grupa je sastavila iz vestaj koji je popularno nazvan Zutom knjigom [36]. Tada je usppstavljen i drugi, jos znacajniji presedan: , vlada je prihvatila izvestaj. No, na zalost, ti presedani nisu kasnije ponovljeni. Nfalazi Z u t e k i i j i g e mogu se ovako sumirati. Neefikasno planiranje dovelo je do ekonomske nestabilnosti. Struktura ponude nije se poklapala sa strukturom potraznje, nastalo je opadanje u dugorocnim eksportnim trendovima, osecao se ozbiljan nedostatak kvalifikovane radne snage. Potencijalno nestabilna privreda bila je izlozena jednovremenim potresima tri slabo pripremljene i lose sprovedene reforme koje su ranije spomenute. Insistiranje na finansijskoj disciplirii dovelo je do ozbiljrie nestasice novca uz jake deflacione efekte. Ukidanje kontrole primanja dovelo je do stihijskih porasta licnih dohodaka koji nisu bili propraceni povecanjem produktivnosti. Liberalizacija spoljne trgovine povecala je deficit u bilansu placanja. U izvestaju je naglasena bitna vaznost ekonomskog istrazivanja kao baze za ekonomsku politiku, i stabilnost pravnog i politickog okvira kao preduslova za efikasno delovanje preduzeca u uslovima trzista. U meduvremenu jedna druga naucna ustanova je dala analizu nedostataka ekonomskog sistema. Ovaj izvestaj je nazvan Bela knjiga i u njemu se kritikpvalo pogresno planiranje, nesavrseno trziste, samovolja u raspodeli dohotka i nedoslednosti u investicioriim odlukama [37]. Oba dokumenta su pretresana na sastanku koji su zajednicki, organizovali Savez ekonomista i Savezni zavod za privredno: plariiranje u Zagrebu januara. 1965. godine [38]. Bivsi rukovodioci plana i izvestan broj ekonomista sa vise centralistickom orijentacijom.kritikovali su ova dva dokumenta. Oni su izrazjli sumnju u mogucnost efikasnog investiranja i visoke stope rasta u uslovima decentralizacije. Qni su smatrali da trziste neumitno vodi unistenju socijalistickog nacela raspodele dohotka.. Neki od njih su istakli da se u osnovi svih ekonomskih teskoca nalazi klasicni konflikt izmedu sustinski drustvenog karaktera proizvodnje i atomiziranog odlucivanja [38, str. 192]. Ipak vecina se ekonomist.a slozila u pogledu potrebe dalje decentralizacije i usavrsavanja samoupravne autonomije. Posle zagrebacke debate osnovni principi razvoja ekonomskog sistema nisu vise bili ozbiljno dovodeni u s.umnju medu jugoslovenskim ekonomistima. Poznata sala na racun lekara da je operacija uspela ali je pacijent umro mogla se primeniti i na diskusiju medu jugoslo venskim ekonomistima: uzroci ekonomskih nevolja su svi bili lepo objasnjeni ali reforma je umrla. Uskoro je p6stalo jasno da citav eksperiment mora da se ponovi. I to se i desilo, 1965. godine. Situacija je. bila prilicno komplikovana. Posmatrac sa strane je cesto u nedoumici, pisao je R. Bicanic. Pre svega nekoliko godina Ju;23

goslavija je predstavljala primer zemlje sa jednom od najvecih stopa porasta u zemlji, a sada je glavni cilj ekonomske politike da se smanje investicije. U toku vise od jedne decenije socijalisticka privreda se borila protiv birokratskog naredivanja; sada je moralo da se uvede administrativno zamrzavanje cena. Jugoslavija je bila prva zemlja na svetu koja je bila spremna da uvede radnicko samo upravljanje u preduzecima i da ukine sistem plata; sad se vodi diskusija o tome da li to znaci suvise mnogb ili suvise malo demokratije . . . Govorilo se da su nacionalni problemi reseni; zemlja je medutim, razdirana nacionalnim zategnutostima, koje su nastale od nedavno i koje su socijalisticke u poreklu. Napori da se nadu resenja za sve te probleme su sad usredsredeni u iedoj reci: Reforma [39, str. 633 34], Bicanic i Dzeba [40] vide sledece ciljeve u reformi. Njena neposredna svrha je da se suprostavi povecanom tempu inflacije; da otkloni hronicni deficit u bilansu placanja; da drasticno smanji sve vrste regresa (za izvoz, nerentabilnu proizvodnju itd.) kako bi se izbegla potreba za centralnim administrativnim intervencijama, da koriguje neuskladenost u cenama kako bi se uspostavili efikasniji trzisni odnosi i eliminisale administrativne kontrole. To su bili preduslovi za neke dugorocne mere strukturnih promena u privredi kao sto su revizija politike rasta i investicija; stavljanje produktivnosti privrede na medunarodno kompetitivni nivo; liberalizacija spoljne trgovine i otklanjanje deficita u bilansu placanja; konvertibilnost dinara kako bi se otvorila privreda i izlozila stimu-' lativnom uticaju svetskog trzista. U njenim sirim drustvenim vidovima reforma je trebalo da dovede do depolitizacije ekonomskih odluka; da udvostruci udeo preduzeca u kontroli nacionalnog dohotka, umanjujuci time ekonomsku snagu drzave; da poveze zivotni standard sa standardom produktivnosti; da poveca racionalnost ekonomskog odlucivanja. Bicanic zakljucuje da je osnovni cilj u stvari da se izgradi model socijalistickog sistema razvijene zemlje, koji ce biti sposoban da izdrzi konkurenciju drugih razvijenih zemalja bez neprestanog tutorstva drzavnog aparata [39, str. 643]. On i Horvat [4] su istakli da je ovaj model veoma razlicit od mesovite privrede drzave blagostanja. Navedeni cilj je imao da se postigne procesom koji je Bicanic nazvao cetiri de decentralizacijom, deetatizacijom, depolitizacijom i demokratizacijom. Kao sto se cesto desava, ideje su bile dobre ali izvrsenje slabo. Reforma je politicki bila mnogo bolje pripremljena nego ona od 1961. godine, ali ne i ekonomski. Ekonomski ona je bila zasnovana na prilicno naivnoj ideji o odrzivosti principa laissez-faire. Monetarna politika je izgledala prakticno jedini postojeci instru ment ekonomske politike. Radi stabilizacije cena, vlada je otezala . dobijanje krec^ita. To je imalo efekta, ali je isto tako dovelo do I deflacije uz nezaposlenost i stagnaciju. Od pocetka 1965. do sredine 1967. godine, godisnja stopa rasta industrijske proizvodnje spala je sa 12 odsto na minus jedan odsto. Negativna stopa rasta nije zabelezena jos od 1952. godine. Vlada je smatrala da je to neizbe24

zno i da se reforma u svojim strategijskim vidovima nastavljala po planu. Neki ekonomisti i mnogi poslovni ljudi su se zabrinuli. Po njihovom misljenju razvoj dogadaja bio je katastrofalan i vodio je jos jednom neuspehu. Uskoro su ekonomisti otkrili postojanje posldvnih ciklusa. Posto ciklusi nisu bili poznati kreatorima ekonomske politike drzalo se za evidentno da ciklusi ne mogu da postoje u socijalistickoj privredi ti su organi uoblicavali ekonomsku politiku kao da ciklusi nisu ni postojali. Rezultati takve ekonomske politike nisu mogli pobuditi odusevljenje. Otkrivanje ciklusa se odvijalo u fazama. Sukcesivna usporenja rasta navedena u Z u toj knjizi ukazivala su da je jugoslovenska privreda mozda podlozna ciklicnim oscilacijama. Ova hipoteza je potvrdena naucnim radom preduzetim u Institutu ekonomskih nauka.3 U prolece 1967. godine, u Ljubljani je odrzan sastanak ) Udruzenja ekonomista posvecen problemima stabilizacije [42], Cetiri referata su se izricito bavila poslovnim ciklusima. Pomenuti naucni institut se usudio da predskaze donju prekretnicu (1967), konjunkturu (1969) i recesiju (1970) sadasnjeg ciklusa, sto se po- j kazalo tacno sve do vremena pisanja ovih redova (druga polovina 1969). Nekoliko meseci posle ljubljanskog sastanka doslo je do javne debate. Ona je bila usredsredena na temu Ekonomska nauka i privreda [43]. Ucestvovalo je sedam ekonomista. A. Bajt je pokrenuo pitanje odgovornosti za reformu i kritikovao naivno glediste da investicije dovode do inflacije. Z. Baletic se osvrnuo na tvrdenje da postoji sukob izmedu politicara i ekonomista. Z. Mrkusic je analizirao.uravnotezenost spoljne trgovine. B. Horvat je istakao izvestan broj gresaka sadrzanih u trenutno popularnom ekonomskom rezonovanju (i sledstveno tome i ekonomskoj politici), i u jednom posebnom clanku, koji je izazvao burn nezadovoljstva u stampi, izracunao je gubitke prouzrokovane ciklicnom nestabilnoscu. Izgubljena proizvodnja pretpostavljalo se da iznosi oko 40 odsto drustvenog proizvoda. Ostala tri ekonomista su podrzavala zvanicno glediste da je sve manje-vise u redu. U feraru 1968. godine, Institut ekonomskih nauka je organizovao opstejugoslovensku konferenciju o tekucoj ekonomskoj situaciji. U referatu pripremljenom za ovu priliku [44] opisan je ciklicni mehanizam koji dejstvuje u jugoslovenskoj privredi i ucinjen je koherentan predlog anticiklicne politike. To je predstavljalo vazan korak napred. U predlogu se insistiralo na kombinaciji monetarnih i fiskalnih mera (fiskalna politika u to vreme tako \ reci nije ni postojala); na kombinaciji kontrole cena i dohotka, i na odnosu izmedu agregatne potraznje i investicija. Do kraja iste godine ponovila se jos jedna karakteristika neuspesne reforme od 1961. godine: dva naucna instituta su bila zvanicno zamoljena da ocene izvrsenje reforme. Medutim, u ovom zahtevu postojale su dve interesantne razlike: on nije dosao od
3) Z a d a lje p o je d in o sti v id i g la v u 5.

25

vlade vec od Centralnog komiteta Saveza. komunista. Pripremljena su dva izvestaja; nalazi su bili manje vise isti. Citiram iz izvestaja koji je bio objavljen [45]. U izvestaju se konstatovalo da uprkos jakoj deflacionoj politici cene nisu stabilnije nego sto su bile: pre reforme; da petogodisnji plan verovatno nece biti izvrsen; da se administrativna kontrola cena proteze nad vecim procentom proizvodnje nego pre reforme; da su trendovi liberalizacije spoljne trgovine zaustavljeni i vraceni; da se povecava deficit u bilansu placanja; da se smanjuje stopa akumulacije; da se povecavaju gubici i zaduzenost preduzeca; povecanje u produktivnosti, rada je nesto usporeno; i da je nezaposlenost veca nego ikad u zemlji za poslednje dve decenije. Razradujuci detaljnije svoju prvu prognozu, Institut je predskazao ubrzanje rasta u prvoj polovini 1969. godine (stopom koja je bila oko 60 odsto veca- nego ona koju je predskazao Savezni zavod za plan), inflacioni pritisak u drugoj polovini, i opadanje ciklusa i pocetak nove recesije krajem 1969. ili u prvoj .polovini 1970. godine. Prva dva predvidanja su se ostvarila, a ono posljednje jos uvek ima status prognoze u vreme kad se pisu ovi redovi. Nekoliko meseci kasnije V. Rajkovic je preduzeo da analizira neobjavljene elaborate koje je pripremila vlada kao bazu za reformu. Rajkovic je dosao do zakljucka da nijedan od vaznih ciljeva nije bio postignut na zadovoljavajuci nacin [61, str. 47], Jos jednom se postavilo ljobno pitanje: sta se desilo? Pazljiva analiza dogadaja izgleda da navodi na.sledeci odgovor. Ekonomski rast i institucionalne promene bile su suvise brze da bi drzavni aparat i drugi organi ekonomske politike bili u stanju da se s njima efikasno ponesu. Takoreci preko noci jedna zaostala balkanska zemlja je dostigla evropski standard ekonornskog razvoja, a adixiinistrativna privreda je pretvorena u trzisnu privredu. U isto vreme odgovorne vlasti cesto nisu imale potrebno razumevanje. o tome kako deluje moderna trzisna privreda.. Ako svemu tome dodamo pionirstvo u sistemu samoupravljanja ; koji ne postoji nigde drugde na svetu postaje jasno zasto su se kompleksnosti drustveno-ekonomskih okolnosti ogromno povecale i zasto ce biti potrebno da prode .vreme dok se ne prilagodi organizacioni okvir, dok se ne steknu potrebna znanja i.d ok he pocne riovi drustveni sistem da dejstvuje bez tegoba [43, 45, 46].

II

PLANIRAN JE
4. C ETIR I PETOGODISNJA PLANA U prvoj glavi smo objasnili osnovne principe centralistickog planiranja. Do 1947. godine izgradten je aparat za centralisticko planiranje privrede. Obimari posao planiranja poveren je hijerarhijski organizovanim planskim komisijama na razlicitim nivoimasaveznom, republickom, na nivou srezova i gradova. Za operativno planiranje i izvrsenje planova zaduzena su bila ministarstva, generalne i glavne direkcije i planska odeljenja unutar preduzeca. Godisnji planovi delili su se na tromesecne, mesecne i desetodnevne. 1949. godine plan je obuhvatio oko 13.000 grupa proizvoda [1, str. 15]. Te godine drzavni budzet je cinio dve trecine nacionalnog do hotka [ 1, str. 453]. Svako preduzece je bilo obavezno da dostavi 600 800 razlicitih izvestaja godisnje svom pretpostavljenom organu. Godisnji privredni plan tezio je oko tonu i po. [42, str. 65]. Svakom preduzecu unapred je odredivano od koga ce nabaviti a kome prodavati.svoje proizvode. Kako su se adniinistrativni ukazi pokazali nesavrseni, preduzecima je preporuceno da se snadu. Planski organi su im dodeljivali vise sredstava nego sto je trazeno i zahtevali od njih da ih potrose. Kako su cene bile utvrdene trosenje sredstava znacilo je nalazenje sirovina i investicionih dobara neophodnih za ispunjenje plana. U trzisnoj privredi svako nastoji da ustedi novae, a u privredi sa centralistickim planiranjem tesko je potrositi sredstava. U prvom slucaju najtezi zadatak je prodaja, a u drugom najveci problem za poslovne ljude predstavlja kupovina. . Privredom je rukovodeno kao nekini mamutskim preduzecem. To je zahtevalo osnivanje sistema za kontinuelno pracenje poslovanja svih preduzeca. 1948. godirie, B. Kidric prigovara svima onima koji su smatrali da nije potrebno da se podnose dnevni izvestaji i koji su se zadovoljavali desetodnevnim izvestavanjem [2, str. 468]. Mnogo godiiia kasnije, J. Stanovniku, sadasnjem sekretaru Ekonomske komisije UN za Evropu, na jednom predavanju koje je odrzao za svedske ekonomiste u Stokholmu, postavljeno je pitanje koja se sve sredstva koriste u Jugoslaviji za izvrsenje pla nova. Telefoni, odgovorio je Stanovnik.

21

Prvi petogodisnji plan obuhvatao je period od 1947. do 1951. godine. Plan je proklamovao cetiri glavna cilja: 1) savladavanje ekonomske i tehnoloske zaostalosti 2) jacanje ekonomske i vojne moci zemlje 3) jacanje i razvijanje socijalistickog sektora privrede 4) povecanje opsteg blagostanja naroda. Plan je vodio racuna i o potrosnji, ali je ona bila pqslednja u redosledu prioriteta. Napred nabrojane ciljeve trebalo je postici naglim povecanjem proizvodnje; u poredenju sa predratniiji nivoima predvidalo se da se nacionalni dohodak poveca za 1,9 puta, poljoprivredna proizvodnja za 1.5, industrijska za 4.9. Medutim, zbog nedovoljnih i netacnih statistickih podataka, verovatno je da je predratni nivo proizvodnje u velikoj meri potcenjen, tako da su tri cilja postignuta tek 1954, 1959. odn. 1961. godine. U pocetku je sprovodenje plana bilo zadovoljavajuce, iako ne u potpunosti na nacin kako se to -verovalo4). 1949. godine ekonom4) v . B eg o vic p o d n o si izveStaj o p re m a S a ju p rv o g d e la P eto g o d iS n jeg p la n a (3 ). M ed u tim , k a s n ije sta tistifik e p ro c e n e p o k a z u ju d a s u p o d a c i k o je je d a la S avezna p la n s k a k o m is ija p reu v elifiav an i. (4, s tr . 251, 484). U p o g l6 d u p ro iz v o d n je in d u s tr ije i r u d a rs tv a ove ra z lik e su sledece:

1948. 1946. Savezna Planska kom isija Savezni zavod za statistiku (kasniji proracuni) 267 190

In d ek s i 1949. 1948. 116.6 111

1950. 1949. 106.3 103

ska blokada zemalja Kominforma prisilila je Jugoslaviju da potrazi nova trzista za oko polovinu svoga izvoza i da obezbedi istu kolicinu uvoza iz drugih izvora. Iako je u naredne dve godine obezbedena znatna inostrana pomoc, ova iznenadna orijentacija spoljne trgovine gusila je rast proizvodnje. Sledeci udarac dolazi 1950. godine kada je jaka susa smanjila poljoprivredni prinos za jednu trecinu. Kolektivizacija je jos vise doprinela otezavanju situacije u poljoprivredi. Radikalna reorganizacija privrede, 1951. godine, mogla je samo jos vise da iskoniplikuje stvari. Industrijska proiz vodnja pala je 1951. godine za 4% i za jos 1% vise 1952. godine. Izvrsenje plana produzeno je za godinu dana. Medutim, to vise nije imalo nikakvog smisla, tako da izvestaj o ispunjenju Prvog petogodisnjeg plana nikad nije bio objavljen. Pa ipak, ako nije predstavljao potpun uspeh, plan ni u kom slucaju nije bio ni promasaj. Plan je podigao proizvodnju znatno vise iznad predratnog nivoa; povisio je ucesce bruto investicija u osnovna sredstva na 33% od drustvenog proizvoda i stvorio je citave nove industrije. 1952. godine centralisticko planiranje zamenjeno je planiranjem globalnim proporcijama. Ove proporcije su bile: obavezni 28

minimum kapaciteta proizvodnje i odgovarajuceg platnog fonda, dobit kao postotak platnog fonda (instrument planiranja plata), investicije, porezi i alokacija budzetskih sredstava [5, str. 31]. Na ovaj nacin se ocekivalo da ce centralni plan regulisati opste privredne aktivnosti bez administrativnih naredenja, time sto ce uticati na stopu rasta i na proporcije izmedu investicija i potrosnje, kao i na strukturalne promene u privredi [6]. Stara Planska komisija koja je imala ulogu nekog vrhovnog organa nad radom svih privrednih ministarstava i kojoj je bilo povereno celokupno sprovodenje plana [19] zamenjena je Saveznim zavodom za plan, jednom strucnom institucijom koja nema upravnu vlast. Repu blike, srezovi (kasnije opstine) i preduzeca samostalno donose svoje planove. Drzavno planiranje postaje drustveno planiranje, sto je znacilo mogucnost sireg dogovaranja medu zainteresovanim stranama, osnivanje tzv. institucija sa samostalnim finansiranjem i autonomiju u donosenju planova preduzeca. Naredne tri godine koriste se za dovrsenje kljucnih investicionih projekata zacrtanih Petogodisnjim planom. U diskusijama o planu za 1955. godinu moze se uociti novo raspolozenje; zapaza se zapostavljenost poljoprivrede, veliki obim i jednostranost investi cija [ 7, str. 147, 150]. Na kraju te godine M. Popovic izjavljuje u Saveznoj skupstini da je jedno razdoblje naseg privrednog razvitka zavrseno. 1956. godina sluzi za pripremu drugog petogodisnjeg plana za period 1957 1961. U ovom planu nalazimo da je porast potrosnje vec na trecem mestu medu pet najvaznijih ciljeva [8, str. 220]. Rast investicija nesto je usporen dok je struktura inve sticija radikalno izmenjena. Ulaganja u industriju su znatno smanjena u cilju udvostrucavanja investicija u poljoprivredu kao i povecanja investicija u transport i trgovinu [7, str. 211]. Medu preradivackim industrijama predvida se veca ekspanzija robe siroke potrosnje. Ubrzane su i tzv. neproizvodne investicije u drustvenu infrastrukturu. Sve ove promene pokazale su se korisne i plan je bio izvrsen za cetiri godine. Sistem planiranja se dobro uklapao u potrebe privrede i delovao je na zadovoljavajuci nacin. Ovaj sistem su opisali J. Sirotkovic [9], S. Dabcevic [10] i B. Jelic [11]. Prvi plan je poremetio strukturu privrede time sto je osnovni naglasak stavljen na investicije u teskoj industriji. Drugi plan je preuzeo na sebe da ispravi ovu gresku ali je otisao u drugu krajnost time sto je preterano razvio industriju robe siroke potrosnje. Prema tome, zadatak treceg plana bio je da ponovo uspostavi ravnotezu ubrzanim ulaganjima u proizvodnju elektricne energije, metalurgiju i proizvodnju reprodukcionog materijala. Ovakve fluktuacije u investicijama navele su N. Cobeljica i R. Stojanovica da postave tezu o investicionim ciklusima koji su svojstveni socijalistickoj privredi sa (neravnomernim) tempom tehnickog progresa [12]. Z. Baletic, A. Bajt i drugi kritikovali su ovu teoriju kao neprihvatljivu posto su greske u planiranju svojstvene neznanju a ne socijalizmu, a da je tehnicki progres prilicno neduzan u tom smislu. 29

Treci petogodisnji plan za period od 1961. do 1965. godine nastojao je da jos vise ubrza rast proizvodnje. Licna potrosnja zauzima sada drugo mesto u redosledu prioriteta [8, str. 221], Jedva da je plan bio i lansiran kad se zemlja nasla usred perioda recesije cije sam uzroke objasnio u prethodnoj glavi. Plan je bio osuden na propast. Da bi se izbegle nepozeljne diskusije, Savezna skupstina je odlucila da ga zameni sedmogodisnjim planom koji bi obuhvatio period od 1964. do 1970. godine. U tom cilju Skup stina je izglasala Rezoluciju u kojoj su bili definisani sledeei osnovni ciljevi novog plana [13]: 1) stalan porast zivot'nog standarda, na prvom mestu licne potrosnje, uz povecanje ucesca licnih dohodaka u raspodeli riacionalnog dohotka; 2) priblizavanje medunarodnim standardima u pogledu intenzivhijeg privredivanja i produktivnbsti rada; 3) ekspanzija .spoljne trgovine iiitenzivnijim ukljucivanjem Jugoslavije u medunarodnu podelu rada; 4) ubrzani razvoj nedovoljno razvijenih republika, i krajeva; 5) dalji razvoj socijalistickih drustvenih odnosa a posebno jacanje uloge neposrednih proizvodaca i radnili organizacija u celokupnom drustvenom procesu reprodukcije. Ako uporedimo ove cilj eve sa onima koje je proklamovao Prvi petogodisnji plan jasno se vidi koliko je drustveno planiranje udaljeno od drzavnog planiranja privrede. Zivotni standard (blagostanje) pojedinaca sada se pomera sa. kraja na pocetak liste prioriteta5 Iza svih ovih promena mozemo uociti filozofiju po ). kojoj ekonomsko blagostanje predstavlja i cilj i ujedno najsnazniji stimulans proizvodnje. Jedna autarhicna orijentacija zamenjena je otvaranjem prema svetskom ti;zistu i medunarodnim uticajima. Izgradenost socijalisticke privrede ne meri se vise ucescem drzave u nacionalnom kapitalu vec stepenom razvijenosti samoupravnih odnosa, Ipak, Prvi petogodisnji plan i Rezolucija imali su jednu zajednicku crtu: ni jedan ni drugi .nisu ostvareni. Rezolucija je, u stvari, nagovestavala Reformu iz 1965. go dine. Promene koje su nastupile u ekonomskim institucijama bile su toliko radikalne da je bilo neophodno pripremiti novi petogo disnji plan za period 1966 1970. Planom su bili obuhvaceni sv'i ciljevi Rezolucije. Plan je predvidao nesto nizu stopu rasta drustvenog proizvoda (7.5 8.5% godisnje), relatiVno skromnu ekspanziju preradivacke industrije (9 10%), ali visoku stopu povecanja produktivnosti rada (6 7% gbdisnje). Tekuce analize Saveznog zavoda za plan ukazuju na to da ovi ciljevi verovatno nece biti postignuti [14].
5) Lifina p o tro n ja je u p e rio d u 19481952. sm a n je n a po g o d ignjoj sto p i od 2%; u p e rio d u o d 19531956. o n a p o c in je d a r a s te p o isto j sto p i k a o i n a c io n a ln i d o h o d a k 9.3/o godiSnje; n a k o n ovog p e rio d a n je n a sto p a r a s ta p re v a z ila z i sto p u r a s ta n acio n a ln o g d o h o tk a [ 18, s tr. 207209].

30

5. RAST I CIKLUSI Da bi mogli da ocenimo uspehe i nedostatke planiranja a i ekonomske politike uopste moramo da razmotrimo neke statisticke podatke. U sledecoj tabeli dat je sumarno prikaz promena izrazenih u stopama rasta najvaznijih statistickih agregata.
Tabela 5.1 Rast jugoslovenske prlvrede u periodu 1946 1968. godine (Stope rasta u /o godisnje)

Centralno planiranje 1946 1952.

Decentralizacija 1952 1960.

Samoupravijan je 1960 1968. 6.8= 7.9 2.1 7.0 7.0 2.4

Drustveni proizvod Industrijska proizvodnja Poljoprivredn a proizvodnja Izvoz TJvoz Zaposlenostd

2.3a 12.9 3.1a 3.1b 3.6b 8.3a

9.8 13.4 8.9 11.7 9.7 6.9

d) 19471952. b ) 19481952. c) 19601967. d ) L ica z a p o sle n a iz v a n p riv a tn o g se k to r a p o ljo p riv re d e . Jzvor: Statistidki godisnjaci:

U periodu centralistickog planiranja kolektivizacija je izazvala stagnaciju u poljoprivredi, a ekonomski bojkot od strane zemalja Kominforma izazvao je stagnaciju u izvozu. U sledecem periodu privreda, oslobodena okova, pocinje da se razvija punim zamahom u svim svojim sferama, s tim sto u drugoj fazi ovog perioda dolazi do ubrzanja stope rasta. Spoljna trgovina se razvija brze od pro izvodnje a izvoz raste brze u odnosu na uvoz. U trecem periodu poljoprivredna proizvodnja je dostigla zahteve domaceg trzista, ali je sve teze da prodre sa izvozom na evropsko trziste. Sporo sirenje trzista poljoprivrednih proizvoda izaziva snizenje stope rasta poljoprivredne proizvodnje. Povecana ekonomska nestabilnost potiskuje prosecnu stopu rasta preradivacke industrije. Kao rezultat ovoga celokupni tempo ekspanzije je smanjen. U svim ovim zbivanjima institucionalni faktori o kojima je napred bilo reci odigrali ,su znacajnu ulogu. Ako zelimo da procenimo ucinak cele privrede u jednom duzem vremenskom periodu, najprikladnije je-izgleda da uzmemo period od 1952. do 1968. godine. Za ovih sesnaest godina celokupna proizvodnja povecala se za tri i po puta, industrijska proizvodnja pet puta, poljoprivredna proizvodnja dva i po puta, spoljnotrgovinska razmena cetiri puta a zaposlenost izvan privat nog sektora tri puta. 31

Posto je Jugoslavia do sada jedina zemlja koja je prosla kroz tri razlicita ekonomska sistema kapitalisticki, etatisticki i samoupravni u toku jednog relativno kratkog vremenskog perioda, mogli bi da izvrsimo komparitvnu ocenu efikasnosti ova tri sis tema. Nesto slicno pokusao je da uradi americki ekonomista T. Marschak. On je smanjio dimenzije ovog problema time sto je proucavao komparativnu efikasnost centralizovanog i decentralizovanog sistema. Medutim, on ne daje neke konacne zakljucke. On sinatra da su pouke koje bi savremeni planeri ekonomskih sistema mogli da izvuku iz jugoslovenskog iskustva iznenadujuce nejasne [21, str. 586], Istrazivanja su kasnije vrsena u Institutu ekonom skih nauka [16]. Efikasnost je merena pomocu stope proizvodnje koja je rezultat tehnickog progresa koji je definisan kao rezidualna velicina nakon sto se obracunaju doprinosi radne snage i osnovnih sredstava. Rezultati su sumirani u tabeli 5.2.
Xabela 5.2 K oriscenje radne snage i sredstava i tehnicki progres u Jugoslaviji Godisnje stope rasta u % >

D rustveni proizvod

Zaposlenost

Osnovna sredstva

Stope rasta drustvenog proizvoda k oje su re zultat povecanja efik a snosti 0.71 3.16 1.04 4.44

Kapitalizam : Etatizam: Sam oupravlja n je:

1911 1932. 1932 1940. 1940 1954. 1956 1967.

3.28 4.67 5.91 10.31

1.87 0.72 4.76 4.44

3.52 2.59 9.99 7.84

P rim e d b a : Iz ove ta b e le iz u z e te su r a tn e g o d in e 19141918. i 19111944. P o d aci se o d n o se n a in d u s tr iju , r u d a rs tv o , p ro iz v o d n ju elek trlfin e e n e rg ije , g ra d e v in a rstv o i z a n a tstv o .

Raspolozivi podaci odredili su periodizaciju u gornjoj tabeli koja nije najpozeljnija. Ipak rezultati ove analize navode na vise zakljucaka. U prethodnom odeljku smo konstatovali da je pro gram investicione izgradnje predviden Prvim petogodisnjim planom zavrsen 1955. godine. Statisticka ispitivanja vrsena su u IE N pokazala su da je jugoslovenska privreda funkcionisala na osnovu dve potpuno razlicite proizvodne funkcije. Jedna se odnosi na period 1947 1955. a druga na period koji je usledio. Prva je imala negativnu rezidu32

~T I [

Go'disnje

stope

rasta

(%>)

alnu velicinu, a druga pozitivnu i to veoma veliku. Ova tabela navodi na zakljucak da je centralisticko planiranje doprinelo brzom povecanju proizvodnje i .zaposlenosti, kao i brzoj akumulaciji u poredenju sa predratnom kapitalistickom privredom. Ali je ono i smanjilo celokupnu efikasnost privrede. Samoupravljanje je ubrzalo rast proizvodnje i tehnicki progres do nivoa do tada nepoznatog, dok je istovremeno zadrzalo brzu ekspanziju zaposlenosti. Kao sto se .odmah moze primetiti, ovaj rast je bio brz ali ne i ravnomeran. U pocetku neki ekonomisti odbacuju mogucnost razvoja u regularnim ciklusima. Medutim, istrazivanja vrsena u IE N pokazuju postojanje privrednih ciklusa koji traju po .oko cetiri godine. [17]. Ovi ciklusi koji se manifestuju kao fluktuacije u stopama rasta (vid i grafikon 5.1) pokazuju neke interesantne karakteristike koje ne nailazimo nigde drxigde. Tako, npr! zalihe se akumuliraju u silaznim fazama ciklusa a dekumuliraju u fazania uspona; akcelerator ne deluje; cene pokazuju tendenciju variranja u obmutom smeru od ciklusa, itd. Gornje prelomne tacke se izgleda stvaraju usled razlicitih kretanja u Uvozriim i izvoznim elasticitetima, sto na kraju dovodi do jedne eksplozije u deficitu platnog bilansa. Donje prelomne tacke je malo teze objasniti. A ,;Bajt veruje da je traznja potrosaca do izvesne mere autonomna te doprinosi akceleraciji stope rasta [48]. Ukoliko se poceci ciklusa mere od tacaka infleksije u silaz nim fazama stopa rasta (ove tacke odgovaraju vrhovima odstupanja od jednog eksponencijalnog trenda apsolutnih velicina) oni .se izgleda podudaraju sa glavnim ekonomskim reformama. Prema: tome, ovih pet ciklusa koji su se do sada zbili na iiiteresahtan nacin opisuju istoriju posleratne ekonomske politike (rimski brojevi oznacavaju kvartale): 1. Ciklus: N ovi privrediii sistem (1 ), III/1949 111/1^55. J ... 2. Ciklus: Prelazni period do Drixgog petogodisnjeg plana) III/1955 11/1958. 'l ' 3. Cislus: N ovi sistem raspodele dohotka, 11/1958 ; iy/1960. 4. Ciklus: N ovi privredni sistem (2 ), IV /1960 1/1965. 5. Ciklus: Privredna reforma, 1/1965 ? Izgleda da i ciklican institucionalni razvoj isto ta!ko predstdvlja novu karakteristiku .privrednih ciklusa. !

6.

P O LITIK A RAZVOJA I METODE PLANIRANJA . ;:

a) Politika razvoja i funkcije dnistvenih planova

Filozofiju razvoja opste prihvacenu od strane jugosldvenskih ekonomista i Vlade do 1956. godine dobro je opisao N. Cdbeljic,-ur to vreme zamenik direktora Saveznog zavoda za plan. Cobeljic kaze da brza industrijalizacija predstavlja glavni metod generiranja raz voja. Industrijalizacija stvara nove mogucnosti zaposljavanja u gradovima, sto ublazava latentnu nezaposlenost u poljoprivrbdi,'
3

33

Porast gradske radne snage stvara dodatnu traznju za poljopri-' vrednirfl proizvodima i time stimulise razvoj poljoprivrede. Fizicka kontrola spoljnotrgovinske razmene u cilju sprecavanja uvoza nepotrebne robe i obezbedenja. uvoza investicione opreme i brzeg razvoja industrije robe siroke potrosnje (tzv. odeljak I ) doprinose ubrzanom industryskom rastu-, sto sa .svoje strane stvara razvojne impulse u celoj privredi. . Uvoz . se placa izvozom sirovina i poljoprivrednih proizvoda. Neophodna stednja se obezbeduje pravilnom politikom cena, U pretezno privatnom: sektoru poljoprivrede zadrzavaju se niske cene, dok se u industriji robe siroke potrosnje vestacki povecavaju preko visokih poreza na promet. Gore opisana ekonomSka politika ne samo da je bila zastiipana vec i dosledno sprpvodena. U. periodu od 1950. do 1956. go dine ulaganja u industriju i rjidarstvo^ apsorbpvala su 51% od celokupnili ulaganja. Ucesce' indusjrije u riacidrialnom dobotku poraslo je sa 21% u 1939. godini na .40% u 1956. godini. Cetiri petine industrijskih ulaganja kanalisano je u. tesku industriju i proizvodnju elektricne energije. Ucesce akumulacije u nacionalnom dohot: ku poraslo je cetiri puta u poredenju sa predratnim nivooni [20, str. 178, 366]. Sistem planiranja u periodu 1947 1952. bio je u skladu sa ovakvom politikom razvpja. B. Jelic,. u to vreme zam. direktora u Saveznom zavodu za plan, dao je sledece glavne karakteristike ovog sistema: a) stfogo centralizovano odlucivanje u pogledu prioriteta, dinamlke i strukture razvpja; t ) fizicka alokacija resursa (faiktora proizvodnje) kao osnovni metod pjaniranja; c ) finansijski elementi su od sekund^rnog znacaja i. sluze za postizanje uskladenosti u pogledu vrednosti; d) ciljevi predstavljaju ,direktive;: e) proizvodnja se planira u fizickom obimu, a akumulacija se planira preko pojedinacnih irivesticionih projekata; f ) cene su utvrdene administrativnim putem; g) svi. ovi elementi koji. cine plan pred stavljaju ujedno i instrumente za njegovo sprovodenje [11, str. 102 105], Posto je ova masinerija rasta stavljena u pokret .na gore opisan nacin, a privreda organizovana na socijalistickim principima, javila se mogucnost i potreba za jednim drugacijim pristupom. Cobeljic sada ocekuje usklSdeniji rast. Jelic se poziva ha teoriju poletanja Rostowa kao i na Bicanicevu teoriju praga rasta [22] i insistira na decentralizovanoj inicijativi (odlucivanju) kao daljem pokretacu rasta. Samoupravljanje podrazumeva da se funkcija planiranja odvoji od funkcije operativnog rukovodenja. Jelic istice da drustveni planovi treba da odreduju bar tri globalne proporcije osnovnu raspodelu nacionalnog dohotka, strukturu investicija i odnose sa inos.transtvom ukoliko zelimo da planovi budu efikasna sredstva u sprovodenju drustvenih ciljeva [11, str. 144]. D. Bjelogrlic,. direktor Zavoda .za. plan ,SR Srbije, prihvata ove tri iste globalne .proporcije kao osnovne. On, medutim, jos dodaje i cetvrtu proporciju: relativni razvoj nedovoljno razvijenih 34

republika i pokrajina [23, str. 118]. Bjelogrlic iznosi ovakve stavove u svom referatu na konferenciji o drustvenom planiranju koja je odrzana u Beogradu, 1965. godine. Na istoj konferenciji N. Cobeljic i K. Mihajlovic govore u prilog uvoctenja jos veceg broja direktiva u planiranju, dok M. Samardzija i M. Korac tvrde da i samo planiranje ucesca akumulacije i strukture investicija znaci krsenje samoupravljanja. Ovakva diskusija-koja je obuhvatala jedan sirok spektar misljenja pocev od polucentralizovanog planirahja pa sve do gotovo potpunog laissgr faire pristupa, karakteristicna je za jugoslovenske ekonomiste od donosenja novog Ustava 1963. godine. Postoji tendencija da se ide do. laisser. faire krajnosti. 1960. godine savezna vlada kontrolise 4896. poslovnih investicija neposredno preko Opsteg investicionog fonda, i jps 14% indirektno preko vezanih zajmova [11, str. 158]. 1969. godine, na Kongresu Saveza komunista preporuceno je ukidanje tzv. drzavnog kapitala s tim sto u buduce Savezna vlada nerna vise nikakve direktne kontrole nad investicionim sredstvima. Do danas jos nije pronadeno neko zadovoljavajuce resenje, a ni rad na izradi Zakona 0 drustvenom planiranju, koji je zapocet 1963. godine, nije jos priveden kraju [24], J. Sirotkovic (25), bivsi direktor Zavoda za planiranje SRH, R. Stajner, generalni direktor Saveznog zavoda za privredrio planiranje, M. Mesaric [26] i drugi koji zastupaju novi pristup planiranju, tvrde da strucnu funkciju planiranja treba dopuniti jednom naglasenom drustvenom funkcijom, da godisnje planove treba napustiti i zameniti ih skupstinskim rezolucijama (sto se u praksi i cini pocev od 1966. godine) da se srednjorocni planovi moraju neprekidno revidirati i produzavati svake dve do tri godine. R. Bicanic govori o policentricnom plani ranju kao pozeljnom sistemu planiranja. Ovakvo planiranje pretpostavlja postojanje jednog mehanizma planiranja koji bi se'sastojao od vise samostalnih planova koji bf medusobno bili povezani na jedan specifican, koherentan nacin [32, 33], Ove ideje su bile u manjoj ili vecoj meri prihvacene. Medutim, u skupstinskim debatama cula se kritika o tome da nije uopste jasno na koji na cin bi se takvi planovi sprovodili [24, str. 91]. Praksa je pokazala da se u pogledu sprovodenja planova jos mnogo sta moze pozeleti, a preostaje da se donese i Zakon o drustvenom planiranju, na cijo j je izradi rad poceo jos 1963. godine. Funkcije drustvenog planiranja u sadasnjim jugoslovenskim uslovima date su u radu Instituta ekonomskih nauka [27, str.-20], a na slican nacin ih opisuje i M. Mesaric [28]. Ove funkcije su sledece: [1], Plan je pre svega instrument predvidanja. [2]. Kao takav on pruza privrednim subjektima potrebne informacije.za. donosenje samostalnih odluka. Prema tome plan j e tu isto vreme 1 instrument za koordinaciju privrednih odluka [3]. Kada se utvrde odgovarajuci drustveni ciljevi uz obaveznu konsultaciju svih drustvenih faktora, primenom modernih instrumenata ekonomske politike plan postaje instrument usmeravanja privrednog razvoja [4], Posto se drustveni plan usvoji od strane Savezne
3*

35

skupstine, on postaje direktiva za Savezno izvrsno vece i druge drzavne organe. Tacka [4] predstavlja jedini administrativni odnosno prinudni aspekt drustvenog planiranja.
/ /

(b ) Institucionalni okvir Preduslov za efikasno drustveno planiranje je adekvatna analiza funkcionisanja institucionalnih okvira. Opsti uvid u to kako funkcionise nas privredni sistem moze se dobiti iz opisa koji je dao autor ovog rada [29]. Jugoslovenski privredni sistem se sastoji od samostalnih samoupravnih radnih organizacija i pojedinacnih proizvodaca u trzisnom i netrzisnom sektoru kao i u vladinom aparatu. Zadatak ovog poslednjeg je u tome da putem neadministrativnih mera koordinira aktivnost trzisnih i netrzisnih faktora i da organizuje javnu upravu u odredenim podrucjima koji su od opsteg interesa (sudstvo, narodna odbrana, spoljni poslovi, itd). Funkcionisanje ovog ekonomskog sistema zasniva se na pretpostavci da su samoupravni radni kolektivi materijalno zainteresovani za maksimizaciju svog dohotka i da su savezna vlada i Skupstina u stanju da obezbede takve ekonomske uslove u kojima ce se samostalni faktori odlucivanja ponasati u skladii sa opstim drustvenim interesima. Moderna ekonomska teorija i iskustva dobro organizovanih trzisnih privreda potvrduju ispravnost ovih dveju pretpostavki. Izmedu Centra (Skupstina) i Periferije (Radne. organizacije) aktivno deluju cetiri tipa gravitacionih sila u odrzavanju ravnoteze sistema i ekonomskih faktora na predvidenim putanjama koje su od drustveriog interesa.' Ove sile su informaciono-konsultacione veze, trzisne veze, veze ekonomske politike (instrumenti ekonomske politike i zakonodavstva) i administrativne veze. Ove poslednje veze su izuzetne u odnosu na privredne faktore a primenjuju se na razlicite organe Centra kao sto su ministarstva (sekretarijati), Narodna banka, neki zavodi i slicno. Ja bih jos dodao da postoji i peta vrsta veza politicke veze koje zatvaraju citavu strukturu povezujuci radne organizacije sa Skupstinom tokovima direktiva (strelicama) koje. su usmerene od Periferije ka Centru. Radi nedostatka prostora ja necu.dublje ulaziti u analizu ovih veza (to je razlog sto su one izostavljene iz Seme 1). Da razmotrimo sada trzisni deo naseg privrednog kosmosa. Trziste na prvom mestu koordinira aktivnosti.preduzeca i individualnih proizvodaca. Trziste je, medutim, dosta grub i nepouzdan mehanizam koji zahteva stalna podesavanja. Ova podesavanja se postizu putem opstih zakonskih mera i instrumenata privredne politike savezne vlade. Finansijski tokovi, u cilju postizanja zeljene alokacije sredstava, regulisani su od strane Narodne banke u okvirima dnistvenog plana. Postoje jos dva tipa specificnih. finansijskih intervencija: u oblasti spoljne trgovine (krediti i osiguranje 36

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izvoznih rizika) i investicija (obezbedenje pravilne strukture i regionalne alokacije akumulacije). Za ove svrhe postoje tri savezna fonda: savezni fond za kreditiranje izvoza, za nedovoljno razvijena podrucja i savezni investicioni fond. Trzisna ravnoteza se postize uz pomoc tri institucije. Dve institucije Direkcije za ishranu i za rezerve industrijskih proizvoda interveniraju uvek kad ponuda ne odgovara potraznji. Direkcija za ishranu takode sprovodi i politiku raznih vrsta garantovanih cena u poljoprivredi. Treca institucija, Zavod za cene, danas predstavlja dosta stran element u ovoiii sistemu. Pretpostavljam da ce u skoroj buducnosti ovaj savezni zavod da preraste u Arbitrazu za cene i licne dohotke, instituciju ii kojoj bi bile zastupljene sve zainteresovane strane a sve odluke se donosile zajednicki. U datom trenutku vise od 40% cena industrijskih proizvoda je kontrolisano. Zavodi za statistiku i drustveno planiranje imaju samo informativno-savetodavne funkcije u ovom sistemu. Aktivnost skola, bolnica, muzeja i drugih netrzisnih radnih organizacija ne moze se koordinirati direktno preko trzista kao sto je to slucaj sa preduzecima. U socijalistickom drustAm bolesnim osobama mora da bude pruzena lekarska pomoc, talentovanim mladim ljudima obrazovanje, bez obzira ha to da li mogu i koliko mogu da plate. S druge strane, tradicionalno budzetsko finansiranje rietrzisnih delatnosti dovelo je do birokratske prakse koja je nespojiva sa samoupravnim sistemom. Resenje za ovakvu dilemu trazilo se u interpolaciji jednog specijalnog samoupravnog mehanizma izmedu vlade i netrzisnih radnih organizacija. Ovaj mehanizam se zove interesne zajednice. Ove zajednice dobijaju finansijska sredstva na osnoAm skupstinskih odluka i sa tim sredstvima kupuju usluge netrzisnih proizvodaca u ime drustvene zajednice. Netrzisni proizvodaci putem konkursa nude svoje usluge pod razlicitim uslovima. Na taj nacin, ovde se javlja specificna vrsta trzi sta kvazi trziste koje omogucava da odnosi izmedu netrzis nog sektora i drustvene zajednice budu ekonomski uslovljeni, da radni kolektivi u netrzisnom isektoru zadrze svoju samoupravnu autonomiju, a u isto vreme i da se odnosi u oblastima obrazovanja, kulture i zdravstva, zasnivaju na principu raspodele prema potrebama, sto predstavlja jedan od preduslova socijalistickog drustva. Jasno je da i preduzeca mogu da intervenisu u netrzisnom sektoru bilo da direktno kupuju usluge ili da stvaraju specijalne institucije. Iz tog razloga su u semi 1 trzisni i netrzisni sektori takode direktno povezani trzisnim vezama. Pored ekonomskih odnosa izmedu saveznih organa i privrednih faktora postoje odnosi i izmedu saveznih, republickih i lokalnih vlasti uprave, izmedu ovih poslednjih i radnih organizacija kao i izmedu svih njih zajedno. Prinuden sam samo ukratko da pomenem sve ove odnose iako su oni izuzetno vazni za funkcionisanje celokupnog sistema. -3.7

(c) Ostali problemi

Jedan od problema koji se stalno javlja u planiranju jeste problem optimalnih investicija i akumulacije. Pod uticajem neprijatnog smanjenja licne potrosnje do koje je doslo u vreme Prvog petogodisnjeg plana, Cobeljic tvrdi da jedna odredena minimalna stopa rasta potrosnje predstavlja gornju granicu za ucesce akumu lacije i rast proizvodnje [20, str. 188]. Na isti nacin, R. Stojanovictvrdi da snizenje rasta potrosnje ispod izvesne granice smanjuje rast produktivnosti rada, kao i da ovaj funkcionalni odnos odreduje optimalnu stopu investicija [44]. A. Bajt se slaze da se optimalna stopa investicija odreduje pomocu stope potrosnje koja maksimira produktivnost rada [45]. Medutim, to ne mora da bude obavezno i drustveno pozeljna stopa investicija. Cilj proizvodnje je povecanje ekonomskog blagostanja a maksimalizacija blagostanja u toku jednog vremenskog perioda moze se utvrditi samo putem diskontiranja [46]. Horvat tvrdi da je cisto vremensko diskontovanje nedosledno jer pojedinac moze da pozali svoju sadasnju nestrpljivost u jednom kasnijem momentu, a diskontovanje utiliteta je neprakticno posto se ne moze empirijski izmeriti. Drugo cesto sugerirano teoretsko resenje drustveno odredivanje stoka kapitala na kraju jednog perioda r je irelevantno jer nijedan ra zuman planer nije nikad insistirao na tacnom izvrsenju dugorocnih planova. Jedan dvadesetogodisnji plan izraduje se, recimo, da bi se mogle uzeti u obzir sve relevantne posledice odluka koje se donose u sadasnjem momentu: prilikom svakog novog elementa blagovremene informacije plan se revidira i horizont plana pomera napred. Jedan alternativni pristup moze se opisati na sledeci nacin. Posto svaka privreda ima odredeni i veoma striktno ograniceni kapacitet da apsorbuje investicije (u Jugoslaviji ova granica je oko 40% drustvenog proizvoda), maksimalni rast se postize kada se marginalna efikasnost investicija smanji na nulu. Ako zaostajanje od nekoliko meseci za postizanje izvesnog nivoa potrosnje predstavlja prihvatljivi uslov za maksimizaciju potrosnje u toku zivota jednog pojedinca, onda je maksimalna stopa produktivnih investicija identicna sa optimalnom stopom akumulacije. Prema tome, izgleda da je maksimizacija stope rasta pravi cilj socijalistickog planiranja. Nedostatak Prvog petogodisnjeg plana nije se sastojao u niskom nivou potrosnje vec u neodgovarajuce visokom nivou investicija. Potisnute u podrucje negativne marginalne efikasnosti, investicije su reducirale proizvodnju pa tako i potrosnju. Osim toga veliki deo ovako reducirane proizvodnje (do 20'% od nacionalnog dohotka) koristio se za potrebe odbrane. Ova dva razloga su uticala na ozbiljno snizenje potencijalne potrosnje [34, 35]. U pogledu ekonomske analize i metoda planiranja postignut je znatan napredak od vremena telefona o kome nam je govorio J. Stanovnik. Medutim, ni u pogledu jednog ni drugog ne mozemo 38

biti posebno impresionirani. Planeri su prihvatili medusektorsku analizu. Ona se koristila u proracunavanju novog deviznog kursa i nivoa cena prilikom donosenja prosle privredne reforme. Jednostavni ekonometrijski modeli se sada redovno koriste u ranim fazama pripreme plana [39, 40]. Nedavno je izraden sistem drustvenih racuna, specijalno prilagoden za potrebe planiranja [40, 41], no Savezni zavod za statistiku odbija da taj sistem primeni. Pored toga planeri se oslanjaju na obimne statisticke podatke, zastarelo bilansiranje i nagadanja. Jos uvek preostaje da se izradi jedna metodologija planiranja koja bi mogla da zadovolji potrebe planera.

39

]
t

Ill SAMOUPRAVNO PREDUZECE

7. SAMOUPRAVLJANJE Samoupravljanje je nesumnjivo najkarakteristicnije od svih jugoslovenskih institucija. Posto se razvilo dalje u drustveno sa- moupravljanje, ono je glavna institucija jugoslovenskog drustvenoekonomskog sistema. Pored toga, jugoslovenski drustveni naucnici su jednodusni u verovanju da bez samoupravljanja socijalizam nije moguc [1]. Na taj nacin sudbina socijalizma zavisi od izvodljivosti i efikasnosti samoupravljanja. U ovoj glavi mi cemo se baviti samo samoupravljanjem onako kako se ono primenjuje na poslovna preduzeca. Samoupravljanje nije jugoslovenski izum. Razvoj ove institucije moze se pratiti od pocetka proslog veka' [2, glava 5]. Svaka drustvena revolucija od Pariske komune naovamo pokusala je da ostvari zamisao samoupravljanja. U samom pocetku revolucije u Jugoslaviji, 1941. godine, radnici su preuzimali vlast u fabrikama na raznim mestima [3, str. 30]. Uspostavljanjem centralnog planiranja, ideja samoupravljanja je bfla odbacena. Medutim, vec 1949. godine ona ozivljava, krajem te godine stvaraju se radnicki saveti kao savetodavna tela u 215 velikih preduzeca, a u junu 1950. go dine usvaja se zakon kojim 'zapocinj.e era samoupravljanja. U toku vise od jediie decenije osnovni organizacioni principi samoupravljanja ostali su neizmenjeni. Svi radnici i namestenici jednog preduzeca sacinjavaju radni kolektiv. Radni kolek.tiv bira radnicki savet tajnim glasanjem. Radnicki savet se sastoji od izmedu 15 i lfO clanova koji su se prvobitno birali na jednu godinu, a od skora na period od dve godine. Radnicki savet je rukovodece telo i sastaje se u intervalima od jedan do dva meseca. Radnicki savet bira upravni odbor kao svoj izvrsni organ. Upravni odbor se sastoji od izmedu tri i jedanaest clanova, od kojih tri cetvrtine moraju biti radnici u proizvodnji. Direktor je glavni rukovodilac i ex officio clan upravnog odbora.. Odmah po svom uvodenju, samoupravljanje je naislo na kritiku i skepsu. One su uglavnom dolazile iz inostranstva. Govorilo se da ce samoupravljanje podriti disciphnu i da ce radnici raspo41

deliti sav dohodak na svoje plate, na ustrb potencijalnog rasta privrede. Godine 1955., B. Ward je zauzeo stanoviste da radnici nemaju stvamog uticaj a u biranju radnickog saveta i da su akcije koje preduzima radnicki savet samo poslusno potvrdivanje ranije donesenih odluka [4, 5]. Pri ocenjivanju ove kritike moglo bi se istaci da je, u pogledu radne discipline, jedna misija Medunarodne organizacije rada konstatovala 1960. godine da . .. dok je samoupravna masinerija za radne odnose umanjila ranija ovlascenja upravnog osoblja, ne izgleda da je podrila njihov autoritet. . . Ona je nesumnjivo ucvrstila poziciju kolektiva u odnosu na rukovodstvo, ali ne izgleda da je podrila radnu disciplinu [ 6, str. 203]. Sto se tice potencijala rasta, stopa akumulacije je ostala visoka sa hronicnom tendencijom prekomernog investiranja i uz visoku stopu rasta. Izbori se obavljaju pod nadzorom, a svi kandidati koje odobri vecina radnika nalaze se na glasackim listicima. Garantiju protiv uspostavljanja menadzerske klase predstavlja radnicka ve cina u upravnom odboru i odredba da se clanovi samoupravnih tela mogu birati samo dva puta uzastopce. Stvarne teskoce su dosle sa druge strane. Prvobitna organizacioria sema se pokazala suvise krutom i morala je temeljito da se menja u sve tri svoje komponente. Uskoro je postalo jasno da direktorov polozaj nije sasvim u skladu sa no vim aranzmanom i direktor je postao jedna od najnapadanijih i najkritikovanijih profesija na svetu [7, str. 137]. U etatistickom periodu direktor je bio drzavni cinovnik i vladin zvanicni predstaVnik unutar preduzeca. On je bio zaduzen za sve poslove preduzeca i iskljucivo odgovoran pretpostavljenom drzavnom organu. U samoupravnom sistemu direktor postaje izvrsni organ samoupravnih tela, dok u isto vreme i dalje zastupa tzv. drustveni interes u preduzecu. Ovaj hibridni polozaj je neprestani izvor sukoba. Isprva su direktora naimenovali drzavni organi. Godine 1952. naimenovanje direktora je preslo na opstinu. Godine 1953. uveden je javni konkurs za direktorski polozaj i u selekcionom odboru predstavnici komune su zadrzali dvotrecinsku vecinu. U 1958. godini radnicki saveti su postigli ravnopravnost sa opstinskim vlastima u zajednickim odborima ovlascenim da imenuju i razresavaju direktora preduzeca. Danasnja praksa je da direktore postavlja radnicki savet izabravsi ga medu kandidatima koje odobri konkursna komisija na bazi javnog konkursa. On se moze ponovo birati svake cetiri godine, ali isto tako radnicki savet ga moze razresiti duznosti. Buduci da na imenovanje direktora ne zavisi iskljucivo od volje kolektiva, kao sto je slucaj sa svim drugim izvrsnim organima on se smatra" kao predstavnik stranih interesa u preduzecu. Stalno su se vrsili pokusaji da se ogranice njegova ovlascenja, sto je cinilo njegov polozaj ainbivalentnim i umanjivalo njegovu operativnu efikas nost. S druge strane, kao sto primecuje Gudrun Leman, direktor mora da igra trostruku ulogu lokalnog politicara, menadzera i rukovodioca. E39, str. 281 U kontekstu gore navedenog, upravni odbor je imao da vrsi kontrolu nad radom direktora i administracije. Upetljan u probleme tehnickog upravljanja i sastavljen od nestruc42

nih ljudi, upravni odbor je cesto ili smetao ili bio neefektivan. Za strucno upravljanje direktor se oslanjao na kolegijum rukovodilaca koji je bio njegovo savetodavno telo i njemu potcinjen. Na taj nacin, dva fundamentalno razlicita organizaciona sistema su se mehanicki integrisala u jedan sistem. Direktorova funkcija je predstavljala vezu izmedu njih, tj. izmedu samoupravnih organa i tradicionalne administrativne hierarhije: Naposletku, u vecim preduzecima samo jedan radnicki savet nije bio dovoljan da bi obezbedio stvarno samoupravljanje. Godine 1956. obrazovani su radnicki saveti na fabrickim i nizim nivoima posebno od centralnog radnickog saveta. Cak ni to nije bilo dovoljno, jer hijerarhijski odnosi izmedu radnickih saveta na raznim nivoima nisu bili u skladu sa duhom samoupravljanja. Samoupravni odnos u svom cistom obliku je poliarhijski a ne demokratski odnos, objasnjava D. Gorapic, Demokratski odnos predstavlja dominaciju vecine nad manjinom . . . Poliarhijski karakter samoupravnog odnosa ocituje se u .ravnopravnosti clanova odredene zajednice [ 8, str. 16]. Godine 1959. zapoceo je interesantan razvoj sa uspostavljanjem tzv. ekonomskih jedinica. Preduzeca su razdeljena u manje jedinice od po vise desetina radnika. Posto su godinu dana pre toga preduzeca postala manje-vise samostalna u unutrasnjoj raspodeli dohotka, smatralo se da se moze dati jak stimulus sistemu ako ekonomske jedinice budu evidentirale svoje troskove, brinule se za kvalitet proizvodnje, za koriscenje i odrzavanje masinerije, i same budu vrsile raspodelu dohotka prema odredenim merilima efikasnosti. U jednoj interesantnoj studiji Gudrun Leman, nemacki istrazivac jugoslovenskog samoupravljanja, tvrdi da su ekonomske jedinice nastale iz nastojanja da se ukloni podela izmedu tri polja delatnosti: rukovodenja, upravljanja i izvrsavanja [40, str. 38 39]. Uskoro su ekonomske jedinice pocele da praktikuju kolektivno odlucivanje po svakovrsnim pitanjima. Postalo je pozeljno da se prosire ekonomske jedinice kako bi obuhvatile pojedine faze tehnoloskog procesa ili pojedine sluzbe. Ekonomske jedinice se pretvaraju u radne jedinice. Pojavila se potreba za revizijom hijerarhijskih samoupravnih odnosa. Znacajria samoupravna prava (raspodela dohotka, zasnivanje, raskidanje radnog odnosa, odredivanje na pojedine poslove) prenesena su na radne jedinice. Neposredno odlucivanje na sastancima svih clanova radne. jedinice postalo je osnovni oblik upravljanja. Na taj nacin, radna jedinica je postala veza izmedu primarne grape i drustvene organizacije. Ona je u isto vreme i jasno definisana tehnicko-ekonomska jedinica, koja ispunjava zadatke efikasne formalne koordinacije, i osnovna celija radnickog samoupravljanja [13]. Radne jedinice, vise radnickih saveta i upravnih odbora, razne komisije i odbori sve je to ucinilo formalnu organizaciju samoupravnog preduzeca prilicno slozenom i neefikasnom. Da bi takav sistem mogao da funkcionise, on je morao u praksi da se uprosti i to je ucinjeno raznim neformalnim nacinima. To je opet 43

znacilo dalje ogranicavanje kompetentnog strucnog rukovodstva i dalje umanjivanje efikasnosti. Radnicko samoupravljanje prolazi kroz krizu efikasnosti usled potrebe za radikalnim menjanjem naslectenih organizacionih struktura. Na kraju krajeva, radnicko samoupravljanje znacilo je jedan bitno novi princip u upravljanju preduzecima i bilo bi cudo kad ne bi bilo bolnih prilagodavanja i dubokih promena u drustvenim odnosima. Moram ipak dodati da se zakljucci u ovom odeljku, mada su zasnovani na siroko prihvacenim misljenjima, ne mogu rigoroznije potvrditi jer dosada jos nije preduzeto odgovarajuce empiricko istrazivanje. Mada kriza jos nije bila prebroctena, stvari su pocele postepeno da se sreduju. Jednim ustavnim amandmanom, usvojenim 1969. godine omogucilo se preduzecima da raspuste upravne odbore i da eksperimentisu sa raznim organizacionim semama. Sindikati, drustveni organi i vlasti su se uverili da su izvesni razvoji bili zasnovani na pogresnim verovanjima u pogledu raznih upravnih funkcija u samoupravnom preduzecu. Verovatno najjasniju analizu ucinjenih gresaka dao je jedan sociolog, J. Zupanov [9]. Zupanov povlaci razliku izmedu samoupravljanja, upravljanja i rukovoctenja. Ovo poslednje je delimicna aktivnost sa ciljem izvrsenja odluke donesene u okviru jedne politike. Integracija svih od luka u jedan dosledni okvir je zadatak upravljanja. Ali upravljanje znaci samo tehnicku koordinaciju, dok su koordinacija raznih interesa i donosenje osnovnih stavova, zadatak samoupravljanja. Sa moupravljanje znaci socijalnu integraciju, formula.ciju zajednickih ciljeva, sto je preduslov za efikasno funkcionisanje upravljaca. Brkanje uprave i samopravljanja stvorilo je tendenciju da se sve vise prenese formalna koordinacija na tela ciji je zadatak drustvena integracija. Kao posledica toga, nije postignuta zadovoljavajuca drustvena integracija, dok je nestrucno upravljanje znacilo slabljenje efikasnosti [33]. S. Bolcic je istakao da je ovaj sam po sebi kompleksni problem komplikovan jos vise prilicno naivnom ideologijom sadrzanom u zakonodavstvu i politickoj propagandi koja se zalaze za neposredno ucesce u administrativnom radu kao neophodno sredstvo ocuvanja interesa radnika. Kako treba resiti probleme koji su nastali? D. Gorupic [10] i Institut ekonomskih nauka [11] vide resenje u fuzionisanju strucne kompetencije i samoupravljanja. Prt eduzece se moze smatrati za udruzenje radnih jedinica. Strucni rukovodioci radnih jedinica se vise ne postavljaju, kao sto je bio slucaj ranije, vec se biraju od strane njihovih drugova. Na taj nacin oni zastupaju interese svojih primarnih grupa, dok su u isto vreme i strucno kompetentni. Od tako izabranih rukovodilaca obrazuje se upravni odbor koji je i izvrsni organ radnickog saveta i strucno upravno telo. Odluke se donose kolektivno. Posto se vecina odluka koje se ticu svakodnevnog zivota radnika donose i izvrsavaju u okviru ekonomskih jedinica i od strane njih samih, rukovoctenje postaje sve vise i vise cisto organizaciona stvar i gubi svoj naredivacki karakter [7, str. 118]. Poslovni ljudi su prihvatili ovaj pri44

laz [38]. Kao sto se moglo ocekivati u zemlji kao sto je Jugosla v ia , cim su te ideje bile jasno formulisane zapocelo je prakticno eksperimentisanje i ustavni amandman je bio ubrzo usvojen.. Pre nego sto zavrsim ovo poglavlje, hteo bih da iznesem jos jednu interesantnu pojavu: razvoj tzv. autonomnog prava. Predu zeca se javljaju kao zakonodavna tela. N jihovi samoupravni organi donose statute i propise kojima se utvrduju organizacija rada, sastav i odgovomosti samoupravnih i drugih organa, raspodela do hotka, poslovanje. Ovlascenje za stvaranje autonomnog prava potice direktno iz Ustava, propisi i pravila su zakonom obavezni za sva lica na koja se odnose u okviru preduzeca, a sporove resavaju organi preduzeca, izuzev u nekim specificnim slucajevima. Na taj nacin, stalno s.uzavanje podrucja drzavnog prava i odgovarajuce prosirivanje podrucja tzv. aut'onomnog prava karakterisu citavi proces resavanja drustvenih odnosa u Jugoslaviji [12, str. 1].

8.

PREDUZECE

Uvodenje samoupravljanja 1950. godine podrazumevalo je napustanje centralnog planiranja i administrativnog rukovodenja privrede. Preduzece je postajalo nezavisno i autonomno. Pojedina preduzeca su imala -potrebu za usmeravanjem i koordinacijom. Stoga su obrazovana tzv. visa privredna udruzenja na mesto ranijih drzavnih direkcija, radi ocuvanja kontinuiteta u organizaciji privrede. Rukovodeca veca ovih novih organa sacinjavali su predstavnici radnickih saveta uclanjenih preduzeca. Medutim, visa pri vredna udruzenja su imala tendenciju da deluju istim administrativnim metodima kao i ranije direkcije i stoga su bila raspustena 1952. godine. Nastaje zatim peiod ideologije laissez-faire. Od pre duzeca se zahtevalo da se upuste u slobodno takmicenje na trzistu. Pokusaji obrazovanja krupnijih privrednih jedinica i visepogonskih preduzeca naisli su na hladan prijem jer se smatralo da su suprotni istinskom samoupravljanju i da predstavljaju prikriven nacin vracanja na drzavnu kontrolu. Uprkos tome ovaj sistem je dobro funkcionisao jer je jos uvek dejstvovala neka vrsta admini strativne koordinacije. Glavni koordinator bila je banka koja je izvrsavala ciljeve plana. Banka je vodila specijalno knjigovodstvo za svako preduzece, vrsila je raspodelu prihoda u razne fondove ("za plate, porez, razne fondove preduzeca), odredivala iznos potrebnih obrtnih sredstava koji se davao na bazi kredita, itd. [14, str. 11 20]. Iako je kontrola bila novcana, vrednosne proporcije su se dobijale od fizickih ciljeva. Posle 1951. godine proces decentralizacije se nije zaustavio na nivou preduzeca vec je otisao jos i nize. Vec smo spomenuli da je 1956. godine zapocelo obrazovanje pogonskih radnickih saveta i da su se 1959. godine pojavile prve ekonomske jedinice. Unutrasnja kohezija preduzeca bila je umanjena i izgledalo je kao da se ono raspada na svoje sastavne delove. U isto vreme razne monetame i nemonetame administrativne kontrole su pocele poStepeno 45

da se otklanjaju. Godine 1954. preduzece je preuzelo kontrolu svojih osnovnih sredstava. Osnovna sredstva su mogla da se kupuju i prodaju bez trazenja dozvole.. Isprobani su i investicioni konkursi. Godine 1958. preduzece je preuzelo kontrolu nad unutrasnjom raspodelom dohotka, a dve godine kasnije eliminisana je sindikalna kontrola nad licnim dohocima. Pripremljen je teren za istinsku trzisnu privredu. Cim su bili ispunjeni svi preduslovi za klasicno slobodno takmicenje mnogobrojnih malih preduzeca, postalo je jasno da takva privreda nece funkcionisati veoma efikasno u drugoj polovini dvadesetog veka. Posto se drzava sve vise i vise uzdrzavala od koordinisanja ekonomskih delatnosti, neka druga ustanova ili ustanove morale su da je zamene u toj funkciji. Zbog toga je zapoceo proces integracije. Sami radni kolektivi je trebalo da preuzmu ekonomsku koordinaciju u drzavi koja je odumirala. Izgledalo je kao da se zatvorio krug organizacionog razvoja. Proces je zapoceo potpuno integrisanom privredom pod drzavnim rukovodstvom, prosao je kroz period radikalne decentralizacije i sad se kretao opet ka jednoj fazi pune integracije u obliku radnicke samoupravne privrede. 4m a vise oblika integracija. Najprostija integracija je sporazum o poslovnoj saradnji sa ciljem, na primer, da se postigne specijalizacija proizvodnih programa za dva ili vise preduzeca. Zatim dolazi ugovoma tehnicko-poslovna saradnja koja se sastoji u zajednickoj proizvodnji, plasmanu ili nabavci sirovina. Ako su poslovni odnosi mnogostruki i slozeni tako da nije moguce da se sve unapred regulise ugovorom, preduzeca formiraju zasebno telo koje se zove poslovno udruzenje. Vec 1962, godine, jedna polovina privrednih preduzeca je bila uclanjena u poslovna udruzenja koja su se prvi put pojavila 1958. godine. Godine 1967. bilo je 290 poslovnih udruzenja koja su se sastojala od prosecno deset preduzeca [15]. Sledeci oblik vise integracije je preduzece koje se zove zdruzeno preduzece. Takva firma radi prema prihvacenim poslovnim nacelima, dok sastavna preduzeca zadrzavaju operativnu nezavisnost. Ova nezavisnost potpxmo nestaje u integraciji spajanja. U toku sedmogodisnjeg perioda pocev od 1959. godine kad je zapo ceo i proces, ukupan broj preduzeca je smanjen na polovinu putem spajanja. Karakteristicno je, medutim, da je dev'et desetina takvih spajanja izvrseno unutar granica iste ili susedne opstine, a svega 1,2 odsto otpada na medurepublicke integracije. U istom periodu smanjen je broj banaka od 378 na 108. Specijalni status je dat tzv. zajednicama privrednih organizacija obrazovanim za zeleznice, distribuciju elektricne struje i za postanske i komunikacione sluzbe. Clanstvo u tim zajednicama je obavezno. Naposletku, postoje i privredne komore, organizovane teritorijalno i udruzene u Saveznu privrednu komoru. Komore imaju dvostruku ulogu: one pomazu svojim clanovima na razne nacine i isto tako vrse drustvexiu funkciju posredovanja izmedu drzave i poslovnih interesa. Clanstvo u njima je obavezno. 46

Spajanje i razni oblici poslovne saradnje mogu da. znace i monopol. Zbog toga se istovremeno pojavila i neka vrsta antimonopolskog zakonodavstva. Izricito je zabranjeno ogranicavanje slobodnog takmicenja u proizvodnji ili plasmanu svakom preduzecu izvan doticne poslovne grape, a drzavni inspektori treba da se pobrinu da ne dode do podele trzista ili dogovaranja oko cena. Jos nije organizovano neko ozbiljno istrazivanje eventualne monopolisticke prakse, i stoga se o tome ne moze dati ocena. Medutim mora se imati na umu da se jugoslovenska privreda ponasa drakcije od dragih trzisnih privreda. Radnicko samoupravljanje podra zumeva spontanu drastvenu kontrolu poslovanja i stoga se ne mogu ocekivati klasicni oblici dosluha, karakteristicni za privatne monopole. J. Dirlam.[34, str. 3854] konstatuje da je stepen kon centracije proizvodnje visi u Jugoslaviji nego u Sjedinjenim Americkim Drzavama; I. Drutter [35] konstatuje nepostojanje odnosa izmedu dobiti i koncentracije proizvodnje, a n a . isti nacin H. Wachtel [36] ne nalazi korelaciju izmedu licnih dohodaka i kon centracije proizvodnje. Uprkos znatnom broju integracija u peri odu 1959 1963, stepen koncentracije se u stvari umanjio [3]. . N ovo preduzece moze da osnuje vec postojece preduzece, neka drzavna ustanova ili grapa gradana. Osnivac postavlja direktora i finansira izgradnju. Cim je zavrseno, preduzece se predaje radnom kolektivu koji bira upravna tela. Dokle god se ispunjavaju sve obaveze, ni osnivac niti drzava nemaju nikakvu ingerenciju u poslovanju preduzeca. Preduzeca su takode slobodna da, se integrisu ili da se rastave u delove. Ako jedna radna jedinica zazeli da napusti maticno preduzece a centralni radnicki savet se tome usprotivi, uspostavlja se mesovita arbitraza: sastavljena od predstavnika preduzeca i opstinskih vlasti. U svim tim slucajevima naravno podrazumeva se da ce se podmiriti nzajamne fi.nansij ske obaveze. Posto je kapital preduzeca u drustvenom vlasnistvu, osnovna obaveza preduzeca je da taj kapital ostane nedimut. Ako predu zece nacinje taj. kapital u toku vise od godinu dana, ako nagomilava gubitke ili ne isplacuje licne dohotke iznad zakonskog minimuma u toku vise od godinu dana, preduzece pada pod stecaj ili osnivac uzima obavezu da poboljsa njegovo poslovanje. U ovom dragom slucaju obustavlja se samoupravljanje i zamenjuje se prinudnom upravom, pod rakovodstvom sluzbenika koje odredi opstina [16]. Stecajevi su prilicno retki jer je opstina duzna da nade nova zaposljenja za radnike i stoga ce radije da pomogne preduzecu sto je duze moguce. Da bi se integracioni procesi efikasno odvijali, organizacione forme moraju da budu veoma elasticne. Stoga je od 1967. godine postalo zakonski moguce da dva ili vise preduzeca vrse ulaganja u neko drago preduzece a zatim da dele dohotke. Slicni aranzmani su usvojeni i u zajednickim poduhv.atima sa stranim kapitalom [17, 18]. U otvorenoj privredi kao sto je jugoslovenska, strani ka pital se rado prima pod uslovom da ne ogranicava radnicko samo upravljanje. Stoga je direktno ulaganje nemoguce, ali zajednickim 47

preduzecima se daje podrska. Glavni podsticaj da jedno jugoslovensko preduzece stupi u tesnu poslovnu saradnju sa stranim partnerom je zelja za sticanjem tehnickog znanja i za koriscenjem organizacije plasmana strane firme. Na taj nacin jugoslovensko preduzece pokusava da dostigne medunarodne standarde u tehnoloskoj efikasnosti i da prosiri svoje trziste. . Teoretska analiza ponasanja jugoslovenskog preduzeca tek je zapocela. Interesantno je, ali mozda ne i cudno, sto je pionirski rad na tom polju izvrsio jedan stranac, B. Ward, sa univerziteta Berkeley. U svom referatu od 1958. -godine o tzv. Ilirsk oj firm i [19], Ward tvrdi da ce racionalno ponasanje zahtevati maksimizaciju licnog dohotka po radniku. U Marshallovom kratkom roku slucaj jedan proizvod jedan varijabilni utrosak dovodi do cudnih posledica: povecanje licnih dohodaka ne stvara promene u proizvodnji i zaposlenosti; povecanje fiksnih troskova povecava proizvodnju i zaposlenost; povecanje cene proizvoda umanjuje proizvodnju i zaposlenost. U slicnoj analizi osam godina kasnije, Domar je pokazao da se uopstavanjem proizvodne funkcije da bi se njom obuhvatilo vise proizvoda i vise faktora i uvodenjem krivulje potrazivanja za radnom snagom, rezultati menjaju i pocinju da lice na tradicionalne zakljucke o ponasanju: preduzeca [20]. D. Dubravcic je posao slicnim putem i dosao do zakljucka da u samoupravnom preduzecu postoje jake tendencije da se koristi kapitalno intenzivna tehnologija [21]. Empiricki dokazi ne podrzavaju sasvim ovaj zakljucak. Dok, s jedne strane, postoji hronicna glad za kapitalom i preduzeca koriste svaku priliku da investiraju, s druge strane, jugoslovenska preduzeca su puna suvisne radne snage. Umesto da propoveda sta bi trebalo da bude racionalno, ovaj autor konstatuje sadasnju praksu jugoslovenskih preduzeca koja utvrduju licne dohotke unapred za tekucu godinu, i bar jednom godisnje vrse korekure (pozitivne ili negativne) u zavisnosti od stecenog dohotka. Ako se ovakvo pravilo ponasanja koristi u analizi, rezultati ce opet biti isti kao u tradicionalnoj teoriji .firme [ 22]. Poslednji u ovoj kontroverzi, D. Dubravcic, istice da komparativna analiza u stvari nije primenljiva jer se pretpostavlja da kapitalisticka firma maksimira jednu apsolutnu velicinu [p rofit] dok se od socijalisticke firme ocekuje da maksimira jednu relativnu veli cinu (dohodak po radniku). Dubravcic predlaze simetricni tretman na bazi preduzimackog utroska koji je kapital u kapitalistickom slucaju. Ako kapitalisticka firma maksimizira stopu (profita po jedinici kapitala) ona ce se ponasati isto kao Wardova ilirska firma, s tim sto bi se izmenili preduzimacki utrosci. U oba slucaja firme ce imati ustede na preduzimackom utrosku i to ce dovesti do kapitalnointenzivnih tehnika u socijalistickoj firm i i do radno-intenzivnih tehnika u kapitalistickoj firm i [23]. Lep i skoro humoristican rezultat. To nas dovodi do problema preduzetnistva u samoupravnom preduzecu. Ako je poduzetnik osoba koja snosi rizik i uvodi no vine kao sto bi Knight i Schumpeter rekli i kao sto bi se vecina ekonomista slozila onda radni kolektiv ispunjava uslove za tu 48

ulogu [24, glava 6], U stvari radni kolektiv se obicno tretira kao preduzimac. Medutim, bilo je isto tako i sumnji. Zupanov tvrdi da praksa utvrdivanja licnih dohodaka unapred znaci da oni nisu rezidualni u raspodeli dohotka kao sto je profit u kapitalistickoj formi i da se time stvara prepreka poduzetnickom ponasanju. On citira rezultate jednog empirickog istrazivanja prema kojemu u radnim jedinicama su samo rukovodioci i strucnjaci spremni da preuzmu rizik, dok druge kategorije radnika i sluzbenika uglavnom nisu. S. Bolcic mi je skrenuo paznju na cinjenicu da se radnici ponasaju racionalno i spremni su da podnesu rizik samo ukoliko.su u stanju da kontrolisu poslovanje. Zbog toga su rukovodioci mnogo vise spremni da preuzmu rizik kao sto se to od njih i ocekuje. Doslovno takvo objasnjenje dali su radnici u jednom slucaju koji navodi G. Leman [39, str. 40]. U jednoj drugoj anketi preduzetoj u Zagrebu 1968. godine konstatovano je da su sve grupe spremnije da ucestvuju u gubicima ako je umanjena proizvodnja nego ako se dohoci smanjuju dok proizvodnja ostaje ista ili se cak povecava [25], S druge strane, empiricka je cinjenica da licni dohoci variraju prilicno u zavisnosti od poslovnih rezultata. H. Wachtel navodi podatke o pitanjima o kojima se raspravljalo na sastancima radnickih saveta: dve trecine tacaka na dnevnom redu odnose se na opsta pitanja upravljanja (produktivnost rada, plasman robe, investicije, saradnja sa drugim preduze cima, rad rukovodstva) a samo jedna trecina na cisto radnicka pitanja licni dohoci, kvalifikacije, sporedne beneficije [36, str. 58]. Varijabilni deo dohotka iznosi prosecno 8 14 odsto standardnog licnog dohotka [36, str. 100]. 9. POLEM IKA O DRUSTVENOM VLASNISTVU U marksistickoj sociologiji vlasnicki odnosi su glavne determinante drustvenih odnosa a otuda i drustveno-ekonomskog sistema. Klasa koja poseduje tj. ima ekonomsku kontrolu nad sredstvima proizvodnje, upravlja drustvom. Dugo vremena, a u mnogome cak i danas, tvrdilo se da privatno vlasnistvo stvara kapitalizam, a drzavno vlasnistvo socijalizam. Ustvari procenat nacionalnog kapitala koji je u vlasnistvu drzave uzimao se kao najpouzdanija mera postignutog stepena socijalizacije. Otuda proizilazi da socijalisticka ekonomska politika mora da bude usmerena na sveobuhvatnu eko nomsku kontrolu drzave i mora da bude protiv privatne inicijative. Kao sto smo vec zapazili, ovo glediste je bilo opste prihvaceno u Jugoslaviji do 1950. godine, a od onda se sasvim izmenilo. Sad se istice da postoje najmanje tri razloga zasto je dogma poistovecavanja privatnog vlasnistva sa kapitalizmom i drzavnog vlasnistva sa socijalizmom pogresna: zanatlije u srednjevekovnim gradovima bili su privatni vlasnici ali ne i kapitalisti; u starim orijentalnim krajevima drzavno vlasnistvo se cesto praktikovalo pa ipak nije imalo nikakve veze sa socijalizmom; u fasistickim zemljama drzava je u velikoj meri kontrolisala drustveni i ekonomski zivot
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mada su te zemlje bile ocevidno kapitalisticke [2, glava 4], Jugoslovenski naucnici sada sasvim jednodusno veruju da je drzavno vlasnistvo koristan instrument da se zapocne socijalni preobrazaj, ali je inace isto toliko stran socijalizmu koliko i privatno vlasni stvo. Sadasnje stanje je lepo sumirao J. Dordevic [26, str. 81, 79]: . . . drzavno vlasnistvo nad sredstvima proizvodnje stvara monopol ekonomskog i politickog zivota i . . . omogucuje jedinstvo ekonomske i politicke vlasti pod kontrolom drustvene grupe koja personificira drzavu. Na taj nacin. . . . sustina klasicnog (klasnog) vlasnistva se ne menja .. . Kao nosilac vlasnistva, ona (drzava) raspolaze sa proizvodacevim radom i njegovim rezultatima, na osnovu cega visak rada prisvajaju 1grupe koje 'imaju sopstvene interese u skladu sa svojim rukovodecim funkcijama i na taj nacin zadrzavaju vlast i svoj drustveni status i prestaz. Ako drzavno vlasnistvo ne unapreduje socijalizam, sta je onda moguca alternative? Jugoslovenski odgovor na to je drustveno vlasnistvo. Ali odgovor na sledece pitanje - sta je u stvari dru stveno vlasnistvo nije.tako lak i-prost. Pravni strucnjaci se slazu da drustveno vlasnistvo podrazumeva samoupravljanje, da je to jedna nova drustvena kategorija, da ako je to novi-pravni pojam, on ne podrazumeva neograniceno pravo .nad stvarima koje je karakteristicno za klasicni pojam svojine, i .da podrazumeva i elemente svojine i javnog i p'trivatnog prava [27, str. 5]. Neslaganje postoji u tako reci svemu drugome. A. Gams i niz drugih pisaca tvrde da drustvena' svojina takode podrazumeva svojinsko pravo. buduci da svojina znaci prisvajanje; preduzeca su pravna lica a osnovni element pravnog lica je imovina [28, str. 61]. U elanu 8. Ustava kaze se da se raspolaganje sredstvima proizvodnje u dru stvenom vlasnistvu i drugim pravima nad stvarima odreduje zako nom. S. Pejovic govori o pravu koriscenja, sto je nesto sire od usus fructus, jer omogucava prodaju osnoVnih sredstava, ali je uzi nego vlasnistvo jer pravo raspolaganja nije apsolutno [30, str. 29] Dijametralno suprotno glediste izrazavaju J. Dordevic i vecina drugih pisaca koji tvrde da drustvena imovina predstavlja negaciju imovinskih prava [26, str. 84-90]. Dordevic citira drugi deo Osnovnih nacela Ustava u podrsku. svog gledista: Posto' niko nema pravo vlasnistva nad drustvenim sredstvima proizvodnje, niko ni drustveno-politicka zajednica, ni radna organizacija, niti pojedini radni covek mogu da prisvoje po bilo kakvom imovinskopravnom osnovu proizvod drustvenog rada, ili da upravljaju ili raspolazu drustvenim sredstvima proizvodnje i rada, niti mogu samovoljno da odreduju uslove raspodele. Pravnici se dalje razmimoilaze oko toga da li naglasavaju komponentu drustvene imovine po javnom pravu ili privatnom pravu. Dalja neslaganja se odnose na subjekt zakona (drzava, drustvo kao stvama zajednica ljudi, vise subjekata, nijedan subjekt). Zatim dolaze neslaganja oko toga da li je drustvena svojina pravni, ekonomski ili socioloski pojam ili se ne moze definisati u tim uslovima jer se odnosi na kvazi-vlasnistvo. A ako jeste pravni po50

jam, on to moze biti na: razne nacine. Primenjujuci racun kombinacija, moze se lako naci broj mogucih teorija. Izgleda da su. sve mogucnosti efikasno iskoriscene buduci da je Marija Toroman [27] bila u stanju da opise trinaest raznih teOrija. ' . ~ Legalisticka polemika je nesto maiije interesantna od one koja je nastala medu ekonomistima i soeiolozima. A. Bajt skrece paznju na cinjenicu da zakonski vlasnik i ekonomskTvIasnik mogu biti dva razlicita lica. Prvi drzi pravni osnov a drugi izvlaci korist iz upotrebe.jedne stvari [29]. U ovom smislu drustveno vlasnistvo podrazumeva nepostojanje eksploatacije, sto sa svoje strane podrazumeva raspodelu dohotka prema izvrsenom radu. Ako jedno lice ili grupa lica steknu dohodak bez rada, oni eksploatisu druge, i ukoliko do toga dode drustvena svojina se pretvara u privatnu svojinu. Stoga samoupravljanje samo po sebi nije dovoljan uslov za postojanje drustvene svojine. Institucija svojine se postepeno raspada vec u kapitalizmu. Akcionari 'su zakoniti vlasnici ali menadzeri vrse stvamu ekonomsku kontrolu. Zbog toga bih ja zamenio tradicionalni pojam vlasnistva fundamentalnijim pojmom ekonomske kontrole [2, glava 15]. Ovo drugo uvek znaci kontrolu nad radom i njegovim proizvodima, sto je Marksova definicija kapitala kao drustvenog odnosa [31, str. 167], U tom pogledu pravni osnovi su irelevantni. Ako zanatlije ili seljaci nemaju moc monopola sto ce verovatno biti slucaj u jednom dobro uredenom trzisnoni sistemu onda oni ne predstavljaju tude elemente u socijalistickom drustvu. A ocevidno je da oni praktikuju samoupravljanje. Horvat i Bajt su dosli do zakljucka da je individualna inicijativa ne samo kompatibilna vec je i sastavni deo socijalistickog sistema. U stvari procesi proizvodnje se mogu organizovati individualno ili kolektivno i zbog toga Bajt govori o dva oblika drustvenog vlasnistva: individualnom i kolektivnom. Vec postoji opsta saglasnost o dosad pomenutim pitanjima. Razlike u gledistima se javljaju kad se razmatraju slucajevi koji ne spadaju ni u jednu kategoriju. Jugoslovensko zakonodavstvo omogucava zanatlijama i ugostiteljima da uposljavaju tri do pet radnika. V. Raskovic [32, str. 106-107] i mnogi drugi smatraju da je ovo oblik eksploatacije, ostatak starog drustva, nesto tude si stemu, ali sto se mora trpeti pri saaasnjem nivou razvoja. U podrsku svom gledistu Raskovic tvrdi da poslodavac ne bi zaposlio radnike ako to njemu ne bi bilo od koristi. Moze se, medutim, tvrditi u odgovoru na to da radnik koji izabere privatnog poslodavca radije nego preduzece pokazuje da mu se ovakvo zaposlenje vise isplati. Ovakvo rezonovanje jasno vodi u corsokak. Da bi se resilo pitanje da li privatni poslodavci mogu da iznajmljuju rad nike i koliko, predlozeno je da kriterijum bude jedan socioloski argument. Doklegod privatni poslodavac i sam radi kao i njegovi namestenici i nije postao poduzetnik koji samo organizuje rad drugih, namestenici se mogu smatrati kao (cesto mladi) ortaci u
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radnom procesu, direktni licni odnosi primarne grupe su time sacuvani, i ne dolazi do pojave otudenja kao kod najamnih odnosa. Politicka tela su zatrazila diskusiju o mestu i ulozi licnog rada i uskoro su donete odluke manje-vise u skladu sa gore izlozenim idejama. Licno organizovana proizvodnja je postala sastavni deo socijalisticke privrede . 8

8) Privatni sektor koji jugoslovenski ekonomisti. radije nazivaju indlvidualnl sektor- kako bi izbegli razne konotacije atributa privatni< predstavlja 29 odsto bruto nacionalnog proizvoda i ovaj se procenat nije izmenio za poslednjih petnaest godina.

52

IV TR2ISTE I CENE 10. P O LIT IK A CENA Politika cena je jedan neprestani niz pokusaja da se kontirolise zakon vrednosti (odnos ponude i potraznje). Njena istorija je poucna jer daje uvid u funkcionisanje raznih institucionalnih aranzmana. (a ) Administrativno odredene cene Odmah posle rata, buduci da je privreda bila potpuno unistena, osecao se viliki nedostatak sve robe. Glavna svrha ekonom ske politike bila je da se spreci spekulacija i da se unapredi pro izvodnja svim mogucim sredstvima. To je bio period rentabilnosti po svaku cenu [1, str. 143].: Samo se nekoliko luksuznih proizvoda prodavalo na trzistu po slobodnim cenama. Vecinom su cene bile utvrdene na bazi stvamih troskova i mogle su da variraju od jednog proizvodaca do drugog. Zavodi za cene su ispitivali svaki slucaj posebno i donosili odgovarajuce odluke (normiranje cena). To nije bio veoma efikasan postupak. Posto su se stvami troskovi uzimali onako kako su bili dati, nije bilo stimulusa da se stedi na utroscima. Licni dohoci su bili fiksni a proizvodi su uvek mogli da se prodaju. Da bi umanjili rizik, proizvodaci su cesto naduvavali troskove u svojim predlozima cena. Da bi pak umanjili cene, zavodi za cene su imali obicaj da primenjuju linearne redukcije na predlozene cene. Vlasti i privrednici su poceli da se igraju zmurke, sto je karakteristicno za administrativno kontrolisanu privredu. Prvi petogodisnji plan koji je zapoceo 1947. godine zahtevao je sistem jedinstvenih cena. Jedinstvene cene su odredivale planske vlasti i trebalo je da budu neumitno stabilne. Cilj je bio da se stvori veza izmedu fizickog i vrednosnog dela plana, da se odrzava kontrola nad izvrsenjem planova i da se izbegnu administrativni troskovi oko cestog menjanja cena. Cene su se formirale dodavanjem prosecne stope zarade na prosecno kostanje jednog 53

proizvoda. Manje efikasni proizvodaci su planirali gubitke, efikasniji proizvodaci su planirali ekstra dobit, a u oba slucaja budzet je podmirivao razlike. Uspostavljanjem sistema jedinstvenih cena smatralo se da je zakon vrednosti podreden efikasnoj drustvenoj kontroli [2, str. 143]. Uskoro se pokazalo da jedinstvene cene ne stvaraju ravnotezu izmedu ponude i potraznje. Privatni proizvodaci (seljaci i zanatlije ) drzali su veliki deo trzista i njihovi dohoci se nisu mogli lako kontrolisati. Vecina potrosacke robe bila je racionisana. Ta roba se prodavala po postojecim jedinstvenim cenama. Raspolozive kolicine potrosacke robe nisu bile dovoljne da zadovolje potrebe citavog stanovnistva po nizim jedinstvenim cenama. Vec krajem 1947. godine na slobodno trziste su izisle prve kolicine potrosacke robe po visim jedinstvenim cenama. Te cene su se dobijale od postojecih jedinstvenih cena uz primenu mnozitelja koji su varirali od 2 (za krompir i pasulj) do 6V2 (za odecu). Profit koji je iz toga nastajao apsorbovao je budzet. Godine 1948. oko 45 odsto potrosacke robe se prodavalo po visim jedinstvenim cenama [3, str. 376], Smatralo se da ce na taj nacin da se apsorbuje visak dohodaka. U poljoprivredi se primenjivao sistem obaveznog otkupa. Se ljaci su morali da prodaju vecinu svojih proizvoda drzavi po propisanim niskim cenama. Za novae koji su dobijali oni nisu mogli da kupuju sve industrijske proizvode koji su im bili potrebni. Oni su stoga pokusavali da smanje otkup 1 da zamene novcani dohodak sopstvenom potrosnjom. Drzava je reagovala stvarajuci trzi ste za industrijsku robu po visim jedinstvenim cenama. Seljaci su odvratili izbegavanjem obaveznog otkupa i povecanim isporukama na slobodno seljacko trziste, jedini deo trzista gde su ponuda i potraznja odredivale cene- Te .cene su imale tendenciju brzog uspona te je vlada odlucila da pokusa milom sto nije mogla silom. Godine 1948. ona je zavela vezane cene.. Poljoprivredne. cene su se vezivale za industrijske cene da bi se uspostavio predratni paritet. Seljaci su prodavali svoje proizvode drzavi po. nizim cenama a za.njih su dobijali kupone s kojima su mogli da kupuju industrijske. proiz vode po cenama oko 16 odsto nizim. od trzisnih cena [4, str. 141]. Lokalna trzista su bila pod manje krutom kontrolom. Posle 1949. godine lokalna preduzeca su u nacelu mogla da prodaju svoje proizvode po trzisnim (visim jediiistvenim) cenama. Trgovinska preduzeca koja su se snabdevala kod dva razlicita proizvo daca naciorialnih i mesnih nisu vise bila u stanjii da prodaju robu po jedinstvenoj ceni. Stoga su izmisljene tzv. klizne cene. Prodajna cena se klize u rasponu izmedu najnize i najvise kupovine cene. Te cene su odobravale mesne vlasti. Na taj nacin bila su stvorena dva trzista: jedno za preduzeca koja su trgovala po ni zim i visim jedinstvenim cenama, a drugo za maloprodaju i stanovnistvo gde su se .cene priblizavale cenama slobodnog trzista. Sistem vezanih cena nije najbolje funkcionisao. Snabdevanje industrijskom robom je bilo nedovoljno i bogatiji seljaci su poceli

54

da spekulise sa kuponima. Godine 1950. vrlo malo poljoprivrednih proizvoda je moglo da se prodaje po vezanim cenama. Sve vise seljackih proizvoda je odlazilo na slobodno seosko trziste ciji je pandan na drzavnom sektoru bio sistem kliznih cena. Vise jedinstvene cene, buduci da su bile administrativno utvrdene, zaostajale su za slobodnim cenama. Proizvodnja potrosacke robe je stagnirala, cak i opadala, dok su se dohoci povecavali [5, str. 49],
1948. 100 100 1949. 128 100 1950. 1951. 1952.

K upovna moc potrosaca R ealm indeks m aloprodaje, bez seljacke trgovine

125 94

245 70

327 77

Sve veci jaz izmedu potraznje i ponude mogao se kontrolisati na administrativni ili na ekonomski nacin. Vlada je izabrala ovaj drugi. U prelaznoj godini 1951. bilo je osam raznih kategorija cena koje su jednovremeno koegzistirale [4, str. 143]. Klizne cene su bile zamenjene visim cenama za potrosacku robu. Racioniranje je bilo ukinuto. Cene potrosacke robe su ostavljene da ih regulise trziste. Cene repromaterijala povecane su od jedan do dvanaest puta pa su zatim bile zamrznute za otprilike polovinu godine. Go dine 1952. ukinut je obavezni otkup poljoprivrednih proizvoda. Vec u drugoj polovini 1952. godine sve su se cene slobodno formirale izuzev nekoliko vrsta robe (hleb, secer, elektricna struja itd.) za koje su uspostavljene plafonske cene.

(b ) Razvoj trzista Strategija reforme cena od 1951/1952 godine moze se ovako sumirati: (a ) dovoljno veliko povecanje cena da bi se apsorbovao visak novcanog dohotka; (b ) dovoljno veliko povecanje maloprodajnih cena potrosackih dobara u odnosu na poljoprivredne cene kako bi se stvorila akumulacija potrebna za brz razvoj; (c ) manje povecanje u cenama proizvodackih dobara kako bi se stimulisale investicij.e radi prosirenja odeljks I. Prva dva cilja bila su postignuta sa znatnim uspehom. Zbos* toga su se industrijske cene repromaterijala odrzale nepromenjene u toku citave jedne dekade. Trece resenje se pokazalo pogresno i stvorilo je mnogo glavobolja. Dok je u toku skoro tri godine opadao opsti indeks cena industrijskog reprodukcionog materijala, skakale su cene izvesnih sirovina (erne i obojene metalurgije, gradevinskog materijala, drvne industrije). Zbog toga je 1954. godine vlada utvrdila plafonske cene za izvestan broj sirovina, a naredne godine je prosirena lista re produkcionog materijala pod kontrolom. Godine 1955., cene indu stry skog repromaterijala. su porasle za pet odsto, sto je dovelo do 55

osnivanja Saveznog zavoda za cene te iste godine. Od onda se postepeno stvarao sistem administrativne kontrole cena. Glavne karakteristike ove kontrole su sledece: 1. Vlada je utvrdivala f i k s n e cene za elektricnu struju, cigarete, prevoz, secer, ulje, so i neku drugu robu. 2. Vlada je utvrdivala p l a f o n i r a n e cene za metalurgijske proizvode, ugalj, petrolej i neku drugu robu. Ove dve kategorije cena su se menjale s vremena na vreme, ne tako cesto, ali kad su se menjale, promene su bile prilicno drasticne. 3. Kontrola na bazi r a n i j e r e g i s t r a c i j e c e n e je najcesca vrsta kontrole. Bila je uvedena godine 1958. Proizvoctaci koji nameravaju da podignu cene moraju da obaveste Savezni zavod za cene trideset dana ranije. Ako u tom periodu Savezni zavod za cene ne stavi veto na povecanje cene, ono moze da se izvrsi. Glavni kriterijumi za stavljanje 'jednog proizvoda pod kontrolu bili su: (a ) njegov znacaj za zivotni standard ili za proizvodne troskove drugih proizvoda; (b ) nestasica na trzistu i (c ) monopolisticki polozaj proizvodaca [ 6]. 4. K o n t r o l u t r g o v i n s k i h m a r z i grosiste a opstinske vlasti za maloprodaju. vrse republike za

5. Z a m r z a v a n j e c e n a . Ovaj instrument se koristio svega dvaput, 1952. i opet 1956. godine, za vreme reforme cena.

6. Poljoprivredne cene se stavljaju na specijalni rezim. G a r a n t o v a n e c e n e se primenjuju na prehrambene pro izvode. To znaci da je Savezna direkcija za prehrambene pro izvode obavezna da otkupi sve kolicine odnosnih proizvoda iznetih na prodaju i da placa garantovane cene. Na mleko i industrijske poljoprivredne proizvode primenjuju se m i n i m a l n e cene. To znaci da ako se ti proizvodi kupuju, za njih moraju da se placaju bar minimalne cene. Industrijski poljoprivredni proizvodi se obicno ne gaje ako proizvodac nema vec zakljuceni ugovor sa kupcem. Cene koje su se u takvim slucajevima koristile bile su u g o vornecene.
Industrijske cene su bile najvise kontrolisane. U poslednjoj deceniji ova kontrola se vrsila nad sledecim procentima vrednosti industrijske proizvodnje [1, str. 282], [7, str. 113], [ 8, str. 6]:
1958. 1962. 1962 65. 31.2 67.0 60.0 1965 1966 1967 1968 70 66 53 46

Vremenske serije cena date na tabeli 10.1 pokazuju koliko su bile efikasne politika cena i kontrola cena. 56

Tabela 10.1 Prom ene u nivoim a cena u procentim a po godinama 1952 1963. 1964. 1965. 1966. 1967. 1968.

Cene proizvodaca u industriji i rudarstvu Cene proizvodaca poljoprivrednih proizvoda M aloprodajne cene (ukljucujuci usluge)

+0,9

+ 5

+ 15

+ 11

+ 2

+8,6 +3,9

+ 24 + 9

+43 + 29

+ 16 +23

3 + 7

4 +4

Izvori: Jugoslavija 19451964., SGJ 1969.

Posle 1961. godine administrativna kontrola cena se povecala a zajedno s njom i inflacioni pritisak. Sta se ustvari desilo? Najcesci oblik kontrole cena ranije registrovana cena nije se mogao adekvatno primeniti na nove proizvode. Vrseci male izmene u spoljnom izgledu proizvoda, preduzece bi ga pretvorilo u novi proizvod i na taj nacin izbeglo kontrolu cena. Godine 1964. lansirano je skoro 25.000 novih proizvoda. Niske i strogo kontrolisane cene sirovina su ucinile proizvodnju nerentabilnom i na taj nacin smanjile proizvodnju; u poljoprivredi cene su bile posebno niske. Zbog toga su 1964. godine cene administrativno povecane u poljoprivredi, prehrambenoj industriji, energetici i obojenoj metalurgiji. Isto tako su diferencijalno oporezivanje, sistem premija i regresa, administrativne intervencije u spoljnoj trgovini odrzavali pa cak i povecavali disparitet cena [10]. Kao posledica toga pojedina preduzeca su poslovala pod veoma neravnopravnim uslovima. Proizvodaci, cije su cene ili dohoci zaostajali, pokusavali su da sustignu svoje kolege. Savezni zavod za cene je primio 12.800 molbi za povecanje cena u 1961. i 69.000 molbi u 1964. godini [7, str. 107], Medutim, najvazniji razlog za prelom u trendovima cena 1961. godine lezi na drugom mestu. Do 1961. godine licni do hoci su bili sasvim efikasno kontrolisani putem fiskalnih i nefiskalnih metoda (sindikata). Zbog toga su .cene bile sasvim stabilne (izuzev u poljoprivredi) a administrativnih kontrola je bilo relativno malo [9, str. 37-41], Kontrola dohotka ukinuta je 1961. go dine, uskoro zatim je doslo do inflacije i uprkos sve vece admini strativne kontrole cene su pocele da skacu. Nekoliko godina kasnije Institut ekonomskih nauka je predlozio da Savezni zavod za cene popusti administrativnu kontrolu cena i da obrati paznju na kontrolu dohotka [ 8, str. 41]. Ovaj predlog nije prihvacen i umesto toga koristila se monetarna politika kao glavno oruzje protiv in flacije. Vec 1965. godine privreda je bila sazrela za jos jednu radikalnu reformu cena. Cene su bile zamrznute u martu i izvedena je poreska reforma. Razni regresi su bili drasticno smanjeni i olak57

sano je poresko opterecenje preduzeca. U toku sledecih nekoliko meseci pripremljena je nova struktura cena. U julu je devalviran dinar, zavedene su nove cene i zamrznute na tom nivou. Relativne cene nekih sirovina, reprodukcionih materijala (elektricne struje, petroleja, gvozdenih i obojenih ruda i metala, hemikalija, drvnih proizvoda i poljoprivrednih proizvoda) i saobracajnih usluga osetno su povecane. Svetske cene (registrovane u uvozu-izvozu) su uzete kao baza za novu strukturu cena. To je trebalo da omoguci brzo ukljucenje jugoslovenske privrede u medunarodnu podelu rada. Svetske cene su se korigovale navise ili nanize, uzimajuci u obzir akumulacione potrebe pojedinih industrija i druge specificne faktore. Nova carinska tarifa je trebalo da izjednaci razlike. Stabilizacija cena se odvijala prilicno lagano, kao sto se moze videti iz tabele 10.1 Ukidanje kontrole cena je bilo jos sporije. Go dine 1968. cene su izgledale stabilizovane, ali skoro jedna polovina industrijskill cena je jos uvek bila pod kontrolom. Dispariteti iz medu kontrolisanih i nekontrolisanih cena poceli su da se javljaju. Proizvodnja izvesnih industrija imala je tendenciju usporavanja. U 1969. godini cene su ponovo pocele da skacu. Izgledalo je da se ponavlja.iskustvo od 1964. godine. Reforma od 1965. godine otklonila je najteze disparitete cena, ali je kasnije kontrola cena stvorila nove. Ova igra sa cenama ne izgleda da ce se uspesrio zavrsiti. Vodile su se zive diskusije oko odgovarajuceg tipa cena za samoupravnu privredu. Ove diskusije se skoro nisu ni dotakle klasicne kontroverzije oko formiranja cena na bazi marginalnih ili punih troskova. Posto utvrdivanje cena marginalnim troskovima zahteva drzavnu intervenciju, sasvim je razumljiva nezainteresovanost jugoslovenskih ekonomista za ovaj postupak. Na teoretskom planu se isticalo da je alokaciona efikasnost (koju predsta vlja utvrdivanje cena marginalnim troskovima) inferiom ija o'd efikasnosti sa stanovista rasta (koju predstavlja .utvrdivanje cena punim troskovima) sto omogucuje poslovnu samostalnost jednog preduzeca [ 11, glava 21. . Debata se vodila oko pitanja kako treba da se formira cena. Ona je zapocela 1950. godine kad se B. Kidric izjasnio za vrednosnu cenu [12], U svojim poslednjim clancima 1952. godine pokojni Kidric je smatrao da je vrednosna cena ona koja se sastoji od troskova proizvodnje (ukljucujuci licne dohotke) i akumulacije (bruto dohodak) obracunatih u srazmeri sa dohocima. Ove su cene ustvari isprobane u praksi 1953. i 1954. godine. Kidric je uporedio princip stope akumulacije sa tradicionalnim principom prosecne stope dobiti (dobit proporcionalna investiranom kapitalu je karakteristicna za Marksovu cenu proizvodnje) i dosao do zakljucka da samo onaj prvi odgovara samoupravnoj privredi. Po njegoVom gledistu nacelo prosecne stope dobiti predstavlja protivurecnost socijalisticki planiranom rukovodenju privrede, i vodi u neku vrstu kooperativnog kapitalizma [13, str. 42, 46]. Jednu deceniju ka snije M. Todorovic, koji je kasnije postao sekretar Saveza komunista dosao je do suprotnog zakljucka. On tvrdi da u sistemu 58

robne proizvodnje, ukljueujuci tu i socijalisticki sistem u kome se upotrebljava fiksni kapital cene moraju da dobiju oblik cena pro izvodnje. Posto je kapital u drustvenom vlasnistvu a proizvodnja se planira, upotreba cena proizvodnje ne moze dovesti do istih posledica kao kod l a i s s e z - f a i r e liberalnog kapitalizma [14, str. 60, 65, 781. Ma kako to cudno moze da zvuci, izmedu Kidrica i Todorovica ne postoji sustinsko razmimoilaienje. Razlike u njihovim glediStima pre svega odraiavaju razlike u ekonomskom obrazovanju. U 1952. godini Kidricevo glediste su svi prihvatali, ukljucujuci i Todorovica, dok je tesko da bi danas neko bio.spreman da ga podrzava. Todoroviceva teorija specificne cene proizvodnje (specificne jer j.e drustveno planiranje jedna od njenih osnovnih komponenta) kao ravnotezna cena u jugoslovenskim uslovima prihvacena je od strane izvesnog broja ekonomista (Z. Pjanic, V. Rakic, I. Maksimovic [15] ali sigurno ne od svih. U jednoj zestokoj debati u Sarajevu 1964. godine jedna druga grupa ekonomista M. Korac, J. Sirotkovic, S. Dabcevic, T. Vlaskalic iznela je teoriju dohodne cene [16]. Po njihovom misljenju jugoslovensko predu zece maksimizira dohodak u odnosu na odredene utroske. Drugi ekonomisti su izmisljali nove vrste cena: gravitacione (M . Mesaric, 17), normalne, stvarne cene drustvene reprodukcije (F. Cerne, 77, str. 233), itd. M. Radulovic je uspeo da opise sest raznih teorija cena ove vrste [1, str. 299-326]. Teorija cena je tesno povezana sa teorijom raspodele o kojoj cemo govoriti u sledecem poglavlju.

11. PO LITIK A RASPODELE N ije uobicajeno da se govori o politici raspodele: Naviknuti smo da govorimo o p o l i t i c i dohotka i o t e o r i j i raspodele. Medutim, videce se dalje da je u jugoslovenskim uslovima i politika raspodele vazeci pojam. ( a) Politilca licnih dohodaka U administrativnom periodu 1945 1952. radnici su bili drzavni namestenici klasifikovani u vise platnih kategorija prema svojim kvalifikacijama. Direkcije su postavljale radne norme cije prebacivanje je donosilo povecanje plate. Rukovodece osoblje je dobijalo premije za ispunjenj'e drzavnog plana. Raspon plata bio je 1:3,5 [18,str. 6], u poredenju sa 1:16 pre rata [50, str. 56]. Nedostatak materijalnog stimulusa nadoknadivao se morabiim stimulusima kao sto su javne pohvale, prelazne zastavice, nazivi udarnika ili novatora. U poslerevolucionarnoj atmosferi ovi stimulusi su bili veoma snazni. Posle nekoliko godina nedostatak materijalnih stimulusa' je postao ozbiljna prepreka efikasnoj proizvodnji. Zbog posleratne ne59

mastine i zbog uravnilovke, do 1953. godine plate cinovnika u industriji smanjene su za jednu trecinu a drzavnih cinovnika za jednu polovinu u odnosu na radnicke plate i u poredenju sa predratnim nivoima [19, str. 81]. Razne beneficije su bile vece nego dohodak od plata. Ovaj trend se preokrenuo posle 1952. godine. Sindikati su se zalagali za vece diferenciranje po kvalifikacijama. Ekonomisti [31 ] su trazili povecani udeo raspolozivog dohotka (dohodak posle isplate poreza i doprinosa s kojim preduzece moze slobodno da raspolaze) radi povecanja produktivnosti. H. Wachtel konstatuje da su se diferencijali po kvalifikacijama povecavali do 1961. godine a zatim poceli da opadaju. Prosecni raspon dohotka izmedu najvise i najnize placenog posla je sada 1:4 [19, str. 82]. N. Jankovic smatra da se dohodak od plate povecao na 65 odsto od ukupnog radnickog dohotka u 1965. godini, i na 73 odsto ukupnog dohotka u 1967. godini [20, str. 159], Namera je bila da trziste samo odredi odgovarajuce diferencijale dohotka i da stimulise efikasnost povecanjem varijabilnog dela radnickog dohotka. Ovo drugo se takode smatralo za potrebno da bi se suzbila centralisticka raspodela dohotka. Posle 1952. godine postao je zadatak radnickih saveta da odreduju diferencijale nadnica i radne stimuluse. Raspodela dohotka izmedu preduzeca i zajednice resila se na veoma prost nacin. Na osnovu drustvenog plana, odredivali su se ocekivani dohodak pre duzeca i odgovarajuci platni fond. Razlika izmedu bruto dohotka (ne uracunavajuci amortizaciju) i licnih dohodaka nazivala se akumulacija i fondovi (A F ). Odnos izmedu akumulacije i fondova i licnih dohodaka nazvan je stopa akumulacije i fondova. Ova stopa se primenjivala na stvarno zaradeni bruto dohodak kako bi se dobili licni dohoci. U poglavlju 10 spomenuto je da se stopa AF sma tra za pogodnu socijalisticku supstituciju stope dobiti, i to je njegovo teorijsko opravdanje. Bez obzira na vrednost samog argumenta, njegovi prakticni efekti su bili dobri. Stopa AF je pomogla da se premosti institucionalni jaz izmedu potpune administrativne kontrole i relativne autonomije preduzeca. Ona je takode podstakla radnike da racionalizuju utrosak radne snage. U 1953. godini zaposlenost u preradivackoj industriji i rudarstvu povecala se za 5 odsto, a produktivnost rada za 6,2 odsto. U 1954. godini, kad je napusten sistem akumulacije i fondova, zaposlenost se povecala za 13 odsto, a produktivnost rada. je nesto opala. Stope akumulacije i fondova naravno nisu bile jedinstvene. Planom od 1952. godine predvidala se stopa od 19 za poljoprivredu a 582 za industriju i rudarstvo. Ova razlika je odrazavala vec pomenute ciljeve politike cena: industrijske cene bile su inflacionirane da bi se olaksalo prikupljanje akumulacije za investicije. Medutim, cak i unutar preradivacke grane pojedine industrije su imale razlicite stope. U industrijama sa visokim stopama nije bilo podsticaja da se smanje troskovi. Posto se te stope nisu mogle utvrditi sasvim precizno, neki kolektivi su poceli da primaju visoke dohotke. Vlada je reagovala uvodeci porez na visak platnog fonda (razliku izmedu standardizovanog i postignutog platnog 60

fonda). Posto je standardizovani platni fond proizvod prosecne stope dohotka i broja zaposlenih, preduzece je povecalo zaposlenost cesto sasvim fiktivno manje kvalifikovanih radnika da bi snizilo poresku osnovu. Vlada je reagovala diferenciranjem oporezivanja prema kategorijama kvalifikacija. Preduzeca su odgovorila time sto su vestacki izmenila kvalifikacionu strukturu izjavljujuci da njihovi radnici imaju vece kvalifikacije. Stope akumulacije i fondova ocevidno nisu bile veoma rafinirani instrument ekonomske politike. One su bile uvedene u verovanju da se one mogu standardizovati za sva preduzeca u okviru jedne industrije. Uskoro su, medutim, morale da se propisu individualne stope za svako pojedino preduzece. Ovo je zahtevalo direktne administrativne intervencije koje su bile u protivrecnosti sa osnovnim intencijama novog sistema. U 1954. godini sistem aku mulacije i fondova bio je zamenjen sistemom takozvanih obracunskih plata, koji je trajao sledece tri godine. Jugoslovenski ekonomisti su se vec duze vremena zalili da pre duzeca u svojim ekonomskim proracunima ne uzimaju kamatu na. kapital kao stavlcu u troskovima [21, str. 142]. To je prirodni rezultat cinjenice da se kapital davao preduzecima besplatno. Ova praksa je bila obustavljena 1954. godine kad je uveden porez na kapital od 6 odsto. Ovaj porez se smatrao kao cena drustvenog kapitala i naplacivao se na kapital investiran iz fondova preduzeca. Pored toga, preduzece je moralo da placa normalnu kamatu na kredite koje daje banka. Isto tako su uvedeni i porezi na dobit i na promet, s tim sto.je ovaj drugi postao glavni instrument aku mulacije. Na taj nacin instrumenti ekonomske politike su postali raznovrsniji i elasticniji. N ovi sistem je doveo do podele platnog fonda na dve komponente: obracunske plate i varijabilni deo. Obracunske plate su se davale po pravilniku prema kvalifikacionim kategorijama, uzimajuci u obizr stvarno utroseno vreme. Ponovo su se kvalifikacije fiktivno povecale. Uzimanje, radnog vremena kao osnove obracuna dovelo je do nepostovanja radnih normi. Sledece godine je uveden tarifni pravilnik. Licni dohoci su se odredivali drustvenim planom. Tarifni-pravilnici pojedinih preduzeca predstavljali su vrstu kolektivnog ugovora izmedu preduzeca i sindikata i opstinskih vlasti [18, str. 11]. Obracunavao se i diferencijal efikasnosti i deo dobiti se koristio kao premija za poboljsanje lcvaliteta, smanjenje troskova, itd. Posto se dobit oporezivala (po poreskoj stopi od 50 od sto), preduzeca'su nastojala da umanje dobit povecavanjem plata i smanjivanjem normi. Drzavne komisije za nadnice nisu mogle to da sprece. U 1957. godini odrzan je prvi Kongres radnickih saveta. Na Kongresu je zatrazeno da se prosiri autonomija preduzeca. To je pre svega znacilo vecu nezavisnost u raspodeli dohotka. Podela do hotka na plate i dobit smatrala se neprikladnom i podsecala je na najamne odnose. Da bi se izislo u susret tim zahtevima, sistem raspodele dohotka je izmenjen 1958. godine i postignut kompromis. 61

Tarifni pravilnik je ostao i morao je da bude odobren od strane opstinskih vlasti i sindikata. Dohodak preduzeca tretirao se kao jedinstven i radnicki saveti su ga raspodeljivali na plate i doprinose u razne fondove. Razlika izmedu dohotka i obracunskih plata (zvana minimum licni dohodak) progresivno se oporezivala. Takode se progresivno oporezivao dohodak iznad osnovne plate [32, str. 98-99], . Progresivno oporezivanje je bilo veoma nepopularno. To je isto vazilo i za spoljno tutorstvo sto se ticalo platnih diferencijala. I jedan i drugi bili su ukinuti 1961. godine. Radnicki saveti postali su sasvim nezavisni u odredivanju plata i u raspodeli dohotka. Pro gresivno oporezivanje bilo je zamenjeno jednoobraznim porezom od 15 odsto koji se odbijao od plate. Cak je i ovaj porez bio ukinut 1965. godine. Promene u politici licnih dohodaka dovele su do drasticnih promena u relativnom ucescu faktora. Ako podelimo dodatnu vrednost na bruto dohodak (plate i porez na plate) i bruto rental (amortizacija, kamata, neto prihod i porez na kapital), procentualni udeo ovog drugog (rentala) u industriji i rudarstvu kretao se na sledeci nacin [23, str. 41]:
1952. 1953. 1955. 3957. 1959. 3960. 10% ll/c 74% 77% 67% 62% 1961. 1963. 1964. 1965. 1966. 1967. 54% 53% 50% 48% . 46% 45%

Procentualni udeo bruto licnih dohodaka dopunjava do 100 odsto navedene cifre za rental. U sistemu amortizacije i fondova, amortizacija je bila jedini kapitalni izdatak. Uvodenjem poreza na dobit i poreza na kapital u sistem obracunskih plata drasticno se povecala cena kapitala. Postepeno smanjivanje i konacna eliminacija poreza na dobit (koja je iAplicirala relativno povecanje po reza na licne dohotke) smanjili su udeo bruto rentala na nesto vise od polovine dodane vrednosti. Na ove promene nadovezale su se promene cena. Povecanje cena prehrambenih artikala i usluga po sle 1960. godine povecalo je nominalne plate; ukidanje raznih regresa u isto vreme a narocito posle 1964. godine omogucilo je smanjenje poreza, sto je u izvesnoj meri neutralizovalo efekat povecanja licnih dohodaka. Sledeci efekat bio je da se snizi udeo bruto rentala na ispod 50 odsto. Prilagodavanje preduzeca na te promene zahtevalo je izvanredan napor rukovodstava. Ali preduzeca su reagovala na njih. Istovremeno sa povecanim opeterecenjima na kapital kapitalni koeficijent (odnos bruto fiksnog kapitala i drustvenog proizvoda) u preradivackog industriji i rudarstvu spao je sa 3,6 u 1955. na 2,5 u 1964. godini [23, str. 51]. Ako su preduzeca orijentisana na trziste i ako je proizvodna funkcija linearno homogena (sto se pokazalo da je prihvatljivo resenje), elasticitet pro62

izvodnje u odnosu na kapital u poslednjoj deceniji mora da lezi negde izmedu 0,45 i 0,62. Stvarni koeficijent elasticiteta je bio 0,48. To se shvatilo kao znak da privreda postuje zakonitosti trzista [23, str. 42]. Dok su se primenjivali sistemi plata sa tarifnim pravilnikom i progresivnim oporezivanjem, stvarne plate su zaostajale za povecanjem produktivnosti a cene reprodukcionog materijala su bile stabilne. Od 1958. godine stvarne plate su pocele da se povecavaju brze nego produktivnost rada, a razlika izmedu te dve serije se prosirila norocito u dobu ciklusa u 1961/62. i posle 1964. godine [24, str 627]. Interesantna kretanja cena koja su nastala spomenuta su u glavi 10. Drugu jednu karakteristiku je primetio Wachtel: diferencijali plata medu industrijama nastavili su da se poveca vaju, a meduindustrijska struktura plata pokazala se da je funkcija prosecne produktivnosti sto je objasnjavalo 80 odsto razlika [25, str. 151, 175]. Sofija Popov je konstatovala visoku korelaciju iz medu stope rasta industryske proizvodnje i produktivnosti rada (r = 0,86), [24, str. 622], Ako se prikupe svi ti podaci pocinje da se javlja sledece tumacenje. Sindikati su najavili princip da licni dohoci treba da se po vecavaju u srazmeri sa proauktivnoscu. To je naislo na siroko odobravanje i u stvari princip je dobar kad se primenjuje na pri vredu kao celinu. N o kad se primenjuje na preduzeca, on stvara velike teskoce. U brzo rastucoj privredi pojedine industrije beleze rast po veoma razlicitim stopama (industrija nafte, po stopi od 19,2 odsto, duvanska industrija 5,1 odsto godisnje u periodu 1952 1966). Na taj nacin stope rasta produktivnosti rada moraju se prilicno razlikovati (11,7 odsto u odnosu na 1,2 odsto). Isto tako licni dohoci moraju da se razlikuju i diferencijali moraju da se povecaju vremenom (novcani prihodi povecali su se 12,8 puta u naftnoj industriji i 8,3 puta u duvanskoj industriji u periodu 1952 1966, [24, str. 630], M. Korac je konstatovao da su u 1966. godini licni dohoci za istu kategoriju kvalifikacija u najvise i u najnize placenim grupama industrije bile u odnosu 2:1 [26, str. 130-33], Sve je ovo naravno u flagrantnoj protivrecnosti sa principom raspodele prema radu. Zbog toga je A. Bajt primetio da je princip nagradivanja prema produktivnosti u stvari negacija principa nagradivanja prema izvrsenom radu [38, str. 363]. Autor ovog rada je analizirao kako se dohodak od produktivnosti razlikuje od dohotka od rada. Te razlike predstavljaju (posle odbitka drugih 'troskova) neku vrstu rente koju ja nazivam rentom tehnoloskog progresa [27], Sto je brza stopa rasta, utoliko je znacajnija ova renta V. Raskovic [58, str. 230] i drugi predlagali su da se nacelo raspodele prema radu zameni nacelom raspodele prema rezultatima rada. Treba nagradivati ne proces rada kao takav vec rezultate rada. Raskovic je podvukao da imperfektnost trzista u Ju goslaviji dovodi do eksploatacije jedne grupe kolektiva od strane druge, privilegovanije [75, str. 218]. 63

Znacenje principa nagradivanja prema rezultatima rada je prosirio B. Sefer na interesantan nacin. Sefer podvlaci da se u razvijenim kapitalistickim zemljama slobodno trzisno odredivanje plata sve vise zamenjuje politikom podjednaka plata za podjednak rad. On smatra da se takva politika ne moze primeniti u Jugoslaviji jer radnici snose poslovni rizik, tj. oni ucestvuju i u prihodima i u gubicima. Rad se ne moze automatski nagradivati; on mora da ima drustveno priznanje a to se desava na trzistu gde razmena determinise rezultate rada. Princip podjednaka plata za podjednak rad moze se sprovoditi samo u sistemu drzavnog vlasnistva i drzavnog rukovodenja privredom [76, srt. 74 75]. Tako B. Sefer, M. Korac i neki drugi u stvari tvrde da se 'ovaj princip, koji se smatra marksistickim, moze sprovoditi u kapitalistickim i etatistickim uslovima, ali ne u samoupravnom sistemu. Neispravnost ovog rezonovanja je ocevidna: imperfektnost trzista ne pruza kriterijum za drustveno priznanje necijeg rada; redistributivni efekti imperfektnosti trzista mogu se eliminisati i drugim sredstvima a ne samo etatistickim.

(b ) Ostali problem i Na diferencijale dohodaka zbog tehnoloskih i drugih renti, nadovezuju se diferencijali usled razlicitih poduzetnickih sposobnosti pojedinih radnih kolektiva. B. Sefer citira podatke za beogradska preduzeca u 1967. godini kad su se za isti rad u raznim preduzecima placale naknade u odnosima 1 :3 ili 1 :4 [28, .^tr. 434], Jasno je takve ogromne razlike stvaraju veliki inflacioni pritisak. Postoji tu jos jedna posledica. Kapitalno intenzivna predu zeca su mogla da poboljsaju svoje licne dohotke raspodelom jednog dela dobiti u licnim dohocima. Zbog toga licni dohoci zavise direktno od kapitalne intenzivnosti. No ako se dobit smanjuje, pre duzeca postaju sve nezavisnija od spoljnih izvora za finansiranje svojih investicija. To pak stvara nove teskoce koje cemo razmotriti u glavi 13. Pored tehnoloske rente, klasicni oblici rente bili su proucavani u literaturi i primenjeni u praksi [29, 30], Poljoprivredna renta se u nacelu apsorbuje kroz oporezivanje prema katastarskom prihodu. Rudarska renta je nekoliko godina predstavljala zasebnu stavku kod proizvodaca sirove nafte i kod rudnika. Medu tim, ona je bila utvrdena prilicno samovoljno i stvorila regionalne razlike. Stoga je naisla iia otpor kod preduzeca i bila je konacno ukinuta. Svo prigradsko zemljiste je pripalo opstinama i gradska renta se koristi za opstinske investicije. J. Dirlam, americki proucavalac jugoslovenskih privrednih prilika, podvlaci da se jugoslovenski sistem moze smatrati kao si stem u kome radna snaga uposljava kapital, umesto da kapital uposljava radnu snagu kao sto je slucaj u kapitalizmu. Drustvena svojina kapitala zahteva nesto drukciji prilaz kapitalnim troskovima u radnickom samoupravljaju nego kod kapitalistickih predu64

zeca. Stope amortizacije se utvrduju na najnizem a ne na najvisem nivou. Profit se ne oporezuje, a umesto.toga predlaze se oporezivanje plata [9]. Porez na kapital je na prvom mestu instrument za alokaciju sredstava i ne mora da bude instrument za prikupljanje prihoda za drzavu. Drzava je koristila prihod od oporezivanja kapitala za finansiranje krupnih investicionih projekata kao i za finansiranje fonda za nerazvijene pokrajine. Otpor tim redistributivnim akcijama Savezne vlade je rastao i nedavno je donesena politicka odluka da se ukine porez na kapital. Mnogi ekono misti se ne slazu sa ovom odlukom. Neki smatraju da ce ukidanje poreza na kapital, koji predstavlja cenu koriscenja drustvenog kapitala, znaciti pretvaranje drustvenog vlasnistva u kolektivno vlasnistvo. D. Gorupic i I. Perisin smatraju da cena proizvoda treba da sadrzi element rasta [32, str. 114]. To se moze postici ako se akumulacija utvrduje drustvenim planom u obliku kamate na poslovni fond. Ali ovaj novae ne sme da prisvoji drzava; on treba da ostane u preduzecu odreden za investicije. Stoga ovu unutrasnju kamatu treba tretirati isto kao amortizaciju. Da bi se neutralizovale oscilacije u poslovanju, minimalna amortizacija i akumu lacija se moraju utvrditi kumulativno [33, str. 12, 13]. I. Lavrac tvrdi da se stopa zastitne kamate moze diferencirati prema industrijama i oblastima [34], S. Popovic predlaze da naknada za koriscenje drustvenog kapitala treba da predstavlja gro sredstava za razvoj. Posto se svim faktorima proizvodnje, izuzev radne snage, isplati njihov udeo, preostali neto dohodak se deli medu radnicima. Dodatna akumulacija se moze dobiti samo od ovog privatnog prihoda, sto znaci da radnici ostaju vlasnici tog dela kapitala [35]. Slicna je pozicija F. Cemea koji tvrdi da bi ucesce radnika svojim sopstvenim sredstvima u razvoju preduzeca sto znaci da bi oni primali odgovarajuce kamate ili dividende dalo podsticaja racionalnom ponasanju radnickih i rukovodecih tela [36, str. 21]. S druge strane, M. Samardzija smatra da je ovo i ekonomski irelevantno i drustveno opasno. Savremeni akcionari ucestvuju u profitima svojih korporacija sa veoma malim procentima koji se isplacuju kao dividende. Pokusaji da se radnici ucine suvlasnicima moraju dovesti na kraju do uspostavljanja posebne grupe vlasnika sredstava proizvodnje u drustvu [37, str. 145, 303]. Mi sad mozemo da predemo na opste principe jedne adekvatne politike raspodele. Postoji prilicno velika saglasnost u po gledu dva pitanja. ( 1) Sto veci deo stecenog dohotka treba da osta ne pod direktnom kontrolom radnog kolektiva. (2 ) Samo se pri hod od rada moze razdeliti kao licni dohodak. Ova dva nacela znace ostru podelu dohotka na dve komponente: zaradeni dohodak koji prisvajaju radnici i nezaradeni dohodak koji pripada drustvu ali ostaje pod kontrolom radnickog kolektiva i upotrebljava se iskljucivo za investicione svrhe. Da bi se mogao podeliti neto dohodak u svoje zaradene i nezaradene delove, potrebna nam je teorija faktora proizvodnje. U tom pogledu A. Bajt se drzi tradicionalnog pristupa i definise fak-

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tore proizvodnje kao izvore proizvodnih usluga. On nabraja pet takvih izvora: radna snaga, poduzetnistvo, izumi, zemljiste i kapi tal [38, str. 351]. Prva tri stvaraju prihod od rada, mada normalno jedan mali deo prihoda od izuma prisvajaju pronalazaci. Ova teo rija dovodi Bajta u teskoce kad mora da objasni monopolisticki prihod. On tvrdi da u trzisnoj privredi monopol ucestvuje u dohotku; monopol ne doprinosi proizvodnji ali doprinosi prihodima svih faktora [38, str. 357]. Da bi se izbegli nedostaci tradicionalne teorije, B. Horvat aefinise faktore proizvodnje kao tipove uticaja na stvaranje proiz vodnje. Faktori moraju da se tako vrednuju da bi proizveli optimalnu alokaciju sredstava. To znaci postizanje maksimalnog proizvoda datim sredstvima, ili minimalnog utroska za jedan dati proizvod. Tu imamo cetiri faktora: radna snaga, poduzetnistvo, kapital i monopol. Prva dva stvaraju zaradeni prihod (plata i dobit), druga dva stvaraju nezaradeni prihod (kamata i renta). Stvaralacki organizacioni kao i rutinski rad stvaraju zaradeni dohodak. Dohodak koji potice od aktivnosti radnog kolektiva kao celine pred stavlja poduzetnicki dohodak. Kamata na kapital se vrednuje na uobicajeni nacin i o tome smo vec diskutovali. Trebalo bi da se kaze jos nesto o m orfologiji rente. Renta je cena monopola u smislu da predstavlja visak iznad minimalne cene ponude sredstava. Zemljisna renta se pojavljuje u tri oblika koje je opisao Marks (diferencijalna renta I i I I i apsolutna renta), zatim postoji rudnicka renta i nesto drukcija gradska renta. Rentu tehnickog progresa zbog cinjenice da neke industrije ekspandiraju brze i uzivaju efekte ekonomije obima ili imaju vece ucesce u opstem tehnoloskom napretku, ili i jedno i drugo vec smo ranije opisali. Bajt dodaje rentu od trzisnog monopola koju on defmise kao situaciju kad su prodajne cene iznad normalnih a kupovne cene ispod normalnih [39, str. 93]. Posto se uzmu u obzir monopoli zemljista, prirodnih sredstava, tehnologije i trzista, preostali deo je monopol u uzem smislu. Izuzev za ovaj poslednji, cene drugih monopolnih faktora mogu se u nacelu utvrditi ili trzisnim mehanizmom (zemljiste i rudnici) ili ekonomskom analizom (tehnologija i trziste). Sto se tice ovog drugog, progresivno oporezivanje se moze u praksi pokazati efikasnim postupkom. Ako se porezi smatraju pravicnim oni nece umanjiti ponudu faktora, a to-je nacin na koji definisemo rentu [11, glava 3, 4, 6]. Stvama poslovna praksa i zakonske mere se ne drze ovih principa. Praksom vezivanja licnog dohotka za novcanu produktivnost prisvaja se znatan deo nezaradenog dohotka. Iste posledice nastaju iz cinjenice da se rudnicka renta ubraja u nediferencirani dohodak i da ne postoji progresivno oporezivanje. Novim zakonom o raspodeli dohotka u preduzecima od 1968. godine uracunava se prihod od kapitala investiranog u druga preduzeca u nediferenci rani prihod kolektiva-investitora. P. Jurkovic je to nazvao dosta sumnjivim teoretskim resenjem [40, str. 50]. Uopste uzev, raspodela dohotka prema radu je cilj do kojega se jos nije stiglo. 66

12. SPOLJNOTRGOVINSKA PO LITIKA (a ) Osnovna kretanja Predratna trgovinska struktura je bila prilicno prosta. Prehrambeni i drugi poljoprivredni proizvodi su predstavljali oko jedne polovine ukupnog jugoslovenskog izvoza. 'Jednu petinu izvoza sacinjavalo je drvo a drugu petinu obojene rude i metali [4, str. 408; 42, str. 144], Na taj nacin skoro 90 odsto prihoda od izvoza dolazilo je od ta tri sektora koji proizvode sirovine i polupreradevine. Odmah posle rata strategija razvoja se sastojala u ( 1) prosirenju eksploatacije prirodnih bogatstava u ta tri sektora, i ( 2) u koriscenju prihoda od izvoza za finansiranje uvoza opreme i reprodukcionih materijala. Takode se ocekivalo da ce (3 ) Sovjetski Savez pruziti veliku pomoc u ubrzavanju ekonomskog razvoja. Drugi deo programa je bio uspesno izveden, udeo potrosacke robe u uvozu smanjen je sa 22 odsto od pre rata na svega 11 odsto u periodu 1947 1951 [43, str. 59]. Prvi i treci deo su naisli na neocekivane teskoce. Zbog opadanja p e r c a p i t a poljoprivredne proizvodnje i usled brze industrijalizacije, umanjeni su poljoprivredni viskovi za izvoz i na taj nacin. i ukupni obim izvoza. Uskoro je postala moda da se raspravlja.o pitanju da li Jugoslavija postaje stalni neto uvoznik poljoprivrednih proizvoda [44]. Nacionalizacija strane imovine je nametnula novi teret na bilans placanja. S druge strane, reparacije za ratnu stetu u velikoj meri su ostale neisplacene, narocito od Zapadne Nemacke i Madarske. Odmah posle rata oko 75 odsto spoljne trgovine se obavljalo sa Sovjetskim Savezom i njegovim istocnoevropskim saveznicima. U godinama 1947 1948, udeo trgovine sa tim zemljama se stabilizovao na oko 50 odsto za izvoz i 42 odsto za uvoz. Sredinom 1948. godine zloglasna rezolucija Kominforma je oznacila zavrsetak dobrih odnosa. Vec 1949. godine sovjetska grupa je smanjila trgovinu na jednu trecinu a 1950. go dine je potpuno obustavila. Sovjetski Savez i njegovi saveznici su zaveli bojkot na sve odnose sa Jugoslavijom. Na taj nacin, zemlja je bila odsecena potpuno od Istoka. Ona je bila isto tako odvOjena i od Zapada. Ona nije uzivala olaksice koje su zapadne zemlje davale jedna drugoj. N ije bila ukljucena u Marsalov plan i ostala je izvan GATT-a. Drugim recima, bila je usamljena u neprijateljskom svetu. Petogodisnji plan industrijali zacije, prozet sa toliko nada, tek je bio zapocet kad su iznenada svi ugovori ponisteni a isporuke opreme i materijala prestale dastizu. Trgovina je opadala:

1948. 1949. 1950. 1951. 1952. 1953. 1954. 1955. 1956. 1965.
Izvo z U voz

100 100

79 95

74 86 str.

64 114

87 115

80 106 str.
121 .

102 103

99 130

122 142

328 311

Izvor:
S*

Jugoslavija 19iS19Bi.,

77, SGJ--1959.,

67

Devizne rezerve su spale sa 43 odsto vrednosti uvoza u 1937. godini na 12 odsto 1948., i na 4 odsto u 1952. godini [45, str. 186]. Licna potrosnja je opadala. Izdaci na odbranu iznosili su 20 odsto nacionalnog dohotka. Dve teske suse, u 1950. i zatim u 1952. godini po stale su neocekivani saveznici Kominforma i smanjile su poljoprivrednu proizvodnju za 25 odsto ispod predratnog proseka. Situacija je izgledala beznadezna. Zbog toga je Staljin ocekivao predaju. Medutim, nasi narodi nisu navikli da se predaju, oni se mnogo bolje snalaze u otporu. Oni su se oduprli i prve dve godine se borili tako reci sasvim sami. Investicioni planovi su bili izmenjeni, trgovina je bila usmerena prema zapadu, cak je i.ekonomski si stem bio izmenjen. Od 1951. godine pocela je da pritice ekonomska pomoc iz inostranstva, najvise od SAD. Ona se uglavnom sastojala od hrane, sirovina i vojnog materijala. Ta pomoc je iznosila 38 odsto ukupnog uvoza u 1951. godini a u toku sledece decenije se postepeno smanjivala do nule. . Kriza je uskoro prebrodena i privreda je usla u period nevidenog rasta. Krupne investicije prvog petogodisnjeg plana pocele su da donose rezultate u brzom prosirenju industrijske proizvodnje. Nova poljoprivredna politika je uskoro dovela do fenomenalnog rasta poljoprivredne proizvodnje. Izvoz je prestizao uvoz. Go dine 1954. uspostavljeni su prvi trgovinski kontakti sa istocnoevropskim zemljama. Posle Hruscovljeve posete Beogradu radi pomirenja 1955. godine ponovo su uspostavljeni normalni trgovinski odnosi i tako je nadeno dragoceno trziste za povecani izvoz [53, str. 40], U narednoj deceniji izvoz se povecao 3,3 puta, tj. dvaput vecom stopom nego za svet kao celinu. Ovaj razvoj je bio suvise dobar da bi trajao dugo. Godine 1957. stvoreno je Zajednicko trziste u Rimu. Dve godine kasnije osnovana je EFTA u Stokholmu. Skoro sve zapadnoevropske zem lje su postale clanice jedne ili druge trgovinske grape. Istocnoevropske zemlje su pristupile SEV-u, obrazovanom 1949. godine, ali koji stvarno funkcionise tek od 1954. godine. Jugoslavia se ponovo nasla usamljena. Isprva to nije mnogo smetalo. Ali postepeno se meduzonska trgovina u sva tri podracja pocela brzo da povecava i da utice na trgovinu sa trecim zemljama. To se narocito odnosilo na Zajednicko trziste, najvaznijeg trgovinskog partnera Jugoslavije. Na zemlje Zajednickog trzista otpada 30 odsto jugoslovenskog izvoza, 38 odsto uvoza i dve trecine finansijskih transakcija. Ova trgovina je posebno osetljiva zato sto se izmedu jedne trecine i jedne polovine jugoslovenskog izvoza zemljama Zajednickog trzista sastoji od poljoprivrednih proizvoda. Redovne i varijabilne uvozne carine u Zajednickom trzistu iznose prosecno 50 odsto jugoslovenskih eksportnih cena, a za govedinu cak i do 60 70 odsto, sto ocevidno ne moze da podstice izvoz. Kad su varijabilne zastitne stope (prelevmani) bile prijavljene GATT-u, receno je da je to izuzetni instrument a da carinska tarifa ostaje osnovni instrument. Medutim, u stvari varijabilne stope su 2,5 puta vece od redovne taxife, menjaju se dnevno, nedeljno i tromesecno, i predstavljaju stalni instrument totalne zastite [46, 47]. 68

Jugoslavia je reagovala na ovu novonastalu situaciju nastojanjem da poveca trgovinu sa zemljama u razvoju. Ovaj pokusaj je naisao na ograniceni uspeh. Uvoz iz zemalja u razvoju povecao se na maksimum 14,1 odsto jugoslovenskog uvoza u 1964. godini i sa tim zemljama je ostao stalni visak u bilansu placanja [48], Posle toga uspostavljeni su tesnji odnosi sa GATT-om, Jugoslavija je isprva bila posmatrac, zatim je postala pridruzeni clan GATT-a 1959. godine kad je takode donela Zakon o carinama. Godine 1961. zavedena je privremena carinska tarifa a naredne godine Jugosla vija je postala privremeni clan GATT-a. Godine 1965. uvedena je nova i stalna carinska tarifa, i godinu dana kasnije GATT joj je odobrio puno clanstvo. Prislo se takode i SEV-u. N jegovi clanovi apsorbuju skoro jednu trecinu jugoslovenske trgovine. Godine 1964. Jugoslavija je postala posmatrac u SEV-u. Pregovara se o specijalnim ugovorima sa Zajednickim trzistem. Od svih zemalja u razvoju, Indija i UAR cine jednu trecinu jugoslovenske trgovine sa zemljama u razvoju. U godini 1966. sefovi te tri zemlje su zapoceli akciju koja je postala poznata kao tripartitna saradnja. Tim sporazumom, koji je bio ratifikovan 1968. godine, obuhvaceno je 500 proizvoda na koje se primenjuju preferencijalne stope od 50 odsto, a takode je predvidena i indu stry ska saradnja. Takode je predlozeno ovog puta od strane ekonomista a ne od politicara [50, str. 33] da se obrazuje poduriavsko trgovinsko podrucje. Ako bi se to pokazalo kao moguce, ocekivalo se da bi se to podrucje moglo prosiriti ka severu i ka jugu. Okupacija Cehoslovacke je ucinila tu zamisao utopijskom, bar za sada. Nastojanja da se razviju ekonomski odnosi sa sto vise zema lja i spoljna politika nesvrstavanja omogucili su Jugoslaviji da uspostavi trgovinu sa 120 zemalja. Ta trgovina je ne samo geografski razbacana vec je i raznolika u odnosu na razmenjene proizvode. Kao rezultat toga nastala je teorija kapilarne trgovine. V. Pertot smatra da male kolicine umanjuju trzisne teskoce, a S. Obradovic dodaje da veoma raznolika trgovina umanjuje rizik od poslovnih fluktuacija. Empiricko istrazivanje daje izvesnu podrsku ovoj hipotezi. P. Mihajlovic konstatuje da je koncentrisani predratni izvoz u velikoj meri zavisio od spoljnih oscilacija, dok se takva zavisnost ne pojavljuje posle rata [51, str. 77]. Kapilarna trgovina ima i svoje nedostatke. Obradovic istice da ona povecava troskove plasmana i podrzava Bicanica koji je stajao na gledistu da je koncentracija izvoza preduslov za permanentnu eksportnu poziciju na svetskom trzistu [52]. Brzi rast posle 1955. godine doveo je do dubokih strukturnih promena. Udeo izvoza robe i usluga u drustvenom proizvodu po vecao se sa oko 13 na oko 20 odsto. Jugoslovenski udeo u svetskoj trgovini se udvostrucio, ali posto je jos uvek ispod 1 odsto, on time podrzava teoriju kapilarnosti. Udeo ona tri tradicionalna sektora prirodnih resursa u izvozu umanjen je sa 90 na 50 odsto 69

[42, str. 144]. Sirovine i preradevine su izmenile mesta u strukturi izvoza (od 55 : 6 u 1939. na 13 : 50 u 1968. godini). Nekad samodovoljna seljacka privreda je danas samo stvar od istorijskog interesa. N ju je zamenila relativno otvorena industryalizovana privreda koja aktivno ucestvuje u razvijanju svetskog trzista.

(b ) Prolog Kruto centralno planiranje u periodu 1945 1951. zahtevalo je drzavni monopol u spoljnoj trgovini. Domace trziste je bilo potpuno odseceno od spoljnog sveta. Kurs dinara je bio cisto knjigovodstveni instrument bez ekonomskog znacaja. Uvozna i izvozna trgovina su se odvijale po propisanim domacim cenama. Fond za izjednacavanje cena, osnovan 1946. godine, kompenzirao je izvoznike za razlike izmedu domacih i izvoznih cena- Svaka transakcija se obavljala po zasebnim deviznim kursevima. To je bilo dosledno principu rentabilnosti po svaku. cenu koji se primenjivao na domacem trzistu. Izvoznici su morali da predaju svoj devizni prihod Narodnoj banci koja je, sa svoje strane, zadovoljavala potrebe uvoznika. Spoljnotrgovinska preduzeca su delovala kao agenti Ministarstva spoljne trgovine i morala su da izvrsavaju planove uvoza i izvoza. Planovi su bili definisani u fizickim terxxiinima i stoga trgovci nisu bili zainteresovani za cene i druge trgovinske uslove. Taj sistem je bio prost i dosledan ali ne vrlo efikasan. A ipak, u bumim posleratnim godinama on je izvrsio svoj zadatak. Najznacajniji dogadaj u tim godinama bio je Kominformov ekonomski bojkot. U to vreme bile su objavljene pojedinosti o poslovanju mesovitih sovjetsko-jugoslovenskih drustava i izazvale veliko ogorcenje. Izvestan broj tih drustava bio je obrazovan sa deklarisanim ciljem da pomogne razvoj u zemlji. Kapital se ulagao sa podjednakim udelima, prihodi su se delili podjednako. Rusi su postavljali svoje ljude za direktore, insistirali na preferencijalnom tretmanu i protivili se jugoslovenskoj finansijskoj kontroli. Sve je to suvse podsecalo na predratna iskustva sa stranim kapitalom i mesovita drustva su postepeno bila likvidirana. Ali problem je bio mnogo komplikovaniji; ekonomski odnosi medu socijalistickim zemljama su bili uzdrmani. U jednom interesantnom clanku od 1949. godine M. Popovic, tadasnji clan vlade a sada predsednik Savezne skupstine, objasnio je stav koji je tada zauzet [54]. Kad se na svetskom trzistu susretnu jedna manje razvijena i jedna vise razvijena zemlja, one ce razmenjivati robu sa razlicitim sadrzinama rada. Produktivnija zemlja ce prisvojiti vise rada nego sto ga daje. To znaci eksploataciju. Osim toga, ako se u mesovitim preduzecima dobit deli prema ulozenom kapitalu, uvodi se princip raspodele dohotka koji je tud socijalizmu i kao rezultat toga pojavljuje se eksploatacija u jos jednom obliku. Po principima socijalizma kaze Popovic celokupni visak vrednosti, odnosno celokupan profit sto ga je dru70

stvo dobilo posto je robu prodalo na svetskom trzistu pripada proletarijatu koji je tu vrednost stvorio . . . [54, str. 108]. Na takve teorije, i ne sasvim neocekivano, ruski pregovaraci su reagovali prilicno lakonski: to rg o v lja torgovlja, a druzba druzba (trgovina je trgovina, a prijateljstvo je prijateljstvo). Ali za Jugoslaviju, koja je tada tek izisla iz revolucije, socijalizam je znacio vise nego trgovina; te dve stvari nisu se mogle stavljati na isti nivo. Na ekonomske odnose medu socijalistickim zemljama gledalo se kao na odnose raznih podrucja unutar jedne zemlje. Razvijene socijalisticke zemlje imale su obavezu da pruzaju pomoc manje razvijenim zemljama kako bi ubrzale njihov rast i omogucile im da dostignu isti nivo razvoja u sto kracem vremenu [53, str. 39; 54, str. 70]. To nisu bile apstraktne ideje; one su se primenjivale u odnosu na Albaniju. Jugoslovenski i albanski partizani borili su se zajedno za vreme rata i odnosi izmedu te dve zemlje bili su veoma tesni. Kao razvijenija zemlja, Jugoslavia je odasiljala strucnjake i materijal u Albaniju. Bile su ukinute carine i novcane jedinice su dobile istu nominalnu vrednost. Pokusaji da se stvori jedinstveni sistem cena nisu uspeli jer su razlike u produktivnosti izmedu te dve zemlje bile suvise velike. Ali one su nastavile da trguju po svojim unutrasnjim cenama, sto je znacilo da je.Albanija izvozila po albanskim cenama a uvozila po jugoslovenskim cenama (ove druge su bile nesto nize u proseku od albanskih). U ovoj supstituciji trzisnih cena sa odnosnim domacim cenama, Popovic vidi eliminaciju eksploatacije karakteristicne za mehanizam svetskog trzista [54, str. 128]. U stvari, medutim, ovaj zakljucak ne proistice automatski. Da bi se iznaslo da li je i koliko Albanija imala koristi, trebalo bi da se obracuna celokupna trgovina po alban skim, jugoslovenskim i svetskim cenama i da se uporede vrednosni agregati. A da bi se razmena ucinila ekvivalentnom u odnosu na radnu snagu, morala bi da se primeni medusektorska analiza. Druga jedna politicka mera je imala mnogo jasnije implikacije. Alba nija je dobila beskamatne zajmove za neodredeno vreme. To je bila prva pojava sada vec dobro poznatih programa pomoci za nerazvijene zemlje. Bugarska je takode bila zemlja s kojom je Jugoslavia nameravala da eliminise carine pa cak i da obrazuje konfederaciju. Ju goslavia je odustala od bugarskih reparacionih obaveza za ratnu stetu, i posle Bledskog sporazuma od 1947. godine nade su porasle u obe zemlje. Nekoliko meseci kasnije Staljin je zapoceo svoj napad, i uskoro su sve tekovine propale i sve nade zakopane. Nekadasnji prijatelji su postali neprijatelji. Kominformov ekonomski bojkot i potreba da se finansira petogodisnji plan prinudili su Jugoslaviju da uspostavi odnose sa svetskim trzistem kapitala. Zbog ideoloskih razloga i zbog nepovoljnih iskustava sa zapadnim kapitalom pre rata i sovjetskim kapitalom posle rata, zajednicka akcionarska drustva i mesovita drustva su bila nepozeljni oblik uvoza stranog kapitala. Zajmovi su 71

ostali jedna moguca alternativa. Ali zajmovi isto tako mogu nepovoljno da uticu na ekonomsku i politicku samostalnost jedne zemlje. Da se to ne bi desilo, V. Guzina je u jednom referatu koji je predstavljao opste glediste u to vreme predlozio da se spoljna trgovina odvija prema ekonomskom planu i da se obezbedi odredeni obim i struktura izvoza [55, str. 71]. Guzina je takode smatrao da je autarhija i nemoguca i nepozeljna, i zalagao se za razvoj otvorene ali kontrolisane socijalisticke privrede. Te ideje su bile karakteristicne za spoljnotrgovinsku politiku u sledecoj deceniji. ( c ) T ri koraka ka slobodnoj trgovini Vec sredinom 1951. godine, nove ekonomske misli su zahvatile sektor spoljne trgovine. Kao i obicno, eksperimentisanje sa trzistem je zapocelo sa poljoprivrednim proizvodima. Izvoznicima neke. poljoprivredne robe bilo je dozvoljeno da prodaju svoje devizne prihode po ceni koja se dobijala mnozenjem zvanicnog kursa sa faktorom 7. Time je nagovesten novi zvanicni kurs koji je utvrden prvog januara 1952. godine, od US $ = 300 dinara (stari kurs je bio $ 1 = 50 dinara). Izvoznici su dobili retencionu kvotu od 50 odsto sa kojom su mogli da uvoze sta su hteli i da prodaju uvezenu robu po slobodnim cenama. Prelaz sa potpunog drzavnog monopola na sistem slobodne trgovine nije bio prosta stvar. Raspravljalo se o raznim altemativama. U jednom vaznom clanku u pocetku 1952. godine D. Avramovic, sada funkcioner Svetske banke, smatrao je da se fiksni devizni kurs a posebno njegova iskljuciva upotreba ne mogu praktikovati u socijalistickoj privredi. Da bi se obezbedio minimalni obim i potrebna struktura izvoza i uvoza u skladu sa proizvodnim i investicionim ciljevima, fiksni devizni kurs treba da bude zamenjen ili fizickom alokacijom robe ili sistemom mnogostrukih kurseva. Ovaj drugi je vise u skladu sa socijalistickom privredom3 . Posto inostrane cene stalno osciliraju i posto puna zaposlenost i visoka stopa privrednog rasta zahtevaju stabilnost, treba da postoji egalizacioni fond koji bi apsorbovao suvise jake oscilacije. Stoga, ne samo da postoji potreba za visestrukim deviznim kursevima vec oni isto tako treba i da osciliraju. Kapitalisticki princip fiksnog deviznog kursa uz poslovne fluktuacije treba da bude za menjen socijalistickim principom visestrukih oscilirajucih kurseva uz ekonomsku stabilnost i porast [56]. Zatim su sve te ideje isprobane. U julu te iste godine stavljen je u dejstvo sistem od 17 koeficijenata za egalizaciju cena. Ti koeficijenti, primenjeni po eksportnim cenama obracunatim po zvanicnom kursu, varirali su od 0,8 (za izvoz poljoprivrednih pro izvoda) do 4,0. Na uvoz opreme i sirovina primenjivani su niski koeficijenti kako bi se njihove cene odrzavale na niskom nivou. Isto kao i na domacem trzistu, predvidao se visok stepen liberalizacije u spoljnoj trgovini, ali za razliku od one na unu72

trasnjem trzistu, liberalizaeija spoljnotrgovinskog sistema se pokazala mnogo tezim zadatkom. Pre svega i opet u suprotnosti sa domacim trzistem cena deviza je bila postavljena suvise nisko. Vec u 1951. godini stvarni prosecni izvozni devizni kurs je bio 354 dinara za jedan dolar, a u 1952. godini se povecao na 585 dinara, sto je bilo skoro dva puta vise nego zvanicni kurs. Prosecni uvozni kurs je prilicno zaostajao ($1 = 440 dinara). Jevtini uvoz je vrsio pritisak na platni bilans. Devizna rezerva od 4 odsto uvoza ucinila je ekonomsku intervenciju nemogucom. N ije ni cudo sto novoosnovano devizno trziste DOM (devizno obracunsko mesto) nije funkcionisalo. Isprva izvoznici su morali da prodaju svega 55 odsto banci , a preostalih 45 odsto, koji su predstavljali njihovu retencionu kvotu, mogli su da koriste za uvoz cega zele ili da pro daju uvoznicima u DOM-u. Vec u oktobru retenciona kvota je bila snizena na 20 odsto, a to je znacilo smrtni udarac za DOM. Naredne godine stope DOM-a su se podigle na nivo 6,8 puta visi od zvanicnog kursa. Stvarni prosecni kursevi su isto tako porasli. Godine 1954. izvrsen je niz ocajnickih pokusaja da se spase sistem. Obracunski kurs je povecan ria 632 dinara po dolaru. Koeficijenti su bili revidirani i primenjivani po stopama DOM-a a ne po zvanicnom kursu. Dobiti u DOM-ii bile su striktno oporezovane. Primenjen je bio i niz drugih komplikovanih procedura. Stope DOM-a su se priblizile novini obracunskim stopama, na sta su vlasti i ciljale. Pa ipak uvoznici sirovina nisu mogli da konkurisu u DOM-u za devize i stoga su za njih organizovane posebne prodaje. Time je bio smanjen iznos raspolozivih deviza na otprilike jedan odsto potraznje. Retenciona kvota bila je smanjena na svega je dan odsto. Cerie deviza su skocile i vec 1960. godine su dostigle nivo koji je bio 12,3 puta veci od zvanicnog kursa. Narodna banka je zamenila izvoznike kao iskljucivi prodavac deviza [45, str. 301-315], Prvi pokusaj slobodne trgovine propao je jer je pocetna cena deviza bila utvrdena suvise nisko, pocetne rezerve bile su suvise male, udeo slobodnog trzista u deviznoj ponudi bio je suvise mali, a disparitet izmedu domacih i stranih cena suvise velik. Bilo bi tesko da se nadu negde drugde na svetu takve relativne cene kao sto su postojale u Jugoslaviji 1955. godine, primetio je V. Meichsner: jedna traka za pisacu masinu (2.800 dinara) kosta koliko jedan par cipela, koji kosta koliko dva metra vunene tkanine, koji iznose jednu trecinu prosecne cinovnicke plate, sto je ravno dvodnevnom pansionu u prvoklasnom hotelu u nekom turistickom mestu, koji kostaju isto kao 56 sisanja kose, sto odgovara mesecnoj kiriji jednog petosobnog stana [57, str. 193]. Postojala su istovremeno tri razna devizna kursa: zvanicni kurs, redovni kurs i zasebni DOM kursevi. Meichsner je predlozio da se broj koeficijenata postepeno svede na svega dva, jedan za industrijske i jedan za poljoprivredne proizvode. Godine 1957. M. Frkovic je izracunao koliko stvarni devizni kursevi raznih grupa proizvoda odstupaju od prosecnog stvarnog kursa od $1 = 779 dinara. Pokazalo se da se in73

dustrijski izvoz i prehrambena roba, oprema i nevidljiv uvoz subvencioniraju po stopama izmedu ,21 i 35 odsto, da se primenjuju eksportne takse izmedu 16 i 21 odsto za izvoz poljoprivrednih proizvoda, drveta i nevidljivi izvoz, i zastitna stopa od 105 odsto za uvoz potrosne robe [58]. Vec 1960. godine postalo je jasno da spoljnotrgovinski sistem mora da se iz temelja izmehi. D. Cehovin je procenio situaciju sa tri konstatacije. Preduzeca se stimulisu da zahtevaju poveeanje koeficijenata, a ne da se takmice na svetskom trzistu. Koeficijenti prestaju da budu pasivni instrumenti izravnavanja i u stvari postaju aktivhi instrumenti za povecanje dispariteta cena. Kalkulacija rentabilnosti je postala prakticno nemoguca [43, str. 125]. Z. Mrkusic je podvukao da ce u privredi u kojoj su cene izvoza elasticne a cene uvoza nisu, uvek postojati tendencija da se izvozni kursevi udalje od uvoznih kurseva. To je iziskivalo fizicka ogranicenja na uvoz [45, str. 297]. Dogodilo se i jedno i drugo. Veci uvozni kursevi su neibezno proizveli inflacione priti'ske putem ponude novca, kao sto je Avramovic .vec bio upozorio [56, str. 24]. . Recesija koja je zapocela I960., godine pogorsala je situaciju i to je navelo vlasti da preduzmu reformu 1961. godine. Ovog puta obezbedena je stranim zajmovima znatna kolicina deviza. Ali ponovile su se druge dve grreske iz reforme od 1952. godine. Novi obracunski kurs bio je postavljen suvise nisko (750 dinara za jedan dolar; stvami izyozni kurs 1960. godine je bio 981 dinar;, a 1961. godine je skocio na 1021 dinar:[63]). a disparitet cena se. korigovao samo u nekoliko slucajeva. Strategija reforme moze se opisati na sledeci nacin. Napusteni su visestruki kursevi a koeficijenti su zamenjeni carinskom tarifom. Umesto deviznih kurseva koji su varirali izmedu 500 i 1200 dinara za dolar, uspostavljen je jedinstven kurs ,od 750 dinara bez ikakve zastite za poljoprivredu i sumarstvo, sa zastitom od 10-40 odsto za potrosacku robu i 17-60 odsto za :opremu i druge industrijske proizvode. Izvoz je bio Slobodan i bio je podrzavan premijama i smanjenjem poreza. Izvoznici su morali da prodaju devize Narodnoj banci, a.li u vecini slucajeva mogli su da otkupe naza.d 7 odsto prodatog iznosa za svoje sopstvene potrebe. Jedna petina uvoza bila je liberalizovana, a za ostatak su uvedene robne kvote ili devizne alokacije. Uskoro su se ispoljili nedostaci takvog resenja. Izvoz je bio usporen a uvoz je ubrzan. Da bi se odrzao deficit platnog bilansa pod kontrolom,. povecana su ogranicenja na uvoz i. 1964. godine carinska zastita je povecana sa 20 na 23 odsto. Izvoz je.bio stirnulisan uslovljavanjem alokacije deviza izyozom. Izvozni regresi; i poreske olaksice su.se brzo sirile. Uskoro se pojayio ponoyo stari sistem visestrukih kurseva sa svim svojim nedostacima [59]. ' Ova se situacija pogorsala cinjenicom da je otprilike jfedna polovina jugoslovenske spoljne trgovine bila orijentisaiia na klirinske zemlje, najvecim delom na SEV. I uvoz i izvoz sa zemljama SEV-a je mnogo nestabilniji nego sa konvertibilnim trzistem [71 ]: ,74

I uvozne i izvozne cene na trzistima SEV-a su vise nego na svetskom trzistu. Pored toga lako je izvoziti na ova trzista a tesko je.uvoziti sa njega, dok je slucaj obrnut sa trzistima konvertibilne valute. Posto je za oba ova.trzista postojao jedinstveni kurs razmene, posledice su bile ocevidne. Uvoznici su bili orijentisani na zemlje konvertibilne valute, a izvoznici~na trziste klirinske valute. Deficit platnog bilansa sa onim prvim brzo se povecao, d o k . se pojavio neiskorisceni visak u trgovinskom bilansu sa ovim drugim. Konjunktura od 1964. godine proizvela je neizdrzljiv pritisak na platni bilans. Te iste godine ciklus se izmenio. Recesija je podstakla organe ekonomske politike da preuzmu jos jednu reformu 1965. godine. Ovoga puta struktura domacih cena je radikalno izmenjena, kao sto je objasnjeno u poglavlju 10. Stvarni izvozni kurs 1964. godine bio je 1050 dinara, a ocekivalo se da ce porasti 1965. go dine na 1200 dinara, te je novi zvanicni kurs utvrden na $1 = 1250 dinara. Na taj nacin su izbegnute dve fatalne greske.iz dve prethodne reforme. Dodatni element u ovom resenju sastojao se u snizenju carinske zastite sa 23,3 odsto da 10,5 odsto uz tradicionalnu diferencijaciju stopa od 5 odsto za sirovine do 21 odsto na potrosacku robu [61]. Potrebne kolicine deviza su obezbedene saradnjom sa Medunarodnim monetarnim fondom. Ambicije reforme bile su velike. D. Anakioski, jedan od direktora Saveznog zavoda za plan, ovako je izneo ciljeve reforme: jugo slovenska privreda mora da se ukljuci u svetsko trziste. Trgovina treba da se postepeno liberalizuje i dinar da postane konvertibilan. Izvoz treba da se poveca u odnosu na uvoz omogucavajuci prikupljanje znatnih deviznih rezervi. Deficit u platnom bilansu se mora eliminisati [60, str. 71]. N ovi spoljnotrgovinski rezim je stupio na snagu 1967. godine. .Skoro jedna cetvrtina uvoza bila je liberalizovana. a retenciona kvota je u vecini slucajeva ostala 7 odsto. Za ostalo uveden je komplikovani sistem stimulacija i restrikcija, kako bi se postigla pozeljna regionalna distribucija trgovine. Jedna kategorija uvoza ,sa konvertibilnog podrucja bila je uslovljena kupovinom odredenog iznpsa klirinske valute [62]. Ukinute su eksportne. premije i regresi. Cvrsta monetarna politika je imala za cilj da odrzava stabilne cene, da smanji unutrasnju potraznju i da prinudi preduzeca da izvoze. I ovog puta novi rezim nije uspeo da dovede do zeljenih rezultata. Posle pocetne eksplozije izvoza i smanjenja uvoza koji su u 1965. godini stvorili mali visak u bilansu placanja, uvoz je poceo da se povecava brze nego izvoz. Usporena jeunutrasnja potraznja, ali se isto odnosilo na izvoz. Deficit u bilansu placanja se ponovo pojavio i poceo da raste. Nagomilavali su se neprijatni viskovi klirinske monete. Vratili su se i diferencijalni kursevi razmene. Dinar je bio stabilan na turistickom trzistu dinarska va luta se mogla kupovati po kursevima bliskim zvanicnom kursu na 75

svim menjacnicama ali ispod povrsine vrsila se tiha devalvacija. Nijedan od ciljeva koji je izneo Anakioski nije bio postignut. Nacin na koji je izvrSena reforma slobodne trgovine nije impresionirao profesionalnim kvalitetima. Ali u tom pogledu Jugo slavia nije jedinstvena u svetu danas. Najpopularniji metod trazenja resenja izgleda da je metod' pokusaja i pogresaka. On ima svoje nedostatke, ali ako se primenjuje sa dovoljno upornosti, on takode moze da proizvede korisne rezultate. Ja sam dosad iznosio samo nedostatke, a sada bih se ukratko osvrnuo i na rezultate. Od 1952. godine raspon izmedu ekstremnih stvarnih kurseva (koji proisticu od stvarnih prihoda izvoznika i stvarnih placanja uvoznika) znatno je suzen. Stvarni kursevi su postali znatno stabilniji. Pozitivna razlika izmedu stvarnih izvoznih i stvarnih uvoznih kur seva od 303 dinara u 1955. godini pretvorila se u negativnu razliku od 100 dinara u 1967. Umanjene su drzavne intervencije u skoro svim spoljnotrgovinskim poslovanjima. Izmedu jedne petine i jedne cetvrtine uvoza je cvrsto i potpuno liberalizovano, ili direktno ili preko retencionih kvota i drugih aranzmana. Turisticki dinar je stabilna i konvertibilna valuta. Pozornica je pripremljena za poslednji ako tako nesto postoji u ekonomici napad na slobodnu trgovinu i konvertibilnost. (d ) Polemika o tome sta da se radi dalje Teskoce sa trecom reformom nisu bile bas neocekivane. Z. Mrkusic, A. Cicin-Sain i drugi ekonomisti ocenjivali su razne vladine ciljeve kao nedostizive s obzirom na politiku koja se vodila. Uskoro se razvila ziva diskusija koja se usredsredila na tri teme: zastita, priroda kurseva razmene i konvertibilnost. I. Fabine je smatrao da svaka zastitna politika treba da bude udruzena sa nekim programom razvoja. Zemlje u razvoju nailaze na ozbiljna uska grla u proizvodnim kapacitetima i nestasicama materijala i finansijskih sredstava. Stoga, za razliku od razvijenih zemalja cija je zastitna politika usmerena na izmenu strukture cena i dohodaka, zemlje u razvoju moraju da imaju zastitnu po litiku koja bi bila orijentisana na promene u strukturi proizvodnje. Glavni cilj tarifne politike je da zastiti nacionalnu proizvodnju stvaranjem povoljne diferencijacije unutrasnjih cena u odnosu na cene na svetskom trzistu. Postoje, medutim, tri vazna zadatka koje carinska politika ne moze da ispuni. Ona ne moze da regulise obim uvoza, ona ne moze da postigne zeljenu strukturu uvoza i ona ne moze da regulise regionalnu distribuciju trgovine [64, 65], Za te tri stvari treba da se nadu drugi instrumenti. Jasno je da su vladine administrativne intervencije jedno moguce resenje. To, medutim, nije prihvatljivo kao dominantna alternativa u jugoslovenskim uslovima. Zatim, odgovarajuci sistem kur seva mogao bi da ostvari bar jedan deo tog posla. Ovaj sistem bi mogao da bude zasnovan na jedinstvenom kursu ili na visestrukim kursevima, a kurs ili kursevi mogli bi da budu ili fiksni ili 76

promenljivi. Od ovih elemenata mogu se obrazovati cetiri glavne kombinacije i izvestan broj varijacija. Na jednoj krajnosti imali bismo jedinstveni fiksni kurs a na drugoj promenljive visestruke kurseve. U toku debate Institut za spoljnu trgovinu je zapazio jednu nedoslednost u tradicionalnom pristupu. Politika jedinstvenog kursa obicno namece eliminaciju visestrukih kurseva kod izvoza, dok se kod uvoza oni zadrzavaju u obliku carinske tarife. U stvari, medutim, ekonomsko opravdanje za visestruke kurseve je isto za obe komponente spoljne trgovine [59, str. 75] Z. Mrkusic i O. Kovac iz Instituta ekonomskih nauka predlozili su da se fiksni kurs ucini elasticnim primenom takvih komponenata kursa razmene kao sto su snizenje poreza, preferencijalne prevozne tarife i slicno. Njim a su, medutim, direktne izvozne subvencije neprihvatljive, po svoj prilici zato sto se boje prosirenja samovoljnih drzavnih intervencija [50, str. 34]. Sto se tice uvoza, Fabinc je primetio da fiksna carinska tarifa ne sprecava njihovu elasticnu primenu (odgovarajucom definicijom carinske vrednosti ili uvodenjem klauzula ogranicenja [64, str. 38]). Mogu se takode primeniti i drugi instrumenti, kao sto je carinska taksa za registraciju. Stoga cak i ako se izabere fiksni kurs kao baza sistema, strucnjaci se zalazu da on bude elastican u oba smisla: da bude vremenski promenljiv i da se moze diferencirati u odnosu na fiksni standard. Opravdanje za ovaj pristup vec je dao D. Avramovic u navedenom referatu od 1952. godine: planska privreda ne moze da trpi da se spoljni ekonomski uslovi i fluktuacije automatski prenose na unutrasnje trziste. To sad ponavlja U. Dujsin koji se zalaze ne samo za elasticne vec i oscilirajuce kurseve [ 66, str. 593]. Z Mrkusic je istakao da ako se ide za ravnotezom u bilansu placanja, stalno ce morati da se uskladuju ili kurs razmene ili unutrasnje cene. Posto unutrasnja stabilnost ima glavni prioritet, fleksibilnost spoljne vrednosti novca se javlja kao prirodna posledica [74], Vlada je odlucila da bazira svoju politiku na utvrdenom kurs. Ova odluka je naisla na otpor. Fiksni kurs znaci vladine intervencije koje su nepopularne. Promenljivi kursevi nose rizik nestabilnosti koji vlada nije bila spremna da preuzme. Cicin-Sain je smatrao da taj rizik ne moze biti tako veliki, da promenljivi kur sevi zahtevaju mnogo manje rezerve i mnogo manje stroge uslove u pogledu finansijske discipline, organizacije trzista itd. [67], Ne koliko godina ranije, G. Macesich, americki ekonomista jugoslovenskog porekla, takode se zalagao za promenljive kurseve. On je smatrao da bi takav sistem posluzio da se privreda zemlje ukljuci efikasnije u svetsku privredu time sto bi brzo saopstila planerima kad su ucinjene greske u planiranju. Korekcija gresaka ne bi morala da zavisi od povremenih promena u krutim zvanicnim kursevima razmene [72, str. 202]. S druge strane, Z. Mrkusic je smatrao da bi promenljivi kur sevi podstakli spekulaciju i doveli da destabilizacije. On se pozvao na kanadske eksperimente u toku 12 godina sa promenljivim kur77

sevima koji su doveli do restrikcije jedne polovine uvoza [73], Cicin-Sain je istakao da bi spekulacija mogla da se izbegne ako bi preduzeca bila prinudena da prodaju devize cim ih zarade. Ocevidno je da bi kretanje kapitala zahtevalo posebnu kontrolu. . Promenljivi kursevi podrazumevaju postojanje deviznog trzi sta. Vlada se bojala da bi to moglo da znaci ponavljanje neuspeha DOM-a. S druge strane, preduzeca i privredne komore su zahtevale pov.ecane retencione kvote. Strucno javno mnjenje je podrzavalo trziste, mada ne za sve valute. Posto je zemlja imala hronicni visak u trgovini.sa. klirinskim podrucjem kao celinom i sa vecinom pojedinih zemalja klirinskog podrucja, izgledalo je preporucljivo da se pocnu trzisne operacije sa tim valutama [50, str. 34]'. To bi znacilo promenljive kurseve za oko jednu polovinu deviznog priliva. Sledecafaza bi mogla da se odnosi na konvertibilne valute, a na kraju bi se proglasila spoljna konvertibilnost dinara. Cicin-Sain je proucavao pozitivne i negativne strane prilazenja punoj konvertibilnosti putem spoljne konvertibilnosti, tj. ispunjavajuci clan V III ugovora sa Medunarodnim monetamim fondom, ili putism unutrasnje liberalizacije. On navodi sledeca tri razloga u korist spoljne konvertibilnosti: ( 1) dinar moze da postane rezervna deviza, sto bi znacilo beskamatni kredit za jugoslovenski uvoz; ( 2) zemlje klirinskog podrucja bi mo'gle da nadu za shodno da likvidiraju svoje klirinske deficite kako bi nagomilale konvertibilni dinar, i (3 ) finansijski prestiz Jugoslavije bi se povecao. On smatra, medutim, da ti razlozi nisu narocito ubedljivi. Cak i kad bi imao pimu konvertibilnost, dinar se verovatno ne bi.drzao kao rezervna deviza u znatnim kolicinama, a buduci da su klirinski deficiti strukturni, oni se ne bi izlecili finansijskim merama. S druge strane, spoljna konvertibilnost zahteva znatne rezerve i teze se postize ukoliko je veci stepen unutrasnje liberalizacije [ 68, 69]. Liberalizacija bi dovela do manjih zaliha zalihe su notorno visoke u jugoslovenskoj privredi sto bi znacilo znatnu ustedu u devizama i poslovnom kapitalu. Kasnije u debati strucno misljenje se okrenulo u pravcu spo ljne konvertibilnosti. Z. Mrkusic je smatrao da u stvari Jugoslavia odrzava spoljnu konvertibilnost sa zemljama konvertibilnog pod rucja. Ako jugoslovenski trgovci placaju stranim izvoznicima njihovom sopstvenom valutom, to je isto kao kad bi oni vrsili placanja ekstemo konvertibilnim dinarom. Zvanicno proklamovanje spoljne konvertibilnosti bi dovelo do vece finansijske discipline, veceg uticaj a svetskog trzista na unutrasnje troskove proizvodnje i isto tako do izvesnih deviznih usteda jer strani izvoznici ne bi insistirali na konvertiranju dinarskog salda odmah u svoju sopstvenu valutu [70], Ekonomski institut u Zagrebu istakao je da bi spoljna konvertibilnost olaksala multilateralizaciju trgovine sa zemljama SEV-a [41, str. 191]. Kao sto je vec primeceno, Jugoslavia ne pripada ni jednom od trgovinskih podrucja u Evropi i politicki je nesvrstana. Zbog toga je ona naisla na znatne teskoce u trgovini sa svojim susedima. 78

Medutim, zasto se ova pozicija slabosti ne bi pretvorila u poziciju snage? Zemlja koja je prosla kroz nerazvijenost, centralno plani ranje i trzisnu organizaciju i koja je ekonomski i politicki nesvrstana mogla bi mozda da postane pozeljno ekonomsko steciste za sva tri razlicita sveta. Ako je to tako, onda je spoljna konvertibilnost svakako jedan od preduslova da posrednicka uloga jugoslovenskog trzista postane privlacna za njene partnere sa zapada, istoka i nerazvijenog juga [69, str. 82],

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V NOV AC, B ANK AR STVO I JAVNE FINANSIJE 13. BANKARSTVO I M ONETARNA PO LITIK A Mnogo se eksperimentisalo u jugoslovenskoj privredi. To se odnosi na podrucje novca vise nego na bilo koje drugo. Bankarstvo se moze organizovati na centralizovani i decentralizovani nacin. Decentralizacija moze da bude (1 ) regionalna, (2 ) funkcionalna, ili (3 ) i jedna i druga. Centralizacija moze biti (1 ) apsolutna, ili (2 ) parcijalna. Stoga postoje pet mogucih orga nizational resenja. Sva su ona bila. isprobana. (a ) Bankarstvo za centralno planiranu privredu Prema Institutu za finansije, u socijalistickoj privredi u 1949. godini novae je bio instrument koji su drzavne vlasti koristile da vrse raspodelu drustvenog proizvoda u srazmeri prema radu svakog trudbenika, da uspostave ekonomske odnose izmedu predu zeca i da vrse kontrolu nad njihovom delatnoscu. Novae je takode bio sredstvo akumulacije i instrument kontrole nad ispunjenjem plana [1, str. 63]. Bankarski sistem je imao da obezbedi novae sa takvim osobinama. Jugoslavia je od predratnog vremena nasledila izvestan broj privatnih i drzavnih banaka. Privatne banke bile su eliminisane do 1947. godine, a drzavne su bile reorganizovane. Narodna banka bila je potomak Srpske narodne banke osnovana 1883. godine. Bivsa Drzavna hipotekama banka naslednik drzavne banke osnovane u Srbiji 1962. godine (Uprava fondova) nastavila je rad kao Drzavna investiciona banka. Poljoprivredna banka od 1929. go dine. nastavila je da funkcionise na istom podrucju. Takode je postojala Zanatska banka, a s obzirom na ambicije programa industrijalizacije, smatralo se za korisno da se obrazuje i posebna Industrijska banka. Rat se jos nije bio zavrsio kad je zapoceo proces osnivanja regionalnih banaka: sest republika sest republickih banaka.
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Za zemlju koja je tezila centralnom planiranju, sve te banke nisu predstavljale celishodan aranzman. U septembru 1946. godine zapocela je konsolidacija bankarskog sistema. Sve postojece banke bile su integrisane u Narodnu banku, kojoj su bile poverene kratkorocne transakcije, i Drzavnu investicionu banku koja je imala da radi sa investicijama i stranim zajmovima. Pored toga sto je radila sa kratkorocnim kreditom, Narodna banka je bila emisiona banka, vrsila je opste bankarske i posrednicke poslove za vladu i sluzila kao blagajnik za citavu privredu. U 1948. godini sistem dve banke izgledao je preterano centralizovan. Posto su u to vreme mesna preduzeca i poljoprivredne zadruge igrale specijalnu ulogu, osnovano je 89 komunalnih banaka i sest regionalnih drzavnih banaka za finansiranje poljoprivrednih zadruga. Komunalne banke su bile univerzalne banke: one su finansirale lokalne budzete, davale kratkorocne i dugorocne zajmove, prikupljale ustedevine, kontrolisale ispunjenje plana mesnih preduzeca. Banke su naplacivale kamatu od 1 odsto sto je u stvari bila provizija za njihove usluge. N ije se smatralo za pogodno da se u socijalistickom sistemu naplacuje kamata kao cena za kapital. Posto je mnogo lakse kontrolisati finansijske transakcije koje se vrse preko bankarskih racuna nego one koje se vrse u gotovom, vec su 1945. godine sva preduzeca i druga pravna lica morala da imaju ziro racune kod banke. Uskoro se oko devet desetina pla canja vrsilo bez upotrebe gotovine. To je bio jedan od trajnih rezultata ranog perioda bankarskog razvoja. Placanja preko bankarskih racuna se razvilo u jedinstveni sistem unutrasnjih placanja, usmerenog kroz mesne filijale Narodne banke. On je obuhvatio sve banke, poste, preduzeca, drzavne fondove i znatan deo privatnog sektora, povezao je sve monetarne tokove privrede u jedan jedin stveni skladni sistem [2, str. 366], U mnogim aspektima pocetni jugoslovenski monetarni sistem je bio kopija sovjetskog modela. To se narocito odnosi na tri instrumenta novcane kontrole: planiranje kredita, distribuciju goto vine (kaseni plan) i automatsko naplacivanje faktura. Planiranje kredita je jedini instrument koji je nadziveo administrativnu fazu. Do 1950. godine planiranje kredita je znacilo prosto sabiranje kreditnih potreba pojedinih preduzeca. To su radili organi planiranja. Banka je imala da izvrsi te planove na jedan rutinski nacin. Kasnije su se kreditni planovi pretvorili u kreditne bilanse, sto je znacilo da su potrebe bile uskladene sa sredstvima. Banke su postale odgovorne za sastavljanje kreditnih bilansa. [3, str. 172], Planirani iznos kredita za pojedina preduzeca dobio se podelom proizvodnog zadatka na individualne koeficijente obrtara a zatim oduzimajuci poslovni fond preduzeca [2, str. 366], Glavna svrha kasenih planova bila je da se kontrolisu prihodi (pre svega u trgovini na malo, ugostiteljstvu i putnickom Transportu) i izdaci (u glavnom za licne dohotke i isplate seljacima) koji se vrse u gotovini [4, str. 145-146]. Kaseni plan se izradivao za teritorijalne jedinice i za posebne novcane tokove 82

i tako je davao korisne informacije o prihodima i rashodima stanovnistva i o raznim kanalima kojima je novae kruzio u privredi. Ali to je bio dosta krut instrument koji se nije mogao mnogo koristiti izvan centralnog planiranja i stoga je bio napusten 1951. godine. Da bi se povecala finansijska disciplina, preduzecima je bilo zabranjeno da daju jedno drugom finansijske kredite. Automatsko naplacivanje faktura je sluzilo istoj svrsi. Banka bi automatski odobrila prodavcev racun cim je roba isporucena a zatim bi razduzila kupcev racun. Na taj nacin, nije se moglo praktikovati uzajamno kreditiranje. Placanja su vrsena bez teskoca. Ako na kupcevom racunu nije bilo novca, automatski se pruzao kredit. To je, naravno, znacilo da su se krediti davali preko granica postavljenih kreditnim planom. Isprva takva pitanja nisu suvise zabrinjavala planere; vazni su bili fizicki ciljevi a ne novcani tokovi. Druge posledice su bile vec vise zabrinjavajuce. Ukupni obim kredita zavisi vise od duznika nego od banaka. Neophodna disciplana je bila dovedena u pitanje. Prodavci se nisu brinuli da li su njihovi kupci likvidni i takode su imali obicaj da ne obracaju dovoljnu paznju na rokove isporuka, asortiman i kvalitet robe. Kupcima nije smetalo da prikupljaju suvisne zalihe. Posle izvesnog vremena nehajni ku pci su bili stavljeni na crne liste, njihovi bankarski racuni su bili blokirani i u mnogim slucajevima bili su izvodeni pred sud. Mehanizam automatskog placanja je prestao da funkcionise i 1951. godine bio je zamenjen slobodnim ugovaranjem medu trgovinskim partnerima [5, str. 21]. (b ) Ucenje kroz praksu K oji bankarski sistem odgovara samoupravnoj privredi? Centralizovan ili decentralizovan? Oko toga su se vodile zive diskusije. E. Neuberger je proucio glavne argumente u prilog jedne ili druge alternative [ 6], Bez obzira koliko su ti argumenti sami po sebi mogli da budu na mestu, vlada je odlucila da ne reskira nista. Niko nije mogao da bude siguran kako ce se ponasati preduzeca pod radnickom upravom. Izgledalo je preporucljivo da decentralizacija na trzistu za robu i usluge bude propracena strogom centralizacijom u finansijskoj sferi. Svi drugi instrumenti kontrole primetio je J. Pokom imali su da se zamene kontrolom i nadzorom banke [7]. U martu 1952. godine Komunalne banke su prestale da postoje a druge banke su se spojile sa Narodnom bankom u jednu jedinstvenu dzinovsku banku sa 550 filijala i 16.000 sluzbenilca. Da bi se kontrola ucinila sto efikasnijom, poslovni fond pre duzeca je bio prenesen na banku. Preduzeca su imala da placaju izvesnu kamatu koja je imala za cilj da ih podstakne da stede kreditni novae. Kratkorocna kamatna stopa se diferencirala prema brzini obrta sredstava i kretala od 2 odsto za proizvodnju nafte i poljoprivredu do 7 odsto za elektricne centrale. Ovaj raspon je smanjen
6*

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na 5 do 7 odsto 1953. godine. On je ponovo povecan 1954. godine a stope su se diferencirale na nesto razlicit nacin (za razne vrste kredita). Eksperimentisanje sa kamatnim stopama se produzilo i kasnije, i 1956. bilo je 25 kategorija aktivnih kamatnih stopa [5, str. 183]. Tzv. drustveno knjigovodstvo predstavljalo je jedan trajni rezultat reforme od 1952. godine. Banka je uspostavila specijalna konta isprva ukupno 13 za sve vazne transakcije svakog pre duzeca. Sve promene koje su se desavale na tekucim racunima preduzeca bile su knjizene ovde. Na taj nacin (1 ) banka i vlada su imale najnovije informacije, (2 ) banka je bila u stanju da vrsi strogu kontrolu; ona je mogla da obustavi svaku nepravilnu isplatu, sto je narocito bilo vazno u odnosu na licne dohotke; (3 ) banka je kontrolisala ispunjavanje poreskih i drugih obaveza preduzeca prema drzavi. Ovaj sistem je kasnije bio uproscen, broj posebnih racuna se postepeno smanjio i banka je pocela vise da se oslanja na kvartalne knjigovodstvene izvode preduzeca. Ovaj zadatak je postao cisto rutinski uvodenjem standardizovanog knjigovodstva koje je bilo obavezno za sva preduzeca. Godine 1959. drustveno knjigovodstvo sa svojim sistemom ziro racuna za citavu privredu bilo je odvojeno od Narodne banke i pretvoreno u nezavisnu drustvenu sluzbu. Uz pomoc racunara ova sluzba je postala veoma efikasna. Nesto kasnije se pokazalo da monopol SDK na platni promet ne sprecava preduzeca da cuvaju svoja finansijska sredstva kod banaka koje ona izaberu. Danas svako pravno lice koje stice dohodak ima ziro racun kod Sluzbe drustvenog knjigovodstva ( i placa proviziju) dok u isto vreme ima tekuci racun kod druge banke (i prima kamatu na pologe). Jedan od vaznih problema koji je imala da resi sveobuhvatna Narodna banka bio je pravilni postupak prilikom davanja kratkorocnih kredita. U tim danima romanticnog verovanja u mogucnost izmisljanja prostih instrumenata za resavanje problema kao sto je stopa akumulacije i fondova koji bi eliminisali samovolju birokratskog aparata, banka je zaposlila nekoliko matematicara i dala im zadatak da izmisle odgovarajucu formulu za pruzanje kredita. Godine 1952. objavljena je knjizica sa vise takvih formula [8]. One su bile zasnovane na koeficijentima obrta kredita i odnosima prodaja prema troskovima. Posto su parametri u formulama mogli da se proracunavaju samo kao neka vrsta proseka, uskoro se ispostavilo da su neka preduzeca dobijala vise kredita nego sto im je trebalo, dok su druga oskudevala u novcu koji im je bio potreban radi odrzavanja proizvodnje. Ove .formule su napustene i 1953. godine, iznos datog kredita je zavisio od maksimalnog kvartalnog kredita koji je preduzece koristilo prethodne godine. To je islo u prilog proslogodisnjim duznicima a na stetu dobrim privrednicima i stoga je moralo da se napusti. Ali ideja nekog mehanizma za automatsko obracunavanje kredita nije bila napustena. U 1954. godini Banka je probala kreditne licitacije. M. Vuckovic objasnjava da su kreditne licitacije neka vrsta socijalistickog kreditnog trzista gde su se sastajali ponuda i potraznja novca i od-

redivali opste uslove davanja kredita [5, str. 38]. Banka je ocekivala da ce se manje rentabilna preduzeca uzdrzavati od trazenja zajmova jer ne bi bila u stanju da podnesu velike kamatne stope. Ispostavilo se upravo da su manje rentabilna ili nerentabilna pre duzeca bila spremna da ponude i najvise kamatne stope cak do 17 odsto jer su smatrala da je kredit jedino moguce resenje za njihove probleme. Banka je tada utvrdila marginalnu kamatnu stopu na 7,5 odsto. Ali to je bila negacija citave zamisli licitacije. Uskoro se kredit pruzao automatski svakom preduzecu koje je ispunjavalo formalne uslove licitacije. Posto su se svi automatski instrumenti pokazali neefikasni, u 1955. godini Banka se vratila na tradicionalnu bankarsku praksu individualnog procenjivanja svake molbe za kredit. Vec 1954. godine utvrdene su bile dve cinjenice: (1 ) novi eko nomski sistem je funkcionisao dobro u celini, ali (2) centralizovanoj banci jos mnogo sta je nedostajalo. Cim je to postalo jasno, zapocela je regionalna i funkcionalna decentralizacija. Jedno od glavnih opravdanja za decentralizaciju bila je drustveno-ekonomska neuskladenost izmedu samoupravljanja na robnom trzistu i drzavnog monopola na finansijskom trzistu. M. Vuckovic podrzava guvernera Narodne banke koji je izjavio da ce u decentralizovanom bankarskom sistemu funkcija kredita biti podvrgnuta kontroli drustvenog samoupravljanja a ne birokratske uprave [5, str. 86]. Komunalne banke sa svim njihovim razlicitim aktivnostima su ponovo uspostavljene. Banke su morale da drze rezerve kod Narodne banke do 30 odsto sredstava po videnju i 100 odsto investicionih sredstava. U toku sledece tri godine otvorene su jos tri specijalizovane savezne banke: jedna spoljnotrgovinska banka, jedna investiciona banka i jedna poljoprivredna banka. Narodna banka je oslobodenja investicionih i nekih drugih bankarskih radnji. Svakom bankom upravljao je upravni odbor ciji su clanovi delimicno naimenovani od organa koji su osnovali banku a delom izabrani od strane bancinog osoblja u srazmeri 2:1. Posto .su sve ove promene izvrsene, izgledalo je celishodno da se preduzecima vrate obrtna sredstva. To je bilo ucinjeno 1956. godine i time se sistem stabilizovao zasada. Obrtna sredstva nisu se vracala besplatno. Preduzeca su imala da placaju kamatu od 6 odsto.

(c ) Bankarstvo za samoupravnu privredu Trebalo je da prode osam godina dok privreda nije naucila kako da operise sa nekoliko osnovnih finansijskih mehanizama. U finansijskom sistemu jos uvek nije postojao adekvatan institucionalni sistem. Trebalo je da prode jos osam godina dok nisu poceli da se naziru obrisi takvog jednog sistema. Nedostatke bankarskog sistema kakav je bio do 1960. godine ovako je spisao V. Holjevac [11]. Filijale Narodne banke bile su 85

neefikasne, neimaginativne, angazovane na raspodeli planskog povecanja kredita i na izvrSavanju odluka iz centrale. Komunalne banke su pale pod potpunu kontrolu mesnih vlasti koje su cesto onemogucavale sprovodenje zdrave poslovne politike rentabilnih i sigurnih investicija. Savezna vlada se cesto neposredno mesala u bankarstvo imobilizirajuci neke vrste uloga ili stvarajuci deficit koji nije u skladu sa drustvenim planom. Da bi se prevazisli ti nedostaci, preduzet je niz reformi. Kao i u periodu posle 1952. go dine, reforme su sprovedene u dvogodisnjim intervalima pocevsi sa 1961. godinom. Te godine komunalne banke su postale osnovne i univerzalne kreditne institucije. Da bi se odstranio monopolisticki uticaj politickih vlasti, dve trecine clanova upravnih odbora banaka postavljali su radnicki saveti preduzeca koja su se nalazila na teritoriji banke. Zatim se pojavilo osam regionalnih banaka. One su imale da sluze kao posrednici izmedu komunalnih banaka koje su bile obavezne da drze rezervu od 5 odsto kod njihovih odnosnih regionalnih banaka i Narodne banke. To je bio nesrecni aranzman je r je prouzrokovao raspadanje nacionalnog kreditnog trzista na sest republickih trzista sa razlicitim poslovnim uslovima, itd. [17, str. 53], Ova greska je bila ispravljena cetiri godine kasnije. Godine 1962. obrazovana je jedna interesantna nova institucija. Ona se zvala Zajednicki rezervni fond preduzeca. Prema D. Dimitrijevicu, zajednicke rezerve su neka vrsta polufinansijskog posrednika. Obrazovane na opstinskom i republickom nivou, Za jednicke rezerve su davale kredite onim preduzecima koja su imala gubitke, koja nisu konkurentna, nalaze se u finansijskim teskocama i ne ispunjavaju uslove za redovni bankarski kredit [34, str. 19]. U toku vise od jedne decenije jugoslovenska bankarska praksa i monetarna teorija odrzavale su fundamentalnu razliku izmedu finansiranja osnovnih i obrtnih sredstava. To je imalo svog smisla u centralno planiranoj privredi, ali je dovelo do pogresne politike u trzisnim uslovima. Uvidelo se da obrtna sredstva nisu homogena: ona se sastoje od jednog konstantnog dela koji se moze i treba finansirati kao fiksni kapital, i jednog promenljivog dela koji je stvarno svrha kratkorocnih kredita. Godine 1961. pre duzeca su konsolidovala fondove osnovnih i obrtnih sredstava u jedinstveni poslovni fond. Celokupna likvidna imovina mogla je da se koristi i za tekuca placanja i za investicije.9 Da bi se povecala finansijska nezavisnost preduzeca, ocekivalo se da ona finansiraju konstantni deo obrtnih sredstava iz svojih sopstvenih fondova i da
9) P re d u z e c a su ip a k b ila o b a v e z n a d a p o re d ziro r a c u n a o d r ia v a ju jo p e t r a c u n a k o d S lu zb e d ru stv e n o g k n jig o v o d stv a . O vi raG uni (za a m o rtiz a c iju , n e ra z d e lje n i d o h o d a k , zajed n ifik u p o tro n ju , i za d v e v rs te re z e rv i) o d r ia v a n i su p re m a poseU niin p ra v ilim a sa ciljem da se p o d s ta k n u p re d u z e c a d a se p o n a g a ju p o slo v n o (14). Z aseb n i r a c u n i s u n a ra v n o s m a n jiv a li m o g ifcn o st ra c io n a ln o g k o ri c e n ja n o v c a poto se ovaj n ije m o g ao slo b o d n o p re n o siti sa je d n o g rafiu n a n a d ru g i. M e d u tim , p o ste p e n o su e lim in isa n i z a s e b n i raGuni,

86

se oslanjaju na bankarske kredite samo za promenljivi deo. Ali to nije bilo dovoljno za jednu potpunu kreditnu politiku. Sledeci se problem postavljao pred rukovodioce: kako uobliciti jednu elasticnu kreditnu politiku sa minimumom administrativnih alokacija u uslovima nepostojanja trzista novca i kapitala. Oni su odlucili da se posluze tzv. kvalitativnom kontrolom koja je imala da regulise potraznju za kreditima. Ta nova politika bila je uvedena 1963. godine i jedan od njenih tvoraca, N. Miljanic, guvem er Narodne banke, detaljno ju je objasnio u knjizi koju je objavio godinu dana kasnije [17]. Prema Miljanicu, finalna potrosnja treba da se finansira iz stvorenog dohotka. To znaci da obrazovanje zaliha treba da se finansira od akumulacije. Deficit u drzavnom budzetu mogao bi da se upotrebi kao izvor novog novca, ali to nije pozeljno jer u odsustvu novcanog trzista, raspodela takvog novca vrsi se neuredno i ne moze se kontrolisati. Miljanic cak insistira na tome da se Savezni budzet u svakom slucaju uravnotezi [17, str. 31]. Ovakav zahtev, mada se ne moze braniti teoretskim postavkama, ima u praksi izvesna opravdanja s obzirom na ponekad gotovo neodgovomo deficitno finansiranje drzavnih organa. U zvanicnom dokumentu Narodne banke dodaje se da je u slucaju recesije bolje da se poveca (selektivno) kolicina novca nego da se ide na budzetski deficit [25, str. 28]. Posto u jugoslovenskoj pri vredi ne postoji kejnzijanska zamka likvidnosti, ovo je tvrdenje sasvim na mestu. N ovi novae trebalo bi da se koristi u prvom redu za fihansiranje prometa robe. Stoga se kredit daje na bazi nekog dokaza (fakture, menice) da je roba prodata (od strane proizvodaca) ili kupljena (od strane trgovca). Kredit se ne moze davati za prodaju krajnjim potrosacima (drzavi, investitorima, potrosacima). Izuzetno od tog pravila i na osnovu posebne procene od strane banke krediti se mogu takode davati za sezonske zalihe i zalihe koje se nagomilavaju zbog okolnosti izvan moci preduzeca. (U stvari kre dit za zalihe, ne samo da nije bio izuzetak vec je tako reci dostigao nivo kredita za promet robe) [17, str. 72]. Pored ove prve kategorije kredita, koja stvara neku vrstu neutralnog novca, krediti mogu takode da igraju aktivnu ulogu u podrzavanju proizvodnje. To su krediti za specificne poduhvate, uglavnom za izvoz, poljoprivrednu proizvodnju i plasman. Miljanic je takode zapazio i jednu teskocu u svom sistemu. Poslovne operacije zahtevaju da preduzece uvek ima na raspolaganju izvestan iznos novca. Taj novae je deo stalnih obrtnih sredstava ali posto je novae, ne bi trebalo da se finansira iz dohotka. S druge strane, ako se finansira kreditima, oni ocevidno ne mogu biti kratkorocni. Miljanic smatra da bi revolving krediti mogli da budu resenje [17, str. 88]. Ovaj sistem je trajao cetiri godine i doneo dobre rezultate. Preduzeca su unapred znala kakve uslove treba da ispune da bi dobila kredit od banke. Komunalne banke su znale da ce dobiti kredit od Narodne banke ako ispune propisane uslove. Ali je taj sistem imao i svojih slabosti. B. Mijovic, jedan o ddirektora Na.87

rodne banke, istice da kvalitativna kontrola (uslovi, svrha, trajanje i vrste kredita) ne bi mogla sasvim da postigne cilj kvantitativnog regulisanja izdavanja novca. Narodna banka je morala neprestano da izdaje detaljne i obimne instrukcije koje su postale veoma glomazne. Posto se svi prakticni slucajevi nisu mogli predvideti i regulisati unapred, resavanje granicnih slucajeva je dovodilo do znatnih teskoca. Ceste institucionalne promene u privredi stvarale su dopunske teskoce [18, str. 73 i 112]. Vec 1967. godine kreditni sistem je bio sazreo za novu reformu. Ovog puta glavni predmet monetame kontrole bilo je izdavanje a ne trazenje kredita.Selektivna kontrola je bila uskladena u okviru jednog sistema kvantitativnog usmeravanja. Tri tipa kredita investicioni, poslovni i potrosacki bili su osnov za donosenje zakona kojim se uspostavljaju tri tipa banaka: investicione banke za finansiranje osnovnih sredstava i stalnih obtnih sredstava, komercijalne banke za izdavanje kratkorocnih. kredita, i stedionice koje rade sa potrosackim kreditima. Na tabeli 1 prikazane su najnovije organizacione izmene [16, str. 78].
Tabela 13,1 Banke u Jugoslaviji N ovem bar 1964. Juni 1967.

Vrsta banke Kom unalne banke Republicke inves ticione banke Specij alizovane savezne banke Ukupno

broj 206 8 3 217

Vrsta banke K om ercijaln e banke M esovite banke Investicione banke Ukupno

broj 61 39 11 111

Organizacione izmene odrazavaju promenu politike. (1 ) Savezne, republicke i komunalne banke su nestale. Sve banke u nacelu mogu da obavljaju poslove na citavoj teritoriji zemlje. Do ove deteritorijalizacije je doslo posle cestih zalbi zbog uskog lokalizma i nezdravih politickih pritisaka od strane mesnih i republickih vlasti. (2 ) Trzisna orijentacija banaka dovela je. do procesa koncentracije kojim je prepolovljen ukupan broj banaka u toku svega tri godine. Do kraja 1968. godine broj banaka je jos smanjen na 74. Ovaj broj treba uporediti sa 700 privatnih banaka pre rata. Ali najvaznija je bila (3 ) promena u osnivanju i upravljanju bankama. Tu j.e najzad nadeno resenje koje je bilo dosledno sa organizacijom ostalog dela privrede. Banku sada osnivaju preduzeca i drustveno-politicke zajednice (savezne, republicke i opstinske) kao ravnopravni partneri. Da bi bila nezavisna poslovna preduzeca, banke imaju svoj sopstveni kapital koji se zove kreditni fond. Osnivaci ulazu svoj kapi88

tal u kreditni fond banke i postaju akcionari. Potrebrio je da se nadu najmanje 25 osnivaca za jednu banku kako bi se sacuvala sustinski servisna funkcija banke. .Bankom upravljaju preduzeca i drustveno-politicke zajednice u srazmeri sa iznosom kapitala koji su investirale u .kreditni fond. Akcionari imaju pravo na dividende u zavisnosti od poslovnog uspeha. Te dividende se ne mogu raspodeliti kao licni dohoci vec se mogu koristiti samo za formiranje kapitala. Da bi se sprecila monopolizacija, nijedan akcionar ne moze imati vise od 10 odsto ukupnog broja glasova u skupstini banke bez obzira koliki je iznos kapitala ulozen. Isto tako nijednom preduzecu ili drustveno-politickoj zajednici se ne moze uskratiti pravo da ulazu u jednu odredenu banku i da ucestvuju u njenom upravljanju. Skupstina banke se sastoji od ulagaca i predstavnika kolektiva banke. Ona postavlja izvrsni odbor, direktora i njegovog zamenika. Izvrsni odbor sprovodi opstu poslovnu politiku banke. Kreditni odbor resava pojedinacne molbe za kredit izuzev u nekim posebnim slucajevima. Da bi se obezbedilo objektivno i strucno poslovno procenjivanje molbi, kreditni odbor je sastavljen od bankarskih strucnjaka. Namestenici banke imaju svoja samoupravna tela koja rukovode raspodelom licnih dohodaka, koriscenjem raznih fondova, kadrovskim pitanjima itd., a preko predstavnika u izvrsnom odboru i skupstini ucestvuju u upravljajnu bankom. Posto je obrazovana mreza komercijalnih banaka, Narodna banka je prekinula svoje direktne poslovne kontakte sa preduze cima i postala je centralna banka u tradicionalnom smislu reci.1) 0 U svojoj funkciji usmeravanja novcanih tokova u 1961. godini Na rodna banka je imala na raspolaganju sledece instrumente [12, str. 95 104]: 1. Emisija novca 2. Prodaja deviza 3. Utvrdivanje uslova za davanje kratkorocnih kredita od od strane komunalnih banaka 4. Zakonski obavezne rezerve komunalnih (kasnije komerci jalnih) banaka kod Narodne banke. Gornja granica bila je utvrdena na 35 odsto odgovarajucih uloga 5. Granice kamatnih stopa (u praksi 8 do 12 odsto) 6. Ogranicavanje u koriscenju nekih vrsta uloga. Ovaj instru ment se koristio cesto i bezobzirno, sto je mnogo ljutilo vlasnike fondova. I. Perisin je istakao da su u periodu 1954 1962., izmedu 34 i 45 odsto ukupnih uloga bili na taj nacin blokirani [13]. 7. Specijalni krediti koje Narodna banka daje drugim bankama. Ti krediti su korisceni za finansiranje otprilike je dne polovine svih kratkorocnih kredita koje komercijalne banke daju svojim klijentima
10) E. N e u b e rg e r je p ro u cio u lo g u c e n tra ln ili b a n a k a u .o k v i r u tr i tip a ekonom skiJi sistem a, je d a n o d k o jih je bio ju g o slo v e n s k i sis te m p r e 1961. godine' (9).

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8. Politika potrosackih kredita 9. Konsultacije i preporuke. U poredenju sa tradicionalnim bankarstvom, neki od navedenih poslova izgledaju suvisni, ali jedan vazan element nedostaje: nema mesta za tzv. politiku otvorenog trzista posto (bar za sada) nema obveznica. Instrument broj 7 obavlja taj posao. Novi novae se stvara specijalnim kreditima i obezbeduje se likvidnost komercijalnih banaka. Ako banka zeli da smanji preteranu likvidnost (da bi izbegla placanje pasivne kamate), ona moze to da ucini otplacivanjem svog kredita Narodnoj banci. Kao sto je vec pomenuto, reformom od 1967. godine kontrola trazenja kredita je smanjena kontrolom davanja kredita, i stoga je funkcija Narodne banke morala da se uskladi na odgovarajuci nacin. Instrumenti 3 i 6 bili su napusteni a postojeci iznos specijalnili kredita vise se nije mogao povecavati. Dodato je nekoliko novih instrumenta: 10. Reeskontni kredit, koji se upotrebljava kao instrument globalne i selektivne kontrole. On iznosi oko 12 odsto svih komercijalnih kredita. Da bi stekla pravo na ovu vrstu kredita, komercijalna banka mora da ispuni dva uslova: (a ) njena ukupna dugovanja kod Narodne banke ne smeju da budu veca nego njeni ulozi po videnju; (b ) najmanje jedna polovina kratkorocnih kredita mora da se sastoji od kredita sa rokom otplate manjim od tri meseca. Uslov (b ) je specijalni tip zahteva za likvidnoscu stvorenog za jugoslovenske uslove gde postoji ogroman pritisak na izvore kratkorocnih kredita za investicione zajmove. 11. Eskontna stopa. 12. Kvantitativno ogranicenje kredita kao izvanredna mera. Ovo je impresivan arsenal oruda koje, ako se nepravilno upotreb ljava, moze da nanese znatnu stetu. U odeljku (e ) videcemo kako se to moze desiti. U 1967. godini u okviru Udruzenja banaka formirano je svakodnevno trziste kao svojstvena berza za ponudu i potrazivanje kratkorocnog kapitala. U nuzdi banke mogu da dobiju kredit za period od manje od 15 dana [16, str. 81]. U vreme pisanja ovih redova Savezna skupstina je usvojila paket finansijskih zakona kojima se izmedu ostalog predvida da se ulozi u kreditnom fondu jedne banke mogu prodati poslovnoj javnosti ali ne drustveno-politickim zajednicama ili samim bankama. Ova dva dogadaja mogu se smatrati pocecima berze ali naravno, na jugoslovenski nacin. Ovaj odeljak treba zavrsiti osvrtom na monetarno plani ranje. Na bazi pouzdanih i najnovijih informacija od SDK, uspostavljen je jedan moderni sistem racuna finansijskih tokova. Od 1967. godine ovaj sistem se takode koristi za godisnje i mesecno monetarno planiranje, umesto staromodnih kreditnih bilansa. Njegov autor, D. Dimtrijevic, dao je tehnicko objasnjenje metoda koji se koriste u tom sistemu [26]. 90

(d ) Finansiranje investicija Kolicina strucne literature o finansiranju investicija je u obrnutoj srazmeri sa nezadovoljstvom zbog stanja stvari na ovom podrucju. Tesko je shvatiti zasto je to tako. Mozda je to zato sto se ni monetarni teoreticari, ni strucnjaici za fiskalnu politiku, niti pak (uglavnom fizicki) planeri ne osecaju nadlezni za to pitanje. U svakom slucaju finansiranje investicija je vec odavno jedna od slabih tacaka u ekonomskoj politici, pa ipak dosad nije preduzeto ozbiljno proucavanje tog problema. Stoga cu organiciti izlaganje na opisivanje stvamog stanja. Formiranje lcapitala moze se finansirati fiskalnim sredstvima, tj. iz oporezivanja, ili iz sopstvenih fondova preduzeca, bankarskim kreditima ili putem raznovrsnih obveznica. U Jugoslaviji su se otprilike po tom redu isprobavale razne vrste finansiranja inve sticija. Pocetkom 1945. godine vlada je obrazovala Fond za Rekonstrukciju cija su se sredstva sastojala od konfiskovanih ratnih profita1 ) i od prodaje robe koju je isporucivala UNRRA. Uskoro 1 su otpisani zajmovi koje je dao Fond i formiranje kapitala se finansiralo na budzetski nacin, tipican za centralno planiranu privredu. Investiciona sredstva su se rasporedivala prema planu i davala preduzecima iz budzeta besplatno. Preduzeca nisu smela da prodaju osnovna sredstva, ona su mogla samo da ih prenesu na druga preduzeca dobivsi prvo dozvolu za to. Posto je drzava bila jedini vlasnik kapitala a cene u svakom slucaju nisu igrale veliku ulogu, ovaj aranzman je bio dosledan sa sistemom uopste. Prelomna 1952. godina je najavila vazne promene. Savezni budzet kao izvor investicionih sredstava zamenjen je Fondom za osnovnu kapitalnu izgradnju. Investiciona sredstva su se jos uvek davala bez obaveze placanja, ali je stvaranje Fonda dovelo do podele budzeta na dva zasebna dela: jedan se odnosio na administra tivne izdatke a drugi se sastojao od raznih investicionih i intervencionih fondova. To je i ostala stalna karakteristika jugoslovenskog budzeta. U 1952. godini savezna vlada je skoncentrisala skoro sva in vesticiona sredstva u ovaj Fond. To je imalo za cilj da se dobije u vremenu radi pripreme sveobuhvatnije reforme. Vec su sledece godine obrazovani fondovi za kreditiranje investicionih delatnosti. Preduzeca su uspostavila svoje sopstvene investicione fondove finansirane dohotkom koji im je bio ostavljen planom. Obe ove mere su dovele do znatne decentralizacije finansiranja investi cija. Ovaj sistem je stekao trajni oblik 1954. godine kad su bili obrazovani drustveni investicioni fondovi na svim nivoima, saveznom, republickom, sreskom i opstinskom. Od onda pa do najnovijih reformi, drustveni investicioni fondovi su davali zajmove
11) U sliCnim u slo v im a p o sle p rv o g sv e tsk o g ra ta , v la d a je im a la v e lik e tesk o ce u z a v o d e n ju p o re z a n a r a tn e p ro fite i je d n o m "kad je ta j zak o n b io u sv o je n , on se n ije m o g ao sp ro v e s ti (35, s tr . 16882).

91

preduzecima, dok su se investicije u neprivrednom sektoru (za skole, bolnice, drzavne zavode itd.) i dalje finansirale iz drzavnog budzeta. Obrazovanje drustvenih investicionih fondova koji su imali tendenciju da se sa vremenom umnozavaju imalo je interesantnih posledica. Posto su svi nivoi vlade bili pod stalnim teskim pritiskom da investiraju, a fondovi su bili odvojeni od bu dzeta, njihova sredstva su cesto bila daleko veca nego sto je bilo predvideno drustvenim planom. U periodu 1955 1960. obim investicija je za 20 odsto premasio cilj utvrden drustvenim planom [19, str. 2157], Reforma od 1954. godine donela je dve druge vazne novine. Jedna od njih sastojala se U prenosenju osnovnih sredstava na preduzeca. Za privilegiju koriscenja drustvenog kapitala, ona su imala da placaju kamatu od 6 odsto, koja je 1965. godine bila snizena na 4 odsto. Kamata je morala da se placa na kapital bez obzira na izvor finansiranja. Ova kamata kao i otplate zajmova sacinjavale su sredstva opsteg investicionog fonda kojim je rukovodila savezna vlada. Kamatna stopa na drustveni kapital se diferencirala vec prema ciljevima politike cena i prema kapitalnoj intenzivnosti odredenih grupa industrija. Njen raspon je bio od blizu nule za poljoprivredu do jedan odsto za energetiku i proizvodnju uglja, dva odsto za saobracaj, cetiri odsto za crnu iiietalurgiju, i sest odsto za vecinu drugih industrija. Na taj nacin je teret kamate, kao postotka neto produkta, bio ravnomernije raspodeljen medu raznim industrijskim grupama. Prosecna kamatna stopa je 1961. godine i 1966. godine iznosila 2,8 odsto odnosno 1,3 odsto u odnosu na kapital i 3,8 odsto odnosno 2,4 odsto u odnosu na neto proizvod [20, str. 23], Druga novina se odnosi na investicione licitacije. Postoje ce tiri vrste odluka o. raspodeli investicija: 1) iznos ukupnih investicija, 2) raspodela investicionih ulagarija medu sektorima privrede, 3) raspodela medu firmama unutar jednog sektora i 4) tehnoloske varijante u jednom preduzecu [21, str. 103]. Ovu poslednju odluku donosi preduzece, a prve dve su utvrdene planom. Posto su utvrdeni prioriteti a investicije raspodeljene na razne grupe industrija, raspodela medu preduzecima moze se vrsiti licitacijom. To je stara ideja iz udzbenika. U raznim tekstovima o socijalistickoj ekonomici sa neoklasicnom pozadinom mogu se naci ovakve vrste konstatacija: U riacelu molioci se klasificiraju. prema visini kamatne stope koju nude i ako dvojica ponude istu stopu, prednost se daje onome koji nudi kraci rok otplate. Banka bi isla. po redu dok se ne bi iscrpeo iznos odreden za ovu licitaciju, ili kategoriju u okviru licitacija, a svako bi onda placao onu kamatnu stopu koju bi ponudio prvi intramarginalni molilac. Ovo u stvari nije izmisljen citat vec E. Neubergerov opis stvamih investicionih licitacija u Jugoslaviji [21, str. 93]. Teoretski, naravno, ovaj sistem bi se mogao poboljsati na razne nacine. Mogla bi se primeniti diskriminacija cenama da bi se iscedio celokupni neekonomski prihod sadrzan u razlici izmedu ponudene i 92

isplacene kamatne stope, ili bi se jedinstvena ponuda mogla zameniti rasporedom ponuda. Ovaj ' eksperiment nije bio veoma uspesan u praksi. Uskoro se pokazalo da ta dva kriterijuma cena kamatna stopa i rok vracanja nisu dovoljna. Stoga su dodati i drugi kriteriji: postotni udeo ucesca sa sopstvenim sredstvima ( diferenciran prema industrijama i kretao se od nule za elektricnu energiju do 80 odsto za preradivacku industriju), najkraci rok izgradnje, najnizi troskovi po jedinici proizvodnje i regionalni efekti [2, str. 372; 62, str. 220]. Pokazalo se da su sledeci bili glavni nedostaci licitacija. Potrebno je i dosta vremena i dosta troskova da se pripremi molba za kredit. Licitacije se vrse u sirokim rasponima vremena koji mogu i da ne odgovaraju potrebi preduzeca za investicionim fondovima. Kao i u slucaju kreditnih licitacija, preduzeca. su bila spremna da ponude visoke kamatne stope samo da bi obezbedila zajam. Ona se nisu mnogo brinula o buducim otplatama jer je tradicija besplatnog drustvenog kapitala jos uvek bila veoma ziva i jer je izgledalo ocevidno da se nijedna veca fabrika ne moze zatvoriti tek zato sto se ne moze vratiti zajam. Stoga su vlasti zaduzene za drustvene investicione fondove morale da veoma pazljivo ispitaju svaki slucaj, kao sto bi ucinile cak i bez licitacija. Prema Neubergerovim procenama, najvise jedna trecina svih investicija se dodeljivala putem licitacija. U talcvim okolnostima licitacije su postepeno prerasle u staromodnu administrativnu distribuciju investicija iz drzavnih fondova. Licitacije su pretrpele neuspeh. Merila koja su se koristila za dodeljivanje investicija iz drustvenih investicionih fondova nisu bila veoma transparentna jos jedan razlog za nedostatak analiticke literature i uvek su bila pod jakim uticajem politickih obzira. Kao rezultat toga pojavile su -se politicke fabrike. Svi vazni investicioni projekti su uspeli nekako da se pomnoze sest puta, po jedan za svaku republiku. Osim toga, drustveni investi cioni fondovi su apsorbovali dve trecine ukupnih investicionih sredstava i zbog zahteva za ucescem direktno su kontrolisali jos i veci udeo ukupnih investicija. Neefikasnost i birokratska kontrola nisu bili sasvim u skladu sa samoupravnim teznjama privrede. Preduzeca su zahtevala povecanje svog ucesca u finansiranju investicija. Podaci o stvarnom razvoju u karakteristicnim godinama dati su u tabeli 2. Znatan udeo investicionog novca u drustvenom investicionom fondu dobio se putem poreza. Kad su 1962. godine ti doprinosi drustvenom investicionom fondu bili poviseni za 50 od sto [15], nastala je opsta povika protiv eksproprijacije. Zahtevalo se da se ukine drzavni kapital. Dve godine kasnije ukinuti su doprinosi drustvenim investicionim fondovima, a sredstva su vracena u bankarske kreditne fondove. Zbog toga su se bankarski investicioni zajmovi tako naglo povecali 1964. godine. Polazno nacelo reforme od 1965. godine bilo je da se ostavi na raspolaganju preduzeca veci udeo njihove akumulacije i na taj nacin da se ogranici uloga drustveno-politickih zajednica u investicionim odlukama [22, str. 3222]. Otislo se suvise daleko u pravcu decentralizacije 93

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jer se trazilo da se cak i krupni kapitalno-intenzivni projekti (energetika, saobracaj) takode finansiraju iz kapitala koncentrisanog u bankama. Uloga federacije u investicijama svedena je na rukovanje fondom za nerazvijena podrucja iz koga se svake godine davalo nerazvijenim oblastima blizu dva odsto nacionalnog dohotka u vidu investicionih fondova. Takode su se znatno smanjili republicki i opstinski fondovi. No s izuzetkom kratkotrajnog povecanja odmah posle reforme, ucesce preduzeca je stagniralo. Kao sto pokazuje tabela 2, desilo se to da su federacija i banke prosto zamenili mesta u finansiranju investicija. U uslovima hronicnog viska potraznje za investicionim sredstvima, banke su lako mogle da zauzmu dominantnu ulogu. Ukupan iznos redovne i kaznene kamate mogao je da se popne cak i na 18 odsto. Prva recesija koja se u stvari i desila odmah posle reforme neizbezno je umanjila investicione fondove preduzeca i ucinila ih jos zavisnijim od banaka. D. Vojnic istice da su u 1968. godini otplate bankarskih zajmova iznosile 111 odsto ciste dobiti preduzeca [23, str. 89]. Sa skoro jednom polovinom investicionih sredstava pod svojom kontrolom banke su se ucvrstile kao dominantna snaga na investicionom trzistu. Sta treba da se ucini da bi se ocxivala nezavisnost preduzeca? Odgovor svakako nije prost. Sadasnja diskusija se uglavnom vodi oko mogucih poboljsanja trzista kapitala. U 1963. godini drzavne obveznice postale su prenosive. Godine 1968. pojavile su se prve obveznice preduzeca. U 1969. godini izmisljene su bankarske akcije. Ovaj autor je predlozio da se uvedu akcije bez prava kontrole [24]. Trziste vrednosnih papira moglo bi da obezbedi bar jedan deo kapitala izvan kontrole banaka. Podsticani su udruzivanje sredstava i zajednicka ulaganja. Posle ukidanja drustvenih investicionih fondova, kamata na drustveni kapital je postala obicna taksa na kapital koja je oticala u drzavni budzet. Donesena je politicka odluka da se sto pre ukine ova taksa na ka pital. Sad se predlaze da se ova kamata u iznosu od oko jedne osmine poslovnih investicija da preduzecima kao sredstva rezervisana za investicije (tj. tretirala bi se isto kao amortizacioni fon dovi). Ne treba se iznenaditi ako se .uskoro izvede jos jedna re forma u ovom podrucju. Posto se do izvesne mere adekvatno organizovalo trziste novca, njegov dvojnik, trziste kapitala, sigumo nece jos dugo zaostajati. (e ) Monetarna politika U centralno planiranoj privredi neuravnotezenost trzista se ogleda u fizickim nestasicama, a u trzisnoj privredi se vidi u inflaciji. Davnasnja rasprava o pravim uzrocima inflacije ponovno je izbila medu jugoslovenskim ekonomistima, narocito posle 1961. godine. 95

Monetarni teoreticari, ne sasvim neocekivano, videli su izvor svih nevolja u stihijskom povecanju ponude novca. M. Cirovic je tvrdio da se privreda prilagodava preteranoj ekspanziji kredita i ponude novca putem povecanja cena robe [27, str. 183], Slicno tome, M. Vuckovic je smatrao da je inflacija u sustini proizvod preterane potrosnje. Posto novi novae povlaci za sobom novu potraznju koja nije popracena ponudom, nastaje neuravnotezenost trzista koja stvara skokove cena. Preterana ekspanzija kratkorocnih kre dita je posledica sledece rdave prakse: kratkorcni krediti se upotrebljavaju (naravno sasvim nepravilno) za dugorocne investicije, za nekurentne zalihe, za pokrivanje gubitaka, za finansiranje budzetskih deficita i za finansiranje poreza na svim nivoima uprave [28, str. 128 29]. Ova poslednja praksa je verovatno jugoslovenski izum na ovom podrucju. Zbog prilicno potpune budzetske decentralizacije, lokalna uprava nastoji sto vise da iscedi svaki moguci dinar iz svojih preduzeca. U prvim danima novog ekonomskog sistema opstine su to mogle da cine takvim oporezivanjem koje je ostavljalo preduzeca bez para. Ovu pojavu su opisali Miljanic i Vuckovic jos 1956. godine [29, 3]. Tako su u 1954. godini, u jednoj jedinoj godini, opstine uspele da povecaju svoje budzetske prihode za 98 odsto [3, str. 173], Da bi se odazvala tim patriotskim zahtevima, preduzeca su morala ili da povecaju cene ili da traze kredite, ili i jedno i drugo. Krediti su se davali bez teskoca jer se pravovremeno placanje poreza uvek smatralo za prvi prioritet. Posto se budzetski sistem nesto poboljsao, umanjena je samovolja u oporezivanju, ali kad su bile u nuzdi opstine su prosto odlagale placanje za robu i usluge koje su kupovale. To cine i dan danas republike i federacija. Stoga nije cudo da privreda nema mnogo poverenja u svoju upravu i da nastoji da se oslobodi svake birokratske kontrole. Mada je istina da je kredit bio ekscesivan a da ponuda novca nije bila u skladu sa stabilnim cenama, to ne znaci da su cene po sledica a kredit uzrok inflacionog procesa. Ova hipoteza je bila proverena u Institutu ekonomskih nauka i pokazalo se da ili nije bilo uzrocnog odnosa izmedu kredita i cena ili je postajala neznatna n e g a t i v n a korelacija: veci krediti nize cene. O ovom paradoksu bice jos reci nesto kasnije. Cene se obicno odreduju promenama u dohocima, i stoga je inflacija u najvecem broju slucajeva inflacija u troskovima. Kao sto je vec receno (u glavi 10), izgleda da su dohoci funkcija kapitalnog intenziteta, tehnoloske rente i institucionalnog monopola (banaka, osiguravajucih drustava). Povecanje licnih dohodaka u privilegovanim radnim organizacijama zapocinjalo je povecanje licnih dohodaka u citavoj privredi, a kadgod cene ne mogu da izdrze povecanje troskova, one skacu. A. Bajt dodaje da visoki stepen kontrole cena povecava pritisak viska potraznje na slobodnom delu trzista, koji onda dovodi do povecanja cena, i da neefikasno planiranje investicija dovodi do neadekvatne strukture proizvodnje zbog cega je u poluzatvorenoj privredi tesko uskladiti potraz nju [30, 61]. 96

Privredni. ciklusi komplikuju stvari jos vise. U Jugoslaviji se cene formiraju na prilicno cudan nacin. Amortizacija i kamata na drustveni kapital predstavljaju fik sn e. elemente. Plate, kao svuda, ne mogu se menjati nanize. Iz razloga koji su objasnjeni u sledecem poglavlju, svi porezi su povezani sa licnim dohocima i variraju u srazmeri sa njima. Posto placanje poreza uziva prvenstvo, moze se desiti i desava se da se ukupni iznos prikupljenog poreza poveca prilikom najnize tacke depresije. Konacno, otplate zajmova predstavljaju dodatni fiksni element. Stoga, cim nastane malo usporenje u proizvodnji, preduzecu je nemoguce da pokrije troskove i ono mora ili da trpi gubitke ili da poveca cene. . -j Prilikom recesije samoupravno preduzece nece otpustiti radnike.Stoga se proizvodnja nastavlja.i nagomilavaju se zalihe. Akumulacija zaliha se finansira iz dobiti. i kredita. Kad se ova dva izvora iscrpe, njih ce zameniti nedobrovoljni trgovinski krediti i povecanje cena. Sto se tice inflacionog pritiska, mozemo ocekivati povecanje cena pri k^etanju nadole, a stabilne cene pri kretanju nagore. Ova ocekivanja su potvrdena na slici 5.1. Ova aHaliza rezultat istrazivanja Instituta ekonomskih nauka nije bila poznata u vreme kad su nastale monetame re forme. Tradicionalno glediste na inflaciju da suvise mnogo novca juri suvise malo robe bilo je siroko prihvaceno. Smatralo se da je trebalo samo smanjiti ponudu novca pa ce se privreda stabilizovati. Pod stabilizacijom se podrazumevala iskljucivo stabilizacija cena. U programu reforme od 1965. godine cak se i ne spominju ciljevi zaposlenosti. Devizna reforma, clanstvo u GATT-u i saradnja sa Monetarnim fondom smatrali su se kao medunarodna obaveza odrzavanja stabilnog dinara. Dinar se morao odrzati stabilan po svaku cenu zadatak koji bi danas tesko cak i Torijevska vlada preduzela, ali koji je bio bezazleno zapocet u privredi koja nije imala pojma sta to moze da znaci. Politika nestasice novca imala je da bude jedini instrument za postizanje stabilnosti cena. Bilo je sumnji u pogledu preporucljivosti takve politike, ali kriticari su bili ucutkani i ta politika je sprovedena. Ona se pokazala fatalnom. Posto cene variraju u obratnom smislu u odnosu na ciklus, antiinflaciona monetama politika je znacila anti-anticiklicnu politiku, politiku stalne i neposredne destabilizacije. Kako se kretala monetarna politika za poslednjih osam godina analizirali su V. Holjevac [31] i I. Perisin [32], odnedavno guvemer Narodne banke. U narednom tekstu ja cu se uglavnom oslanjati na njihov rad i na istrazivacki rad obavljen u Institutu ekonomskih nauka. U 1960. godini ciklus je dostigao gornju prekretnicu (vidi sliku 5. 1). To je proslo nezapazeno, ali su zapazena povecanja cena. Analiticki postupak koji se koristi u takvim situacijama sastojao se iz uporedenja izmedu robnih fondova (drustveni produkt u realnom obliku) i kupovnih fondova (licna i opsta potrosnja i investicije u vidu novca) koju je omogucivala dobra i azurna statistika. Razlika izmedu njih se tumacila kao preterana ponuda 97

novca. U 1960. godini ta razlika je bila znatna i zahtevala je monetarna ogranicenja. Pored toga, u 1961. godini, za vreme recesije, preduzeta je monetarna reforma sa svrhom da unese nesto poslovne discipline. Preduzeca su bila prinudena da povecaju udeo svojih sopstvenih fondova u ukupnom obrtnom kapitalu koji im je stajao na raspolaganju. Ovaj udeo je podignut sa 7,8 odsto u 1960. godini na 22,4 odsto u 1961. godini; ova se operacija finansirala iz akumulacije, sto je znacilo manje investicija [15], Recesija se pogorsala, maloprodajne cene su nastavile da skacu po stopi od 6 do 9 odsto, zalihe su se nagomilavale po stopi od 20 do 25 odsto godisnje, te su vlasti odlucile da zavedu restriktivnu monetarnu politiku. Posledica toga bila je da se jedno preduzece za drugim naslo u nemogucnosti da izmiri svoje dugove i uzajamna zaduzenost se povecavala stopom od oko 50 odsto godisnje. Saveznoj vladi nestao je novae i ona je zatrazila veliki kredit kod Narodne banke; ta besparica novi izraz koji je nastao morala da se lei povecanjem kredita. Sve je to, naravno, unistilo kreditni bilans. Na zavrsetku godine ponuda novca bila je dvaput veca nego sto je bilo predvideno. V. Holjevac se tuzio zbog nedostatka novcane discipline i cinjenice da je Narodna banka izgubila kontrolu nad prosirenjem kredita [31,- str. 36]. Ali usled toga ciklicni pad je zaustavljen a stopa rasta je povecana. Kretanje nagore nastavilo se citave 1963. godine i, pored svog suvisnog (sa stanovista monetarnog planera) novca u privredi, cene su zacudo ostale stabilne; cene industrijskog repromaterijala su porasle za jedan, a maloprodajne za 4 odsto. Vec do kraja te godine to kretanje. se razvilo u konjunkturu, industrijska proizvodnja se povecavala stopom od 15 do 20 odsto godisnje, a povecavao se i deficit u platnom bilansu. Nekoliko meseci kasnije ciklus je dostigao gornju prekretnu tacku i u drugoj polovini 1964. go dine recesija je vec bila u punom jeku. Svi simptomi recesije od 1961. godine ponovili su se a isto tako i monetarna politika. U dru goj polovini 1964. godine i pocetkom 1965., obavezne rezerve su podignute do zakonske granice od 35 odsto, preduzeca su bila pri nudena da koriste akumulaciju za povecanje obrtnog kapitala, investicione banke su morale da upotrebljavaju jednu cetvrtinu svojih zajmova za finansiranje obrtnog kapitala, a smanjeni. su potrosacki krediti. Sve ovo, zajedno sa neredom koji je stvorila reforma cena, umanjili su ukupnu potraznju i porast proizvodnje sa oko 15 odsto u 1964. na oko 4 odsto krajem 1965. godine. Po sto je poreska reforma ostavila saveznu vladu bez novca, ona je morala da pribegne znatnom deficitnom finansiranju, sto. je opet poremetilo monetarno planiranje. Ali kretanje nanize bilo je zaustavljeno u toku perioda od cetiri kvartala, i pojavili su se svi simptomi koji obicno karakterisu obrtanje ciklusa nagore. Medutim, ovog puta Narodna banka je imala u rukama jako orude i resila se da ga upotrebi protiv preterane likvidnosti. Iz nekih razloga, koji nisu objasnjeni u dokumentima, Naro dna banka je uspostavila pravilo da likvidne rezerve komercijalnih banaka koje se drze kod Narodne banke ne smeju da iznose vise 98

od 6 odsto novcanih uloga po videnju [32, str. 515].. Te rezerve su iznosile oko 10 odsto u drugoj polovini 1966. godine. Posto su kupovni fondovi bili znatno veci nego robni fondovi sto se odrazava u povecanjima cena izgledalo je ocevidno da privreda ima suvise mnogo novca. Narodna banka je smanjila svoje specijalne kredite komercijalnim bank am a i stavila je apsolutan limit na njihova kreditna poslovanja. Jos vise su smanjeni potrosacki krediti. U 1967. godini izvoz je bio usporen, i stoga je bilo odluceno da se jos vise deprimira unutrasnja potraznja kako bi se povecao izvoz. Kao sto se moglo ocekivati, to izvozu nije mnogo pomoglo u stvari njegov porast je uskoro pao ispod nule, uprkos selektivnim eksportnim kreditima ali su likvidne rezerve snizene na 5 odsto, cak i nize nego sto je bilo predvideno. Kao rezultat ove antiinflacione politike porast proizvodnje je snizen na minus dva odsto, sto se nije desilo od informbirovskih dana. Ovaj autor je izracunao da su gubici usled pogresne monetam e politike iznosili 11 odsto drustvenog proizvoda. I. Perisin je konstatovao da je bruto akumulacija snizena sa 43 odsto bruto nacionalnog produkta u 1964. godini na 30 odsto u 1967. godini [32, str. 517], Nezaposlenost se brzo povecavala. Medutim, stabilnost cena ipak nije bila postignuta, (vidi tabelu 10. 1). Novi sistem regulisanja ponude pokazao se veoma efikasan u reduciranju ponude novca na zeljeni nivo. Ovaj zakljucak je izveden iz gornjeg opisa njegovog prakticnog dejstva, ali se moze takode ilustrovati nizom pokazatelja. Ako obracunamo odnos po nude novca prema 100 dinara transakcija (izrazenih kao zbir drustvenog proizvoda i mateijalnih troskova) dobijaju se sledeci podaci [33, str. 63]:
1957. 1958. 1959. 1960. 1961. 1962. 15,3 15,3 14,5 15,1 15,3 18,7 1963. 1964. 1965, 1966. 1967. 1968. 19,4
18,3

14,9 12,3 11,4 13,1

U toku tri godine posle 1964. relativna ponuda novca je spala na manje od dve trecine svog prvobitnog nivoa. Moglo bi se pomisliti da to znaci samo udvostrucavanje brzine prometa novca. Ali to nije tacno; nedostatak bankarskih kredita kompenziran je nedobrovoljnim trgovinskim kreditima. Ovi su iznosili 69 odsto kratkorocnih bankarskih kredita u 1964. godini, 138 odsto u 1967. godini, a do sredine 1969. godine pemasili su bankarske kredite skoro dva puta. Vredno je zapaziti jos jednu cinjenicu. Slika 5.1 pokazuje da su se periodi konjunkture u poslovnim ciklusima desili 1960. i 1963. godine, a periodi recesije u 1961. i 1967. godini. Gornja tabela po kazuje jasno u kojoj meri je monetarna politika sinhronizovana sa ciklusima: u periodu konjunkture ponuda novca bila je obilna 99

dok je u recesiji vodena politika nestasice novca. Prema tome monetama politika je bila vazan destabilizirajuci faktor koji je ometao privredu da ne koristi svoje potencijale rasta. U drugoj polovini 1967. godine doslo je do ozivljenja i ubrzani rast se nastavio kroz 1968. do 1969. godine. Cene su se stabilizovale za neko vreme, zalihe smanjile, izvoz povecao u 1969. godini a monetarna politika je imala relativno lak posao da podrzava ove povoljne trehdove. Ostaje da se vidi da li 'su nionetarne vlasti i monetami teoreticari primili pouku na znanje i da li ce biti u stanju da izbegnu iste greske kad ove tendericije budu prestale.

14. JAVNE FINANSIJE I FISKALNA PO LITIK A' (a ) Budzet za centralno planiranu privredu U toku prve dve posleratne godine, nova drzava je nastojala da se izvuce kako ume sa nasledenim finansijskim sistemom. Opo rezivanje je.bilo poboljsano na dva nacina. P.re rata znacajan izvor prihoda za drzavni budzet dolazio. je od poreza na promet na potrosacku robu. To je predstavljalo veliko opterecenje za siromasnije slojeve stanovnistva. Osim toga, pirogresivnost oporezivanja dohotka bila je blaga (do, 32 odsto) a postojalo je nekoliko yrsta poreza za razne izvore prihoda..Na taj nacin ljudi sa vise izvora prihoda tj. bogatiji ljudi mogli su lako da izbegnu placanje visokog poreza. Prirodno je bilo sto je nova revolucionarna vlada izvrsila potrebne korekcije. Porez na promet je smanjen (sa 62,8 odsto drzavnog budzetskog prihoda u 1939/40. godini na 46,5 od sto u 1946. godini), a posebni porezi su bili zamenjeni jedinstvenim porezom koji se primenjivao na celokupni licni dohodak po povecanim stopama [1, str. 25], Medutim, uskoro se ponovo pojavilo neravnomemo oporezivanje i jos 1969. godine B. Jelcic je smatrao da diferencirano poresko opterecenje za isti licni dohodak raznih poreskih obveznika znaci negaciju nacela proklamovanih i garantovanih zakonom [67, str. 159]. Kad je zapoceto centralno planiranje 1947. godine, finansijski sistem zemlje morao je da se radikalno izmeni. U starom sistemu drzavni budzet je finansirao rad javne administracije i neke drustvene sluzbe. To je odgovaralo administrativnom karakteru stare drzave. Nova socijalisticka drzava prema konstataciji Instituta za finansije [1, str. 16] deluje kao organizator celokupne privrede. Ciljevi se svake godine razraduju ekonomskim planom a budzet treba da ih odrazava finansijski. Svaki planski organ ima svoj sopstveni budzet koji je sastavni deo opsteg budzeta. Zbir svih finasijskih planova svih ministarstava, tj. svih industrija, predstavlja ankes budzeta. Na taj nacin, budzet postaje finansijski plan celokupne privrede [1, str. 11; 36, str. 170]. Budzet je iznosio 100

64 do 83 odsto nacionalnog dohotka [37, str. 126]. Oko jedne polovine budzetskog prihoda se trosilo na investicije. R. Radovanovic navodi cetiri principa na kojima se zasnivao takav budzet. (1 ) Centralizacija svih sredstava jedne drustveno-politicke zajednice (opstine, sreza, okruga, pokrajine, republike, federacije), u budzetu njihovih uprava. (2 ) Budzetsko finansiranje svih drustvenih delatnosti. Sto se tice poslovnih preduzeca, samo su neto prihoda ulazili u budzet. (3 ) Koncentracija budzeta svih drustveno-politickih zajednica u saveznom budzetu da bi se obezbedilo centralno usmeravanje u izvodenju najvaznijih zadataka. To je poznati. princip budzetnog monizma. (4 ) Kao posledica (3) fondovi se raspodeljuju medu .raznim. organima u skladu sa njihovim priznatim potrebama i bez obzira na njihove budzetske potencijale. Nizi organi moraju da izvrsavaju opstu politiku a visi organi da obezbeduju potrebna sredstva. To je imalo najmanje jednu negativnu posledicu. Nizi organi nisu bili zaiteresovani da stede sa svojim fondovima. Umesto da nastoje da prosire proizvodnju u svojim teritorijama, oni su povecavali svoje budzetske izdatke i vrsili pritisak na vise organe da nadu potrebna sredstva [38, str. 1112]. U takvom sistemu porezi su cisto tehnicki nacin usmeravanja bruto dobiti u budzet [39, str. 29], Cena proizvoda sastoji se iz proizvodnih troskova, dobiti' i poreza na promet. Dobit je obicno mala stavka i uglavnom se ostavlja preduzecu. Ako je pojedina planirana dobit veca nego prosecna, polovina te ekstra dobiti mora da se unese u budzet viseg administrativnog organa. Planski gubici se pokrivaju iz visih administrativnih budieta. Ako je postignuta dobit veca nego planirana, polovina razlike se ostavlja preduzecu kao stimulus.. Porez na promet sluzi uravnotezenju administrativno utvrdene cene. Posto se on primenjuje na svu robu i placa cim se roba isporucij on se takode koristi kao indikator napretka u izvrsenju plana. Da bi se naslo mesta za promenlijvi faktor produktivnosti u tako krutoj strukturi cena, izricito se planiralo kao posebna stavka snizenje pune cene kostanja. Ovo snizenje se delom uplacivalo u budzet i na taj nacin je stvorena prilicno neobicna nova vrsta poreza. Konacno, razne vrste cena, o kojima se govorilo u poglavlju 10 a, stvarale su tzv. komercijalnu dobit koja se uglavnom ut'apala u budzet. . U 1949. godini ove cetiri stavke su bile (u milijardama di nara): porez na promet 66,6, udeo dobiti 4,6, snizenje pune cene kostanja 3,8, a udeo komercijalne.dobiti 13,1 [39, str. 96]. Porez na promet je, naravno, predstavljao. najveci deo budzetskog prihoda. Najveci deo budzetskog prilioda je dolazio iz privrednog sektora. Porez koji je placalo stanovnistvo postepeno se umanjivao, sa 22,4 odsto od svih prihoda u 1946, na 19,7 odsto u 1952. godini. Stoga je politika oporezivanja stanovnistva bila nadahnuta vanporeskim obzirima. Godine 1950.. ukihut je.porez na prihod stecen u drzavnom sektoru (i tek I960; godine on je. bio ponovo uveden). 101

To nije igralo veliku ulogu zbog postojece uravnilovke. Ali porez na prihod je zadrzan za privatni sektor uz prilicno ostru progresiju. Za seljake poreske stope su porasle na 70 odsto u 1947. go dini i do 90 odsto u 1948. godini, u poredenju sa jedinstvena tri odsto za clanove seljackih radnih zadruga [1, str. 34]. Ova poreska politika je bila nadahnuta idejom klasne borbe i imala za cilj da privoli seljake da stupe u zadruge. Politika strogog oporezivanja seljaka i zanatlija nastavila se i kasnije i zbog istih razoga. U poljoprivredi ona je obustavljena posle druge agrarne reforme 1953. godine, kojom je smanjena maksimalna velicina poljop.rivrednih imanja na deset hektara i time iskljucena mogucnost kapitalistickog razvoja. Godine 1954. uvedeno je oporezivanje na bazi katastarskog prihoda*, a poreska stopa je snizena. Obe ove mere su se pokazale stimulativnim. Interesantno je primetiti da R. Radovanovic gleda na porez na katastarski prihod kao instrument sa zadatkom da zameni obavezrii otkup, obezbedujuci u isto vreme da ce se proizvesti odredeni mi nimum prinosa [44, str. 91]. Takode nije postojala mogucnost ka pitalistickog razvoja ni u zanatstvu, jer zanatlije ne mogu da uposljavaju vise od pet radnika. Medutim, javno mnenje je smatralo da je privatna privreda nesto lose i nepozeljno. Poreske stope su osetno snizene tek 1963. godine [62, str. 33]. Politika pritiska na stavila se sve do diskusija o vlasnistvu u 1967. godini analiziranih u glavi 9. U meduvremenu znatno je smanjen broj zanatskih radnji, sto je dovelo do ekonomskih teskoca.

(b)Eksperimentisanje porezima Posle Francuske revolucije 1789. godine primetio je J. Lovcevic Konstituanta je ukinula porez i zamenila ga doprinosima. Posle Jugoslovenske revolucije u Zakonu o porezima usvojenom 1946. godine kaze se da je porez doprinos.. . koji se daje drzavi za ekonomski razvoj, kulturni napredak.. . i za izdrzavanje drza vnog aparata [40, str. 34]. Uprkos protestima strucnjaka za javne finansije**, izraz je ostao. Od 1952. godine preduzeca placaju doprinose (p ri cemu je porez na promet izuzetak) a pojedinci poreze. Na neki nacin doprinosi proisticu iz drustvene imovine a porezi iz privatne imovine. Posle poreske reforme od 1965. godine doprinosi su postali sinonim za direktni porez ili porez na licni dohodak a izraz porez se upotrebljava za razne oblike poreza na promet ili poreza na imovinu. Zbrka oko termina nije mnogo vazna, ali je nedostatak strucne spreme u stvaranju odgovarajuceg poreskog sistema bio i te kako vazan. U periodu 1952 1965. pore*) Katastarski prihod je vrednost prosecnog prinosa jedne odredene kategorije zemljiSta pri prosecnim vremenskim uslovima i prosednom nadinu obrade zemlje.
* * ) U fisk a ln o j te o riji ra z lik u ju se p o rezi, d o p rin o si i ta k s e . P o re z je o bavezno p 'a c a n je u n a c e lu n i za k a k v u specifiC nu u slu g u . D o p rin o s p re d s ta v lja p la d a n je za specififin u u slu g u i u p rln c ip u p o k riv a troS kove. T a k sa je p la c a n je za specififinu u slu g u n a in ic ija tiv u p latio ca, ali n e m o ra d a im a v eze sa stv a rn im troSkom .

102

ski sistem je bio pet puta menjan sa ocevidnim posledicama sto se tice bar efikasnosti u poslovanju. U godini 1952 1953. sistem stopa amortizacija i fondova 0 cijoj racionalnosti se diskutovalo u glavi 11 predodredio je sistem oporezivanja. Drustveni doprinos se placao drzavi 'iz akumulacije i fondova dobivenih primenom jedne stope, propisane drustvenim planom, na neto produkt preduzeca. Taj doprinos je sadrzao uplate za socijalno osiguranje, bio je srazmeran licnim dohocima i uplacivao se po jedinstvenoj stopi od 45 odsto. Plate iznad propisanih normi oporezivane su po stopi koja se naglo povecavala. Zakonom je predviden i porez na ekstra-dohodak, all zbog tehnickih teskoca on se nije nikad primenjivao [39, str. 97], Porez na promet je jako smanjen i iznosio je 9 do 14 odsto budzetskog prihoda [41, str. 14]. Njegov zadatak je bio da absorbuje monopolsku dobit i da utice na formiranje cena [42, str. 62]. Sistem stopa akumulacija i fondova doprineo je uklanjanju administrativnih veza izmedu preduzeca i planskih vlasti, ali se uskoro srozao na administrativno odredivanje stopa akumulacija 1 fondova za svako pojedino preduzece. Morao je da bude zamenjen sistemom koji je dejstvovao vise trzisno. N ije bilo jasno kako da se stvori takav jedan sistem. Izgledalo je preporucljivo da se koristi iskustvo tradicionalnih trzisnih privreda. Umesto neto produkta, dobit je postala osnova oporezivanja u toku cetiri naredne godine (1954 1957). Licni dohoci su postali deo proizvodnih troskova. Dobit se oporezivala po jedinstvenoj stopi od 50 odsto. Dniga polovina bruto dobiti se koristila za doprinose drustvenim investicionim fondovima, za dodatke osnovnim platama, za fondove preduzeca i za neke druge svrhe. Licni dohoci iz dobiti bili su povezani sa doprinosima za mesne budzete, sto je predstavljalo neku vrstu progresivnog oporezivanja licnih dohodaka.. Bio je pred viden i porez na monopolsku dobit ali on se nije nikad primenio jer se pokazalo nemoguce utvrditi koji je deo dohotka iskljucivo rezultat rada kolektiva. Udeo preduzeca (plate i neraspodeljena dobit) postepeno se povecavao na jednu trecinu stvorenog neto proizvoda, (neto proizvod sadrzi i porez na promet) [39, str. 99]. U ovom periodu zavedena su dva interesantna nova poreza. Rudnici, hidrocentrale i neka druga. preduzeca imala su da placaju rentu. Zanatlije i seljaci morali su da placaju porez na iznajmljenu radnu snagu. Ovaj poslednji porez bio je kvantitativno beznacajan (je r je svega jedna osmina zanatlija i skoro niko od seljaka iznajmljivala radnu snagu) ali je sluzio kao podsetnik da najamni rad znaci eksploataciju. Licni dohoci kao deo proizvodnih troskova smatrali su se nepogodnim za samoupravni sistem. Stoga je novi sistem, lansiran 1958. godine,: bio zasnovan na raspodeli ukupnog dohotka predu zeca. To je predstavljalo vracanje sa dobiti na neto produkt (umanjen za porez na promet i neke druge stavke). Takode je doslo i do terminoloske promene: plate su se zamenile licnim dohotkom. Ovaj sistem uz mnoge promene trajao je do 1964. godine.

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Glavni porez, koji je tek posle 1961. godine bio premasen porezom na promet, bio je doprinos iz dohotka. Stope su bile progresivne do 80 odsto. Poreska progresija je 1961. godine bila zamenjena jedinstvenom stopom od 15 odsto i super-porezom od 25 odsto. U meduvremenu desile su se nove stvari. Pojavila se zamisao da se povezu kolektivna potrosnja i drustveni standard za velicinu licnih dohodaka koji se sticu u jednom odredenom podrucju. Za tu svrhu odredeni su doprinosi budzetu iz platnog fonda. U 1958. godini ti doprinosi su bili progresivni, u 1959. naplacivana je jedinstvena stopa od 11 odsto, a zatim 1963. godine povisena na 15 od sto. U 1964., neke poreske stope su bile smanjene, a porezi na rudnike i doprinosi drustvenim investicionim fondovima ukinuti. Ukidanje poreskih stopa dovelo je do ponovnog uvodenja progresivnog licnog poreza [39, str. 207]. Na taj nacin bile su pobrkane ekonomske funkcije poreza na platni fond i poreza na licne dohotke. Udeo preduzeca u svom neto proizvodu povecao se na otprilike jednu pol'ovinu. Da bi se ovaj udeo jos vise povecao, poslednjom reformom od 1965. godine ukinuti su svi doprinosi iz dohotka preduzeca. Udeo u neto produktu skocio je na oko dve trecine. Od onda se oporezivanje preduzeca oslanja iskljucivo na porez na platni fond. Ako uracunamo doprinose za socijalno osiguranje, radna snaga je postala oko 60 odsto skuplja nego sto je bilo potrebno. To je imalo ozbiljne posledice. Pre 1960. godine sistem oporezivanja je stimulirao stednju kapitala [43]. To je i bilo racionalno u privredi sa viskom radne snage. Posle 1964. godine porezi su stimulisali praksu usteda na radnoj snazi. Preduzeca su na to reagovala: ugalj se zamenjivao naftom, gajenje pamuka ili stoke bilo zamenjeno proizvodnjom zita, itd., i hiljadama radnika .je postalo suvisno. Osim toga jedinstvene stope su unele nezgodnu krutost i imale tendenciju da intenzifikuju cikluse. Konacno su ukidanje, progresiv nog oporezivanja plata posle 1958. godine i dizanja kontrole plata 1961. godine znacila eliminisanje dve vazne kocnice inflacionih pritisaka. Mi smo vec spomenuli posledice toga. Eksperimentisanje sa. porezima jos nije zavrseno. Sta se moze reci kako treba razraditi jedan pogodan sistem oporezivanja? U raznim prilikama Institut ekonomskih nauka je davao predloge u tom pogledu i oni se mogu ovako sumirati. Ujednaca.vanje raspodele licnih dohodaka moze se postici vec poznatim progresivnim porezom na licne dohotke. Nema potrebe da se oporezuje dobit, a jos manje da se oporezuje progresivno, posto je kapital u drustvenoj svojini. Ali postoji potreba da se oporezuje fond licnih do hodaka i to da se oporezuje progresivno. Da bi se to ucinilo, licni dohoci bi trebalo da se standardizuju primenom obracunskih lic nih dohodaka za pojedine kategorije kvalifikacija (sistematizacija kvalifikacija ne bi smela da se ostavlja samim preduzecima, isto kao sto sami daci ne izdaju skolska svedocanstva). Suocen sa izborom ili da izgubi najveci deo viska platnog fonda putem oporezivanja ili da upotrebi taj novae za razvoj, radni kolektiv ce cesto da se opredeli za ovo drugo. Time se staje na put povecanjima 104

licnih dohodaka u najrentabilnijim preduzecima koja su stalno gurala plate navise i poveeavaju njihove investicije, dok se pri tom povecava ponuda njihovih proizvoda u odnosu na potraznju i snizavaju cene. Radna snaga treba da bude sto jeftinija (za pre duzece, naravno a ne za radnike) da bi se stimulisala radnointezivna proizvodnja. Ako se izvesni porezi jos uvek pokazu potrebni, oni se mogu nametnuti preduzecima po jedinstvenoj stopi. Takvi doprinosi iz dohotka mogu se smatrati kao samoupravni pandan poznatom porezu na dodanu vrednost. Dok su direktni porezi dobivali malo paznje u strucnoj ekonomskoj literaturi, opsirno se diskutovalo o porezu na promet. I s punim pravom. On je prosao krOz sve poreske reforme kao jedan od glavnih poreza. Od 1954: godine udeo poreza ria promet u ukupnom budzetskom prihodu kretao se izmedu 29 i 43 odsto [44, str. 28]. Do 1964. godine pojavilo se sest vrsta poreza ria pro met [45], Porez na promet proizvodaca nasleden je iz doba centralnog planiranja. On se nametao na oko 250 proizvoda po stopama koje su se kretale izmedu 2 i 81 odsto; bn je bio sad'rzan u proizvodacevim cenama, predstavljao deo bruto prihoda predu zeca i prikupljao se prilikom fakturisanja. On se lako i brzo sakupljao cak i pre nego sto su fakture bile isplacivane - i vlada se za njega zalagala. On se takode koristio i kao instruinent poli tike cena. Da bi se stvorili samostalni izvori za opstinske budiete, 1956. godine uveden je opstinski porez na promet. Godine 1961., usled ukidanja progresije u oporezivanju priroda preduzeca, drzavi sii ponestala sredstva i ona je zavela opsti porez na promet od jedan odsto. To je bio visefazni porez i imao za cilj da smanji broj posrednika izmedu proizvodaca i krajnjih potrosaca; medutim, izgleda da ovaj efekat nije bio postignut [62, str. 47]. Postoje ta kode porez na promet za specificne proizvode, usluzni porez na promet i taksa za prenos imovine i druge yrste licnih poslova.. Porez na promet proizvodaca bio je ostro kritikovan. I vlada i preduzeca su ga zloupotrebljavali kao instrument za formiranje cena. U toku dvanaest godina njegova stopa je menjana skoro stotinu puta [46, str. 4], On je zahtevao da preduzece irria velike kolicine obrtnog kapitala. On je imao tendenciju da rerrieti cene a to isto je cinilo i visefazni opsti porez na promet. U slucaju izvoza mo.rali su da se obracunavaju i vrse odbici ranije obracunatog poreza. Zbog svih tih razloga ove dve vrste poreza na promet su bile ukinute a 1965. godine su bile zamenjene porezom na promet ria potrosacku robu u maloprodaji, koji se dodavao maloprodajnim cenama, naplacivao direktno od kupaca i prikupljao cim se roba prodavala. Ali porez na maloprodajni promet rie moze se cesto menjati i ne moze se diferencirati za razne proizvode. Stoga je njegova korist kao instrumenta formiranja cena bila dosta ogranicena. On se sada uglavnom upotrebljava kao instrument za prikupljanje budzetskog prihoda. 105

(c ) Budzet za samoupravnu privredu Sto je sveobuhvatniji, to vise budzetu odgovara centralno planirana privreda. Idealno sve finansijske transakcije privrede treba da budu regulisane budzetom. U samoupravnoj privredi je obratno. Ovde bi budzet trebalo da bude ogranicen na sto manji sektor privrede, kako ne bi ometao ekonomske delatnosti radnih kolek tiva. Idealno, budzet bi trebalo da pokriva samo delatnosti raznih drzavnih ustanova. U tom pogledu reforma od 1952. godine zapocela je tri vazna kretanja. Ona su se odnosila na organizaciju neprivrednog sektora u privredi, na stvaranje radnih drustvenih fondova i na decentralizaciju budzetskih prihoda i rashoda. Jugoslovenska tradicija je stvorila jasnu razliku izmedu pre duzeca i ustanova. Prva su goslovne institucije, a druge se finansiraju od budzeta i otprilike odgovaraju ustanovama koje ne rade za dobit u SAD i drugim zemljama. Posto ustanove zavise od bu dzeta, tj. od drzavne administracije, za svoje prihode, jasno je da tu samoupravljanje nije imalo velike sanse da se razvija. Stoga ustanove koje (a ) vrse javne sluzbe i (b ) mogu da se finansiraju delimicno ili potpuno prodajom svojih usluga* odvojene su u jednu specijalnu grupu ustanova sa samostalnim finansiranjem. Uskoro je postalo ocevidno da postoje dva iz osnova razlicita tipa javnih sluzbi: jedna (drzavna administracija, sudstvo, milicija, odbrana) koja obavlja razne administrativne usluge drustvu, i druga (prosveta, nauka, zdravstvo itd.) koja povecava dobrobit clanova drustva. Izgledalo je celishodno da se oni prvi finansiraju iz budzeta (ja vn i izdaci) i da se organizuju na manje-vise tradicionalni nacin, ali je ovaj drugi (kolektivna potrosnja) zahtevao razlicit pristup. M. Hanzekovic je predlozio da se porez upotrebljava radi finansiranja prvog a doprinosi za ovaj drugi [44, str. 17]. Zatim, dok je slobodno trziste moglo i dalje da postoji za kratkorocno poslovanje preduzeca, pokazalo se preporucljivo da se zadrzi znatna centralna kontrola na podrucju formiranja kapi tala. Ali finansiranje investicija je moralo da bude na bazi kredita a budzetsko finansiranje je znacilo davanje bez obaveze vracanja. Na taj nacin su inv'esticiona sredstva odvojena od budzeta i usredsredena u investicione kreditne fondove. Budzetom su se i dalje finansirali investicioni projekti u vanprivrednom sektoru (skole, bolnice, itd.). 1952. godine socijalno osiguranje se takode izdvojilo iz bud zeta. Ova odluka je bila motivisana cinjenicom da socijalno osigu ranje moze da dejstvuje efikasno kao nezavisna drustvena sluzba pod rezimom drustvenog samoupravljanja. Ovo pitanje je znacilo da su rukovodeca tela sastavljena od predstavnika raznih drustve nih interesa (lekara, socijalnih radnika, gradana, vladinih pred stavnika).
* ) Z a k o n o m od 1959. g o d in e ta j u slov je p re fo rm u lis a n u u s ta n o v e o rg a n iz o v a n e p re m a n a c e lim a d ru stv e n o g s a m o u p ra v lja n ja . U sta n o v e su se p r e k rs tile u >*-samostalne u sta n o v e . G o d in e 1965. d o b ile su s ta tu s r a d n ih o rg a n iz a c ija sa istim s a m o u p ra v n im p ra v im a k a o i p red u zeca.

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Uskoro su poceli da se mnoze razni fondovi (za stambenu izgradnju, za unapredenje poljoprivrede i sumarstva, za puteve, za kulturne delatnosti, za prosvetu, itd.). Vecina ovih fondova imala je svoja samostalna upravna tela i dobijala je svoja sredstva iz posebnih dohodaka ili iz budzeta. M. Hanzekovic je predlozio sledece trostruke klasifikacije [44, str. 13]: (1 ) fondove za investicije ili za finansiranje javnih sluzbi; (2 ) fondove za finansiranje bez obaveza vracanja ili za davanje kredita; (3 ) sa samostalnim telima ili bez njih. Odredene tendencije su se pojavile sa daljim razvojem. Kreditni fondovi bili su uglavnom preneseni na banke. Fondovi bez samostalnih upravnih tela upotrebljavaju se kao instrumenti (cesto privremeni) budzetskog finansiranja za posebne svrhe. Treca kategorija, stalni fondovi sa nezavisnim samoupravljanjem, predstavljaju novost. Fond socijalnog osiguranja je stvorio. presedan. Tim primerom je deceniju kasnije posla prosveta. Isprva, kao sto je primetio T. Konevski, to je bila samo transmisija u budzetskom finansiranju [47, str. 163]. Ali godine 1967. obrazovane su Zajednice obrazovanja da rukuju tim fondovima. Skupstine na opstinskim i republickim nivoima izglasavaju novae koji ce se dodeliti fondovima obrazovanja. Zajednice obrazovanja samoupravna tela sastavljena od predstavnika skola, istaknutih licnosti u kulturnom zivotu, drzavnih ustanova vrse distribuciju novca utvrdujuci usluge koje razne prosvetne ustanove treba da izvrse. 1969. godine obrazovane su Zajednice za naucni rad. One upravljaju fondovima za istrazivacki rad obrazovanim 1960. godine. Zajednice su prikazane na kvazi-trzisnom sektoru seme 6.1. Hanzekovic istice da su 1965. godine fondovi apsorbovali 8,8 odsto a ustanove 14,2 odsto nacionalnog dohotka, koji je morao da se uklopi u opsti budzetski rashod koji je iznosio 20,1 odsto nacionalnog dohotka [44, str. 14], Ustanove dobijaju oko jedne trecine svog dohotka prodajom usluga direktnim kupcima (trzistu), 50 do 60 odsto njihovog dohotka dolazi iz raznih fondova (kvazi-trziste) a svega jedna desetina potice iz budzetskih subvencija. Takva struktura prihoda omogucila je neprivrednim (ali ne i bezprofitnim jer one zaraduju) ustanovama da steknu prilicnu samostalnost. One su takode uspostavile tesnje odnose sa kupcima svojih usluga i sa ostalim delom privrede. Moglo bi se pitati da li postoji neka ekonomska delatnost u koju bi mogli da se angazuju arheoloski fakultet, muzej ili umetnicka galerija? Postoji, mada mozda ne sasvim direktno. Turisticke agencije i hoteli bi mogli biti i u stvari i jesu zainteresovani u finansiranju razvoja jednog arheoloskog nalazista, lokalnog muzeja ili umetnicke galerije. Ponekad postoje i okolisni putevi da se postignu izvesni ciljevi, ali da bi se izbegla drzavna kontrola i povecala samostal nost, cena toga mozda i nije previsoka. A ipak postoje i drugi troskovi. T. Konevski istice neke od njih [47, str. 128 65]. Da bi se upravljalo jednim fondom; potrebno je da se uspostavi admini107

strativni aparat. Za razliku od poslovnih preduzeca na trzistu, skola ili bolnica se nalaze u inferiornom polozaju kad pregovaraju 0 zakljucenju ugovora sa fondovima. Komercijalizam moze da ima 1 stvarno ima stetne posledice na takvim podrucjima kao sto su kultura, prosveta, nauka ili zdravstvo. Potrosac moze da bude a cesto i jeste zrtva. Posto je suvise rano da se proceni funkcionisanje ovog sistema, mozemo se samo pozvati na mudrost starih Grka u pogledu organizacije ljudskih poslova: umerenost, bez krajnosti. . Stvaranje fondova i uspostavljanje ustanova koje se same finansiraju predstavljaju dva Vida decentralizacije. Kao posledica toga udeo budzetskog prihoda u nacionalnom dohotku smanjen je sa jedne trecine 1952. godine na j.ednu petinu 1967. godine. Treci vid decentralizacije odnosio se na raspodelu dohotka medu bud zetima raznih drustveno-politickih zajednica. Federacija je postepeno prenosila svoje odgovomosti za razne drustvene sluzbe na republike i opstine. Usled toga udeo saveznih izdataka u ukupnom budzetskom rashodu je spao sa 74, odsto u 1952. na 53 odsto u 1968. godini. Tendencije su se preokrenule u poredenju sa razvojem u drugim zemljama.* Raspodela budzetskih prihoda medu raznim budzetima je prilicno kbmplikovan tehnicki problem. Nista manje nego pet zakona je pokusalo da to rese u periodu 1952 1965. i sa ogranicenim uspehom. Teoretski postoje dve mogucnosti: odvajanje pri hoda i zajednicki prihodi. Oba su bila isprobana u raznim vremenima. ., Posle 1952. godine budzetski monizam centralno planske pri vrede bio je zamenjen: budzetskim pluralizmom koji mnogo bolje odgovara samoupravnoj privredi. Raniji' budzetski sistem bio je zasnovan na ucescu u zajednickim prihodima, s tim sto su visi drzavni organi odre'divali uslove ucesca. Da bi nize budzetske jedinice postale samostalnije u razvijanju izvora prihoda na svojim sopstvenim teritPrijama, izgledao je pogodniji sistem zasnovan na razdvajanju izvora dohotka. Tako su .izvori prihpda bili dodeljeni budzetima na raznim nivoima. Jedino je federacija. imala pravo da uvodi nove poreze, ali cim bi se zaveli, porezi su morali odmah da se namene specificnim budzetima ili fondovima. U principu svaka jedinica je morala da pokrije troskove svojim sopstvenim pri hodima. Ovaj princip se nije sprovodio u celini, ali je to ipak bila velika promena u odnosu na raniju praksu. U dvema karakteristicnim godinama republike i opstine su sticale svoje prihode na sledece nacine [49, str. 445]:
* ) IJ SAD u d eo f e d e r a ln o g . p rih o d a u u k u p p o m b u d z e ts k o m d o h o tk u p ovecao se sa 42 o d sto u 1890. g o dini n a 75 o d sto u 1954. g o d in i; u S v a jc a rsk o j fe d e r a ln i iz d a c i su iz n o sili je d n u p o lo v in u k a n to n s ld li r a s h o d a o d 1913., i 111 o d sto u 1958. g o d in i (48. s tr . 10).

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1948.

1954.

sopstveni prihodi ucesce u zajednickim prihodima savezne subvencije

53,7% 43,3% 3,0/o

72,5% 22,5% 5,0%

Uz mnoge izmene ovaj sistem je trajao devet godina (1952 1959). On je imao dva glavna nedostatka, koje su opisali R. Radovanovic [38, str. 1115] i K. Bogoev [48, str. 188 90]. Izvori koji su se dodeljivali nizim jedinicama nisu bili dovoljni da pokriju priznate potrebe. Deficiti su bili znatni i pokrivali su.se ucestvovanjem u prihodima i subvencijama., O regresima se pregovaralo iznova svake godine, zbog cega su nize jedinice bile uvek. zavisne od visih vlasti. Zatim, nedostatak objektivnih kriterija dodeljivanja otvorio je proces cenjkanja. Iz oba ta razloga taj sistem nije uspeo da stvori stabilnost i pruzi stimulus. U periodu 1960 1964. budzetski sistem je ponovo bio zasnovan na participaciji. Posebni izvori su bili dodeljeni sam ofederaciji (oni su pokrivali 90 odsto njenih prihoda) i opstinama (oko 20 odsto njihovih prihoda). Repub like i srezovi nisu imali posebne izvore. Ucesce svih jedinica bilo je odredeno federalnim i republickim zakonima. Vise teritorijalne jedinice nisu mogle samovoljno da biraju sa sebe povoljnije izvore. Da bi se otklonio jos jedan izvor samovolje, stope ucesca nisu se diferencirale prema izvorima kao ranije, vec se primenjivala jedinstvena stopa ucesca za sve izvore prihoda. Stope ucesca su povecavane za manje razvijene zajednice, a ako to nije bilo dovoljno onda su davane i subvencije. Povecani udeli i subvencije su se odredivali na bazi fondova potrebnih za izvodenje obaveznih zadataka i sluzbi. Medutim, po sto nisu bili uspostavljeni objektivni kriterijumi, u taj proces se uvukla vec poznata samovolja. U 1960. godini svega.9 odsto, a naredne godine svega 3,6 odsto svih opstina bile su u stanju da zadovolje svoje potrebe na redo van nacin [48, str. 205]. Otprilike jedna polovina svih opstina morala je da se oslanja i na povecano ucesce i na subvencije. Ono sto je trebalo da bude korektivna mera pokazalo se da je glavni instrument za balansiranje budzeta nizah jedinica. Poreskom reformom od 1965. godine ponovo je uveden princip odvajanja. Izvori se dodeljuju na sledeci nacin. Porez na licni dohodak i porez na promet mogu da nametnu sve drustveno-politicke zajednice. Osim toga, porez na imovinu pripadao je opstini, porez na nasledstvo republikama a carine federaciji.. Opstine i re publike su ovlascene da samostalno odlucuju kakve prihode da uvedu za svoje teritorije i da utvrduju poreske stope. To su dve mere bezbednosti. Savezna vlada moze privremeno da utvrdi granice za poreske stope koje postave repub like i opstine. Opstine i republike su zakonski obavezne da saraduju medusobno u utvrdivanju nivoa svojih prihoda kako bi obezbedile gradanima ravnopravnost. Republike i pokrajine imaju pravo na savezne subvencije 109

ukoliko je njihov per capita prihod ispod jugoslovenskog proseka i ukoliko su se iscrple sve mogucnosti prikupljanja prihoda putem oporezivanja licnih dohodaka u skladu sa ekonomskim potencijalom njihovog stanovnistva [50], Ovog puta je kriterijum za subvencije nesto preciznije definisan. Ali on je isto tako bio i kritikovan. Hanzekovic tvrdi da priblizno podjednak budzetski prihod po glavi stanovnistva ne moze da bude pogodno merilo. Umesto toga pogodno definisani, nuzni i opravdani izdaci trebalo bi da predstavljaju osnovu za alokacije [44, str. 71 U stvari ovo izgleda da je glavni problem jugoslovenskog budzetskog sistema. Per capita dohodak u SR Sloveniji je 5,4 puta veci nego u SAP K osovli. Opstinski budzetski prihodi su naravno jos neujednaceniji: u godini 1965. najrazvijenija komuna u Sloveniji je dobijala per capita prihod skoro sesnaest puta veci nego najmanje razvijena komima na Kosovu. Ovako ekstremne razlike su morale da upropaste sve planove u kojima kriterijumi alokacija nisu bili precizno definisani. Konevski podvlaci da u novom sistemu vise od jedne polovine komima u Srbiji moraju da zavise od subvencija, sto je nespojivo sa filozofijom samo upravljanja [47, str. 116]. Godine 1968. vlada je zatrazila od jednog naucnog instituta da prouci ovaj problem. Jedna grupa pod rukovodstvom P. Sicherla pripremila je obiman izvestaj [51]. Sicherl konstatuje da iako su razlike izmedu razvijenih i nerazvijenih oblasti u per capita dohotku ekstremne, razlike u nepoljoprivrednom prihodu po radniku su male. On upotrebljava jedan specijalni statisticki metod koji je pronasao njegov kolega B. Ivanovic [52] da utvrdi da je distanca izmedu razvijenih i nerazvijenih oblasti znatno veca u ekonomskoj sferi nego u sferi drustvenog standarda. U jednom kasnijem clanku Sicherl tvrdi da je lakse smanjiti distancu u ovoj drugoj sferi (u smislu obezbedenja usluga) nego u per capita nacionalnom dohotku [53]. Sicherl je uzeo za osnovu za obracunavanje subvencija obracunski budzetski prihod koji on definise kao prihod koji se dobija primenjivanjem prosecnih jugoslovenskih poreskih stopa na stvarne poreske izvore u toj oblasti. Dilema oko toga da li ta politika treba da bude zasnovana na izjednacavanju potreba ili prihoda resava se u prilog prihoda, iz razloga sto je tesko odrediti potrebe na objektivan nacin i sto je to takode nespojivo sa filo zofijom decentralizovanog odlucivanja. Tome je usledila duga i komplikovana diskusija oko najcelishodnijeg . metoda odredivanja standardnog prihoda. Razlika izmedu standardnog i obracimskog prihoda treba da se pokrije saveznom subvencijom. Sicherlov iz vestaj je bio pretresan u vladinim i skupstinskim odborima ali dosad jos nije doneo nikakve prakticne rezultate. ( d) Komunalna privreda U svakodnevnom zivotu svaki covek se pojavljuje u dvojnom svojstvu kao proizvodac i kao gradanin. Stoga ce i neposredna 110

demokratija imati dva vida: jedan koji se odnosi na radno mesto, a drugi koji se odnosi na teritoriju gde gradanin zivi. Kao clanovi radnih kolektiva ljudi se angazuju li samoupravljanju. Kao stanovnici gradova i sela oni upravljaju svojim poslovima uspostavljajuci mesne samouprave. Teritorijalno udruzenje koje odgovara kolektivu na radnom mestu je komuna. U Jugoslaviji postoji jaka tradicija opstina jos od dana narodnooslobodilackog rata. Narodnooslobodilacki odbori, kao tela lokalne uprave, funkcionisali su sa velikom samostalnoscu, inicijativom i snalazljivoscu u snabdevanju partizanske vojske i organizovanju svakodnevnog zivota u oslobodenim podrucjima. Svakako nije slucajno sto su se prvi narodni odbori i prvi odbori radnickog upravljanja jednovremeno pojavili u jesen 1941. godine u rudarskom gradu Krupanj. Narodni odbori su nastavili da postoje i posle rata, ali tada kao sastavni deo jednog krutog centralizovanog sistema. Sistem je bio zasnovan na principu demokratskog centralizma, koji je znacio da visi organi mogu da poniste odluke narodnih odbora. Ova praksa bila je radikalno izmenjena sudbonosne 1952. godine. Princip demokratskog centralizma je zamenjen principom kontrole zakonitosti [54, str. 24]. Sreski narodni odbori su postali organi samouprave a opstinski narodni odbori organi mesne upra ve. Sreski narodni odbori su imali skupstine sa dva doma: jedan koji se sastojao od politickih predstavnika i drugi od predstavnika proizvodaca. Sledeci presudni korak je nastupio tri godine kasnije. Zakonom o samoupravljanju od 1955. godine proglaseno je da je komuna osnovna politickoteritorijalna organizacija samoupravljanja od strane radnog naroda i osnovna drustveno-ekonomska zajednica stanovnistva na njenoj teritoriji. Ustav od 1963. godine unekoliko je izmenio frazeologiju time sto je proglasio opstinu za osnovnu drustveno-politicku zajednicu. Na razvoj komunalnog sistema uticao je mnogo istorijski primer koji je 1871. godine postavila Pariska komuna, koja je konacno pronasla politicki oblik u kome se moze izvrsiti emancipacija rada (Marks). Korisno je zapaziti, kao sto istice D. Milivojevic, da komuna nije zamisljena kao oblik inace vec poznate mesne uprave. To je zajednica onih koji zive, rade i proizvode, zadovoljavajuci svoje osnovne potrebe i ostvarujuci svoja gradanska i samoupravna prava u odredenoj teritoriji [55, str. 8]. Neko vreme srezovi su zadrzali izvesne koordinacione fimkcije a zatim su postepeno odumrli. Posto je opstina teritorijalno udruzenje, jedan od prvih problema bio je da se odredi velicina te teritorije. Problem je bio resen prakticnim eksperimentisanjem u toku jedne decenije. U skladu sa centralnim planiranjem postojala je hierarhija upravnih nivoa.Postojala su tri ispod nivoa republike: oblast, srez i mesni narodni odbor. 1951. godine oblasti su nestale. Orijentacija na trzisnu privredu ucinila je nepotrebnom preteranu administrativnu rasparcanost (bilo je vise od 7.000 mesnih narodnih odbora), i stoga je 1952. godine prepolovljen broj mesnih narodnih odbora 111

i na njihovo mesto dosle su opstine. Da .bi se mesna uprava priblizila .gradanima, 1955. .godine opstina. je postala osnovna samoupravna jedinica. Medutim, posto je opstina imala da obavlja sirok niz funkcija, njena teritorija je morala da se po.veca. .Na tabeli 1 prikazan je proces teritorijalne transformacije. Svaki novi zakon o teritorijalnim izmenama primetio je E. Pusic bio je najavljen kao poslednji i konacni [63, str. 245].
Tabela 14.1 B roj teritorijalnih jedinica mesne samouprave (na .kraju godine) 1948. Mesni odbori/zajednice Opstine Srezovi 7967 " ' 427 1952. 1955. 1967. 4968* 501

4052 351

1479 107

* 1965. Izv o ri: J u g o s la v ia 19i5195i., s tr. 3536, SGJ 1968., s tr. 62,
JugoslovensUi pregled, 1965., str. 3296.

Opstinska. teritorija je sve vise rasla i do 1967. godine prosecni .broj stanovnika u opstini (40.000 u 1967. godini) skoro je dostigao velicinu sreza na pocetku tog procesa (48.000 u 1952. go dini). Srez je postao suvisan i nestao je. Opstina je postala efikasnija ali i manje samoupravna. Zbog toga je novim Ustavom predvideno obrazovanje mesnih zajednica. One su zamisljene kao samoupravne zajednice gradana u seoskim i gradskim naseljima koje se bave svim delatnostima u vezi sa zadovoljavanjem potreba gra dana i njihovih porodica. J. Duricic opisuje tri funkcije mesne za jednice: ona je (a ) oblik samoupravljanja koji obuhvata tradicionalne politicke delatnosti, (b ) jedinica gradskog planiranja i (c ) organizacija koja se brine za drustveni standard, komunalne sluzbe itd. [56], E. Pusic je prilicno skeptican u pogledu nekog znacajnijeg doprinosa mesnih zajednica u samoupravljanju. Po njegovom misljenju njihove delatnosti su suvise ogranicene da bi bile posebno privlacne gradanima a u modernim gradskim uslovima teritorijalna bliskost sama po sebi ne stvara narocito aktivne drustvene veze [63, str. 2433. U Jugoslaviji ima 27.706 naselja i vec 1965. godine statutima opstina predvideno je stvaranje 4.968 mesnih zajednica (7,7 odsto. opstina nije u to vreme obrazovalo mesne zajednice). Izgledalo je da je organizacioni krug zatvoren: opstine su zamenile srezove a mesne zajednice su zamenile mesne narodne odbore. Ali je u tom procesu steceno mnogo drustvenog iskustva. Pored toga sto obavlja funkciju tradicionalne mesne uprave, koja obuhvata mesnu politiku, komunalije, prosvetu, socijalno staranje, itd. opstina je takode odgovorna i za druge vidove mesnog zivota. D. M iljkovic ovo objasnjava detaljno. Od opstine se

ocekuje da uskladi individualne i drustvene interese. Ona je odgovorna za drustvenu imovinu, bilo da je ona pod njenom kontrolom ili da pripada preduzecima. Ona se brine za ekonomski razvoj i kulturni napredak. Ona liskladiije sve ekonomske, drustvene i politicke delatnosti na.:svOjoj -teritorijiy priprema drustveni- plan i omogucava gradanima da ucestvuju u procesu drustvenog odlucivanja [57, 66]. Ali opstitisko samoupravljanje je kontradiktoma institucija primetio je J. Dordevic ona nosi u sebi snage unifikacije i dezintegracije [10, str. 202], Uskoro ce obe ove snage doci do izrazaja. Zakonu od 1955. godine prethodile su obimtie diskusije o funkcijama opstine. U referatu podnetom na gbdisnjoj skupstini srpskih ekonomista 19541 godine, J. Davico je tvrdio, a prisutni su se slozili, da samoupravno preduzece nije stiinulisaiio da stvara veliM'-kapitatl': Pb'; njegbvoin misljeriju velike inVesticije bi znacile stVaranje novog'preduzeca koje bi isto tako bilo pod radnickom upravom i stoga rie bi mogla da mu se nametne domin'acija. Iz tog reizloga Davico je smatrao da je komuna prirodni iiivestitor u nasim okoliiostiffla [58, str: 192]-. Kao sto pokazuje tabela 13.2, opstine su zaista postale veliki investitori. Go'dine 1964., kad je dostignut maksimum, 25 odstb svih investicija u osnovna sredstva finansirale su opstine ( i srezovi). 1959. godine su stekle pravo da osnivaju svakoyrsna preduzeca',; da sprovode ; integracije ili da vrse likvidacije t48, 'str. 129]. Medutim, poslednja privredna refor ma se skoro iskljucivo oslonila na preduzeca: u pogledu investicija tako da je vec 1968. godine udeo opstirie: u irivesticijarria smanjen na 4 odsto. Ali time su ostale nedirnute druge ekonomske funkcije opstine. U slucajevima neixspeha jedriog preduzeca: opstina sriosi znatan deo finaiisijske odgovomosti. Opstina' takode daje garkncije za kredite i zajmove koje daju banke preduzecima na rijeiibj teri toriji. !i Za ljude naviknute na centralno planiranje, tj. na adininistrativne metode u upravljanju privredom, bilo je tesko da se zamisli zaista slobodno trziste. Oni.su bili reseni da se otarase drzavne kontrole. Izgledalo je ocevidno da se taj cilj najbolje moze postici ako se namesto nje zavede opstinska kontrola. Samoupravna opstina ce reci preduzecima sta da rade i kako da se poriasaju. U 1954. i 1955. godini opstine1 bile ovlacene da utvrduju potrebe six preduzeca i da vrse raspodelu njihovog dohotka posle saveznog poreza. Posto su opstine imale pravo da odrede svoj udeo u dohotku i posto su bile samostalne u budzetiranju rashoda, opstine su oporezivale prihode preduzeca vise nego sto su ona mogla da izdrze. Posledica toga bio je opsti skok cena, kao sto je prikazano na tabeli 10.1 i grafikonu 5.1. 1956.' godine prava opstine na oporezivanje ponovo su bila regulisana saveznim zakonoin [59, str. 113 16; 48, str. 166]. Postepeno se doslo do toga da se revidiraju romanticna gledista o zajednicama bez sukoba mesnim ili drugim. Nade su bile uperene u pravcu jednog bezlicnog trzisnog mehanizma. Oce-

kivanja su ponovo bila malo neopravdana. Ali bar ljudi su bili spremni da se uce na iskustvu. Preduzeca su stekla veliku meru' samostalnosti i presla su opstinske granice. Komunalne banke koje su se pojavljivale u periodu 1948 1964. postale su komercijalne banke. Pristupilo se mnogo serioznije komunalnoj privredi, samoupravljanju i zivotu. Stvama ekonomska, drustvena i politicka vaznost opstina nije se umanjila mada su u poslednje vreme republike pokazale tendenciju da se mesaju u komunalne finansije. U jednoj odlicnoj studiji K. Bogoev daje osvrt na razvoj komunalnih f inansij a [48]. U tom kontekstu moze se izblize sagledati jedan teski fiskalni problem, a to su dovoljna finansijska sredstva za administrativne i narocito za socijalne sluzbe. Bogoev i Petrovid isticu da je rezolucija Savezne skupstine od 1967. godine o javnim izdacima i kolektivnoj potrosnji (k o ji zajedno sacinjavaju opstu potrosnju po jugoslovenskoj terminologiji za razliku od privatnog finansiranja potrosnje) zahtevala da se takvi izdaci povezu sa ekonomskim potencijalima doticnog podrucja [48, str. 179; 65, str. 57], Kasnije je novi Ustav insistirao da princip ulozenog rada bude kriterijum ubiranja poreza koji bi se primenjivao na formiranje prihoda drustveno-politickih jedinica. Poreski zakoni su protumacili ova dva principa da znace da porez treba da se prikuplja u srazmeri sa licnim dohotkom. Iz tog razloga je proporcionalni porez na platni fond povecavao svoj znacaj, dok 1964. godine nije postao jedini porez koji placaju preduzeca. Posto je kolektivna potrosnja vrsta licne potrosnje koja se kolektivno finansira, izgledalo je pravilno i pravicho da se ona poveze sa licnim dohocima stecenim na odredenoj teritoriji. Porez na platni fond postao je jos privlacniji kad je bilo reseno da se on uplacuje u budzet opstine gde ljudi zive a ne gde rade ili gde se nalazi centrala preduzeca. Tek od nedavno pocelo je da se diskutuje o slabostima poreza na platni fond i o pogresnom rezonovanju na kome je bio zasnovan. Ja bih zavrsio ovo poglavlje kratkim osvrtom na glavne delatnosti opstina. Sta opstine rade najbolje se vidi iz pregleda budzetskih rashoda, prikazanih na tabeli 14.2.
Tabela 14.2 Budzetski izdaci u 1966. godini Ukupni izdaci Ukupni izdaci Prosveta Nauka i kultura Socijalno staranje i zdravstvo Kom unalne sluzbe Drzavna administracija Narodna odbrana Infrastrukturne investicije Izv o r: (50, str. 71) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Federacija Republike i pokrajine 45,8 0,1 5,3 52,0

Opstine

19,4 21,5 58,1 11,6 16,2 16,2

99,7 . 5,3

38,8

34,8 78,4 36,6 36,4 83,8 83,8 0,3 55,9

114

Komunalne delatnosti, prosveta, infrastrukturne investicije i javna administraqija su delatnosti. koje opstina kontrolise vise nego republika ili federacija. Bogoev istice da je opstinsko ucesce u ukupnim budzetskim izdacima medu najvecim na svetu 29 35 odsto ili 50 odsto bez narodne odbrane u Jugoslaviji,. u poredenju sa 30 odsto u Zapadnoj Nemackoj, 20 odsto u Svajcarskoj, 22 od sto u Austriji i 20 odsto ili 35 odsto bez odbrane u SAD) [48, str. 329], Ostaje jos da se vidi da li je ovaj udeo dostigao svoju gornju granicu. (e ) Fiskalna politika Dodajem ovo poglavlje radi. potpunosti, ali bi ono moglo i da se izostavi. Ma kako to cudno izgledalo, ali u. Jugoslaviji ne postoji fisklana politika. U stvari to je sasvim u skladu sa verovanjem u odsustvo ili sa ignorisanjem prisustva privrednih ciklusa. Fiskalna politika moze da utice na ukupnu potraznju preko prihodne ili rashodne strane budzeta. Prihod putem oporezivanja priznat je kao zakoniti instrument fiskalne politike u teoriji koji se ponekad koristi i u praksi. Proizvodacki porez na promet se ponekad koristi da utice na opsti nivo cena kako bi apsorbovao suvisnu kupovnu moc. Inace mnoge poreske izmene su izvrsene da bi uticale na pojedine cene ili da bi povecale raspolaganje preduzeca sa svojim dohocima, bez namere da uticu na agregatnu potraznju. U izvesnoj meri selektivna smanjenja poreza na promet su ponekad imala efekat stabilizacije cena. Savezna vlada je ponekad zapadala u znatne deficite u godinama recesije, kao na primer u 1962. i 1965. godini. Ali to je bilo sasvim slucajno, posledica kombinovanih efekata poreskih reformi i nedostatka prihoda. Udzbenici o javnim finansijama, koje redovno pisu ljudi sa pravnim obrazovanjem, neprestano podsecaju studente na starodrevni princip zdravih finansija uravnotezeni budzet. Posto vlada na svim svojim nivoima nije mnogo skrupulozna u svom trosenju, insistiranje na uravnotezenju budzeta je sasvim opravdano. Bogoev istice da je budzet uvek bio uravnotezen kad se podnosio Saveznoj skupstini na prihvatanje i da su se deficiti pojavljivali u njegovom izvrsenju. Deficiti su iznosili 10 15 odsto saveznog budzeta i do 5 odsto republickih i opstinskih budzeta, ali su bili mnogo veci za vanbudietske izdatke (in vesticije, socijalno osiguranje)[60, str. 159]. Prva javna debata o fiskalnoj politici odrzana je 1967. godine. Na jednoj ekonomskoj konferenciji u Ljubljani K. Bogoev [61], M. Hanzekovic [62] i B. Jelcic [63] diskutovali su o odsustvu fiskalne politike u Jugoslaviji i dali vise sugestija. Bogoev citira rezoluciju Savezne skupstine o ekonomskoj politici od 1967. godine u kojoj se kaze da postoji suvisna potraznja i trazi da se ne samo svi budzeti uravnoteze vec i da se akumuliraju rezerve. Kao sto 115

pokazuje grafikon 5.1 Jugoslavija je iskusila neuobicajenu depresiju upravo u 1967. godini. Bogoev takode .istice da.proporcionalne poreske stope na platni fond imaju efekat intenzifikovanja ciklusa i da mali iznos transfernih izdataka (naknada za nezaposlenost, vracanje dugova, subvencije) ogranicava mogucnosti efektivne anticiklicne politike. U posleratnom periodu savezna vlada je raspisala tri unutrasnja zajma (za prvi petogodisnji plan, za otklanjanje posledica informbirovskog ekonomskog bojkota i za finan siranje rekonstrukcije Skoplja posle katastrofalnog zemljotresa). Jedina svrha tih zajmova bila je da se prenese deo licne potrosnje na investicije. Bogoev veruje da se krutost postojeceg fiskalnog pluralizma moze ublaziti i da se dobro smisljene savezne budzetske subvencije mogu iskoristiti efektivno protiv ciklusa. B. Soskic je jedini drugi ekonomista koji je pisao o fiskalnoj politici [64]. Soskic je bio u prvom redu zainteresovan za ekspanzione efekte javnih radova. Po njegovom misljenju najcelishodniji ciljevi povecanog javnog finansiranja su stambena i komunalna izgradnja, izgradnja puteva, melioracije i isusivanje zemljista i energetski projekti. Takvi investicioni projekti su pozeljni i zbog njihovog veoma niskog uvoznog sadrzaja, kao sto je istakao Institut ekonomskih nauka. Soskic je dodao da su oni isto tako veoma radnointezivni, sto je od velikog znacaja za privredu sa viskom radne snage [68].

116

V I. SAMOUPRAVLJANJE I SOCIJALISTICKA ROBNA PROIZVODNJA Usled nedovoljnog prostora nismo u mogucnosti. da ovde razmotrimo dva vazna podrucja ekonomske politike:. poljoprivrednu politiku i politiku regionalnog razvoja. Medutim, u diskusijama koje vode jugoslovenski strucnjaci iz oblasti drustvenih nauka javlja se jedna permanentna tema: uzajamni odnos izmedu socijalizma, samoupravljanja i trzista. U zakljucku cemo razmotriti nedavne diskusije koje su vodene po ovom pitanju. Ja sam vec govorio (odeljak l.b ) o poznatoj tvrdnji o nespojivosti socijalizma sa trzistem. Ova tvrdnja predstavlja osnovu od koje polazi Paul Sweezy u svojoj kritici jugoslovenske ekonomske politike kao postepenog prelaza od socijalizma ka kapitalizmu [1 ]. Sweezy tvrdi da trziste ogranicava socijalisticke odnose i transformira drustvenu svojinu u neku vrstu kolektivne svojine. Materijalni stimulansi i trzisna orijentacija neminovno usmeravaju nadin misljenja ka stvaranju profita. Koriscenje profita kao ocene drustvene korisnosti karakteristika je kapitalistickog drustva. Opsednutost posedovanjem materijalnih predmeta i gramzljivost potiskuju socijalisticke vrednosti. Ovakva vrsta kritike je dosta cesta. U odgovoru na to J. Dordevic tvrdi da su ove nepozeljne drustvene pojave rezultat industrijske civilizacije a ne posledica trzista. Ukidanje trzista znaci povratak etatizmu i drzavnoj svojini. Pod samoupravljanjem se podrazu meva slobodno raspolaganje zaradenim dohotkom i uopste uzev, poslovna samostalnost (autonomija) koja, sa svoje strane, podra zumeva postojanje trzista. Ako ovako ne shvatimo, alternativa je stara eshatoloska ideja o vladavini drzave i prevaspitavanju coveka. Covek ce se staviti pod starateljstvo drzave (ili partije ili nekog drugog mehanizma) da bi se pripremio i odgojio kako bi jednog dana postao zreo socijalisticki podanik [2, str. 96]. Jugoslovenski ekonomisti su jedinstveni u svom verovanju da trziste treba da bude iskorisceno do maksimuma kao sredstvo ekonomske organizacije. Filozofi, medutim, izrazavaju tu svoje sumnje. M. Markovic, jedan od vodecih filozofa koji se zivo interesuje za ekonomska pitanja, veruje da se pocetni oblici radnickog samoupravljanja ne mogu postici bez materijalnih stimulansa koji 117

sami po sebi podrazumevaju i konkurenciju na trzistu. Medutim, ukoliko iskljucivo ukazivanje poverenja novcanim odnosima po stane permanentna karakteristika jednog drustva samoupravljanje bi postepeno moglo da se izrodi u neku vrstu kapitalisticke koopeperative. Ukoliko se rezultati rada permanentno ocenjuju pomocu ostvarenog dohotka, i ako zelja da zaradi sto je vise moguce novca postane permanentni i osnovni interes radnika, onda ce to stvoriti vrstu licnosti koja se u osnovi nece mnogo razlikovati od vrste koja je proizvod kapitalistickog drustva [3, str. 70], Pozivajuci se na Marksa jedan od kolega, filozof, je iz- . javio da socijalisticka robna proizvodnja predstavlja c o n t r a d i c t i o i n a d j e c t o. Prema Marksu robna proizvodnja podrazumeva trzisne odnose koji dovode do fetisizma robe i razlicitih pojava alijenacije. Ja sam pokusao razjasniti ova pitanja na sledeci nacin. Poznatu tvrdnju da robna proizvodnja stvara kapitalizam, treba odbaciti. Robna proizvodnja je postojala u robovlasnickom drustvu, feudalnom i kapitalistickom kao i etatizmu. Jasno je da robna proizvodnja nije odredila sve ove drustveno-ekonomske sisteme; naprotiv, nju su odredili mnogo dublji drustveni odnosi a oblikovao je odgovarajuci drustveni sistem. Tako je, na primer, kapitalizam nastao kao rezultat privatne svojine, etatizam kao rezultat drzavne svojine. Posto postoji veliki broj vrsta robne proizvodnje ne treba da nas cudi kad nailazimo i na socijalisticku robnu proizvodnju. Ukidanje privatne svojine ne dovodi neminovno do socijalizma, iako moze znatno da ogranici ulogu trzi sta. Ako se privatna svojina zameni drzavnom svojinom, kapita lizam se zamenjuje etatizmom a fetisizam robe fetisizmom cina (cinovnika). U oba ova slucaja odnosi medu ljudima se postvaruju, zadrzava se drustvena nejednakost, nastavlja eksploatacija i u sustini onemogucava ljudska egzistencija. U socijalizmu dru stvena svojina omogucuje da drustveni kapital bude podjednako pristupacan svim clanovima drustva, dok se autoritarizam u preduzecu kojim rukovodi privatno lice ili drzava zamenjuje samoupravljanjem. U ovom kontekstu trziste i planiranje nisu cilj vec sredstvo. Ukoliko zelimo da radni kolektiv bude stvarno samostalan u odlucivanju po ekonomskim pitanjima, postojanje trzista je neminovno. Medutim, planiranje je u protivurecnosti sa poslovnom autonomijom te se moramo odluciti ili za planiranje ili trziste kaze jedna starodrevna zabluda. U stvari drustveno planiranje daleko od toga da ogranicava, vec naprotiv povecava autonomiju predu zeca i to bar iz tri razloga: (1 ) planiranje smanjuje neizvesnost koja je osnovna restrikcija slobodnom odlucivanju; (2 ) utice na povecanje stope rasta trziste se siri te se povecava i broj mogucih altemativa; (3 ) izjednacuje uslove poslovanja te na taj nacin uspesno poslovanje proizvodaca manje zavisi od spoljnih uslova koje on nije u stanju da kontrolise a koji su ekonomski i dru stveno iracionalni [4]. Cesto se diskutuje o prirodi odnosa izmedu trzista i plana. Obicno se trziste i plan suprotstavljaju jedno drugome kao dva 118

zasebna mehanizma (uporedi sa Odeljkom 2.b). Neki ekonomisti, medutim, pokusavaju da razviju monisticki pristup. V. Bakaric tvrdi da tu nema nikakvog suprotstavljanja jednog drugome, da u celosti vlada zakpn vrednosti, a da je plan samo jedan elemenat, iako najznacajniji, u zakonu vrednosti. Ovakva izjava izgleda suprotna onome sto sam rekao u prethodnom paragrafu i u odeljku 2.b. Medutim, kontradikcija je vise prividna nego stvarna. Ono sto Bakaric pokusava da pobije jeste voluntarizam etatistickog planiranja i da pokaze da postoji jedan objektivno dat okvir unutar koga se planeri moraju kretati. Prema I. Maksimovicu ovakva tvrdnja znaci isuvise prepustanje 1a i ss e r f a i r e situaciji. On kritikuje nedoslednost zvanicne ekonomske politike i opominje da nedovoljno kontrolisano trziste nanosi stete pojedincima (negiranje raspodele prema radu), preduzecima (razliciti uslovi privredivanja u raznim granama industrije) kao i zajednici u celini (proizvodna aktivnost ispod drustvenog optimuma). Sve ovo dovodi do stvaranja ideologije prema kojoj socijalizam nema ekonomskih prednosti nad organizovanim kapiializmom, prema kojoj su nejednakosti i eksploatacija vezani za ljudsku prirodu te da se ne mogu eliminisati [61. D. Misic vidi nedostatke u samoupravljanju, kakvo danas po stoji u Jugoslaviji, prvenstveno u cinjenici da je ono ograniceno na nivo preduzeca. Investicije se neracionalno alociraju, u sadasnjoj situaciji samoupravljanje i planiranje protivurece jedno dru gome, negira se princip socijalisticke raspodele a javlja se tendencija pojave grupne svojine. Kao rezultat ovoga dolazi do glorifikacije l a i s s e r f a i r e pristupa. Misic predlaze da strukturu samoupravljanja treba dograditi i dopuniti prema gore. On veruje da procesi integracije, o kojima je bilo reci u Glavi 8, nisu dovoljno brzi niti sasvim adekvatni. Misic se, zalaze za jedan integralni si stem samoupravljanja u kome bi se formirala koordinaciona samoupravna tela kako po granama privrede tako i regionalno. Clanstvo u ovim udruzenjima bilo bi obavezno [7]. Misicev sistem podseca na sistem visih poslovnih udruzenja koji je postojao u vreme dvogodisnjeg prelaznog perioda od 1951 1952. god. Nekoliko godina nakon uvodenja sistema samou pravljanja ujugoslovensku praksu, aiitor ovog rada je predlagao nesto drugaciji prilaz. Temeljito proucavanje ekonomike naftne privrede ukazalo je na to da se veoma malo moze postici putem konkurencije, dok se veoma mnogo dobija uz pomoc jedne koordinirane politike koja bi se zasnivala na nezavisnom i kompetentnom istrazivackom radu. Ja sam tada predlagao da pojedine privredne grupacije koje imaju slicna obelezja osnuju.zajednicke ali nezavisne ekonomsko-tehnoloske naucnoistrazivacke institute. Ovi instituti bi pripremali alternativna resenja prilikom donosenja glavnih odluka u ekonomskoj politici. Predstavnici preduzeca bi tada putem neke vrste samoupravnog mehanizma izabrali najprihvatIjiviju altemativu, koja bi mogla biti nesto modificirana u toku procesa. Ovi instituti za industrijska istrazivanja mogli bi da posluze i kao institucije za planiranje razvoja i kao takve bi sara119

divale sa regionalnim zavodima za drustveno planiranje. [8, Glava 24]. Samoupravljanje u preduzecima predstavlja samo jedan elemenat u mtegrisanom sistemu drustvenog samoupravljanja. E. Pu sic istice da takav jedan sistem ima tri osnovne komponerite: teritorijalnu (institucija vlasti na razlicitim nivoima), fimkcionalnu (preduzeca i institucije, tj. radne organizacije), i drustvenu (kultume, verske, i druge vrste povezivanja pojedinaca). Pusic je najvise zainteresovan za ovu prvu komponentu. Prema tome Pusic je prvi medu jugoslovenskim autorima koji sistematski proucava pro blem odumiranja drzave sto se izvan Jugoslavije smatra utopijom. Drzava odumire onda kada na mesto vladanja osobama dolazi upravljanje stvarima. Engels je preuzeo ovu cuvenu recenicu od Saint-Simona. Saint Simon je kao i mnogi njegovi savremenici smatrao da je uprava iskljucivo instrument vlasti a da je inace bez znacaja za zivot jedne nacije. Marks i Engels su se slagali sa prvim delom ove izjave, ali su javnu upravu smatrali veoma znacajnom. Kasnije nailazimo na poznati dualitet javna uprava nije vise iskljucivo instrument moci vec joj se poveravaju i razne drustveno neophodne aktivnosti. Obrazovanje, zdravstvena zastita, socijalno osiguranje itd. u osnovi se razlikuju od odbrane, policije i zakonodavstva. Monopol fizicke moci moze ponekad da bude koristan, ali je potpuno nepotreban kada se radi o drustvenim sluzbama. U socijalizmu javna uprava bez drzavne prinudrie vlasti postaje aktuelno pitanje. Drugim recima, sistematsko planiranje i koordinacija drustvenih sluzbi ne preduslovljava vise postojanje jednog komandnog centra kakva je politicka vlast [9]. Interesne zajednice i kvari trziste, o kojima je bilo reci u odeljku 6: b predstavljaju jedan od pokusaja u tom pravcu. Samoupavljanje nije iskljucivo ekonomska pojava. Ekonomisti se, kao sto je sasvim prirodno, prvenstveno interesuju za eko nomske aspekte, dok naucni radnici koji se bave drugim drustve nim naukama istrazuju i druge dimenzije samoupravljanja. Lj. Ta dic, politikolog, istice da se jugoslovenski samoupravni socijalizam ispoljava pretezno u ekonomiji. On se potvrdio iskljucivo na mikro nivou, bez odgovarajuceg odjeka na makro planu globalnog drustva [10, str. 55]. S. Stojanovic, filozof, smatra da bez brze politicke demokratizacije nije moguce konstituisanje samouprav ljanja na visim nivoima drustvene organizacije [10, str. 34]. R. Supek, sociolog, objasnjava da politicki pluralizam ne znaci visepartijski sistem koji moze da bude birokratski. U samoupravnim okvirima politicki pluralizam znaci direktnu kontrolu razlicitih centara moci. Ostaje otvoren problem na koji nacin se to moze postici. Supek ocekuje da ce se u pocetku pojavljivati jedna forma dualisticke vlasti, a to znaci neka kombinacija klasicne reprezentativne demokratfje i samouprave. Ocigledno je da samoupravljanje ne predstavlja jedan pot puno dovrsen sistem. Mnoga pitanja ostaju i dalje otvorena, mnogi problemi nereseni. Jugoslovenska drustvena laboratorija ce morati jos neko vreme i ubuduce da aktivno dejstvuje. 120

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G L A 'V A

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u s v e tu ,*

57. V. M a jc h sn e r I n te rv a lu ta r n i k u r s i cene,- >*-Ekonomski anali, 3/1956., 186204. 58. M. F rk o v ic , D isp a rite t sp o ljn o trg o v in sk ih k u r s e v a u nagoj p r iv re d i,* Ekonom ist, 1957., 7997. 59. I n s titu t za sp o ljn u trg o v in u , Analiza devizne refo rm e iz 1961. B e o g rad , 1964. 60. D. A n ak io v sk i, Foreign T ra d e in th e Y u g o slav R e fo rm ,* Y ugoslav Survey, 3/1969., 7184. 61. A. D o m an d zic, "-Customs T a rif f ,-* Y ugoslav Survey, 24/1966, 348588. 62. S av e z n a s k u p s tin a , D evizni i sp oljn otrg ovin s k i rezim . B eo g rad , 1966. 63.. O. K ovafi, U zroci i posljed ice stru k tu rne neravnoteze u platnom bilansu Jugoslavije. S a p iro g ra fira n a s tu d ija I n s titu ta e k n n o m s k ih n a u k a . B e o g rad , 1966. 64. I. F a b in c , >*Uloga c a r in s k e p o litik e u z e m lja m a u ra z v o ju ,* M edunarodni p ro b le m if 4/1963., 2739. 65. I. F a b in c , E le m e n ti p ro g ra m a za tite ju g o sla v e n sk e p r iv re d e ,* Ekonom ist, 1968., 4160. 66. U. D ujgin, D eterm inante iz b o ra iz m e d u fik sn o g i fle k sib iln o g k u rsa kod n a s ,*
Ekonom ist, 1968., 59298.

67. A. C ifiin-Sain, -Fiksni ili fle k s ib iln i k u r s e v i, Ekonom ist, 1968., 64248. 68. A .' C ifiin-Sain, D evizni rezim i k on vertib iln os t dinara. Z ag reb , 1967. 69. A. C i6 in -5 a in , P ro b le m i k o n v e rtib iln o s ti in a r a ,* Ekonom ist, 1968. 79102. d 70. 2 . M rk u sic, Spoljnoekonom ska p olitik a T receg svijeta. R u k o p is. 71. L j. M ad zar, -Jedna e m p ir ijs k a a n a liz a s ta b iln o s ti s p o ljn o trg o v in sk ih to k o v a ,* E ko nomist, 1968., 58087. 72. G. M acesich , Yugoslavia. The T h eory and P ra ctice o f D evelopm ent Planning. C h a rlo tte sv ille , 1946. 73. 2 . M rkugic, P ro b le m i p r iia g o d a v a n ja 13341. d ev izn o g k u r s a ,
Ekonom ska misao,

1969.,

74. 2 . M rkuSic, N ek a p ita n ja n a a lte m a tiv u : p r ila g o d a v a n je dev izn o g k u r s a d ire k tn a k o n tr o la ,* Ekonom ist, 1967., 89102. 75. V. R aSkovic, DruStveno sam oupravljanje B e o g rad , 1967.
i raspodela prem a radu u Jugoslaviji.

76. B. S efer^ E konom ski ra zvoj Jugoslavije i privredna reform a . B e o g rad , 1969. 77. F . C e rn e, TrziSte i c ijene. Z a g re b , 1966. G L A V A V 1. F in a n s ijs k i in s titu t, F inan sijski sistem F N R J Jugoslavije, B e o g rad , 2. M. V ufikovic, T he R e c e n t D e v e lo p m e n t of th e M oney Y u g o sla v ia ,* Journal o f P o litica l Econom y. 1963., 36377. and 1949. S y stem od

B a n k in g

3. M. V uCkovic, Preduzece i k r e d i t * , Ekonom ski anali, 1956., 16685.

127

4. R. M. S tev an o v ic, N ovca n i i k red itn i sistem. B e o g rad , 1954. 5. M. VuCkovic, K red itn i sistem u F N R J. B e o g rad , 1957. 6. E. N euberger,- " C e n tra liz a tio n v s. D e c e n tra liz a tio n : T h e C ase of Y u g o sla v B a n k in g ,* A m e rica n Slavic and East Europian Review, 1959., 36173.7. J . P o k o rn , R azvoj naeg f in a n s ijs k o g siste m a ,
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8. N. M iljan ic e t al., K red itn i i fina nsijski sistem u ju g o s la v iji. B e o g rad , 1956. 9. E. N e u b e rg e r, T h e R ole of C e n tra l B a n k in g u n d e r V a rio u s E co n o m ic S y ste m s, C. J . F ried rich ', S. E. H a rris , ecfs., P u b lic P olicy , Cam bridge, * 1958, s tr. 22754. 10. B . JelCic, -Poreski in s tru m e n t! k a o in s tr u m e n t e k o n o m s k e p o litik e ,* Ekonom ist, 1967., 5063. 11. V. H o ljev ac, K ireditno-m onetarni p rob lem i.' S a p ir o g ra f ira n a m o n o g ra fija u E k o n o m sk o m in s titu tu . Z ag reb , 1967.12. M. G o lija n in , C red it a n d M oney C o n tro l, Y ugoslav Survey, 1967.^ 93104. 13. I. P eriS in, >*-Stabilizacija i m o n e ta m o -k r e d itn a 14. N. M iljan ic, -R eguliranje m o n e ta rn o g danas, 910/1966; p o litik a , Ekonom ist, 1967., 103120. u SFR Ju g o s la v iji*, ' U niverzitet v o lu m eria

15. R. V u k san o v id , ^ C re d it a n d M oney, Yugoslav Survey, 1966., 346174. 16. P . B a s a ra b a , ^C h a n g e s in th e O rg a n iz a tio n a n d M a n a g e m e n t' of B ariks, Yugoslav surw ey, 4/1967., 7781. 17. N. M iljan ic, N ovae i kredit. Z a g re b , 1964. 18. B. M ijovic; Novdana i kreditna p olitik a . B e o g ra d , 1967. 19. F . V asic, ^-In v estm ent in th e P o st-W a r Period**, Yugoslav' Survey, 15/1963., 2153172. 20. M. T rk lja , Kam ata na fondove u p riv red i. S a p ir o g ra f ira n r a d u E k o n o m sk o m in s ti tu tu . Z a g re b , 1968. 21. E. N e u b e rg e r, T he Y u g o sla v In v e s tm e n t A u c tio n s *, Q uarterly Journal o f Econom ics, 1959., 8fr115. 22. B . Jo v a n o v ic , R eform o f th e C re d it a n d B a n k in g S y s te m * , Y u g o sla v Survey, ' 22/1965, 3216236. 23. D. V o jn ic, *Investiciona p o litik a i sistem p ro S iren e re p ro d u k c ije * , u A k tu e ln i p rob lem i ekonom ske p olitik e Jugoslavije 1969/1970. Z a g re b , 1969, s tr . 7592. 24. B. H o rv a t, Jugoslavensfci sis te m 's a m o u p ra v lja n ja in uvoz tu je g a k a p ita la * , Ekonom ska re v ija f 1967., 40517. 25. N a ro d n a b a n k a Ju g o sla v ije , NovGano-kreditna p olitik a i stabilnost diTiara. S a p iro g ra fira n o . B e o g rad , 1965. 26. D. D im itri jev ic, *-The U se o f F lo w -o f-F u n d s A cc o u n ts in Y u g o sla v ia *, Review o f In com e and W ealth, 1968., 101116. 27. M. C irovic, N ovae i kredit. B e o g rad , 1966. 28. M. V uC kovic; D o sa d a sn ja 121140. 29. N. M iljan o v ic, 1956., 1224. P rilo g in fla c io n a k r e ta n ja u M o n e ta ry P la n n in g in

J u g o s la v iji* , no v ca*,

Ekonom ist,

1967.,

iz u c a v a n ju

p ro b le m a tik e

E konom ski

pregled,

30. A. B a jt, -Izvori in fla c ije u ra z d o b lju p o sle re fo r m e * , Ekonom ist, 1967., 14146. 31. V. H o lje v a c ; K red itn o m o n eta m t p ro b le m i 19601967. S a p ir o g ra f ira n a u E k o n o m sk o m in s titu tu . Z a g re b , 1967. m o n o g ra fija

32. I. P erig in , A n tiin fla to rn a p o litik a Ju g o s la v ije p o slije r e fo r m e *, E konom ski pregled, 1969., 497530. 33. I. P eriS in , M onetarno-kreditna p olitik a. Z a g re b , 1968. 34. D. D im itrije v ic , T h e F in a n c ia l S tru c tu r e in a C h a n g in g E conom y: Y u g o s la v ia *, F lorid a State U n iversity Slavic Papers, 1968., 122. th e C ase of

35. D. M. M ilosevic, N eposredni p orezi S rb ije i K ra lje v in e Srba, H rvata i Slovenaca. B e o g rad , 1925. 36. M. M a tejic, Javne finansije. B e o g rad , 1958. 37. A. P e ri6 , FiTiansijska te o rija i p olitik a . B e o g rad , 1964. 38. R. R ad o v an o v id , ^ B u d g e ta ry 1962., 111122. S y ste m and B u d g e t E x p e n d itu r e * , Y ugoslav Survey
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39. T. T ism a, Jcvne finansije, Z ag reb , 1964. 40. S. M. M ilato v ic, P oresk i sistem. B e o g rad , 1967. 41. B. JelCic, P ro b le m i druStvenih fina ncija (p rih o d a ). S a p iro g ra fira n r a d u E kon o m sk o m in s titu tu . Z ag reb , 1967. 42. R. R ad o v an o v ic, P ores k i sistem F N R J. B e o g ra d , 1953. 43. S. P e jo v ic h , '>-Taxes a n d P a tte r n of E co n o m ic G ro w th : th e Case of Y u g o sla v ia*, Cahiers de VlSEA , 1964., 22735. 44. M. H an ze k o v ic , P ro b le m i druStvenih fin a n cija . . S a p iro g ra fira n r a d u E k o n o m sk o m in s titu tu . Z a g re b , 1967. 45. B . L a z a re v ic , Turnover T a x * , Y ugoslav Survey 1965., 331120. 46. B. JelCic, Ekonom ski udinci oporezivanja prom eta proizvoda. S a p iro g ra fira n ra d u E k o n o m sk o m in s titu tu . Z a g re b , 1967. 47. T. K a n e v sk i, Fundam entalnost i ra zvojn e sm ernice n ovog sistema finansiranja dru~ Stveno-politidkih zajednica. B e o g rad , 1968. 48. K. B ogoev, Lokalne finansije. B e o g rad , 1964. 49. R. R a d o v an o v ic, B u d 2e t u to k u p ro te k lih d e s e t g o d in a *, u Rdzvoj p rivrede FN RJ. B e o g rad , 1956, s tr . 44351. 50. S. T u rC in o v ic, " F in a n c in g S o cio -P o litical U n its * , Y ugoslav Survey, 1968., 5974. 51. P . S ic h e rl e t al., TzuGavanje problem a dopunskih sredstava republikam a na tra jn ijo j o snovi. S a p ir o g ra f ira n a s tu d ija I n s titu ta e k o n o m s k ih n a u k a . B e o g ra d , 1968. 52. B . Iv an o v ic, Prim en a m etoda 1-odstupanja u p rob lem im a odredivanja ekonomske razvijenosti. In s titu t e k o n o m s k ih n au k a^ s e p a ra t b r. 13., B e o g rad , 1964. 53. P . S ich erl, A n aliza n e k ih e le m e n a ta za o ce n u s te p e n a ra z v ije n o sti re p u b lik a i pok r a j i n a * , Ekonom ska analiza, 1969., 528. 54. J . B o rd ev ic, Sistem lokalne sam ouprave u Jugosla viji. B e ograd, 1957. 55. D. M ilivojevic, The Y ugoslav Com m une. B e o g rad , 1965. 56. J . B u ricid , >*-L.ocal C o m m u n itie s*, Y ugosla v Survey, 1965, 3287300. 57. D. M iljkovld, K o m u n a i d ru g tv e n a r e p o d u k c ija * u Priv re d n i sistem i ekonom ska p olitik a Jugoslavije. B e o g ra d , 1961. 58. J . DaviCo, P riv re d n i p ro b le m i k o m u n e * , Ekonom ist, 34/1954, 18595; d isk u s ija , s tr. 195208. 59. R. Radovanovi<5; O porezivanje dohotka p riv red n ih poduzeca. B e o g rad , 1956. 60. K . B ogoev, -Opti p rik a z fisk a ln o g sis te m a i f is k a ln e p o litik e J u g o s la v ije *, XJniverzitet danas, 910/1966., 14963. 61. K. B ogoev, S fa b iliza cio n a f is k a ln a p o litik a * , Ekonom ist, 1967., 128. 62. M. H a n ie k o v ic , ^D je lo v a n je p o re z n e i m o n e ta m o -k r e d itn e p o litik e n a sta b iliz a c iju ju g o slo v e n s k e p r iv re d e * , Ekonom ist, 1967., 2949. 63. B. S o5kic, R a st p ro iz v o d n je i z a p o s le n o sti i m e re e k o n o m sk e p o litik e *, Ekonom ist, 1969., 14355. 64. M. P e tro v ic , F orm ira n je prihoda dru&tveno-politiGkih zajednica u SR S rb iji i n jihova raspodela izm edu repu blike, p ok ra jin a i o p&tina. B e o g rad , 1968. 65. M. K o 5ir The K ra n j Com m une. B e o g ra d , 1966. 66. B. JelCic, >*-Poreska i b u d ie ts k a p o litik a * , Jugoslavije 1969/1970. Z a g re b , 1969.
A k tu e ln i prob lem i ekonom ske p o litik e

67. B. SoSkic, P o v e c a n je z a p o s le n o sti u n a e m s is te m u trzig n e p r iv re d e * , Ekonom ska misao, 1969., 7992. 68. A. B a jt, ^Y u g o sla v E co n o m ic R e fo rm s, in M o n e ta ry and P ro d u c tio n M e c h a n ism *,
Econom ics o f Planning, 1967., 20118.

69. A. p a p ic , ^-In v estm en t f i n a n c i n g 1969., 20831.

Y u g o s la v ia *, Annals o f C ollective Econom y,

70. J . B o rd e v ic , >*The C o m m u n a l S y ste m in Y u g o s la v ia *, Annals o f C ollective Econom y, 1959. i 169207. 71. E. P u sic , Sam oupravljanje. Z a g re b , 1968.

129

GLAVA

VI

1. P . S w eezy , >*The T ra n s itio n fro m S o cialism to C apitalism ?** M on th ly Review, 1964., 56990. 2. J . B o rd e v ic , -A C o n trib u tio n to th e T h e o ry o f S o cial P ro p e rty -, Socialist Th ough t and Pra ctice, 24/1966., 73110. 3. M . M a rk o v ic, S o cijalizam i sa m o u p ra v l'ja n je , S m isoo i p ersp e ctive soc ijalizm a. Z a g re b , 1965, s tr . 547L 4. B . H o rv a t, -S ocijalistika ro b n a p ro iz v o d n ja , GlediSta, 1968., 132130. 5. V. B a k a ric , A k tu e ln i p ro b le m i izgradnje naSeg p rivred n og sistema. Z ag reb , 1963. 6. I. M a k sim o v ic, -R azm iljanje o n e k im te o re ts k im i id e jn im p ita n jim a ro b n e pro izv o d n je p o v o d o m naSeg p riv re d n o g sistema*-', E konom ist , 20926. 7. D. MiSic, -Sistem in te g ra ln o g s a m o u p ra v lja n ja u ju g o sla v e n sk o j p riv re d i , Ekonom ist, 1965. 289312. 8. B. H o rv a t, E konom ika jugoslovenske naftne p rivrede. B e o g rad , 1962. 9. E. P u sic , Sam oupravljanje. Z a g re b , 1968. 10. S im p o zij ju g o slovensko-cehoslovafckih filo so fa, >-S avrem eni tr e n u t a k socijaIizm a,
F ilosofija , 2/1969., 198.

130

REGISTAR AUTORA

Anakioski D. 75, 76 A vra m o vic D. 72, 74, 77 B a jt A . 25, 29, 33, 38, 51, 63, 65, 66, 96 Bakaric V. 22, 119 B aletic Z. 25, 29 B egovic V. 28n. Bicanic R. 17. 17n, 18, 22, 23, 24, 34, 35, 69 B jelogrlic D. 34, 35 B ogoev K . 109, 114, 115, 116 Bolcic S. 44, 49 Cehovin D. 74 Cerne F. 18, 19,; 59, 65 Cicin-Sain A . 76, 77, 78 . Cobeljic N. 22, 29, 33, 34, 35, 38 C irovic M. 96 DabCevic S. 29, 59 D avico J. 113 D avidovic R. 22 D im itrijevic D. 86, 90 D irlam J. 47, 64 Domar E. 48 Dragicevifi A . 13 D rutter I. 47 DubravCic D. 48 Dujsin U. 77 Dzeba K . 24 Dordevic J. 50, 113, 117 Duricic J. 112 Ekonomski institut 25, 26, 78 Engels F. 12, 120 Zagreb 23,

Fabinc I. 76, 77 Fab ri Z. 13 F rk ovic M . 73

Gams A . 50 Gorupic D. 43, 44, 65 Guzina V. 72

H anzekovic M. 106, 107, 110, 115 H oljevac V. 85, 97, 98 H orva t B. 18, 19, 24, 25, 36, 38, 51, 63, 66, 119 Institut ekonomskih nauka, Beo grad 23, 25, 26, 32, 33, 35, 44. 96, 97 Institut za finansije, Beograd 81,

100
Ivan ovic B. 110 Jankovic N . 60 Jelcic B. 100, 115 Jurkovic P. 66 K a rd elj E. 15, 20, 21 KidriS B. 12, 13, 27, 58, 59 K n igh t F. H . 48 K on evsk i T. 107, 110 K ovafi O. 77 K ovafi P . 13 K orac M. 35, 59, 63, 64 K ra igh er S. 12 Lavrac I. 19, 65 L en jin V. I. 13 Lem an Gudrun 42, 43, 49 L o vcevic J. 102

131

Macesich G. 77 Macura M. 22 M aksim ovic I. 18, 59, 119 M andel E. 19 M arkovic M. 117 Marschak T. 32 Marshall A. 48 M a rx K . 2, 66, 111, 118 Meichsner V. 73 M esaric M. 35, 59 M ihailovic K . 22, 35 M ihailovic P. 69 M ilic R. 13 M iliv o je v ic D. I l l , 120 M iljan ic N. 87, 96 M ijo vic B. 87 M il je vie B. 13 M iljk o vic D. 112 Misic D. 119 Mrkusic 2. 74, 76, 77, 78 N euberger E. 83, 92, 93 N ovak M. 13 Obradovic S. 69 Pasifi N. 13 P e jo v ic S. 50 Perisin I. 65, 89, 97, 99 Pertot V. 69 Fjanic Z. 59 Pokorn J. 83 Pop ov S ofija 63 Popovic M. 17n, 29, 70, 71 Popovic S. 65 Pusic E. 112

R adovanovic R. 101, 109 Radulovic M. 59 R ajkovic M. 26 Rakic V. 59 Raskovic V. 51, 63 Rostow W. 34 Saint-Sim on C. H. 120 Sam ardzija M. 35, 65 Schumpeter J. A. 14, 48 Sicherl P. 110 Sirotkovic J. 29, 35, 59 Stanovnik J. 27, 38 Stojanovic R. 29, 38 Stojanovic S. 14, 120 Supek R. 120 S w eezy P. 117 S efer B. 64 Soskic B. 116 Stajner R. 35 Tadic L j. 120 T ito J. Broz 14 T odorovic M. 58, 59 Torom an M ari j a 51 U valic R. 12, 18, 19, 22 V idakovic Vlaskalic V ojn ic D. Vuckovic Z. 16 T. 59 95 M. 84, 85, 96

W achtel H. 47, 49, 60, 63 W ard B. 19, 42, 48 2upanov J. 44, 49

1 32

vod za privredno planiranje s grupom naucnih radnika 1958. god. osnovao je Odeljenje za ekonomska istrazivanja i metodologiju plani ranja. Iz Odeljenja se 1963. god. razvio Jugoslovenski institut za ekonomska istrazivanja i zatim Instutut ekonomskih nauka, ko jim, kao direktor, B. Horvat rukovodi i danas. U 1962. god. izabran je za profesora Beogradskog univerziteta, a od 1963. god. kao profesor ekonomije predaje na Postdiplomskoj skoli Instituta i povremeno na Zagrebackom i Ljubljanskom univerzitetu. U 1964/1965. kao stipendist Fordove fondacije B. Horvat boi'avio je na Harvardskom univerzitetu, M as sachusetts institute of technology i, u 1968. god. predavao je na Miphiganskom univerzitetu, a u 1970. god. na Floridskom univerzitetu i A m erickom univerzitetu u Vasingtonu. Pozivan je kao predavac na mnogim drugim sveucilistima: u nasoj zemlji, u Austriji, Bugarskoj, Cehoslovackoj, Engleskoj, Finskoj, Italiji, Kanadi, Kubi, Nizozemskoj, Nemackoj, Poljskoj, SAD i Svedskoj. B. Horvat bio je clan Ekonomskog saveta, a sada je clan Komiteta za trziste i cene Saveznog izvrsnog veca. Ucestvovao je u delegacijama jugoslovenskih planera u Poljskoj i Sovjetskom Savezu. Vodlo je jugoslovensku delegaciju da prvom zasedanju Ujedinjenih nacija za industrijski razvoj. B. Horvat je clan vise domacih i medunarodnih strucnih udruzenja i, povremeno, njihovih uprava. Urednik je casopisa E K O N O M S K A A N A L I Z A i clan urednistva casopisa E U R O P E A N ECONOM IC REVIEW . Dosada je objavio vise od sto pedeset clanaka u domacim i stranim naucnim casopisima, kao i petnaest knjiga. Cetiri knjige i niz clanaka prevedeni su na ceski, engleski, francuski, madarski, nemacki, ruski slovacki, spanjolski i talijanski jezik. Profesionalni interes: Privredno planiranje i politicka ekonomija socijalizma.

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V. V. N o v o z h il o v ( L e n in P rize L a u r e a t e ) " . . . T h e p u b l is h e r s ( o f t h e R u s s ia n e d i t i o n ; c o r r e c t l y n o te t h a t th. ti o n o f t h is b o o k is an o u t s t a n d i n g e v e n t in e c o n o m i c s .. T h e q u e s t i o n s w h i c h N o v o z h il o v a n a ly z e s is v e ry w id e , i n c l u d i n g ti b e t w e e n i n v e s t m e n t v a ria n ts , t h e ra te o f in te re s t, t h e o p t i m a l life e q u i p m e n t , a n d p r i c e f o r m a t i o n ... T h is is a f u n d a m e n t a l w o rk im p o rta n c e ." M i c h a e l E llm a n . S O V IE T S T U D IE S

Plan and M arket Under Socialism

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. . .

this is an im po rta nt study in p o litic a l econom y.

J a n M. M ic h a l. T H E A M E R I C A N E C O N O M IC R

T h e a u t h o r , w h o w a s fo r m e r l y t h e D e p u t y P r e m i e r o f C z e c h o s lo v a k a r c h i t e c t of th e C z e c h o s l o v a k e c o n o m i c r e f o r m , a n a ly z e s th e reasi' th e c r i s is o f th e C z e c h o s l o v a k e c o n o m y a n d a r g u e s t h e c a s e fo r com*, th e m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m w ith c e n t r a l p l a n n i n g . A b o o k o f h i s t o r i c im p o i in C z e c h o s l o v a k i a 's s t r u g g le to w a r d lib e r a liz a t io n a n d in t h e d e v e l o p o f e c o n o m i c t h e o r y in E a s te rn E u ro p e .

IOS

In ternation al Arts and S c ie n c e s P ress, Inc. 901 N orth B roadw ay. W h ite Plains. N e w Y o rk 10603

265

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W i N L

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B r a ik o m

BUSINESS CYCLES lay YUGOSLAVIA

Translated by Helen M. K ram er

International Arts and Sciences Press, Inc., White Plains, N.Y.

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O rigin ally published as P riv re d n i cik lu s i u Ju go slavia by Institut ekonom skih nauka, B elg rade, 1969 Library of C ongress C atalog C ard N u m b e r LC 72-105 544 "B1971 by International Arts and S cien ces Press, Inc. 901 North B roadw ay, W hite P lains, N ew Y ork 10603 All rights reserved P rinted in the U nited S tates o f A m e ric a

C O N TEN TS
Preface to the American Edition Preface to the Yugoslav Edition Chapter 1. Fluctuations in Production and the Quantitative Effects of Those Fluc tuations in Yugoslavia Chapter 2. Summary Review of Empirical Research on Business Cycles, in the World Chapter 3. Inherent Instability of the Economy 3.1. A Yugoslav Model of Inventory Fluctuations 3.2. Cumulative Random Disturbances as a Source of Cyclical Fluctuations 3.3. Autoregression Model, Linear Oscillator, and Servomechanism as P ossible Models Chapter 4. Methodological Foundation for Empirical Research on Cyclical Fluctuations of the Yugoslav Economy 4.1. Introductory Considerations 4.2. Characteristics of the Model Selected Chapter 5. Cyclical Fluctuations of Production and Investment 5.1. Cycles of Industrial Production 5.2. Measured C haracteristics of Business Cycles 5.3. Investment Cycles Chapter 6. Agricultural Cycles and the Influence of Agriculture Chapter 7. Regional Cycles Chapter 8. Regularities in the Trend of Labor Productivity Chapter 9. Inventory Cycles vii ix

1 8 17 17 20 23

30 30 34 43 43 48 61 67 73 80 91

9.1. Some Characteristics of Inventory Formation in the Yugoslav Economy 9.2. Cycles of Components of Industrial Inventories 9.3. Cycles of Total Industrial Inventories Chapter 10. Monetary-Credit Factors and P rices 10.1. Fluctuations in the Aggregate Values of Industry and the Economy as a Whole 10.2. The Volume of Transactions, Money, and Indebtedness 10.3. P rice Movements Chapter 11. Cycles of Exports and Imports and the Influence of International Trade 11.1. Introductory Theoretical Considerations 11.2. B asic Empirical Findings 11.3. Intermediate Goods Imports and Other Questions Chapter 12. Administrative Cycles and the Influence of Administrative Interventions 12.1. Cycles of Legal Regulation 12.2. Institutional Content of Business Cycles 12.3. Frequency of Legal Regulations and the Rate of Economic Growth Chapter 13. International Comparisons Chapter 14. Long Cycles 14.1. 14.2. 14.3. 14.4. Correlogram Periodogram Autoregression Scheme Moving Averages

91 96 107 119 119 131 136 152 152 155 166 170 170 178 187 193 206 206 210 215 220 227 237 242 243 245 247

Chapter 15. Conclusions: The Mechanism of Move ments in the Yugoslav Economy Mathemati cal Appendix Glossary Tables Graphs Index

TO AMERICAN EDITION

PREFACE

It is well known that capitalist or market economies are un stable and that they have been plagued by business cycles. It has been widely held that socialist or planned economies are stable, or at least are not subject to cyclical fluctuations. If there are no business cycles, there is no sense in studying them, which is why business cycles have not been studied in socialist economies. If the rate of growth is high, say around 9-10% a year, cyclical fluctuations, even if they exist, do not matter very much. But when the rate of growth is retarded, as happened in Yugoslavia after 1960, instability becom es a serious economic problem. Research undertaken at the Institute of Economic Studies showed that there were very strong system atic components in the fluctuations of the Yugoslav economy. The study of these compo nents led to research on business cycles in a so cia list economy. In a rapidly growing economy like that of Yugoslavia, cycles man ifest them selves in system atic changes in the rates of growth. And the institutional framework workers' management is r e sponsible for certain novel features of business cycles not found elsewhere. I might add that this is the first comprehensive study of busi ness cycles in a so cia list economy.
BRANKO HORVAT

Belgrade, April 1971

vii

PREFACE
TO YUGOSLAV EDITION

The relatively great instability of the Yugoslav economy and the intensification of instability from 1960 on stimulated the Yugo slav Institute of Economic Studies to undertake an examination of this phenomenon in its research program. It appeared that in a certain sense society had begun to lose control over economic movements, and it was necessary to examine the causes. There were indications that in our economy, in spite of planning, there were business cycles, which are considered characteristic only of capitalist econom ies. It was necessary to determine whether this was true and, if cycles did indeed exist, to find out how the cyclical mechanism functioned. All these questions were obvious ly of more than academic significance: they were exceptionally urgent from a practical political point of view. Long-term policy for stabilization and growth can be scientifically substantiated and efficient only if it is known beforehand how, in fact, a de centralized market economy of the Yugoslav type functions. The task of this study is to increase our knowledge in that area and thus to contribute to a solution of the serious and complicated problems with which our economic policy is today confronted. The study was begun as early as 1965. After several months of research, the funds of the Institute were exhausted, and a ll at tempts to interest federal governmental and economic agencies in the work and in offering financial support were unsuccessful. This being the case, the initial results of the research were p re pared for publication (Ekonomist, 1966, Nos. 1-4; Economic Science and the National Economy [ Ekonomska nauka i narodna
ix

privreda], Zagreb, Naprijed), but further work was interrupted for an indefinite period. At the beginning of 1967, the Economic Chamber of Belgrade became interested in the work of the Insti tute. An agreement was reached on long-term arrangements for mutual collaboration, within the framework of which the entire investigation of business cycles in Yugoslavia was assured and financed. Thus it became possible to finish this study and present it for the use of our economy and the scientific community. The interruption of the work and the postponement of its com pletion have resulted in a certain lack of statistical uniformity in the text. In the majority of cases the latest available data for 1966 or 1967 are included in the tables, graphs, and analyses. However, in a certain number of ca ses, when it was a question of complicat ed and expensive calculations whose revision would not only in crease the cost of the work but delay completion of the research, I have retained the calculations from the first phase of the study. This is why the data used som etim es do not go beyond 1964 or 196 5. The relatively rapid completion of the work, which demanded numerous special investigations, construction and reconstruction of statistical s e r ie s, and complicated statistical calculations, was made possible by the exceptional collaboration I have had at the Institute. The chapter on inventories is based on Ljubomir MadSar's comprehensive research; the chapter on regional cycles, on Marta B azlers research. The last two sections of the mathemat ical appendix and the calculations in connection with it were p re pared by M. Bogdanovic. My assistants Zvonimir Marovic and Milena Jovicic prepared the bulk of the statistical material; and statistical calculations were performed by the Institute's sta tisti cians, Mirosinka Dinkic and Nada Brakus. D. Jaric prepared a ll the graphs in the text. T. Rakic did a ll the calculations at the In stitute's Electronic Calculating Center. The resu lts of individual phases of the research were discussed by the research staff of the Institute, and those discussions resulted in many improvements in the original version of the text. If, despite the conscientious and high-quality work of my collaborators and the critical comments of other m embers of the Institute, there are s till unnecessary gaps and erroneous conclusions in the completed text, the responsibil ity for these inadequacies naturally can be solely mine.
BRANKO HORVAT

Belgrade, January 1968 x

B U S if U E S S C Y C L E S
Ify Y U G O S L A V IA

Chapter 1 FLUCTUATIONS IN PRODUCTION AND THE QUANTITATIVE EFFECTS OF THOSE FLUCTUATIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA

A quarter of a century has already passed since the Liberation. That is a sufficiently long period for definite regularities in eco nomic development and the functioning of the economic system to manifest them selves. One of the facts with which one is im m edi ately confronted is the frequent changes in general business orga nization. In this connection, one gets the im pression that the econ omy is in a state of som e kind of chronic instability. Is this an ob jective consequence of building and perfecting a new economic system , or is there something that until now has been neither known nor perceived? To what degree has economic policy in particular situations been adequate? Could economic develop ment and, along with it, the rate of raising the standard of living objectively have been even faster? The task of this study is to ex amine the feasibility of answering these and sim ilar questions, to make possible the perception of som e basic characteristics of the functioning of our economic mechanism, and thus to contribute to its further development. Everyone who u ses the publications of the Federal Statistical Bureau or simply reads the daily p ress knows that in certain years the Yugoslav economy grows rapidly, while in others it grows slowly or not at all. Fluctuations are therefore evident. These fluctuations are considered in government offices and po litical forums and even in professional circles as something that life itself entails and that essentially cannot be rectified. They are regarded alm ost in the sam e manner as are fluctuations in the harvest, conditioned by hazards of the weather. Moreover,
1

the quantitative effects of these fluctuations are unknown and un derestimated. (1) In fact, if these effects were not significant, this entire study would have only an academic character. For this reason, quantification of the production lo st through econom ic fluctuations represents a convenient introduction to and s o cial justification for the investigation that follows. Insofar as an enterprise for som e reason does not utilize its capacity, production is le s s than it might be and, correspondingly, the income of the collective is also le s s . Accordingly, the cost of unutilized capacity can be measured by the amount of lo st income. A sim ilar calculation can also be applied to the economy as a whole. In so doing it is necessary to exclude agricultural produc tion, since it depends to a great extent on weather conditions. We shall make use of Federal Statistical Bureau data for the social product (excluding agriculture) in constant 1960 prices for the pe riod 1952-1965. We shall extend that se r ie s to 1966 and 1967 with the aid of the index of nonagricultural physical production (indus try, including mining and electric power, forestry, and construc tion) for 1966 and the fir st seven months of 1967. Unfortunately, the Federal Statistical Bureau still has not calculated quarterly figures for the social product; and so we must use annual data, which make a more p recise periodic profile of the cycles im pos sible. The calculated resu lts are shown in Graph 1.1, which we shall subject to a short analysis. The lower solid line shows the trend of the social product, while the higher indicates the potential trend; the difference b e tween them represents the lo sse s due to retarded growth of pro duction. These lo sse s consist of two parts: lo s s e s due to the un even trend of production, and lo s s e s due to retardation in growth. This is what is in question. When, in the course of the cycle, the line of the rate of growth turns downward, the path of achieved social product exhibits con vexity to the right. It can be seen that the troughs of the cycles were reached in 1953, 1956, 1962, and 1967. If we connect the peaks of the cycles by straight lin es, we obtain a continuous line, with the shaded area A lying between it and the broken line rep re senting achieved social product. The shaded area A represents the social product lo st because of the uneven trend of production. Because of the production lo st through su ccessiv e retardation, the average rate of growth was also reduced. By how much? That, naturally, we do not know exactly; but we can calculate it on

the basis of several assumptions. We shall assum e that the p o ssi ble rates of growth are somewhere in the middle between the av erage rate of growth in the course of the cycles and the rate of growth in the phases of the cyclical upturns. That means, in other words, that we are assum ing that the high rate of growth in the phase of cyclical upturn only partially reflects the long-run d evel opmental possibilities of the economy, and that the remaining part is the result of unutilized capacity and accumulated inventories. Thus, for example, for the cycle 1957-1960, the average rate of growth amounted to 11.6%, and the rate of growth in the upturn phase (1958-1960), to 12.5%; then we use as the possible rate of 11.6 + 12.5 n, grow th--------------- = 12.1 /o. Final results of these calculations di are presented in Table 1.1. Table 1.1 Social Product Lost Due to Business Cycles (1960 p rices, in billions of old dinars) 1952-60 1960-64 1964-67 1952-67 L osses due to uneven growth L osses due to retardation Total lo st social product Achieved social product L osses as % of achieved social product 246 761 1,007 13,316 7.6% 625 1,711 2,336 10,998 21.2% 1,376 3,830 5,206 10,384 50.2% 2,247 6,302 8,549 34,698 24.6%

The more developed the economy, the more complicated and thus more sen sitive it is to every disturbance. Moreover, the sam e percentage lo s s e s mean an ever-greater total of lost pro duction, and the lo s s e s due to retardation are accumulated from period to period. Insofar as all these factors are not taken su ffi ciently into account, the lo sse s can attain surprising amounts. Thus, it is shown on the graph that the period 1952-1960 passed on to the succeeding period a difference between actual and potential social product of 214 billion dinars. By the end of 1964 that differ ence increased to 659 billion dinars, and with that deficit the r e form was begun. The deficit multiplied in the course of the r e 3

form, so that for the la st three years the lost social product amounted to half the achieved social product. And that is p recisely the m easure of retardation and stagnation that we wished to e s tablish. We can now take one further step in the analysis. It is obvious that fluctuations in the economy cannot be completely eliminated. Therefore, part of the established lo sse s could not be avoided. Which part? It is probably indisputable that the management of the economy in the period 1952-1960 was not ideal. If, therefore, we take the proportion of lo s s e s from that period (7.6%) as the un avoidable minimum, then the difference of 42.6% for the la st three years surely is not an exaggerated figure for the lo ss that could have been avoided if from 1960 on an adequate economic policy had been followed. When the lo ss of 4,420 billion dinars thus ob tained is valued at 1966 prices by u se of the index of wholesale prices (for lack of better data) which, according to data of the Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia [Statisticki Godisnjak S .F .R .J.], for 1967 gives a valorization factor of 1.63 we obtain an amount of 7,200 billion dinars. The economic meaning of those m asses of resources is seen from the following few illustrations. The social product of the Yugoslav economy (excluding agricul ture) amounted to 7,200 billion dinars in 1966. Accordingly, the entire production of the country for one year was lost. Total ex penditures for education, science, and culture amounted to 453 billion dinars in 1965. A comparison of these funds with the lost social product leads to the conclusion that all the pressing mate rial problems in the above-mentioned areas could have been solved, and that significant amounts would still have remained for other needs. It is known that we have already struggled with the housing problem for a quarter of a century. Total housing and communal investment in 1966 amounted to 444 billion dinars. This means that with the above-mentioned funds even the housing problem could have been eliminated. A lso, several hundred thousand new workers could have been employed, thereby liquidating the current ly recorded unemployment. These exam ples, naturally, do not im ply the conclusion that these are the only things that must be done. They m erely demonstrate in a concrete way the huge potential economic power hidden in higher rates of growth. It is obvious from the calculations in Table 1.1 that the e s ti mated siz e of lo s s e s depends to a great extent on the assumptions on which the estim ate is based. A sm all change in the assumptions
4

Billion dinars

Graph 1.1

Achieved and Potential Social Product (Excluding Agriculture, at 1960 Prices)

can change the absolute amounts significantly. For this reason the amounts cited must be treated as the order of magnitude, not as p recise data. Similar calculations of lo sse s are made in other market econ om ies, and it will undoubtedly be of interest for us to cite just one of those calculations. Thus, the Woytinskys estimated that in the United States in the period 1947-1958, approximately $413 billion were lost (almost half a trillion old dinars), of which $113 billion represent the direct lo ss and $300 billion are related to the lo ss due to retarded growth. (2) It is interesting that the ratio, of the first to the second lo ss is sim ilar to the ratio in our calculation (27:73 for the USA, 26:74 for Yugoslavia). It is very important to notice that the lo sse s due to retarded growth are two-and-a-half tim es greater than the lo sse s due to uneven growth, which are, in fact, the only ones directly observable. The Woytinskys made their calculations on the assumption that the production growth achieved in the last year before the down ward turn of the cycle could be maintained. They therefore extrap olated that growth until it came again to a cyclical upturn, and from that point on, the line of potential product is parallel to the line of actual production. If this method of estimation is adopted, then the extrapolation of production from the last year before the peak of the cycle can be made in two ways: by extrapolation of the absolute growth of production, or by extrapolation of the rate of growth. In an economy of relatively slow growth, such as the U.S. economy, there is no great difference between the two variants; in fact, the Woytinskys accepted the first, more elementary v a ri ant. In a rapidly growing economy, such as that of Yugoslavia, the difference can be very great. In that case the first variant repre sents a fairly conservative calculation. Its interpretation is as follows: even if the economy cannot attain the sam e relative growth, it can increase production in the future by at lea st as much as the absolute increase in production in the preceding year. When the lo sse s of the Yugoslav economy are thus calculated for the above-mentioned three periods 1952-1960, 1960-1964, and 1964-1967 they amount to 941, 1,560, and 4,025 billion old d i nars in all, 6,526. The total is 23% le s s than that in the table. The actual difference is , in fact, sm aller because we reduced the figures from the table by 7.6%, leaving a final difference of about 15%, which for calculations of this type is a more than sa tisfa c tory result. Accordingly, we might say that in the period 19526

1967 the Yugoslav economy, because of uneven growth and depar ture from the average line of economic expansion, lost somewhere between 6,500 and 7,500 billion dinars, at 1960 prices. Of this sum, 61% was lost in the last three years (1964-1967). The calculations presented depend upon the assumptions made. What is the meaning of those assumptions? Are they scientifically founded? Are they justified? Or did the Woytinskys, I, and other economists who carry out sim ilar calculations play around with statistical data and arithm etic? N eedless to say, the justification for the assumptions does not derive from them, but from the the ory on which they are based. That theory may or may not be in harmony with reality. Consequently, the task of this investigation is to introduce a certain order into the statistically recorded con fusion of economic movements, not just to describe those m ove ments, but to explain them theoretically in a consistent way. Time and again in this introduction we have used expressions such as "cyclical movements," "turning of the cycle," and the like, that, strictly speaking, now only represent still unproved hypoth eses. All that is seen directly in Graph 1.1 are certain deviations of production from som e trend. There is not even a trace of som e regular cyclical fluctuations. If they do exist, it is necessary only to reveal them. We shall proceed in the usual way by acquainting ourselves first with all relevant sim ilar discoveries in other coun trie s and by other econom ists. Then, treating the economy as one complex system , we shall attempt, on the basis of general knowl edge, to determine the stability characteristics of that system . Thus prepared, we will be able to enter into an empirical analysis of economic trends in Yugoslavia. Notes 1) For this reason, when the fir st quantification of these effects was published (B. Horvat, "Cijena usporenog rasta," Vjesnik u s r ijedu, November 8, 1967), the effect on the public was one of com plete shock, as may be seen from the reaction of part of the press and the statements of certain individuals in som e political bodies. 2) W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, Lessons of the R ecessions, Wash ington, D. C., Public Affairs Institute, 1959, p. 9.

Chapter 2 SUMMARY REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE WORLD

Business cycles have been studied since Marx's tim e. In fact, periodic c r ise s of overproduction are considered one of the basic characteristics of the capitalist method of production. In this con nection, it has long been observed that there is more than one type of business cy cle. There are several of them: som e are general, som e sectoral; they develop simultaneously and are superimposed one on the other, thus creating the irregular periodicity of general economic movements. Schumpeter proposed a tricyclical scheme: long cycles with waves of 54-60 years' duration, intermediate cy cles of 9-10 years' duration, and short cycles of 40 months' dura tion. (1) These cycles were named for the econom ists who first described them the terminology later also entering into the lit erature and were linked so that the short cycles would be in cluded in the longer: the long cycle (Kondratiev) contains six inter mediate (Juglar) cycles; and these, in turn, each contain three short (Kitchin) cycles. Statistical research later revealed the ex istence of 20-year cy cles, which were usually associated with a long-term swing in housing construction. Then there were also found to be shorter housing and construction cycles. An entire s e ries of cycles of the cobweb type was established in agricul ture: cycles of hogs and cattle, a coffee cycle, etc. It is necessary briefly to examine the em pirical base of all these cycles, for the knowledge gained will be useful to us in interpreting our own cycles. Kondratiev. Director of the Business Cycles Institute in Mos cow, Nikolai Kondratiev, at the beginning of the 1920s, investigated statistical se r ie s of prices, rates of interest, deposits, wages, im
8

ports, exports, and production and consumption of coal and iron in France, England, the United States, and Germany for the period 1789-1921. Kondratiev divided the annual data by the number of in habitants, eliminated the trend, and smoothed deviations from the trend by u se of nine-year moving averages, so that intermediate and short cycles and random deviations would be eliminated. As a result of this procedure, there appeared long waves in economic activity of about half a century's duration. (2) Kondratiev gave these data for his three cycles: Cycle I: Cycle II: Cycle HE: r ise from 1780-1790 to 1810-1817 fan from 1810-1817 to 1844-1851 r ise from 1844-1851 to 1860-1875 fall from 1870-1875 to 1890-1896 r ise from 1890-1896 to 1914-1920 fall from 1914-1920

Schumpeter, within the framework of his noted theory of innova tions, attempted to give an entirely economically determined in terpretation of these long waves of economic activity. Whereas Kondratiev m easures the waves from trough to trough, Schumpeter m easures them at the beginning of the prosperity phases. In his view, the first wave includes the period 1783-1842 and reflects the Industrial Revolution. The second wave, 1842-1897, represents an era of steel and steam and, particularly, of railroad building in the world. For the third wave, which begins with 1897, the appli cation of electric power, the development of chem istry, and the u se of automobiles are characteristic. Long cycles remain a sub ject of discussion in the learned literature. For our present r e search they are, naturally, not directly relevant; but it is n e c e s sary to bear them in mind, for they represent a definite fram e work for the analysis that follows. Juglar. In earlier discussions of business cycles, the cycles normally thought of were of 7-11 years' duration. These are the cla ssic ten-year cycles which manifested them selves throughout the entire nineteenth century, particularly in England, and whose duration Marx compared with the average lifetim e of equipment in industry. (3) A century ago the form er m edical doctor Clement Juglar first described these periodic economic fluctuations s y s tem atically, analyzing statistical se r ie s of prices, rates of in ter est, and balances of the central bank. (4) If we m easure the length 9

of the cycle from peak to peak, then there were in England during Marx's lifetim e that is, in the period 1820-1870 five cycles with c r ise s, which means that the average duration of the cycles was ten years. That periodicity continued in the succeeding p eri od, 1870-1914, when the next four cycles lasted nine, seven, ten, and seven years. And, finally, another two cycles with cr ise s ap peared in the period 1920-1938. (5) Accordingly, in a period of more than a century, England experienced crise s at intervals of about ten years. This, however, does not hold for other countries. In the United States in the period 1854-1938, there was one cycle longer than six years. (6) And even the English data have been subjected by Matthews to a reinterpretation for the period after 1870. (7) Today there is a growing conviction among econom ists that it is n ecessary to stipulate as intermediate cycles those with a duration of about twenty years. Kitchin. Following World War I, the English statistician Joseph Kitchin analyzed se r ie s of bank clearings, p rices, and rates of in terest in the USA and England for the period 1890-1922 and d is covered short cycles of three-and-a-half years' (40 months') du ration. Kitchin considered these cycles psychologically condi tioned. (8) Later it was established that these short cycles arose from the accumulation and depletion of inventories. In five interwar cycles in the USA, accumulating inventories absorbed 23% of the average expansion; in three postwar contractions, depletion of inventories accounted for 50-100% of the decrease in social prod uct. (9) And whereas ten-year cycles are characteristic of the English economy, th ree- or four-year cycles prevail in the United States. In the period 1854-1961 in the USA, there were 26 cycles, of which 17, or two-thirds of the total number, were three or four years in length. (10) In the period 1854-1958 the duration of such cycles varied between 27 and 99 months, with an average of 50 months, of which 30 months fell within the expansion and 20 months within the contraction. After World War n the expansive phase was prolonged by one-third, and the contractions were shortened by 42%, so that the rate of growth of the U.S. economy markedly increased. These cycles have been em pirically investigated very system atically. Thus, it has been established that som e economic se r ie s always come first in the phase (changes in inventories, 10 months; bankruptcies, 7; starts in housing construction, 6; equip ment orders, 5; net profits, 2; etc.), som e are simultaneous (per sonal income, unemployment, wholesale p rices, etc.), and som e
10

lag behind changes in social product (investment expenditures on equipment, 1 month; consumer credit, 4.5; interest rates on bank credits, 5. (11) This information is useful in forecasting upswings. Where amplitude is concerned, it is known that production and con sumption of durable consumer and producer goods fluctuate s ig nificantly m ore than production of reproduction m aterials* and serv ices, and inventories fluctuate most. Wholesale prices vary more than retail prices; prices of raw m aterials, much more than p rices of sem ifinished and finished products. Industrial produc tion fluctuates considerably more than the social product. (12) F i nally, imports narrowly accommodate them selves to the business cycle, but exports do not. (13) Yugoslavia's four-year cycles are sim ilar in timing to the U.S. cycles, but their conditioning is , as we shall see, different. Fur ther, the psychological stages of which Kitchin spoke also are not d ecisive. However, one should not ignore them completely. In view of the sequence of changes in our public life, the im pression a rises that every three or four years there is a buildup of impatience and dissatisfaction with existing conditions; the belief a rises that som e thing must be changed, various political bodies begin to carry out a reorganization, and individuals begin to change their places of employment. (14) If this im pression is accurate, the respective phenomena represent a subject for study by sociologists or politi cal scien tists. Our research w ill bring us to the conclusion that a certain combination of exports and imports that has very accentu ated cyclical behavior and great amplitudes plays the d ecisive role in Yugoslav cycles. Whether the Yugoslav economy also has cycles with a duration of more than four years, and what their natures are, cannot be established with certainty, for a period of two d e cades is too short for em pirical analysis. There are certain indi cations. The quickening of growth in the decade 1952-1960 and the subsequent slowing down can develop into a 16-year or longer cy cle if stabilization is achieved at the price of reducing the rate of growth. The acceleration of agricultural production before 1960 and the slowing down after that year, and the slowing down of in dustrial exports before 1961 and the acceleration after 1961, also point to longer cycles; but at this moment it is im possible to p re*"Reproduction m aterials" consist of resources consumed in cur rent production, e.g ., raw m aterials, fuel, grease, energy, packag ing Translator.
11

diet their duration. The waves of total gross investment also ap pear longer: one trough occurred in 1955-1956, and a second in 1965-1966, which points to ten-year periodicity. Construction cy cles. Twenty-year cycles were discovered first in construction, above a ll in housing construction in the USA, En gland, Germany, Sweden, and Canada. (15) The amplitudes of those cycles are fairly great. They are explained by the well-known r e lationship between total and marginal volumes: a slight percentage change of the total volume leads to enormous percentage changes of the marginal volume. Total housing space is a function, other things being equal, of total population; but housing construction is a function of the growth of population. (16) Accordingly, if in the course of tim e the growth rate of the urban population increases from 1% to 2% annually, housing construction in the cities must in crease by 100%. The length of the cycle is explained by the slow ness of population changes and the durability of buildings. It is a l so stated that in capitalist countries it is chiefly sm all contractors who carry on construction activity. When supply exceeds demand, they abandon their work with difficulty, the disequilibrium is in creased, and the cr isis is prolonged and aggravated. Later, when demand begins to grow rapidly, the shortage of skilled labor (which in construction is apprenticed a relatively long tim e) and the sm all scale of construction enterprises (which are not in a position to in v est more capital and quickly expand the volume of production) pre vent rapid adjustment of production to expenditures. For the period 1862-1933 in the USA, Gordon cites four construction cycles that, mea sured from trough to trough, lasted 15 to 22 years. (17) Fromwhathas been said it appears probable that there w ill also be short cycles in con struction. Dauten cites, for the period 1879-1933 in the USA, an average length of 59 months in 11 construction cycles. (18) Guttentag established four housing cycles of 31-35 months' duration for the postwar period in the USA (1948-1959). These cycles were conditioned, in the first place, by the volume of mortgage credit, i. e ., by the available funds for financing. As Graph 5.2 shows, the Yugoslav construction cycle is linked to the industrial cycle. It has a much greater amplitude, while be ing conditioned by available funds. As for the long construction cycle, it cannot normally develop while there is a chronic lack of housing space. Twenty-year cycle. After the 20-year construction cycle was estab lished, sim ilar periodicity was discovered in other serie s as well. Abramovitz adduces that the rate of growth of production in the United States in the period 1814-1938/39 passed through cycles of 15-20 years'
12

duration. Similar cycles were also noticed in prices, the growth of pop ulation, and movements of people and capital. (19) These cycles are linked with the construction cycles. Matthews noticed that great crise s of general economic activity occur at 20-year intervals and correspond to the troughs of the construction cycles. (20) It is important to observe that the 20-year American and 10-year English cycles differ from short cycles in the intensity of the contraction that we call the crisis. The troughs of these c rise s correspond to the troughs of the construction cycles. R. A. Easterlin (21) w rites that research on the 20-year cycle shows: that one of the mechanisms responsible for long swings in economic growth may involve interactions among aggre gate demand, labor-m arket conditions, and household growth, with a feedback effect from the last to the first. An upswing in the growth of aggregate demand and the growing labor-m arket tightness induced thereby engen ders accelerated m arriage, migration, and household growth. These are critical decision-points in the life cyjj, cle, entailing spending commitments extending over se v 7 eral years as a new home is established and a family ' started or se ttle d .. . . A bunching of such commitments serves to cushion the economy against the usual business cycle and becom es exhausted only gradually. Agricultural cy cles. These cycles are of a somewhat different nature than the others. T h eyarisefrom the factthatthe process of production is relatively long and the volume and costs of production depend on weather conditions. If the price of soybeans is low this year, farm ers w ill reduce the area under soybeans and sow something else. The next year, supply w ill be le ss than demand, the price w ill in crease, and the production decisions will be changed. Such twoyear cycles are characteristic of one-year crops. In the produc tion of hogs and in cattle-breeding generally, the process of pro duction is prolonged by the tim e necessary for the production of fodder. Since 1900, U.S. hog cycles have lasted an average of five years; for cattle they are somewhat longer and le s s regular. With crops such as coffee, more years are necessary for maturation. "Coffee cycles" last, on the average, 15 years. (22) However, the cycles, or at lea st cyclical components, can be longer even for one-year crops because of clim atic fluctuations and other causes. The well-known Beveridge periodogram of the index of grain prices in Western Europe through three centuries shows the
13

strongest intensity for the cyclical component with a period of 1 5 1 /4 years. (23) I do not know whether such cycles have been studied in the Yugoslav economy. In this study they are not included for, if they exist, they have only secondary significance in relation to the great fluctuations in agricultural production as a whole. The various cycles established point to the possibility that an economy is inherently unstable, i.e ., that an economy is an inher ently unstable system . It is of interest to examine whether such an assumption is accurate. Notes 1) J. A. Schumpeter, "The Analysis of Economic Change," R e view of Economics and Statistics, 1935, No. 4, pp. 2-10; Business Cycles: A Theoretical, H istorical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist P rocess (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939). 2) The hypothesis was put forward in 1919-1921, was published for the first tim e in a study in Moscow in 1922, and finally was discussed in an article, "Boljsie cykly konjuriktury," Voprosy konjunktury, 1952, No. 1. Since the original was not a ccessib le to me, I cite the English version, "The Long Waves in Economic Life," Review of Economics and Statistics, 1935, No. 6, pp. 105-115, and reprinted in J. J. Clark and M. Cohen, eds., B usiness Fluctuations, Growth and Economic Stabilization (New York: Random House, 1963). 3) Kapital, Vol. n (Zagreb: Kultura, 1947), p. 148. Marx's views on economic c rise s are discussed comprehensively in the study by Z. Baletida, M arksisticka teorija ekonomske krize (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1965). Marx thought of an em pirical treatment of business cy cles. Of interest in this connection is his letter to Engels of May 31, 1873, in which he says: "You are acquainted with the tables which present the zig-zag up and down movement of prices, discount rates, etc., in the course of the year, etc. I have attempted several tim es for the analysis of cr ise s to calculate these ups and downs as irregular curves and have thought (and still think that it is possible, with sufficiently refined material) of determining mathematically from that calculation the principal laws of crise s. M oore. . . maintains that in fact it is for now impracticable, and I decided to let it go for the tim e being" (Prepiska, IV, Belgrade: Kultura, p. 444). 4) C. Juglar, Les c rise s com m erciales et leur retour p^riodique
14

en France, en Angleterre et aux Etats Unis, 1860. 5) R. C. O. Matthews, The Business Cycle (Chicago: University of Chicago P re ss, 1959), pp. 216-220. 6) C. A. Dauten, Business Cycles and Forecasting (Cincinnati: Southwestern Publishing Co., 1961), p. 246. 7) Loc. cit. Matthews considers that the ten-year periodicity in the second period is accidental and that it is the result of the existence of two unsynchronized waves each approximately twice as long in dom estic and foreign investments. In the third period it is a question of structural changes. 8) J. Kitchin, "Cycles and Trends in Economic Factors," R e view of Economics and Statistics, 1923, No. 1, pp. 10-16; reprinted in Clark and Cohen, op. cit. 9) Dauten, op. cit., p. 260. 10) Ibid., p. 246. 11) Ibid., pp. 255, 373. 12) E. C. Bratt, Business Cycles and Forecasting (Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1953). 13) A. F. Burns, "Mitchell on What Happens During Business Cy cles," in Clark and Cohen, op. cit., p. 10. 14) For example, in the 14 years from 1951 to 1964, four gover nors of the National Bank of Yugoslavia were replaced, and in the Federal Economic Planning Bureau four directors; in 13 years four system s of taxation had their turn (M. Hanzekvic, "Savremena porezna politika i oporezivanje privrednih organizacija," Ekonomski pregled, 1965, No. 11-12, p. 780), reelection of directors is fixed for every four years, the electoral period for political bodies is four years, etc. 15) Matthews, op. cit., p. 98. 16) A. F. Burns, "Long Cycles in Residential Construction," in Clark and Cohen, op. cit. 17) R. A. Gordon, Business Fluctuations (New York: Harper & Row, 1952), p. 210. 18) Op. cit., p. 287. 19) M. Abramovitz, "The Nature and Significance of Kuznets Cy cles," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1961, No. 3, p. 229. However, in statistical determination of the length of long cy cles, it is right to be cautious, for some techniques of smoothing short cy cles result in long cycles even where they do not exist in the original data. See R. C. Bird e ta l., "Kuznets Cycles in Growth Rates: The Meaning," International Economic Review, 1965, No. 2, pp. 229-239.
15

20) Matthews comments: "__ the twenty-year cycle is the only system atic periodic elem ent in the annals of fluctuations in the USA besides the short inventory cycle" (op. cit., p. 212). 21) Ibid., p. 209. 22) R. A. Easterlin, "Economic-Demographic Interactions and Long Swings in Economic Growth," American Economic Review, 1966, No. 5, p. 1092. 23) Dauten, op. cit., p. 294. 24) W. H. Beveridge, "Wheat P rices and Rainfall in Western Europe," J.R.S.S. (1922). The basic results of that work are d is cussed in M. G. Kendall, The Advanced Theory of Statistics (Lon don: Griffen, 1959), pp. 423-435.

16

Chapter 3 INHERENT INSTABILITY OF THE ECONOMY

One often encounters the belief that the market can efficiently regulate the economic process. This layman's belief is , of course, entirely mistaken and dangerous. A market economy is inher ently unstable and must therefore be directed. That direction does not have to be adm inistrative in fact administrative direction is the most prim itive form of direction but in every case there must be direction if one wants to avoid cycles. What form that d i rection takes is not the subject of this study. What we wish to demonstrate here, with em pirical parameters and using the Yugo slav economy, is how cycles n ecessarily a rise in a pure market economy. Marx demonstrated the inherent instability of a market economy a long tim e ago on the basis of the proportions postulated by his reproduction models and of the capitalist institutions that n e c e s sarily destroyed the required proportions. (1) However, besides the instability one can also demonstrate the cyclical nature of a market economy and show that those cycles are not dependent up on the institutional system . This can be done in various ways. (2) I shall use one of the economic models I constructed earlier. (3) 3.1 A Yugoslav Model of Inventory Fluctuations Let us assum e that investment in fixed capital and inventories in division I of social production are determined from without and that inventories of consumer goods are formed in proportion to expected consumption. Let us also assum e that it is planned that consumption will increase from period to period by som e factor a. We w ill take the planning period as one year, which is in
17

fact an assumption of em pirical behavior, although at fir st glance it does not appear to be. Therefore, planned inventories at the end of year t will amount to Ht-haCu, (3.1)

where h is the coefficient of inventory formation (the reciprocal of the number of turnovers) and c,_, is consumption in the preced ing period. Actual inventories (Ht) will differ from those planned (H,) by as much as actual sa le s of consumer goods (Ct) differ from planned sa les (a c,_,). Accordingly, H,-ha Ct_,-(Ct- a Ct_,) (3.2)

We w ill assum e that actual consumption maintains a constant share of social product (Yt) by the action of governmental bodies: Ct = cYt It follows that the planned social product will be Y, = a Ct_, -f (h a Ct_, Ht_,) + It (3.4) (3.3)

where the expression in parentheses represents the planned in crease in inventories of consumer goods and I, is externally given investm ent expenditures. Substituting (3.2) and (3.3) into (3.4), we obtain: Y ,-c [a (1 1h) - 1J Yt_, a c (1+h) Y,_2= I, For the sake of sim plification, let 1 + h = /, Yt (ay -f-1) Yt_,+acy Yt_2= It c (3.5)

We will assum e for the sake of sim plicity that investment ex penditures expand by a factor a, it = llM' . For the solution of the difference equation of the second degree (3.5), it is important wheth er the roots of its characteristic equation are real or not. It can be shown that the necessary condition for the roots to be real is o
18

^ (az+l)1

(3.6)

In the case of rapid growth (large a) and generally large invento ries, the product a-/ is relatively large. When ay grows, the ex pression on the right side of (3.6) d ecreases. Let us take extreme - em pirical values of the param eters in a situation of rapid growth: a = l . l , Z = 1.7, from which we obtain the most favorable case for satisfying relation (3.6). It follows that c must be greater than 7 5 - L = 0.91. This is unrealistic, for when there is rapid growth,
8.2

parameter c is relatively sm all (in Yugoslavia, between 0.6 and 0.7). Accordingly, the roots of the characteristic equation are complex, and the solution of the difference equation runs
Yt = Ap cos (0t-<p) + Yoat ( 3 .7 )

which means that the social product oscillates with an amplitude of A and with the phase y . On the basis of the parameters of the Yugoslav economy, it follows that p is greater than one:
p -

Vac

> 1

which means that the oscillations in the social product are explo siv e . We may still be able to find the period of oscillation. From
n c (a -/ + ! ) 2 |/a c / 0 . 6 ( 1 , 0 3 x 1 . 3 + 1) i.4 4 9 ~ 2 ]/ 1 . 0 8 x 0 . 6 x 1 . 3 T i f "

it follows that = 0.45. According to this, the period of fluctuation amounts to

2
Tt

6,23

" T 'o S S " 14 years which is a somewhat longer period than the cla ssica l business cycle. It is worth observing how cos0 grows with the growth of X, b e cause of which period P then also in creases. It follows that larger inventories increase stability, and sm aller inventories make the economy unstable. It appears, as we shall se e later, that som e thing of this holds true for the actual Yugoslav economy. However, the model presented was not intended to be realistic. The point was only to show, from a few very sim ple economic relations that are, in addition, entirely plausible, how cycles are necessarily generated. The cycles in our case a lso appear even in the most favorable case, when investment regularly expands by som e fa c tor a . Intuition te lls us that regular expansion of investment and
19

planning of consumption are all that is necessary for a stable econ omy. But intuition in this case, as so often in econom ics, proves to be mistaken. B esides, investments can move altogether irregu larly, with their own oscillations, as in fact happens in Yugoslavia (see Graph 5.5). In that case oscillations conditioned by invento ries are superimposed on oscillations caused by investment. Inso far as the periods of oscillation are sim ilar (and graphs 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, and 5.5 show that they are identical), there appears, as in physical system s, a resonance effect, i.e ., greater and greater de viations. And in every case, the instability of the economy in creases in the absence of control. 3.2 Cumulative Random Disturbances as a Source of Cyclical Fluctuations What we have just established is not a ll we know today about the performance of economic sy stem s. It would therefore be useful to consider the problem from still one more, at first glance very dif ferent, aspect. Forty years ago the Soviet econometrician and sta t istician E. E. Slutsky took a se r ie s of final figures from a table of Soviet lottery loans and calculated a second serie s of numbers from them by moving averages of every ten numbers. (4) When this second se r ie s was presented graphically, a picture was ob tained of the English business cycles in the period 1855-1877 such as resu lts from the indices of Dorothy Thomas from 1916. Slutsky then once more calculated ten-number moving averages from his second s e r ie s, and the new curve showed an arrangement of fluc tuation periods such as the American Mitchell found em pirically for 93 cycles of 12 different countries. These resu lts perhaps ap pear as some sort of black magic. Actually, they d isclose, re la tively sim ply, an explainable fact: that the accumulation of random disturbances leads to a cyclical process. Let us se e what is in volved. Let us take four-number moving averages, which we often use in this study. Let the original data be random numbers which means that they are mutually uncorrelated and let us designate them by x t. Instead of moving averages we shall calculate only moving sums dividing by 4 to obtain averages is not n ecessary for investigating the effects that interest us which we will d e s ignate by y- . It follows:

20

y,

x, i x,

x3

x4

y2
y3

*2 *J *4 1* ' 5
x3 X4 X; : x6

We observe immediately that the adjoining y's each have three common term s and are therefore, as distinguished from the x 's, mutually correlated. Accordingly, the moving averages (sums) are no longer random numbers, but numbers that maintain som e regularity; correlation is strongest for adjoining term s and falls toward zero with the increase in interval. In fact, the coefficients of seria l correlation are easily obtained. Without limiting the gen erality of the resu lts, let us u se E(x,) = 0, according to which E(y; ) = 0; then

E (*? )
E (Yi yi-f-k) (nk)
n k r k = -----n

a **,I

( 3 .8 )

In relation to our case in which n = 4, the seria l coefficients amount to:

r0 - l , n 1 3 r, r_, --------- r 2- r _ 2- - n 4 1 2

1 ri * r-3 ~r< r4r-4 ~ ij - r_j ... -0 4 If two quantities are mutually positively correlated, as in this case, then there is a tendency for them both to move in the sam e direction. Therefore, if y; in creases, there will be a tendency for y[--1 also to increase and sim ilarly with d ecreases. How t ever, neither increase nor d ecrease can be continued long. In the original serie s, for every x; there exists the probability of 1/2 that its value is above or below the given average (zero). The probability is 1/4 that the following term , x; + , , is found on the sam e side of the mean; the probability that the third term , x,-42, will be on the sam e side is 1/8; etc. Therefore, the probability that su ccessive term s w ill be far below or above the line rep re senting the average is very slight. And since the term s ys consist of sums of x;,, this means that in the se r ie s, y; must arrive at a re-

21

versal of direction and crossing of the line of the average. We thus come to this result: the moving sums will change, su c c e s sively departing for som e tim e from the average, then approach ing the line of the average and cutting it from tim e to tim e. Ex cept for the progress by steps and the existence of turning points and an average, these movements are rather irregular. If we express the initial differences in our serie s of moving sums as
A y . - y i y . - X j A y 2 = - y 3 y 2 = x 6 x ,

we notice that su ccessiv e initial differences do not have common term s and therefore are uncorrelated. Hence there are also the irregular fluctuations, to which we drew attention in the preced ing paragraph. If, however, we apply the procedure of moving sums also to the se r ie s y; so that z;= yi , then the initial difi-1 ferences w ill have common term s and w ill be correlated. Thus the fluctuations w ill be slightly straightened, and there w ill be a tendency for individual segm ents to appear straight. If we now ap ply, for the third tim e, the calculation of moving averages, the new se r ie s W= z-, w ill have correlated second differences as ; i=i well, and therefore segm ents of the waves w ill appear as parabol ic curves. The su ccessiv e use of moving sums is nothing other than the change of the weights of term s in the original se r ie s. As there is no reason why these weights would be equal and, m ore over, equal to one which would imply sim ple moving averages then in em pirical se r ie s we can expect correlation of higher differences and, consequently, curvilinear segm ents in the fluctu ations. If segm ents of the waves are curvilinear and there are turning points and inflections (in the vicinity of the averages), does that not mean that perhaps there is also som e tendency of the curves to be sinusoidal? This would then also imply greater regularity with regard to amplitude, phase, and periodicity. Let us consider a difference equation of the second order:
A 2 yt = - a y t+I ( 3 .9 )

22

For 0 < a < 4 the solution of the equation is sinusoidal (see the mathematical appendix). R egression coefficient a always satisfies the n ecessary conditions for E(A2 yi^yi+i) E [(yi+2 a yt4-|-i-yt)(ym-|)] (1 r) (3 10)

Applying the sam e judgment as in the preceding section, Slutsky concludes that a tendency toward sine wave movement will exist if there is negative correlation between the second differences and the term s y i + I . For example, in our case of averaged indices of industrial production for the period from the middle of 1955 to the beginning of 1965, i.e ., for the last three cycles, the corresponding coefficient of correlation r = - 0.67; this coefficient is highly s ig nificant and shows the existence of strong cyclical components, which we shall discuss below. In his models Slutsky obtained rela tively low coefficients of correlation ( - 0 .3 to a maximum of - 0 .6 ) , and concludes that it is probably an insufficient criterion, since equation (3.9) holds only for one sine curve, but actual movements can represent the sum of several sine waves of various lengths. Slutsky therefore used a difference equation of the fourth order, which represents the sum of two sine waves and gives satisfactory results. Finally, he a lso shows the conditions for obtaining a com plete sinusoidal shape. (5) 3.3 Autoregression Model, Linear Oscillator, and Servomechanism as P ossible Models Slutsky's work is rarely quoted, probably because it is rather difficult; and when it is mentioned, its unreality is emphasized fir st of all, inasmuch as it purports to represent an explanation of business cycles. (6) Slutsky's hypothesis im plies that economic movements are determined by the weighted sum of random distur bances in the course of the present and several previous periods. Such cumulative stochastic disturbances result in more or le s s regular cyclical fluctuations. In this form the theory does not have much meaning, for we know that in an economy there are both random disturbances and system atic relationships. For this reason economic movements are expressed much more realistically

23

by an autoregression model of the type

yt = f(yt_ y t_ 2, . . . y t_ n et) ( 3 .1 1 )

where y, represents present social product and et is the distur bance factor. (7) Our model, expressed by equation (3.5), also b e longs to this type, except that the stochastic element in it is not explicitly designated. It was therefore incomplete and it was n ec essary to consider Slutsky's results in more detail. In this con text it is also useful to mention an interesting study by Irma Adelman. She departs from the Klein-Goldberger model (whose equa tions by them selves do not describe cycles), superim poses stochas tic shocks on the model, and obtains a system that represents very well the cyclical fluctuations of the U.S. economy. (8) From these investigations we know that both system atic and random compo nents and their combinations show tendencies toward cyclical fluc tuation. Since we find both the first and the second component in an economy, we must conclude that an economy is inherently un stable. It will be useful to mention here still one more possible ap proach to economic fluctuations. If we adapt from physics the con cept of the spring that o scillates around som e equilibrium point, as did Joseph Schumpeter under the influence of Ragnar F risch (9), then economic equilibrium becom es a kind of attractive force that is stronger the greater the deviation from equilibrium. Schum peter determines equilibrium by the points of inflection on the curve of economic indices. It can therefore be assumed that a change in the velocity of the system 's movement from the equi librium position is inversely proportional to the distance from that position, i.e ., y " ky
( 3 .1 2 )

where y represents the deviation, for example, of social product from its equilibrium value, and k > 0 is a constant proportion. We notice immediately that it is a question of the fam iliar equation of the linear oscillator whose solution gives a sine wave. Besides the attractive force of the equilibrium position when the system d e parts from that position, there can also appear som e brakes (bot tlenecks, for example) that are proportional to the velocity of the system 's movements. The new equation
24

y" = kyry'

( 3 .1 3 )

represents the fam iliar equation of damped oscillation, in which r > 0 is the braking factor. Insofar as it is desired to avoid reg ularity with respect to phase, periodicity, and amplitude and that regularity is lacking in a real economy then the constant coefficients in our differential equations can be replaced by func tions of tim e, which in the sim plest case means
y" + f (t) y - o ( 3 .1 4 )

Finally, if the structure of the system is such that it spontaneously fluctuates by damped oscillations and after som e tim e subsides to an equilibrium orbit, it w ill, however, not reach it; oscillations will continue endlessly and will always be activated anew by ex ternal shocks that come from stochastic economic disturbances. (10) It is interesting to note the sim ilarity of equation (3.13) and (the homogeneous part) of equation (3.5). The form er is a differential equation of the second order; the latter is a difference equation of the second order. That one is a differential equation and the other is a difference equation is not a fundamental distinction, for the latter equation also can be constructed so that it is differential. The point is that economic phenomena are often discrete in their origin for example, investment expenditures this year will yield new production only next year, final income accounts [ zavrseni racuni] are calculated annually, not at every moment, etc. whereas physical phenomena are usually continuous a force acts on som e body continuously so long as it still acts. Therefore, eco nomic phenomena are often described by difference equations, and physical phenomena by differential equations. However, one e s sential difference is much more significant. When the physicist speaks of a linear oscillator he describes the phenomenon by the hypothesis that "the change in the velocity of movement of the s y s tem from the equilibrium position is inversely proportional to the distance from that position." When the economist says that "pro ducers attempt to maintain inventories in constant proportion to expected sales," he explains a phenomenon. And since in both ca ses it is a question of system s, the formal algebraic presenta tion w ill be the same. The la st described model is very clearly illustrated by Ken dall's (11) position:
25

Imagine a motorcar proceeding along a horizontal road with an irregular surface. The car is fitted with springs which perm it it to o scillate to som e extent but are de signed to damp out the oscillations as soon as the com fort of the passengers w ill permit. If the car strikes a bump or a pothole in the road the body w ill oscillate up and down for a tim e but w ill soon come to r e s t .. . . If, however, it proceeds over a continual succession of bumps, there will be continual oscillation of varying amplitude and distance between peaks. The oscillations are con tinually renewed by disturbances, though the distribu tion of the latter along the road may be quite random. The regularity of the motion is determined by the inter nal structure of the car; but the existence of the motion is determined by external im pulses. The value of this illustration is that it directly suggests a solu tion. If we wish to increase the velocity of the car and the com fort of the traveler and reduce the expenses of repair, then we can achieve relatively little by improving and constantly chang ing the springs; the basic solution lie s in constructing a smooth and durable road that rain w ill not wash out and that will not be repaired by piles of gravel. If we substitute the springs for the instruments of economic policy and the durable road for the in sti tutional conditions of business activity, then the whole example has its macroeconomic interpretation. Still another analogy is possible, this tim e with technical regu lation. The economy can be thought of as a complex system with a multitude of reciprocal links (for example, investment expendi tures influence income, and income influences investment). In fact, that is not just an analogy: the economy is , in essen ce, a large servomechanism . A servom echanism functions w ell only if a ll its parts and operations are precisely constructed so that they exactly dovetail in the functioning of the system as a whole. Inso far as that is not the case, there w ill be disturbances, vibrations, and oscillations that can be so strong as to result in a breakdown of the mechanism. In this case the system "does not oscillate b e cause of som e lagged response; it o scillates because of its own inherent dynamic contradictions." (12) Let us now conclude this part of the analysis. We approached the problem of economic stability in four different ways. These approaches do not differ in essence; they represent variations of
26

a single approach with emphasis on various aspects of the problem. The autoregression model can be understood as a special case of the model of moving averages of random disturbances. On the other hand, that model represents system atically an explanation of the linear oscillator model. The servomechanism model can be understood as a broadening of the autoregression model in an area where explicit mathematical solutions become im possible and the solution is arrived at by simulation. However, although we began that way, we always unambiguously maintained that there was no reason whatever why the economy should in itself be stable, and that there are many reasons for its instability. Therefore, o s c il latory, not equilibrium, movements must be considered the rule. The inherent instability of the economy demands very active regu lation and control by way of adequately determined economic policy and adequately formed economic institutions that act as automatic stabilizers. Notes 1) Paul Sweezy presented an interesting and sim ple form ulization of a possible Marxian approach. See Teorija kapitalistickog razvitka (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1959), pp. 198, 201-204. 2) R. C. O. Matthews (The Business Cycle, University of Chicago P re ss, 1959, Chs. m and IV) provides an elementary survey of mod els of cyclical fluctuations. The sim plest is the model of the in ter action of the multiplier and the accelerator or of the multiplier and the adjustment of fixed capital. When a lag is introduced, these models with realistic values of the parameters always result in cy cles. Nonlinear effects are achieved by the introduction of various restraints with respect to available resources, by which even usu ally exponential movements are transformed into periodic ones. Technical progress, renewal of fixed capital, and various external shocks can activate damped fluctuations which are abated, but which are otherwise inherent in the economic mechanism. 3) B. Horvat, "Dva modela efekta formiranja zaliha nakretanje drustvenog proizvoda," Ekonomski pregled, 1964, No. 7; Yugoslav Institute of Economic Studies, Tearsheet 30. 4) E. E. Slutsky, "Solzenie slucajnyh pricin kak istocnik cik liceskih procesov," Voprosy konjuktury, Vol. m , No. 1 (1927), and r e printed in Slutsky, Izbrannye trudy, USSR Academy of Sciences Publishing House, Moscow, 1960, pp. 99-132. That work was
27

entirely forgotten by econom ists until the author published it, with certain extensions, in the journal Econometrica, 1937, No. 2, pp. 105-146 ("The Summation of Random Causes as the Source of Cy clic P rocesses"). 5) Op. cit., pp. 118-19. The se r ie s which sa tisfies those condi tions represents the mth difference of the nth-fold tw o-term mov ing sums of random numbers when m and n tend to infinity and such that m /n = constant. 6) See Matthews, op. cit., p. 201. 7) However, here it is worthwhile also to observe that form ally the autoregression model represents only a special case of accu mulative random disturbances, as can be seen from the following. Let us take the difference equation of the first order
yi = a y,_, + e,

whose general solution consists of the sum of the solution of the homogeneous part and of the particular solution. For a < 1 we can ignore the solution of the homogeneous part, yn , for over a tim e it tends to zero. Therefore, after a sufficiently long period the general solution is reduced to the particular solution with the precision we desire. And the particular solution can be carried out as follows:
yi = El + a yt_, =E, + a (3,_, + ay,_2 ) = + aet_, a2 ( e , _ 2 + ay,_3 ) = et + aet_, + a2 et_2+ . . .

Accordingly, the autoregressive se r ie s is equal to the se r ie s of moving averages of random elements with definite values of the weights and an infinite number of term s. 8) L Adelman, "Business Cycles Endogenous or Stochastic?" Economic Journal, 1960, pp. 783-796. 9) J. A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 210. 10) Ragnar Frisch first worked out such a model of business cy cles in his work "Propagation Problems and Impulse Problem s in Dynamic Economics," published in Economic E ssays in Honour of Gustav C assel (London, 1939). Frisch thus explained his concep tion: "The most important feature of the free oscillations consists of the length of the cycles and the damping tendency of certain characteristic values of the system which o scilla tes, whereas the intensity (amplitude) of the fluctuations is determined fir st of all by external im pulses. An important consequence of that is that
28

more or le s s regular fluctuations can be called forth by a cause which acts irregularly" (p. 171). 11) M. G. Kendall, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, n (London: Griffen, 1959), p. 423. 12) R. M. Goodwin, "Econometrics in B usiness-C ycle Analysis," in A. Hansen, Business Cycles and National Income (New York: Norton, 1951), p. 453. See also R. G. D. Allen, Mathematical Eco nomics (London: Macmillan, 1956), Ch. 9: "Economic Regulation: Closed-Loop Control System," pp. 281-313.

29

Chapter 4 METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS OF THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY

4.1 Introductory Considerations This study is confined to the analysis of a lim ited number of stra tegic factors. Such an approach does not imply a denial of the e x is tence of other relevant factors. However, it is desirable to avoid complicating the analysis unnecessarily and to examine som e key hypotheses with a minimum number of variables. The statistical se r ie s on which the analysis is projected must satisfy the following conditions: a) the se r ie s must be sufficiently disaggregated so that individual phenomena can be p recisely located in tim e, even within a period of one year; b) seasonal components must be excluded. For the satisfaction of condition (a), annual data are insufficient ly selective but monthly data contain an excessively large random component. Therefore, quarterly data were chosen. Condition (b) is usually satisfied by the use of moving averages. However, mov ing averages, p recisely because they are averages, reduce devia tions (i.e., besides the seasonal component, they to a large extent also eliminate the random component) and thus em bellish the p ic ture of the movements. Insofar as such a picture shows regularity even without moving averages, it can only be still more regular with them. The seasonal component was therefore eliminated in such a way that in calculating the rate of growth the sam e quarters of different years are placed in relation. Furthermore, by use of moving averages the se r ie s would be shortened by two quarters at
30

the beginning and at the end of the period. In view of the fact that quarterly serie s exist only from 1952 or 1953, this would be a s e rious lo s s . The method used elim inates the lo ss. Finally, moving averages distort the oscillatory movements, which my method avoids. It w ill be useful to demonstrate immediately and formally the first and third characteristics of moving averages. We assum e that the term s of our serie s y, = fj + 2 + fa consist of three additive components, trend fi (t), oscillatory components f* (t), and random components fs (t). Let us calculate the term s of the trend by operation of the moving averages T: Ty, = Tfi + Tf* + Tfs We assum e that in this way the trend is exactly calculated, and by its subtraction from the original se r ie s we obtain the deviations that contain only an oscillatory and a random component: y. Ty, = (f. - Tf.) + (U - TU) The term s Tf* and Tfs can distort the oscillatory component and introduce nonexistent oscillations into the random component. The . latter, known as the Slutsky effect, has been examined in Section 3.2. Here we can only notice the reduction in variability of the ran dom elements through the adoption of moving averages. If the v a ri ance of random elem ents equals v, and the moving averages have n (1) Accordingly, with averages of n four term s the variance of random elements will be reduced to onefourth its original value. We assum e that the oscillatory component has a sinusoidal shape: f2(t) = sin (a +X t) then - 1 n, _ srn A 2 l 2 sin (a + X = ----- sin [a + -(n +1)X1 t) t-1 sin -i-X 2 (4.1) term s, then their variance is

(4e2)

which means that the moving average will have the sam e period and sin -Ln X phase, but its amplitude w ill be reduced by the factor 1 - _ n sin -LX Here we can notice still another effect, which is intuitively obvious and which we w ill u se in the analysis of long cycles. Namely, the
31
2

term Xf2 , i. e ., the distortion of the oscillation, w ill be sm all if n is large or if nx is a multiple of it, i.e ., the span of the moving average corresponds to the period of oscillation in fa (t) . If the oscillation is slow, i.e ., I is sm all, and if nfc is sm all, i.e ., the span of the moving average is short, then the amplitude is slightly reduced and the term f2 Tf2 therefore declines. This means that moving averages become a trend and eliminate a slow oscillation. If the span of the moving average is somewhat longer than the pe riod of oscillating, n > the factor of distortion, can have a
1

negative sign, as a result of which the oscillations will increase. (2) Consequently, moving averages can increase, decrease, or elim i nate the oscillatory component, and therefore it is desirable that they be replaced by som e other method. In studying business cycles, two methods, having several v a ria tions, are used. The fir st con sists of separating the trend from seasonally adjusted data, on the assumption that the form er has an additive (as above) or multiplicative character, and then consider ing deviations from that trend. This method has great shortcom ings. F irst of all, every interpolation is arbitrary. Second, if v a l ues for som e usual mathematical curve are interpolated, the trend must be recalculated for every extension of the tim e serie s. If mov ing averages are adopted, they produce distortions, which we d is cussed above. In an expanding economy, especially if the rate of growth is high, absolute deviations do not have much meaning. And relative deviations, because of the arbitrariness of the trend, do not directly tell us anything. Therefore, the second method of m ea suring cycles attempts to avoid the previous elimination of trend. The best-known example of this second method com es from the U.S. National Bureau of Economic R esearch, and it is useful to be acquainted with this technique. (3) The Bureau proceeds from the assumption that cycles are a constant phenomenon in a capitalist economy, that they maintain the essential characteristics of the functioning of the mechanism of that economy and that, according ly, there is no sen se in choosing only one statistical aggregate for measuring general fluctuations. Therefore, on the .basis of an anal y sis of som e 800 different statistical s e r ie s, a so-called reference cycle is determined, which represents the general fluctuation. One of the ways of determining the reference cycle is by using an in dex of diffusion. The index of diffusion shows which proportion of
32

all the se r ie s considered are se r ie s that increase (or decrease) in definite months or quarters. It shows the turning point that mo ment when, after a r ise , the index of diffusion stops increasing and when, after a fall, it stops declining and begins to rise. In that way the initial trough, the peak, and the final trough of the reference cycle are determined. The subdivision of the cycle between the initial trough and the peak is divided into three equal parts, and the sam e thing is done with respect to the subdivision between the peak and the final trough. Thus nine reference points and eight reference segm ents of the cycle are obtained. In the determination of specific cycles of individual economic se r ie s, seasonal influences are first eliminated from the em piri cal data, and then two troughs and the peak that correspond to the reference data are established. From seasonally adjusted data the average for the whole cycle, which represents the base of the cy cle, is calculated; and quarterly or monthly data are expressed as percentage deviations from that base. Peaks and troughs are d e termined on the basis of three-monthly averages of seasonally r e fined data, so that random disturbances are eliminated. Then the specific cycle, like the reference cycle, is divided into eight s e g ments. These segm ents are averaged for several cycles so that a typical cycle may be obtained for the period being studied. It is then possible to compare directly the typical specific and the typi cal reference cycles: differences in amplitude, period, and phase (lags and leads) in individual segm ents and variability of amplitude and duration of the cycles measured; and characteristic differences in retardation and acceleration in individual segm ents are estab lished. Thus system atized knowledge of the em pirical character istic s of economic movements can then be usefully employed in forecasting economic upswings. The following remarks can be made with regard to the usefulness of the Bureau's technique for our analysis. This technique elim i nates trend between cycles, but not within cycles. For the relative ly slow-growing U.S. economy and relatively short cycles, this does not lead to any analytic difficulties. However, the Yugoslav econ omy expands 2.5 tim es faster than the American, and the intracyclical trend becom es a significant factor in the analysis. It would therefore be necessary to make modifications in the technique. Furthermore, such a technique makes sen se when a larger num ber of cycles are analyzed. In our case it is a question, as we shall se e later, of four cycles in all, of which the first is entirely atypical,
33

so that a complicated technique would not lead to knowledge that was not attainable on the b asis of a sim pler method of analysis as well. And, finally, a special reference cycle does not appear n ec essary to me. Although it is true that cyclical tendencies are con stantly present in the economy about which there was som e d is cussion in the preceding chapter it is also true that planning must correct and level off these tendencies. The basic task of economic policy is the stabilization of production at a high rate of growth. Accordingly, our reference se r ie s would have to be a s e r ie s on the social product. In the absence of that serie s, and tak ing into consideration the fact that in the Yugoslav economy indus try* directly conditions the movements of a ll other economic s e c tors (except agriculture), we will use the se r ie s of industrial pro duction as representative, and the industrial cycle as the refer ence cycle. Along with the inadequacies mentioned, it is worth emphasizing also that the Bureau's method gives as the cycle the deviations from a base that is unknown beforehand. Therefore, a current forecast becom es difficult. That, as w ell as the majority of other inadequacies, can be removed if chain indices of economic move ments are used for measuring cycles. That method is used in this study. Since chain indices and the rate of growth are not the sam e and do not change equally as absolute amounts, it is necessary to examine here the characteristics of that method, especially with regard to the possibility that it results in distorting amplitude, phase, and the period of cyclical movements. 4.2 C haracteristics of the Model Selected We assum e that our economy follows som e long-run trend at a constant rate of growth (a - 1). Accordingly, the trend w ill be d e termined by the equation yt = a1 We assum e, further, that in the . short run the economy regularly o scillates about that trend along som e cosine curve, but in such a way that the amplitude of devia tions is proportional to the values of the trend at every moment, t. This is n ecessary because it is plausible to assum e that with ex pansion of the economy, the movements also increase absolutely, but not relatively as well. The factor of proportionality, k, must *Throughout this work, the term "industry" refers to manufac turing, mining, and the generation of electricity Translator.
34

be le s s than one to avoid the absurd result of a rate of growth in som e part of the cycle greater than 100%. The path by which the economy m oves is given by the equation yt = ka* cost + a* (4.3)

which in shape is identical to equation (3.7), to which we came by an entirely different route. Equation (3.7) thus represented the o s cillatory movements of the social product:
Y t= -A p* cos (0 t<p)h-Y 0 a*

Let us make the initial equilibrium product equal to one, y 0 = 1, which depends on the proper choice of the units of measurement. Then we arrange the measurement of tim e so that q = 1, q- = 0. F i nally, we introduce one assumption that can be em pirically tested, namely, that both components of the social product expand by the sam e factor p = a = a. In that case equation (3.7), which was de duced from certain assumptions about the behavior of economic subjects and of em pirical values of certain structural coefficients, is transformed into equation (4.3), which w ill serve as the sta tis tical model for the investigations in this study. y, = k a cos t -f- a1 With the em pirical values of the Yugoslav economy, yt indeed oscillates, but constantly in creases (see Graph 4.1);. We will now compare the amplitude, phase, and period of that equation with the equations that result from applying the two methods discussed above. Let us examine, first, the movement of relative deviations, , from the line of the trend:
dt y tyt ( k a 'c o s t -i-a1 a 1 ) = --------- --- -------------------------------- = k cost yt yt a'

(4.4)

The relative deviations also oscillate along a cosine curve of the sam e period and phase, but the amplitude of oscillations is natu rally le ss , and in fact equal to the factor of proportionality. The case is somewhat m ore complex when, instead of relative devia tions, we use chain indices. Since the indices represent the num ber 100 plus the rate of growth, it w ill be sim pler for us to con sider the oscillation of the rate of growth. In so doing we w ill use
35

Graph 4.1 ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATIONS OF BUSINESS CYCLES

''l

T im e t

36

* \* <<

instantaneous rates of growth, for they make possible a sim pler mathematical analysis than the usual interval rates of growth. Accordingly,
dy 1 dt y k ln a cost k sin t + lna k cost + 1 (4 .5 )

For characteristic values of t, the curve of the rate of growth a s sum es these values: 7: 3
t 0

2 lna-k

IT

--- 77 2

2k

y In order to get a conception of the order of magnitude of our con stants, we can insert the em pirical magnitudes that w ill m ost fr e quently appear in the analysis. We can use 12% annually as the average instantaneous rate of growth of industrial production, which gives lna = 0.11. One can see from the table that the high est cyclical rate of growth w ill be somewhere in the vicinity of t = n- As em pirical data show that the highest cyclical growth rate of industrial production is about 20%, that would amount to a proportionality factor of approximately k = 0.20 -0 .1 1 =0.09. On the basis of those constants, curves are drawn on Graph 4.10 The extreme curves are given by the equation
d dt . fy ' \ k (k - cos t)

Ina

Ina

lna+ k

Ina

\y /

(I

-c o s t)2

(4.6)

. cos t = k = 0,09

As cos t= -cos(n: t), that is 180- t = 84c 50. At the minimum, tm i=180 - 84'- 50= 95T 10', at the maximum, tm ' =180 + 84 50= 264 50. The sm aller the factor of proportionality, k i.e ., the sm aller the deviations from the exponential path the closer are the ex trem es to the points y (for the minimum) and (for the m axi

mum). When we insert the condition for the extreme (4.6) in the equa tion of the curve (4.5), we obtain as values of the extremes = ln a = -r=== y I'l-k* (4.7)

37

which means that the curve o scillates about ina.. As a is near one, that m e a n s a I, which represents the rate of growth. Conse quently, the curve of the rate of growth oscillates about som e av erage rate of growth, which corresponds to the rate of growth from the trend, and that is intuitively obvious. The sm aller the factor k, the closer are the extrem es to the values lna~k, i.e ., to the values given in the table above. For our value k =0.09, the corrective fa ctor is practically equal to one: | /
l

We must still ascertain at which points the curve of the rate of growth cuts the line of the average growth rate about which it o s cillates. In order to do that we subtract the values of the latter from the values of the former: k Ina cos t sint +lna k --------------------------- Ina = k cos t + 1 ksint -------1+ k cos t , . (4.8)

The expression obtained w ill be cancelled for all values for which sin t is cancelled, i.e ., for t = n x , n = 0 , 1 , 2 , ___ Now we can resum e the discussion of the characteristics of the curve of the growth rate (4.5). That curve oscillates about the av erage rate of growth given by the trend. It cuts the line of the av erage rate of growth m ore p recisely, the line = Ina in reguy lar intervals for t= it . Our curve resem bles the cosine curve shifted to ward the origin by y (see Graph 4.1); however, that shift is valid pre cisely only for zero points, but not for the extrem es. The extrem es are found at the points --At (minimum) and y * At (maximum),

which means that the interval between the extrem es is by 2At le ss than the interval between zero points, which amount to exactly That also means that individual phases of the cycle are not sym m etrical. The retardation phase (recession and depression) is somewhat pro longed, and the acceleration phase (revival and boom) is somewhat shortened in relation to a regular cosine curve. As in real life, the retardation phase is usually shorter than the acceleration; in that way a spontaneous correction is carried out in the direction of symmetry of the em pirical curve. Those "corrective" deviations are very small; in our case At= n , and besides that At- 0 when
38

factor k->0. The amplitude of the curve of the growth rate is equal to k - L - ^ k for sm all values of k, which appear in practice, which means that it is practically equal to the amplitude of r e la tive deviations. We can therefore conclude that for all practical purposes the curve of the growth rate represents the curve of r e l ative deviations from the trend shifted toward the origin by y . The shift of phases of -j- or one-fourth of the length of the cy cle in advance in relation to the remaining two cosine curves is ob vious and intuitive. The rate of growth attains its extrem es in the vicinity of the points of inflection of the original curve, and p asses through zero in the vicinity of the maximum and minimum of the original cosine curve. In em pirical work there appear further complications which w ill be discussed in the next chapter. The noncorrespondence of the phases is the price that must be paid for the other advantages of our method. But that price is not too high. In an expanding economy, changes in the rates of growth are of primary importance. One of the cycle-producing mecha nism s, the accelerator, reacts directly to changes in rates of growth, and not sim ply to absolute changes. It is necessary, how ever, to have constantly in mind the import of the phasal shift. It is only when the rate of growth just begins to fall that the devia tion upwards from the trend begins; when the rate of growth de creases through the average, the deviation scarcely attains the maximum; when the rate of growth begins to increase again, the deviation just enters the negative quadrant. Insofar as we m easure cycles of the growth rate as we will do in this study from the first inflection of the cosine curve, then to those cycles correspond cycles of relative and absolute deviations whose cosine curves are shifted so that they begin with the peak at the origin. In other words, measurement of cycles of growth rates from descending to descending inflections corresponds to measurement of cycles of deviations from peak to peak. Thus we have arrived at the problem of determining the begin ning and the end of the cycle. In physics, osciallations are m ea sured from the ascending (descending) to the ascending (descend ing) inflections. The sam e approach was adopted by Schumpeter, for whom the points of inflection represent points of economic equilibrium from which outbursts of innovative im pulses quickly push the system upward. That approach is now rare in the study
39

of business cycles. The duration of cycles is determined alm ost always by time intervals from trough to trough or from peak to peak. The advantage of such a method of measuring is that peaks and troughs can be determined mo^e p recisely than other points and that a period of duration of the cycle, so determined, is then relatively invariant in relation to later occurrences or another analytic approach. M oreover, the length of the cycle is obtained as a sim ple number of expansive and contractive phases. I did not, however, decide upon that traditional mechanical approach, for I consider that the fundamental criterion in determining the cycles must be its economic interpretation. Later it will be seen that each of five of our postwar business cycles began with som e significant economic reform . The beginnings of those reform s fall right at a tim e when the retardation part of the cycle cuts the trend line, i.e ., they fall in the vicinity of the point of inflection. Since the duration of em pirical cycles is different if they are m ea sured by troughs rather than by peaks, and those differences are som etim es rather pronounced, measurement by points of in flec tion gives som e kind of average duration and thus avoids extrem es. Determining cycles by points of inflection also em phasizes the heterogeneity of individual stages of the cycle, of which there are s ix and which we can designate as follows, according to the d evel opment of the cycle: (1) depression; (2) lower turning point or trough of the cycle; (3) revival; (4) boom; (5) upper turning point or peak of the cycle; and (6) recession. (4) The cycle begins with the depression which is contrary to the usual approach in the analysis of cycles for we determined the boundaries of the cy cle at the points of inflection of the descending segm ents. The first three stages develop below the trend, the latter three above the trend. We shall call the ascending segment the accelerative phase, and the recession and depression the retardation phase of the cycle. The revival and boom form part of the accelerative phase, and the recession and depression are part of the retarda tion phase. The peaks and troughs, i.e ., the turning points, shall be designated as separate stages of the cycle, for the reversal of economic movements represents a different phenomenon from their cumulative extension in the sam e direction and in fact rep resents a basic theoretical and practical problem in the sphere of business cycle analysis. One more remark should be made in connection with term ino logical questions. In physics, vibrations and oscillations differ;
40

oscillatory movements are vibratory and also periodic. In the analysis of tim e se r ie s the English statistician Kendall proposes that the unsystem atic components of residual fluctuations (after seasonal influences and trend are eliminated) be called stochastic movements, and the system atic components be called oscillatory; the oscillations may, but need not, also include a cyclical compo nent that is a periodic function of tim e. (5) Economic fluctuations are never strictly periodic functions, but nevertheless it is usual to call them cycles. This terminology will be used in the present study. Fluctuations mean som e kind of deviation from a uniform trend or a stationary level. Insofar as we discover in these devia tions system atic elem ents (regularity in amplitudes, definite p eri odicity) we shall speak of cy cles. We can u se fluctuations and o s cillations as alternative term s. One additional introductory remark is necessary in connection with statistical se r ie s. Our sta tistics, unfortunately, do not elab orate quarterly se r ie s of the social product, as is the practice in more advanced statistical serv ices. Quarterly indices are calcu lated of movements of industrial production and the sum of produc tion of industry, forestry and construction (so-called production excluding agriculture). E arlier research in the Yugoslav Institute of Economic Studies showed that in the Yugoslav economy m ove ments of all economic sectors (except agriculture) are narrowly correlated with industrial production. (6) Therefore we can prob ably use the quarterly indices of industry and production (exclud ing agriculture) of the Federal Statistical Bureau as indicators of the quarterly movement of the social product excluding agriculture. Further difficulty in the analysis stem s from the fact that the Fed eral Statistical Bureau reports investments very incompletely. Here not only are quarterly data nonexistent, but there are no an nual data in constant p rices for investment in fixed capital or for growth of inventories. Therefore we shall have to u se the other statistical se r ie s as substitutes. Notes

2) M. G. Kendall, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, n (Lon don: Griffen, 1959), pp. 378-380. 3) See C. A. Dauten, Business Cycles and Forecasting (Cincin nati: Southwestern Publishing Co., 1961), Ch. HI, "Measurement of Economic Fluctuations." 4) The business cycle model can be ordered differently. For example, A. Spiethoff, in his well-known work of 1923, analyzes English and German cycles of the period 1822-1913 by this model: crash or depression (1 recession, 2 first revival); upswing (3 second revival, 4 boom, 5 shortage of capital); c risis. We cite the version "Business Cycles," International Economic P apers, 3 (1953), 123. 5) Op. cit., p. 370. 6) B. Horvat, Pristupna kvalifikacija globalnog modela privrednog razvoja Jugoslavije za period od 1963 do 1970 godine, SZPP, Serija B, br. 20.

42

Chapter 5 CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS OF PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT

5.1 Cycles of Industrial Production At one tim e it was imagined that in a socialist economy there would be neither commodity-money relations nor business cycles. In contrast to the form er, the latter assumption is much more justifiable, for planning ought to elim inate business cycles. How ever, study of economic movements shows that in the first twenty years of socialist construction in Yugoslavia not even the latter assumption was accurate (1): there are pronounced business cy cles which recur at regular intervals. This discovery im plies an unpleasant consequence. What is disturbing is not the denial of a fa lse assumption, but the fact that economic policy is conducted as though that assumption were accurate. In other words, those who determine economic policy are unaware that they are acting in the context of business cycles and that by their actions they are creat ing those cycles. By way of illustration, the planning and implementation of three su ccessive annual plans of industrial production in the period 19601963 can be mentioned (2): Rate of Growth Plan Achievement 12.0 7.2 12.6 7.0 10.3 15.6

1961 1962 1963

For 1961 the Federal Economic Planning Bureau essentially ex43

trapolated the earlier high rate of growth. But as retardation had already begun in the middle of 1960, which remained unnoticed, the rate of growth achieved was 40% lower. That was considered a c cidental, and for 1962 a still higher rate of growth for industry was planned. (3) However, strengthened by inadequate economic m easures, the retardation deepened and the actual rate was 45% lower. After personnel changes in the Planning Bureau, the princi ple of cautious planning was accepted, and for 1963 one of the low est rates of industrial expansion for the entire decade was fo re cast. Meanwhile, a turning point had been reached, and the b u si ness cycle entered anew into the accelerative phase, so that the planned rate was exceeded by alm ost 50%. These errors contrib uted to the abandonment of two su ccessiv e variants of the fiv eyear plan worked out in that period, and in 1965 a third variant was worked out, with the period 1960-1965 remaining without a five-year plan. (4) As still m ore serious failures to hit the planned target occurred from 1965 on, even the third su ccessiv e mediumterm plan came into question and the need appeared for serious revisions or the construction of a fourth variant. In the 16 years from 1949 to 1965 there were four industrial cy cles. Except in 1951 and 1952, and then again in 1967, the rate of growth was never negative and that is the first significant charac teristic which distinguishes Yugoslav cycles from the cla ssica l business cycles. Therefore we will not proceed in the analysis by way of study of absolute amounts, or of relative deviations, which are customary in the cla ssica l analysis of business cycles. We w ill, as was explained in the methodological survey, study changes in the rates of growth (5); instead of relations of absolute quanti ties and deviations, we shall analyze relations of growth rates. To avoid negative rates of growth, in the numerical analysis we will use indices which, as is known, represent the sum of 100 and the rate of growth. Business cycles in Yugoslavia appear as fluctuations around a rising and rather steep trend. In Graph 5.1 that trend is shown by a horizontal line that represents the average rate of growth (12.3%) for the period 1952-1965, derived from actual em pirical values for the beginning and final years of the period. Where that hori zontal line cuts the broken line of the quarterly industrial indices, the boundaries of individual cycles are determined. The begin nings of the cycles are fixed at the descending phases. The eco nomic significance of that decision w ill become clear later. B e
44

sid es the chain indices of the sam e quarters of su ccessiv e years, the annual indices and indices on the basis of moving quarterly averages are given for the sake of comparison. As can be ex pected, these latter moderate random deviations of the direct quarterly indices, and in the la st cycle give a picture of a true mathematical sine curve. It can be seen that taking either direct or average chain quarterly indices does not change the boundaries of the cycles. To avoid a mistaken interpretation it is desirable beforehand to call attention once again to the statistical content of all quarterly indices that are used in the graphs and tables of this study. These are not indices of su ccessiv e quarters (not H quarter I960. jn(jjces ^he sam e quarters of su ccesI quarter 1960 / H quarter I960, , . , , , siv e years (meaning: ^---------- Such an index: (a) excludes ). J v 6 II quarter 1959 v seasonal components, for it compares the sam e parts of the year, and (b) reflects the annual and not the quarterly growth or decline, for it refers to su ccessiv e years. In the Yugoslav economy the accelerative and retardation phases correspond to the expansion and contraction phases of cla ssica l cycles. Those phases, as well as the dates of troughs and peaks, are presented for industrial cycles in Table 5.1. The data refer to the curve of the direct indices of the sam e quarters. The fig ures in parentheses present the dates and durations of the phases on the basis of the index of moving averages of the sam e quarters. Table 5.1 Acceleration and Retardation Phases of Industrial Cycles Period Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough H/1951 1/1955 1/1956 1/1957 IH/1958 H/1960 1/1962 1/1964 IH/1967 (?) (IV/1954) (1/1956) (1/1957) (IV/1958) (1/1960) (1/1962) (IV/1963) (?) Duration in Quarters Acceleration Retardation 15 (14) 4(5) 4(4) 6 (7) 7 (5) 7 (8) 8 (7) 14
45

The figures in Table 5.1 require very careful analysis. F irst of a ll, a question mark designates my estim ate for 1951, for quarter ly data of the Federal Statistical Bureau do not exist for that year. The question mark for 1967 sim ilarly represents my forecast. Great regularity is noticeable in the duration of individual phases of the cycles except for the first cycle, which is significantly longer than the others, and the last, which shows abnormal length of the retardation. Analysis of Graph 5.1 establishes that the first cycle is not entirely homogeneous, and that it consists of two sub cycles; accordingly, a peat in the fourth quarter of 1953 and a trough in the first quarter of 1954 are interpolated. Insofar as we may thus break down that cycle, instead of an accelerative phase of 15 quarters we would obtain this picture: Duration in Quarters Acceleration Retardation Trough Peak Trough Peak n/1952 IV/1953 1/1954 1/1955 10 1 4

That picture agrees well with the one that follows from Table 5.1. However, I believe that breaking down the first cycle is not ju sti fied, and therefore that the retardation la sts one quarter altogeth er and is checked on a level which is higher than the other troughs. In addition, the curve oh the basis of moving averages shows only one sm aller jag. Accordingly, the first cycle is obviously not typ ical. Perhaps this interpretation is possible: as a result of fr e e dom from the pressure of the economic blockade, emergence from the administrative stage of centralized planning, and orientation toward hurrying the completion of projects that were started in earlier years, economic movements had such an expansive force that the disturbance at the beginning of 1954 was quickly absorbed and the expansive phase was prolonged for nearly four years, which is twice as long as in later periods. In that prolonged a c celeration, the great expansion of construction in 1952 and 1953 probably played a significant role (see Graph 5.2). What strikes one in the remaining part of Table 5.1 is the rela tively long duration and lengthening not only of the accelerative but also of the retardation phase. That indicates an inefficient and inadequate economic policy. The "boom" is insufficiently controlled,
46

and subsequently the "recession" does not respond to the stimulus of the m easures adopted, but as we shall see later, acts negative ly. In the last two full cy cles, the retardation and acceleration phases last 6-8 quarters. The entire industrial cycle, accordingly, lasted 12-16 quarters or 3-4 years, which is somewhat shorter than business cycles in other European countries. (6) Here it w ill be of interest to determine the extent to which our introductory theoretical analysis of alternative accounts of b u si ness cycles is in accord with em pirical data. In Graph 5.3 indus trial cycles are shown on the basis of chain indices and of relative deviations from the exponential trend (in both cases the data are based on moving averages). A definite phasal shift is noticeable, but it is not complete (the turning points of the chain indices p re cede by 0-3 quarters; with regular oscillations about the exponen tial path with a period of one quarter, the lead would have to be 3 ^ quarters). Much more important is a phenomenon which follows from the fact that the fluctuations do not unfold about a con stant rate of growth, as is assumed in the theoretical model. Since up to 1960 the average rate of growth increased and later decreased, the oscillations of relative deviations deviate upwards from the trend in the first subperiod and deviate downwards in the second. In that respect the oscillations of the chain indices present a more regular picture. The amplitudes of those oscillations are also greater, which reflects the greater sensitivity of this method of measuring business cycles. Generally, as follows from the gener al theory of economic growth (7), the economy reacts functionally to changes in the rate of growth, and not to absolute changes. The average annual rate of growth for the period IEI/1952-II/1965 amounts to 12.2% for the trend of values and 12.25% on the b asis of the beginning and the end of the em pirical serie s. The arithm et ic average of the rate of growth would have to be somewhat higher than the geometric average rate of growth. It is, but only in the second decimal place, and amounts to 12.28%. Accordingly, with sufficiently long se r ie s and to the extent that fluctuations are not too extreme, we can take the average of annual rates as the ap proximate trend of growth rates. If we add, moreover, that calcu lation of trend and of relative deviations from the trend is com pli cated and tim e-consum ing work, while chain indices and their a v erage are calculated directly from basic data, it follows that our method computationally is significantly sim pler and analytically
47

Graph 5.1

Industrial Cycle

more efficient. Meanwhile, even the asym m etry of the cycles of relative deviations from the trend have their significant informa tive value. It can be seen, as has already been emphasized, that before 1960 growth accelerated and later slowed down. Accord ingly, there appeared accelerative and retardation phases of a longer cycle, which la sts at lea st 15 years. Later we w ill attempt to examine more fundamentally the origin of that longer cycle. 5.2 Measured C haracteristics of Business Cycles Since agriculture still accounts for about 26% of Yugoslavia's social product, and agricultural production is subject to large variations owing to weather conditions, that factor must be elim i nated in studying business cycles. That may be done in such a way that the se r ie s of agricultural production is refined of se a 48

Industry averaged quarterly

in Yugoslavia

sonal influences. However, as quarterly data for agricultural pro duction do not exist, it is sim pler m erely to subtract agriculture and to consider movements of the economy without agriculture. As there are no quarterly data for that either, we will substitute, as was indicated, the aggregate of production of industry, forestry and construction (henceforth referred to as "IFC production"). That production, excluding agriculture, is shown in Graph 5.2. Two important facts are noticeable: (1) nearly all the troughs and peaks of industrial and IFC production coincide, and there fore the analysis carried out on the basis of Table 5.1 also holds for IFC production; (2) in relation to industrial production, the o s cillations of IFC production are more pronounced. It is of inter est to ascertain why those oscillations are greater. We establish easily that the oscillations of construction are huge, and that is p recisely why IFC production fluctuates more than industrial.
49

13 5

Consequently, construction appears as one of the significant fa c tors of instability of the Yugoslav economy. Owing to a se r ie s of unresolved problems, and above a ll those involved in financing in vestm ent and housing construction, construction fluctuates with huge amplitudes and in nearly every cycle experiences a c la s s i cal depression with negative rates of growth. Therefore, and not because of objective reasons in connection with the capacity of construction operations, labor force, or the supply of raw m ate ria ls (8), housing construction in Yugoslavia is half that in the So viet Union or Sweden and is significantly le s s than in many other European countries with much lower rates of growth. We are forced to conclude that the standard of living of our working people is unnecessarily below the productive potential of our economy. In addition, the huge fluctuations in production prevent more ef50

P roduction (in d u stry , fo r e s try , co n stru c tio n ) Ind u stry C onstruction (effective w orking hours)

in Yugoslavia

ficient organization of construction enterprises: productivity is low, quality poor, fluctuations of the labor force large, business activity erratic, and serv ic es expensive. In the present depres sion once again an enterprise that at one tim e specialized in build ing roads is building apartment houses, and an enterprise sp ecia l izing in housing construction is involved in bidding for roadwork contracts. The repercussions for production are seen in the in tensification of economic instability. It rem ains for us to present the measured characteristics of Graph 5.2 in tabular form. The boundaries of the cycles of IFC production are determined in a manner sim ilar for those of indus try: by the intersecting of the horizontal line of average growth in the period 1953-1965. The duration of the cycles of IFC production is equal to that of industrial cy cles, i.e ., 3-4 years.
51

Table 5.2 Measured C haracteristics of Production Cycles Index of Annual Growth Duration in Quarters Difference 33 40 73 18 28 69
11 10

Trough
97 **

Period Cycle I: m /l9 4 9 -m /1 9 5 5 industry production (exc. agr.)* n /1 9 4 9 - D/1955 construction Cycle II: m /1 9 5 5 - D/1958 industry production n /1 9 5 5 - 1/1958 (exc. agr.)* construction Cycle HI: industry production (exc. agr.)* construction D/1958-IV/1960 I/1958-IV/1960

24 24

130 133 149

121 122

93** 76** 103 94 60 107 107

102

11 11

129 118 117 115 119

121

10 11

Peak

13 15
20

Cycle IV: IV/1960- 1/1965 industry production (exc. agr.)* IV/1960-IV/1964 construction

17 15

104
101 88

128

40

Production excluding agriculture includes industry, construc tion and forestry. .Quarterly data do not exist, and so the indices refer to the whole of 1951. Quarterly indices would be lower. In the first three cycles there "was a significant reduction of the difference between the maximum and minimum annual growth. That means that a tendency toward economic stabilization was at

work. At the sam e tim e, the efficiency of investment was significantly improved and the rate of growth of the whole economy (excluding agriculture) increased. (9) Three conclusions are to a certain d e gree relevant to the discussion of centralization and decentraliza tion. It was shown that decentralization entails both more effi cient economic activity and a faster rate of growth, along with more stable expansion of production and, a s will be seen later, more stable prices. That positive trend underwent a reversal in the fourth cycle: the instability of the economy again began to increase, the rate of growth fell, and the increase of efficiency in investment slowed down or stopped. (10) Is this a matter of random phenomena? B e fore we attempt to answer that question we will consider in detail what happened to the rates of growth in the first four industrial cycles. Table 5.3 presents the data for analysis. Table 5.3 Rate of Growth of Industrial Production by Cycles Index of production Indices of growth moving av erages, base within cycles 1/1952=100 Cycle I: m /1949 113* 100 m /1955 163 144 Cycle D: m /1955 H/1958 Cycle m: D/1958 IV/1960 Cycle IV: IV/1960 1/1965 163 224 224 306 306 477
100

Annual rate of Duration growth of cycles within in years cycles

6

6.3% 12.3% 13.3%

1 1 . 0%

138
100

2.75 2.50 4.25

137
100

156

*An annual index on the basis of the first quarter of 1952 = 100 is used; the average for 1952 is 111. Source: Indeks, 1952-1965, monthly indices.

53

Deviations from trend III/1953-I/1955 in %

Graph 5.3

Alternative Representations of Industrial Cycles: Chain Indices and (Data on the B asis of

54

Chain indices Relative deviations from trend y = a 1,029 t

Moving A verages)

55

Chain indices

Chain indices

56

Industry Construction (effective working hours) Gross investment

Construction, and Gross Investment

57

135

/
Industrial production Machinery production j Total investment expenditures for j fixed capital / ................ Investment expenditures for fix e d 1 capital in commodityj /\ producing sectors | j ________ Construction (effective working | j ^ hours) i ------------________

130

125

120

115

110

105

100

95

90

85 Graph 5.5 Cycles of Industrial Production, Machinery Production, (Chain Indices on the B asis

Construction, and Investment Expenditures for Fixed Capital of Moving Averages)

59

In order to elim inate seasonal influences, the indices are ca l culated on the b asis of 4-quarter moving averages centered on the beginning and end of the cycle. It is notable, first of all, that pro duction within cycles increases in rather narrow intervals, b e tween 37% and 56%. That means that in the la st 15 years we had discontinuous development in segm ents of 50% increase in each. If that tendency continues, then we shall have the next cycle when current production increases by 50%. The rate of. growth will d e term ine when that happens. Longer cycles attain greater growth of production within cycles, but along with a lower rate of growth. This agrees with our general knowledge of the em pirical charac teristics of the economy, and therefore we can consider that phe nomenon to be an expression of economic laws. There is one more regularity that em erges. It is not probable that the rate of growth in the present, fifth cycle w ill be greater than that in the preceding one. Subsequent analysis w ill indicate the possibility insofar as the stabilization of the economy at a low rate of growth continues that the fifth cycle will be longer, and will have a lower rate of growth, than the fourth cycle. If that happens, and we then connect on the graph the average growth rates through the cycles with one line, we shall obtain a longer wave that may la st about 16 years or longer. What has been said is possible but not necessary. I believe that in a planned economy there cannot be erratic n ecessities and that when once a correct diagnosis is drawn up, there always exists in principle the possibility of conscious correction and control. By the sam e token it is improbable that the slowing down in the fourth cycle is the product of chance. In fact, that slowing down of the economy as a whole is still greater than is shown by the data for industry, for in the sam e period there was an abrupt deceleration of agricultural expansion. On the basis of the available informa tion, the following hypothesis may be posited: the complexity of the Yugoslav economy outgrew the framework of practical and ad m inistratively encumbered techniques that guided it. Economic theory, general economic organization, and the preparedness of the administrative apparatus appear to lag behind the needs of our economic development. Insofar as this hypothesis is correct, and we w ill have to return to it again, then it is clear that conclusions follow concerning the actions that must be taken to avoid huge eco nomic lo s s e s in the future. It is worthwhile to have in mind that the social product (excluding agriculture) now amounts to about
60

7,200 billion old dinars annually. Every lo st percent of increase of the social product represents a value of 72 billion. If the dif ference between the maximum and minimum annual growth rates in creases by 10, as is the case in the fourth cycle in relation to the third, that means that the lo s s e s in unattained production have increased by 720 billion dinars annually. In comparison with that sum, all the savings in government budgets, however desirable in the reduction of costs of administration, but not in the organi zation of cultural, educational, scientific and m edical develop ment to which, by the logic of circum stances, it is often related appear to have rather second-order significance. The main r e serves of the Yugoslav economy probably lie in another sector. (11) 5.3 Investment Cycles Investment plays a significant role in theoretical explanations of the functioning of the cyclical mechanism. Unfortunately, our statistical serv ice does not follow real investment quarterly, and does not even have reliable estim ates of investment in constant p rices for the preceding year. The available data on total annual real gross investment are juxtaposed in Graph 5.4 with the analo gous data for construction and industrial production. It is evident that the movements of gross investment and construction co rre spond w ell, and also that gross investment fluctuates with much greater amplitudes than industrial production. These findings are not surprising when one bears in mind that construction activity com prises the greater share of investment. However, as the in vestm ent and production cycles correspond, investment policy or its absence represents one of the significant factors of in stability in the Yugoslav economy. Further information on investment cycles is presented in Graph 5.5, in which investment in equipment is approximated by produc tion of machines, and investment in construction by effective work ing hours in construction. Money expenditures for investment in fixed capital are also drawn on the graph. It can be seen that the turning points of those expenditures correspond with total in vest ment and investment in machinery and construction. All indices are calculated on the basis of 4-quarter moving averages, and all the movements turn out to be rather regular. Table 5.4 gives the basic data for comparative analysis. F irst of all, it can be seen that the turning points of machinery
61

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CJ O S ^ T -(

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^ 05 C C MM

3 e g H Measured Characteristics o Cycles in Industry, Machinery Industry, and Construction f (on the basis o moving averages) f

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62

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> s a a a U 0) S D h S < m H ft H f t E-i

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T J c ti (1 )

production lag, especially at the peaks, whereas construction a c tivity corresponds with the turning points of industry. Therefore, the rather useful conclusion can be drawn that investment does not interrupt the flow of production; on the contrary, acceleration or retardation in production leads to interruption of investment a c tivity. That is a very important finding, for it shows that the usu al theory of the accelerator is not applicable to the Yugoslav econ omy. On the average, alm ost two entire quarters after retardation of industrial expansion has begun, the machinery industry further accelerates the growth of its production. Accordingly, machinery production has until now acted as a stabilizing factor, contrary to the experience of other market econom ies, where it is a marked destabilizer. That phenomenon can be explained by the chronic hunger for investment in an economy in which there is complete faith in rapid and long-term economic expansion. The synchronization of construction cycles with the others is suddenly interrupted in 1966, when an upward turning point is reached in construction long before the turning point is attained in industry or machinery production. That unexpected leap in con struction might be accidental, but we can explain it. This is one of the possible explanations. Since in all other cases the down turn in construction and industry is synchronized, the turning point of the construction path in 1966 signalled that the tim e had also arrived for the turning point in industrial production. That conclusion is strengthened by the fact that at the sam e tim e there was a sharp increase of investment expenditures for fixed capital in the economy as a whole and in the commodity-producing sector. That the turning point in industry did not arrive, however, is ex plained by som e new factors factors of economic policy which were not present in earlier cycles. Because of these factors, a year later there was again a reduction of investment expenditures. In the present phase of our research it is not yet possible to v e r ify this hypothesis. But since it is a very important question, it will be n ecessary to work it out more fundamentally later. The indices at the turning points and the line on Graph 5.5 show that industry and machinery production expand at approximately the sam e tempo, while construction develops more slowly. But construction has significantly greater amplitudes than the other two activities. Construction is, as we have already emphasized, a marked factor of instability in our economy. In the first two cy cles the amplitudes of the activities concerned were reduced, and
63

after that they increased. The instability of machinery production, whose amplitudes at first were le s s and later were greater than those of industry, especially increased. All this corresponds to the earlier observation that the acceleration of growth before 1960 was accompanied by a decrease in the instability of our economy, and that instability increased with the retardation of growth after that year. Since, as we shall later see, the instability of the econ omy is positively correlated with the rate of growth, the observed phenomenon can by no means be considered normal or regular. The hypothesis may be posited that the discontinuity in 1960 came because of changes in institutional factors or, perhaps more p recisely, because of unsatisfactory and inadequate changes in in stitutional factors. Investigation of this hypothesis is beyond the framework of this study. Therefore we shall content ourselves with an im pression that was stated earlier, and which is deduced from the following. After workers' self-m anagem ent was in sti tuted in 1950-1952, there was an exceptionally rapid economic ex pansion in the period 1952-1960 in fact, the fa stest in the world at that tim e. In those eight years total production doubled and in dustrial production alm ost tripled. If we extend the relevant p eri od another four years to 1964 then total production tripled and industrial production increased by more than four tim es. In the increase of the volume of production in that short period was com pressed several decades of earlier development. However, the institutional foundation did not develop at the rate required by the overflowing of productive power, and this led to a gap between the needs of the economy and social organization (the knowledge and preparedness of social organizations to satisfy those needs). Almost overnight we found ourselves in a relatively developed economy, but with the organization, knowledge, mentality, and habits of a backward economy. The neglect of scientific work, the unwillingness of the state apparatus to rely upon scientific r e search, and the disregard of political bodies for the creation of conditions for scientific research are som e of the reasons why the inherent possibilities of our society have not been utilized. The consequence is that the accurate prediction of economic m ove ments is rapidly reduced and the economy evades conscious social control. That is especially pronounced in industry, where devia tions from planning forecasts in the period 1961-1964 already in creased two-and-a-half tim es in relation to the period 19571960. (12) And thus we had a long-term retardation of growth
64

after 1960 and a failure of two reform s that were undertaken at the tim e precisely in order to adjust the institutional superstructure to the m aterial base. Notes 1) It is of interest to note that in this case the fir st methodolog ical doubt was expressed in a creative period of Soviet economic theory that was terminated at the end of the 1920s by the brutal repressions of Stalin. Thus, E. A. Preobrazhensky wrote in 1924 about the economic crise s in the NEP period (see Z. Baletid, M arksisticka teorija ekonomskih kriza [Zagreb: Naprijed, 1965], p. 216). However, contemporary Soviet econom ists, for example, S. Khavina, consider that business cycles in so cia list countries are a figment of bourgeois ideology, for "socialism does not know of antagonistic contradictions. Khavina then presents data on an nual growth rates of Soviet industry, from which it may be seen that before World War II the cycles were five-year periods, and after the war, from 1952 on, the tempo of industrial expansion con tinually slowed down. Instead of analysis, these data drew the com ment that it is a matter of "concrete historical conditions of eco nomic development" ("Izmisljotine o 'krizama' i 'ciklusima' u s o cialistickoj privredi," Ekonomiceskie nauki, 1967, No. 2, pp. 6567). 2) Total production is m ore difficult to forecast because of ex ternally conditioned fluctuations of agricultural production, which still accounts for m ore than one-fourth of the total social product. 3) For the economy as a whole, the highest growth of the decade was planned (16.2%), but a rate of 4.3% was attained, or three-anda-half tim es lower. See B. Horvat et a l., U zroci i karakteristike privrednih kretanja u 1961. i 1962. godine. SZPP, DAM (Belgrade, 1962), pp. 29-32. 4) It is of in terest to note that the sam e Planning Bureau at that tim e rejected the proposal of a scientific institute that it in vesti gate and analyze the implementation of plans in Yugoslavia. The Bureau explained in writing that it "considers that the study would not be able to show anything of great importance that is not a l ready known." 5) In mathematical jargon it may be said that the new phenom ena demand that instead of functions their (logarithmic) deriva tions be studied.
65

6) Postwar business cycles in ten European countries and the USA have durations extending from 16 quarters in Belgium to 21 quarters in Austria, with an arithmetic average of 18.3 quarters or 4 -1 /2 years for all eleven countries (see A. Maddison, Econom ic Growth in the West [New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1964], p. 48). 7) See "Optimalna stopa investiranja," in B. Horvat, Ekonomska teorija planske privrede (Belgrade: Kultura, 1961). 8) It is n ecessary, however, to mention that in planning there existed a system atic tendency to neglect the development of pro duction of construction m aterials. 9) This question is emphasized in the so-called "Yellow Book" (see Uzorci i karakteristike, op. cit., pp. 1-9). 10) We shall m easure the efficiency of investment by production coefficients (the social product in the course of the year in re la tion to fixed capital at the beginning of the year). The production coefficient of the economy, excluding agriculture, increased from 0.11 in 1952 to 0.18 in 1960, or by 64%. In the following three years, for which data exist, the efficiency of investment stagnated with coefficients of 0.18, 0.18, and 0.19. The data are from the study by P. Sicherl, Osnovna sredstva kao faktor privrednog rasta i planiranja, Yugoslav Institute of Economic Studies. 11) Anticipating a comparative analysis in a later chapter, here we can caution that business cycles are not specific to Yugoslavia, but appear in all so cia list countries. The Czechoslovak economist Jozef Goldmann studied economic movements in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and Hungary on the basis of annual data for the period 1950-1964, and he established industrial production and investment oscillations with a duration of 7-9 years. "Fluctuations in the rate of growth," reasoned Goldmann, "differ in principle from cyclical development in cap italism . . . the business cycle fol lows n ecessarily from the very essen ce of the capitalist system and can be reduced only by state intervention. On the other hand, fluctuations in the rate of growth are not inherent in the so cia list system , but those fluctuations occur because of insufficient knowl edge of the economic laws of socialism and inadequacies in their application." See "Fluctuations and Trend in the Rate of Econom ic Growth in Some Socialist Countries," Economics of Planning, 1964, No. 2, pp. 89-90, 94. 12) M. Ostradanin, "Analiza izvrsavanja drustvenih planova," in ternal paper of the Yugoslav Institute of Economic Studies. 66

Chapter 6 AGRICULTURAL CYCLES AND THE INFLUENCE OF AGRICULTURE

In addition to construction (and investment as a whole), agricul ture is another sector with extrem e oscillations and thus rep re sents an exceptionally serious factor of economic instability. Let us consider the measured characteristics of agricultural cycles. Table 6.1 Agricultural Cycles 1948-1964 Annual Index of Change Year______ Trough_______Peak______Difference 1950 75 1951 143 68 1952 69 1953 144 75 1954 89 1955 125 36 1956 83 1957 145 62 1958 89 131 1959 42 1960 90 1963 110 20 1965 91 1966 116 25

Cycle I Cycle n Cycle in Cycle IV Cycle V Cycle VI Cycle VH

67

Table 6.1 w ill be very interesting for astrologers and useful for the student who must remember the data: the troughs of agricul tural cycles fall in even years and the peaks in uneven years. The first five cycles were uniformly two-year cycles. In the sixth there was a great change: the length of the cycle doubled. Is that a random phenomenon? Probably not. The sixth cycle is different not only in the length of the cycle but in amplitude, which is s ig nificantly le s s . At the beginning of the period in productive years agricultural production happened to be one-and-a-half tim es great er than in bad years. However, these differences show a tendency to decrease, especially in the last two cycles. The modernization of agricultural production (contemporary technology and orienta tion toward stock-raising) probably contributed to that, at least

Graph 6.1

Agricultural and

68

partially. Moreover, the share of agriculture in national income (in current prices) fell from 35% in the first cycle to 26% in the sixth. Taking both facts into consideration, it follows that, in the future, economic policy can count on a strong factor of instability having been brought under .control. However, it is also necessary to bear in mind that the troughs of the cycles were raised le ss than the peaks were lowered, which means that there had been a retardation of the growth of agricultural production. Since in the period 1949-1965 there were six agricultural cycles and a total of four industrial cycles, they are obviously not syn chronized. Accordingly, the influence of agriculture on the indus trial cycle is neither d ecisive nor entirely sim ple. Agriculture can influence economic movements in three ways: (1) by the supply

Industry (annually) ------------ Industry, (quarterly) -------------A griculture (annually)

(1952-1965)

Industrial Cycles

of raw m aterials for other sectors; (2) by changes in the purchas ing power of farm ers; and (3) by the effect on the external balance of trade. Where the first effect is concerned, about 90% of all con signments of agricultural raw m aterials are absorbed by four in dustries: textiles, leather and footwear, food processing, and to bacco manufacturing. (1) Those four industries created about onefourth of the social product of industry in the last ten years. How ever, the textile and leather industries can also produce with im ported raw m aterials. There remain the food processing and to bacco industries, which are mainly oriented toward dom estic raw m aterials and produce about 10% of the industrial social product. Therefore, the direct influence of agricultural fluctuations on in dustry w ill be relatively sm all and they do not contribute much to the explanation of the industrial fluctuations on Graph 6.1. P rices move in reverse to agricultural production (Graph 10.4), offsetting fluctuations in the purchasing power of farm ers. R e maining fluctuations are transmitted first of all to the production and prices of consumer goods and serv ices. Growing (falling) d e mand leads to an expansion (contraction) of production, and the latter again to an increase (decrease) of imports and decrease (increase) of exports. Thus we have arrived at the external m ar ket effects which, it appears, are the most significant. It is worth while to survey certain compensatory movements. A good har vest reduces imports of food, but at the sam e tim e it increases raw m aterials and final goods imports for satisfaction of the increased purchasing power of farm ers. The reverse is true when the harvest is poor. But even in spite of those compensations, the net effect on the balance of payments is great and must be analyzed. It appears most natural to assum e that a bad harvest in one year will lead to large net imports of agricultural products in the su c ceeding year and, along with that, an increase in the balance of payments deficit. Sim ilarly, good harvests w ill eliminate net im ports of agricultural products and contribute to a reduction in the balance of payments deficit. Table 6.2 shows that this assumption is correct only for the first three agricultural cycles, when the maxima and minima of the balance of payments deficit correspond with the peaks and troughs of agricultural fluctuations with a natu ral lag of one year. However, in the last three cycles that rela tionship does not exist. The discontinuity begins in 1958. (2) Un productive years come nearer to productive ones. Agricultural production increased so much that it covers dom estic needs, and
70

Table 6.2 Fluctuations of Agricultural Production and the Balance of Payments Deficit Net ImD eficit in ports of Annual Share of A gricul- Balance Agricul Index of tural Production of Pay- tural A griculin Total_______ ments Products tural Pro Imports Exports (billion dinars, duction $1= 300 d.) % % Peaks of Agricultural Cycles 143 24 37 38 - 1 32 144 28 30 6 32 125 33 20 27 145 17 28 51 - 1 131 9 57 - 16 23 110 14 20 2 71 Troughs of Agricultural Cycles 30 69 21 89 29 24 83 23 24 89 19 22 90 14 23 15 91 17

Year* 1951/1952 1953/1954 1955/1956 1957/1958 1959/1960 1963/1964

1952/1953 1954/1955 1956/1957 1958/1959 1960/1961 1965/1966

66 51 59 47 80
*

24 20 16 9 - 1 8

The first year in each pair refers to the index of agricultural production, and the second to all other data. Sources: SZS, J u goslavia 1945-1946, pp. 86, 97. SZS, Statisticki Godisnjak Ju goslavia, 1967, pp. 131, 208.

in good years resu lts in net surpluses. Since the balance of pay ments deficit increased still further along with the expansions in 1961 and 1964, the reasons for it must be sought in the cycles and structure of industrial production. It is necessary to examine this indication in more detail later. 71

Notes 1) SZS, Medjusobni odnosi privrednih delatnosti Jugoslavije u 1962. godini (Belgrade, 1966). 2) The eternal balance of trade, with a usual lag of one year, r e flects the situation on the internal market. "Until 1957," states V. Stipetid, "consumption of food products increased more rapidly than agricultural production. That was especially the case with nourishment in the village after the abolition of compulsory de liveries" (Jugoslovensko trziste poljobprivrednih proizvoda, Zadr. Knj. Belgrade, 64, p. 78).

72

Chapter 7 REGIONAL CYCLES

Because of very uneven development in the territory of Yugo slavia per capita social product is five tim es le s s in Kosmet than in Slovenia and very uneven distribution of productive pow er, it will be useful to briefly examine regional differences in eco nomic fluctuations. F irst we shall consider the summary picture of regional differences given in Table 7.1. Seven Yugoslav regions are classified in three groups: underde veloped regions, developed regions, and Serbia proper,* whose per capita production corresponds to the Yugoslav average. The developed regions have 40% of the population, and they produce 53% of total production. Given the proclaimed goal of economic policy to reduce the differences in degree of development, one would have to expect that the rate of growth would increase with the degree of underdevelopment. The table shows that this goal was achieved only in the developed group for the economy as a whole, as w ell as for industry and agriculture. There were no such regular movements in the underdeveloped regions. M ore over, in the course of the 13 years under consideration, the pro ductive position of the entire underdeveloped area worsened. That occurred because of the relatively slow development of Kosmet and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Kosmet, development was very slow at the beginning of the period and accelerated later. In Bosnia Herzegovina the movements were the reverse: the rate of growth constantly fell from a relatively high value at the beginning of the period. In both ca ses the average development was slow. The Serbia proper is the Republic of Serbia excluding the autono mous provinces of Kosovo-Metohija (Kosmet) and Vojvodina. 73

Per Capita Social Product and the Rate of (based on stable

Per Capita _____________ Economy Social ProdRate of uct in 1,000 Growth Percent Share in 1952 Old Dinars 1965 % 8.2 Kosovo-Metohija 81 9.6 136 Macedonia 8.2 154 Bosnia-Herzegovina 11.2 Montenegro 164 Underdeveloped regions Serbia proper Vojvodina Croatia Slovenia Developed regions Yugoslavia

139 208 222 256 410 280 213

8.8 9.2 9.8 8.7 8.5 8.8 8.9

22.8 23.8

22.4 24.8

53.4 100.0

52.8 100.0

Source: Statisticki Godisnjak-Jugoslavia (1967), pp. 326, 355. relative position of the underdeveloped regions w orsens m ore per ceptibly when population indices are considered, for the growth of population in that area is twice as fast as in the developed regions. It is of interest to observe that, contrary to expectations, the shares of agriculture in the social product are not much different in the underdeveloped and developed regions (28.5% and 25.7% in 1952, 17.1% and 16.8% in 1965). Accordingly, the eventual greater instability of production cannot be attributed to a greater share of agriculture. Since quarterly data exist only for industrial production, we shall carry out a comparative analysis of cyclical movements only for in dustrial production. And there too, because of lack of data, we shall have to omit Kosmet from the group of underdeveloped regions and Vojvodina from the developed group. The underdeveloped regions
74

Table 7.1 Growth of Social Product by Regions, 1952-1965 1960 prices)

Industry Rate of Growth % 10.1 14.2 12.9 20.8 Rate of Percent Share in Growth 1965 % 1952 5.2 5.7 4.0 3.5

Agriculture Percent Share in 1965 1952

13.3 13.7 13.8 10.9 9.9 10.9 12.0

19.9 19.3

23.2 23.3

4.6 5.3 6.8 5.0 3.5 5.3 5.1

23.7 26.7

22.1 27.3

60.8 100.0

53.5 100.0

49.6 100.0

50.6 100.0

thus determined (Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro) accounted for 21% of the total industrial output of the country in 1965, while the developed regions (Croatia and Slovenia) accounted for 45%. The movements are shown on Graph 7.1, and the basic measured characteristics are given in Table 7.2. Aggregation from the original data is carried out so that unweighted arithmetic averages of chain indices are used. It can be seen from the table that the amplitudes of industrial fluctuations in the underdeveloped regions are significantly great er than in the developed ones, and the graph shows that the path of the chain indices has a much more irregular shape for underde veloped regions. It follows from both facts that the instability of industrial production is significantly greater in the underdeveloped regions than in the developed regions. The oscillations are also 75

Graph 7.1

Regional

Industrial Cycles

77

Measured Characteristics of Industrial Cycles Turning Points Indices Developed Underdevel Yugoslavia Regions oped Regions Yugoslavia 1/1955 1/1955 1/1955 130 1/1956 1/1956 1/1956 103 1/1957 m /1958 n/1960 1/1962 1/1964 m /1967* 1/1957 m /1958 n/1960 IV/1961 1/1964 m /1967* 1/1958 1/1959 n/1960 H/1962 1/1964 1/1967* 121 107. 118 104 119 99*

Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough

Forecast of turning point. greater in agricultural production, for which there exist only annual data. (1) Thus, the entire economy of the underdeveloped regions is more unstable than the economy of the developed regions and demands special attention on the part of agencies concerned with economic policy. The increase of general industrial instability from 1960 on that was observed earlier can now be explained by the increase of in stability in underdeveloped regions (in the developed regions the amplitudes of fluctuations decrease up to the la st peak as can be seen in Table 7.2). That holds especially for the period beginning with the implementation of the la st reform s. In the entire earlier period the path of the index of growth of the underdeveloped regions lie s above the path of the developed regions (see Graph 7.1). How ever, in the middle of 1966 the rate of industrial expansion of the underdeveloped regions fell below the rate of the developed regions, and in 1967 there was even an absolute decline in industrial pro duction. Except in the second cycle, the turning points of the developed and underdeveloped regions coincide with the turning points of in dustrial production as a whole. Accordingly, the industrial cycles are synchronized in a ll regions of Yugoslavia. The exceptional o c currence in the second of the mentioned cycles, i.e ., in 1958, was
78

Table 7.2 of Developed and Underdeveloped Regions at Turning Points Amplitudes Developed Underdevel Developed Underdevel Regions oped Regions Yugoslavia Regions oped Regions 151 128 30 98 102 27 49 121 104 118 105 116 100* 130 113 124 107 125 96* 18 14 11 14 15 20* 23 17 14 13 11 16* 28 17 11 17 18 29*

that a sharp acceleration of production took place in the underde veloped regions just at the tim e when the retardation of production in the developed regions deepened. And that is precisely the rea son for the exceptionally mild recession in 1958. Note 1) See the monograph by M. Bazler, Klasifikacija jugoslavenskih podrucja po stepenu privredne razvijenosti, Yugoslav Institute of Economic Studies, Belgrade (1968). That monograph deals with regional cycles in much greater detail.

79

Chapter 8 REGULARITIES IN THE TREND OF LABOR PRODUCTIVITY

Economic stability depends upon stability of prices, among other things. But price stability is to a significant degree conditioned by the increase in efficiency of economic activity. Thus we arrive at the problem of productivity of labor and the efficiency of capi tal. In addition, the cyclical movements of the economy make pos sib le em pirical verification of a widely circulated hypothesis r e lated to labor productivity. "With a given volume of employment, the growth of labor pro ductivity results in an increase of production. In addition, the growth of productivity of labor always represents a positive phe nomenon. Now, when the volume of employment changes, sta tisti cal data do not always show unambiguously whether the causal connection is that production grows because of increased labor productivity or, conversely, productivity of labor which rep re sents the ratio of production to employment grows because pro duction can in crease faster than employment. Establishing an ap proach to the causative conditions in this case is of great im por tance for the formulation of economic policy. Insofar as the pro cess begins with an increase in the productivity of labor, then it is a matter first of a ll of utilizing the internal reserv es of eco nomic organizations. Insofar as the predominant influence is ful fillm ent of the possibilities of increasing production, then the Archimedean lever must be sought in the organization of the econ omy as a whole and, in general, in the institutional framework of production." Five years have elapsed since this was written in the "Yellow Book" (2uta Knjiga) (1), and this perm its the positions brought out there to be m ore strongly substantiated em pirically. In the meantime, the daily p ress and official m aterials appear to have made the following three positions one of the maxims of economic policy:
80

1) rapid growth of labor productivity is the precondition for in clusion in the international market, i.e ., for increased exports; 2) rapid growth of labor productivity i.e ., a greater con tribution to production from increased productivity than from in creased employment is the precondition for greater expansion of production; 3) in order to attain goals (1) and (2) it is necessary to reduce the present rate of employment growth. The question a r ise s as to whether that three-point maxim is correct. As far as point (1) is concerned, Ricardo has already shown that it is mistaken. Inclusion in the international market does not de pend upon absolute productivity on that score the underdeveloped countries would have no chance whatever but on relative pro ductivity which, in the theory of international trade, is known as "comparative advantage." In addition to comparative advantage, the exportability of products, which again depends upon the stru c ture and expansion of world demand for imports, plays a key role. It is also a m istake to believe that an increase of the share of labor productivity growth in the increase of production in relation to the share of increased employment is, in itself, positive. In slow ly growing econom ies, such as the British, the share of pro ductivity of labor is greater than in Yugoslavia, but the rate of economic growth is several tim es lower. A lso, in developed coun trie s that have exhausted their reservoirs of labor from agricul ture, the contribution of productivity is greater. In fact it is only for such economies that there is validity to the conclusion that there is an identity between rapid increases in labor productivity in nonagricultural secto rs ar\d the general rate of economic growth. In underdeveloped econom ies with large reserves of labor, the contribution to production of new employment will be greater. There is not only nothing bad in that, but on the contrary it rep resents the rational way to m axim ize the increase of social pro duction. The expansion of production will in fact be maximal only if the growth of labor productivity is also sufficiently high. What the relative contributions of productivity and employment will be is entirely irrelevant: they are not determinants Of growth; they are determined by growth. The faster the rate of economic d ev el opment, the faster the reserv es of labor will be exhausted and the faster the proportions w ill change in favor of productivity of labor. Points (2) and (3), m oreover, represent em pirical propositions.
81

Insofar as they are correct, then a rapid growth of labor produc tivity will be accompanied by relatively little employment growth, and vice versa. What do statistical data show concerning that? Table 8.1 aggregates years in which the growth of labor produc tivity was above the average (Group I) and those in which it was below the average (Group n ), considered in relation to what hap pened to employment. The result obtained is that in years of high gains in production, industry employed 10% more workers than in years of low gains. The tendencies are sim ilar in the economy as a whole (measured by the social product, agriculture excluded), but they are not as pronounced. Accordingly, em pirical v erifica tion turned out negative, and our maxim must be turned about so that it reads: the faster the growth of production, the faster will be the growth of labor productivity, even if a great many new work ers are employed. The accuracy of this conclusion can be seen clearly especially if we group the data according to maximum and minimum growth of production, i.e ., according to the peaks and troughs of our graphs. In addition, the conclusion is accurate not only for labor productivity, but holds also for efficiency of u se of capital. We will m easure that efficiency by the marginal production coefficient, i.e ., the ratio of the increase of the social product to the increase of fixed capital (A P /A K). Table 8.1 Growth of Productivity of Labor and Employment in Years withAbove-Average (I) and Below-Average (n) Increase in Labor Productivity Average Annual Average Annual Index of Labor Employment _________________________ Productivity______ (in thousands)______ Industry* Ia 107 66 Hb 103 60 Economy, exIc 107 129 eluding agri101 122 culture**______ *Period 1952-1965 a 1953, 1957, 1959, 1960, 1963, 1964. b 1954, 1955, 1956, 1958, 1961, 1962, 1965. **Period 1952-1964 c 1956, 1957, 1959, 1960, 1963, 1964. d 1953, 1954, 1955, 1958, 1961, 1962. 82

Table 8.2 Growth of Productivity of Labor and Efficiency of Capital in Years of Maximum and Minimum Growth of Production Average Annual Index of Growth of P ro ductivity peaks a 106 troughs b 103 Average Annual Average Index of Annual Growth AP of Fixed AK Capital 0.75 108 0.47 108

Industry: Economy, ex cluding agri culture:

Average Annual Increase in Em ployment 81 50

167 peaks a 0.71 106 106 88 0.35 106 troughs b 103 a) 1955, 1957, 1960, 1964; for fixed capital, excluding 1964 for lack of data. b) 1956, 1958, 1962. At the peaks of the cycles the economy employed alm ost twice as many new workers as at the troughs and, at the sam e tim e, a t tained twice as high a growth rate of labor productivity. Since fixed capital is not as mobile as the labor force investment a c tivity must be completed once it has begun it expanded at equal rates at the peaks and troughs. Consequently, the efficiency of its utilization depends fir st of a ll on the variation of the social prod uct. It can be seen that the marginal production coefficients are twice as high at the peaks than at the troughs. In both cases the differences are extreme: a high rate of growth means high pro ductivity and efficiency as w ell, while a low rate of growth r e duces both. Since there are quarterly data for employment, it is possible for us to consider cycles of employment and labor productivity in more detail. Graph 8.1 presents the n ecessary data. One can see, fir st of all, that there is a close connection in industry between movements of employment and movements of production: when production grows, employment also grows. The maximum value 83

Chain indices

84

Industrial production Employment in industry Labor productivity

Employment, and Labor Productivity

85

of the coefficient of correlation r = 0.54 is obtained when a lag of one quarter is assumed. This means that the cycle of employ ment lags behind the cycle of production by about one quarter, which is also evident on the graph. The lag of employment behind production at the peaks of the cycles can be explained by the op tim ism of enterprises that the upswing w ill continue, while at the troughs it is caused by depressive pessim ism and accumulated excess labor force, which must be utilized first by an increase of production. Since the index of labor productivity is obtained as the coeffi cient of the index of production and the index of employment, the growth of labor productivity is narrowly correlated with the growth of production (r = 0.66, period I/1953-II/1955). In this case there is no lag, but all the peaks except one and a ll the troughs correspond. At the peaks the productivity of labor grows 9-14%, and at the troughs it falls by 0-6%. The variations are, naturally, significantly greater than with annual data, and they persuasively demonstrate the th esis that an expansion of produc tion not only increases employment but accelerates the growth of productivity of labor as w ell. If we possessed quarterly data for fixed capital, we would undoubtedly obtain the sam e picture of the movement of efficiency of investment in relation to the utilization of fixed capital. We shall se e later that acceleration of produc tion also reduces the volume of inventories in the production unit. Thus, acceleration of production enhances the general efficiency of economic activity, and retardation reduces it. However, the problem is more complicated than the analysis up to now has indicated, and therefore to avoid misunderstanding it may be n ecessary to point out still other aspects. Industrial ization means, among other things, the transfer of labor force from the village to the city. Historically there have been two types of such transfer. Capitalist transfer with the pushing of the peasants off the land by force or by economic differentiation created slum s and an army of unemployed whose pressure kept wages low, and industrialization was carried out from the in creased profits. In our century that process of agrarian differ entiation and depopulation in the developed countries is mitigated and slowed by state subsidization of sm all farm s. The second type of transfer was carried out in the Soviet Union, where col lectivization was completed by administrative m easures and where the flow of labor to the city was checked by administrative 86

m easures. In this connection it is of interest to cite a study by Rudolf Bidanid, in which he takes as the end of a characteristic phase of development a year in which the active agricultural pop ulation fell absolutely. The Soviet Union reached that turnabout in 1956, with 41% of the active population in agriculture. In Yugo slavia the turnabout already occurred in 1948, when two-thirds of the active population was still employed in agriculture. (2) In fact the Yugoslav turnabout took place with the highest percent of agri cultural population of a ll countries considered, and therefore at one of the low est lev els of economic development. It is rather obvious that neither of the two mentioned types of transfer has any relevance in Yugoslavia. That does not mean, of course, that the present rate of employment of the labor force from the village which, as we have seen, is one of the highest, and perhaps even the highest in the world is n ecessarily optimal. Unqualified workers come from the village; they do not have in dustrial habits, disturb labor discipline, and do not show interest in workers' self-m anagem ent, especially to the extent that they also keep their property; insofar as the peasant is completely proletarianized and cast into the city, then an apartment must be built for him, and that burdens and otherwise strains investment bal ances; m assive employment growth reduces the potential growth of real personal incomes; to the extent that labor productivity d e pends on the siz e of personal incom e, then low income reduces not only productivity of labor but also total potential production. This customary argument is accompanied by the assertion that low productivity prevents integration into the international division of labor. Since adequate economic m easurements are not carried out, it is difficult to say what the quantitative significance is of the effects described in this argument. Therefore, a ll that can be done in this situation is to present other argumentation, and then experi ence and intuition are left to determine the relative weight of each argument. It is undoubtedly true that an inadequately nourished worker without adequate housing and with poor education achieves le s s working effectiveness than a worker whose conditions of life are better. But it does not follow n ecessarily that greater personal in come also means greater productivity. Adequate education, ration al housing construction, and workers' nourishment can be effi ciently organized even with lower personal income. The conclu sion concerning income and productivity would follow only if
87

haphazard development were assumed and it were expected that every individual would resolve the above problems him self. In a planned economy there is no need for such an assumption. Fur thermore, it is taken as obvious that a high standard in and of it self means an incentive for increasing the productivity of labor. In fact that is not only not obvious, but can be entirely erroneous, for it confuses static and dynamic phenomena. Income levelling at a high level which does not increase probably represents the extreme disincentive situation for an increase in labor productiv ity. This im plies therefore that stimulation depends on the follow ing two elements: income distribution according to work performed, and anticipation of rapid and continual in creases in the standard of living. The first im plies a certain spread in income distribu tion, and the second stands in contrast to the present situation, which in no way can be essentially changed. Increases in the standards of industrial workers depend, natu rally, not only on their labor productivity, but on the productivity of labor in the entire economy. And there again agriculture is ex cluded. The growth of agricultural production depends on the de velopment of socialized farm s, but these cannot develop on tiny peasant property. Accordingly, the social transformation of a g ri culture will progress at the rate by which labor is transferred from the village to the city. In addition, because of the big differ ence between the marginal productivity of labor in the city and the village, even the low productivity of the newly-hired in the city will still be significantly greater than the opportunity cost that a rises from their departure from the village, which means that general Yugoslav productivity is increased. However, employment has both a sociopolitical and a productive aspect. We cannot sep arate the city from the village. If incom es in the city grow faster than those in the village and they cannot grow fast in the village if the collective production structure does not change rapidly then inflationary pressures will constantly come from the village along with the growth of unemployment of those whom the urban standard has drawn from the village. Let us add that the retarda tion of production during 1965 resulted in registered unemploy ment of about 300,000 at the beginning of 1966, which represents 8.8% of the number employed. In all, during 1965, 54,000 people were hired. At that rate of hiring, six years would be necessary to absorb those who are today registered for employment. How ever, each year it is a lso n ecessary to employ the 110,000 new 88

entrants to the labor force. But in the following year, 1966, not only was there not new hiring, but the number employed even fell by 84,000. In 1967 the number employed fell still further. Doubtless it is correct that the flow from the village dilutes the working class in som e manner. And probably it is also correct that the migration to the city, especially to the factory, repre sents the best possible school for building socialism . It is a ques tion, naturally, of sca le. Comparing the rate of economic growth of Yugoslavia and of other countries, it appears that this scale has not been surpassed. Industrial productivity of labor grows faster in Yugoslavia than in, for example, France and many other countries; the general national productivity is increasing faster in Yugoslavia than in the majority of countries in the world. Fur thermore, it is true that the large flow of labor force creates very serious problems in housing and urbanization. But it is also true that the village youth have the sam e right to a high living standard as manual workers and w hite-collar em ployees. Community con struction for their housing has its costs, but at the sam e tim e the general living standard of the country is raised, which is the pur pose of overall economic growth. Without detailed research and quantification of the effects, it is im possible to define the optimal economic policy in the area that we have just outlined. But som e conclusions are fairly clear. An increase not of labor productivity and of the efficiency of capi tal utilization but of the rate of the increase is desirable, n ec essary, and probably possible. In that respect there are still large unutilized reserv es in economic organizations. However, from the point of view of economic policy the main reserves lie in the increase of production, or m ore precisely, in the increase in the rate of economic expansion. And in that respect the individual enterprise is not able to accom plish much. The enterprise can plan the dynamics of inventories by the m ost modern statistical technique, but what good w ill that do if at any moment the delivery of m aterials can be interrupted, if somewhere in the production chain someone has not succeeded in bringing about an essential import. The experts of an enterprise can faultlessly program an optimal plan of production and then, for example, there is a reduc tion of the supply of electrical energy or the transportation chan nels are blocked som ewhere. The workers' council can very con scientiously work out a long-range investment and business policy, and then prices, interest rates, taxes and other instruments are
89

changed administratively, so that what appeared very profitable becomes unprofitable, and vice versa. The work collective* can, like a good householder, se t aside substantial funds in the invest ment account from the personal incomes account, and then the state blocks those funds and coercively converts them into long-term de posits. And when this is how things are, the enterprises are not in terested in modern statistical methods, or in a thoroughly prepared investment program, or in a solid long-run business policy, but they respond to bureaucratic demands to the sam e degree. The po litica l bodies are obviously responsible for the creation of condi tions for more efficient business activity, and thus for an increase in the rate of production. To that theme we w ill have to return. Notes 1) Uzroci i karakteristike, op. cit., p. 10. 2) R. Bi6ani6, "Zaokreti u ekonomskom razvoju i agrarna politika," Ekonomski pregled, 1965, No. 11-12, pp. 739-740.

*A work collective consists of a ll the people who earn their liv ing in a particular enterprise, from the director to the cleaning women Translator.
90

Chapter 9 INVENTORY CYCLES

Since the flows of production and consumption cannot be abso lutely synchronized, the differences that appear are absorbed by inventory changes. However, that does not mean that inventories only passively absorb shocks that come from imbalances of sup ply and demand. There is also a reflexive link by which changes in inventories influence changes in the production program. In that respect various economies react very differently, and even in dia m etrically opposite ways. Thus, a response by the economic s y s tem that involves the formation of inventories can be either a sta bilizing or a destabilizing reaction. 9.1 Some C haracteristics of Inventory Formation in the Yugoslav Economy F irst of all, it is important to observe that in Yugoslavia a huge amount of capital is continually tied up in inventories. About onehalf of the entire economy's social product is continuously in in ventories. (1) Furthermore, in the la st fifteen years total inven tories have constantly grown faster than the social product, so that the proportion of inventories to social product has increased from one-third at the beginning of the 1950s to alm ost one-half in the m id-1960s. In that period about two-thirds of the social prod uct of industry and alm ost 100% of the social product of collectiv ized agriculture and trade lay in inventories. (2) The proportion of inventories increased in a ll economic sectors except in com munications and construction where, because of the nature of the production p rocess, inventories do not play a significant role. The second statem ent is related to the recorded fact that inven91

tories are significantly greater in the Yugoslav economy than in many other countries. This indicates definite inefficiency in eco nomic activity. Since comparable data on inventories in various countries are very scarce, it is difficult to set forth any reasoned hypothesis on the determinants of the siz e of inventories in na tional economies that would enable us to judge the Yugoslav situ ation. It appears that the s iz e of inventories depends upon the following circum stances. 1) Underdeveloped countries have larger inventories than the developed ones. That is partly true because of a greater share of agriculture in the production of those countries, and agricul ture has larger inventories than other productive sectors. But it appears that this holds for each productive sector separately. Thus Madzar shows that the coefficient of inventory turnover in India is 50% lower than in Yugoslavia. The sam e holds also for individual phases of development of one and the sam e country. Thus in the USA the proportion of inventories to industrial pro duction fell 25% from 1920-1929 to 1947-1954 (3) (industrial in ventories amounted to 49% before the war, and in 1960 to 39% of the social product of industry, excluding indirect business taxes). (4) By way of explanation, one can say that le s s developed econ om ies are more prim itively organized, channels of supply do not function reliably, and the enterprise must insure itself by main taining large inventories. (5) 2) Centrally planned economies have larger inventories than market econom ies. According to the data of the American econo m ist Campbell, Soviet industrial inventories are twice as large as the American. According to the data of the Soviet economist Bunich, the difference is le s s but still significant. Bunich's data for Czechoslovakia and East Germany show the sam e picture. Madzar's estim ate indicates that Yugoslav inventories are som e what sm aller than those of centrally planned econom ies, but s ig nificantly larger than in market economies. Because the data are not precise, it can probably be assumed that the Yugoslav econ omy, according to its performance, belongs in the centrally planned group. The explanation as to why centrally planned econ om ies require larger inventories is fairly obvious. In those econ om ies the enterprises have an interest in completing the produc tion plan, but are not stimulated to deliver goods then and there, just when they are needed. Since all details in practical situ a tions cannot be foreseen far in advance by a plan, nor can the
92

latter react flexibly to unforeseen changes in the situation, that n ecessarily results in significant separation of the structure, and even the volume, of supply and demand; so the enterprise must protect itself by maintaining large inventories. The enterprise also accumulates inventories because they cost le s s due to a low or nonexistent rate of interest. 3) It appears justified to assum e that accelerated growth, which multiplies bottlenecks, requires larger inventories than slow growth. Madzar presents a table for twelve countries at the head of which, in term s of accumulation of inventories, are the world's two best perform ers in rate of growth, Yugoslavia and Japan, and at the bottom a slowly-growing economy, Belgium (in the p eri od 1955-1964, these three economies absorbed 65%, 65% and 10% of the social product by accumulation of inventories). However, the remaining countries in the table do not provide strong support for our hypothesis. Thus, slowly-growing Great Britain accumu lated twice as much inventory as fast-growing Italy. It follows that at least within a certain interval, the effect of the growth rate can be significantly modified by other factors. 4) In addition, an unstable economy will require larger average inventories than a stable economy. Later, in the chapter "Inter national Comparisons," the coefficients of instability are calcu lated for individual countries. If those coefficients are compared with Madzar's data on the accumulation of inventories for three countries which appear in both tables Japan, France, and Italy it can be seen that the order of inventory accumulation is the sam e as the order of instability. However, it is also necessary to have in mind that economic instability is closely correlated with the rate of growth. 5) Finally, the siz e of inventories a lso depends on the specific reaction of individual national economies to disturbances that pro duce fluctuations. Hypothesis (5) leads us to the third key contention. At lea st som e capitalist countries, of which the USA is the m ost well-known and investigated case, accumulate inventories in the upswing phases and reduce inventories in the downswing phases. In fact, the four-year American cycles begin by reduction of inventories, which releases the recession mechanism and results in cumula tive contraction of demand. Therefore, fluctuations of inventories represent a factor of instability in the American economy, and the four-year cycles have been called inventory cycles. The Yugoslav
93

Table 9.1 Inventory Formation in the Yugoslav Economy, 1952-1964 (in 1962 prices) Share of In ventory In vestm ent in Growth of the Social Product % 7.6 22.5 26.1 36.3 39.0 43.4 30.7 50.7

Increase of the Social Product (billion din.) Fat Years 1953 1955 1957 1959 1963 1964 Total Lean Years 1954 1956 1958 1960 1961 1962 Total 291 280 495 454 459 546 2525 71 -82 84 205 192 156 626

Inventory Investment (billion din.) 22 63 129 145 179 237 775 36 230 232 223 180 259 1160

Growth Rate of the Social Product % 17.8 14.1 22.7 16.4 12.2 12.9

276.2 108.8 93.8 166.0 185.3

3.7 -3.6 3.1 6.4 5.6 4.3

----

economy reacts in an entirely opposite way. In the upswing phases inventory accumulation slow s down, and even resu lts in an abso lute reduction of inventories (for example, in industry in 1953, in the fourth quarters of 1959 and 1963, and in the first quarter of 1964). In the downswing phase the cycle of inventory accumulation accelerates. Accordingly, in recession s and depressions invento ries function as one of the economic stabilizers of the Yugoslav economy. In connection with what has just been said, som e data that I have taken from Madzar are very illustrative. The twelve years of the period 1952-1964 can be divided into two equal groups: "fat" years 94

with growth rates of the social product of about 12% annually, and "lean" years with growth rates below 6-1/2%. Inventory formation is carried out very differently in "fat" and "lean" years, as can be seen in Table 9.1. Until 1960 every odd year was productive, and every even year was unproductive. Since at that tim e agriculture contributed a s ig nificant part of total production, those were predetermined "fat" and "lean" years for the economy as a whole. After 1960 the b e havior of agriculture and its influence on the rest of the economy changed significantly, but the pattern of inventory formation still remained the same: contrary to the Bible, in "lean" years inven tories accumulated and in "fat" years they were depleted. In the entire period considered, recession years accumulated half again as much inventories as expansive years. In years of economic up swing somewhat le s s than one-third of the annual growth of the s o cial product entered into inventories. However, in lean years in vestm ent and inventories absorbed not only the entire annual in crease of production, but also a good part of the current production beyond that. It is obvious that the years when the warehouses were empty and the market was chronically unsupplied in quantity are now far behind us. From that point of view we may be satisfied. However, comparative analysis shows that inventories in Yugoslavia are significantly larger than in other countries and, what is more s e rious, that they constantly increase in relative term s. That pro c e ss was intensified in the period 1965-1967 (at this moment there are no comparable data for expressing that statement precisely). Our current economy is significantly more developed than the economy of 1952. Industrial production has increased five tim es. Administrative central planning has been replaced to a large ex tent by the market mechanism. Therefore, in accordance with hy potheses (1) and (2), derived from comparative analysis, and with the improvement of market supply, inventories ought to decrease relatively. That actually occurs in phases of cyclical upswings. But in the retardation phases which follow and which become long er and deeper, the positive effects are annulled and the process of accumulating inventories continues. Naturally, if one must still choose between production for inventories and stopping production, then the spontaneous choice of the Yugoslav economy was eco nom ically rational. For stopping production and reducing inven tories i.e ., the American reaction would lead to cumulative
95

contraction of demand and thus to an absolute reduction of produc tion i.e ., to American effects. The mechanism of inventory fo r mation thereby saves the unstable Yugoslav economy from cyclical catastrophes. It is also understandable why relative reductions of inventories do not occur, which we would otherwise have had to ex pect. And it also becom es clear that it is n ecessary to formulate economic policy that will solve the problem. It would be a mistake to drive out inventories from enterprises by means of credit r e striction. Such forced imitation of American behavior would lead to American effects. What we must work out is the levelling of cy cles, eliminating or at least mitigating instability, and the economy will then spontaneously channel inventories in the right direction. 9.2 Cycles of Components of Industrial Inventories Industrial inventories include about 60% of nonagricultural inven tories, so that a study of the movements of those inventories is sufficiently representative of the behavior of inventories as a whole. Inventories have three components, which behave very dif ferently. There are inventories of raw m aterials and sem i-finished products (intermediate goods), of unfinished production, and of final products. The structure of total and industrial inventories at the be ginning and end of the period under consideration was as follows: Table 9.2 Structure of Inventories Intermediate Unfinished ___________________ Goods_______ Production Final Products Total Inventories 1952-1954 46 14 40 1962-1964 39 17 44 Industrial Inventories 1952-1954 59 21 20 1962-1964 49 23 28 Industrial Inventories in the USA* 1919-1938 40 20 40 1952-1953 38 29 33 Source: Stanback, Postwar Cycles in Manufacturers' Invento r ie s, p. 25. 96

It can be seen that because of the reduction of the share of in termediate goods inventories, there was growth in inventories of unfinished production and especially of final products. On the oth er hand, Madzar shows that the coefficients of turnover of inven tories of intermediate goods remained approximately unchanged in the period considered, while the coefficients of turnover of the other two components of inventories were reduced. It follows that inventories of intermediate goods move in step with production. Since according to general belief the supply of raw m aterials and sem i-finished products is today significantly better than at the be ginning of the period, in this area there has been an advance in the economy's business activity in the sen se of hypotheses (1) and (2) of the preceding section. The contrary conclusion may be drawn for the movement of inventories of final goods. The inadequately organized and unstable market results in their relative increase. This conclusion appears to contradict the American data, which show an even greater share of final products. However, in making a definitive judgment it is necessary to keep in view the following two facts: (1) in the USA the share of final products falls, while in Yugoslavia it rises; (2) the import element of production is se v e r al tim es lower in the USA than in Yugoslavia. And importation of materials requires longer term s of delivery, and hence also larger inventories. With significantly larger imports, American invento ries of intermediate goods would be larger, and that would auto m atically reduce the share of final products. Thus, it can proba bly be said that the increase of the share of final products was in part n ecessary because of the filling up of inventories, and in part it was the result of increased economic instability. The relative increase in inventories of unfinished production represents a regular phenomenon, and we can expect the sam e trend in the future as w ell. It is a matter, namely, of a regular change in the structure of industrial production in the direction of a greater proportion of durable consumer and producers goods. Table 9.3 shows that the durable goods industries (the metals complex and the lumber industry) increased their share of total industrial inventories in twelve years from 42% to 51%. And it is p recisely those industries, because of the nature of the technologi cal p rocess, that have a significant share of unfinished production, while in addition that share increased. Thus, the growth of the av erage share of unfinished production from 21% to 23% is explained. We may now state the following three hypotheses: (1) since
97

Table 9.3 Structure of Industrial Inventories (in current prices) Interme Unfinished Produc Final diate Goods Products tion Inventories, durable goods industries 1952-1953 1964-1965 Inventories, other industries 1952-1953 1964-1965 Industry, total 1952-1953 1964-1965

Total

Share

61.7 54.7

23.9 27.5

14.4 17.8

100 100

41.9 51.4

51.6 49.0

19.0 18.0

29.4 33.0

100 100

58.1 48.6

55.8 51.9

21.1 22.9

23.1 25.2

100 100

100.0 100.0

inventories of raw m aterials and sem i-finished products m ateri ally precondition production, there will exist a tendency for inven tories to follow trends of production and to behave like production; (2) since unfinished production is technologically conditioned and, m oreover, precedes finished production, this component of inven tories w ill also move like production with a short lead; (3) since inventories of final products serve to absorb disturbances in de mand, fluctuations of those inventories and of production w ill be phasally shifted so that the troughs of production correspond to the peaks of inventories, and vice versa; i.e ., the behavior of in ventories must be just the rev erse of the behavior of production in every phase of the cycle. There are no data on movements of unfinished production, but research carried out in the USA com pletely supports hypothesis (2). Graph 9.1 presents the data for verifying the other two hypotheses. Those data are then summa rized in Table 9.4. Let us begin with inventories of intermediate goods. As we ex pected, the cycles of these inventories correspond on the whole to 98

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100
Chain indices 170

Industrial production Inventories of final products Inventories of intermediate goods ----------------Imports of intermediate goods for industry (annual)

Production and Inventories

'C 1 U

101

the industrial cycles. The amplitudes are also equal. An in terest ing tendency of decreasing expansions and amplitudes of interm e diate goods inventories can also be seen from the graph before 1960-1962, and of increasing expansions and amplitudes after those years. The changes in amplitudes can be explained by the reduction of general economic instability before 1960 and by in creased instability after that year. And the changes in the expan sion of inventories can, it appears, be explained by the reduction of imports of intermediate goods for industry before 1962, as is seen from the movements of annual chain indices of intermediate goods imports drawn on the graph. The reduction of imports of intermediate goods is an indication of the substitution of dom estic production for imported m aterials, which together with better o r ganization of supply, reduced the term s of delivery and thus the siz e of the required inventories. The opposite is true with the in crease of imports and disorganization of the market. It is worth noting that the amplitudes of the annual indices of imports of inter mediate goods are greater than the amplitudes of the quarterly in dices of inventories and production. This is explained by the fact that the elasticity of imports of intermediate goods is greater than one at a high rate of growth of industry and le s s than one in r e cession periods. The correspondence of the cycles of intermediate goods inven tories and production is interrupted in the third production cycle. In 1958-1959 an intracycle of inventories whose meaning is not entirely clear is interpolated. Perhaps the rapid growth of inven tories in the second half of 1958 can be explained by the relatively large credits for working capital immediately prior to that, along with the simultaneous growth of imports of intermediate goods, and the fall in 1959 by the contraction of credit expansion which lasted until the beginning of 1960 and may have stopped the expan sion of intermediate goods in a situation of relatively good supply. Similarly, in the fourth production cycle another cycle of invento ries of intermediate goods is interpolated. That mildly expressed cycle, with a tendency to fall, can probably be explained by the slowing of expansion of imports of intermediate goods for indus try in 1961 and 1962. (6) Four cycles are insufficient for drawing more certain conclu sions about the eventual tim e shift of the turning points of cycles of inventories and production. However, they give som e indications and it is necessary to note them. Thus, the peak of intermediate
102

goods inventories corresponds twice to the peak of production, pre cedes once and follows once, and it is therefore probable that in the general case the peaks of both c y c le s correspond. The troughs of the cycles correspond once, and the troughs of inventories p re cede twice, which makes probable a lead in the general case. In sofar as these observations are correct, it can be said that cycles of m aterials inventories and production are, on the whole, synchro nized with an eventual short lead of the inventory troughs. The la t ter may mean that the equipping of industry with intermediate goods, stimulated by the previous growth of credit, gives an im pulse to the upward turning of the production cycle. The movement of inventories of final products presents, natually, an entirely different picture. The amplitudes of fluctuations are several tim es greater, especially at the beginning of the p eri od, when inventories were relatively sm all. The correspondence of the inventory and production cycles is alm ost perfect with the expected phasal shift of 180. The trough of the inventory cycle corresponds once, precedes tw ice, and lags twice with respect to the corresponding peak of production. In three cases the peak of the inventory cycle lags behind the corresponding turning points of the production cycles. The lagging of the peaks of inventories of final products, as well as the leading of troughs of intermediate goods inventories, indicates that the departure from depression is achieved at first by production for inventories. The place on the graph where the line of inventories of final prod ucts cuts the a b scissa or closely approaches it indicates situations in which inventories remain unchanged or even fall absolutely. It can be seen that this happens when the expansion of industrial pro duction exceeds a rate of about 14%. We w ill se e later that at this rate the tempo of industrial exports and imports is equalized with the tempo of industrial production. The graph also shows the rates of industrial expansion at which there results a relative reduction of final products inventories (i.e., inventories increase more slowly than production). That happens when the line of inventories moves below the line of production, i.e ., at a rate of industrial ex pansion of about 13%. One is strongly tempted to conclude that at a rate of 13-14%, long-run industrial expansion could be stabilized so that cycles are smoothed, inventories increase moderately, and the export-import gap remains closed. It is interesting that this is also the rate that is obtained as the arithmetic mean of average attained expansion of the social product
103

104
Chain lndtccs of Industrial production and in v e n to rie s

Graph 9.2

Ratios of Inventories

In d u s tria l production T o ta l in d u s tr ia l in v e n to rie s _

and Production in Industry

105

Indices of ra tio s

R atio of In v e n to ries of fin al pro d u c ts and In d u s tria l p roduction (H /1S65= 100) R atio of to ta l in v e n to rie s and in d u s tria l production (rV /1965 :100 ) R atio of in v e n to rie s o f in te rm e d ia te goods and in d u s tr ia l production _ (H I/1962 : 1 0 0 ) ***.,

(excluding agriculture) in the course of the la st full cycle and of expansion during the upswing, which was used as one of the e le ments in calculating the lo s s e s of production in Section 1.1. Thus the realism of that calculation obtains still another substantiation, and the economic analyst and planner are given yet another indi cation of the structural constants of the Yugoslav economy. The coefficients of turning points in relation to their reciprocal values, the proportions of inventories and production, provide u s e ful information on inventory movements. Those proportions are shown in Graph 9.2. The proportions are shown as indices in r e lation to base values, which are again selected as average values for the whole period, and the scale of proportions of inventories and production is shifted so that the index 100 corresponds to the average index of growth of industrial production of 112.3. In that way the base indices of proportions (in relation to the average proportions) are centered on the average value of industrial ex pansion (for the period 1952-1964). The usual assumption is that producers attempt to maintain in ventories in som e fixed proportion with respect to production. We saw earlier why this tendency is condemned to failure when it is a matter of inventories of final products. Because of that the huge fluctuations of proportions of final goods inventories are not su r prising. However, now it can be seen that the proportion of inter mediate goods is also very unstable. The large growth in the pro portion of inventories of intermediate goods to production in 1956 is the result of large im ports of interm ediate goods in that year. In the succeeding years, imports of intermediate goods slow down, and the proportion of inventories of intermediate goods also de creases, with large fluctuations. The proportion attains its m ini mum in the first half of 1963 and then again grows by leaps. The large fluctuations in the proportion of intermediate goods inven tories from quarter to quarter show how irregularly Yugoslav in dustry is supplied with m aterials. And the shifts between a c c e l eration and deceleration of imports in somewhat longer periods, along with a sim ilar increasing and decreasing of the proportions of intermediate goods inventories to production, show that not only is the market extremely disorganized, but a lso that there is not any kind of developmental program for Yugoslav industry. The reduction of the quarterly changes of proportions of intermediate goods inventory after 1960 shows that the supplying of interm edi ate goods had become more regular. The rapid increase of the
106

proportion after 1964, along with the corresponding movements of intermediate goods im ports, indicates the presence of an effective program to produce goods that would replace imports. And the very noticeable tendency from 1957 on for the proportions of inter mediate goods to fall in prosperous years and to increase in d e pression years (which can be seen on the graph, as the lines of in term ediate goods inventories are below the line of production in prosperous years but above the line of production in depression years) points to the possibility that depletion of intermediate goods inventories resu lts in a break at the peak of the cycle, and the r e newed normalization of interm ediate goods supply prepares the way for a new upswing. 9.3 C ycles of Total Industrial Inventories Unfortunately, since in Yugoslavia we do not have statistics of the quarterly movement of the social product and of total invento r ie s, we cannot analyze cycles of total inventories. We will there fore have to lim it ourselves to the examination of cycles of indus trial inventories. Table 9.5 gives an idea of the significance of in dustrial inventories. Table 9.5 Nonagricultural Inventories by Economic Sectors (structure on the basis of current prices) _______ Yugoslavia______ USA* ___________________________ 1928-1939 1952-1953 1964-1965 Industry and mining 53.5 63.9 56.8 Trade 38.9 25.5 28.2 Other sectors 7.6 10.6 15.0 Source: M. Abramovitz, Inventories and Business C ycles, p. 36. It can be seen that 90% of nonagricultural inventories are found in industry and trade. Inventories of agricultural producers rep resented 12.3% of total inventories in the USA in the period cited, while comparable data are lacking for Yugoslavia. Because of a certain uneconomic management of trade, inventories in that s e c tor are le s s than what economic p ro cesses demand, and that w ellknown assertion is illustrated here by the American data. R ela tively larger inventories in trade probably would enable inventories
107

108
Chain indices

In d u strial production Total inventories in industry

Working Capital, and Indebtedness

109

in industry, as w ell as total inventories, to fall absolutely. Since we do not know of a single em pirical study of cycles of trade in ventories, and there are no domestic data, we will have to be sa t isfied with the assumption that inventories in trade move approxi mately like inventories of intermediate goods in industry, since sa les determine supply in both cases. In that way we can im m edi ately approach an examination of movements of total industrial inventories (Graph 9.3). Table 9.6 Turning Points of Industrial Production and Inventories Industrial Production 1/1955 1/1956 1/1957 m /1958 H/1960 1/1962 H/1964 Total Industrial Inventories Trough m /1954 Peak m /1956 Trough IV/1957 Peak IV/1958 Trough IV/1959 Peak m /1962 Trough IV/1963 Lead ( - ) or Lag (+) in Quarters -2 +2 +3 +1 -2 +2 -2

Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak

Considering the divergent movements of individual components of inventories, total industrial inventories behave with surprising regularity. Additional cycles of intermediate goods are on the whole eliminated, and the large amplitudes of final products in ventories make total industrial inventories move inversely to pro duction in spite of the le ss e r weight of final products. A ll the peaks of inventories lag one to two quarters behind the troughs of production, which supports the earlier th esis that the departure from recession is paid for by accelerated accumulation of inven tories in the first few months. The inventory troughs, except in 1957, precede the peaks of industrial cycles by two quarters r e spectively, which at first leads to the conclusion that renewed a c cumulation of inventories is the signal for producers that the m ar ket is oversaturated and that it is necessary to reduce the expan sion of production. We w ill see later in fact the explanation is otherwise. Explosions of the foreign trade deficit at peaks of the production cycles check the further acceleration of production
110

and, with it, also demand while enterprises which do not depend upon imports or which in the preceding period were well supplied with imports continue to expand production; that output, for lack of buyers with means of payment, begins to overflow into inventories. Table 9.7 Tim e Lags of Industrial Inventories at the Turning Points of Industrial Production (based on constant prices) Lead ( - ) or Lag (+) in Months Final Total Intermediate Unfinished Goods Production Products Inventories YugoYugo YugoYugoUSA* slavia USA* slavia USA* slavia USA* slavia Peaks +2.8 -4 .0 +8.8 0 +2.7 -2 .2 0 +3.3 ... Troughs +5.8 -4 +6.0 +1 +5.0 +5.0 +3.6 -2 +7.4 +0.5 +3.8 Average +4.5 Source: Stanback, op. cit., p. 101. Note: The American data relate to the period 1948-1958, and the Yugoslav to 1955-1964. They are not entirely comparable, for Stanback m easures deviations in relation to the so-called refer ence cycle and I m easure in relation to the production cycle. In addition, Stanback works with se r ie s of absolute values and I use rates of growth. For Yugoslav data on final products and total in ventories, the lag (lead) is measured from peak of production to the trough of inventories and from the trough of production to the peak of inventories, while in the American se r ie s the lags (leads) are measured from the sam e turning points. Industrial Cycle 1 o It w ill be useful now to sum m arize our observations concerning the comparison of movements of inventories and production and to compare them with a sim ilar approach in a foreign study, i.e ., with Stanback's data for the USA. This m aterial is presented in Table 9.7. It can be seen that the cycles of inventories and of production are better synchronized in Yugoslavia than in the USA. And differences appear in the direction of tim e displacements that must be examined. Let us begin with final products, which com prise the most com plicated category of inventories. Stanback (op. cit., p. 63) distin111
CO

guishes the following components of final products inventories: USA 1947 Goods made to order 15-25 Goods made for stock 75-85 Goods whose production cycles are governed by demand Perishables * * Nonperishable staples 50-60 41-51 Goods whose production cycles are governed by supply Perishables * * _________ Nonperishable staples_____________ 16_______ 23 Total industrial inventories 100 100 1939 15-25 75-85

Total perishable goods account for 9%. Their structure is un known. Inventories of goods made to order (machines, transportation equipment, etc.) fluctuate along with production. The sam e is true of demand-governed perishable goods. Supply-governed invento r ie s (agricultural raw m aterials and the products derived from them) are not sensitive to the business cycle. Inventories of nonperishable goods governed by demand, which constitute the largest single component of final goods, move inversely in relation to the production cycle; therefore total inventories of final goods move in the same way as in Yugoslavia. The inversion is complete to the extent that cycles are short, but it turns into a lag when they are longer, which is the normal case in the USA. This observa tion indicates the possibility that in Yugoslavia an interruption of the inversion of inventory movements w ill also result to the extent that the cycle is prolonged. In other words, insofar a s the present depression is prolonged, it may be that the expansion of invento rie s w ill weaken before the lower turning point of production. Re duction of the share of nonperishable demand-governed staples r e sulted, in the USA, in reduction of the lag of total industrial inven tories from 8.6 months before the war to 3.8 months after the war. Inventories of intermediate goods largely move together with production; they lag behind production in the USA, but they lead
112

in Yugoslavia. This has, as we shall see, significant consequences for the explanation of the cyclical mechanism. It follows from the above considerations that inventories of intermediate goods, un finished production, final products made to order, and final p er ishable goods governed by demand in all, 75% of industrial in ventories in the USA move in conformity with the production cy cle, inventories of nonperishable staples governed by demand (16% of total inventories) move inversely, and the rest move randomly. As a result, total industrial inventories change in conformity with the cycle of industrial production in the USA, while they move in versely in Yugoslavia, for those components of inventories which move directly with the cycle are relatively sm all, and the rea c tions of economic decision-m aking units are different. Stanback and Abramovitz explain the functioning of the cyclical mechanism as follows. (7) At the beginning of the upswing, sa les increase and orders sim ilarly grow rapidly. Enterprises place orders (a) to cover the requirements of increased sa les, (b) to in crease disposable inventories, and (c) to obtain a place in tim e on the waiting lists of suppliers, who prolong their delivery sched u les with the growth of demand. At the beginning of the decline in production, sa les fall, enterprises reduce orders to adjust inven tories to the lower volume of business activity, and the increase in available goods shortens the delivery schedules, by which the desired ratio of unfilled orders to inventories is reduced. The cy cle is determined by such behavior. At the beginning of the up swing it appears to result in a relative, and even an absolute, r e duction of inventories (troughs of inventories lag: see Table 9.7), and producers increase orders. After som e tim e inventories b e gin to increase and grow faster than production, for producers try to restore the normal relation between inventories and sa les. At som e point in the course of the upswing a situation em erges in which producers consider that they are sufficiently insured with resp ect to inventories and orders, and they begin to reduce new orders. The inventory accumulation also slows down, and the r e duction of demand results in a downward turning of the cycle. A f ter the turning point inventories still increase for som e 2-3 months (see Table 9.7), for producers are in the course of fulfilling unfin ished orders for intermediate goods and because producers of f i nal nonperishable staples made for stock cannot reduce produc tion quickly because of the great costs involved in such rapid adaptation. But inventories also begin to fall after 2-3 quarters,
113

and the rapid decumulation of total inventories deepens the depres sion. Later, inventory decumulation begins to slow down and that i.e ., the trough in negative changes in inventories gives the impulse for the upward turning of the cycle. The fact that in all three postwar cycles the peaks of inventory investment preceded the peaks of the business cycle a s was also true in two or three troughs indicates that in the American economy inventories in i tiate the upswing from recession and then check that upswing at a certain point. It would doubtless be useful to consider in like manner the func tioning of the cyclical mechanism in a centrally planned economy. In this respect the so le work published so far is the short paper of Goldmann and Flek on waves in the movement of the growth rate and inventory cycles in Czechoslovakia. (8) Analyzing the period 1950-1966, the authors establish that in the years when the social product grew only a little, inventory decumu lation resulted by which consumption greater than production was covered, and that the rev erse was true in years of great growth of the social product. In other words, high growth rates generate in ventory accumulation, and low rates decumulation; in "fat" years inventories accumulate, while in "lean" ones they are d e pleted, just exactly as in the Bible. Such reactions of producers are sim ilar to those of the American producers. Some difficulty in interpreting Goldmann's results is introduced by the statistical data, which include in inventories uncompleted investments in fixed capital and which allocate to the social product new capacity put into operation in the course of the year without regard to when they are completed investments. Goldmann and Flek see "social ist speculation" as the prime mover in Czechoslovak inventory cy cles. That is, in the accelerative phases of the production cycle, difficulties in supplying intermediate goods increase and each en terp rise attempts to protect itself with larger inventories. The r e sult, of course, is that the scarcity in creases still more. When, finally, import possibilities are also exhausted, the turning of the cycle downward results. Now the enterprises complete and throw into production objects that were started in earlier years. Thus capacity is increased, which, along with slowed expansion of d e mand and reduction of the foreign trade deficit, improves condi tions of supply; enterprises reduce their inventories, which still further stabilizes the situation; and at a certain moment a ccelera tion of growth begins again. These cycles last six to eight years.
114

Thus Abramovitz, Stanback, Goldmann and Flek explain inven tory cycles by the sam e "speculative" behavior of producers con ditioned by the gap between demand and supply. But the causes of that gap are diam etrically opposed in the two economies. The Czechoslovak economy, like every centrally planned economy, is oriented toward production. Because it comes up against capacity barriers i.e ., because of the deficiency of supply in relation to existing demand a recession results. The American economy, like every market economy, is consumption oriented. Therefore insufficient demand w ill stipulate the end of the upswing. The sam e argument holds for the emergence from depression: increased supply in the centrally planned economy and increased demand in the market economy spur on the new upswing. Since in both economies the inventories change in conformity with the production cycle, but in such a way that inventory changes absorb a sm aller percentage of the growth of production in the a c celerative phase and a relatively greater part of the fall in produc tion in the retardation phase, consumption is more stable, fluctu ating le s s than production. It is precisely in this respect that the behavior of the Yugoslav economy is different. In the Yugoslav economy inventories move inversely to the production cycle, r e sulting in reduction of fluctuations of production at the expense of increased fluctuations of consumption. And thus we have estab lished in fact a third, hitherto unknown, type of mechanism of in ventory fluctuations. As the result of the inverse movement of in ventories and production, in the accelerative phases of the cycles the investment in total industrial inventories absorbs about 25% of the growth of production, and in the retardation phases it ab sorbs the entire increase in industrial production. (9) The latter means that in the retardation phase of the Yugoslav industrial cy cle, production growth is possible only if it is production exclu sively for inventories. And insofar as it may be attempted, for example by credit restriction, to prevent the formation of a c e r tain volume of inventories, an absolute reduction of production w ill result. Evidence of the correctness of this la st hypothesis is provided by economic policy in 1967. Now we are finally able to consider in detail the mechanism of inventory fluctuations in Yugoslavia. The necessary information is given in Graph 9.3. Slowing down of production corresponds to acceleration of accumulation of total inventories and to the reverse in phases of accelerated production. Total credits for working
115

capital on the whole follow inventories (the coefficient of correla tion r = 0.75 for the period 1955-1965) but have somewhat sm aller amplitudes. The curve of chain indices of credits has a disconti nuity in the second quarter of 1962, since a year earlier in May 1961 significant institutional changes occurred: initial funds of working capital transferred to enterprises that had earlier been in the form of a debt were now paid in part from blocked am orti zation funds and in part were turned into credits from the general investment fund. In order to obtain an approximate idea of the a c tual movement of available sources of working capital in the d is rupted year of 1962, we extended the curve several quarters on the basis of the construction of comparable movements of chain indices. The credit curve shows an interesting feature. In the en tire thirteen-year period considered, it was only in the second half of 1955 and in the last three quarters of 1966 that credit ex pansion slowed down below 10% annually. And in both those ca ses it resulted in stagnation of industrial production. With the excep tion of the beginning and end of the period considered (1954-1958 and 1966) which were both abnormal, although for different rea sons credit policy was to a certain degree anticyclical in rela tion to industry. Following inventories, which move inversely to production, in depressed periods credit expanded more rapidly than production; in periods of high growth rates the credit expan sion was slow er. However, even when it was objectively anticyc lical, it was delayed; it is obvious that economic movements were not anticipated and that, especially in retardations, credit therapy was undertaken under the pressure of self-protective reactions of economic organizations. D irect credits of producers, i.e ., accounts payable, represent the third component of our cyclical mechanism. The data, taken from periodic reports of the Social Accounting Service, extend back only to 1960. In years of prosperity accounts are settled promptly and indebtedness to suppliers is reduced relatively. When retardation of production begins, it results in a sharp in crease in accounts payable. Since it is a question of an expedient in n ecessity, and since accounts payable, especially earlier, were significantly le s s than bank credits in absolute term s, they flu c tuate several tim es more intensively. The deep trough at the end of 1962 is the consequence of an action to settle mutual outstand ing debts by a m ultilateral clearing operation with significant credit support, which was extended in the first half of that year.
116

If we now consider the interplay of all the above-mentioned fac tors, we may be able to describe the industrial cycles in the last thirteen years in the following way. In the course of 1955 there was a retardation of production, which evoked inventory accumu lation supported by significant credit expansion. As we saw in Graph 9.1, there accumulated not only inventories of final prod ucts but, to a large extent, also inventories of intermediate goods. In that way industry, well supplied and relatively liquid, entered the m ildest of all cycles in 1957-1959. The upswing in 1959 r e sulted in an absolute reduction of inventories and relatively stable credit expansion that was relatively close to the critical rate of 10%. The first half of 1960 saw the beginning of a retardation of production, an abrupt growth of inventories, mild credit expansion, and a sharp slowing down of debt payments to suppliers. The un prepared and inconsistent radical institutional changes in 1961 deepened the recession, producing a piling up of inventories, and despite relatively large credits the economy became illiquid. A f ter the illiquidity was resolved in 1962 by special m easures, there was a new upswing of production and a fall of inventories. The r e tardation in 1964 renewed the already fam iliar sequence of events. Inventories increased abruptly and, since credits did not follow that increase, indebtedness grew by leaps and bounds. In 1965 credits began to follow inventories, the expansion of indebtedness slowed somewhat, the line of inventories turned downward, indus trial production attained som e sort of plateau and, to all appear ances, a turning upward of the cycle would ensue. However, just at that tim e, contrary to all principles of anticyclical policy, the National Bank began a sharp restriction of credit that lasted a year, reduced the rate of growth to production below zero, and brought the economy to the sam e condition of illiquidity as in 1962. How, accordingly, does the typical Yugoslav industrial cycle d e velop? The results of investigations up to now present us with this picture. In the upswing, inventories relatively and at the peaks even absolutely decline, credit expands by som e well-balanced rate of about 10%, liquidity of industry in creases, and it pays its debts. When, for various reasons, a downward turning of the cy cle occurs, practically at the sam e tim e inventories begin to pile up, liquidity is reduced, and the economy becom es indebted very quickly. After production reaches the lower turning point, inven tory accumulation accelerates still another one or two quarters,
117

accompanied by expansion of credit and reduction of illiquidity, which means that revival begins with production for inventories, which must be financed by additional money supply. This picture of the functioning of the cyclical mechanism is still incomplete. There remain, especially, the unexplained upper and lower turning points. It is not clear what happens with prices, nor what the role of international trade is. Investigation of these prob lem s is the task of the following chapters. Notes 1) All data in this chapter that are related to inventories are taken from the doctoral dissertation of Ljubomir Madzar, Mesto zaliha u procesu drustvene reprodukcije. 2) In relation to sa les, inventories com prise 16% in trade, 20% for the economy as a whole, and 20% in industry. 3) T. M. Stanback, Postwar C ycles in Manufacturers' Invento ries (New York: NBER, 1959), p. 15. 4) M. Abramovitz, Inventories and Business C ycles (New York: NBER, 1959), p. 109; Stanback, op. cit., p. 132; UN Statistical Yearbook, 1966, p. 569. 5) W. Stolper remarks: "Textile factories that in England would keep two days' supply of spare parts on hand must in Nigeria keep enough to last nine months. Similar figures apply to tobacco fac tories and steel m ills. It takes that long to order and get the parts from overseas" (Planning Without Facts [Cambridge, Mass.: Har vard University P re ss, 1966], p. 111). 6) Op. cit., pp. 123-127, 270. 7) J. Goldmann and J. Flek, "Vlnovit^ pohyb v tempu rustu a cyklus v dynamice zdsob," Pldnovan^ hospoddrstvi, 1967, No. 9, pp. 1-16. 8) In the USA these percentages for the prewar and postwar pe riod amount on the average to 9% in the expansion and 44% in the contraction (Stanback, op. cit., p. 13). 9) For a more extended explanation and corresponding analysis, see my book Ekonomska nauka i narodna privreda, Part n (Naprijed, 1968).

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Chapter 10 MONETARY-CREDIT FACTORS AND PRICES

10.1 Fluctuations in the Aggregate Values of Industry and the Economy as a Whole E ssentially a ll the movements which we will analyze in this chapter are shown in the next three graphs. Let us begin with a description of industrial movements, by which we extend the anal y sis in the preceding chapter (Graph 10.1). The data on sa les have been taken from the statistical bulletins of the National Bank and the Social Accounting Service. Those nominal sales are then deflated by an index of producers' prices for industrial products in order to obtain chain indices of the physical volume of paid-in-full shipments. On the basis of our earlier analysis of inventory fluctuations, we may expect that sa les fluctuations w ill be significantly greater than fluctuations of industrial production. That expectation receives full confirmation in Graph 10.1. The segm ents for 1962 and 1965-1966 on the graph, where the sa les line resem bles the line of a seismograph, are striking. And indeed it is a matter of two economic shocks, the reform s of 1961 and 1965. Sales of the economy as a whole (Graph 10.2) behave sim ilarly to industrial sa les and have the sam e two earthquake-like periods, but the amplitudes of fluctuation are significantly greater. In this case the general index of retail p rices was utilized as a deflator; this is not the most adequate deflator, but it is the best available. Since there are no quarterly indices of movements of the total s o cial production, it would be interesting to examine the extent to which sa les can act as a proxy for those indices, with respect to the degree to which the indices of sa les and of the physical volume 119

1351

Sales Physical volume of industrial production Producers' prices Ratio of chain indices of nominal personal incomes and labor productivity (moving averages) Sales deflated by indices of producers' prices

1 30

1 25

120

115

Chain indices

110

1 05

100

1 1955

1 1

i \i \ 1956

1 1

-19 5 /7

i 1

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Graph 10.1

Industry: Nominal and Deflated Sales, Production, Producers'

120

121

Sales of the economy Industrial production Retail prices Sales deflated by the general retail price index Total personal incomes in the economy

Graph 10.2

Nominal and Deflated Sales of the Economy, Retail Prices,

Total Personal Incomes of the Economy, and Industrial Production

123

Graph 10.3

Sales, Credits, Inventories, Demand Deposits,

124

 ........................

S a le s o f th e econom y T o ta l c r e d its f o r w ork in g c a p ita l D em and d e p o s its (from 1/1962, to tal liq u id r e s o u rc e s ) A ccounts payable M oney supply (from 1/1966, ac co rd in g to new definition) O In v e n to rie s in th e econom y a t end o f y e a r (constant p ric e s ) *
/ \

Money Supply, and Accounts Payable

of production agree. The correlation between deflated industrial sales and the physical volume of industrial production is r = 0.52 for the entire period and r = 0.72 for the sam e period without the two reform s; and between deflated sa les for the economy and the physical volume of industrial production r = 0.63 and r = 0.66 r e spectively. R egression equations show that the indices of sa les and of physical volume move approximately at the sam e rate, and that their level is corrected by a positive or negative value of the constant term . (1) The regression coefficients are highly sign ifi cant even at the level of 1%. Table 10.1 Chain Indices of the Social Product (in 1960 prices) Other Sectors Economy (excluding (excluding Industry agriculture) agriculture) 3 2 1 109.5 105.3 1953 107.4 110.5 114.4 1954 112.4 114.1 106.3 1955 110.2 103.5 109.7 96.7 1956 112.5 117.3 1957 115.2 106.9 109.7 1958 111.8 111.6 110.6 111.2 1959 113.6 113.7 113.9 1960 109.6 107.0 1961 108.7 107.3 102.8 1962 105.4 115.6 111.0 113.7 1963 116.0 112.0 1964 114.4 1965 106.1 108.4 102.9 Source: SZS, Statisticki godisnjaci.

Difference 2-3 4 4.2 3.9 7.8 13.0 4.8 4.9 1.0 -0 .3 -2 .6 4.5 4.6 4.0 5.5

Analysis of annual data gives additional information (Table 10.1). It can be seen that the economy, excluding agriculture, and indus try move at about the sam e rate, which is not surprising when one bears in mind that industry contributes a significant part of total production excluding agriculture 36% at the beginning of the pe riod considered and alm ost 50% at the end (in constant 1960 prices).
126

The data in column 4 show that the physical volume of industrial production grows faster than the production of other sectors. In that respect the table shows a tendency for the differences to d e cline up to 1961, when they even become negative, and to increase after that year. What is particularly interesting is that at high rates of growth the differences decline, while in depressed years they are significantly greater than the average. An important con clusion follows: fluctuations of economic activity of other sectors are greater than fluctuations of industry; accordingly, other s e c tors are a more unstable element of the Yugoslav economy than industry is. The sam e conclusion can also be drawn from the data in Table 10.2 on turning points and amplitudes of fluctuations. The am pli tudes of deflated sa les are greater for the economy than for indus try, and in both cases they are greater than for industrial produc tion. Furthermore, it is very significant that the amplitudes s y s tem atically increase from cycle to cycle for all three aggregates; this means that from 1957 to the present the instability of the Yu goslav economy has system atically increased. In that respect the phenomenon of the constant lowering of the cyclical troughs is e s pecially dangerous. In the last cycle all the troughs fell below 100, which means that there was an absolute reduction of both produc tion and sa les, the first since the tim e of the Cominform blockade. Our knowledge about m onetary-credit phenomena, which we a c quired by the analysis of fluctuations of industrial inventories, w ill now be supplemented by analysis of certain aggregate values for the entire economy. It can be seen from Graph 10.3 that total credits for working capital follow total inventories at the outset, and from 1957 they follow total sa les in the economy (the coeffi cient of correlation is 0.62 for the period 1957 to the second quar ter of 1965). However, as credits are not well synchronized with the requirements of sa les, the economy is aided by mutual indebt edness and variations in liquidity. Both variations are extreme. Liquidity of the economy is shown on the graph by chain indices of funds in demand deposits (ziro racuni) up to 1963, and by indices of total liquid resources, (demand deposits, depreciation funds, funds for common consumption, and other money deposits) from 1962 on. This statistical discontinuity is necessary in order to neutralize institutional changes as much as possible. That is , d e preciation funds and other liquid resources had been strictly a s signed and often blocked; changes in the financial system after 1961
127

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(when business funds of economic organizations were created) gradually abolished restriction s, and other funds approached the liquidity of demand deposits. At high rates of credit expansion, liquidity increases still fa st er, at low rates even slower. When credit expansion exceeds the rate of 20% annually, liquid funds grow faster than credit; when credit expansion falls below 15%, liquidity not only deteriorates relatively, but even the absolute amount of liquid resources falls. Naturally, the reverse is true of movements of indebtedness of the economy, which are shown on the graph by chain indices of a c counts payable that are based on the periodic calculations of the Social Accounting Service. Since credits move with sa les, along with extreme oscillations (in opposite directions) of liquidity and indebtedness, it is completely clear that anticyclical credit poli cies had not been devised for the Yugoslav economy as a whole. What is more, as we shall se e a little later, credit policy resulted in increased instability. Only in emerging from depressions, par ticularly in 1962, did credit policy play a positive role. It is interesting that the money supply is much more weakly cor related with economic movements than credits for working capital (the coefficient of correlation with total sa les is r = 0.21). The cause of that is probably at lea st partially the earlier inadequately p recise definition of money supply, which includes in money those funds which do not serv e for payment. Although all three recessio n s shown on Graph 10.3 occurred ba sically in the sam e way, the recession s that began in the first half of 1960 and 1964 deserve special attention because of their se v e r ity. In both cases the expansion of sa les and credit slowed down and the liquidity of the economy fell sharply, while the indebted n ess of the economy increased enormously. When in the first of these recession s the illiquidity of the economy became more than critical, rem edial action was taken in the first quarter of 1962 debts were mutually cleared, and relatively large (in relation to the volume of production) credits and other financial m easures during 1962 liquidated indebtedness and increased liquidity, so that in the second half of that year an economic upswing began anew. The recession of 1964 is different from the preceding one, inasmuch as large adm inistrative increases in prices were intro duced in 1965; the price increase raised nominal sa les and, along with the support of somewhat accelerated credit expansion, in creased nominal liquidity. However, since the expansion of liquid
129

resources only follows the expansion of nominal sa les, liquidity per unit of monetary transactions did not increase. In 1966 there was a slowing down of credit expansion, and then an absolute r e duction of money available for economic transactions. As a result, the growth of nominal sa les slowed down sharply, the physical v o l ume of sa les which in the second half of 1965 and the first half of 1966 fell absolutely, and then recovered somewhat again showed a tendency to fall absolutely, and the liquidity of the econ omy fell far below the low est point of 1961. From the middle of 1965 the indebtedness of the economy increased by a rate of 4550% annually and in 1967 reached the level of indebtedness of 1961 with respect to the volume of transactions. There can be observed, it appears, yet another interesting dif ference between the la st two recession s. In the recession of 1960 the expansion of indebtedness and liquidity of resources moved in reverse directions; in the recession that started in 1964, they moved in the sam e direction from the middle of 1965 to the mid dle of 1966. The latter phenomenon can be explained by the fact that in the middle of the recession, in mid-1965, reform s were adopted which: (a) cancelled various taxes, thereby increasing the liquidity of the economy as a whole; (b) drastically changed prices and the structure of demand, and thus produced unexpected and un earned profits for som e enterprises and undeserved lo sse s for other enterprises; and (c) treated low-profit and unprofitable en terp rises le ss generously than hitherto. Consequently, som e en terp rises accumulated liquid resources normally while others had to incur debt in order to continue production. Since the economy is an interdependent system , every stronger disturbance in one segment of that system will lead to a stoppage in the functioning of the whole system . In a system of intersectoral links, low profit enterprises are directly or indirectly custom ers of high-profit enterprises. To the extent that the first group abrupt ly stops or reduces production, that w ill also have to be done by the latter group. For that reason the high-profit enterprises w ill use their own and borrowed funds to grant credit to their weaker partners, at least so long as the process of readaptation of the economy to the initial disturbance is uncompleted. Since, as our graphs show, the initial disturbance was violent, the normal un folding of the process of readaptation ordinarily would require a longer period of tim e, at least several years, along with a sy stem atic campaign to strengthen and replace weak links in the economic
130

chains. However, weak enterprises were left more or le s s to them selves, em issions of money and credit were slowed instead of accelerated, and thus after only one year the weak pulled them selv es and the strong into the abyss of nonliquidity. In 1967 the economy again found itself in the situation of 1961. 10.2 The Volume of Transactions, Money and Indebtedness Although we established in the preceding section that quarterly movements of the money supply (according to the appropriate def inition) are not closely correlated with quarterly movements of the economy, it can be assumed that the correspondence is sign if icantly better in longer tim e periods. Therefore it would be u s e ful to attempt to supplement the conclusions from the preceding section with a summary analysis of the supply and demand for money. We will carry this out for the period from 1958 on, when the Yugoslav economy had already assumed the characteristics of a market economy. We can begin this task conveniently by a com parative analysis of som e economic movements in the eleven most expansive market econom ies in the world over the last twelve years. Those econom ies that grow by rates of 5% or more annual ly have been selected as expansive. The data were taken from statistical publications of the International Monetary Fund, whose definition of money supply approximates the Yugoslav definition. Table 10.3 perm its the statement of an entire serie s of hypoth e se s concerning monetary and real movements. F irst of all, the unweighted averages show that accelerated growth is accompanied by an increase in p rices, and to som e extent, the elasticity of the supply of money. In a ll the countries, the ela sticities of the money supply in relation to the physical volume of production are sign ifi cantly greater than one; however, in relation to the money value of final production they som etim es fall below one, and on the average are not significantly greater than one. This means that the v elo c ity of turnover of money in relation to the money value of transac tions was constant for the period considered. In all the countries, prices on the internal market represented by the costs of living increased relatively fast. In a ll there were two quite significant exceptions Portugal in the first group and West Germany in the second. Both countries also have below-average elasticities of money supply. The example of West Germany, because of its high rate of economic development, is particularly instructive. The
131

Table 10.3

Rate of Growth of the Social Product, Money Supply and Cost of Living in Twelve Expanding Economies in the Period 1953-1965 Social Product Coefficients of In Con-In Cur- Supply Cost of of E lasticity stant rent 3:1 3:2 prices prices Money Living 4 5 1 2 3 6 I Medium Expansive Economies Netherlands Italy France Portugal Austria 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.5 9.1 9.0 9.7 6.7 9.2 6.3 11.6 11.8 7.4 8.4 3.3 3.3 3.9 1.8 2.8 1.26 2.32 2.36 1.45 1.53 0.69 1.29 1.22 1.10 0.91

II Highly Expansive Economies Greece West Germany Spain Mexico Japan Israel Average, Group I Average, Group II Yugoslavia, 1958-1964 Yugoslavia, 1958-1967 6.0 6.0 6.4a 6.6 9.3 10.5 5.1 7.5 10.9 9.8 9.1b 12.7 13.2 18.7 8.7 12.4 16.2 9.9 13.5^ 11.6 15.0 16.7C 9.1 13.8 3.4 2.1 6.9b 5.0 3.6 6.1 3.0 4.5 2.70 1.57 2.11 1.76 1.62 1.59 1.78 1.89 1.49 1.01 1.48 0.91 1.14 0.89 1.04 1.15

9.5 7.4

20.6 23.5

24.9 17.8

8.8 12.2

2.62 2.40

1.21 0.76

a) 1956-1964, b) 1955-1964, c) 1954-1964 Sources: a) For foreign countries and Yugoslavia during 1958-1964, data are taken from International Monetary Fund, In ternational Financial S tatistics, Supplement to 1966/ 1967 Issues; and UN Statistical Yearbook, 1966.
132

Table 10.3 (continued)

b) For Yugoslavia, according to columns of the table: (1) SZS, Statisticki godisnjak, 1958-1965, estim ate of SZPP for 1966 and my estim ate for 1967 (-1%). (2) SZS, Statisticki godisnjak, 1958-1966, my estim ate for 1967 on the basis of the estim ate of the dynamics of total values of production (+6.3%). (3) As under (a) for 1958-1965, SDK, Statisticki bilten 11/1967 for 1965-1967. ( 4 ) Indeks, 12/1967. ordering of internal finances, along with a significantly slower movement of p rices in relation to all her main partners, made it possible for Germany to have a revaluation of the mark and great export expansion. The case of Japan is sim ilar. Its economy is certainly le s s stable than the German, but attains a rate of growth half again higher and, in term s of price movements and coeffi cients of money supply, is below the average of her group. Two countries at the extrem es of the table, the Netherlands and Israel, are striking because of their unusual behavior prices rising significantly above the average, but the supply of money ex panding significantly below the average. Accordingly, these coun tries fundamentally contradict that quantitative theory of money according to which prices are lower the le ss money there is in relation to the volume of transactions. The explanation is proba bly sim ilar to the one for the sam e phenomenon in Yugoslavia. Both countries are sm all and very open the Netherlands exports half of its production and the rate of price inflation is a basic peril to their economic growth. Having exhausted other methods of controlling p rices, they resorted to restricting the supply of money. Yugoslavia, with a rate of growth of 8.5% in the 1958-1964 p eri od, enters at the very peak of group n . Em issions of money were above the average for the group, especially in relation to the phys ical volume of production. However, those em issions were still lower than, for example, in G reece, and the second coefficient of elasticity (in relation to the nominal social product) was le s s than in a number of countries, while at the sam e tim e prices increased faster not only than the average but also in relation to any other country in the table. In connection with this statement it is n e c e s sary to have in mind that, because of institutional changes, the
133

sam e stock of money was able to clear a greater volume of eco nomic transactions in 1964 than six years earlier. But there r e mains a very strong indication that the price increases had an au tonomous cause, that m onetary-credit policy cannot be blamed in that respect, and that the supply of money was, on the whole, the sam e as in other countries. The above-mentioned indication is further strengthened when the period considered is extended to cover three more years of the last reform. Monetary em issions slowed down drastically, so that for the three years the average second coefficient of elasticity fell to the Netherlands-Israel level. At the sam e tim e, administrative in creases of prices significantly raised the average price in creases for the entire period. A drastic monetary shock had to be d rasti cally reflected in the liquidity of the economy, concerning which we present data on financial flows of the National Bank (Table 10.4). As regards the changes in the composition of money during the period considered, judgments cannot be made concerning the changes in the turnover of money in the p ossession of economic organizations, except that the obvious sharp increase of liquidity in 1962 was the result of m easures to deal with the illiquidity of the economy, and the drastic reduction of liquidity after 1965, when the money supply fell not only relatively but absolutely, was the result of a policy of monetary restriction. D irect credits to buy ers, by which the availability of money as a means of payment is corrected, naturally move cyclically. In the expansive years (1959, 1963, 1964) accounts receivable were lower (10.5-11.4% of the value of production); in recession years (1961, 1965-1967) they increased (11.8-15.9%). In that respect the situation in 1967 was the sam e as in 1961. In 1962, as a result of m easures to improve the financial condition of the economy, accounts receivable fell by 330 billion old dinars, or 21%. Short-term bank credits, as can be seen in column 9 of Table 10.4, move in the sam e way as the business cycle, thereby deep ening the latter. In 1967 bank credits reached by far their low est value for the entire period. The extent to which credit restriction was severe is seen from the data that accounts payable surpassed indebtedness to banks; the economy substituted its credit for that of the banks. Total means of payment (money and accounts receivable) and to tal credits (i.e., bank and direct) represent fairly steady propor tions of the value of production: first they move in the interval
134

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between 15.6 and 20.7%, and later in the interval between 21.4 and 27.9%, with a tendency to fall. However, the movements within the intervals are not random but system atic, and such that the v elo c ity of turnover falls in retardation phases of the cycle and in creases in accelerative phases. At the trough of a depression, a total volume of money of 21%, or total credits of 28%, of the value of production will not be sufficient; in periods of economic up swings, even means of payment of 16% and credits of 22% can be entirely satisfactory. However, the total volume of money and credit required depends also on their composition. Money turns over faster than accounts receivable, and sim ilarly, it would ap pear, bank credits turn over faster than accounts payable. And that is one more indication, among the others observed earlier, of the exceptional importance of correct doses of money and cred it in maintaining the normal rhythm of economic transactions. 10.3 P rice Movements Variations in the volume of money are immediately linked in popular and expert opinion with the movement of p rices. Our anal y sis has given som e indications that this conception, at lea st as far as the Yugoslav economy is concerned, is mistaken and that price movements have a specific and autonomous cause. D iscov ery of the cause which satisfactorily explains current, quarterly price movements in the Yugoslav economy would be of great im portance in establishing stabilization policy on a scientific basis. And, indeed, the research that follows is dedicated to resolving that problem, insofar as it falls within the framework of this study. Table 10.5 gives us, first of all, a general conception of price movements in Yugoslavia. The im plicit deflators of the social product and the direct price indices show that the dynamics of in dustrial prices are significantly m ore stable than the dynamics of p rices either in agriculture or in other sectors. This means that industry succeeded in absorbing the even greater variations and price in creases of other sectors and, until 1964, kept its own prices quite stable. There is little doubt that industry achieved this as a result, first of all, of the rapid growth of labor produc tivity and the efficiency of investment; that is, in turn, the result of rapid expansion of production, as was established in the chapter on the productivity of labor. Comparison of the im plicit deflators and the direct indices shows
136

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the existence of the sam e tendencies and order of magnitude of variations, but otherwise the agreement is by no means ideal. The differences can be the result of more fundamental differences in the indices (for the indices m easure different phenomena), but they cap also stem from methodological and other errors. Since I am not fam iliar with the research in this field, it is im possible to make a judgment at this point. It is n ecessary to warn, however, that the statistical methodology has a peculiarity that can have significant effects: producers prices include the turnover tax which, until the la st reform s, was paid mainly by producers. Thus, since the turnover tax changes from tim e to tim e, and changes in dependently of the producers, these in fact are not producers' p rices, i.e ., producers do not determine them. Our table shows at the bottom that, after the proportioning of prices on a higher lev el in 1965, the chain indices of prices in 1967 alm ost returned to the average of the period 1952-1964, and a g ri cultural prices were even below that average. We shall elaborate on the analysis of movements of producers' prices in agriculture and industry, industrial retail prices, and the general index of r e tail prices. In that connection, in interpreting the graphs it is n ec essary to keep constantly in mind that the lines of chain indices do not represent quarterly indices of the changes of prices in su c cessiv e quarters but (in order to eliminate seasonal influences) the index of the sam e quarters of su ccessiv e years, as has been generally done in our graphs. Let us begin with agricultural p rices, which are easier to ana lyze. The economy came out of the adm inistrative period with large disparities between industrial and agricultural prices, to the detriment of the latter. Development of market relationships demanded the elimination of those disparities, so that in the p eri od under consideration there was a constant and rapid in crease of agricultural p rices. For the period 1952-1964, that increase amounted on the average to alm ost 10% annually. Since food ab sorbs about half of fam ily budgetary resou rces, the increase of agricultural prices produced a significant increase in the cost of living which, through p ressure to ra ise personal incom es, evoked strong inflationary tendencies. Where annual changes are concerned, it can be expected that a good harvest causes a fall in prices (in our case, a fall in the rate of increase of prices) in the third and fourth quarters of the sam e year and in the first two quarters of the next year. Graph 10.4
138

supports that expectation. As good and bad harvests appeared in alternate years, the troughs and peaks of the price curve, with a sm all phasal shift, coincided with the troughs and peaks of the curve for agricultural production. That correspondence stopped after 1959, for after that year the two-year cycle of good harvests was interrupted. But the general regularity of the reverse m ove ment of rates of increase of production and prices remained, with a certain lag. One cannot discern any sort of connection between annual changes of industrial and agricultural prices. However, from time to tim e there occurred a coincidence of inflationary pe riods, as in 1954-1955, 1960-1961, and 1964-1966, and then a strong inflationary wave ensued throughout the country (see Ta ble 10.5). What strikes one first about industrial prices is something that we have already emphasized their very sm all increase, an over all average of about 1% annually in the period 1952-1964. There are not many countries in the world with such mild movements of industrial prices. That result is even more significant because, in the sam e period, there was strong inflationary pressure from agricultural prices, as well as the pressure of frequent economic reorganizations. By rapid in creases in labor productivity, as well as efficiency in the use of capital, industry succeeded in absorb ing those p ressures. But in 1954-1955 industrial prices began to follow agricultural prices. When that tendency attained its culm i nation in 1955, the Federal P rice Bureau was founded and p erm is sion had to be obtained to ra ise p rices. Those m easures, accom panied by the establishment of som e maximum price ceilings and aided by corresponding credit policy, stabilized industrial prices in the following eight years. Reduced fluctuations express certain market laws. High industrial production lowers industrial prices and low production ra ises them (or the chain index of prices). That is a very important statement. It follows that in Yugoslav condi tions industrial expansion does not lead (within certain sufficiently large lim its) to inflation but to better satisfaction of chronically unsaturated consumer demand. And the reverse also holds: in d e pressed periods there w ill be strong inflationary pressure because there is a tendency in those periods to carry out administrative in creases in prices (1962, 1964 and 1965), as well as because of a (for now) still unidentified cause. These are not necessarily nor mal characteristics of the market, but they are the reflection of a certain institutional system . (2) The effects are stronger when the 139

155 r
150
-

75 7 0

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Graph 10.4

Indices of

peaks and troughs of industrial and agricultural production co r respond. The picture described changed abruptly at the end of the period, when there was an explosion of p rices, agricultural as well as in dustrial. That explosion was probably in part prepared by the ex cessively rigid price policy in the preceding eight stable years. Some prices remained fixed too long and the profitability of pro duction fell, while real personal incom es began to lag. In a num ber of industries price stability was attained by subsidization, e i ther direct or indirect (through reduction of tax obligations). E lec140

P ric e s of Industrial products

Producers' Prices

trie power production, coal, iron and steel, railroads and other in dustries operated with subsidies, on the borderline of profitability or even with a lo ss. Instead of developing market relations, the more convenient but dangerous path was taken of expanding every year the sphere of adm inistrative price control. (3) And thus d is parities accumulated underneath the apparently smooth level. In 1961 industrial enterprises presented the Federal P rice Bureau with demands for increasing the p rices of 12,800 industrial prod ucts; in 1964 the number of demands exceeded 69,000. (4) As a r e sult, when ways of equalizing conditions of economic activity and
141

of relieving the federal budget of various subsidies were empha sized, it was possible to achieve a harmonization of prices only at a significantly higher level. Then there is the question of drastic administrative intervention, and whether it was necessary to wait eight years, or did there exist som e more efficient solution? Ad m inistrative harmonization can eliminate only the m ost gross d is parities and, in addition, it simultaneously creates new ones. Freezing of p rices, which is the natural consequence of adm inis trative intervention, and which la sts for months, intensifies d is parities and also creates new ones, for in a dynamic economy the relative relationships of costs of production constantly change. Therefore, in the succeeding period we can expect further distur bance in the market. In fact, already in 1966 the Federal P rice Bureau received the sam e number of demands for price increases as it did in 1964. Viewed from a longer perspective, however, the following con clusion appears to be indisputable. Since in a turbulent tw elveyear period, in which agricultural prices increased 10% annually, su ccess was achieved in maintaining the stability of industrial p rices, that stability can be preserved by an adequate price policy in the future to an even greater degree. That is so because the main disparities between agricultural and industrial prices have declined, and the significance of agricultural production in the s o cial product is decreasing. The adequacy of that policy depends on the factor which directs changes in industrial p rices, and we shall now undertake to identify that factor. The recession s of 1961 and 1965-1967 showed that, along with all the monetary restriction and piling up of inventories, prices continued to increase, and even more than before. That paradox remained unexplained. It was believed and experts hold the sam e opinion even today that it is a matter of the deformation of an insufficiently market-oriented economy, a deformation that the Na tional Bank has been attempting already for two years to correct by the artificial "limbs" of rigid m onetary-credit restriction. It would seem more logical to me, however, to assum e that the dif ferences in the reactions of the Yugoslav economy in comparison to cla ssica l capitalist market economies do not result from the form er's deformations, but from differences in the institutional system . Let us consider for a moment what happens in the course of a cycle. With the slowing down of the expansion of production, capacities
142

are insufficiently utilized, fixed costs (depreciation, overhead) per unit of output rise, and variable costs also rise, for the collectives quite normally and quite properly avoid dism issing their f e l low workers. Furthermore, in a rapidly growing economy average personal incomes increase rapidly, and they continue to r ise with a certain inertia even when the recession has already begun. Em ployment growth also continues after the beginning of the recession, for producers do not react immediately at the turning point of the cycle and, so it appears, it is a social-psychological characteristic of the decision-m akers to make short-run forecasts by extrapolat ing tendencies of the recent past. As a result of the phenomena we have described, nominal personal incomes rise faster than the pro ductivity of labor and, under the pressure of increased unit costs, prices also rise. Since, fortunately, bankruptcy and m assive d is m issals of workers do not enter into consideration, the economy rapidly becom es illiquid; then, when the unavoidable credit injec tions set it back on its feet, a new economic expansion begins in which all the cited reasons operate in the reverse direction, the pressure of costs slackens and prices stabilize or even fall. We must now submit this theory to an em pirical test. P rice movements are drawn on Graphs 10.1 and 10.2, which we analyzed earlier. The correlation between deflated total sa les and the gen eral retail price index is strong and negative. It follows that retail prices are in som e way related to the physical volume of sa les, but the relationship is such that prices r ise when sa les slow down and they fall (or r ise more slowly) when sales accelerate. Graph 10.2 also presents data on increases in total personal in comes in the economy. Unfortunately, we have at our disposal only annual data until 1964. But even that data is sufficient to observe that with the exception of 1958, when the points for personal incomes were below the line for sa les (and when, therefore, all price indices were exceptionally low, as can be seen from Table 10.5), personal incom es constantly rose faster than sa les, and a c cordingly also rose faster than production. There is therefore lit tle doubt that the Yugoslav economy is so constructed that there are huge pressures to increase personal incomes. But the case of 1958 shows that those pressures can be held in check even in a r e cession year. Since we have more data for industry, the line for the ratios b e tween nominal personal incom es and productivity of labor is drawn on Graph 10.1. Those ratios show the extent to which personal in
143

com es per employed person increase faster than the achieved in crease in labor productivity in particular years. In order to elim inate random deviations, four-quarterly moving averages of the original ratios are drawn. Since those ratios are continually greater than one, this means that incom es constantly r ise faster than production, thus confirming the statement made for the econ omy as a whole. The so le exception is 1962, when the ratio fe ll to one and despite the depression, large credits, and great liquidity industrial prices stabilized (see Table 10.5). The above analysis and careful study of Graph 10.1 show that there must be a quite strong connection between producers1 prices and the ratios of income ex cess the shortened expression we use for the ratios of chain indices of nominal personal incom es to productivity of labor. The connection is such that high indices of producers' prices correspond to high ratios, and v ice versa. R e gression and correlation computations entirely support this hypothesis:
X,

=49.7 + 47.3 x2, (4,9)

r = 0.84

(-m i a )
'

X .-8 1 .8 + 1 7 .J X ,,

r - 0,57

( 1 0 .1 b )

Variable Xi represents the producers' price index for industrial products; X2, the average ratio of income excess shifted in tim e by half a quarter ahead of the price index. Equation (a) refers to the whole period for which there are data, i.e ., for 1957-1967; equation (b) excludes the la st reform , i.e ., the period from Janu ary 1965 on. The standard errors are given in parentheses, as is customary. The regression coefficients are highly significant, even at the 1% level. Interpretation of the resu lts is very sim ple. Let us take case (a): when the ratio of income ex cess is exactly equal to one (X2 =1), the index of producers' prices equals 97; a c cordingly, it is possible for incomes to r ise faster than production and for prices nevertheless not to increase. The lim it of income excess over productivity beyond which prices w ill increase is 6.5%; below that lim it prices w ill fall. Finally, every increase of the ratio by 0.1, i.e ., an acceleration of the increase of incom es in relation to production by 10%, in creases p rices by 5%, or approximately half of the percent of income ex cess. These effects hold for som e av erage rates of growth and are modified to the extent that rates deviate from the average.
144

The results just obtained, as well as the earlier fundamental consideration, show the possibility of further improvement in ex planations of variations in producers' prices. Namely, the p res sure on prices does not depend only on how much the increase of average money incom es exceeds the increase of productivity, but also on the phase of the cycle in which that happens. The sam e ra tio of income excess w ill exert more pressure on costs when pro ductive capacities are underemployed than when they are fully u ti lized. In order to take this influence into account, we will construe variable X* as the difference between the index of growth and the index of income excess; therefore Xa equals the index of the phys ical volume of industrial production minus the ratio of income ex c e ss tim es 100. And this hypothesis is confirmed, for the correla tions improve further.
x, = 102.3-0.425 x (0.036) r -0 ,8 9

(10.2 a) (10.2 b)

x, = 101.9-0.239 x2 r = 0.72 (0.043)

The interpretation of equation (a) is now this: if the difference between the index of growth and the index of income excess in creases by one, X* = 1, the price w ill fall by 0.4; that difference must amount to at lea st 5.4 for producers' prices not to change. This means, then, that in periods of prosperity the ratio of income excess can be fairly high (e.g., 1.10 if the rate of growth is 15.5%) in those periods the productivity of labor and average incom es both r is e so fast that the pressure of income excess is not great and that prices nevertheless do not increase; and conversely, in de pression even a sm all increase of the ratio, e.g ., a ratio of 1.01 with a rate of growth of 5%, w ill lead to price in creases. To the extent that average incom es surpass productivity (and total in com es production) by the sam e rate at which production in crea ses, there is no difference between them and therefore X2 =0, and the increase of p rices is determined by the constant term. Since the constant term corresponds approximately to the average r is e in producers' p rices for industrial products, the equation can be interpreted (heuristically) as representing som e average trend of p rices (the constant term) about which prices oscillate down ward or upward depending upon whether the index of production or the index of income excess is greater (X- $ 0). Comparing equations (a) and (b) in both pairs of equations shows 145

that inclusion of the reform s in the period considered raised the correlation and regression coefficients. That may mean two things: (1) either there were changes in the reactions of economic decision-m akers, so that the factor of income excess has an even greater quantitative effect on prices and explains them to a great er extent; or (2) the index of producers' prices in the last nine quarters which correspond to the reform (when the turnover tax was removed from production) is a better expression of true pro ducers' p rices. A combination of both factors, by which the effects are strengthened, is naturally also possible. It w ill not be possible to answer this question until more tim e has elapsed or we obtain reconstructed serie s of the index of pure producers' prices from the Federal Statistics Bureau. The coefficient of correlation r = 0.89 between the index of pro ducers' prices and the complex variable X2 means that by u se of the difference between the index of growth and the index of income excess we have succeeded in explaining about 80% of current v a ri ations in producers' p rices. That undoubtedly establishes the dom inant factor in the formation of producers' p rices. The earlier m ysteries as to how p rices r ise when money is in short supply and inventories are increasing are now easily explained. However, it would be useful if we could explain som e of the remaining 20% of price variations. It is natural to assum e that credit em issions influence p rices, and therefore that price variations can be explained at lea st par tially by variations in credit. It is also obvious that credit must be placed in relation to something that it serv es. We ascertained earlier that, in industry, credit follows inventories. Accordingly, our second independent variable, X.i, may represent the ratio of chain indices of total credit for working capital and of the physi cal volume of industrial inventories. It seem s plausible to a s sume in fact it is a very widespread assertion upon which all justification of restrictive credit policy is founded that prices w ill r ise with values of that ratio above one, and that p rices will fall when credit expands m ore slowly than inventories. However, this assumption not only cannot be verified, but in the conditions of the Yugoslav economy it is shown to be mistaken. Inserting Xi in equation (a) shows that the corresponding regression coefficient is insignificant even at the 10% level. Inserting Xn in equation (b) yields a regression coefficient that is significant at the 5% level, but is negative, which is contrary to the assumption. The latter
146

result means in effect that faster expansion of credit in relation to inventories results in a fall in prices. This paradox is easily solved when we recall that credit stim ulates production, expansion of production reduces costs, and lower unit costs exert le ss p res sure on prices. As we have already emphasized, there are no quarterly data for the economy as a whole, as there are for industry, and there fore it is not possible to draw such strong conclusions. It is n ec essary, nevertheless, to try to determine what can be done with the existing data. We will therefore attempt to explain the m ove ments of industrial retail prices and the general retail price index. a, =42.1
-r 56,4 x2, (13.0) (0.085)

r = 0.77
r = 0.88

(10.3)
( 1 0 .4 )

x, = 10 3 .4 -0 .5 7 4

In both equations the variable Xi represents the retail price in dex for industrial products. X2 in equation (10.3) signifies the r a tio of the chain index of total personal incomes in the economy (ex cluding the private sector) to the index of the total social product (excluding the social product of agriculture), and therefore it r e fers to the already fam iliar ratio of income excess. X2 in equa tion (10.4) is constituted in the sam e way as in equation (10.2), i.e ., it represents the difference between the index of growth of the social product (excluding agriculture) and the index of income ex cess as defined in (10.3). A ll data are annual and relate to the p e riod 1952-1967. From the definition of the variables used it can be seen that they are by no means theoretically ideal. However, the results are surprisingly satisfactory. Now the correlation is high and increases in moving from the sim ple to the complex v a ri able X j. Accordingly, the interpretation and conclusions drawn from the analysis of equations (10.1) and (10.2) hold.
x, = 36.27 r 64,16 Xj, (6,70)

r = 0,90

(10.5)
( 10 . 6)

x, = 107,73-0,436 x2, r = 0,90 (0.046)

The general retail price index is explained by equations (10.5) and (10.6), where it is the dependent variable. X> in (10.5) is d e fined as the ratio of chain indices of personal incomes to deflated total sa les. X> in (10.6) signifies the difference between the index
147

of growth of deflated total sa les and the index of income ex cess as defined in (10.5). The data are annual for the period 1955-1963, and quarterly for 1964-1967. Given the apparently chaotic m ove ment of sa les and the crudity of the deflator adopted, the correla tion coefficients obtained are a ll the more surprising. The differ ence between the use of the sim ple and complex variable X2 is now combed out. The strength of the correlation may possibly be explained by the fact that quarterly data are used for the period from 1964 on, and therefore that period receives four tim es great er weight in relation to the preceding period, for which we have only annual data. And p recisely for the period 1964-1967, as we saw earlier, there are strong indications that a firm er link emerged between relative movements of personal incomes and price variations. It is useful, next, to verify the hypothesis about credit. There fore variable X ,, which in one variant represents the ratio of chain indices of credit for working capital to chain indices of the social product in constant prices (excluding agriculture), is also inserted in equation (10.4). The meaning of the first variant is the assum p tion that credits cover inventories, and of the second that they are proportional to the physical volume of sa les, and that deviation from these norms affects prices. In equation (10.6) the ratio of credit to deflated sa les is inserted as X3. In a ll three cases the regression coefficients with the credit variable are insignificant even at a level of 10%. Thus it is fairly certain that credit movements do not explain price variations. Are there other, additional factors that explain that remaining 20% of variation of producers' and retail p rices? At this moment the answer to that question is not known. However, it is entirely possible that, with corrected indices of producers' p rices, the ratio of income excess explains more than 80% of the variation, of which we mentioned one indication before. In that case it may be that there are no additional system atic individual factors. (5) But only further research can bring greater certainty to this question. One of the very popular candidates for explaining variations in prices is investment. It is said that a high level of investment in flates demand and the latter, when it exceeds supply, results in price in creases. The lack of satisfactory quarterly se r ie s for in vestm ent prevents us from directly examining this hypothesis. In addition, here an entire economic model, whose construction lie s
148

outside the framework of this study, would be necessary for an adequate analysis. However, something can still be said as of this moment. The entire so cia l demand in a period consists of inter mediate goods, personal and public consumption, exports, and in vestment. Juxtaposed to that demand are the flows of production and import capabilities. To the extent that the two spheres are not equal, there w ill be disturbances that w ill be reflected in prices. However, the component of demand which contributed to that situation is not known in advance. Accordingly, the frequent ly drawn conclusion that the existence of an overall surplus of d e mand indicates that there has been excessive investment rep re sents an economic non sequitur. What is more, it can happen that the two spheres are the sam e in volume but diverge significantly in structure for example, in 1966-1967, when investment was sharply reduced and result in large disturbances, scarcity of one commodity, and unsalable stocks of another. Investment can therefore function as a disturbance factor on the market only if it further increases even when producers of investment goods are already fully utilizing their capacity while import p ossibilities are exhausted. I do not know of any serious study in this area, and the existing em pirical analyses give no indication whatever that, in relation to available capacities and the possibilities for imports, the surplus of investment demand is greater than the surplus of demand for intermediate goods or consumer goods. We can now proceed one step further. Since investment is syn chronized with business cycles, i.e ., expands in upswings and falls in the downturns of the cycles, while prices fall in upswings and increase in downswings, it is hardly probable that expansion of in vestm ent results in a r ise in prices as a whole (although, let us say, producers of som e construction m aterials can temporarily exploit the boom by inflating their prices, etc.). But viewed in the longer run, investment naturally reduces prices because it a c c e l erates production and ra ises labor productivity. Finally, it is n ecessary to note that this examination of the mechanism of fluctuations of producers' prices and retail prices represents only the beginning of a study of the inflationary mech anism s in the Yugoslav economy. Our task was lim ited by the framework of this study. Improvement of data and the construction of new tim e se r ie s w ill make possible increased accuracy in the explanation of price formation. Construction of economic models will make it possible to discover new relationships. Experimen
149

tation with averaging and lags will improve regression relation ships. And in the meantime economic policy can rely dependably upon the following conclusion: if average personal incom es do not increase faster than the productivity of labor, other things being equal, prices in the Yugoslav economy will be perfectly stable. M onetary-credit policy has no direct connection whatever with the realization of that task. Efficient control of overall movements of personal incom es can m ost probably be attained by fisca l m easures. And the task of m onetary-credit policy must be lim ited exclusively to providing the economy with money when and where the rational allocation of resources demands it. Notes 1) Industry: a) X. = 23.9 + 0.820 X-,
(0 . 211)

X. = the index of deflated sa les of industry

b) X = 13.7 + 0.910 Xi , Xs = the index of the physical v o l ume of industrial production (0.159) Economy: a) Xi = 0.510 + 0.982 X2,, X, = the index of deflated sa les of (0.193) the economy b) X. = -1 .3 4 + 1.008 Xi , X: = the index of the physical v o l (0.184) ume of industrial production In equations (b) the periods of both reform s are omitted, which r e duces the standard errors of the regression coefficients and in creases the correlations. 2) In fact, just the reverse effects have been considered up to now as normal reactions of the market: growth of production lead ing to inflation, and retardation of production conditioning deflation. 3) In 1958, prices were controlled in 10 industries out of a total of 20; in 1962 in all industries except shipbuilding. In 1962, in 16 industries 60-100% of the value of production was included in price control (K. Dzeba and M. Beslad, Privredna reforma, Zagreb, Stvarnost, 1965, p. 71). In 1964 about 60% of industrial products were under control; in the first quarter of 1965 industrial and other p rices were frozen, and up to the end of 1965 le s s than 50% of p rices were liberalized, so that the situation in that resp ect was
150

not essentially better than in 1964. 4) I. Karli, Kriticki prikaz rezim a cijena prije i poslije reforme (Zagreb: Institute of Economics, 1967), p. 27. 5) In investigations such as ours it is always useful to test the influence of an eventual tim e trend. That testing showed that in all the equations, with the single exception of equation (1 0 . 2 a), the co efficient of the tim e variable is insignificant even at a level of 10%. In the exception mentioned it remains insignificant at 1% (in creasing the previous coefficient of correlation by 0.90). Thus we can conclude that there is no tim e trend in the explanation.

151

C H A P T E R 11 CYCLES OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS AND THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

11.1 Introductory Theoretical Considerations It can be assumed that in an economy which has a relatively large and chronic balance of payments deficit and which works without the necessary foreign exchange reserv es, fluctuations in exports and imports w ill significantly affect economic fluctuations. Let us begin our analysis with one of the standard considerations in the theory of international trade. The basic economic balance that equalizes sources and the use of resources can be represented by this equation: Sources C+G+S +M Use C +G+I +X
(11 . 1 )

where C represents that part of personal income which is spent on consumer goods, G is governmental expenditures on noninvest ment goods, S is saving (1) (accumulation), I represents in vest ment, and M and X are imports and exports. Since C + G are the sam e on the left and right sid es, equation (1 1 . 1 ) reduces to S +M= I +X and net saving = net exports: S - I = X - M (11.3)
( 11 . 2)

152

Let us assum e for a moment that investment is determined by a plan as, in fact, it is , even though these plans are usually not carried out and that the saving function of national income is, for the sake of sim plicity, a linear function. Let us then assum e that exports are fixed, for they are determined exogenously by the possibilities of sa le on the international market (which is only partially correct), and that imports are a linear function of pro duction. Let us draw such a graph. The m ost frequent situation in the Yugoslav economy is rep re sented by the thick line on Graph 11.1. In that situation production amounts to Yi , and is achieved with a balance of payments deficit that is financed by negative internal accumulation. We can define economic equilibrium as the absence of a balance of payments def icit: X - M = 0. Under the assumption that we do not change any thing in foreign m arkets, equilibrium will be restored at Y2, where either internal accumulation w ill be increased at the expense of personal and governmental consumption or investment will fall. Since the new production is le s s than the preceding amount Y2 < Yi, such an economic policy, whether in its first or second variant, is not desirable. We see further that equilibrium can be attained also at production y 3 , which is greater than both preceding levels: Y3 > Yi> Y2. We can attain that desirable result by an economic policy that changes the conditions of foreign trade, whether by an increase of exports with a given lev el of im ports, or a reduction
Graph 11.1
Net sav in g

ESTABLISHING ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM

153

of imports with a given lev el of exports, or a combination of both. Such an economic policy is realized, first of all, by an adequate change in the productive structure of the economy: reinforcem ent of those sectors of the economy in which the country has compara tive advantages, as well as those which produce import substi tutes. It is important to observe an asym m etry in the two groups of economic policies cited: the latter requires significantly more tim e than the form er because it is n ecessary to change the stru c ture of production, and not only to correct the volume of consump tion by financial instruments. It is not surprising, therefore, that policy-making bodies, especially in unplanned econom ies, take the path of least effort and orient them selves toward the first group, which results in contraction of production. In connection with our graph we must still call attention to level of production Y4 which, along with the application of both groups of economic policies, r e sults in a balance of payments surplus, but with a lower lev el of production than is objectively possible. Having made these prelim inary rem arks, we can proceed to an em pirical analysis of the effects of imports and exports on indus trial cycles. Since we considered imports and exports of agricul tural products earlier, we w ill now analyze foreign trade in indus trial products. This separation of agricultural products is ju sti fied because the agricultural deficit was financed to a large ex tent by noncommercial means. We take into account imports of a ll industrial products, and not only those that are used in indus try. This involves the exclusion of som e agricultural raw m ateri a ls, such as leather, wool and cotton, which we w ill correct som e what later. But investment and consumption goods are included, which is important for observation of the total effect of industrial variations; the total effect consists of the primary effects of chang ing production on the expenditure of intermediate goods and of the secondary effect on income from which investment and consump tion are financed. F irst we must solve yet another statistical problem. Along with the index of imports and exports, it is necessary to construct an instrument that w ill m easure the aggregate effect of exports and imports. That can be achieved by correlating either the absolute quantities of exports and imports or their rates of growth. Since with sufficient tim e the economy can adapt to various s iz e s of the foreign trade deficit, the relationship of the absolute quantities would be a' biased m easure of the effects of foreign trade on short-

run economic movements. Consequently it would be n ecessary to u se the indices of change of those relationships. But then it is sim pler to work directly with the relationships of the index of growth of imports and exports. Accordingly, our indicator, which we will call the index of divergence in the growth rates of imports and exports of industrial products, will appear thus: chain index of imports chain index of exports ^ ^

An increase in the index, i.e ., a widening of the divergence, means that imports have accelerated and not sim ply increased absolute ly in relation to exports; sim ilarly, a reduction of the index, a narrowing of the divergence, shows a retardation of imports in relation to exports. The reason why we place imports in the nu merator and exports in the denominator will be clear from the analysis of Graphs 11.2 and 11.3. Since the random fluctuations of imports and exports are not the sam e, it is necessary to achieve comparability by use of moving averages. The industrial indices are given, as earlier, on the basis of 4-quarter moving averages. 11.2 Basic Empirical Findings On the b asis of the above considerations, Table 11.1 and Graphs 11.2 and 11.3, which tell an unexpected tale about the functioning of the Yugoslav economy, are worked out. To the extent that I am able to read from the graphs, that tale has ten parts. 1. The index of divergence represents a concentrated exp res sion of international trade. For the sake of comparability, the scale of the index of divergence is shifted so that the average in dex of divergence which amounts to 99 for the period considered corresponds to the average index of annual growth of industrial production which amounts to 112.3 for the period under consid eration. It is noticeable that exports and imports fluctuate signif icantly more than industrial production, and that the amplitudes of the index of divergence are even somewhat greater. Industrial imports and exports fluctuate significantly more than total exports and imports. From these observations it follows that: a) international trade is an additional factor of economic in stability ( 2 ); b) imports and exports do not change in a parallel direction; there is a tendency for fluctuations of imports and exports to 155

G raph 11.2

Cycles of International (Chain Indices on the

Industry Exports Imports Index of divergence of trade in industrial products . index of imports x i qq j index of exports
140

130
ir inHiiotriol nm dnofo

Basis of Moving Averages)

157

TnHinao

of Hiiurrronpo

of fraHo

Graph 11.3

Cycles of Total Exports (Chain Indices on the

158

and Imports of Goods Basis of Moving Averages)

159

Index of divergence

occur in different directions; c) since exports fluctuate significantly le s s than imports, and fluctuations of industrial imports are especially large (four tim es larger than production), the cause of refractions in economic m ove ments must be sought especially in imports. 2. There is exceptional correspondence between industrial cy cles and the index of divergence: accelerative and retardation phases conform with a certain lag. The peaks of the index of d i vergence lag behind the peaks of industrial cycles by 1-3 quarters. It follows that acceleration of industrial production leads to a rela tive increase in the trade deficit. P ressu re on foreign exchange reserves in creases, foreign exchange is all the more rigidly a llo cated, and it is increasingly difficult to obtain the necessary im ports on tim e. This strain at a certain moment brings on the turn ing point of the cycle. As a result of the pressure of earlier or ders, imports still increase for som e tim e at the expense of the balance of payments deficit, but it is already late and, besides, the payments deficit becom es insupportable. The solution is found in reducing the tempo of importation, which further reduces the rate of growth of industrial production. We obtain the cycle. The troughs of the index of divergence lag behind the troughs of industrial production by 1-2 quarters. These troughs correspond to the troughs of the import cycles. That fact indicates that im ports probably do not contribute fundamentally to the turning up ward of the cycle. B esides, it can be assumed that imports are at least partially a technological function of production. The position of exports is otherwise. 4. To the extent that exports are determined by the possibilities of sale on the international market, they will reflect fluctuations of that market. Since until recently the Yugoslav market was sepa rated from the world market to a considerable degree, external and internal economic fluctuations would have to be distinguished. We see, however, that export cycles show definite regular behav ior in relation to industrial cycles. Accordingly, they are at least partially internally conditioned. Furthermore, when production capacity is uniformly utilized, and investment is carried out in cy cles, the investment potential would be increased in cycles with a shift equal to the gestation period. Graphs 5.4 and 5.5 show that the investment and industrial cycles correspond very well. Now, it is known that the average gestation period of investment in Yugo slav industry is shorter than 3f years as long as the duration
160

of the production cycle. It is also known that industrial capacities are utilized very unevenly. Consequently, investment cycles do not condition export cycles. The next assumption is related to aggregate demand. To the ex tent that the rate of growth of industrial production increases, the expansion of internal production also increases and through in comes investment and consumption demand increase. Insofar as exports represent residual quantities which until now has often been the case in the Yugoslav economy then expansion of internal demand means a reduction of export potential. The graphs show that this assumption is justified. For sim ilar reasons im ports move in the opposite direction. Therefore the peaks (troughs) of import cycles often approach or correspond to the troughs (peaks) of export cycles. 5. In accordance with the just-mentioned assumption, it is to be noted that the peaks of the export cycles precede the peaks of the industrial cycles. Accordingly, reduction of the tempo of export ing strengthens the negative effects of the increased tempo of im porting and the combined effect leads to a turning of the cycle downward. One can see, however, that the troughs of exports also precede the troughs of industrial production. It can therefore be concluded that expansion of exports represents one of the factors which transform the retardation phase of the industrial cycle into the accelerative phase. Both effects point to the exceptional im portance of exports for the stability and expansion of the Yugoslav economy. 6 . The graphs show that until 1961 there was a tendency for ex ports to grow at a declining rate, and that from 1961 until 1966 the expansion of exports again accelerated. In the period 1953-1961 the rate of growth of the value of industrial exports was cut in half: from about 2 0 %at the beginning of the period to about 1 0 %at the end. For the whole period 1952-1965 the rate of growth, a c cording to current foreign trade p rices, amounted to about 15%. The acceleration of export expansion in the last cycle was obvi ously the consequence of economic policy which, from the end of 1960 on, was oriented toward pressing ahead with the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the world economy. The analysis thus far unambigu ously confirm s the correctness of that orientation. But from 1959 the rate of industrial imports also increased (1952-1965, 10.5%; 1959-1965, 11.9%) because of inadequate changes in the productive structure (the lagging of industries that produce import substitutes),
161

Table 11.1 Turning Points and Amplitudes of Cycles of Industrial Production, Exports and Imports, and Index of Divergence (4-quarter moving averages) Exports____________________ Imports_______________Index of Divergence Total Industrial Industrial______ Turning______ Points___________ Total Industrial________ Total H /1955 H /1955 H /1955 H /1955 H/1956 H /1956 U /1956 H /1955 H /1956
H /1957 H /1958 H /1959 m /1 9 6 1 IV/1962 1/1964 H /1956 1/1959 IH/1960 IV/1961 IV/1962 1/1964 IH/1957 1/1959 H /1960 m /1 9 6 2 H /1964 H /1965 H /1957 IV/1958 H /1960 IH/1962 H /1964 H /1965 H/1966* IV/1957 1/1959 n /1 9 6 0 (IV/61) ID/1962 H /1964 D /1965 m /1 9 5 7 IV/1958 IV/1961 (H/60) IV/1962 1/1964 H /1965

Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak (Trough)

Industrial Production IV /1954 1/1956

1/1957 m /1 9 5 8 1/1960 1/1962 IV/1963

H /1966* IV /1965 m /1 9 6 5 (Peak) III/1967* ? ? ? Trough Lag (+) or Lead ( - ) in quarters in relation to industrial production: +1.8 - 2 .0 - 1 .7 Peak - 2 .0 +1.7 Trough - 1 .5

?
+1.5 +1.3

? ?
+2.0 +1.7

? ?
+3.0 +1.7

Amplitudes (Differences Between Indices at Turning Points) Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak Trough Peak (Trough) (Peak) Trough Average

12 10 8

___

20

37
68

31 36 42
21 21

36 57 58 38 42 48 44 ? ? 46

45 35 27 27 38 36 33 ? ? 34

18 14 24 38 24 16 ?
22

18 9 19 30 18
12

67 40 36 40 41 24 ? 44

7
12

13

29 29
22

18
11

? 18

? 29

Forecast S ou rce:Indeks, 1952-1967.

so that the index of divergence in the two subperiods was not e s sentially changed. One must also add that in the second subperiod there was a reduction in the rate of growth of agricultural produc tion, which meant that the expansion of industrial exports to gether with the expansion of invisible exports was neutralized by the expansion of industrial imports and the lagging of agricul tural exports. Therefore, despite all the beginnings in that d irec tion in the period 1961-1966, it was not possible to achieve a freer internal market, liberalization of foreign trade and currency regu lations, and stabilization of the economy on the level of a high rate of growth. And the m ost recent economic m easures unfortunately fall in the first group, which yields quick results but leads to a r e duction of production. 7. It is of interest to call attention to an anomaly in the m ove ment of industrial imports and, especially, of industrial exports during 1961. After the acceleration of exports at the beginning of 1959 abruptly ceased, a drop occurred that continued in the follow ing year. In the middle of 1960 export acceleration began again, but was no more able to stop the economic retardation which b e gan at approximately the sam e time. An insufficiently prepared reform of foreign trade and exchange regulations was carried out at the beginning of 1961. The reform conditioned a sharp retarda tion of exports and som e acceleration of imports. Because of that the trade deficit, financed by loans obtained to implement the fo r eign exchange reform s, increased which is shown on the graph by a temporary upswing of the index of divergence. The fall of the divergence index continued until 1962. That lag of one year r e sulted in a widening of the trough of the cycle for one year. Total exports and imports also had very sim ilar movements, and for the sam e reasons. The reform of 1965 had somewhat different effects. By then the economy was already to a much greater degree a m ar ket economy, and devaluation immediately led to an acceleration of exports and a deceleration of imports. However, the effects of devaluation were soon exhausted, and the insufficiently thought-out liberalization opened the door to uncontrolled imports, so that the divergence between exports and imports quickly began to widen. 8 . For the reasons cited, the reform of 1965 is interpolated by an additional cycle of exports and imports. It is characteristic, however, that the export expansion and import contraction in 1965 did not succeed in stopping the retardation of general economic movements. It is obvious, therefore, that although foreign trade
164

expansion aids the recovery from depression, it is not sufficient by itself to reverse economic movements. 9. Agricultural imports and exports are included in total im ports and exports. E arlier, aid was included in agricultural im ports, a practice by which economic relationships are distorted. Agricultural exports depend substantially upon weather conditions. Since to a great extent agricultural trade involves food, which has priority in consumption, total trade will be more stable than indus trial, as is shown especially by import amplitudes in Table 11.1. However, the more sen sitive industrial trade will more p recisely reflect economic interdependence. But it is interesting that the lags and leads in total and in industrial trade are approximately equal. That probably occurs because industrial trade accounts for a very high percentage of total trade (75% of exports and 8 6 % of imports in 1959-1960). 10. It remains for us to look at still another phenomenon that appears to be regular. With the exception of the second peak for industry and the first for the economy as a whole, the peaks of the divergence index move in the region of 114-121 for industry and 114-117 for the economy. The troughs of the divergence index move in the region of 78-73 and 90-78 respectively. This hypothe s is may therefore be Stated: in a situation in which import expan sion exceeds export growth, the form er growing at a rate of 1421% and the latter at 14-17%, there em erges an unrestrainable r e tardation of development; after the revival has begun, export ex pansion can exceed import growth by a maximum of 28-37% (1/0.78, 1/0.73) compared with 11-28% (1/0.90, 1/0.78). But since import expansion lags behind production by 4-5 months, a still significant ly sm aller widening of the divergence in exports and imports than that cited will condition refractions of economic movements and turn the cycle downward. The graphs show that this happens when the divergence widens to 106-111. Accordingly, when in the course of the boom the increase of imports exceeds the increase of ex ports by about 6%, it is n ecessary to sound the alarm and to take energetic m easures to prevent further widening of the divergence in trade. Insofar as this is not done, the economy will quickly en ter into a cumulative retardation of growth.

165

11.3 Intermediate Goods Imports and Other Questions After having examined, along with industrial exports, the behav ior of total imports of industrial products, it would be useful to study imports of raw m aterials and other intermediate goods for industry. We can assum e that this importation is to a large degree technologically determined, and that it will therefore be closely correlated with industrial production. In this analysis we will use the work of S. Stamenkovid and D. P irec. (3) The authors calculate their regressions on the basis of sem i annual data for the values of imports and exports and of the physi cal volume of production of industrial goods for the period 1957 1964. As a function of imports they u se a cubic parabola, as a function of exports a quadratic parabola; in both cases the inde pendent variable is industrial production, and the variables are ex pressed in annual rates of growth. The coefficient of determination for imports is 0.8, and for exports 0.5. That difference in cor relation must be expected because exports are much le ss techno logically determined than imports. Research shows that with a slow expansion of industry, imports of intermediate goods increase more slowly than production, and the difference widens up to an industrial rate of growth of about 9.8% and then narrows; with a rate of growth of industrial produc tion of 13.5%, imports of intermediate goods r ise at the sam e rate, but if the expansion of industry accelerates still further, the rate of increase of imports exceeds the rate of growth of production even faster. As regards exports, the differences between exports and productive power decrease after a rate of industrial growth of 11.2%, and beyond a 13.7% growth of industry the expansion of ex ports of industrial products begins to slow down (the maximum is 14.8%). Since exports r ise slow er but imports increase faster, at a certain rate the result is a maximum difference between these rates of growth. That happens when industry grows at a rate of 10.5%, which determ ines a 12.7% increase in exports and a 5% in crease in imports; this represents the most favorable possibility for the foreign trade balance of industry. When the rate of growth of industry increases to 13.7%, the rates of increase of exports and imports equalize. From the above data the authors draw the conclusion that the optimal rate of growth of industrial production is somewhere around 10.5%. (4) That conclusion is mistaken. What appears as
166

optimum is the result of a particular economic structure and the rate of its adjustment. Given more adequate changes in the produc tion structure, the "optimal" rate of growth may be raised signifi cantly; given poor economic policy, it may also be lowered signifi cantly. Indeed, if in order to achieve short-term effects, industrial expansion were reduced by financial m easures to 10.5%, and noth ing were done to change the production structure, the economy would adjust to the new rate and the "optimal" rate would be per ceptibly lowered. Instead of the optimal solution we would have a retardation of economic growth. But a second conclusion which corresponds to the facts is p o ssi ble. If the rates of export and import expansion equalize when in dustry grows at a rate of 13.7%, industry cannot grow by a higher rate than that in the longer run. Indeed, in the longer run we can expect a lower rate. And in fact in the 1957-1964 period, industry expanded at a rate of 12.1%, and in the 1952-1964 period at a rate of 12.4%. It is evident that these are not the highest possible rates of industrial growth since Japan and Bulgaria achieved rates of 14.1% and 13.7% in the 1952-1963 period. (5) There rem ains, finally, still another question that must be con sidered. Reduction of the excessiv e expansion of imports at high rates of growth depends upon the possibility of developing import substitute industries. In that regard the potentialities of the Yugo slav economy have obviously not been utilized; agriculture, the iron and steel industry, and the entire sector of intermediate goods lag behind the needs and possibilities for development. With respect to exports, however, it is not only a matter of pressing exportoriented industries; there is also the question of the possibilities for sales on the world market. Since the Yugoslav economy expands significantly faster than the world average, that must also hold for Yugoslav trade. In the decade 1955-1964, world exports increased at a rate of 6.5% annually. In that decade the physical volume of total Yugoslav exports grew at a rate of 13.5% (12.5% in the period 1951-1964) (6 ), or twice as fast as the world average. This means that it is n ecessary to conduct a very aggressive export policy, for it is not only a question of penetrating new markets, but of wresting markets from exporters who were there earlier. To what degree is that possible in the longer run? That is obviously a practical rather than a theoretical question, and the answer must be sought in the results achieved by other countries. In the sam e period Japan achieved an annual average rate of growth of exports of
167

14.8% (7), and the rates for West Germany and Italy in the decade 1950-1960 were 14.8% and 12.1%. (8 ) Since these cases involve a significantly greater volume of exports than in the case of Yugo slavia, it is obvious that such rates of export expansion can also be attained by Yugoslavia. And since the highest rates of export expansion are achieved by the countries with the highest rates of economic growth, we have additional support for our earlier con clusion that exports are a precondition of growth. However, exports cannot be achieved irrespective of price. If, for example, we stroll through Rome and compare the prices of consumer goods with the prices in Belgrade, we notice that they are, with som e exceptions (e.g., automobiles), equal. However, the exchange rate of the dinar is twice as unfavorable as that of the lira. The im pression of the tourist is confirmed by system atic research carried out in the Yugoslav Institute of Economic Studies. (9) In 1962 the internal purchasing power of the French franc was, overall, 14% greater than that of the new dinar and the exchange parity was 52% more favorable, while today it is 150% m ore favor able. Part of the difference is explained by the regular deviations of exchange parity from the parity of purchasing power in le s s de veloped countries in comparison with the m ore developed countries. But there is still a large part of the difference that must be ex plained by other factors, such as: (a) the exporting of products in which the country does not have comparative advantages; (b) sub standard quality; (c) poor organization of foreign trade (1 0 ); (d) the costs of capturing and wresting away the market. It would be im portant for correct economic policy to examine and quantify the comparative effects of all these factors. To the extent that the dif ferences cited are not economically justified, Yugoslavia is giving the substance of its production to its trading partners without payment. Notes 1) The term "saving" seem s to me scientifically m ore accurate than "accumulation," for it is a question of ex ante analysis. A c cumulation is an ex post phenomenon. Ex post saving and accumu lation are identical. 2) A. Maddison com es to the sam e conclusion in his analysis of postwar fluctuations in 14 West European and North American coun tries: "The coincidence of the timing of fluctuations in trade in r e
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lation to movements of production clearly indicates that those flu c tuations in trade and production are closely connected in alm ost all the periods and countries" ("Growth and Fluctuation in the World Economy, 1870-1960," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarter ly Review, June 1962, pp. 32-33). 3) S. Stamenkovid and D. P irec, "Analiza medjuzavisnosti nekih agregatnih velicina u jugoslavenskoj privredi," Ekonomist, 1965, No. 3, pp. 429-439. 4) Ibid., pp. 438-439. 5) Z. Popov, "Zemlje s najbrzim privrednim razvojem," Ekonomska analiza, 1967, No. 1-2, pp. 112-122. 6 ) SGS 1965 and 1962, pp. 231 and 185. 7) See A. Maddison, "Japanese Economic Performance," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, December 1965, p. 36. 8 ) A. Maddison, "Growth and Fluctuation in the World Economy," op. cit., p. 18. 9) S. Stajid, Kupovni paritet dinara, work in progress. 10) K. Dzeba and M. Beslad state: " ... in England our bacon is sold 10-15% cheaper than Danish bacon because of poorer quality, while in Vienna and Munich our fruit is 10-20% cheaper than Italian fruit also because of poorer quality and bad packing. In interna tional markets many of our machines and other industrial goods also obtain prices that are lower by 1 0 - 2 0 %in comparison to those of other producers because of construction, quality, and their being out of date" (Privredna reforma, [Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1965], p. 24).

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Chapter 12

ADMINISTRATIVE CYCLES AND THE INFLUENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE INTERVENTIONS

12.1 C ycles of Legal Regulation The meaning of decentralization in the economy lie s in extension of the autonomy of direct producers. The actual degree of autono my and, accordingly, the real su ccess of decentralization depend on the degree to which adm inistrative interventions are absent. There are probably various ways of measuring the extent of ad m inistrative interventions. One of the sim p lest and m ost obvious follows from the assumption that the scope of administrative inter ference in the economy is reflected in the siz e of the Official Ga zette. (1) We w ill use that m easure in further analysis. Let us b e gin with the assumption that the Federal Official Gazette sets in motion and at the sam e tim e indicates waves of adm inistra tive regulation in general. However, measurement of the organizational state of the Yugo slav economy is not sim ply a matter of academic interest. It is clear that frequent reorganizations and waves of new regulations (not infrequently, regulations that are retroactive and mutually in compatible) must have a negative effect on the efficiency of busi ness activity. Often unforeseeable changes in the param eters of business activity introduce unrest and uncertainty into the economy, and forecasts and long-run calculations become im possible; eco nomic organizations are oriented toward the extraction of privi leges from economic policy bodies instead of serious program ming, toward consciously irrational expenditures instead of an economically substantiated investment program, toward specula tion with loopholes in the regulations instead of the organization
170

of production. Moreover, every wave of new regulations demands a period of adaptation during which the efficiency of business a c tivity falls instead of growing; and, because of the inherent in stability of the economy, such adaptations can cause cumulative retardation of growth. Our task is to examine the correctness of such an assumption and to quantify the effects. Let us first consider the lawmaking activity of the Federal Par liament and Federal Executive Council. In the fourteen years covered, every three days brought a regu lation issued at the level of the Administration or Parliament. In addition, the Federal economic secretariats and banks produced rules, orders, instructions, decisions, and solutions (245 in 1965). When we take into account the regulations of the republics and lo calities, and subtract holidays and vacations from the annual tim e available, it follows that every working day brought som e adm inis trative surprises. However, this does not exhaust a ll the p ossibil ities for administrative pressure. State bodies (2), the National Bank, and the Social Accountancy Service also have their internal regulations; they also change and, by the nature of things, even faster and more often than legislative acts. Economic organiza tions and their leading cadres bear a huge burden, and therefore it would not be surprising to us if this led to refractions. Let us verify this. Table 12.1 Legal Regulations Governing Relations in the Economy (1952-1965) Federal Parliament D eLaws cisions Total 1952 1 1 2 13 2 1953 2 4 1954 1 2 8 20 1955 5 9 4 9 1956 17 8 10 1957 7 17 12 5 1958 17 1959 24 21 45 12 1960 11 23 Federal Executive D eD ecrees cisions 29 9 39 27 36 79 36 72 115 32 35 87 33 79 28 62 18 36 Council Total 38
66

115 108 147

12 2 112

90 54

Grand Total 51 70 135 117 164 139 129 135 77

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Table 12.1 (continued)

Federal Parliament Federal Executive Council D e De Grand Laws cisions Total cisions Total D ecrees Total 23 106 29 63 83 169 1961 34 112 18 52 26 86 1962 34 164 70 12 58 16 46 116 1963 30 81 25 58 15 66 139 1964 33 71 20 12 2 11 60 193 1965 102 Average 93 13 27 23 36 66 129 Source: Sluzbeni List SFRJ (Chronological Register) We w ill compare the number of regulations in the years that had peaks and troughs of business cycles. Since a ll regulations need not equally represent adm inistrative encumbrances, we w ill cite, alongside the total, the number of acts of Parliament and only the decrees of the Federal Executive Council: In Years of Peaks Number of Regulations Excluding Adm inistra tive D eci sions of Total F.E.C. 117 45 52 139 77 4.1 73 139 In Years of Troughs Number of Regulations Excluding Administra- fji tive D eci3 5 sions of Year Total F.E.C. 1956 164 49 50 1958 129 1962 164 78 193 133 1965 J r||
M

Year 1955 1957 1960 1964

The regularity is rather pronounced: except in 1958, which is also the m ildest retardation of all cycles, the troughs of the cycles are accompanied by a significantly larger number of regulations than the peaks. That regularity is even more clear in Graph 12.1, which shows the quarterly movement of legal regulations in rela tion to the quarterly movement of the annual rate of growth of industrial production. Seasonal fluctuations in lawmaking activity are eliminated by moving averages. It can be seen that the cycles of the economy and of lawmaking activity are differentiated from

J Ji ;m fj

each other in phase, so that "bad" years in Parliament correspond to good years in the economy, and v ice versa. Table 12.1 reflects an important tendency in Yugoslav political life: the shifting of economic regulatory activity from the Adminis tration to Parliament. At the beginning of the period considered, Parliament accounted for 26% of the total number of regulations, and at the end, for 63%. Such a development is undoubtedly p osi tive, since it elim inates arbitrariness and introduces the public to economic regulatory activity. In addition, one would expect that under public pressure Parliamentary acts w ill be more thoroughly prepared, that they w ill therefore be more permanent, and hence that they will bring greater stability in the functioning of the econ omy. However, that assumption has not proven true up to now. It was p recisely in the latter years of the period, when there was special insistence on the elimination of administrative interference in the economy, that the number of regulations reached a record level and the rate of growth of production fell to one of the lowest levels. Simultaneous changes in normative regulative activity and in economic movements point to another possibility: instead of in creased expertness and preparation, there was a greater lag in un dertaking adequate m easures, because of which the rate of growth was reduced and the duration of the cycle was prolonged. Some in dications of the accuracy of this observation are cited in the fo l lowing section, but at this moment I do not see analytic p ossib ili ties of proving it. Comparison of Table 12.1 and Graph 12.1 shows that the number of regulations rose until the end of 1956. That can be explained by the emergence from the adm inistrative period, when internal reg ulations of economic organizations replaced public ones and when the regulative function of Parliament began to develop. In the pe riod 1946-1951, Parliament brought forth an annual average of 7 regulations (as compared with 36 in the next 14 years) and the Fed eral Executive Council issued 52 (compared to 93 later). The num ber of regulations fell from the beginning of 1957 to the end of 1960. That can be considered the stabilization phase of the new economic system. There is reason to repeat that it was, at the sam e tim e, the period of Yugoslavia's fastest economic growth. But the num ber of regulations began to increase again in 1961, which probably indicates that the state apparatus and economic policy bodies fell behind in the mastering of techniques for regulating the ever more complex mechanism of the Yugoslav economy.
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Graph 12.1

LEGAL REGULATION!

an d in d u s t r ia l p r o d u c t io n

'5 3

Legal regulations Industrial production

48

43

38

33

28

23

1
1S59 I960

I 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 18

13

175

Number of legal regulations

It is of interest to observe that a "long" cycle in legal regula tions (upswing to 1956; decline, 1956-1960; upswing after 1960) corresponds to the long cycles, noted earlier, in the Yugoslav economy with a certain phasal shift. Agricultural production a c celerated in the period 1956-1960, and after that it slowed down; the expansion of industrial exports decreased in the period 19561961, and then accelerated; the rate of economic growth attained its maximum in 1956-1960 and the five-year plan was declared completed in four years, and after that the economy slowed down along with the postponement of the new five-year plan. On the ba s is of these statem ents it would not be necessary to conclude that it is desirable to return to the economic system of 1956-1960; and indeed that would be sen se less, for today's economy is no le ss different from that of 1956-1960 than the latter was different from the economy before 1956. What is m ore, it is necessary to seek the causes of today's difficulties in part in the su ccesses of 19561960: there has been a failure to make changes in the productive structure in a sufficiently intensive way, and on time; there has been a failure to prepare thoroughly and on tim e a program of in stitutional changes, the need for which could be foreseen with the further development of a market economy. In addition to the sim ple comparisons that we have made so far, we can express the close connection between administrative inter ventions and economic fluctuations somewhat more formally. We will begin with the hypothesis that low rates of growth correspond to a large number of legal regulations and v ice v ersa, and that therefore there is a significant negative correlation. Since every legal regulation does not have the sam e effect on the economy and every discrimination or weighting would be arbitrary, and we will therefore not carry them out it can be expected that the number of regulations will explain a le ss e r part of economic fluctuations than would correspond to the real effect of administrative interventions. Furthermore, since until som e tim e in 1958, when there was a definite settlem ent of the distribu tion of incomes of economic organizations, the economy was a l ways to a large extent adm inistratively regulated by direct inter ventions which bypassed Parliament, we can expect that the con nection between legal regulations and the rate of growth w ill not be particularly strong. We can also expect that the connection from quarter to quarter will becom e all the stronger, until som e maximum at which it w ill temporarily stabilize. All these assum p
176

tions are shown to be justified. Coefficient of Correlation Between the Rate of Growth and Number of Regulations Period_______________ Industry____________ Production I/1953-H /1965 -0 .0 1 I/1954-II/1965 -0 .1 8 -0 .2 0 I/1955-H /1965 -0 .2 1 -0 .2 3 -0 .2 8 I/1956-H /1965 -0 .2 2 -0 .2 6 -0 .2 8 I/1 9 57-D /1965 -0 .3 7 -0 .4 2 I/1958-II/1965 -0 .4 7 1/1959 -11/1965 -0 .4 4 -0 .4 7 -0 .5 0 H /l9 5 9 -n /l9 6 5 -0 .4 7 -0 .4 9 m /l 9 5 9 - n /l 9 6 5 -0 .4 9 -0 .4 7 IV /1959-II/1965

The se r ie s are correlated until the second quarter of 1965, for which the last data are available for moving averages of legal reg ulations. For both industry and production the coefficients of co r relation attain the maximum in the second quarter of.1959. In that quarter both coefficients of correlation are significant at the 2 % level. Accordingly, by the usual statistical criteria it can be said that there is a significant connection between the number of legal regulations and the rate of growth. Correlation, naturally, does not reveal causation. Therefore we still do not know whether an increase of regulations reduces the rate of growth or, conversely, if a retardation has occurred, it is cured by the normative acts of Parliament or the Federal Execu tive Council. The latter is m ost often the explanation of the Yugo slav press and economic policy bodies. There are certain sta tisti cal indications for the accuracy of the first explanation larger correlation coefficients when the se r ie s of legal regulations (with out removal of seasonal effects) precedes the se r ie s of growth rates but that is entirely inadequate. The dilemma can be r e solved only by detailed analysis of economic policy in the last fif teen years. Let us se e , therefore, when the most significant changes in the Yugoslav economic system occurred, and what those changes were.

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12.2 Institutional Content of Business Cycles 1. The new economic system (1). In 1950 a law was passed con cerning workers' councils. This law inaugurated the relinquish ment of administrative planning and began the building of a new, specifically Yugoslav economic system . The far-reaching reorga nizations caused a retardation of growth, and the economic block ade transformed that retardation even into an absolute reduction of production. After nearly two years of preparation, the new s y s tem began to function in 1952. The general and main directorates were abolished and, in addition to self-management, the enter p rises also received a certain amount of operational independence. Administrative planning was replaced by planning of global propor tions. Distribution of income between the community and the en terp rises was resolved on the basis of a single and, therefore, rather primitive instrument: the rates of accumulation and funds.* But those rates which were abolished after two years along with som e operational independence, played an alm ost revolution ary role in increasing the efficiency of business activity. Almost overnight the chronic shortage of labor was transformed into su r pluses, labor productivity began to increase, and the efficiency of utilization of fixed capital began to grow. A sharp and unrestrainable economic upswing began. It is n ecessary to add one more remark. In the chapter on in dustrial cycles we mentioned that before the end of the prolonged first cycle there was a sm aller cycle, which started at the begin ning of 1954 and lasted som e seven quarters. Now we may add that at the beginning of that year there was a change in the system of business activity which, at the tim e, was called the "new economic system ." "Rates of accumulation and funds" were superceded as an instrument for the distribution of income of enterprises by ca l culation of the basis of "accounting wages and profit." Government financing that did not include an interest charge for new enterprises was abolished. Investment funds for communities were established. Sales of fixed capital were permitted, with the sole obligation that Translator's note: these rates were centrally determined and varied according to industry and, ultim ately, according to individ ual enterprises; they were used to determine the enterprise's tax base and had the effect of giving the enterprise an incentive to economize on the use of labor.
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enterprises maintain the value of fixed capital. A rate of interest on fixed capital was introduced. But all those changes meant the direct freeing of the hitherto shackled potentials of the economy, so that they only slightly retarded growth and therefore a full cy cle did not develop. 2. Transition to the second five-year plan. At the end of 1955, in M. Popovid's report to the Federal Chamber of Nationalities, he asserted: "One period of our economic development is com pleted. . . . In a certain sen se the year 1956 is a transitional year in our economic policy. During the coming years we must make a ll the preparations for a more successful economic development in the future___ Therefore, the basic task which runs through our economic policy in 1956 is stabilization of the market." (3) In the course of 1956 there were strong inflationary movements, in fact so strong that they were not repeated until 1965 (see Graph 10.4). The inflation reached its culmination two quarters after the peak of the divergence index of industrial production and three quarters after the toppling down of the industrial rate of growth. The econ omy began to feel the consequences of the disproportions of prior development the neglect of investment in agriculture and trans portation, as w ell as the lag in production of consumer goods and of noneconomic activities. The rapid development in the preceding period led to expansion of demand which, however, did not encoun ter a corresponding structure of supply. After it was no longer possible to correct disproportions by imports, there was a retar dation of growth and inflation. The reaction was price control, credit restrictions, compulsory reserv es, blocked funds, and r e duction of investm ent Investment not only slowed down, but in 1955 it constantly fell absolutely and reached its lowest lev el in the middle of 1956. (4) The reduction in industrial investment was especially sharp: in 1955 it amounted to 77% of the volume of in vestm ent in 1953. Thus, at the beginning of 1955, when the econ omy had already entered a retardation phase, economic policy strengthened that downward movement still more. P rices stabi lized, and an attempt was made to revive the economy by credit expansion. (5) Investment in fixed capital grew rapidly. The stru c ture of investment was significantly changed by the new five-year plan: noneconomic investment grew at the expense of economic; investment in transportation and agriculture, at the expense of in dustrial; investment in consumer goods industries, at the expense of basic industries. (6 ) While the first five-year plan was oriented 179

toward basic industries, the second was oriented toward p ro cess ing industries. That orientation was shown to be fundamentally correct, for it led to exceptionally rapid growth. But inadequately controlled, it went to the other extrem e, so that the second fiveyear plan was completed with new disproportions and, naturally, with the occurrence of a new cycle. But in the meantime there was a sm aller cyclical disturbance. 3. The new system of distribution of total income of economic organizations. In the course of 1957 there was a record increase in industrial imports (see Graph 11.2) and, because of the bad har v est the preceding year, a large increase in agricultural imports. Since exports lagged, the index of divergence of industrial trade attained a maximum (see Graph 11.2). The balance of payments and trade deficits were the maximum for the entire period until 1960. (7) That determined the turning of the cycle and the retar dation in 1957. In the m idst of the downward phase, at the begin ning of 1958, a new system of distribution of the total income of economic organizations was introduced. After the u se of rates of accumulation and funds, which were abolished at the end of 1953, and som e experimentation with various instruments of income distribution in the following years, in 1958 the basic system that is still in effect today was instituted. (8 ) The essential character istic of the new system is that the enterprise acquired the right of independent distribution of net income, which it autonomously divides into personal incom es and enterprise funds. Adaptation to the new conditions required som e tim e and probably also contrib uted to the deepening of the cyclical fall. But since prices of in dustrial and agricultural products increased relatively little, in vestm ent expansion continued, credit policy was conducted well, and the new law did not bring after it the usual wave of other reg ulations and changes (see Table 12.1), the retardation phase was checked relatively quickly and was the m ildest of a ll the cyclical drops. 4. The new economic system (2). In the already fam iliar man ner, the index of growth of industrial production and the index of divergence of industrial trade started downhill in the middle of 1960. Economic policy did not take account of that and, as the an nual plans of the period show, there was a failure to grasp what was in fact the matter: thus, in the midst of those downward m ove ments, at the beginning of 1961, the most radical reform since 1950-1952 was inaugurated. A special study has been written of
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what was done, and what the consequences w ere, so we need only recapitulate here som e of the more important conclusions. (9) Three reform s were carried out simultaneously: in banking, in the sphere of income distribution, and in foreign exchange. Those r e form s were not w ell prepared, nor were they mutually compatible. The liberalization of the.distribution of the income of economic organizations was intended to encourage work collectives to ra ise production, increase labor productivity, conduct business activity more rationally, etc. A s it happened, however, economic organi zations " ... lost much tim e in discussions and attempts to adjust to the changed conditions of their income distribution, and when those were completed, the result diverged significantly from ex pectations. Namely, in not a few ca ses, adjustment to the changed conditions meant the discovery of ways to achieve a better finan cial result without an in crease in production___ " (10) The increase of the rate of exchange to 750 dinars to the dollar reduced the ex isting divergences of individual exchange rates in international trade, and that, together with an orientation toward tariffs, was n ecessary to liquidate the system of multiple exchange rates and to make possible freer trade relations. Liberalization of the fo r eign trade regulations was required to hasten the inclusion of the Yugoslav economy in international trade, and toward that end, fo r eign credits were secured. However, " ... extensive utilization of foreign capital made it possible to attain a significant increase in imports along with the stagnation of exports, but the correspond ing changes in the activity of economic organizations were not forthcoming. Nor was the planned increase of foreign exchange reserv es achieved." (11) But the m ost serious disturbances origi nated in the sphere of credit policy. It was precisely 1961 that was chosen for the introduction of order and discipline in that sphere. Credit was lim ited to the covering of short-run needs for working capital. Longer-term additions to working capital, as well as investment in fixed capital, had to be covered by the en terp rises' own funds or by loans from the social investment funds. "However, the mechanism of financing durable investments was not adjusted to this reorientation of credit p o licy .. . . Further m ore, the m ore uneven arrangement of accumulation and the com mitment of funds determined earlier had the consequence of r e ducing the possibility of reorienting economic organizations s ig nificantly m ore than is apparent from overall assessm en ts. The speculation of economic organizations that they would not be held
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to carrying out the goals set for credit policy also operated in the sam e way. Thus, economic organizations did not reduce their investments in fixed capital so that there were additions to work ing capital, as was expected, but continued to spend, to a ll appear ances, as they had before." (12) The result was a shortage of working capital, then mutual indebtedness, and finally complete illiquidity of the economy, which led to a sharp slowing down of production. All these short-run effects were added to the consequences of structural disproportions, price disparities, and an inadequate system of planning. "Structural disproportions. . . are riot p er ceived completely or in tim e, and problems have not been sub jected to fundamental research. Our system of planning, includ ing here the implementation of plans as w ell, has not been worked out either conceptually or methodologically. Pragmatism in work ing out plans, the slow introduction and neglect of scientific meth ods of analysis, and consequently a certain subjectivism and a r bitrariness in the construction of the basic proportions of produc tion and distribution, have constantly introduced elem ents of in congruity into the economy." (13) In such conditions the rate of growth was quickly halved, and the trough of the cycle fell lower than before and lasted longer. The low est point was reached at the beginning of 1962. "Then rather worrisom e phenomena were established in our economic life," says Boris Kraigher in Ms expos^. "There occurred relative stagnation in economic development, a large deficit in the balance of payments, and a rapid increase in the Federal budgetary deficit. There occurred the phenomenon of irresponsible distribution of income to personal incom es, which was expressed in excessively wide spans. Some sort of inertia prevailed in the business activity of economic organizations, and there began to be an excess of all form s of consumption, instability in the market, and large o s c il lations in prices." (14) In order to return the economy to the path of the upswing, there were discharges of mutual debts, pumping of credits, pressing of exports, and reduction of legal and orga nizational changes. In addition to a ll these usual m easures there was also a political mobilization, and the Yugoslav economy quick ly found, again its normal path of rapid expansion. 5. Economic reform . The lesso n s of the experience with the last cycles were unfortunately not learned, and the relatively quiet year of 1963 was not used to prepare a program of system
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atic action for 1965 and the following years that would be oriented toward scientifically studying the building of the system and adapt ing economic policy to new conditions. P rices began to increase at the beginning of 1964. The earlier disparities accumulated to the extent that stabilization was no longer possible by sim ple price control and deflationary policy. In the course of 1964, along with a significant increase in prices of agricultural products and som e intermediate goods, prices for coal increased by 10% and by 40% for electrical energy. (15) The adoption of deflationary credit pol icy slowed the relative growth of the money supply, but remained totally incapable of harmonizing the volume and structure of sup ply and demand. (16) Economic instability increased still further. In 1965 two drastic interventions, which were mutually determined, were carried out: adm inistrative freezing of prices and adm inis trative correction of disparities at a higher price level. That n e cessitated a new rate of exchange, which was significantly in creased from 750 to 1250 dinars for a dollar. The increased costs of imported intermediate goods, along with the fixing of prices, had to induce deflation. Internal demand fell, exports increased, and the balance of payments deficit tem porarily disappeared (17), but at the price of reducing the potential social product in keeping with the standard explanation given in the analysis of Graph 11.1. Enterprise income was freed of various tax burdens that had a c cumulated in the course of tim e. Subsidies were reduced. Reduc tion of tax contributions of various forms necessitated adaptation of the government budget. Elimination of inflationary pressures required reduction of aggregate demand. But global reduction of demand does not have the structure which corresponds to the pos sib ilities of supply. Capacities remain unutilized. Some branches of investment goods industries found them selves in an especially difficult situation. Unprepared for a greater breach of the foreign market, with a dried-up dom estic market and very sm all p o ssi b ilities for credit, those branches at tim es did not u se 50% of their capacity, which increased costs and made the situation still more difficult. That entire complicated action was begun after mid-1964, when the economic upswing once again turned downward. It could be expected that the effects on retardation would be sim i lar to the earlier effects, and that the new depression would not be of le sse r magnitude than the preceding one. "Here the historical analysis is interrupted," we wrote in the original text of this study at the beginning of 1966, "for we have
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arrived at the la st available data. The question naturally a rises as to how the next cycle will appear. The answer to this question depends on the extent to which economic policy makes use of the lesson s of past experience and of the results of economic theory. Provided nothing essential changes, we can expect that the current cycle w ill reach the minimum somewhere in the second or third quarter of 1966, and the maximum in the middle of 1968." (18) Events have shown that the forecast of the turning of the cycle in the second or third quarter was not realized. Does that mean that it was a matter of a mistaken forecast, a forecast founded on a mistaken theory? Sometimes unfulfilled forecasts make possible a more fruitful em pirical analysis than fulfilled ones. It appears that this is what has actually happened. We need only recall the fragments of analysis of events in 1966 that are scattered in v a ri ous chapters of this study to convince ourselves of this. A look at Graph 7.1 w ill establish that the fall of industrial pro duction stopped at the end of 1965 and then was held on a plateau at the index 105 until the third quarter of 1966. Industrial produc tion of the developed regions, which usually pulls along total in dustrial production, shows an acceleration trend from the third quarter of 1965 to the third quarter of 1966. The construction cy cle turned upward in the first quarter of 1966, and investment ex penditures did the sam e a quarter earlier (Graph 5.5). The growth of industrial inventories slowed down from the first to the third quarter of 1966, as did accounts payable; deflated sa les of the economy accelerated until the third quarter and, sim ilarly, the liquidity of the economy increased until the third quarter of 1966 (Graphs 9.3, 10.2, 10.3). Thus, according to a ll the key movements, the Yugoslav economy was ready for a new upswing in the middle of 1966. Why did that upswing not occur? The following fragments from the annual report of the National Bank gives a condensed, though not complete, answer to that question (19): The stock of money grew in 1966 by 5%, and total liquid r e sources by 6 % Short-term bank credits increased 3%. B ear . ing in mind that at the sam e tim e the social product in cur rent prices increased by nearly 24%, it is obvious that the goal of m onetary-credit policy to have the money supply grow slow er than the increase in the social product was fully r e alized. In order to realize such a movement of the money supply and credit, sev ere restrictive m easures were adopted

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in the course of 1966, especially in the second half of 1966 (my emphasis B.H.). The falling rate of growth of industrial production, reduction of construction, and the low rate of economic activity in gen eral constituted one of the most significant components by which monetary-credit policy contributed to the realization of stabilization goals (my emphasis B.H.). Distinguishing the question of whether credit policy can op erate m ore restrictively from the question as to whether it has operated restrictively enough, it can be said that it is difficult to assum e that the credit policy m easures could be essentially more restrictive, but also that their restrictive effect was not sufficient, especially in the field of the balance of paym ents. . . the conclusion is that it is necessary to con tinue with restrictive m easures, especially having in view the effect in the field of foreign tra d e. . . (my emphasis B.H.). And thus under m onetary-credit pressures in the second half of 1966, everything again turned downward instead of there being an upswing: in just one year expansion of industrial production fell from +5% to -1% , investment began to fall absolutely, the growth of inventories quickened, illiquidity reached the proportions of 1961, and the growth of labor productivity quickly fell to zero. And after all that the National Bank found it necessary to apologize for the fact that credit restriction was not still more severe! And to conclude that it was n ecessary to continue with the sam e policy! Therefore, the theory on which the forecast was founded was not mistaken. The dramatic struggle of industry and of the whole economy to start to r ise again from the level of 105 to ward the normal rates of growth for Yugoslav conditions lasted the entire year. The word "dramatic" has not been chosen hap hazardly; it exactly describes what happened in many collectives. With a little help on the part of economic policy, that struggle could have been terminated successfully. However, economic pol icy was rigid and altogether inadequate. In that respect, naturally, it is not a question so lely of the m easures which the National Bank was obliged to carry out. The assumption of the forecast, "to the extent that nothing essential changes," obviously was not

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realized, for much that was essential changed, work collectives finally broke under unbearable pressure, and the economy fell still another flight of steps lower in its path of growth. That flight represents a difference in the rate of growth of som e 6 % which , in relation to a social product (excluding agriculture) of 7,200 b il lion old dinars represents a lo ss of 430 billion in the course of one year. The lo ss is further increased when one takes into a c count that, instead of retardation in the course of that year, there could have been an initial acceleration of growth of 5% . In mid-1967 production lagged at the index 98-99. A new plateau of several quarters' duration was formed. According to a ll indi cations the economy was again ready for an upswing. Whether the upswing would come and at what tempo or whether there would be still another step lower would depend exclusively on econom ic policy, on the extent to which economic policy utilized the l e s sons of previous experience and the results of economic theory. This tim e monetary policy did not prevent the upswing from b e ginning. Growth accelerated during 1968 and developed into a boom in 1969. The five cycles analyzed are distinguished from each other by the reasons for their appearance. The first, fourth and fifth were conditioned by economic reforms; the second, by the remedy for inflation; the third, by uncontrolled expansion of imports. How ever, two characteristics are common to all: every cycle was set in motion by difficulties in international trade and in every cycle the depression was deepened by reform s that were initiated in the retardation phase, i.e ., when it was not the tim e for them. One must exclude from this statement the first cycle, which was in every respect exceptional; that cycle began in the search for a new economic system , when solutions objectively could not be known, and when in fact it was a question of Yugoslavia's struggle for existence. But with respect to the other cycles, I believe that one can speak of the bad timing of the reforms: the second cycle began with the investment reform, the third with the reform in in come distribution, the fourth with three simultaneous reform s, and the fifth with a complex of reform s called "the economic r e form." With reference to these facts, the beginnings of business cycles in Yugoslavia must be sought in the retardation phase, and not in the accelerative phase, and the determination of timing and content must be carried out according to the key reform actions that have been implemented to date. This picture is obtained:
186

Cycle I: Cycle II: Cycle HI: Cycle IV: Cycle V:

New economic system (1), m /1 9 4 9 -Hi/19 55 Transition to the second five-year plan, m /l9 5 5 -n /1 9 5 8 New system of income distribution, II/1958-IV /1960 New economic system (2), IV /1960-I/1965 Economic reform , 1/1965-?

In that way Yugoslav cycles until now purely statistically d e termined have received their names and their economic con tent. 12.3 Frequency of Legal Regulations and the Rate of Economic Growth Now we are finally in a position to answer the question of the causal connection between the number of normative acts of state bodies and economic fluctuations. It follows rather unambiguously that the waves of legal regulations intensified economic fluctua tions. If there were fewer regulations in general, if they were better prepared, and if, particularly, there were fewer regulations adopted in the downswing phases, the growth of production would have been more even and therefore the average rate of growth would have been higher. The connection between the quarterly number of regulations (moving averages) and the indices of growth of industrial and of IFC production is shown on the scatter diagram (Graph 12.2). We obtain the following two regression equations: Industry: Production: y= -0 .3 9 x + 125.7 y= -0 .4 6 x + 126.6 r = -0 .4 7 r = -0 .5 0

where x represents the number of economic regulations in the quarter, and y the corresponding index of annual growth of pro duction. It turns out that for every additional regulation in the course of a month (i.e ., three additional regulations quarterly), the rate of economic growth falls by over 1%. The larger coeffi cient of the trend of IFC production shows that it is even more sensitive to an increase in regulations than is industrial produc tion. At a level of social product (excluding agriculture) of 7,000 billion old dinars, one excess regulation monthly costs the Yugo slav economy about 1 0 0 billion old dinars annually, on the average. The analysis is not concluded with that. The lower part of Graph 12.2 shows a rather large scatter of points about the r e 187

Graph 12.2

CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF ECONOMIC

REGULATIONS AND THE INDEX OF GROWTH OF INDUSTRY AND PRODUCTION (EXCLUDING AGRICULTURE)
^ D e v i a t i o n ___ of in d u s try

D eviation of production

Chain indlccs of growth

J Deviations from

188

Chain Indlccs ol industrial production

the regression line

gression lines. Is that scatter without any order, or is there som e thing system atic there? To ascertain if the deviations from the regression line are consistent over tim e, we introduce a special graph, which is worked out in the upper part of Graph 12.2. The result is surprising: again a cycle! And it is not just any cycle, but one which entirely corresponds to the industrial cycle; this can be seen when the latter is also drawn on the sam e graph. The coefficient of correlation between these two serie s between the deviations from the industrial regression line and the industrial chain indices of growth is very high and amounts to 0.88. A c cordingly, we have worked out the explanation of the connection between industrial growth and the number of legal regulations in two stages. In the first stage 0.47 2 =21% of the total variance is explained by the regression line. In the second stage 0.88 2 =77% of the remaining variance is explained. In that way about fourfifths of the total variations are explained in both stages. It remains for us to interpret the resu lts, especially for the s e c ond stage. It is obvious that the effects of legal regulations on the rate of growth are not the sam e in all phases of the cycle, and that they essentially depend on the point of the cycle where the econ omy is at the moment. In the fir st stage we determine the effect from the equation y = 0.39x + 126, which means that one additional regulation quarterly reduces the annual rate of growth by 0.39%, on the average. If the economy is at that moment just on the trend line, which in our case means at the beginning or at the end of the cycle, then there is no deviation of the current rate from the av erage rate and the equation of the first stage completely d eter mines the effect. If, however, the economy is somewhere within the cycle, then it is n ecessary to add to or subtract from the ef fect of the first stage depending on whether the economy is above or below the trend the effects from the equation of the second stage, z = 0.77u + 0.02, where z represents the deviation of the rate of growth from the regression line, and u the deviation of the rate of growth from the average rate of industrial growth. It follows that the negative effects of additional regulations are stronger than the average in phases of the cycle below the trend and weak er than the average in phases above the trend. In other words, ad m inistrative interventions in phases of depression and revival r e duce the rate of growth more than in phases of boom and r e c e s sion. What is m ore, during the lowering below the trend, i.e ., the entry into depression, the negative effects of regulations become
189

all the stronger, reach a culmination at the bottom of the cycle, and begin to weaken at the emergence from depression. From the historical survey we saw that far-reaching reorganizations and r e form s were carried out p recisely in the phases when the economy rose to below the level of the trend, and that the boom phase r e mained unrealized. In that way the negative effects were increased unnecessarily. Perhaps this is the place to emphasize one fact. The present Yugoslav economy is truly a market economy and very different from the rigid, sem i-adm inistrative economy of ten years ago, not to mention earlier periods. But it appears that this has not been noted, and old conceptions, bureaucratic approaches, intuitive and ad hoc solutions, short-run pragmatism, and neglect of scien tific economic research continue to burden Yugoslav economic policy. A market economy is like a precious machine, highly pro ductive but sensitive. A skilled worker can attain exceptional r e sults with it. When there is inept leadership, waste and break downs occur. Notes 1) A second possible method would be to measure the degree of bureaucratic control and interference in the business activity of economic organizations on the part of the state apparatus, the banks (as exponents of that apparatus), the Social Accounting Ser v ice, the price bureau, and other such bodies. What happens in that sphere is illustrated by the notes of Z. Surjak in Vjesnik u srijedu, May 4, 1966: "A Zagreb import firm imports these days from West Germany five spare electric bulbs at a value of 7.5 DM, which are necessary for a machine (value about 30,000 DM) to be able to run for the next five years. The importing of these bulbs requires: an application for approval of import (to Yugobank) in three copies; a report on the final transaction (to the National Bank) in 12 copies; a payment order (to the National Bank) in 8 copies; a dinar transfer (to the National Bank) in 4 copies. That is , a total of 30 copies of form s or documents which must be cal culated, written out, signed, and verified. The National Bank, in order to complete the allotment of foreign exchange, collects on the form of the 'payment order' which the importer fills out six stamps so that the payment abroad may be approved. This sketch explains at once why industrial imports continue to a ccel190

erate even after the economic upswing has already long turned downhill. It would be useful to examine and quantify the effects of this type of adm inistrative intervention. Until that is done it ap pears to me justified to assum e that they are closely correlated with the phenomena examined in the text. 2) For example, in the report of the Social Accounting Service's central office for Croatia, it is stated: "In the course of 1965, in only 24 bulletins of official interpretations of the Federal S ecre tariat for Finance there appeared 260 interpretations of the turn over tax and rates . .. " (Borba, May 15, 1966). 3) M. Popovid, Drustveno-ekonomski sistem (Belgrade: Kultura, 1964), pp. 160-61. 4) Narodna Banka, Godisnji izvjestaj 1956, p. 29. 5) Credit increased by 178 billion dinars in 1954, 97 billion in 1955, 307 billion in 1956 (ibid., p. 65). 6 ) The structure of gross economic investments in fixed capi tal was as follows: 1953-1956 1957-1960 Industry 59.1 43.8 7.0 15.8 Agriculture Transportation 27.4 22.9 (B. Horvat, "O karakteristikama naseg privrednog razvoja," Nasa stvarnost, 1961, No. 1, p. 13). 7) Total imports grew in 1957 by 31%, and exports by 18%; the trade deficit amounted to 80 billion dinars, and the payments d efi cit was 59 billion dinars ($1 = 300 d.). See SZS, Ju goslavia 19451964, pp. 8 6 , 197, 198. 8 ) See V. Zekovid and S. Novakovid, Ekonomika Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Rad, 1962), pp. 186-190. 9) B. Horvat et a l., Uzroci i karakteristika privrednih kretanja u 1961. i 1962. godini, SZPP, DAM-7 (Belgrade, 1962). 10) Ibid., p. 175. 11) Loc. cit. 12) Ibid., p. 174. 13) Ibid., p. 169. 14) Razvoj i problemi drustvenog i privrednog zivota Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Komunist, 1963), p. 59. 15) Narodna Banka Jugoslavije, Godisnji izvjestaj, 1964, p. 29. 16) By the first half of 1964 the further development of events could already be accurately predicted, i.e ., the development of a
191

cla ssica l business cycle. In the middle of that year, in a shorter essay ("Lessons of 1961 and 1964") which Komunist, for which it was written, did not publish because the forecasts were too un popular, but which was later published in Vjesnik (November 11 and 12, 1964), I warned that the country had entered a cyclical boom which is followed by a recession. See B. Horvat, Ekonomska nauka i narodna privreda (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1968), Part I. 17) It is necessary to emphasize, however, that total payments were settled in a way that compensated for a deficit of convert ible currencies by a surplus in clearing accounts. Since these two are not comparable amounts, the payments deficit in fact was not eliminated. 18) In 1965 the volume of investment was reduced by 12-14%, which represents a stronger contraction than in 1956. See SPK, Neki problemi proizvodnje i trzista u 1966. godini (Belgrade, April 1, 1966), p. 3. 19) B. Horvat, Ekonomska nauka i narodna privreda. 20) Narodna Banka Jugoslavije, Godisnji izvestaj 1966, pp. 4, 39, 40.

192

Chapter 13

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS

In order to ascertain the efficacy of Yugoslav economic policy with regard to economic fluctuations, we must carry out an inter national comparative analysis. Let us begin with the hypothesis that economic instability in creases with the stage of growth and that it is different in various institutional system s. We shall therefore choose countries with high growth rates to obtain com parability with the Yugoslav economy, and divide them into two groups: countries with capitalist markets and countries with cen tral planning. Since quarterly data do not exist for all the coun tries chosen, we w ill use annual data. Tim e se r ie s of fourteen years cover the period of n o r m a l postwar development and are sufficiently long to draw definite conclusions with respect to the characteristics of economic movements in that period. Move ments of the social product and industrial production of the eleven countries that we are comparing are shown on Graph 13.1 by chain indices. Construction of instruments for measuring the intensity of eco nomic fluctuations represents a special problem. The average deviation of em pirical values in relation to the arithmetic mean would give a biased estim ate for, as can be seen on the graph, in every case the fluctuations occur about som e trend of annual growth rates, and not about som e average rate of growth. For the sam e reason the usual statistical coefficient of variation would also give a biased estim ate. Parenthetically, I would note that this is still another illustration of the need to carry out the analy s is on the b asis of changes in rates of growth, and not on the ba s is of changes of absolute magnitudes, as is customary. In the latter case the effects of changes in growth rates would remain
193

Graph 13.1

CHAIN INDICES OF ANNUAL GROWTH OF SOCIAL PRODUCT

AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN ELEVEN COUNTRIES

unaccounted for by the m easure, and the result would be biased. Selection of a definite mathematical function for expressing the trend is always arbitrary to a certain degree. Our graph shows that in som e cases a straight line is entirely efficient, while other configurations of em pirical values conform better to a quadratic or cubic parabola or even som e oscillatory curve. Does that mean that for every case it is necessary to choose a correspond ing curve ? I think that this would be mistaken in term s of the goal of the analysis. A parabola of the second or third degree and oscillatory curves would mean that in the course of 14 years the economy passed from the phase of acceleration (deceleration) to the phase of deceleration (acceleration) one, two, or more tim es. But passing from accelerated to decelerated growth and the r e v erse in a relatively short tim e period also represents a type of economic fluctuation, and it would not be necessary to eliminate that effect. Therefore we w ill interpolate a linear trend in all cases. As an instrument for measuring the intensity of fluctua tions I will use the average of absolute values of relative devia tions from the trend, which I will call the coefficient of fluctua tion (1 ):

This coefficient m easures the proportion of deviations from the trend of rates of growth. In this form both the trend of values and the em pirical values represent chain indices. Of the eleven countries cited, only the USA, Italy, C zechoslo vakia and France are not among the twelve countries with the most expansive economies in the world. (2) For the sake of homogeneity and, through that, comparability of groups, the USA is separated from the capitalist group and Czechoslovakia is separated from the centrally planned group. Those two countries have the most unstable economies within their groups, and they achieve the low est rates of growth. Therefore they obviously rep resent special ca ses, and it would be interesting to establish the reason for this. Perhaps this hypothesis is plausible. Of the five capitalist countries the USA lagged the most in planned regulation of its economy, and at the sam e tim e it is the m ost developed and complex economy in the world. The U.S. lag in the construction of an adequate mechanism of economic coordination results in hypertrophic fluctuations in that country. It is interesting that
196

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Czechoslovakia is also the m ost developed country in its group, but contrary to the American case, it was probably hindered by having a rigid centrally planned economy like the others in the group. Rigid centralized planning in such a complex economy as that of Czechoslovakia stifles economic expansion and leads to disproportions and refractions. (3) In analyzing Table 13.1 we observe, first of all, that the hypothe s is of the determination of instability in the rate of growth appears entirely correct: in alm ost a ll cases the rank of the rate of growth corresponds to the rank of the coefficient of fluctuation. Further more, and this is probably a surprise, the economic instability of the so cia list countries is 36% greater than that of the capitalist countries; the index of fluctuation is 0.45, compared to 0.33 in the capitalist group on the basis of social product. That information cannot be left without interpretation. The difference can be ex plained at least partially by the following three factors: (1 ) the rate of growth in the so cia list group is greater than in the capi talist countries; (2 ) the so cia list group includes le s s developed countries (especially Bulgaria and Romania) in which agriculture, and therefore fluctuations of agricultural production, have much greater significance; and (3) the social product in the first group includes serv ices whose volume fluctuates le s s than the volume of material production, which com prises the national income of the second group. Elimination of these factors would require sub stantial work, and therefore we will carry out the group com pari sons on the basis of an aggregate which perm its more direct com parability. That is worked out in the second part of the table, where fluctuations of industrial production are measured. It can be seen that the socialist group has, along with a higher rate of growth, significantly smoother industrial expansion. This gives us an indication that planning accelerates growth and reduces fluctuations. However, it is necessary to have in mind that while the first index is biased to the advantage of market econom ies, the industrial index of fluctuation is biased to the advantage of centrally planned econom ies, where industry is the object of sp e cial attention and industrial stability is achieved at the expense of instability in other sectors. Therefore an unbiased m easure of relative instability is somewhere between our two indices. It is also necessary to bear in mind that our index is constructed so that it moderates fluctuations of economies with high growth rates in relation to those with low rates, i.e ., it reduces the fluctuations
198

of the centrally planned group in comparison to the capitalist group. Had the index been constructed in such a way that the re la tive deviations from the corresponding trend of production were used instead of the trend of growth rates that index would correspond to the average of absolute, and not relative, deviations from the trend of the rate of growth. This would increase fluctua tions in the centrally planned group. In other words, the index of fluctuation on the basis of changes in rates of growth (of chain in dices) is more favorable to the centrally planned group (and Yugo slavia) than the index of fluctuation on the basis of changes of production. (4) These considerations offer criteria for judging Yugoslav eco nomic movements. The coefficient of fluctuation on the basis of social product is 1.25. That means that on the average the devia tions amount to 125% of the trend of growth rates. In that respect the Yugoslav economy was significantly more unstable than any of the ten economies cited, including the U.S. The basic reason for that extreme instability must be sought, as we saw earlier, in a g riculture. Since agricultural fluctuations have been reduced in recent years, and the share of agriculture in total production has fallen, we can expect le s s instability in the future with respect to this factor. Economic instability as measured by industrial flu c tuations is somewhat le s s than in capitalist countries, but it is 79% greater than in countries of the so cia list group. That is a very significant piece of information, and it supplements our ea r lier analysis of the conditioning and effects of business cycles in Yugoslavia. We must still examine the question of whether there is som e connection between the economic fluctuations of various countries. Graph 13.1 shows that there is no connection whatever between the economic fluctuations of the so cia list countries, although they proclaimed firm economic cooperation through COMECON. In the capitalist countries there is a certain synchronization of econom ic movements, especially if the USA is excluded. Thus, in 1954 a ll the countries except France (and there, too, with respect to industry) experienced a retardation of total production, while in the following year in every one, without exception, the index of social product attained a local maximum. In 1958 all the countries experienced a pronounced retardation in both total and industrial production. In 1960 all the countries except the USA attained a maximum in industrial production. This was followed by a drop,
199

which ended in Japan in 1962, and in France and West Germany in 1963; and in all countries except Italy industry was again in an up swing in 1964. In connection with the ever-greater opening up of the Yugoslav economy to international trade, the synchronization established is very important and dangerous. To the extent that a co rre sponding protective mechanism is not constructed, fluctuations in the world market w ill be transmitted to the Yugoslav economy and, if that catches the Yugoslavs unprepared, they will again have waves of administrative interventions, with all the consequences which follow from that. As far as I can ascertain, the first case occurred with the cycle of 1958. Reduced opportunities on the world market hit Yugoslav exports, and the index of divergence reached a maximum, which we have discussed (5) (see Graph 11.2). There were other instances of synchronization, but I assum e that they are random. Finally, let us use another item of information from our graph, one that takes account of the trends of changes in growth rates. Since the tim e se r ie s is relatively short, selecting beginning and final years can have a strong influence on the slope of the trend. For Yugoslavia I chose 1952 and 1965 for the beginning and final years for industry, since in both years there was a slowing of in dustrial growth; for the social product I used 1952 and 1964, which is not entirely satisfactory. Data for 1965 were still not available, while extending the se r ie s backwards would increase the already large coefficient of fluctuation, and in 1964 agricultural produc tion increased 6 % while in 1952 it fell 31%. The result is that the , trend shows an unrealistically high rise. For other countries I was guided by the need to obtain a longer tim e se r ie s but, at the sam e tim e, one that would cover only normal development. Since postwar reconstruction was completed in a ll the countries con sidered between 1950-1952, that determined the choice of the b e ginning of the se r ie s. Given these lim its, let us now look at what the graph tells us. The data are summarized in Table 13.2. The so cia list countries began the period with high rates of growth. From then on general economic and industrial expansion slowed down in a ll these countries (6 ) (negative slope). It can be surm ised that this deceleration evoked the reform s toward d e centralization in those countries in recent years. At the end of the period the trend rates of growth in the so cia list countries fell to the level of the capitalist group. A slowing of industrial growth
200

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took place in the capitalist group at approximately the sam e tempo as in the so cia list group. The USA represents the exception: the slope is so sm all that it can be concluded that the rate of growth in the USA did not change; the social product fluctuated at about a rate of 3%, and industrial production at about 4.2%. The rate of growth of the social product fell in West Germany, stagnated in France, and increased in Italy and Japan. Economic movements in Yugoslavia deviate from this picture. In Yugoslavia both indus trial and general economic expansion accelerated. Therefore the final rates were significantly higher than the beginning ones, and at the end of the period the rate of growth equaled that of Japan (see Graph 13.1). Those are very favorable movements. They in dicate that the developmental potential created by the great social reform of 1950-1952 is not exhausted. However, if we also in cluded the last two or three years, 1965-1967, in the calculation, this would perceptibly turn the trend downward. Whether and to what extent the potential w ill be utilized, whether and to what ex tent the satisfactory trend will be continued, whether and to what extent business cycles will be eliminated all depend on the ef ficacy of economic policy in the coming years. Iii the meantime, however, it will be of interest to renew the discussion of secular cycles on the basis of the m aterial just pre sented. Graph 13.1 and Table 13.2 show: (a) that from 1950 on, industrial expansion constantly markedly slowed down in the ten countries which have the greatest part of the world's industrial potential, and (b) the rate of growth of the social product was maintained in the capitalist group but fell markedly in the so cia l is t group (7), so that there was an overall decline. Don't these movements indicate the downward phase of a secular Kondratiev cycle? The last Kondratiev began, according to Schumpeter, at the end of the 1890s, and its trough was reached at the tim e of the world economic cr isis of 1929-1933. Insofar as that theory truly ex p resses som e secular law and secular cycles last about half a century, then the third Kondratiev ends its revival phase at the beginning of the Second World War. During the war a new, fourth Kondratiev begins, which has its culmination in the postwar r e construction. After that follows the recession phase, which our twenty se r ie s reflect. That recession in the absence of a rtifi cial activators of expansion such as wars and armaments races may develop into an acute world c r isis. Schumpeter gives the
202

following dates for the three m ost severe world economic crises: 1825-1830, 1873-1878, 1929-1934. All three crises occurred in the troughs of the corresponding three Kondratiev waves. The in tervals between those troughs are 48 and 56 years. If that period icity continues, the next world cr isis ought to break out at the end of the 1970s. However, our knowledge of these secular mechanisms is so in significant that nothing more serious can be said ex ante. Guesses are possible, but not forecasts. It may be said eventually that in the meantime we have at lea st learned to crudely control cumula tions in economic movements, so that a crisis can no longer widen so spontaneously as in the past. It may be said that the centrally planned economies represent a qualitatively different type of econ omy as compared to the capitalist economies of form er days. Schumpeter would probably accept that thesis without further a r gument with respect to his theory of waves of innovative activity of capitalist entrepreneurs as generators of cycles. But, on the other hand, the data we have cited show that in a complex modern economy central planning is not so efficient as was formerly thought. The fact is that economic expansion in the most impor tant countries of the world capitalist and centrally planned alike is slowing down, and although we cannot maintain that this deceleration will continue, we cannot be sure that it will end quick ly. In connection with the fact that the Yugoslav economy is be ginning to open up to the world, we must take these facts into a c count very seriously. Notes 1) We could also u se as a statistical m easure the so-called relative standard error of estim ate. But the "coefficient of flu c tuation" is more easily calculated and has more direct meaning intuitively. That coefficient is sim ilar to the coefficient of the average relative intensity of cyclical variation, which A. Dobrid d iscu sses in his textbook Statistika u oblasti analiza cijena (Sveuciliste u Zagrebu: Zagreb, 1956), p. 148. 2) See Z. Popov, op. cit., p. 117. 3) The Czech economist Goldmann also gives a sim ilar expla nation. See his article "Fluctuations and Trend in the Rate of Economic Growth in Some Socialist Countries," Economics of Planning, 1964, No. 2, pp. 88-98.
203

4) G. Staller carried out a sim ilar comparative study of fluctua tions of market and planned economies for the period 1950-1960 ("Fluctuations in Economic Activity: Planned and Free-M arket Economies, 1950-1960," American Economic Review, June 1964, pp. 385-395). Staller uses as one of the indicators the "standard error of the least-sq uares fit of the se r ie s yt/yt-, to tim e . . . ; it [the indicator] exp resses the fluctuations in percentage points measured from the trendline fit to yearly growth rates." The r e sults are as follows: Social Product A griculture Construction_____

Industry Planned econo m ies* 6.5 12.3 4.2 11.9 Market econo m ies, aU** 3.0 (3.8) 7.4 4.1 8.1 Market econo m ies, le s s d e veloped*** 3.4 (4.3) 8.2 3.9 9.9 *)Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, Yugoslavia **)Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, G reece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, England, USA ***)Austria, West Germany, G reece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey )The figures in parentheses are related to dom estic m ateri al product in factor prices, which is comparable to the social prod uct as calculated in East European countries. Staller concludes that fluctuations are greater in the planned group than in the market group. The countries that have the least fluctuations of social product (on the basis of the comparable definition) are the USSR (1.9) and Norway (1.8); the countries that have the greatest fluctuations are Yugoslavia (11.8), Romania (11.6), Bulgaria (10.4) and Turkey (7.5). In agriculture the ex trem es are Poland (4.0), Czechoslovakia (4.6), England (2.7), Sweden (4.3) and the USA (4.5), on the one hand, and Yugoslavia (25.6), Bulgaria (18.4), Romania (17.6) and Canada (20.2) on the other. Industrial production fluctuates least in the USSR (1.4) and most in the USA (7.5). Construction expands evenly in the USSR

(4.7), France (4.4) and England (3.7), and with large fluctuations in Bulgaria (18.5), Romania (17.4), Turkey (17.1), and Yugoslavia (16.0, but calculated on the basis of actual working tim e in hours, rather than value of production as in other countries). It follows that during 1950-1960, among the 26 economies considered, the Soviet was the most stable and the Yugoslav, Romanian and Bul garian economies were the m ost unstable. 5) In 1958 world exports fell by 5%. In this connection the Na tional Bank's Annual Report for 1958 states: " . . . the growth of the volume of trade was le s s than in earlier years, which to a large degree can be attributed to the situation on the world market" (p. 97). 6 ) Goldmann, studying the sam e period with the aid of 7-year averages, also noticed the long-term slowing down of the indus trial rate of growth in the so cia list countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and East Germany (op. cit., pp. 95-97). 7) It is n ecessary to mention, however, that the statistics in som e countries in that group were unreliable in earlier years, and the deceleration is probably misleadingly overemphasized.

205

Chapter 14

LONG CYCLES

The relatively short period a ccessib le to analysis makes it very difficult to establish regularity with respect to the lengths and am plitudes of cycles. It is especially difficult to establish whether alongside short cy cles, which we have analyzed in detail, there are also longer cycles. In this chapter we will use the m ost ad vanced statistical techniques developed to date to squeeze out maximum information from the available data. We will avail our selv es, therefore, of the following methods of analysis: correlogram, periodogram, autoregression schem e, and moving averages.
1 4 .1

Correlogram

Insofar as there is som e regularity in economic fluctuations, we can expect seria l correlation of the data. Correlation w ill be greatest for those tim e intervals which correspond to som e d is tinct period of fluctuation. Therein lie s the sen se of correlogram analysis. Moreover, a correlogram also enables one, at least theoretically (i.e ., for infinite serie s), to establish the nature of an em pirical s e r ie s, namely, whether what we have are moving averages of random disturbances, harmonic movements, or auto regression. Let us begin with that analysis. (1) Let us take moving averages of random disturbances as our index:
yt ~ a,e, + a 2el+1 + + a mel+ln_ 1 ( 1 4 .1 )

We assum e that E( et ) = 0, from which it follows that E(yt) = 0. Then if k is the order of the correlation, and m the number of
206

term s of the moving average, for m > k it holds that

E (y iy i+ k )

E(a,El+

(a1E(+|C+ + amE(+k+m j)
( I 4 *2 )

- ( a i a k+ i + a 2a k + 2+ - - - + a m_ kam)v

since owing to the assum ed randomness,

E(et et+k) (0, z a k?0 . lv , z a k - 0 ( 1 4 .3 ) ' '

insofar a s k ^ m holds, naturally,

E(y iy t+ k )= o ( 1 4 .4 )

Accordingly, for infinite se r ie s originating from moving averages of random disturbances, seria l correlation disappears for k ^ m and from that point the correlogram overlaps the abscissa. Let us assum e now that it is a matter of a harmonic movement:
y t - A s in 0t + et ( 1 4 .5 )

and, as before, we can assum e that E(yt.) = 0, and therefore

E(yt y+k) - E [Asin 0t + EtJ [A sin0 (t + k) + c^ k ] = A2E [sin 0t sin 0 (t + k)] A2 n = 2 sin 0t sin 0 (t + k)
1 t= l 1 ( 1 4 .6 )

A2 n = S [cos 0 k cos 0 (2t + k)] 2n t= 1 A2 A 2 cos 0 ( k + n + 1 ) sin n0 = cos 0k

2 2n s in 0

Insofar as n is large, and 0 is not very sm all, the covariance is reduced to:
A2 E(yt yt+k) = - y cos 0k

(14.7)

Similarly, the variance is found:

E (y 2t) = ~ + var e (1 4 > 8 )

From this it follows that

r k = B cos 6k, B = A, /2 + ^

k>0

( 1 4 .9 )

An infinite se r ie s of harmonic term s thus form s a correlogram that is also harmonic with the period of the original components. If the term s of the em pirical se r ie s are composed of higher har monic components, the period will be different but the oscillations continue infinitely. Finally, let us take an autoregression equation of the second degree:
y t+ 2

+a y t + ,

+ byt

= et+ 2

(14.10)

Insofar as 4b > a* , the characteristic equation has complex roots and the general solution runs:
y t ^ A p l cos (Ot-i-cp) + B

(14.11)

The period is , where 0 is determined from coso = - a /2 p , p= . Insofar as b < l , the oscillations are damped, which we take as the typical case. By certain transformations we obtain a correlogram of this form: pk sin (k0 + Ji) sin J j k"

(14.12)

in which the sam e factor of damping p < 1 appears as w ell as the sam e autoregressive period as in the autoregression equation. It is n ecessary to have in mind, however, that this period is not n ecessarily equal to the average period of fluctuation of the em pirical serie s. Let us look now at our em pirical correlogram on Graph 14.1. Not one curve coincides with the axis of the ab scissa, so that it is probably not a matter of moving averages of random distur bances. Two of the three curves show damping, which indicates the autoregressive character of the movements. But the m ost in teresting feature is the information with respect to the length of the cycle. The correlogram of the industrial indices for the period 1953208

1965 shows exceptional regularity for an em pirical se r ie s. Peaks appear for k = 13 and 23, and troughs for k = 7.18 and 30. The pe riod of fluctuation is therefore between 10 and 12 quarters. It is worth observing that industrial exports show still more regular fluctuations, which, in addition, agree with the fluctuations of in dustrial production. For export peaks appear at k = 13 and 26, and troughs at k = 6 and 19, which indicates a period of about 13 quar ters. Since both se r ie s are relatively short, it would be useful to extend at least one se r ie s to obtain additional information. That is done for the se r ie s of industrial production, which is extended back to the beginning of 1949 by interpolating quarterly data be tween the known annual data. As a result we obtain a correlogram with an entirely different shape, from which neither peaks nor troughs can be established with certainty. That extension does not enable us to establish the existence or nonexistence of long cycles, but it can be interpreted, I think, as an indication that the periods up to 1953 and after 1953 are essentially different and therefore that a regularity which holds equally for both periods probably cannot be found. 14.2 Periodogram The correlogram is not suitable for discovering the sim ulta neous existence of several different cycles in som e given em piri cal movement. For that purpose a periodogram is constructed. Two rows are taken that, with the exception of the term s in front of the summation sign, represent the covariance: (2 )
A -=
2 7T t
Ui c o s ------

(14.13)

U| sin ------

27 t T

(14.14)

and let
Sl = A1 -! B1

(14.15)

We assum e that the term s of the actual statistical se r ie s are given by this expression: (14.16)
210

Accordingly, n t=i where the second summation is equal to zero for b, and cos are not correlated. If we write a. = ^ , p = y ,w e w ill obtain
A -----

"
sin [ y fc + P n ] s i n [ y ( a + P ) (n + l)]

D
a ("sin [ y ( a - P ) n] s i n y (<x-P) ( n + 1 ) ]

For large n the second summation tends to zero, and if it holds that sin 1 / 2 (< n = 1 / 2 ( n and thus, as a final * P) P) result, we obtain
A == a sin ( a P) (n + 1)

(14.18)

(14.19) S -A +B^a 1 (14.20)

However, the condition a -+(3 means that the tentative period n ap proaches the actual period X. Therefore, when these two periods approximately agree, the intensity S2 is equal to the square of the amplitude of the original movement. If the tentative and a c tual period diverge, S* w ill be sm all because of the division of the square brackets into the expressions A and B with n. For this result to hold it is obviously n ecessary that n, the number of term s in the statistical s e r ie s, be sufficiently large. Graph 14.2 contains the periodogram of the deviations of the rate of growth of industrial production from the average rates determined in the period from the beginning of 1949 to the end of 1966. In order to obtain a sufficiently large n, the period is ex tended backward by interpolations and forward by forecasts. Thus 72 quarters are obtained. However, the graph shows that this was still not a sufficient number of statistical observations, for n > 35 quarters, i.e ., when the entire period permits only one cycle of that length to develop fully, the periodogram begins to behave very oddly.
211

Si:
to to

a >
05 05 (q u a rte rs )
z3 'X j im s ju ]

Ph

s
0
<

W K H

1 /3 w H H

W > 0

a 9 H
V

1
ft

Period

o O H H K H

Analysis of the periodogram indicates the possibility of the ex istence of the following five periods: Period (quarters) Corrected Intensity
S " 72 k15.77

S2

Ic-

8.87

14
21

33 37 54

10.23 22.81 19.30 32.71 26.68

0.65 1.45 1.23 2.08 1.70

1.16 2.58 2.18

-

What is the significance of these periods? Obviously it would be necessary to test the significance of the individual periods. Sat isfactory tests have not yet been developed. The m ost suitable existing test, Schuster's, has this meaning. We take Ui . . . un random elem ents from a normal population with variance a* . Then
A = Z u, co s---n t- 1 V 1

2T 7t

( 1 4 .2 1 )

is normally distributed with varA =^ and sim ilarly

2a2

h2 t = 1

S cos*
(i. n

(14. 22)

varB=

(14.23)

Furthermore, cov (A,B) = 0 and A and B are independent. There fore their joint distribution, taking into account that A* + B2 = S2, is given by the expression dF= J } _ exp (_ n s>)dS>
4~a2 4<i

(14.24)

and the mean value of S2 is

213

E (S2) = n

( 1 4 .2 5 )

4a2 k It follows that the probability that S2 exceeds the value n is e-k. We continue from this point with Walker's supplement. If e-k is sm all, the probability that none of m independent values of S2 ex ceeds 4g;k is (1 )m. Accordingly, the probability that at least e-k
n

one S2 exceeds 4o k is n
1( l - e - k)m ( 1 4 .2 6 )

This test, as well as a ll the others, is based on the assumption of random normal variation of the original s e r ie s, which, however, we think is not random. N evertheless the test makes som e sense. If S2 is not significant on the basis of the assumption of random variation, it probably is also not significant when the se r ie s is system atic. ^ In our case the mean value of the intensity E(S2 )= if =15.77 for all values, and E(S2) = 8.87 for the first 35 values of S2. If we express the values of k as ratios of actual and mean intensities, we obtain the data that are presented in the second part of the table on page 213. We must still establish, on the basis of formula (14.26), the probability that at least one of the 71 or of the 35 independent values of k exceeds the given values: k
2 4 6

P,i
0 .9 9 9 0 .7 3 1 0 .1 6 4

Probability J

P 35
0 .9 9 3 0 .4 7 7 0 .0 8 5

0.022

0.011

It follows that not one of the periods found is significant. The one that com es closest to significance is the period of 2 1 quarters. But in that case also the probability is alm ost 50% that som e other period has greater intensity. Therefore our final resu lt is negative. Insofar as there are longer periods, the periodogram has not even made it possible to establish with som e certainty the existence of som e shorter period of fluctuation. The reason for that must be sought in part in the
214

shortness of the s e r ie s. Probably more important, the reason must also be sought in the peculiarities of the mathematical mod el of the periodogram. That model requires that peaks and troughs appear at regular intervals, while we know that this was not the case in the period considered. Therefore, just as with the correlogram, we can nevertheless draw one important conclusion: the 1949-1966 period is too heterogeneous for us to be able to con sider it as a whole. The first fourth is especially different from the remaining three-fourths of that period. Therefore in the next section we will ignore that first administrative period and we w ill divide the remainder of the period into cycles. 14.3 A utoregression Scheme The next step in our analysis consists of the approximation of economic movements by autoregression equations. For reasons which will immediately be clear, we will use difference equations of the second and fourth order. The four equations used with the em pirical values of the param eters are given in the following table, where y, is the chain index of industrial production in quar ters t, obtained on the basis of 4-quarter moving averages: Equations Correlation Coefficients for the Period m /1953 m /1953 1/1959 -H /1965 -IV /1960 -H /1965 0.54 0.64

1.

A2y ,= a y ,+1+ c yi+2- (a + 2 )y ,+1y,+c

2.

yi+ 2ayt+i + byt + c a, = l,1677 b , - -0 ,5 3 6 3 c, = 41,7514 a2= 1.5218 bz 0.6674 = c2= 16,1694

0.91

0.83

0.95

3.

A y, = aA 2y,+1 + by,+2 + c
y t+ 4 = (a + 4 ) y , + J (2 a b + + (a + 4 ) y , + 1 y t + c a , = 3.7 J82 b, = -1 ,2 5 0 7
c ,

0.95
6) y t+2 +

0.98

0.98

-3 ,2 1 2 1 b 2= -0 ,4 7 1 9 C j= 52,2933

= 141,0648

215

4.

yt+4= ayt+ 3 + byt+j + cyt+1 + dyt+e a, = 0,6450 b, = 0 c, = 0 d, - -0,4901 e, = 95,4067 a2= 1,1055 b2= 0 c2= 0 d2= -0,3933 e2= 32,0724

0.93

0.93

0.98

On the basis of the resu lts obtained in the earlier analysis, we now do not take into account the period before 1953. Since two of the three cycles in the 1953-1965 period were short, and one was somewhat longer, this period is also not treated as a unit; it is divided into two subperiods which partially overlap, namely, into the periods IH/1953-IV/1960 and 1/1959-n /1 9 6 5 . In the table on pages 215-216 the first column of coefficients relates to the first peri od, the second column to the latter. That the division into two p eri ods was justified can be seen from the fact that the coefficients of multiple correlation are greater for movements in the second sub period, which means that the last cycle was more regular than the earlier two. A lso, the em pirical values of the param eters are somewhat different for each of the subperiods. The first equation contains the condition that the amplitude does not change, i.e ., we have a true harmonic movement. The re la tively low coefficients of correlation show that this equation pro vides a poor description of the economic movements and the pa ram eters are not calculated. In the second equation the lim iting condition is abandoned and a completely general difference equation of the second order is adopted. The correlation in creases significantly, and from the regression coefficients we can calculate the param eters which in terest us m ost, the factor of damping p and the period of fluctua tion P:
_______ 1,1677 360 P .-V ' 0.5363 - 0,73, cos 0 ~ 0,80, 6 - 36-50', P, - 9,8
P2- 1/0,6674 = 0,81, cos 6 - - 0 , 9 4 , 0 - 20, P2- - - -

2 0,81

20

As we expected, the period of fluctuation in the second subperiod

216

is prolonged to 4.5 years. The damping is rather large, so that the fluctuations degenerate very quickly into a horizontal line. A glance at Graph 14.3 reveals that this equation also does not d e scribe the fluctuations of industrial production in a satisfactory way. (3) The third and fourth equations have equal coefficients of m ulti ple correlation and describe industrial movements equally well, as can be seen from the graph. The third equation includes the restraint that the amplitudes of the components of the sine wave are constant (see the Mathematical Appendix), while the fourth equation is completely general. It can be seen that removing the restraint does not improve the results perceptibly, so that the third equation, which is mathematically sim pler, is entirely ade quate for the analysis. In the fourth equation the regression co efficients b and e are insignificant at the 1 0 %level, so they are ignored and the remaining coefficients are calculated anew. The new coefficients, as well as a ll coefficients in the other equations, are highly significant. Introducing the fifth and sixth term s in the equation gave insignificant coefficients for these term s and it can therefore be concluded that the difference equation of the fourth degree describes the em pirical movements in the best possible way. For the third equation the roots of the auxiliary equation have these values for subperiods I and II: I mi,! = 0,8130 0,5823 i, II mi,! = 0,9239 0,3827 i,
m s ,4

ms,4 = 0,6721 0 = 0,5499 0

A s we have already mentioned, pi =p* = l; and the period of o s c il lation looks like this: I cos O = t 0,8130, O = 3540, i
0, 0,

cos (fe = 0,6721 II cos (), = 0,9239,

= 180 4750, = 2230r P2 = ^

3

cos ()o = 0,5499,

0a = 180 5640'

= 2,92

In order to be able to interpret these resu lts, it would be u se ful also to solve the general, fourth equation. The roots of the auxiliary equation are easily calculated on an electronic computer.
217

O O O E m pirical d ata
--------------------------*t + 4 a *i + 3 + d y t + e

x X

A o A +1 bjyH 4y 2rt +

Graph 14.3

Approximation o Industrial Cycles b Autoregression Equations f y

For the two periods considered, these factors of damping (p) and of length of period (P) are obtained in quarters:
I p. = 0.96 p2 = 0,73 II p. = 0.99 p-> = 0.63 P, - 10.4 P2 = 9.3 P, = 17.0 P , = 6.7

The results are very informative. The periods of oscillation are prolonged from 10.1-10.4 quarters in the period m /1 9 5 3 IV/1960 to 16-17 quarters in the period I/1959-II/1965. For the wavy movements compounded of two or more sine waves, the pe riods of the components of the movements cannot be ascertained by the naked eye. Mathematical analysis shows that Yugoslav in dustrial cycles consist, in a ll, of two sine wave components, since testing of the hypothesis of a larger number of components gave statistically very convincing negative results. The component cy cles are such that one has a longer period and the other has a shorter period. The longer periods are equal for the third and fourth equations and correspond to the periods that we established earlier for industrial cycles directly ( 1 1 and 1 0 quarters in the first two cycles and 17 quarters in the following see Table 5.2). Short periods are significantly different. Furthermore, for the longer components of the cycles the factor of damping is approxi mately equal to one (which was used as an assumption in equation three) and the oscillations are therefore regular. For shorter cy cles we have pronounced damping. We may therefore conclude that industrial cycles in Yugoslavia can be described in a s a tis factory way by the sum of two sine waves. The period of the longer sine wave corresponds to the visib le period of the cycle of em pirical magnitudes, and the amplitude is constant. T here fore the longer sine wave can be understood as the basic wave, which moves regularly. On this basic wave are then superim posed irregular shorter waves with periods of som e 3-9 quarters and with significant damping. The regular basic wave can be in terpreted economically as periodic structural refractions, and the superimposed short fluctuations as stochastic shocks (dis turbances) which constantly occur in every real economy. It is necessary to add that the coefficient of multiple correlation for both equations is exceptionally high: R = 0.93-0.98. And the de viation of the calculated from the em pirical values in the entire
219

period considered is 0.5% for the third equation and is further r e duced to 0.4% for the fourth equation. Accordingly, the sum of the two sine waves presents a practically perfect description of the em pirical industrial cycles. Since we are not dealing with acoustics or light, this harmonic analysis must not be interpreted mechanically. We still know a l most nothing about the system atic characteristics of the economy, and therefore we do not know either to what extent the result ob tained is pure mathematical fitting of a curve, or to what extent there is presupposed economic content. Under the circum stances it is best that we conceive it as additional information about the behavioral characteristics of the Yugoslav economy. The infor mation indicates the possibility that, in addition to the alreadyknown short cycles of 3-4 years, there also may be ultrashort cycles of about 3 to 9 quarters. The existence of longer cycles was not uncovered by this technique. 14.4 Moving Averages In the introductory methodological discussion we established the fact that moving averages hide oscillatory effects. Generally, short variations are overemphasized at the expense of longer ones, and fictitious oscillations are introduced by summation of random influences. Therefore, when moving averages are adopted it is necessary to take these effects into account, and calculations must be carried out so that they are minimized. It also follows from the earlier discussion that the effect is minimized for har monic components by equalizing the path of the moving average with the period of oscillation of the components. This is , after all, intuitively obvious. If we wish to determine the trend, and we know that there are "seasonal fluctuations," then the smoothing of these fluctuations requires that the path of the moving average be made equal to the period of fluctuation. The effect of the ran dom component will be minimal if the sum of the squared weights is minimized, i.e ., if a sim ple moving average is adopted. We w ill adopt only such moving averages in this study. Since we are now interested in longer cycles, quarterly data are no longer n ecessary and it is sufficient to u se annual data, by which the se r ie s is extended. We will consider the following stra tegic economic series: the economy, agriculture, total investment, total exports, industry, industrial investment, and industrial ex
220

ports. Six-year moving averages were used for the economy and industry until 1957, and four-year averages were used from then on. That was done because the first cycle was atypical (six years) and because adoption of the six -y ea r and four-year moving av er ages for the entire se r ie s shows the same values on the boundary of 1956 and 1957, so that the six -y ea r curve directly p asses over to the four-year curve. Agriculture has two-year cycles until 1960, and four-year cycles after that, and therefore four-year moving averages must correspond to that serie s. As for the oth er s e r ie s, we know that after 1953 they follow industrial produc tion on the whole, so four-year moving averages are also adopted for them. All these movements are shown on Graph 14.4. For the sake of comparability, fluctuations of quarterly industrial produc tion are also shown. We can read the following m essage from Graph 14.4 All the s e r ie s, with the exception of industrial investment, reach a minimum in 1951. All the s e r ie s, except total and industrial exports, reach a maximum in 1959. Both export serie s reach a maximum som e what earlier. Exports show a decline beginning in 1956, and the other se r ie s fall from 1959. The retardation of exports led to well-known difficulties, and efforts were made from 1961 to a c celerate exports again. These efforts produced definite resu lts after two years, but the expansion of exports began to slow down after 1964 and devaluation failed to change that tendency. Indus trial investment gives a se r ie s that is in complete disharmony with all other se r ie s. That indicates two things. F irst, industrial investment was subjected to exceptional administrative shocks, and second, the trough in the three-year period 1955-1957 is prob ably responsible for certain structural disproportions (especially as regards energy and ferrous metallurgy) which expressed them selv es later. Huge oscillations in industrial investm ent generally must have a pernicious influence on the stability and intensity of industrial expansion. Agricultural production alone, of seven ag gregates considered, gives som e optim istic indications. A gricul tural expansion accelerated from 1962 on, and that may have aided the upturn of the other economic movements. A lso, although the rate of growth of exports fall, it is still always greater than the rate of growth of production. In that way the share of exports in production grows, which creates the preconditions for widening the basic bottleneck of Yugoslav economic expansion. As we could have expected, our se r ie s do not show any special

Graph 14.4 CHAIN INDICES OF ECONOMIC MOVEMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1949-1967

Note: F o r "econom y" and " In d u stry an n u a lly ," s i x - y e a r a v e ra g e s a r e u sed u n til 1957 and fo u ry e a r a v e ra g e s from 1957 on. F o u r-y e a r a v e ra g e s a r e u sed fo r the o th e r s e r ie s .

222

roundness in the movements. However, they show a high degree of synchronization in the movements, and especially synchroniza tion with the movements of industrial production. This enables us to observe the rhythm of general economic movements through the movement of industrial production. And there we notice an a c celeration from 1951 to 1959, and after that a retardation up to the end of 1966, when the last data for moving averages are reached. Accordingly, it is a matter of a cycle of at least 15 y ea rs. Whether that cycle w ill last longer than 15 years is som e thing that cannot be forecasted now with certainty, but it is very probable on the b asis of the indications available at this moment. The worrisom e thing about industrial production is the move ments after 1959. The reform of 1961 evoked retardation in steps, after which there was a tendency to return to the earlier level. That level was not reached; the reform of 1965 pushed the indus trial curve yet another step lower, and the industrial trough in 1967 was lower than in 1952. A sim ilar phenomenon can reappear, and that would significantly prolong the retardation phase of the long cycle, decelerate growth, and prolong the cycle to a total of 18-20 years. We are reminded of the earlier statement concern ing the greater frequency of cycles of that length in other coun tries. We can, it seem s to me, conclude with this remark. Besides the existence of short cycles, we have also established the existence of cycles in the longer-run trends of economic movements. The shortness of the tim e se r ie s does not permit the determination of those longer cycles more precisely. But in interpreting those c y cles it is necessary to have in mind that there is nothing mechani cal and absolutely unavoidable about them. Whether the present phase will continue and be prolonged depends alm ost entirely on the efficacy of the work of economic policy bodies. The retardation of economic growth after 1959 coincides with the acceleration of the decentralization and democratization of the Yugoslav economy and society. Because of the contemporaneous ness of those two p rocesses it may be thought that they stand in a relationship of effect and cause. It is well known that such a conclusion is in fact drawn. I have repeatedly, in this study and elsewhere (4), tried to give an alternative explanation which, to me, seem s incomparably closer to the truth. The problem is that the building up of Yugoslav society has lagged behind the develop ment of the m aterial base, that administrative and political bodies
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are not prepared and able to manage an economy as complicated as the present Yugoslav economy, that pragmatism and neglect of theory result in totally unnecessary lo sse s and failures, and that the potentialities of the Yugoslav social system are significantly greater than the actual achievements of the la st years. Can these theses be proved? Or are they only the expression of a personal belief? Insofar as a cla ssica l fundamental proof is sought in the sen se of an experiment, then such a proof can be given only ex post, through the results of future development. But the scientific substantiation of economic policy would have the role of an experi ment that would draw a ll the necessary conclusions from develop ment up to the present time. However, it can hardly be doubted that a high degree of plausi bility of the conclusions whether positive or negative with r e spect to the stated hypothesis can also be attained by ex ante analysis. This study offers many elements for such an analysis, but does not verify the hypotheses. Verification would require an entirely different study which, to be sure, logically begins with the present, but is not oriented toward an analysis of what has happened, but rather toward what might and must happen. In other words, it would be n ecessary to turn from analysis of business cycles and the functioning of the economic mechanism to the elab oration of an economic stabilization policy and the establishment of ways of more fully utilizing existing potentials. At this moment we can only guess at what those potentials are. It appears to m e, however, that it is now already possible to men tion a more serious indication. Long cycles (Graph 14.4), devia tions from the trend (Graph 5.3), average rates of growth within individual cycles (Table 5.3), and other indicators show that a c tual economic growth accelerated until 1960, and that after that year they slowed down. But actual growth is not identical with potential growth. The p recise establishment of potential growth is , of course, very difficult. In that respect we return right to the problem emphasized at the beginning of this study. We w ill there fore attempt to solve a sim ilar problem in a sim ilar way. When the retardation phase in the depression reaches the trough of the cycle, it can be assumed that the basic obstacles to more rapid growth have been removed, that the economic structure is better proportioned, and that the institutional system has been brought up to date in relation to the needs of the economy by the implementation of a reform. Accordingly, the rate of growth
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realized in the conditions after the lower turning point corresponds in principle to growth in a well-balanced economy. However, b e cause of unutilized capacities and large inventories, the m aterial conditions for rapid growth are more satisfactory than in a nor mal situation in which the factors of production are fully utilized. For that reason the rates of growth in the accelerative phase of the cycle must be adjusted downward. The correction can, natu rally, be carried out in various ways. In the absence of further information, correction with the aid of the average rate of growth in the course of the cycle (measured from peak to peak) seem s to me to be most suitable. We will therefore u se, as indicators of potential expansion, the arithm etic mean of average rates of growth and the rate of growth realized in the accelerative phases of the cycles. This picture is obtained (rates of growth of the social prod uct, excluding agriculture; data are annual, for quarterly data do not exist for this aggregate): 1952-1955 1955-1957 1957-1960 1960-1964

11.0 % 12 . 0 % 12.1 % 13.7%

The last cycle, which began with the reform, still does not have an accelerative phase, and therefore it is not possible to calculate the rate-indicator. It can be seen that the rates of potential ex pansion rise. They r ise , and significantly, even after 1960. A l though these data are entirely unsatisfactory for a firm conclu sion, I assum e, nevertheless, that they give a strong indication of the justification for stating the following thesis: institutional changes after 1960 and the general development of Yugoslav s o ciety freed social forces and developed initiatives which offered the possibility of achieving an even more rapid economic expan sion than that which until now has been considered exceptional both among Yugoslavs and in the rest of the world. It is up to the Yugoslavs to transform that possibility into reality. Notes 1) Worked out according to M. G. Kendall, The Advanced The ory of Statistics (London: Griffen, 1959), n , Ch. 30. 2) According to Kendall, op. cit. 3) Graph 14.3 is divided into three parts that correspond to the
225

three cycles. Fitting of the curve in each part is carried out in such a way that the constants of the corresponding equations are found by the method of least squares (see the Mathematical Ap pendix). Because of that procedure the ends of the preceding cy cles and the beginnings of the following cycles do not entirely overlap on the boundaries of the cycles. 4) See B. Horvat, Ekonomska nauka i narodna privreda (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1968).

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Chapter 15

CONCLUSIONS: THE MECHANISM OF MOVEMENTS IN THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY

Methodological Problems 1. An economy should be regarded as a large system . Research shows that this system is unstable by nature. Insofar as suitable m easures for regulating and directing the system are not under taken, and efficient self-regulating institutions are not built into it, fluctuations are unavoidable. These fluctuations reduce the rate of growth and result in lo sse s of production. The estim ate we have made shows that in the fifteen-year period 1952-1967 probably about one-fourth of the social product was lost because of uneven development and reduction of the potential rate of growth. 2. In the statistical analysis of economic fluctuations in the Yugoslav economy we start with the following model. It is assumed that the economy moves along som e long-run trend with a constant rate of growth ( a - 1). It follows that the trend values of the social product will be determined by the equation y, = a (15.1)

Let us assum e, furthermore, that in the short run the economy oscillates about that trend, but in such a way that the amplitudes of deviations are proportional to the values of the trend in the period t. What we are assum ing, then, is that with the expansion of production, fluctuations increase absolutely but remain rela tively constant, i.e ., deviations from the trend represent equal proportions of the trend values of production in the respective
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periods. The factor of proportionality is designated by k, and de viations from the trend are determined by the expression yt* = ka* cos t (15.2)

If now the trend values, which represent equilibrium growth of production, and deviations from the trend, which reflect fluctua tions, are summed we obtain our model yt = yt+ y t* = a* (i + k cos t) (15.3)

3. In studying economic fluctuations one can consider: (a) abso lute deviations from the trend, (b) relative deviations from the trend, and (c) movements of growth rates. In expansive economies such as the Yugoslav, approach (a) lacks analytic value. Approach (b) is inconvenient from the point of view of statistical calculation. Approach (c) is chosen as most efficient. In comparing m ove ments (a) and (b) with (c) it is n ecessary to have in mind that the turning points of the path of growth rates precede the turning points of the path of relative and absolute deviations from the trend by one-fourth of the period. That means that the deviation from the trend attains a maximum when the rate of growth has already fall en to the average; production returns to the trend value when the rate of growth has fallen to the minimum and falls below the trend when the rate of growth begins to increase. Instead of annual rates of growth, chain indices can be used to avoid calculation of nega tive values when, occasionally, contractions occur in economic movements. Seasonal fluctuations are eliminated by a method that u ses quarterly changes of annual rates of growth, measured by calculating ratios of the sam e quarters of su ccessiv e years. Industry 4. Chain indices of economic movements, corrected for s e a sonal fluctuations, reveal the existence of business cycles in Yugoslavia. These cycles la st three to four years and have a tendency to become prolonged and deeper. In industry the am pli tudes of the cycles are 10-20 percentage points. This means that, at the peaks of the cycles, industry expands at a rate clo se to 2 0 % , while in the troughs of the cycles it is stagnant. Because of the dominant position of industry in the Yugoslav economy, industrial
228

cycles predetermine cycles in all other economic movements with the exception of agriculture. The periodicity of Yugoslav business cycles is exceptionally regular. Given the complexity of economic movements, it is surprising how precisely industrial cycles can be described by the sum of two sine waves: for the period 1953-1965 the coefficient of correlation between the empirical and calculated movements is r = 0.93-0.98, and the em pirical path of industrial production deviates from the mathematical (expressed as the sum of two sine waves) in a ll by 0.4%. It is obvious, therefore, that it is a matter of very system atic movements. It is also obvious that learning the mechanism of those movements can make it possible in the future to subject them to the conscious control of society. 5. All economic sectors of a ll statistical aggregates do not show the sam e intensity of cycles. The strongest factors of material instability are agricultural production, construction, and total in vestment. Agriculture
6 . Agricultural production has its own, exogenously determined cycles which, until 1960, were of two years' duration. Those cy cles bring about an absolute reduction of production and have s ig nificantly greater amplitudes than the industrial cycles. From 1960 on, the agricultural cycles have toned down; the expansion of production slowed down for several years, but recently it has again shown signs of acceleration. For that reason, and because of the reduction of the share of agriculture in the total social product, agriculture will represent a significantly reduced factor of instability in the future than it has up to now.

Investment 7. Because of a se r ie s of unsolved problems, and first of a ll because of unsolved problems in financing investment and housing construction, the construction industry fluctuates with huge am plitudes and in alm ost every cycle undergoes a classical depres sion with negative rates of growth. Rates of growth of construction vary between - 40% in the trough of the second cycle and +49% at the peak of the first cycle. Even in recent years, with significant ly greater volume of construction work, the fluctuations remain intolerably large, from +28% at the beginning of 1964 to -16% in
229

the middle of 1965 (measured by effective working hours; accord ing to the real value of production the fluctuations would be still greater). Since construction fluctuations not only have huge am plitudes, but also coincide with industrial fluctuations, construc tion represents a dangerous factor of instability in the Yugoslav economy. 8 . Investment movements have a special place in the theory of business cycles. The most frequent and thoroughly developed ex planations of cycles consist, in effect, of a description of the mechanism of the accelerator-m ultiplier, because of which retar dation (acceleration) of the expansion of aggregate demand leads to an accelerated reduction (increase) of investment demand, and changes in investment magnify variations in aggregate demand. Accordingly, breaks in investment movements turn production cy cles upward or downward. It appears that this mechanism does not operate in the Yugoslav economy. If, because there are no quarterly data on real economic investment, the serie s for con struction and machinery production are taken as substitutes, this picture is obtained. The amplitudes of machinery production alone are a little greater than industrial amplitudes, so it is therefore im possible to speak of accelerated instability in the production of equipment. On the other hand, the turning points of the cycles of machinery production lag, especially at the peaks, while the turn ing points of construction coincide with those of industry; but a c cording to the usual theory they should lead. Therefore, one can rather safely conclude that investment does not provoke breaks in short-run flows of production; on the contrary, acceleration or retardation in production leads to breaks in investment activity. Inventories 9. After investment in fixed capital, investment in inventories is taken as the m ost frequent explanation of cyclical turning points. The literature up to now describes two types of inventory fluctuation: one of them corresponds to a capitalist economy, above all the American; the other corresponds to a centrally planned economy, above all the Czechoslovak. In both cases the cycles of inventories and of production coincide; in both cases the cumulation and decumulation of inventories are conditioned by the speculative behavior of producers. In the phase of the cy clical upswing, demand exceeds supply and producers endeavor
230

to build up inventories to provide for expansion of production; in ventories pile up. In recession phases the motivations and m ove ments are the reverse. However, the causes of the discrepancy between supply and demand are very different in the two types of economy. The centrally planned economy is oriented toward pro duction. Consequently, running up against capacity barriers i.e ., insufficient supply in relation to existing demand results in r e cession. The capitalist economy is oriented toward consumption. Therefore inadequate demand determ ines the end of an upswing. 10. In the Yugoslav economy, inventory fluctuations regulate a mechanism that is different from both the capitalist and the cen trally-planned. The latter two mechanisms change inventories in accordance with the production cycle and in such a way that changes of inventories absorb a sm aller percentage of the increase of pro duction in the accelerative phase and a relatively larger part of the decline in production in the retardation phase. In that way consumption is more stable and fluctuates le ss than production. In the Yugoslav economy, inventories move inversely to the pro duction cycle slower in the upswing, faster in the downswing and thus fluctuations of production are reduced at the expense of greater fluctuations of consumption. As a result of that inverse movement, in accelerative phases of the cycle the investment in total industrial inventories absorbs about 25% of the increase in production; in retardation phases it absorbs the entire increase in industrial production. The latter phenomenon means that in the retardation phase of the Yugoslav industrial cycle an increase in production is possible only if it is exclusively for inventories. And if an attempt is made, by credit restriction, for example, to hamper the formation of a certain volume of inventories, an abso lute decline in production w ill result. Economic Efficiency and P rices 11. In an economy geared toward rapid expansion of production, high rates of growth are the precondition for full use of capacity. Therefore, in years of expansion the capital coefficients fall per ceptibly, and in years of stagnation they increase. Better u tiliza tion of capacity and econom ies of larg e-sca le production reduce costs in accelerative phases of the cycle. Personal incomes act with the sam e effect: to be sure, they move cyclically synchro nized with production, but they have le s s amplitude and burden
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production co sts le s s in the accelerative phases of th e cycle than 4 in the retardation phases. As a result of a ll th e s e m ovem ents, p ressure on p rices w ill be le s s at high rates of grow th and greater at low rates. Accordingly, contrary to the p ostu late of the c la ssi cal theory of supply and demand, in the Yugoslav econom y prices % w ill r ise m ore slow ly in tim es of expansion than in r e c e s s io n periods-' An em pirical test supports that expectation: the co rrela tio n be- ~ tween deflated sa le s of the economy and the g en era l reta il price 1 index is r = - 0 .6 2 , which means that the rela tio n sh ip is strong and1 negative. Thus, prices in crease when sa les slo w down and fall (or: r is e m ore slowly) when sa le s accelerate. M : 12. For purposes of economic policy it would b e of exceptional f importance to establish which economic v a ria b les con trol quarter^ ly movements of p rices. R esearch shows that in th is resp ect the 5 Yugoslav economy behaves with unusual regu larity: a sin gle vari-,able determ ines four-fifths of all short-run v a r ia tio n s of producers and retail p rices. The factor involved is the m o v em en t of personal incom es in relation to the movement of production. When nominal! personal incom es grow 6.5% faster than the p rod u ctivity of labor, ? producers' p rices in industry remain unchanged; p r ic e s increase ! if the ex cess of personal incom es is greater than th is lim iting per* centage, and they fall if the excess is le ss . Including credit in the! regression equation did not improve the explanation of price varif ations or even produced a negative coefficient. T h e la tter means > f that expansion of credit reduces prices. T h erefo re, contrary to I widespread belief, m ovem ents of credit do not ex p la in movements of prices. This paradox is easily resolved when one rem em bers 1that credit stim ulates production, expansion of production lowers:; co sts, lower unit co sts put le s s pressure on p r ic e s , and thus it appears statistically that credit low ers p rices. Foreign Trade 13. The large amplitudes of exports (22 p erce n ta g e points) and, esp ecially, of imports (44 percentage points) in rela tio n to indus-. trial fluctuations (average amplitudes in the p erio d 1952-1957 * amounted to 1 1 percentage points) make foreign tr a d e a dangerous and, as we w ill se e directly, key destabilizer of th e Yugoslav eco: omy. In conditions of rapid growth and the p r a c tic a l nonexistence! of foreign exchange rese r v e s, the economy i s excep tion ally sen si tive to the acceleration and retardation of im p o rts and exports.

Uncontrolled production expansion near the peak of the production cycle leads to acceleration of imports and an inevitable lag of ex ports, and that widening of the divergence in growth rates of ex ports and imports of industrial products becom es the key factor in the turning downward of the industrial path. It has been shown that it is sufficient for the divergence to widen to 6 % i.e ., for the chain index of imports to be 6 % greater than the chain index of exports to have breaks in production and cumulative retar dation of production. In the depression, export acceleration, which precedes the acceleration of production, helps the revival of pro duction. It is important to note that the index of divergence which is constructed as an instrument for measuring the speed of separation of import and export flows and is the ratio of the chain index of imports to the chain index of exports multiplied by 1 0 0 has very regular movements. Its cycle, with amplitudes as large as those of im ports, corresponds to the industrial cycle with a certain phasal lag. Accordingly, in industrial upswings the d iver gence in trade widens and at a certain point provokes a production slowdown; in industrial downturns the divergence narrows and at a certain point begins to stim ulate the acceleration of production. The Mechanism of Yugoslav Business Cycles 14. Once the cyclical upswing begins, that is, when there is a c celeration of production growth, inventories decline relatively and at the peaks even absolutely, credit expands by som e equilib rium rate of somewhat over 1 0 % liquidity of the economy in , creases, and debts are paid. Imports of intermediate goods for industry grow more slowly than industrial production, while indus trial exports grow faster than production. The acceleration of production leads to better utilization of capacity and inventories, increases labor productivity, reduces costs and, despite increases of personal incom es and business saving, reduces pressure on prices. The increase of consumption, investment, exports, and demand for interm ediate goods stim ulates production and, in the absence of effective control and the ex ante coordination of eco nomic movements (planning), the economic machine gradually overheats. Bottlenecks appear that are overcome by intensified importing. Export production slow s down, either because it is difficult to accelerate exports further, or because a part of po tential exports is absorbed by the expanding dom estic market.
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The divergence of exports and imports widens rapidly; the d is crepancy between imports and exports is covered at first by fo r eign loans and credits, but soon an explosion of the balance of pay ments deficit exceeds the possibilities of supplying foreign ex change at reasonable p rices, import orders are executed more and more slow ly, the supply chains on the internal market begin to break, and the cycle turns downward. Import-oriented enter p rises reduce production and new orders to their dom estic part n ers, the internal market begins to disintegrate, inventories a c cumulate, liquidity is reduced, and the economy becom es indebted by leaps and bounds. The retardation of production reduces im ports, the pressure of the balance of payments deficit slackens, and production for inventories prevents a contraction of the in ternal market. However, personal incomes continue to r ise a l though more slowly and since that increase cannot be covered by a rise in labor productivity, business saving falls and prices rise. The drop in investment demand and the r ise in prices c r e ate new disturbances which delay adjustment of the internal m ar ket and check the expansion of exports. Further developments now depend to a large extent on economic policy. Usually at the point great attention is paid to stimulating exports, and credit policy becom es more liberal. As a result, a new acceleration of exports which precedes the lower turning point of production by about 4-5 months and an acceleration of inventory accumu lation which continues som e 5 months after the turning point turn the path of the rate of growth upward. A new cyclical upswing begins. Guiding the Economy 15. The existence of business cycles and their causes were un known to economic policy bodies and, until a few years ago, even to research workers. This explains the fact that anticyclical poli cies were not formulated. It also explains why waves of reorga nization were begun in the m idst of the retardation phases of the cycle, which intensified the slowdown of growth and deepened and widened the troughs of the cycle. Both caused large economic lo sse s which objectively could often have been avoided. 16. In addition to inadequate current economic policy, a sign ifi cant role in causing instability was played by structural dispro portions which were not promptly noted and eliminated. The first
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five-year plan was completed with overexpanded basic industries, the second with overexpanded processing industries. The third five-year plan did not succeed in correcting structural dispropor tions since it was not implemented. Structural disproportions c r e ate inflationary and import pressures which cannot be eliminated by price control, credit policy, and short-run financial instru ments. If that is attempted, either it has no results or the cycles are deepened with an overall contraction of production; the d is proportions remain, but are transformed periodically from a la tent to an acute state. 17. In the entire postwar period there were five business cycles, of which the la st is still in p rocess. Those cycles were in part se t in motion by five important economic reform s, and in part they stimulated the reform s. We obtain the following picture: Cycle I Cycle II Cycle m Cycle IV Cycle V
in /1 9 4 9 -IH /l9 5 5 : The New Economic System (1) in /1 9 55-11/1958: Transition to the Second F ive-

Year Plan II/1958-IV/1960: The New System of Income Distribution IV/1960-I/1965: The New Economic System (2) 1/1965-?: Economic Reform

Each cycle is thereby not only clearly determined statistically, but it also has a definite economic content. Regional Cycles 18. Cycles in the developed and underdeveloped regions are synchronized. But the amplitudes of agricultural and industrial fluctuations in the underdeveloped regions are significantly great er than in the developed regions. And the path of the chain indices of industrial production has a much more irregular form for un derdeveloped regions. It follows from both factors that the entire economy of the underdeveloped regions is more unstable and r e quires special attention from economic policy bodies. Comparisons with Other Economies 19. Of eleven capitalist and so cia list countries with high rates
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of growth in the period 1951-1965, economic instability was the greatest, by far, in Yugoslavia. One of the main reasons for that was agricultural production, for which, as we have emphasized, we can predict smoother movements in the future. If agriculture is excluded and only industrial fluctuations are considered, the relative instability is reduced, but it is still greater than in any of the five so cia list countries. Therefore it is not probable that this instability is inevitable or objectively determined. Long Cycles 20. From a longer-run point of view, the social product, the physical volume of industrial and agricultural production, indus trial and total investment, and industrial and total exports can be taken as strategic economic variables. If we smooth the cyclical fluctuations of the rates of growth of those economic aggregates by four-year moving averages, we obtain a picture of a long busi ness cycle which is not yet completed and which will la st longer than 16 years. A ll the se r ie s considered, except total and indus trial exports, attained a maximum in 1959. Total and industrial exports attained a maximum somewhat earlier. Exports have shown a downward trend sin ce 1956, and the other se r ie s have moved downward since 1959. Not only has economic expansion slowed since 1959-1960, but the instability of the economy has in creased. Industrial investment is the only se r ie s that is in com plete disharmony with all the others. That indicates two things. F irst, industrial investment was subjected to exceptional admin istrative blows, and second, the deep trough in the three-year pe riod 1955-1957 is probably responsible for certain structural d is proportions (especially in energy and ferrous metallurgy) which appeared later. A sim ilar trough, but this tim e not only in indus trial but also in total investment, began to take shape after 1965, and therefore sim ilar consequences can be expected in the future. In general it can be said that huge oscillations in industrial invest ment must have an injurious effect on the stability and intensity of industrial expansion and, thereby, on economic growth as a whole. Of seven aggregates considered, agricultural production alone gives som e optim istic indications. Agricultural expansion has been accelerating since 1962, and this may help to turn other economic movements upward toward the earlier rapid economic development.
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX

1. We have a difference equation of the second order

A2 yt - = - a y t+1 (1 )

for which
A2 yt - (yt+2yt+i)(yt-Hyt) = yt+j2yt+i + yi

Accordingly, equation (1) in developed form runs

y t f 2 + (a 2) yt+, + yt 0 (2)

and its auxiliary equation

m2 i (a2)m r 1 =0

has the roots

which are complex if (a 2)- < 47 i.e ., equation (1 ) then has the form
y,
Api cos (0t9)

< a < 4. The solution of

(3)

where p = l , and 0 = arc cos (l ). y The solution represents a harmonic movement, with amplitude and phase given by the in i tial conditions. 2. Let us add to equation (1) the constant c, which can be thought of as the mean value of the stochastic elements:
A:yt = ay,+1 -c (4 )

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The solution for the homogeneous part is given in (3), and the particular solution runs Yi B By insertion in (4) we obtain
B + (a2) B i B - c B .1
a

(5)

<5 -

and the general solution is accordingly

y t A cos (0t 9) ~ - a (6 )

3. Let us consider the general form of the difference equation of the second order
yi-i: - a y , - , + by, ^ c

( 7)

Its auxiliary equation

m J a m b - 0 (8 )

has conjugate complex roots

mp! =
a f | a-' + 4b

------ = p (cos 0 = i sin 0)

if

< b, b < 0 . Then the general solution runs

yi = A p l cos (0t( p ) + ----------1 b a

(9)

where p

= ]/ b

= arc cos 2

^'

4. The difference equation of the fourth order

A*y, = a d Jyt+1 + by,+2 + c

(10)

in its developed form runs

yl+<- ( a T - 4 ) y l+1 + ( 2 a - b - r 6 ) y l+ j - ( a + 4 )y ,+ 1+ y, = c (1 1 )

238

and its solution depends on the roots of the auxiliary equation

m* (a + 4) m1+ (2ab -f 6) mJ(a + 4) m + 1 - 0 (1 2 )

We divide by m2 and introduce the substitution u = m + l / m so that we may obtain

u2(a + 4 )u + (2ab + 4) = 0

(13)

from which it follows that u.,2 - ----a + 4 / . i 1 + 4b 2 -------

(14)

.v

which is real when a2 > 4 b. Then, from the relation determined by the above substitution
mJum + l ~ 0 (1 5 )

it follows that
m 2- U|:i:^2-----= p, (cos 02 i sinO,)

(16) (17)

m3M= - - j --------= P 2 (cos 02 i sin 02)

When < 4 t j. aJ + 4 a + 2
b + (a + 4) KaJ + 4 b < 0

(18) (19)

u 2 < 4 t j - a2+ 4 a + 2 b(a + 4) ^ a2+ 4 b < 0

From (15) it follows that pi =pa =1. Particular solution (11) runs y, = B from which it follows that
B (a i 4)B i (2 a b ; 6) B(a i4 ) B i B B c b. c

(2 0 )

(21)

and the general solution is therefore

y, A, cos (0, t<p,) i A2 cos (02 l-<p2) ^

(22)
239

That solution, besides the constant term , represents the sum of two harmonic movements of constant but different periods, am plitudes, and phasal constants. 5.* The difference equation of the fourth order of the form
yi u - ay,.| j i- dy, -i e (2 3 )

has a solution of the form

yt

(C , cos a

C , sin a t) p |

I (C 3 cos fJ t

i C 4 sin

[i t)

p !, i B.

(24)

To determine the param eters , ft, p, and p j, we use the auxiliary equation
in'1 am3d - 0 (2 5 )

of equation (23). After estimation of coefficients a, d and e, equation (25) is solved very quickly and effectively by an electronic computer. The roots of that equation are complex conjugate numbers (this follows from the nature of the problem alone, i.e ., from calcula tion of the coefficients a, d, and e) of the form
m i, = p i (c o s a i sin ) m 3,4 = p a ( c o s p i s i n p ) .

Coefficient B is obtained as the particular solution of equation (23) in the form B= e / l - a - d. According to general theory, solution (24) is obtained directly from the difference equations. Depending on the values of the pa ram eters pi and p2, we w ill have damped or explosive oscillation about the value of y, = B (if either pi or p2 is greater than one, then explosive oscillations are obtained; if both are le s s than one, then damped oscillations are obtained; and if they are just equal to one, then we have agreem ent of the two harmonic oscillations with an amplitude of one and different periods, as in 4). 6 . In connection with the fact that in solutions (9), (22), and (24) we have a relatively large number of degrees of freedom, we can attain great accuracy in the approximation of em pirical data by *Parts 5 and 6 were worked out by M. Bogdanovid, an assistant at the Yugoslav Institute of Economic Studies.
240

the method of lea st squares. Even the calculation is carried out in an entirely elementary manner. Here we will demonstrate the approach only to the solution of the form (24), though a ll these r e sults can be carried over in an analogous way to (9) and (22). We have solution (24) in the form
y tB = C , p 1 cos a t + C 2p * sin a t + C , p , ,

2 cos 3 t + C 4 p^ sin p t.

We stipulate further that: yt = Yt B

p j cos a t = X t(l)

Pi sin a t = X t(JJ P 2 cos p t = X t(3*

sin 3 t - X , <4)

Then
Y i = C , X |(') + C 2 X ,W + C 3 X,<3> + C4 X t< 4) (2 6 )

We designate the em pirical data by Yt . Thus we obtain the ex pression

2(yt-c,x,(o -c ,x , - c 3xt(J) - c 4xt<y 4

t which must be minimized. The further approach is well known. In that way we obtain the values which must take the arbitrary constants Q (i = l , 2, 3, 4) to obtain the particular solution of equation (23) that fu lfills the conditions of the method of lea st squares.

241

GLOSSARY

"Social product" is defined in the Yugoslav national income ac counts as the total volume of goods and serv ices produced in in dustry, mining, agriculture, fishing, forestry, construction, handi crafts, communications, transportation, public u tilities, trade, tourism , and catering. It differs from the Western concept in ex cluding the services of government, defense, health and welfare, insurance, and scientific, cultural, political, and professional or ganizations. "The economy" includes only production and services in the sectors included in the definition of "social product." Helen M. Kramer

242

TABLES

Page 1.1. Social Product Lost Owing to Business Cycles, 1952-1967 5.1. Acceleration and Retardation Phases of Industrial Cycles 5.2. Measured Characteristics of Production Cycles 5.3. Rate of Growth of Industrial Production by Cycles 5.4. Measured Characteristics of Cycles in Industry, Machinery Industry and Construction 6.1. Agricultural C ycles, 1948-1964 6.2. Fluctuations of Agricultural Production and the Balance of Payments Deficit 7.1. Per Capita Social Product and the Rate of Growth of Social Product by Regions, 1952-1965 7.2. Measured Characteristics of Industrial Cycles of Developed and Underdeveloped Regions 8.1. Growth of Productivity of Labor and Employment in Years with Above-average and Below-average Increase in Labor Productivity 8.2. Growth of Productivity of Labor and Efficiency of Capital in Years of Maximum and Minimum Growth of Production 9.1. Inventory Formation in the Yugoslav Economy, 1952-1964 9.2. Structure of Inventories 9.3. Structure of Industrial Inventories 9.4. Cycles of Industrial Production and Inventories 9.5. Nonagricultural Inventories by Economic Sectors 9.6. Turning Points of Industrial Production and Inventories 9.7. Time Lags of Industrial Inventories at the Turning Points of Industrial Production 10.1. Chain Indices of the Social Product 3 45 52 53 62 67 71 74 78

82

83 94 96 98 99 107 110 111 126

243

Page

10 .2 . Turning Points and Amplitudes of Physical Volume of Production and Deflated Sales 10.3. Rate of Growth of the Social Product, Money Supply, and Cost of Living in Twelve Expand ing Economies in the Period 1953-1965 10.4. Value of Production, Supply and Demand for M oney,1958-1967 10.5. Implicit Deflators of Components of the Social Product and Some P rice Indices, 1953-1967 11.1 Turning Points and Amplitudes of Cycles of Industrial Production, Exports and Imports, and Index of Divergence 12.1. Legal Regulations Governing Relations in the Economy, 1952-1965 13.1. Intensity of Economic Fluctuations in Eleven Countries in the Period 1950-1964 13.2. Characteristics of Trends of Growth Rates of Eleven Countries, 1950-1964

128

132 135 137

162 171 197

201

244

GRAPHS

1.1. 4.1. 5.1. 5.2. 5.3.

5.4. 5.5.

6.1. 7.1. 8.1. 9.1. 9.2. 9.3. 10.1.

10.2. 10.3. 10.4. 11.1. 11.2. 11.3. 12.1.

Achieved and Potential Social Product, 1952-1967 Alternative Representations of Business Cycles Industrial Cycles in Yugoslavia Business Cycles in Yugoslavia Alternative Representations of Industrial Cycles: Chain Indices and Relative Deviations of Indus trial Production from the Exponential Trend Cycles of Production of Industry, Construction and Gross Investment Cycles of Industrial Production, Machinery Pro duction, Construction and Investment Expendi tures for Fixed Capital Agricultural and Industrial Cycles Regional Industrial Cycles Cycles of Industrial Production, Employment and Productivity of Labor Cycles of Industrial Production and Inventories Ratios of Inventories and Production in Industry Industrial Production, Inventories, Credits for Working Capital and Indebtedness Industry: Nominal and Deflated Sales, Production, Producers' P rices and Relations of Nominal P er sonal Incomes and Productivity of Labor Nominal and Deflated Sales, Retail P rices, Total Personal Incomes and Industrial Production Economy: Sales, Credits, Inventories, Demand Deposits, Money Supply and Accounts Payable Indices of Producers' P rices Establishing Economic Equilibrium Cycles of International Trade in Industrial Products Cycles of Total Exports and Imports of Goods Legal Regulations and Industrial Production

Page 5 36 48 50

54 56

58
68

76 84 100 104 108

120 122 124 140 153 156 158 174

245

Page

12 . 2 . Connection Between the Number of Economic Regulations and Index of Growth of Industry and Production 13.1. Chain Indices of Annual Growth of Social P ro duct and Industrial Production in Eleven Countries 14.1. Correlogram of the Index of Industrial Produc tion and Exports 14.2. Periodogram of Deviations of Rates of Growth of Industrial Production from Average Rates for the Period I/1949-IV/1966 14.3. Approximations of Industrial Cycles by Auto regression Equations 14.4. Chain Indices of Economic Movements in Yugoslavia, 1949-1967

188 194 209

212

218
222

246

IN D EX

INDEX

Accelerating industrial e x ports, 1 1 agricultural production, 1 1 growth, 1 1 A cceleration, 33, 184, 223 exports, 161, 232, 233, 234 growth, 63, 185 imports, 154, 161, 232 inventory accumulation, 234 production, 61, 8 6 , 110, 230, 233 A ccelerator, 39, 63 mechanism, 229 Accumulation, see Saving Active population, 87 agricultural, 87 Administrative direction, 17 Administrative m easures, 86 economic, 44 retardation and stagnation, 4 Agriculture, 2, 4, 11, 34, 41, 48, 67, 6 8 , 81, 82, 87, 91, 92, 95, 106, 126, 167, 198, 199, 220, 221, 229, 236 Allocation of resou rces, 150 Amortization, 116 Amplitude agricultural fluctuations, 235 curve of growth rates, 39 exports, 162, 232 im ports, 162, 165, 232

index of divergence, 155 industrial production, 71, 162, 231,235 inventories, 1 1 0 relative deviations, 39 Autoregression model, 23, 27 economic, 17, 148 inventory fluctuations, 17 Klein-Goldberger, 24 linear oscillator, 23, 27 moving averages of random disturbances, 27 servomechanism, 23, 26 statistical, 35 Autoregression schem e, 206, 215 A verages, 20, 21, 22, 31, 33 four-term , 32 moving, 11, 20, 22, 30, 31, 32, 33, 47, 155, 206, 208,
220

one-term , 2 2 sim ple, 2 2 0 three-month, 33 Balance of payments, 70 surplus, 154 Bank clearing, 10 Bankruptcy, 10, 143 Base of cycle, 33 Bottlenecks, 24, 93, 233 Boundaries of cycles, 12, 39,
249

40, 45, 52, 207 IFC production, 60 Budget, 142, 183 expenses se e Government expenditures family, 138 Business funds of economic o r ganizations, 129 Capacity, 2 industrial, 161 Capital, 12 fixed, 17, 178 liquid, 127, 129 working, 102, 116, 127, 146, 148, 181, 182 Coefficient capital, 231 correlation, 23, 8 6 , 116, 127, 129, 146, 147, 177, 189, 215, 216, 229 elasticity, 133 fluctuation, 196, 198, 199, 200 multiple, 216, 219 production, 6 6 , 82 regression, 23, 75, 144, 146, 216 serial correlation, 2 1 structural, 35 turnover, 92, 97, 106 variance, 193 Collectivization, 86 Communal construction, 89, 229 Comparative advantage, 81, 154 Components additive, 31 cyclical, 13, 14, 23, 41 harmonic, 205, 220 oscillatory, 31
250

random, 24, 30 seasonal, 30 social product, 35 system atic, 24, 41 unsystem atic, 41 Construction, 2, 12, 49, 61, 63, 67, 91, 204, 229, 230 Consumer goods, 152, 153 Consumption, 17, 59, 114, 115, 165 durable consumer goods, 1 1 durable producers' goods, 1 1 expected, 17 government, 153 intermediate goods, 149 personal, 149, 152, 153 public, 149 Contraction, 10, 118, 228 import, 164 internal demand, 234 production, 235 upswing, 70, 86 Correlogram, 206, 208, 210, 215 Costs, 113, 142, 145, 147, 183 fixed, 143 imported intermediate goods, 183 living, 138 opportunity, 88 production, 13, 142 variable, 143 Covariance, 208, 210 Credit, 96, 102, 103, 115, 117, 129, 130, 134, 136, 144, 146, 148, 180, 182, 184, 232, 234 b a n k ,116 producers', 116 restriction, 117, 179, 185, 231 short-term , 134, 184

C risis, 10, 12, 13 world, 2 0 2 Critical decision points, 15 Cycles absolute deviations, 39 administrative, 170 agricultural, 8 , 67, 6 8 , 229 business, 3, 8 ) 13, 19, 23, 32, 40, 43, 44, 47, 48, 112, 134, 149, 202, 228, 234 component, 219 construction, 1 2 twenty-year, 12, 13 two-year, 13, 139 construction, 12, 13, 63, 184 developed and underdevel oped regions, 235 em pirical, 40 employment, 82, 83 English, 42 foreign trade, 152, 154, 164 four-year American, 10, 93 generators of, 203 German, 42 growth rates, 38 housing, 1 2 industrial, 12, 34, 43, 44, 45, 47, 69, 78, 102, 107, 113, 117, 154, 160, 161, 219, 220, 228, 229, 231, 233 investment, 61, 160 inventory, 91, 93, 98, 102, 107, 1 1 1 ,114, 230 legal regulations, 170 long, 9, 13, 31, 206, 234, 236 medium -term , 9, 10 production, 61, 8 6 , 98, 102,

103, 111, 112, 115, 160, 231 productivity of labor, 83, 85 reference, 32, 34, 111 regional, 73, 235 secular, 2 0 2 sh ort/ 9, 10, 13, 112, 206, 220, 223 sixteen-year, 1 1 specific, 32 typical, 33 reference, 33 specific, 33 ultrashort, 2 2 0 Yugoslav, 10, 44, 228 Cycle-producing mechanism, 39 Cycles of growth rates, 6 , 37 tendencies, 34 Cyclical mechanism, 113, 114 p rocess, 2 0 upswing, 3, 6 , 95, 230 Deceleration of industrial e x ports, 1 1 agricultural production, 1 1 growth, 6 , 1 1 Decentralization, 170, 200, 223 D eficit, 3 agrarian, 154 federal, 182 balance of payments, 70, 71, 110, 152, 1 5 3 ,1 5 4 ,1 6 0 , 164, 180, 182, 183, 234 Deflated sa les of industry, 150 of the economy, 122, 150, 232 Deflation, 150 Deflator, 119, 148 social product, 136 Demand, 12, 15, 70, 91, 93, 96,
251

98, 111, 112, 115, 130, 148, 179, 183, 230, 231, 232 aggregate, 161, 183 consumption, 149, 161, 233 export, 149 intermediate goods, 149, 233 internal, 161, 183 investment, 149, 161, 233 money, 131 social, 149 Depression, 38, 40, 50, 94, 103, 114, 129,136, 139, 144, 145, 165, 183, 186, 224, 229, 233 D estabilizer, 63, 232 Devaluation, 164, 221 Disparity, 138, 141, 142 p rices, 182 Distortion, 32 Distribution according to work, 88 Divergence of trade, 164 industrial, 233 Economic development, 8 6 , 87 equilibrium, 24, 153 organization, 89, 134 stability, 26, 80 transaction, 1 3 0 ,133, 134, 136 upswing, 183 Economic balance, 153 growth, 81, 89, 131, 133, 187 p rocess, 107 regulations, 187 stabilizer, 94 stochastic disturbance, 25 upswing, 95, 129, 178
252

Economic blockade, 127, 178 Economic theory, 184 Economies of sca le, 231 business activity, 97 Economy capitalist, 32, 142, 230 centrally planned, 92, 114, 198, 203, 204, 230 developed, 81 expansive, 32, 39 illiquid, 143 market, 6 , 17, 92, 115, 131, 142, 164, 176, 190, 198, 204 national, 93 planned, 88 rapidly growing, 6 , 143 readaptation, 130 sem i-adm inistrative, 190 slow-growing, 6 , 81, 93 so cia list, 65 underdeveloped, 81 unplanned, 154 world, 161 Yugoslav, 1, 4, 6 , 34, 35, 41, 45, 50, 61, 63, 92, 131, 136, 142, 146, 150, 153, . 181, 190, 193, 199, 202, 223, 230 Education, 4, 87 Efficiency of investment, 53, 8 6 , 136 economic activity, 8 6 , 178, 231 utilization of resou rces, 82, 89 Electroenergy, 141 agricultural, 2, 14, 48, 6 8 , 70, 142, 143, 164, 176, 200, 2 2 9 ,236 capacity, 160

consumer goods, 179 contraction, 154 industrial, 11, 41, 43, 49, 60, 61, 63, 64, 74, 92, 95, 97, 103, 115, 141,155, 160, 161, 166, 185, 193,* 199, 202, 233 lot, 1, 3, 4 machinery, 42 m aterial, 198 potential, 41, 87 profitability, 142 reduction, 61 unfinished, 96, 97, 98, 111 Employment, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87, 88 Enterprise, 8 6 , 92, 96, 113, 114, 116,130 industrial, 141 Expenditures, 4 government, 152 investment, 1 1 Exports, 9, 11, 81, 133, 149, 152, 153, 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 165, 166, 167, 180, 183, 200, 220, 221, 233, 236 agricultural, 165 expansion, 165, 221 industrial, 103, 155, 161, 164, 166, 176, 210, 220, 221, 233, 236 invisible, 164 Feedback,13 Financial instrum ents, 154 Financial m easures, 167 Fixed capital, 83, 8 6 , 114 Fluctuations, 1, 22, 40, 41, 93 agricultural, 70 construction, 229 cyclical, 7, 13, 20, 23, 24,

30, 34, 43, 80, 236 economic, 2, 4, 7, 24, 41, 43, 73, 78, 129, 152, 160, 172, 184, 193, 197, 199, 203, 227 exports, 152 hypertrophied, 198 im ports, 152' industrial, 70, 127, 198, 210, 219, 230, 232, 236 inventories, 230 industrial, 127 periodic, 9, 41 p rices, 70 producers' p rices, 149 residual, 41 seasonal, 2 2 0 world market, 160, 2 0 0 Forecast, 33, 143 Forecasting, 185, 203, 211 current, 34 turning of cycle, 184 upswing, 11, 33 Foreign exchange, 160 Foreign market, 118, 153, 155 Foreign trade, 81, 152, 164, 168, 181,232 Foreign trade regulations, 164 balance, 72 Forestry, 2 Funds, 179 common consumption, 127 Illiquidity, 117, 118, 129, 131, 134, 185 Imports, 9, 11, 70, 81, 89, 97, 102, 106, 111, 149, 152, 153, 154, 160, 161, 164, 166, 167, 233 agricultural, 165, 180 elasticity, 1 0 2
253

industrial, 103, 155, 160, 161, 180 intermediate goods, 166, 233 raw m aterials, 166 Income, 2, 26, 87, 143, 152, 161, 178 distribution, 186, 187 economic organizations, 181, 183 net, 180 personal, 10, 87, 90, 138, 140, 143, 147, 150,180, 182, 231, 235 nominal, 143, 232 social, 152 total, 180 Indebtedness, 129, 130 economy, 129 Indices, 35, 45, 52 agricultural production, 71 chain, 34, 35, 45, 47, 116, 119, 126, 127, 137, 146, 193, 196, 215, 228,235 employment, 8 6 exports, 154, 233 foreign trade, 161, 233 fluctuation, 198 growth, 144, 146 imports, 154, 233 income ex ce ss, 144, 146, 148 industrial, 23, 44, 145, 155, 180, 187 moving averages, 45 nonagricultural production, 2 p rices, 138, 143, 147, 232 producers', 145, 146 retail, 119 w holesale, 4
254

production, 8 6 , 145 productivity of labor, 86 quarterly, 41, 44, 45, 119 social product, 126, 147, 199 total personal income, 147 turning points, 61 Industrialization, 8 6 Industrial trade, 165 rate of growth, 189 stability, 198 Industry, 2, 34, 63, 64, 82, 94, 102, 103, 106, 108, 116, 117, 119, 126, 127, 136, 143, 146, 177, 187, 220, 228 basic, 179, 180, 235 durable goods, 97 food processing and tobacco, 70 leather, 70 processing, 180, 235 textile Inflation, 138, 139, 149, 179, 186 p rices, 133 Inflection, 22, 39 Instability, 93, 127, 229 economy, 16, 19, 53, 64, 75, 93, 97, 102, 155, 171, 182, 183, 193, 198, 230, 236 inherent, 17, 24, 27 machinery production, 64 market, 182 material, 229 Institutional factors, 26, 64 Interest rates, 89, 93, 179 Intermediate goods, 103, 106, 110, 113, 154, 167 International division of labor, 87, trade, 181 Interpolation, 32, 211

Intersectoral links, 130 Intervention, 142 Intracycle of inventories, 102 Inventories, 17, 19, 25, 8 6 , 91, 92, 93, 96, 98, 102, 103, 106, 107, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 119, 142,150, 152, 186, 225, 230,234 accumulation, 3, 10, 93, 94, 113, 119,230 actual, 18 average, 92 decumulation, 10, 94, 113, 114, 117,230 final products, 96, 98, 103, 117 fluctuations, 93, 115, 119, 231 industrial, 92, 96, 98, 110, 115 intermediate goods, 96, 98, 102, 106, 107, 110, 112 m aterials, 103 nonagricultural, 96, 107 planned, 18 trade, 107,110 unfinished products, 1 1 0 Investment, 12, 17, 25, 26, 41, 61, 63, 95, 114, 116, 148, 149, 152, 153, 160, 179, 185, 220, 229, 230,236 agricultural, 179 buildings, 61 communal, 4 consumer goods industries, 179 economic, 230 fixed capital, 41, 51, 179, 182, 230 industrial, 220, 221, 236 initial, 83

inventories, 94, 114, 230 transportation, 179 uncompleted, 114 Investment balances, 87 expenditures, 184 funds, 178 potential, 160 programs, 89, 170 Investment funds, 83, 89, 115 Investment goods, 154 Labor force, 81, 83, 8 6 , 8 8 , 89 marginal, 88 reserve, 81 Lag, 26, 33, 8 6 , 112, 139, 150, 160, 165 Linear oscillator, 23, 25 Liquidity, 129, 134, 144, 184, 233 Livestock raising, 13 Loans, 164, 181 foreign, 181, 234 L osses, 3, 6 , 141 Yugoslav economy, 6 , 60 Machinery production, 61 Market, 17, 70, 95, 97, 106, 110, 115, 139, 142, 149 capitalist, 193 foreign, 153, 183 internal, 131, 164, 233 international, 81, 153, 160 Yugoslav, 160 Market relations, 138, 141, 181 Means of payment, 134 Money, 129, 131, 136, 183 deposits, 127 em issions, 131, 133 restrictions, 134, 142 supply, 131, 132, 133 turnover, 131, 134
255

Movements economic, 216 harmonic, 206, 216 oscillatory, 40 periodic see Fluctuations potential, 2 short-run, 155 sine curve, 23 vibratory, 41 National Bank, 117, 119, 134, 142, 171, 185 NBER technique, 32, 34 Noninvestment goods, 152 O scillations, 19, 25, 26, 31, 35, 39, 40, 67, 208,220 construction, 49 IFC production, 49 social product, 19 Peaks of cycles, 6 , 10, 26, 33, 39, 40, 67, 83, 8 6 , 103, 107, 161, 210, 215, 228 business, 114 exports, 161 industrial, 1 1 0 , 161 inventories, 98 production, 110, 233 productivity of labor, 86 Period, 23, 24, 30, 31, 33, 35, 215, 217 administrative, 138 autoregressive, 208 fluctuations, 19, 210, 216, 220 inflationary, 138 planning, 17 oscillation, 19, 217, 220 Periodogram, 206, 210, 211, 215
256

Phasal shift, 39, 47, 103, 139, 233 Phase of cycles, 22, 25, 31, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39 accelerative, 38, 44, 45, 46, 4 8 ,1 1 4 , 115, 1 3 6 ,2 2 5 ,2 3 0 , 231 contractive, 40, 45 depression, 189 descending, 44, 93, 94 expansive, 10, 40, 45, 46, 134 production, 233 prosperity, 9 recession , 231 retardation, 38, 40, 45, 48, 117, 136, 160, 161, 179, 224, 231, 234 revival, 189, 202 upswing, 93, 94 Plan, 43, 89 achievement, 43 annual, 180 five-year, 44, 176, 179, 187, 235 industrial production, 43 Planning, 34, 43, 44, 198 administrative - centralized, 46, 92, 193, 196, 198 consumption, 2 0 global proportions, 178 Points downward phase, 40 economic equilibrium, 39 inflection, 24, 39, 40 reference, 33 Policy agrarian, 86 anticyclical, 234 business, 89 deflation, 183

economic, 1, 27, 34, 43, 69, 80, 89, 115, 150, 153, 161, 167, 168, 177, 179, 180, 1 8 3 ,1 8 4 ,1 9 0 ,1 9 3 ,2 0 3 , 223, 224, 232, 234 export, 168 fiscal, 150 investment, 61, 89 monetary-credit, 127, 134, 150, 182, 185,235 price, 140, 142 P rice Control Bureau, 139, 141 P rices, 3, 9, 13, 89, 118, 119, 129, 131,132, 133, 136,138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 147, 168, 231, 232, 233 agricultural, 136, 138, 142, 180 constant, 2, 41, 126, 148 control, 133, 141, 179, 183, 235 current, 184 foreign exchange, 161 industrial, 136, 138, 139, 140, 147, 180 producers', 138, 144, 145, 146, 148,234 retail, 11, 142, 147, 149, 232 stability, 80, 140 wholesale, 1 1 Producers, 25, 105, 110, 113, 114, 138,143 Product agricultural, 154 industrial, 147, 154 nominal, 133 Production, 1, 2, 4, 6 , 7, 25, 41, 60, 64, 73, 80, 81, 8 6 , 89, 91, 95, 97, 98, 103, 107, 110, 112, 114, 117, 126, 130, 131,

133, 138, 144, 153,166, 177, 187 social, 17, 81, 119 Production chain, 89 Production sector, 92 decision, 13 structure, 161, 166 Productivity absolute, 81 general social, 88 industry, 89 labor, 80, 81, 82, 83, 8 6 , 136, 139, 143, 145,149, 150, 178, 181, 185,232, 233 Profit, 86 Profitability, 140 Rate of exchange, 183 Raw m aterials, 70 R ecession, 38, 40, 47, 94, 110, 114, 117, 130, 134, 142, 189, 202 industrial, 79 Reference cycle, 32 Reform, 3, 40, 126, 130, 134, 138, 144, 146, 150, 164, 180, 181, 200, 223, 224, 225 economic, 182, 186, 187, 190,235 foreign trade, 164 investment, 186 social, 2 0 2 Reproduction m aterials, 11 coal, 141 current, 95 durable consumer goods, 1 1 durable producers' goods, 11 flows, 160 IFC, 41, 49
257

rate, 89 retardation, 115 stopping, 95 structure, 154 Reproductive m odels, 17 R eserves, 89 foreign exchange, 152, 181 internal, 80 unutilized, 89 Retardation, 27, 44, 46, 95, 116, 177, 179, 186 exports, 161, 221, 232 imports, 155, 232 production, 47 , 64 , 69 , 79, 8 6 , 8 8 , 116, 117, 230, 233 Revaluation, 135 Sales, 113, 127, 143 actual, 18 expected, 25 planned, 18 Saving, 152, 153 rates, 178, 180 Science, 4 Self-management, 64, 87 Serial correlation, 206 S eries, 2, 30, 34 economic, 10, 12, 33 industrial production, 34 reference, 34 social product, 34, 41 statistical, 9, 30, 41 tim e, 32, 200 Services, 11, 198 Servomechanism, 23, 26 Shocks exogenous, 25 stochastic, 24 Simulation, 27 Slutsky effect, 31 Social Accounting Service, 119
258

Social product, 2, 3, 10, 11, 18, 1 9 ,2 4 , 60, 61, 74 , 82 , 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 103, 107, 114, 126, 132, 142, 183, 186, 187, 193, 198, 199, 200, 201, 204, 225, 229, 236 collective agriculture, 91 industry, 70, 91 lost, 3 planned, 18 potential, 3 Yugoslav, 48 Stabilization, 11 economy, 11, 34 market, 179 Standard of living, 89 Stimulation, 88 Subcycle, 46 Subsidies, 8 6 , 140, 183 Supply, 12, 13, 91, 93, 112, 115, 149, 179, 183, 231, 232 System s, 20, 25, 26 economic, 20, 91, 178, 180, 186, 187 financial, 127 institutional, 139, 142 T ariffs, 181 Taxes, 89, 92, 130, 138, 146, 185 Transportation, 91 Troughs of cycles, 9, 12, 33, 40, 83, 98, 127, 136, 182, 215, 224, 228,234 index of divergence, 160 initial, 33 final, 33 Turning of cycle, 7, 161 Turning points of cycles, 22, 33, 40, 61, 113, 117, 143, 162, 228

chain indices, 47 developed regions, 78 exports, 162 im ports, 162 industry, 63, 78, 110, 162, 230 inventories, 99, 102, 110 lower, 40, 117, 118,225, 236 machinery production, 63, 230 production, 99, 102, 110 underdeveloped regions, 78

upper, 40, 118 Unemployment,. 10 Upswing, 8 6 , 165, 189, 190 Urbanization, 89 Variance, 207 Wages, 8 , 86 Workers' councils, 89 Yellow Book, 80

259

----

YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD: PROBLEMS, IDEAS, INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

BRANKO HORVAT

S E P A R A T 123

INSTITUT EKONOMSKIH

Ill 118697
200702357
COBISS Q

Separat 123

YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD: PROBLEMS, IDEAS, INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS Branko Horvat

INSTITUT EKONOMSKIH NAUKA Beograd, 1971.

Supplement to the American Economic Review, Vol. 61, No. 3, Part 2

Izdaje: Institut ekonomskih nauka, Beograd, Zmaj Jovina 12

.^ A A - M \

\ \

Yugoslav Economic Policy in the Post War Period: Problems, Ideas, Institutional Developments
By Introduction Yugoslavia has been described as one country w ith two alphabets, three reli gions, four languages, five nations and six federal states called republics. One might add th a t the country has a population of tw enty million and th a t it lies in the heart of the Balkans, w ith all th a t this connotes historically. For centuries the Balkans have been a meeting place of three world cultures and three powerful religions: the Catholic W est, the Greek Orthodox E ast and the Moslem South. In term s of con tem porary economic organization We m ay refer to the capitalist W est, the centrally planned feast and the undeveloped South. All these influences have been felt. A rather tu rbulent life was to be expected in a country so located and having these characteristics. The present generation of Yugoslavs has experienced all three known m odern econom ic'system s: capitalism be fore the war, centrally planned economy after the war and self-governm ent social ism in more recent years. The last-m ehtioned system is their own innovation and so far the only one of its kind in existence. The same generation has also experienced all four modern political regimes: bourgeois
* Director, Institute of Economic Sciences, Belgrade. I am grateful to Helen Kramer for linguistic assistance and helpful comments. B ra n k o H o rv a t*

democracy (in the form of a constitutional monarchy and m ulti-party system) before the war, fascism during the war, 2 onep arty state immediately after the war, and self-government democracy which is now in the process of being developed. I t has also lived through a partisan national lib eration war and a revolution. After the war a centralized kingdom was replaced by a federal republic, and in. two decades the country had three constitutions. Finally, the same generation has experienced three different economic epochs: a pre-industrial stage before the war, rapid industrializa tion in the two decades after the war and the recently begun stage of a modern in dustrial economy approaching the W estern European level. Before the war, 77 percent of the population were peasants and 40 percent were illiterate. A few economic in dicators will suffice to indicate the eco nomic development th a t has' taken place since then: (see table 1) Illiterates still constitute close to one fifth of the adult population, but at the same tim e w ith 11 university and college stu dents per 1000 of population the country has moved close to the very top of the world list. Such a trem endous pace of change vir tually destroyed all traditions, b u t it also created a new one, a tradition of no tradi-

2,
T able 1

Before the war Yugoslavia Western Europe* Production per capita: Electric energy, KWH Crude steel, kg. Cement, kg. Cotton yam, kg. Energy kg. Fertilizers, kg. Sugar, kg. Stocks per 1000 of population: Radio sets Automobiles .80 17 60 1.3 180 3 5 9 1 500-1300 150-300 100-190 5-11 2100-4300 20-65 24-47

1968 Yugoslavia

1000 96 190 5 1030 96 25 /

110-200 17-50

160 20

France, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom. Sources: SGS~1S>6S>. U.N. Statistical Yearbook 1956.

tibn, a tradition of change. In line w ith th a t the 1958 Program of the League of Com m uniststhe heir of the Yugoslav Com m unist P a rty ends with the words: Nothing that has been created must be so sacred for us th at it cannot be surpas sed and ccde its place to what is still more progressive, more free, more human. In such circumstances economic discus sion displayed certain unusual features which m ake formal presentation somewhat difficult. Until about 1960 m ost of the dis cussion was either not put on paper, or at least not published. Further, professional articles made practically no use of refer ences. There was a feeling of a complete break w ith the past, and so there w as noth ing to be referred to. In the same period professional literature was almost com pletely descriptive. T hat .was due partly to the fact th a t the first university depart m ents in economics were established only after the war. I t is said th a t 90 percent of all scientists who have ever lived, live to day. As far as Yugoslav economists are concerned, this percentage is virtually 100. The second reason for the lack of ana lytical literature is to be found in the fact th a t there was hardly any time left for analysis. Econom ists were busy changing

organization, institutions, and policies and keeping themselves informed about all these changes. Unless one had the inclina tions of an economic historian, it did not make much sense to engage in a long-term research project. Before the book came off the press, the system had already been changed. Thus for quite some time pro fessional economists were just describing w hat was happening. Description always precedes analysis. Finally, until recently attention was m ainly focussed on what Yugoslav econo mists call the economic system . Eco nomic policy in the traditional sense the use of a set of instrum ents to achieve de-. sired results in a given framework hardly existed. Problems encountered were gen erally solved by changing the institutional framework itself. For a long tim e, and to a certain extent even today, economic policy consisted of an endless series of reorganiza tions. The search for an appropriate eco nomic system was the main preoccupation of economic policy. After 1960 economic organization began to assume a more perm anent shape and economic discussion began to take a more familiar form. Since then use has been made of references in articles, ties with the

3past and with the rest of the world have been established, economic debates have become frequent and lively, professional competence has increased, and a specific ally Yugoslav theory of economic policy is now beginning to emerge. I. Three Economic Reforms Centrally Planned- Economy Institutional Development: Of all E uro pean countries occupied by the fascist in vaders, Yugoslavia was the only one to liberate herself by her own forces. The , N ational-L iberation W ar coincided with a genuine Social Revolution. This m eant two things: an unbelievably high morale, the readiness to assault heavensas a. poet said and also a hardly imaginable degree of devastation of the country. About 1.7 'million people were killed in the battles, in concentration camps, by penal expeditions and by domestic quislings. One in every nine inhabitants disappeared in this way. Almost two fifths of the m anufacturing in dustry was destroyed' or seriously dam aged. A bout three and a half out of fifteen million people were left w ithout shelter. The loss of national wealth am ounted to 17 percent of the total war damage suffered by eighteen countries represented a t the Paris Reparations Conference in 1945 (Inform ativni prirucnik, 1948, pp. ,27-29). A part from all this, the financial system of the country was in.a chaotic state; divided and occupied by various aggressive neigh bors, the.country was left with seven kinds of currencies (Germ an marks, Italian, lirasy H ungarian pongos-, Bulgarian levas, Al banian francs, Serbian dinars and Croatian kunas). T he first task of the new government was to repair war damages as fast as pos sible and to organize the economy on w hat were considered to be socialist principles. For this purpose all available hum an and m aterial resources were centralized, and with enormous efforts and great enthu siasm by 1947 the prewar output was achieved. The program of socialist recon struction was carried out by means of legislative and political activities. Yugoslavia was a peasant country. Peasants participated in the N ational Liberation W ar en mass. Agrarian reform, initiated already after the First World W ar, had never been fully implemented be cause of the opposition of the ruling classes. No wonder th a t one of the first moves of the new state was to undertake a radical agrarian reform. The land was to be given to those who tilled it. In less than, three m onths after the end of the war a law was passed th a t took away the arable land in excess of 87 acres from farmers, in excess of 12 acres from nonfarmers. Big land owners lost their land w ithout compensa tion. The land th a t was acquired in this way was distributed among poor peasants, who received about one half of the total land, to cooperatives and state farm s (Dobrinci6 el ah, 1951, pp. 53-54). The next crucial move, undertaken in 1946, was nationalization of private cap ital in industry, mining, transport* bank ing and wholesale trade establishments. In 1948 nationalization was extended to retail trade and catering and in 1958 to houses with more than three apartm ents. About one half of the. Yugoslav economy, outside agriculture, had been owned by foreign capital. Of the rem ainder, a siz able p a rt had been owned by the Royal governm ent which possessed coal and iron ore mines, forests and the largest agricul tural estates; enjoyed a monopoly in re tail trade of tobacco, salt, m atches and kerosene; and was the largest wholesaletrader, transporter, im porter and exporter, banker, building entrepreneur and real estate owner (Bicanic, 1962a, p. 78). Since a num ber of private businessmen col laborated with the fascist invader and quisling governments, their property was confiscated. Those who took p art in the

4.
P^esi stanceand 'Communist P arty mem bers did th a t as a m atter >df course;very often gave away their iprqperty without asking for compensation. And, as was al ready noted, tnany business establish m ents were destroyed or damaged. In such circumstances complete nationalization was politically possible, was relatively easy to carry out a d didHot represent an n excessive financial burden. The next tnove was to introduce plan ning by a law in June, 1946. Plans were p rep a re d 'b y the Federal Planning Com mission, responsible directly to the Fed eral Government. Everything was now ready for tile new C onstitution which was adopted in 1946, and in which Article 15 read: "In ofder to protect the essential interests of the people, increase national welfare and make proper use of all ecohomic potentials, the state directs economic life and development through a general economic plan relying on the state and cooperative sector and exercising general control over the private sector in the economy. This paragraph m ay be considered as both the definition and the inauguration of a specific socio economic system, later to be kriown as adm inistrative socialism or 6tatism. The year 1947 brought the First Five Year Plan which was to fay the foundation for the future industrialized and developed Yugoslavia. The Plart was extreirtely amMtious hationalincom e was to be doubled as compared with, the pre-w ar levelbut iawtife first eighteen m onths it was quite s'lsseesslirlJjk carried out. I t appeared as fJiOT^>'ffie(^efriodi af'violent revolutionary ^pheaTrSls^was' over-'fHldi 'the country setslkfd 4,on-'a "wfell'ldSfined and predictable ^course of' economic and social develop m ent. However, for Yugoslavia, history had always had some surprise in store. This time the surprise was more thafr unex pected: it w as a complete shock. I n the first hrflf of 1948 Stalin accused Yugoslav P a rty 'leaders of revisionism and anti sovietism. Yugoslavs rejected the accusa tion, and soon afterwards the Cominform countries launched a full scale political and economic attack. The Yugoslav Com m unist 'Party was excommunicated from the family of brotherly parties, various treaties were abrogated unilaterally, de velopment loans cancelled, trade with Yugoslavia amounting to about one half of her total foreign trade reduced to vir tu a lly nothing by the middle of 1949, and a coinplete economic boycott established. The first reaction on the Yugoslav side was a somewhat naive but understandable attem pt to prove that Stalin and others m ust have been misinformed, th a t iio one questioned orthodoxy in organizing a so cialist economy, th a t state ownership and central planning were keystones of the system. M otivated by consideration of this sort, in January 1949 the Central Committee of the P arty decided to ac celerate the collectivization of agriculture. Already in an income lax law, passed in August 1948, it was staled th at the rate of taxation should be such as to foster peasants work cooperatives by means of lower taxes. A law on cooperatives, passed in June 1949, provided a legal framework for various types of cooper atives. Individual peasants were free not to join cooperatives if they chose. B ut by political propaganda and various adm in istrative and financial devices, the au thorities exerted strong pressure on them arid' they did so in great numbers. li&EHMliile the organization of the etbhbmy was modeled after the Soviet p attern . The state budget absorbed the greater p a rt of national income. The state apparatus was running the economy ditectly by means of ministries and direc torates. -By 1950 organizational develop m ent reached the stage at which the Yugoslav economy could be considered as

5.
a model of an adm inistratively run or centrally planned economy (Milic, 1951, pp. 126-70). This was also the climax. Al ready in 1950 a new development set in. The following year a complete overhaul ing of the economic system was in full swing. And by the end of 1951, the centrajly planned economy belonged to his tory. Discussion: The ideas and theories th a t served as guidelines in organizing the Yugoslav economy im m ediately after the war are to be sought in pre-w ar discussions among Yugoslav M arxists. They followed the well known orthodox viewpoint ac cording to which socialism, m eant state ownership cum central planning. Im m e diately after the war there was so much to to th a t little tim e was left for leisurely reflections. Besides, everything seemed p retty clear, both theoretically and prac tically. One could rely on M arxist liter ature and on the experience of the Soviet Union, the first socialist country. W hat m attered m ost in those days was fast economic growth. And the Soviet Union showed how to achieve it. B ut copying the Soviet blueprint did not produce quite the results expected. Furtherm ore, the savage attack of the Cominform countries forced people to re consider their ideological positions quite thoroughly. And so preconditions were created for the emergence of a Yugoslav version of socialism. Economic discussion before 1952 was dom inated by two them es: planning for fast growth and the search for an authentic socialism. Since the former theme will be dealt w ith in the chapter on planning, we shall focus attention here on the latter. The older theory m aintained th a t in socialism there would be no m arket and no prices. After the Revolution, .Yugo slavia was going through a period of tran sition between capitalism and socialism. In this period commodity, relationships were still necessary because of the exis tence of private ownership and because labor was still heterogenous (Kidric, 1949). Boris Kidrica statesman* who was to dom inate the economic thinking of the country until his prem ature death in 1952 m aintained th a t only state ownership was truly socialist (1950a, p. 8), th a t the state sector was the highest form of our social ownership . . . (1950a, p. 8). The same opinion is still held by most econo mists in the Soviet sphere of influence. In Yugoslavia it did not survive beyond 1950. C onsistent'w ith the above reasoning was the extolling of the significance of state planning. R. Uvalic (1948, p. 20), Kidric (1949, p. 42), S. Kraigher (1950, p. 12) and others repeated the familiar thesis of Soviet economists about planning as a fundam ental law of socialist economics. A few years later this theory was to be de scribed as a voluntarist fallacy. Rereading of M arx and Engles showed the possibility of great confusion in inter pretation. M arx and Engels wrote seldom and very little about socialism. W hat they wrote amounted to two groups of state m ents: one dealing with the organiza tional form of a socialist economy, the. other w ith the essential social character istics of a socialist system. M arx and Engels m aintained th at commodity rela tions and the m arket would disappear along w ith private ownership; there would be comprehensive planning: production and distribution would be organized with out the m ediating role of money. For m any decades it seemed obvious th at comprehensive planning m eant central planning exercised by the government, and th a t the absence of private ownership m eant state ownership. In 1950 it was discovered th a t M arx had never drawn
1 He soon became the President of the Economic Council of the Government and the Chairman of the Federal Planning Commission. He was also a member of the top P arty leadership.

6 the last conclusion. In fact, and here they argued about essential characteristics of socialism, M arx and Engels denounced the state, argued th a t it would wither away in aclassless society, talked about the selfgovernm ent of producers, and asserted th a t . . a worker is free only when he becomes the owner of his means of pro duction. M arxs insistance on the free dom of the individual was discovered in a statem ent, which was later entered into the P a rty program ; and which reads: The old bourgeois society with its classes and class antagonism is being replaced by an association in which development of every individual is a, precondition for the free developm ent of all (H orvat, 1969a, pp. 105-17). F ar from being truly socialist, state ownership turned out to be a rem nant of capitalism , characteristic of backward couhtries th a t are building socialism, and likely to generate dangerous bureaucratic deviations (Dobrincic cl aL, 1951, pp. 16-18). In 1950 Kidric w rote: State so cialism represents . . . only the first and the shortest step of Socialist Revolution . . . Persisting in state (bureaucratic) so cialism . . . unavoidably leads to an in crease and strengthening of privileged bure aucracy as a social parasite, to a suppres sion' . . . of Socialist democracy and to a general degeneration of the system into . . . state capitalism . . . The building of socialism categorically requires the de velopm ent of socialist democracy and a bold ttarisformaticm of state socialism into a free association of. direct producers (Kidric, i950b, pp. 5-6). Very soon a similar position was ac cepted by practically a L Yugoslav social I scientists. M . N ovak wrote th a t to keep state ownership would m ean . . . not the abolition of the proletariat but the tran s form ation of all people into proletarians, not the abolition of capital but its general rule in which a specific exploitation can be

and necessarily will be developed (Novak, 1955, p. 92). Approaching the problem from a different point of view, N. Pasic came to the conclusion: In the past state intervention in the economy was errone ously identified with socialism. If this cri terion were applied to the last several decades, it would bring into socialist ranks all eminent capitalist politicians of recent times, from Baldwin and Roosevelt to H itler and de Gaulle (Pasic, 1957, p. 11). A. Dragicevic w rote: Nationalization of m eans of production and planning are pre conditions of socialism, b u t only precon ditions and nothing mord. In order to achieve fully developed socialism, m any more additional factors are required, in the first instance a socialist development of political relations and of economic struc ture of the.society (1957,'p. 21S). Sim ilarly, P. Kovac and Dj. M iljevic observed th a t state ownership and state m anage m ent by themselves lead to small or no change in the position of the producer in the production process and in his right to participate in the m anagem ent of the economy. . . . In the countries in which socialist Revolution was victorious, the state, instead of becoming an organ of the working people, m ay and does become an organ of the state and p arty apparatus, which rules on behalf of the working people (195.S, p. 13). R. Milic observes th at state socialism in the USSR through bureaucratic socialism develops into state capitalism. . . . (1951, p. 21). These sta te m ents are not quite so novel as they might sound. Already half a century ago Z. Fabri, in connection with a book by Lenin* wrote: If the state becomes an owner, we shall have state capitalism and not socialism. . . . Under state-ow nership all proletarians would become workers hired by the state instead of by private capitalists. The state would be an exploiter and th a t means th a t an entire crowd of higher and lower managers and an entire

7.
bureaucracy with all its hierarchical strata would create a new ruling and exploiting class. I t looks as if something similar has already been happening in Russia . . . (Stanovcic and Stojanovic, 1966, p. 164). Lately there has been a tendency to re place state capitalism by an emotionally more neutral term etatism (Stanovcic and Stajanovic, 1966, pp. 328-36; Pecujlic, 1967). The m ost radical in this respcct is S. Stojanovic, a philosopher by profession: The term etatism denotes a system based on state ownership of means of production and state m anagem ent of production and other social activities. The state apparatus represents a new ruling class. As a col lective owner of means of production it employs and exploits labor. The personal share of the mem bers of the ruling class in the distribution of the surplus value is pro portional to their position in the state hierarchy . , . (1967, p. 35). If the state is an institution alien to socialism, who is to organize the economic process? Clearly, the only available al ternative is th at this task be undertaken by producers themselves. Centralization as the principle of organization is to be re placed by decentralization, centrally m an aged economy by a self-government economy. In the middle of 1950 a law was passed by which workers councils were created. The draft of the law was intro duced to the Federal Assembly in a speech by President Tito who said: The slogan, the (factories to th e workers, the land to the peasants, as inert any .abstract .propaganda slogan, but one whidh ihas deep m eaning.' I t contains in itself the whole program of socialist relations in production and also in regard to social property and the rights arid obligations of the workers, and there fore it can be and must be realized in practice, if we really desire to build so cialism quoted according to (Bilandzic, 1967, p. 69). By 1952 the new economic system was already .in operation. Decentralization Institutional Development: The prepara tion for the New Economic Systemas it was called started with the Law on M anagem ent of Government Business E n terprises and Economic Associations by W orkers Collectives enacted in July 1950, and ended with the Constitutional Law on Principles of the Social and Political System of Yugoslavia, accepted by the Federal Assembly in 1953. The New Economic System (NES) became opera tional in 1952. I t was transitional in char acter and lasted until 1960. During these eight years the country achieved the high est rate of growth in the w orld: per capita gross national product expanded at the rate of 8.5 percent per annum, agricultural output a t the rate of 8.9 percent, industrial output at the rate of 13.4 percent (H orvat, 1963; Popov, 1968, pp. 363-64). The law postulated th at workers col lectives conduct all activities of their re spective enterprises through their m anag ing organs. W orkers Councils and M an aging Boards. The Workers Council was to be elected by all employees of an enter prise in a secret ballot. J . A. Schumpeter once rem arked: Wild socializationsa term th at has acquired official standing are attem pts by workmen of each plant to supersede the management and to take m atters into their own hands. These are the nightm are of every responsible so cialist (1950, p. 226). Such a nightmare was now .made legal and obligatory iby .an aot .the Belgrade National Assemlbly. The principle of producers self-manage m ent explains E. Kardclj, a social sci entist and one of the most active political le a d e rs ^ is the starting point of every socialist politics. . . . Revolution th at fails to open the door to such a development inevitably m ust . . . stagnate in state cap italist forms and in a bureaucratic des potism (Kardelj el al., 1956, p. 17).

8.
In 1951 the governm ent was busy dis m antling the central planning apparatus with its ministries, directorates and ad m inistratively fixed prices. The last di rectorates disappeared in 1952. On Decem ber 30, 1951, a Law on Planned M anage m ent ol the N ational Economy was passed. I t replaced detailed central planning of production by planning of so-called basic proportions such as the rate of accum ula tion and the distribution of investm ent. Enterprises acquired a large degree of autonom y. In 1951 there existed numerous categories of m arket and planned prices. This was all replaced by a single price structure which with certain exceptions was to be regulated by the m arket. The rate of exchange was made more realistic by devaluing the dinar six times. And so in January, 1952, the economy was ready to em bark upon a new road of decentraliza tion. Once it was recognized th a t the es sential features of socialism consisted in individual freedom and the autonom y of self-governing collectives, two im portant consequences followed. First, the political monopoly of the state and p arty apparatus became incompatible with the so-con ceived social system. Second, in order to be really autonomous, working collectives had to have full, command over the economic factors determ ining their position. The form er consideration led to a gradual trans form ation of the Communist P arty from a classical political p arty into w hat I called an association of political activists (H or vat., 1969a, p. 261). The process was ini tiated in 1952 when the Sixth Congress of the P a rty changed its name to the League of Communists. T h e-latter consideration led to a m arket economy with, it was in tended, a minimum of government inter vention. In 1952 and 1953 several laws were passed regulating the formation, operation and term ination of business enterprises. The enterprises could be set up even by a group of citizens. The director was to be appointed on a competetive basis by a joint commission of the W orkers Council and the local government. Unsuccesful en terprises could go bankrupt. In agriculture the collectivization drive had increased the num ber of peasants work cooperatives, but with its compulsory deliveries, adm inistrative controls and the rest it depressed output. Once the idea of an all-em bracing adT a b le 2

Index of output 1930-1939 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1964 100 103 103 75 106 75 106 94 116 97 140 170

Number of work cooperatives

_,
1217 6238 6913 6804 4225 ' 1165 896 688 561 507 16

(SZS, Jugnslavija 1945-1964, 1905, pp. 99, 111)

m inistrative state control was abandoned, it. was useless to insist on collectivization in agriculture, even more so because of the poor economic results. Z. Vidakovid- gives the following explanation: . . . the m as sive participation of peasants in the armed phase of the Revolution and in setting up the revolutionary political power con tributed to the failure of etatist-bureaucratic socialization of agriculture, since the social-politically active peasantry did not submissively accept the adm inistrative m ethods of collectivization (1967, p. 42). In 1953 the Law on Reorganization of the P easants Work Cooperatives made it easy for peasants to leave cooperatives and most of them used this opportunity. Those who remained were often poor peasants

9.
and th a t m eant th a t the remaining co operatives would not be viable. In order to prevent this from happening and: also to curb income polarization in the villages, two m onths later the governm ent carried out a new agrarian reform which reduced the land maximum to 25 acres. Since be fore the war nearly nine tenths of all peasant farm s were smaller than 25 acres anyway, the new reform did not meet with m uch opposition. B ut the harm ful effects of former policy were not wiped oul, In Yugoslavia there was a long tradition of agricultural cooperatives. Forced collectiv ization did a great deal to discredit co operatives. L ater the general agricultural cooperatives, which were adm inistratively established and given a monopoly in vil lage trade, also contributed to the dis couragement of a genuine cooperative movement. AfLer all these changes the six-year-old etatist constitution became grossly inap propriate, while the tim e was not yet ripe for a brand new constitution. The problem was solved by a C onstitutional Law, passed in 1953'. I ts article four States: Social ownership of means of production, the self-governm ent of producers in the economy and the self-government of work ing people in the Commune, City and D istrict represent- the basis of the social and political system of the country. . . As a consequence of the self-govern m ent principle, another very im portant innovation found "its place in the Constitutional Law. I t became known as the principle of the fusion of the political and economic sovereignty of the working peo ple. The principle was implemented by creating the Council of Producers as a new house in the Assembly. The Council was composed of representatives of collectives of business enterprises. In the following years the governm ent was engaged prim arly in perfecting the m onetary and fiscal systems. Interest rates were applied and there was some experi m entation with investm ent auctions. Com mercial banks were added to the hitherto all embracing N ational Bank. Reserve re quirements were introduced. Local govern m ents acquired financial autonomy. The First Five-Y ear Plan (1947-1951) was extended for a year, but. never really completed. The period 1952-1956 was left w ith only annual plans. After NES was well established, the Second Five-Y ear Plan covering the period 1957-1961 was launched. I t was carried out in less than four years. Discussion: While the preceding period was mostly characterized by discussion of what was not socialism, the theoretical approach becomes more positive now. The discussion started by an exchange of opin ions o n . the so-called Transition Period and ended with an analysis of w hat was to be known as self-governmient or associationist socialism. M arx wrote th a t the revolutionary tran s formation of a capitalist into a communist society could not be carried out a t once. Between the two socio-economic systems there m ust be a short transitional period, and the state of this period would be organized as a Dictatorship of the Pro letariat. M arxs analysis looked plausible and in fact- proved to be a good anticipa tion of w hat happened in Yugoslavia in the first two decades after the war (H orvat, 1969a, ch. IF). Around: 1952, and inter m ittently later, the main issue of the de bate was whether socialism (considered to be the first of the two stages of a commu nist society); is to be included in or ex cluded from the Transition Period (Hor vat, 1951; Novak, 1952 and 1955; Perovic, 1953; Sirotkovif, 1951; ICiorac, 1951). The debate was highly scholastic, and yet the issue was of enormous practical impor tance. If Dictatorship of the Proletariat is interpreted as a form of political regime, and not as the class content of the govern

m ent (which is w hat M arx had in mind), the identification of socialism w ith the T ransition Period will produce a command society. If the political regime is demo cratic, b u t the Transition Period extended to include socialism, the development of a classless society m ay be.endlessly delayed. The issue was resolved in an indirect way after the essential characteristics of a selfgovernm ent socialism had been elaborated. Contrasting the Old (adm inistrative) and New (self-government) Economic System, R. Bicanic2 summarizes the actual developments by enumerating differences in goals, agents and means (1962a, pp. 44-47). The goals of the Old System were to achieve socialism by m eans of state power, to equalize the position of workers in relation to the state-ow ned means of production, and to achieve the new social order fpr its own sake. Individual interests of 1producers and consumers were sub ordinate to impersonal and superhuman goals of the economic system, and the state apparatus, entrusted with the achievement of this goal, was in a position to exploit the population. The New System presupposes the withering away of the state and the m anagem ent of socialized property by workers, and makes the personal happiness of every individual a supreme goal. As, far as the agents are concerned, in the Old System there was centralized state m anagem ent by means of a hierarchically organized state apparatus. The directives were passed down the line in an author itarian way with littje or no independence of enterprises. In the New System the state apparatus ca,nnot interfere with the business of individual enterprises, which became autonomous, 'Decentralization was applied not only to economic, but also to
2 BiCanic completed his study early in 1961. Essen tially the same comparative analysis had already been presented by M. Popovif in 1952 (1952). Evidently, the system was being developed in a consistent way.

social and political life. A uthoritarianism was replaced by self-government as a basic, principle of economic and social or ganization. The means of the two systems are con trasted by Bicanic in the following way: state ownership vs. social ownership; cen tral planning vs. social planning; adm in istrative allocation of goods vs. m arket; adm inistrative rules vs. financial instru m ents; adm inistratively fixed wages vs. free disposition of the income of the work ing collectives; all-em bracing state budget vs. the budget of the state adm inistration decentralized and separated from the eco nomic operations; consumption as a re sidual vs. consumption as an independent factor of development; collectivization vs. business cooperation of peasants and large agricultural estates. In the period under consideration econo mists began to study intensively, writirtgs in the economics of socialism, particularly those of W estern authors; This literature had hitherto been virtually unknown. I. Maksimovic (1958), F. Cerne (I960) and B. H orvat (1964) produced extensive crit ical accounts of earlier economic liter ature. Cerne attem pted to provide an ac ceptable definition of socialism. In his view socialism is characterized by the following three elements: (1) E qual rights of mem bers of the community as producers. This implies social ownership. Element (1) is a precondition for (2) equal rights in terms of income distribution. This in turn im plies distribution according to work. Both (1) and (2) are indispensable for the re alization of (3) equal rights in political life. As citizens members of the com m unity must, enjoy political Ccrne talks of socialistdemocracy (1960, p. 281). I t appears th a t socialism is essentially a philosophy of egalitarianism. Cernes defi nition, although never explicitly quoted references are not popular in Yugoslavia may be considered as commanding wide

11.
agreement among economists and other social scientists. On a less abstract, level, in an im portant article in 1953, Uvalic described the m ain intentions of NES (1954): In the adm in istrative period o utput was expanded re gardless of cost. Nov- fast growth was to be m aintained but cost considerations had to play an im portant role in the determ ina tion of the- structure of output. The law of value, i.e. the m arket, was to take care of th a t. B ut the operation of the law of value m ust be restricted in two im portant respects: income distribution and capital form ation m ust be controlled. Otherwise, Uvalic warned, exploitation and m arket anarchy will reappear. These ideas were to dom inate economic policy in the next de cade. B ut clumsy bureaucratic and often incom petent controls of income distribu tion and capital form ation were to become more and more irksome and irritating. The relation between m arket and plan ning has become a recurrent theme in economic discussion. Usually m arket and planning are visualized as two different mechanisms. In the opinion of Cerne the planning mechanism is to be used for longrun and general decisions, while short-run and partial decisions m ay be left to the m arket mechanism (1960, p. 11). A sim ilar position was taken by J. LavraC (1958). B. Jelic explores in more detail in stitutional arrangem ents necessary to h ar monize the m arket and planning. He ar gues th a t unbalanced growth sometimes requires interventions even outside the general -framework provided by the plan (1958). By the end of the period (1958) under consideration, N ES got its first theoretical rationalization in a book by the present author (H orvat, 1964). Since the socio economic system is conceived as an asso ciation of business, political, etc., associ ations, I suggested th a t it be called As.;ociationist Socialism. I pointed out th at the old alleged inco!np;'Ubii:iy of -market, and planning was nothing more iban- an ideological fallacy. The market, is ju st one and a t th a t a very, efficientdevice of social planning. The integration of market, and planning, social ownership and busi ness autonom y of enterprises,, produces a system with interesting new practical as well as theoretical features, First reactions towards this book were negative (Dragicevic, Stam par & H orvat, 1962; 1963). In sisting on consumer sovereignty was con sidered to represent the (negative) in fluence of W estern welfare economics. In sisting on rigorous technical analysis was considered devoid of social content and so anti-M arxian. Insisting on m arket economy was considered to reflect the in fluence of the W estern theory of free com petition. The analysis of price formation, in which interest and rent played a certain well-defined role, was said to represent a bourgeois theory. A similar critique was voiced by some socialist economists abroad. E. M andel m aintained th a t there is a definite incom patibility between socialism or, put other wise, a classless socicty and a high degree of social equality and economic efficiency and commodity production (1967). This is so because commodity production inevitably generates social inequality and produces waste of economic resources. The reader was not told why this should be in evitable. In this debate B. W ard came perhaps nearest to the truth. As to the m ethod of analysis she says: In value theory H orvat manages to produce more or less M arxian results from more or less neoclassical as sum ptions (1967, p. 519). As to the sub stance of the theory she concludes: N at urally enough this regime is essentially socialist; not surprisingly, it bears a more than casual resemblance to Yugoslavia; W hat is surprising is that it carrics a more th an expected measure of plausibility . . .

12,
(1967, p. 509). M ost of the ideas developed in this 1958 book have by now been ab sorbed and seem self-evident. The latest reform is based on the m arket mechanism and the,, welfare of individuals as the m ain guiding principles. Self-government Socialism Institutional Development: The last phase in Yugoslav post-w ar socio-economic developm ent was prepared by a series of political, economic and constitu tional reforms in the period 1958-1963. This turbulent period was inaugurated by the new Program of the League of Commu nists in 1958. Here socialism is defined as: . . . the social system based on socialized m eans of production in which social pro duction is m anaged by associated direct producers, in which income is distributed according to the principle to each accord ing to his work and in which, under the rule of the working class, itself being changed ,as a cjass, all social relations are gradually liberated from class antagonisms and all elements of exploitation of m an by m an (Program S k J 2a, 1958, p. 133). Thus the Yugoslav variant of socialism appears to imply social ownership, self m anagem ent in the economy, the absence of non-labor income and of exploitation. The term working class, as explained a few years later by K ardelj, was to mean all working people who are participating in the social process of labor and in so cialist economic relations (K ardelj, 1962, p. 1531). B y 1960 the second Five-Y ear Plan was successfully completed. The economy was booming, self-m anagem ent in enterprises was already well established and thi' Pro. gram paved the way to an acceleraLed pace of changes. The new Five-Y ear Plan was. prepared. The Society felt ready for a new im portant step forward. In 1961 three radical reforms were carried out. In order to increase the efficiency of the m arket organization and to improve the quality of goods produced, the hitherto virtually closed economy was to be made more sus ceptible to, the influences of the world m arket. To achieve. th a t, the system of multiple exchange rates was replaced by a customs tariff, the dinar was devalued, foreign trade was liberalized to a certain extent and the country became an asso ciated member of GATT. Since develop m ents in the field of. money and banking were lagging behind the general institu tional changes, an overhaul of the entire fi nancial organization was undertaken. And finally, it seemed inappropriate for trade unions to continue to supervise wage levels and wage differentials in self-managed en terprises. And so this control was discon tinued. Since then in this field, m arket competition has gone further than in any other modern economy. These three re forms inaugurated in 1961 the beginning of the third distinct phase of economic de velopment. By th a t time the country was institu tionally ready for the . new constitution which was promulgated in 1963. Explain ing the aims of the constitution. Kardelj, one of its chief architects, said th at it was not only the constitution of the state but also a specific social charter which will pro vide the m aterial basis, political fram e work and encouragem ent for. the faster internal development of the system of social self-government and direct de mocracy (1962, p. 1533). Self-manage m ent was extended to cover not only busi-. ness but also non-profit organizations. I t was generalized as a principle of selfgovernment to be applied in all spheres of economic, social and political life. In order to achieve this, the Constitution invented a new institution: the work organization (radna organizacija). W henever people as sociate in order to work for a living, they create a work organization and represent a work union (radna zajednica) which en

joys basic self-governm ent rights con stitutionally guaranteed. W ork organiza tions include enterprises and other business establishm ents as well as educational, cul tural, medical, social insurance and other public service establishm ents. As a con sequence the fusion principle of the 1953 C onstitutional Law was extended to cover all work unions, and the Assembly got three houses of work unions: for the economy, for education and culture and for health and social welfare. The three reforms of 1961 were poorly prepared, partly inconsistent and badly implem ented. As one m ight have expected, the sensitive m arket economy reacted vi olently. E verything went wrong: in one year the rate of growth of industrial out p u t was reduced to one half of its 1960 level, im ports soared, exports stagnated, wages went far ahead of productivity. The reformers, accustomed to a tardy halfadm inistrative economy, were taken by surprise. Planners increased targets for 1962 in order to catch up w ith the F iveYear Plan goals and were, of course, deeply disappointed. The recession was deepened. I t became clear th a t the Plan would have to be abandoned. A dm inistra tors and political bodies were deeply dis turbed. Conservative politicians and econo m ists were busy explaining the failure of the m arket system and demanded th a t central planning be reintroduced. H eavy pum ping of money into the economy helped to generate recovery in the second half of 1962. In the next year the economy was back to its normal path of fast growth. T he. upswing continued into 1964 ending in a boom with heavy in flation and a great.balance of paym ents deficit. The new recession brought a new reform. Throughout 1964 assemblies were busy discussing the principles of the new reform (Savezna Skupstina, 1964). In the beginning of 1965 the governm ent ad m inistration was set to work. By M ay,

technical preparations were completed and in July the Federal Assembly enacted the package of laws inaugurating the reform (Savezna Skupstina, 1965). Significantly enough, the solution of economic troubles was sought in further decentralization, perfection of self-government autonom y, development of a more competitive m arket and an integration into the world economy. W hat followed appeared to be a second, more radical and more consistent, edition of the 1961 reform. The reform started as an economic one, but very soon produced im portantsocial and political consequences. M ulticentric planning could not help but produce a pluralistic society. Reform was in its essence a new stage of the revolution; so asserted V. Bakaric, president of the Croatian League of Communists (1967, p. 231). Self-governm ent autonom y be came firmly rooted in the Socialist E s tablishm ent. Discussion: The reform of 1961 called also N ES (II) marked the beginning of a real academic discussion of economic m at ters. Up to th a t time institutional changes had been foo fast, and economists too few, so rigorous analysis and discussion had been replaced by descriptions. The discussion started with an exchange between Uvalic and Bicanic. Uvalic re iterated his views that income distribution and capital form ation could not be left to regulation by the m arket. So far, distribu tion according to work had encountered serious difficulties. The capital m arket, as a device for capital formation and alloca tion, was unacceptable because it would lead to group ownership. Social profit ability and individual profitability were two different things. The individual in terest of a collective was inferior and had to defer to the social interest (Uvalic, 1962). Bicanii; objected th a t Uvalic did not distinguish clearly between what is commonly called the economic system, and the plan. The economic system (general

conditions for business conduct) used to be an instrum ent of the plan; now the relation had been reversed. (In fact, two years later a p arty congress would request ex plicitly th a t the plan become an instru m ent of the system instead -of the system being accommodated to the plan (Sefer, 1968b, p. 29). Uvalic offered no guidance as to how to replace labor and capital m arkets. He really implied central plan ning, w ith operational freedom being left to planners and politicians and discipline being reserved for the rest. Bicanic feels th a t this is unacceptable. A modern economy is essentially polycentric and not m onocentric (1963a). ^ In December 1962 the Association of Yugoslav Economists organized a debate in Belgrade about the draft of the new constitution (Ehonomist, 1962). A number of participants:R. Davidovic, M. M acura, N. Cobeljic, K. M ihajlovicargued th a t th e role of planning was underesti m ated in the draft constitution. M acura explained th a t this was so because economic problems were approached from the point of view of an enterprise, even an individ ual, instead of from the point of view of the economy as a whole (Ekonomist, 1962, p. 462). Cobelj ic thought th a t planned m arket economy would in future be re placed by m arket planned economy (.Ekonomist, 1962, p. 473). M ihajlovic argued th a t, while consumer and interm e diate goods m arkets worked well, invest m ent goods and capital m arkets were no toriously imperfect and needed strict con trol (Ekonomist, 1962, p. 500). The debate reached its climax a t another meeting a m onth later in Zagreb., F u th er discussion was prom pted by the failure of the reform. The economy sank deeply into depression (relative to the standard Yugoslav state of affairs). From the beginning of 1961 to the middle of 1962 the annual rate of grow th of indus tria l ou tp u t dropped from 12 to 4 percent.

The government was alarmed and asked a group of academic economists associated with a research institute to find out w hat had happened. This move set a precedent in the governm ental attitu d e towards m an aging economic affairs. In a few m onths the group produced a report, popularly called The Yellow Book (H orvat, 1962a). Then the second, even more im portant, precedent was established: the govern m ent accepted the report. The findings of the Yellow Book m ay be summarized as follows. Inefficient plan ning resulted in economic instability. The structure of supply failed to m atch the structure of demand, there was a down ward shift in long-run export trends, there was a serious lack of skilled labor force. The inherently unstable economy was ex posed to the simultaneous shocks of the three poorly prepared and badly imple m ented partial reforms cited above. The insistence oil financial discipline created a serious shortage of money with strong de flationary effects. The abolition of income control led to wild increases of wages un related to productivity increases. The lib eralization of foreign trade emphasized the fundam ental importance of economic research as a basis for economic policy and the stability of the legal and policy fram e work as a precondition for efficient oper ations of enterprises in a m arket setting. Fn the meantime, another research in stitution produced an analysis of the de fects of the economic system. The report became known as The White Book and it criticized deficient planning, an imperfect m arket, arbitrariness in income distribu tion and inconsistencies in investm ent de cisions (Dabcevic el al., 1962). Both docu m ents were discussed in a m eeting jointly organized by the Association of Econo m ists and the Federal Planning Bureau in Zagreb in January 1963 (Savjetovanje, 1963). The former planning officials and a certain number of economists with a more

centralist orientation criticized the two documents. They questioned the possibil ity of efficient investm ent and a high rate of growth in a decentralized setting. They thought th a t the m arket necessarily led to a destruction of the socialist principle of of -income distribution. Some of them pointed out th a t the classical conflict be tween the essentially social character of production and atomized decision-m aking lay a t the bottom of all economic dif ficulties (Savjetovanje, 1963, p. 192). However, the m ajority of economists agreed on the necessity of further decen tralization and the perfection of self'government autonom y. Since the Zagreb Rebate the basic principles of the develop m ent of the economic system have never been seriously questioned among Yugoslav economists. The well know saying about doctors the operation was successful b u t the pa tien t diedm ight have been applied to discussions among Yugoslav economists: the causes of economic troubles had been well explained, b u t the reform was dead. I t soon became clear th a t the entire ex perim ent had to be repeated. And so it was, in 1965. The situation was rather com plicated. The casual observer is often puzzled, commented R. Bicanic. "Only a few years ago Yugoslavia was presented as an example of a country with one of the highest growth rates in the world, now the foremost aim of economic policy is to re duce investm ent. For more than a decade the socialist economy struggled against bureaucratic command; now an . adm in istrative price freeze has had to be intro duced. I t was the first country in the world to initiate workers m anagem ent in business enterprises and to abolish the wage system; now there is discussion about, w hether this m eans too m uch or too little democracy. . . N ational problems were said to have been solved; and now the country is pregnant w ith increased tensions among the con

stituent nations, tensions newly' created and socialist in origin. Efforts to find solu tions to all these problems are now con centrated into two words: The Reform (Bicanic, 1966, pp. 633-34). Bicanic and Dzeba (Dzeba and Belsac, 1965) the following aims of the reforms. The im m ediate purpose was to com bat an increasing pace of inflation; to -remove the chronic deficit in the balance of paym ents; to reduce all sorts of subsidies (for exports, unprofitable production, etc.) drastically in order to avoid the necessity of central adm inistrative interventions; to correct price disparities in order to establish more efficient m arket relations and eliminate adm inistrative controls. These were pre conditions for some longer-term measures of structural change in the economy such a s : revision of growth and investm ent pol icies; putting the productivity of the econ omy on an internationally competitive level; liberalization of foreign trade and elim ination of the balance of paym ents deficit; convertibility of the currency in order to open the economy and expose it to the stim ulating influences of the world m arket. In its broader social aspects, the reform was expected to im part a de-?politicization of economic decisions; double the share of enterprises in the control, of na tional income, reducing thereby the eco nomic power of the state; to link the level of living to th a t of productivity; to in crease the rationality of economic deci sion-making. Bicanic concludes th a t the fundam ental aim was in fact to build a model of a socialist system for a developed country, one which will be able to stand the competition of other developed coun tries w ithout the constant tutelage of gov ernm ent m achinery (1966, p. 643); He and H orvat (Dobrincic el al., 1951) pointed out th a t this model is very different from the mixed economy of the 'w elfare state. The aim described was to be achieved by a process which Bicanic called the four

D s: Decentralization, D e-etatization, D epolitizauon and Democratization. As often happens, the ideas were good b u t the im plem entation was poor. The re form was politically m uch better prepared th a n the one in 1961, b u t not so economi cally. Economically it was based on a rather naive idea of the viability of the laisserfalre principle. M onetary policy appeared to be practically the only available device of economic policy. I n order to stabilize prices, th e governm ent applied a credit squeeze. I t worked, b u t it also produced deflation with unemployment and stagna tion. :From the beginning of 1965 to the m iddle of 1907 the annual rate of growth of industrial output dropped from .twelve percent to m inus one percent. Negative growth rates had not been known since 1952. The governm ent thought th a t this was unavoidable, and th a t th e reform in its strategic aspects proceeded as planned. Some economists and m any businessmen were alarm ed. For them , developments were catastrophic and certain to produce another failure. Soon economists were to discover the existence of business cycles. Since cycles had not been known to the governm ent it was held as self-evident th a t cycles could not exist in a socialist economy the governm ent proceeded to fram e economic policy, as if the cycles did not exist. The results of such an economic policy could not be encouraging. \ The discovery of cycles proceeded in stages. The successive, retardations of grow th, described already in the Yellow BooM;in d ic a te d th a t the Yugoslav econ omy m ight have been subject to cyclical fluctuations. The research undertaken in the In stitu te of Economic Studies con firmed the hypothesis. (This will be dis cussed more fully in C hapter 5.) In the Spring of 1967, in L jubljana the Associa tion of Econom ists held a meeting dedi cated to problem s of stabilization (Savjetovanje, 1966). F our papers dealt ex

plicitly with business cycles. The research institute mentioned ventured to m ake a forecast of the lower turning point (1967), boom (1969) and recession (1970) of the current cycle which proved to be correct up to the time these lines were w ritten (second half of 1969). A couple of m onths after the L jubljana m eeting a public debate took place. I t was focussed on the them e: Economic Science and the Econom y (In stitu t, 1968a). Seven economists participated. A. B ajt raised the question of the responsibility for the reform and criticized the naive view th a t investm ent generated inflation.. Z. Baletic evaluated the contention th a t there was a conflict between politicians and economists. 2. M rkusic analyzed the for eign trade equilibrium. H orvat pointed out a num ber of m istakes contained in cur rently popular economic reasoning (and, consequently, in economic policy), and in a separate article, which caused a news paper explosion of discontent, calculated the losses due to cyclical instability. The output lost appeared to am ount to about forty percent of the social product. The three remaining economists supported the official view th at everything was more or less all right. In February 1968 the In stitu te of Economic Studies organized an all-Y ugo slav conference oh the current economic situation. The study prepared for this, occasion (Institute 1968b) described th e cyclical mechanism operating in the Yugo slav economy and m ade a coherent pro posal for an anti-cyclical policy. This was an im portant step forward. The proposal insisted on a combination of m onetary and fiscal policies (the latter was virtually non existent a t th a t tim e ); on a combination of price and income controls; and on the im portance of the interrelations between ag gregate demand and investm ent. By the end of the same year another fea ture of the unsuccessful 1961 reform was re-

( p ^ e d : two research institutes were offi cially asked to assess the im plem entation of the reform. There was, however, an interesting'diffeirencc: this dem and did not come !from"l!he-govemment b ut from the C entral Com m ittee df the'L eague of Com m uaists. Two njpofts were p rep a re d : the findings w.ere more or Iess:fhe same. I quote from . '{he report th a t was published (in stitu t, 1969). This report found th a t in spite of a strong deflationary policy; prices were no more sta.bie th an they were before the re form; th a t the Five-Y ear Plan was not likely to be fulfilled; th a t the adm inistra tive control of prices was extended over a greater percentage of output than before the reform ; th a t th e liberalization trends in foreign trade were checked and re versed; th a t the balance of paym ents deficit was expanding; th a t the rate of saving was decreasing; th a t the losses and indebtedness of firms were increasing; th a t the rise in labor productivity was slightly retarded; and th at unemployment was in creasing beyond anj'thing known in the country in the past two decades. E laborat ing its early prognosis in more detail, the In stitu te predicted an acceleration of growth in the first half of 1969 (to a rate some sixty percent higher th an the one forecast by the Federal Planning Bureau), an inflationary pressure in the second half and the dow nturn of the cycle and the be ginning of a new recession -by the end of 1969 or in the first :teUf> of 11970. The first !two forecasts prove'd o ' b e . correct, Hie t ,f;la%Chad still the status of:forecast u t'tlie 1'tim e r'th ese : lines were -w ritten. 'A ' few 1 m onths later V. Rajkovic;. undertook to 'analyze: the unpublished papers prepared by the adm inistration as a basis for the re form. Rajkovic came to the conclusion th a t none of th e im portant goals had been achieved in a satisfactory way (.1969/70, p. 47). Once again the ominous question was posed:.W hat had happened? A careful anal

ysis of developments seems to suggest tjhe following answer. Economic growth and institutional changes were too-.'rapid for the governmerit apparatus and other organs o f' economic policy to be able to cope, with efficiently. Almost overnight a backward B alkan.country reached a European stan dard of economic developm ent, and an adm instrative economy was transform ed into a m arket economy. A t the same tim e re sponsible authorities often lacked the necessary understanding of how a m odern m arket economy operated. If to all th a t we add the. pioneering in the system of self-governmentnonexistent anywhere else in the world it becomes clear th a t the complexities of the socio-economic en vironm ent have increased enormously and th a t it will take some tim e before the or ganizational framework is adapted, the necessary knowledge is accum ulated and the new social system begins to operate smoothly (In stitu t, 1968a, 1969; Ilo rv at, 1968a)." II. Planning Four Five-Year Plans The rationale for central planning was explained in Chapter 1. By 1947 the m a chinery for central planning was com pleted. Hierarchically organized planning commissions on various levelsfederal, state, district and citywere entrusted with comprehensive planning in their re-ppectiveterriterits. The operational plan n in g and^TppWmentation was carried out iby ministries! 4Uld then down the line by general and 'chief directorates, and plan ning sections, in the enterprises. Annual plans were broken down into quarterly, m onthly and ten -d ay plans. In 1949 about 13,000 groups of commodities were planned (Calic, 1948, p. 15). In the same year the state budget comprised two thirds of the national income (Kidri, 1960, p. 453). Every enterprise had to send to the su

18.
perior authorities 600-800 different reports per year. The annual economic plan weighed some 3,300 pounds (Bicanic, 1957, p. 65). Supplies and customers were as signed to every enterprise in advance. Since these adm inistrative allocations were not quite perfect, the enterprises were asked to find their w ays. The planning authorities would provide them more money then they wanted and would ask them to spend it. As prices were fixed, spending money m eant finding raw m a terials and investm ent goods necessary for the fulfilment of the plan. In a m arket economy one endeavors to save money, in the centrally planned economy one is at great pains to spend i t : in the former selling is the m ost difficult task, in the latte r buy ing is the greatest worry of businessmen. The economy was run as one single m am m oth enterprise. T h a t required es tablishing a system of continuous control of operations of all enterprises. In 1948 K idric voiced complaints against those who considered th a t there was no need for daily reporting and who were satisfied with ten -d a y reporting (Kidric, 1960, p. 468). A num ber of years later J. Stanovnik, now Secretary of the U. N. Economic Commis sion for Europe, a t a lecture delivered to Swedish economists in Stockholm, was asked w hat sort of devices were used to im plem ent plans in Yugoslavia. He an swered: Telephones!. The first Five-Y ear Plan covered the period from 1947- through 1951. I t pro claimed four m ain goals: (1) to overcome economic and techno logical backwardness; (2) to strengthen the economic and m ilitary power of the country; (3) to strengthen and develop the so cialist sector of the economy; (4) to increase the general welfare of the population. Consum ption was taken care of, b u t it was last in the order of priorities. T he goals enumerated were to be achieved by an explosive increase of output; compared with the pre-w ar level, national income was to increase 1.9 times, agricultural out p ut 1.5 times, industrial output 4.9 times. However, due to poor statistics, the pre war level m ust have been greatly under estim ated and the three targets were achieved only by 1954, 1959 and 1961 re spectively. A t first the im plem entation of the plan proceeded in a satisfactory way, though not as well as was generally believed.3 In 1949 the economic blockade of the Cominform countries forced Yugoslavia to search for trading outlets for about one half of her exports and to secure the same propor tion of im ports from other sources. Al though substantial foreign aid was secured two years later, this sudden reorientation of foreign trade had stifling effects on growth. The next blow came from nature; in 1960 a severe drought reduced agricul tural output by one third. Collectivization also helped to aggravate agricultural prob lems. The radical economic reorganization in 1951 could only complicate m atters. I n dustrial output fell by four percent in 1951, and by one more percent in 1952. The plan was extended for a year, b u t th a t was already pointless, and the report on
3 Thus V. Begovifi reports about the overfulfillment of the first half of the Five-Year Plan (1949). B ut later statistical estimates showed that the data produced by the Federal Planning Commission (Informativni Pritutnik pp. 251, 484) were inflated. Thus for the out p u t of manufacturing, mining and power plants the dif ferences are as follows: Indices 1948 1946 Federal Planning Commission Federal Statistical Office (later estimates) 267 190 1949 1948 116.6 111 1950 1949 106.3 103

the fulfilment of the First Five-Y ear Plan was never published. And yet, if not a full success, the Plan was far from being a failure. I t generated output substantially above the pre-w ar level, it raised the share of gross investm ent in.fixed assets to 33 percent of gross na tional product (material product definition; close to 30 percent on the SNA definition) and created entire new industries. In 1952 rigid central planning was re placed by planning by global propor tions; These proportions were: minimum use of output capacity and the correspond ing wage fund, profits as a percentage of the wage bill (a device for wage planning), basic capital form ation, taxes and alloca tion of budgetary resources (Vuckovic, 1952, p. 31). In this way, the central plan was expected to regulate general economic activity w ithout adm inistrative orders, by., influencing the rate of growth and the pro portion between investm ent and consump tion, and by effecting structural changes in the economy (Jelic, 1961). The old Plan ning Commissionwhich acted as a super m inistry controlling the activities of all economic m inistries and was in charge of the overall im plem entation of the plan (Djordjevic, 1965)was replaced by the Federal Planning Bureau, an expert insti tution w ith no adm inistrative powers. Republics, districts (later communes) and enterprises would produce their plans in dependently. State planning became social planning which m eant wide consultations among all interested parties, inclusion of non-profit institutions and independence of enterprise plans. The next three years were used to com plete the key investm ent projects of the Five-Y ear Plan in annual installm ents. In the discussion about the 1955 Plan the new mood was already apparent; agriculture looked neglected, investm ent too large and onesided (Popovic, 1964, pp. 147, 150). By the end of th a t yqar M . Popovic could

say in the Federal Assembly th a t one period of economic development was com pleted (1964, p. 160). The year 1956 was used to prepare the Second Five-Y ear Plan for the period 1957-1961. In this plan increase o f . consumption already ranks third among the five m ain goals (Lovrenovic, 1963, p. 220). Growth of investm ent was somewhat retarded and its structure radically changed. The share of industrial investm ent was substantially reduced in order to double the share of agriculture and increase the shares of transport and. trade (Popovic, 1964, p. 211). W ithin m anufacturing, consumer goods industries were to expand faster. So-called non-pro ductive investm ent in social overhead capital was also accelerated. All these changes proved beneficial and the plan was carried out in four years. The planning system seemed to be well adapted to the needs of the economy and worked satis factorily. This system was described by J. Sirotkovic (1961), S. Dabcevic (1963), and Jelic (1962). . . . .... The first plan distorted the stru ctu re of the economy by emphasizing capital for m ation in heavy industries. The second one undertook to make corrections but went to the other extreme by overexpand ing consumer goods industries. Thus, the third plan was left with the task of redress ing the balance again by accelerating in vestm ent in power generation, m etallurgy and interm ediate goods industries. These fluctuations in investm ent induced Cobeljic and R. Stojanovic to invent a theory of investm ent cycles inherent in a socialist economy with an uneven pace of techno logical progress (1966). Z. Baletic, B ajt (1969) and others criticized this theory as unacceptable since mistakes in planning are attributable to ignorance and not nec essarily to socialism, and th a t technologi cal progress is rather innocent in this re spect. The Third Five-Y ear Plan for the period

1961 through 1965 endeavored to acceler ate the, growth of output even further. Personal consumption ranked second among the goals (Lovrenovic, 1963, p. 221). The Plan was hardly launched when the country found itself in the m iddle of a recession, the reasons for which were ex plained in the previous chapter. The Plan was doomed to fail. In order to avoid un pleasant discussions, the Federal Assembly decided to replace it by a seven-year plan covering the period. 1964-1970. For th a t purpose the Assembly passed a Resolution in which the basic political and economic goals of the new plan were defined as fol lows (Yugoslav Survey, 1964): '(l1 steady rise of the level of living, in ) the first place of personal consumpr tion, and higher share of personal 1 incomes in national income; (2) catching up w ith international sta n dards of productive efficiency and labor productivity; (3) .expansion of external trade through more intensive inclusion of Yugoslavia in the international division of labor; (4) accelerated developm ent of under developed areas; (5) further developm ent of socialist soviety by strengthening the role of direct producers and working; or ganizations in the m anagem ent of productive forces. A comparison of these goals w ith those of the F irst F ive-Y ear Plan shows very clearly the distance th a t separates social planning from state planning. The welfare of individuals is moved from the end to the beginning of the priority list.4 Behind this
4 Personal consumption was reduced at a rate of 2 percent annually in the period 1948-1952; it began to expand a t 4.6 percent per annum in 1953-1956; it ex panded a t approximately the same rate as national income, a t 9.3 percent, in 1957-1963; and its rate of growth surpassed th at of national income afterwards (Sefer, 1965, pp. 207-209).

change one finds the philosophy, which holds th a t economic welfare is both th e. purpose and1the most powerful incentive for production. An autarchical orientation is replaced by openness towards the world m arket and international influences. The measure of the perfection of a socialist economy is no more to be found in increas ing the share of the state in the national capital but in the developm ent of selfgovernm ent. Yet, th e .F irst Plan and the Resolution had one thing in common: neither of them was implemented. The Resolution in fact foreshadowed th e Reform of 1965. The changes in economic institutions were so radical th a t it became necessary to prepare a new Five-Y ear Plan for the period 1966-1970. The Plan incorporated the goals of .the Resolution. I t envisaged a somewhat lower rate, of growth of G N P (7.5-8.5 percent per year), a relatively tnodest expansion of m anu facturing (9-10 percent), but a high rate of productivity increase (6-7 percent a y e a r). Current analysis of the Federal Planning. Bureau indicates th a t these targ ets are not likely to be achieved (Medenica, 1968). Growth and Cycles In order to be able to evaluate successes and failures in planning and in economic policy in generalone has to have a look at some data. The following table sum marizes the developm ents in term s of rates of growth of the most im portant statistical aggregates. : . In the central planning period collecti vization caused stagnation in agriculture and the economic boycott of the Cominform countries caused stagnation in. ex ports. As a result total o utput grew slowly. In the second period the unfettered econ omy was in full swing in all spheres with aii acceleration of growth in the second half of the period. Foreign trade expanded faster than output and exports faster than im ports. In the third period agricultural out-

T a b l e .3 . G r o w t h o f t h e Y u g o s l a v E c o n o m y 1 9 4 6 -1 9 6 8 (rates of gro w th, per c e n t pe r annum )

Central Planning 1946-1952 Gross National Product Industrial output Agricultural output Export of Commodities Im port of Commodities Employment1 1 2.3" 12.9 3.1* 3.1b 3 .6 b 8 .3 s

Decentralization 1952-1960 9,8 13.4 8 .9 11.7 9 .7 6.9

Self-government 1960-196S 6 .8 ' 7.9 2.1 7.0 7.0 2.4

1947-1952 b 1948-1952 0 1960-1967 d Persons employed outside private agriculture. Sources: Statistical Yearbooks.

p u t caught up w ith domestic demand, while the European export m arkets be came increasingly difficult to penetrate. The slowly expanding m arket for agricul tu ra l products reduced the rate of growth of agricultural output. Increased economic instability depressed the average rate of growth of m anufacturing. As a result, the overall pace of expansion was reduced. In all these developm ents institutional fac tors, described before, played an impor ta n t role. If one w ants to judge the per formance of the economy on the basis of a somewhat longer period, the period 1952 1968 appears to be the appropriate one. In these sixteen years, to tal output expanded three and one half times, m anufacturing five times, agriculture two and a half times, foreign trade in commodities four times and employment outside private agricul ture three times. Since Yugoslavia has been so far the only country th a t has lived through three different economic systems capitalist, St atist and self-governm ent in a relatively short period of tim e, it may be possible to evaluate the com parative efficiency of the three systems. Something of the kind was attem pted by T. M arschak. He reduced the dimensions of the problem by study ing the com parative efficiency of the cen tralized and decentralized frameworks.

M arschaks results were not conclusive. He felt th a t the lessons which the current designer of new economic systems could draw from the Yugoslav experience were staggeringly obscure (1968, p. 586). L ater research was undertaken in the In stitu te of Economic Studies (IES) (H or vat, 1969b). Efficiency was m easured in term s of the rate of growth cf ou tp u t a t tributable to technical progress, defined as the residual after the contributions of labor and capital have been accounted for. The results are summarized in Table 4. The periodization in the table is not ideal and is determined by the availability of data. Yet the results of the analysis are ex-' trem ely suggestive. In the foregoing sec tion it was stated th a t the investm ent pro gram of the First Five-Y ear Plan was completed by 1955. Statistical testing in the IE S study showed th a t the Yugoslav economy operated on the basis of two com pletely different production functions, one applying to the period 1947-1955 and the other afterwards. The former had a nega tive residual, the latter a positive and a very large one. The table seems to suggest th a t central planning expanded ou tp u t and employment fast, and capital form ation even faster, as compared w ith the private capitalist pre-w ar economy. B ut it also re duced overall efficiency. Self-government

22.
T a b l e 4 . T h e U s e o f L a d o r a n d C a p i t a l a n d T e c h n i c a i. P r o g r e s s i n Y u g o s l a v i a

Rates of growth per annum in % GNP Employ ment Capitalism: 1911-1932 1932-1940 1940-1954 .1955-19(57 3.28 4.67 5.91 10.31 1.87 0 .7 2 4.76 4.44 Fixed Assets 3.52 2.59 9.99 7.84

Rates of growth of - GNP due to increased efficiency 0.71 3.16 - 1 .0 4 4.44

Etatism ; SeJf-govemment:

Note: The war years 1914-1918 and 1941-1945 are excluded. The data refer to manu facturing, mining,,power generation, construction and crafts.

accelerated the growth of output and tech they appear to coincide w ith m ajor eco nical progress beyond anything known be nomic reforms. Thus, the five cycles th a t fore while preserving fast em ploym ent ex have occurred so far describe in an inter pansion. esting m anner the history of post-w ar As m ight have been noticed already, the economic policy (Rom an num erals indicate grow th was fast but not a t all smooth. A t q u arters): first the possibility of regular cyclical de 1. Cycle: New Economic System (1), velopm ent was rejected by some econo 111/1949-111/1955. ' ' r: m ists. Y et in another IE S study business 2. Cycle: The transition to the Second cycles w ith periods of about four years Five-Y ear Plan, III/1 9 5 5 -II/1 9 5 8 , ' were established (H orvat, 1970). These 3. Cycle: New System of Income Dis cycles, th a t m anifest them selves as fluctu tribution, II/1958-IV /1960. ations in the rates of grow th (see Figurc 1), 4. Cycle: New Economic System (2), have interesting features not found else IV /1960-L/1965. where. T hus inventories are accum ulated 5. Economic Reform, 1/1965 ? in th e downswings and decum ulated in the Cyclical institutional developm ent seems upswings; the accelerator is not operative; also to be a novel feature of business cycles. prices tend to vary inversely with the cycle etc. The upper turning points seem to be Development' Policy and Melhods of P lan generated by divergent changes in im port ning and export elasticities th a t end'in. an explo ID'evclopmcvl Policy and Functions of sion of the balance of paym ents deficit'. Social fljlie philosophy of developThe lower turning*- points are somewhat rRient, -generally accepted by Yugoslav (^ n o re ^ i^ e u lt to expla^.rB^jjfc believes th a t economists and the Government until consumer- dem and ,isi to -a. certain extent about 1956, is well described by Cobeljic, autonom ous and 'helps; to generate an ac then the deputy director of the Federal celeration of output growth (1969b). Planning Bureau (1959a). Cobeljic m ain If the beginnings of the cycles are m ea tains th at rapid industrialization is the sured from inflection points in the down chicf m ethod of generating development. swings of the rates of growth (these points Industrialization creates additional urban correspond to peaks of deviations from an employment, which alleviates latent unexponential trend of absolute m agnitude),

23.

F icitre

1. B u sin ess

C ycles

in

Y u g o sl a v ia

24.
em ploym ent in agriculture. The growth of the. urban labor force generates additional dem and for agricultural products and so stim ulates the development of agriculture. Physical control of foreign trade, in order to prevent the im port of non-essential goods and to secure im ports of capital goods, and the more rapid growth of con sumer goods industries (so-called D epart m ent IT) helps to accelerate industrial growth which in tu rn generates develop m ent impulses throughout the economy. Im ports are paid for by exports of raw m a terials and agricultural products. The nec essary saving is secured by a proper price policy. Prices in predom inantly private agriculture are kept low and in consumer goods industries are inflated by m eans of high turnover taxes. The policy described was not only ad vocated b ut was also consistently imple m ented. In the period 1950-1956 invest m ent in industry (m anufacturing, mining and power generation) absorbed 51 per cent of all investm ent. The share of in dustry in national income, rose from 21 percent in 1939 to 40 percent in 1956. Four fifths of industrial investm ent were chan neled into heavy industry and power gen eration. The share of saving in national income increased four times as compared w ith the pre-w ar level (Cobeljic, 1959a, pp. 178, 366). The planning system in 1947-1952 was consistent with such a development policy. The m ain characteristics of this system , as described by Jelic, another deputy director of the F PB , were as follows: a,/ strict cen tralization of decisions about priorities, tim ing and structural changes; b / physical allocation of resources as a basic, m ethod of planning; c/ financial elements play a secondary role and serve to achieve bal ances in value term s; d / targets represent directives; e / production is planned by commodities and capital formation, is planned in term s of individual investm ent projects; [/ prices are adm inistratively fixed; g / the elements of which a plan is composed are also instrum ents of its im plem entation (Jelic, 1962, pp. 102-105). After the engine of growth had been set into motion in the way. described and the economy organized along socialist lines, there was a possibility of and a need for a different approach. Cobeljic. now expected a move balanced, growth. Jelic referred to Rostows take-off theory and to Bicanics threshold of growth theory (Bicanic, 1962b) and insisted on decentralized initia tive as a further vehicle of growth. Selfgovernment implied th a t the function of planning be separated from the. function of operational m anagement. Jeli-c pointed out. th a t social plans should determine a t least three global proportions the basic divi sion of national income, the structure of investm ent and the relations w ith foreign countriesif they were to be efficient de vices for im plem entation of social pref erences (Jelic, 1962, p. 144). The same three global proportions were accepted as basic by D. Bjelogrlic, director of the Planning Bureau of Serbia. He added, however, a fourth one: the relative growth of the less developed states and re gions (1965, p. 118). jelogrlic presented B his paper to a conference on social plan ning held in Belgrade in 1965, where Cobeljic and K. Mihajlovic. spoke in favor of introducing more directives into plan ning, while M. Samardr.ija and M. Korac m aintained th a t even the planning of the share of accumulation find the structure of investm ent m eant a violation of selfgovernment. This discussion, which cov ered a wide spectrum of opinions from sem i-central planning to an almost com plete laisser fairc approach, has been char acteristic of the Yugoslav economic pro fession since the enactm ent of the new Constitution in 1963. The trend has been tow ards th e laisser faire extreme. In 1960 the Federal governm ent controlled 48 per

cent of business investm ent directly through- its General Investm ent Fund, and in addition to th a t 14 percent in directly; through tied loans (Jelic, 1962, p. 158). In 1969, the P a rty Congress rec ommended th a t so-called state capital be eliminated and in the future the federal governm ent is not supposed to retain any direct control over investm ent resources. A satisfactory solution has not as yet been found, and work on the new Law on Social Planning, which began in 1963, has not yet been completed (Savezna Skupstina, 1966a). The advocates of the new approach to planning, Sirotkovic (1966), the former director of the Planning Bureau of Croatia, and R. Stajner (Savezna, 1966a), the present director general of the Federal Planning B ureau, M . M esaric (1967) and others argue th a t the professional function of planning should be supplemented by an emphasized social function, th a t annual plans should be abandoned and replaced by parliam entary resolutions (which has been practiced since 1966), and th at me dium -term plans should be continually revised and extended every two to three years. Bicanic describes the desirable sys tem of planning as polycentric planning. This presumes the existence of one plan ning mechanism consisting of m any au tonomous plans interlinked in a specific, competitive way (Bicanic, 1963b, 1967). These ideas have been more or less ac cepted, but in parliam entary debates criticisms have been voiced th a t it was not a t all clear how the plans were to be im ple m ented (Savezna Skupstina, 1966a, p. 91). In practice the im plem entation of plans has left m uch to be desired and the law on Social Planning is still to be produced. The functions of social planning in the present Yugoslav setting have been de scribed by the IES (Jugoslavenski In stitu t, 1968, p. 20), and similarly by Mesaric (1969), as follows: (1) A plan is, first of ail,

a forecasting device. (2) As sucli it provides economic subjects with necessary inform a tion for their autonomous decision-m ak ing. This, together with institutionalized consultations, makes the plan an instru m ent of coordination of economic deci sions. (3) After relevant social preferences have been determined by an essentially political process, the application of mod ern tools of economic policy makes, the plan an instrum ent for programming economic development. (4) Once the social Plan has been adopted by.the Parliam ent, it becomes a directive for the-Government. Point (4) is the only adm inistrative: or compulsory aspect of social planning. 'institutional Framework: The precondi tion for efficient social planning is an ade quate analysis of the functioning of an in stitutional framework. A general idea of how the system works or is supposed to work m ay be obtained from a description by H orvat (1969c). The Yugoslav economic system consists of autonomous, self-governing, work or ganizations5 and individual producers in m arket and non-m arket sectors and of governm ent machinery. The task of the latte r is to use non-odminisirativr, means in coordinating the activities of m arket and non-m arket agents and to organize public adm inistration in certain fields of common interest (judiciary, defense,.foreign affairs, etc.). The functioning of this economic system is based on the assum ptions-that the selfgoverning collectives are m aterially in terested in maximizing their incomes and th a t the Government and Parliam ent are able to create an economic environm ent in which autonom ous decision-makers be1 Working Organization is a constitutional term meant to underline ;i fundamental equality iu lights and status of every group of citizens organized with an in tention to earn a living regardless of the activity they perform. A.n enterprisej a theatre and a government officeall of thorn are work organizations.

O /
have in accordance with general social in terests. Both assum ptions seem to have been proved correct by the m odern theory of economic policy and by experience in well organized m arket economic;. Be tween the C enter (Parliam ent) and the Periphery (Work Organizations) four types of gravitational forces are active in keeping the system in equilibrium and the economic agents on the predictable trajec tories of social interest. These forces are inform ation consulta tion ties, m arket ties, economic policy ties (instrum ents of economic policy and legislation) and adm inistrative ties. The last m entioned are exceptional as far as economic agents are concerned and apply to various organs of the Center such as ministries, the N ational Bank, certain bureaus, and the like. I should add th a t there is also a fifth type of tiespolitical tieswhich closes the whole structure connecting the work organizations w ith the Parliam ent and with flows of commands (arrows) oriented from the Periphery tow ards the Center. In order to keep this section short, I shall not analyze these ties (this is why they are om itted from Figure 2). I t is, however, im portant to realize th a t the Parliam ent is organized in a rather unorthodox fashion. A part from.the traditional Political House, whose members are more or less profes sional politicians, elected by all citizens, there are three additional houses, dealing w ith three different social-economic groups of problems (economic, health and welfare, education and culture). The mem bers of these three Houses'of W ork Unions are not professionals; they keep their usual jobs and are elected by the producers in these three specific fields. L et us now have a look a t the m arket half of our economic cosmos. The activities of enterprises and individual producers are coordinated by the m arket in the first place. The m arket is, however, a very rough and unreliable mechanism requiring constant adjustm ents. These adjustm ents are achieved through general regulative measures and the in strum ents of economic policy of th e Gov ernm ent. The financial flovvs, intended to achieve a desirable allocation of resources, are regulated by the N ational Bank w ithin the framework of the Social Plan. There are two additional types of specific finan cial interventions: in the field of foreign trade (credits and exchange risks insur ance) and in investm ent (insuring proper structure and regional allocation of capital form ation). These three purposes are served by three federal funds: for export credits, for underdeveloped regions and for investment. M arket equilibrium is being worked upon by three institutions. Two of them the D irectorates for food and for industrial products reservesintervene whenever supply and demand do not m atch. The former D irectorate also administers agri cultural support prices. The third in stitution, the Price Control Bureau, is now a somewhat, alien element in the system. I expect th a t in the near future this governm ental bureau will evolve into a Price and Wage A rbitrator, an institu tion in which all relevant interests would be represented and all decisions made jointly. A t the moment more than 40 percent of industrial priccs arc controlled. Statistical and Planning Bureaus have only inform ative-consultative functions in this system. A rather peculiar arrangem ent of the Yugoslav system is to be found in w hat I call a quasi market. The activities of schools, hospitals, museums, and other non-m arket work organizations cannot be coordinated by the m arket directly as is done in the case of enterprises. In a so cialist society sick persons should be healed, talented youths educated, regardless of whether and how m uch they can afford to

s + a * > fB V * e a J < g * ! I t I !

S H t/D

.3
a ;> W 8 t-

t3 P

pay. On -the other hand, the traditional budgetary financing of non-m arket ac tivities. lias led to bureaucratic practices incom patible w ith a self-government sys tem . The solution of this' dilemma was sought in an interpolation of a special selfgovernm ent mechanism between the governm ent and the non-m arket working organizations. This medhanism is called interest unions. The unions obtain their financial resources on the basis of parlia m entary decisions and then buy the ser vices of non-m arket producers on behalf of the society. The non-m arket, producers compete for available resources by offer ing their services on differential conditions. ]^n this way, there emerges a special type of m ark e t-a quasi-m arket which makes ii possible for the relations between the non-m arket sector and the society to be economically conditioned, for the collec tives in the non-m arket sector to preserve their self-governm ent autonom y, and at the same, time for relations within the fields of education, culture and social wel fare to be based on the principle of dis tribution according to needs, which is one of the preconditions of a socialist society. I t is clear th a t the enterprises can also intervene in the non-m arket sector either by buying services directly or by creating special foundationsand th a t is why in Figure 2 m arket and non-marke;t sectors are also directly connected by m ark et ties. A part from economic relations between !federal'bodies and?economic -agents there are'relations between1federd.1 -and state and local authorities, between the latter two and the work organizations and among all of them . I m ust, however, refrain from describing all these relations, although they are extremely im portant for the func tioning of the system as a whole. Other Issues: One of the recurring issues of the planning controversies is the prob lem of optim um investm ent and. saving.

Impressed by the unpleasant contraction of personal consumption during the F iveYear P la n ,' Cobeljic m aintained that, a certain minimum rate of growth of con sumption represents the upper limit for the share of accumulation and for the growth of output (1959a, p. 188). Sim ilarly, Stojanovic argued th a t reduction of consumption growth below a certain lim it reduces the growth of labor productivity and th a t this functional relation deter mines the optimum rate of investm ent (1960). B ajt also agreed th a t the optim um rate of investm ent is determ ined by the rate of consumption th a t maximizes the productivity of labor (1958), but this is not necessarily the socially desirable rate of investm ent. The purpose of production is to increase economic welfare, and a maximization of welfare through time can be ascertained only by a discounting pro cedure (Bajt, 1963). H orvat argued th a t pure tim e discounting is inconsistent be cause an individual will regret his present impatience at some later date, and u tility discounting is impractical since it cannot be ascertained empirically. The other often suggested theoretical solutionsocial de term ination of the term inal stock of cap italis irrelevant, since no sensible planner ever insisted on carrying out a long-term plan. One constructs, say, tw enty-year plans in order to take into account all relevant consequences of the decisions th a t are taken now; with every new element of information in tim e the plan is revised and the planning horizon pushed forward. The ..alternativerapproaeh -suggested can be de scribed as follows. Since every economy has a definite and very'strictly limited ca pacity to absorb investm ent (in Yugo slavia the lim it is around 35 percent of GNP, SNA definition), maximum growth is achieved when the m arginal efficiency of investm ent is reduced to zero. If a lag of several m onths for achieving a certain level of consumption is an acceptable price

29.
for maximizing consumption within ones lifetime, then the m aximum rate of pro ductive investm ent is identical to the op tim um rate of saving. Thus maximization of the rate of growth appears to be a proper target for socialist planning. The trouble with the First Five-Y ear plan was not a low level of consumption b ut an in appropriately high level of investm ent. Pushed into th e region of negative m ar ginal efficiency, investm ent depressed out put. A large p art of such a stagnating o u t p u t (up to 20 percent of national income) was used for defense. On both counts po tential consumption was seriously reduced (fio rv at, 1958, 1965). Sophistication in economic analysis and planning m ethods has advanced consider ably since th e telephone age described by Stanovnik. Yet, both are still far from being impressive. Interindustry analysis has been adapted for planning purposes (Sekulic, 1968; H orvat, 1969d). In terin dustry analysis was used in calculating the new exchange rate and the price levels in the last reform. Simple econometric mod els are now regularly used in the early stages of the preparation of a plan (Nikolic, 1964; K orvat, 1968b). An integrated system of social accounts, specially adapted for planning needs, lias been produced re cently (Horvat., 1968b; 1969e). For the rest, planners rely on abundant statistics, old-fashioned balancing and hunches. A satisfactory methodology of planning is yet to be written. I II. Labor-Managed Enterprise Self-M anagement Self-m anagem ent is- undoubtedly the most characteristic of Yugoslav institu tions. Further, developed into social selfgovernm ent, it is the pivotal institution of the Yugoslav socioeconomic system. M ore over, Yugoslav social .scientists are quite unanim ous in believing th at w ithout selfgovernm ent socialism is impossible (Fiamengo, 1965). Thus the fate of socialism depends on the feasibility and efficiency of self-government. In this scction we will be concerned only with self-government as applied to business firms, which is usually denoted as self-m anagem ent.. Self-management is not a Yugoslav in vention. The development of this institu tion can be followed from the beginning of the last century (H orvat, 1969a, ch. 5). Every social revolution from the Paris Commune onwards attem pted to imple m ent the idea of self-m anagem ent. In the very beginning of the revolution in Yugo slavia, in 1941, workers were assuming con trol over factories in various places (Tanic, 1963, p. 30). Witli the establishm ent of central planning, the idea of self-managem ent suffered a setback. However, al ready iii 1949 it was revived; by the end of th a t year workers councils were created as advisory bodies in 215 m ajor enterprises and in June 1950 the law passed th a t in augurated the era of self-managemeut. For more than a decade the basic or ganizational principles of scl [-m anage m ent remained unchanged. All workers and employees of a firm constitute the work collective (radni kolektiv). The col lective elects a workers council (radnicki savet) by secret ballot. The council has 15 to 120 members elected originally for one year and recently for a tw o-year period. The council is a policy making body and meets at intervals of one to two months. The council elects a managing board (upravni odbor) as its executive organ; the board has 3 to 11 members, three quarters of whom m ust be production workers. The director is the chief executive and is an ex officio member of the managing board. As soon as it was established, self-m an agement m et with criticism and skepticism. Both came mostly from abroad. It was said that self-m anagem ent would erode dis cipline and th a t workers would distribute all profits in wages, thus reducing the

3o.
grow th potential of the economy. In 1955 W ard suggested th a t workers had no real choice in the election o[ the council and th a t actions reportedly taken by the councils m ight represent rubber su, raping (W ard, 1957; H orvat and Raskovic, 1959). In evaluation of these criticisms one m ay point out th a t, regarding labor discipline, an International Labor Organization mis sion found in 1960 th a t . , while the self-governm ent machinery for labor re lations has curtailed the former powers of the supervisory staffs, it would not appear to have im paired their authority. . . . I t has undoubtedly strengthened the posi tion of the collective v is-a-v is the m an agem ent, b u t it does not appear to have underm ined labor discipline (Interna tional, 1962, p. 203). As to the grow th po tentials, the rate of accum ulation re m ained high w ith a chronic tendency to wards overinvestm ent and w ith a high rate of growth. Elections are supervised by courts, and all candidates approved by the m ajority of the workers are included in the voting list. The safeguards against the creation of a m anagerial class are the w orkers m ajority in the managing board and the provision th a t members of selfm anaging bodies m ay be elected only twice in succession. The real difficulties were encountered elsewhere. The original organizational scheme proved to be too rigid, and had to be revised extensively in all its three com ponents. I t soon became evident th a t the directors position was not quite com pati ble w ith the new arrangem ent, and di rectors came to be one of the most attacked and criticized professions in the country (N ovak, 1967, p. 137). In the e ta tist period the director was a . civil servant and a governm ent official within the enterprise. He was in charge of all affairs in the enterprise and responsible ex clusively to the . superior government agency. In the self-m anagem ent system the director, became an executive officer of the self-m anagem ent bodies, while at the same tim e continuing to represent the socalled public interest in the enterprise. This hybrid position has been a constant source of conflicts. At first the director was appointed by government bodies. In 1952 the power of appointm ent of directors was vested in the commune. In 1953 public competition for the directors office was in troduced and in the selection committee the representatives of the commune re tained a tw o-thirds m ajority. In 1958 workers councils achieved parity with communal authorities on the joint com m ittees authorized to appoint and dismiss directors of the enterprises. The present state of affairs is th a t the director is ap pointed by the workers council from can didates approved by the. selection com m ittee on the basis of public competition. He is subject to re-election every four years, b u t m ay also be dismissed by the workers council. Since the appointm ent of the director does not depend exclusively on the will of the collective-as is the case w ith all other executiveshe has been con sidered a representative of alien interests in the firm. There have been constant a t tem pts to rcduce his power, which have made his position am bivalent and reduced his operational efficiency. On the other hand, as G. Leman rem arks, the director is expected to play the triple role of a local politician, a m anager and an executive (1969, p. 28). In the contex't of w hat has just been said, the managing board was supposed to exercise control over the work of the director and the adm inistration. I n volved in problems of technical manage m ent and composed of nonprofessionals, the managing board often proved to be either a nuisance or ineffective. For pro fessional-management the director had to rely on the college of executive heads (kolegij), which was his advisory body and subordinated to him. Thus two iunda-

m entally different organizational setups were mechanically fused into one sy ste m .. The directors office provided a link be tween them , i.e. between the self-m anage m ent organs arid the traditional .viministrative hierarchy. Finally, in any somewhat larger firm one single: workers council was not sufficient if there was to be real self-m anagem ent. In 1956 workers councils on the plant and lower levels were created a p a rt from the central workers council. Even this was not sufficient, because hierarchical rela tions between w orkers councils a t various levels were not compatible with the spirit of self-m anagem ent. The self-managem ent relation in its pure form is polyarchic and not dem ocraticexplains D. Gorupic - the dem ocratic relationship represents a dom ination of the m ajority over the m inority. . . . The polyarchic character of the self-m anagem ent relationship is re vealed in equal rights, of members cf a certain com m unity (Gorupic, 1969, p. 16). In 1959 an interesting new development, began with the creation of so called eco nomic units (ekonomske jedinice). The enterprises were subdivided into smaller units w ith a score or several scores of workers. Since a year earlier the enter prises had become more or less auton omous in rhe internal division of income, it was thought that, a strong incentive could be built into the system if economic units recorded their costs, took carc of the quality of o u tput, use and m aintenance of . m achinery, and themselves distributed - their incomes according to certain effi ciency criteria. In an interesting study LOman, a German student of Yugoslav self-m anagem ent, argues th a t economic units resulted from endeavoring to elim inate dividing lines between three fields of activities; policy making, managing and executive work (1967, pp. 38-39). Soon, economic anils began to practice collective

decision'making on all sorts ol m atters, ft became .advisable to enlarge economic units so as to comprise individual stages of the technological process or separate ser vices. Economic units were transformed into work units (radne jedinice). The hier archical self-m anagem ent relations within the enterprise called for a revision. Im p o rtan t self-m anagem ent rights ( d i s t r i bution of income, employment and dis missals, assignment to jobs) were trans ferred to work units. Direct decision mak-. ing at meetings of all members of the work unit became the fundam ental form of m an agement. In this way the work unit pro vided a link between the prim ary group and social organization. It was both a well defined techno-economic unit, meeting the requirements of efficient formal coordina tion, and the-basic cell of workers selfgovernment (2upanov, 1962).. Work units, several workers councils and managing boards, many commissions and committeesall this made the formal organization of a labor-managed enter prise rather, complicated and-inefficient. In order to make such a formal system work, it had to be simplified in practice and this was done in various informal ways. Ttiat in turn m eant further lim itations on com petent professional management and a further reduction of efficiency. W orkers m anagement is passing through an effi ciency crisis caused by the need for a radical transform ation of inherited or ganizational structures. After all, workers1 m anagem ent m eant a fundam entally new principle, in running enterprises and it would have been surprising if th at did not require painful adaptations and deep changes in social relations. I m ust add, however, that, the conclusions in this para graph, though based on widely held be liefs, cannot be. substantiated in a more rigorous way because no adequate em pirical research has been undertaken so far.

Although the crisis has not yet been overcome, m atters have begun to be grad-', ually sorted out. A constitutional amendm ent, passed in 1969, m ade it possible. for enterprises to drop managing boards and/ to.experim ent w ith vavioua organisational schemes. T rade unions, authorities and workers have come to realize th a t certain developm ents were based on erraneoua be= liefs concerning various management func tions in a labor-managed enterprise.- Perha.ps the clearest analysis of the m istakes . made came from a sociologist, J, Zupanov (1967a). 2upanov distinguishes elf=man=

saw the solution in a fusion of pr0= fessional competence and self^manageInent. -Tht1enterprise may be considered an association of Work units. The professional Managers of the work Units should no longer be appointed, as in the traditional set-up, but, be elected by their associates. Ill this way they would represent the in-

* '

agement (samoupravljanfe); management (upr&vljarijc) and executive work (ruko= vodfenje), The last mentioned i a partial activity.-intended to carry out a decision made w ithin a policy frame work. The integration of all decigiong into a conaistent framework is the task management. I. But management means? only technical coordination, while coordination of various interests, making basic policy decisions, is a task of gelf~management. elf=manage= . ment means social integration, the formu lation of common goalg, which i a precon dition for efficient operational work of the management. The confusion between management and self-management generated tendencies to transfer more and more of /formal.coordination to bodies whose task .Was social integration. As a consequence, satisfactory social integration was not achieved, while non-profegfional manage ment meant lower efficiency (Bitendiic, 1969), S. Bol&t6 has reminded me that this inherently, complex problem was compli cated even further by a rather naive ide ology contained in legislation and political propaganda and advocating direct par ticipation in admimitrative work as.an in dispensable of safe-guardingthe interests of the workers, How are the problems encountered to be . solved? , , Gorupid (1967) and the 1E ( Im iitu t,

terest. of their primary poups, while, at the Same tim e being also professionally competent. Manager? so elected would make up a managing board which would be both an executive organ of the workers' council and a prefeiiienal management body. Decisions would be made eellee= lively, Since most, of the decisions affecting' the daily lives of workers would be made and implemented within economic u n its . and by themielvei f executive work would become more and more purely organizational and lose it erder=giving charaGtef (N vak ( 167, p , 11S) BUsiiigSSmcn proved uceptible te this approach(M.iletie, 19(59)..' As one m ight have expected in a c o u n try ; like Yugoslavia, as soon a these ideas had been clearly form ulated the pragUeal ex perim entation began, and the C onstitu tion was prom ptly amended.Before closing this section let me note another interesting phenom enon; ttu; de velopment of the go=called autonomous tew. Enterprises appear a iaw=ereating bodies. Their self=msBsgeme.nt organ pass charters and rules governing the organlES^ tion of work, the composition and re sponsibility of elf=managgmeni and ether organs, th e distribution el income, and t h e , conduct of business. T he autonomous law= creating power emanates directly from the Constitution, the rules and regulations are legally binding on all persons to whom they, are addressed within an enterprise and disputes ave settled by the enterprise or gans, except in some specific eae, In t-hb way continual narrowing oi the area of state tew and corresponding broadening, of the area of so called atitoflomous law

characterizes the entire process of regula tion of social relations in Yugoslavia (Kovacevic, 1969, p. 1). Enterprise .

The introduction of self-m anagem ent in 1950 implied the dissolution of the cen trally planned, adm inistratively run economy. The enterprise was to become independent and autonomous. Individual enterprises needed some guidance and co ordination. Therefore so called Higher Business Associations (visa privredna udruzenja) were set up in order to replace former state directorates and to preserve continuity in the organization of the economy. The governing councils of the hew bodies were composed of representa tives of w orkers councils of the constituent enterprises. B ut Higher Business Associa tions tended to operate along the same ad m inistrative lines as former directorates and were therefore dissolved in 1952. A period of laissez faire ideology followed. Isolated enterprises were expected to en gage in free competition on the m arket. A ttem pts to form larger business units and m ultiplant firms were frowned upon as contrary to genuine self-m anagem ent And as signs of going back to a disguised state control. In spite of th a t the system worked well because a special sort of adm inistra tive coordination Was still effective. The chief coordinator was the Bank imple m enting the targets of the Plan. The Bank operated a specially designed bookkeeping for every enterprise, distributed the in coming money to various accounts (for wages, taxes, and various enterprise funds) and determ ined the am ount of th e neces sary working capital which was to be pro vided on a credit basis, etc. (VuCkovic, 1952, pp. 1l- 2 p ) . Although the control was m onetary, the value proportions were de rived from physical targets. A fter 1952 the process of decentraliza tion was not arrested a t the level of the

enterprise, but went below it. I t has al ready been mentioned th a t in 1956 the form ation of plant workers councils began and in 1959 the first economic units ap peared. The internal cohesion of the enter prise was reduced and it looked as if it was broken up into its component parts. At the same time various m onetary and non m onetary adm inistrative controls were gradually being removed. In 1954 the en terprise assumed control of its fixed cap ital. Fixed assets could be bought and sold w ithout asking for permission. Investm ent auctions were tried out. In 1958 the enter prise gained control over the internal dis tribution of income and two years later the trade union control of wages was removed. The stage was set up for a genuine m arket economy. As soon as all preconditions for classical free competition of numerous small enter prises were m et, it became clear th a t such an economy would not work very effi ciently in the second half of the tw entieth century. Since the state refrained riiore and more from coordinating economic ac tivities, some other agency or agencies had to replace it in th a t function. T h at is why the process of integration was initiated. W orking collectives themselves had to re sume economic coordination in a state th a t was withering away. Tlie circle of organ izational developm ent seemed closed. The process was started by a fully integrated state managed economy, passed through a period of radical decentralization and is now moving towards anpther stage of full.' integration in the form of a labor-m anaged economy. The forms of integration are various. The simplest one is an agreement for busi ness cooperation intended, for instance, to achieve specialization of the production programs of two or more enterprises. Next comes contractual techno-economic co operation resulting in joint production, sales or procurem ent of raw materials. If

business relations are numerous and com plicated so th a t it is not. possible to regu late everything in advance in a contract, the enterprises form a separate body called a Business Association (poslovno udruzenje). By 1962 already one half of m an ufacturing enterprises were members of Business Associations th a t first appeared in 1958. In 1967 there were 290 Business Associations consisting on the average of ten enterprises (Dautovic, 1968). The next more integrated form is a firm called Af filiated Enterprises (zdruzeno poduzece). Such a firm is run according to commonly accepted business principles, while con stitu en t enterprises retain operational in dependence. The latter disappear in a m er ger.. In a seven-year period, starting with 1959 when the process began, the total num ber of firms was reduced by one half by mergers. I t is characteristic, however, th a t nine-tenths of these mergers were ef fected within the boundaries of the same or neighboring communes, and only 1.2 percent were interestate mergers. In the same period the num ber of banks was re duced from 378 to 108. Special status was given to so-called Unions of Enterprises (zajednice privrednih organizacija) created for railways, electric power generation and postal and communication services. M em bership in these Unions is obligatory. F i nally, there are Economic Chambers, or ganized territorially, and associated in the Federal Economic Chamber. The Cham bers have a dual role: they help their m em bers in various ways and they also perform a public function, m ediating between the state and the busineas interests. M em ber ship is obligatory. M ergers and various forms of business cooperation m ay mean monopoly. T hat is why a sort of anti-m onopoly legislation appeared as well. I t is explicitly forbidden to lim it free competition in production or sales to any enterprise outside the business group concerned, and governm ent in

spectors are expected to take care th at there is no sharing of the m arket or con nivance about prices. No serious research about possible monopoly practices has been undertaken as yet, and so there is no possibility of presenting an evaluation here. B ut it m ust be borne in mind th a t the Yugoslav economy will behav;; differently from other m arket economies. W orkers m anagem ent implies a spontaneous public supervision of business conduct and so classical forms of collusion, characteristic of private monopolies, are hardly to be ex pected, J. Dirlam (U.S. Congress, 1968, p. 3854) finds th a t the degree of output concentration is higher in Yugoslavia than in the United States; J D rutter (1964) es tablishes the non-existence of correlation between profits and output concentration and similarly H. W achtel (1969) finds no correla tion between wages and output con centration. In spite of a considerable num ber of mergers in the period 1959-1963, the degree of concentration actually de creased (Tanid, 1963). A new enterprise m ay be fobnded by an already existing enterprise, by a govern m ent agency or by a group of citizens. The founder appoints the director and finances the construction. Once completed, the en terprise is handed over to the work col lective which elects m anagement bodies. As long as all obligations are m et, neither the founder nor the governm ent have any say about the operations of the enterprise. Enterprises are also to merge or to break in parts. If a work unit wants to leave the m other enterprise, and the central workers council opposes th at, a mixed arbitration board composed of representatives of the enterprise and of the communal author ities is set up. In all these cases it is, of course, implied th a t m utual'financial ob ligations will be settled. Since the capital of an enterprise is socially owned, the fundam ental obliga tion of the enterprise is to keep capital in

tact. If it fails to do so for more than a year, if it runs losses or fails to pay out wages higher th an the legal m inimum for more th a n a year, the enterprise is declared bankrupt or the founder undertakes to im prove its business record. In the latte r case self-m anagem ent is suspended and re placed by Compulsory M anagem ent (prinudna uprava), a form of receivership ad m inistered by officials chosen by the com m une (Miljevic, 1965). B ankruptcies are rather rare because the commune is obliged to find new employment for workers and so prefers to help the enterprise as long as possible. If integration processes are to proceed efficiently, the organizational forms m ust be extremely flexible. Thus since 1967 it became legally possible for two or more enterprises to invest in another enterprise and then share in profits. Similar arrange m ents were adopted in joint ventures with foreign capital (Friedm ann and M ates, 1968; Sukijasovic and Vujacic, 1968). In an open economy, like the Yugoslav one, foreign capital is welcome provided it does not lim it workers self-m anagem ent. Therefore direct investm ent is impossible, but joint ventures are encouraged. The basic m otivation for a Yugoslav firm to enter into close business cooperation with a foreign partner is to be found in the de sire to secure access to the knowhow and the sales organization of the foreign firm. In this way the Yugoslav firm tries to achieve international standards in tech nological efficiency-and to expand its m ar ket. Theoretical analysis of the behavior of the Yugoslav firm has only begun. Oddly or understandablyenough, the pio neering work was done by a foreigner, B. W ard of the University of California at Berkeley. In his 1958 paper on the Illy rian firm (1958), W ard argues th a t ra tional behavior will require maximization of income per worker. In the M arshallian

short-run, one product, one factor case this leads to some queer consequences: an increase in ..wages leaves output and em ploym ent unchanged, an increase in fixed costs increases output and employment, and an increase of product price reduces o utput and employment. In a similar anal ysis eight years later, Dom ar showed th at by generalizing the production function to include several products and several fac tors and by introducing the demand curve for labor the results are changed and begin to resemble the traditional conclusions about the behavior of the firm (Domar, 1966). Proceeding along similar lines D. Dubravcic comes to the conclusion th a t in a labor-m anaged firm there will be a strong tendency to use capital intensive technolog}7 (1967). The empirical evidence does not give unequivocal support to this conclusion. While on the one hand there is a chronic hunger for capital and enter prises use every opportunity to invest, Yugoslav enterprises are also full of re dundant workers. Instead of postulating w hat should be rational, the present au thor observes the actual practice of Yugo slav enterprises which fix wages in advance for the current year, and a t least once a year make corrections (positive or nega tive) depending on the income earned. If this behavioral rule is used in the analysis, the results are again the same as in the traditional theory of the firm (Dubravcic, 1968). The last in this controversy, D u bravcic, points out th at comparative anal ysis is really not legitimate because it is assumed th a t a capitalist firm maximizes an absolute magnitude (profit) while a socialist firm is expected to maximize a rel ative m agnitude (income per worker). D u bravcic suggests a symmetrical treatm ent on the basis of the entrepreneurial input, which is capital in the capitalist case and labor in the socialist case. If a capitalist firm maximizes the rate of profit (profit per unit of capital) it will behave in ex

36.
actly the same way as W ards Illyrian firm w ith entrepreneurial inputs being inter changed. In both cases firms will economize on th e entrepreneurial input and this will lead to capital intensive techniques in a socialist firm and to labor intensive tech niques in a capitalist firm (H orvat, 1967a) a nice and almost humorous result. This brings us to the problem of entre preneurship in a labor-m anaged firm. If an entrepreneur is a risk taking and innovat ing agent as K night and Schumpeter would say and most economists would agree-then the work collective qualifies for th a t role (H orvat, 1964, ch. 6). In fact the work collective is generally treated as an entrepreneur. However, doubts have been voiced as well. Zupanov argues th a t the practice of fixing wages in advance means th a t they are not a residual in the income distribution as is profit in a cap italist firm and th a t this sets up a barrier to entrepreneurial behaviour. He quotes results of empirical research according to which in work units only m anagers and professionals are prepared to bear risks, while other categories of workers and em ployees mostly are not. S. Boleic has drawn m y attention to the fact th at workers be haved rationally if they were prepared to bear risks only to the extent th at they were able to control business operations. T hat is why m anagers were both prepared and expected by others to bear risks to a much larger extent. Such as explanation was spelled out explicitly by workers in a case quoted by Leman (1969, p. 40). In another piece of research undertaken in Zagreb in 1968 it was found th a t all groups were more prepared to share in losses if output was diminished than if income was reduced while o u tp u t rem ained the same or even expanded (2upanov, 1967b). On the other hand, it is an empirical fact th a t wages vary p re tty widely depending on the busi ness results. W achtel quotes d a ta on the issues discussed a t workers councils m eet ings: two thirds of the agenda items are concerned w'ith general m anagem ent issues (labor productivity, sales, investment, cooperation w ith other enterprises, work of m anagem ent) and only one third with direct worker issues (personal income, vo cational training, fringe benefits) (1969, p. 58). Variable wages derived from profits am ount to 8-14 percent of standard wages on the average (W achtel, 1969, p. 100). The Ownership Controversy In M arxist sociology ownership relations are the basic determ inants of social rela tions and thus of the socio-economic sys tem . The class th a t ownsi.e. has an economic control over the means of pro duction, rules the society. For a long time, and in m ost instances even today, it has been m aintained th a t private property generates capitalism and state property socialism. In fact the percentage of the na tional capital o^vned by the state has been taken as the most reliable measure .of the degree of socialism achieved. I t follows th a t a socialist economic policy m ust be oriented towards an overall economic con trol by the state and m ust be hostile tof. wards private initiative. As already noted, the above described view was generally accepted in Yugoslavia until 1950, and since then it has been thor oughly revised. I t is now pointed out th a t there are a t least three reasons why the dogma of the identities between private ownership and capitalism, and state own ership and socialism, is. false: the artisans of medieval towns were private owners but not capitalists; in ancient Oriental, king doms state ownership was frequent and y et th a t had nothing to do with socialism ; in fascist countries the state extensively controlled social and economic life while these countries were obviously capitalist (H orvat, 1969a, Ch. IV ). Yugoslav scien

tists are notv quite unanim ous in believing th a t state ownership m ay be a useful de vice to initiate socialist reconstruction, but is otherwise as alien to socialism as is pri vate ownership. The present position is well summed up by JV Djordjevic (1966, pp. 81, 79): . . . state ownership of means of production creates a monopoly of economic and political power a n d . . . makes possible the unification of economic and political power under the control of a social group personifying the state. Thus . . . the essence of classical (class) ownership is not changed. . . As the holder of the title to property, it (the state) dis poses w ith the producers labor and its results, on the basis of which surplus labor is appropriated by groups which have their own interests in keeping their commanding functions and thus retaining power and their social status and prestige. If state ownership fails to promote so cialism, w hat is a feasible alternative? The Yugoslav answer is: social ownership. B ut the answer to the next question W hat precisely is social ownership? is not so easy and simple. The legal experts agree th a t social ownership implies self-govern m ent, th a t it is a new social category, th at, if it is a legal concept, it docs not imply an unlim ited right over things characteristic of the classical concept of property, and th a t it includes property elements of both public and private law (Torom an, 1965, p. 5). In practically everything else there is disagreem ent. A. Gams and a num ber of other writers m aintain th a t social prop erty also implies rights of property since property implies appropriation, enter prises are juridical persons and the basic ingredient of the juridical person is prop erty (Gams, 1965, p. 61). Article 8 of the Constitution says th a t the disposal of m eans of production in social ownership and other rights over things will be deter mined by the law. S. Pejovic talks about

the right of use which is somewhat wider than usus frucius, because it makes pos- . sible the sale of capital goods, but is nar rower than ownership because, the right of disposal is not absolute (Pejovic, 1966, p. 29). A diam etrically opposite view is ex pressed by Djordjevic, and most other writers who m aintain th a t social property represents a negation of property rights (Djordjevic, 1966, pp. 84, 90). Djordjevic quotes P a rt I I of the Basic Principles of the C onstitution to support his view: Since no one has the right of ownership of the social means of production, no one neither the socio-political comm unity6 nor the work organization nor an individual working m anmay appropriate on any property-legal ground the product of social labor, or manage and dispose of the social means of production and labor, nor can they arbitrarily determine the condi tions of distribution. Legal writers differ further according to whether they stress the public law or pri vate law component of social property. F urther disagreements relate to the sub jects of law (state, society as a real com m unity of people, several subjects, no sub jects). Next come disagreements on whether social property is a legal, eco nomic or sociological concept or is nondefinable in these terms because it relates to quasi-property. And if it is a legal con cept, it may be so in various ways. By applying the calculus of combinations we can easily determine the number of pos sible theories. I t seems th a t available pos sibilities have been efficiently exploited since M . Torom an (1965) .was able to de scribe thirteen different theories. The legalistic controversy was some what less interesting than the one among economists and sociologists th a t followed.
6 Territorial political unit such as a commune, a district, an autonomous province, a republic and the federation.

B ajt drew attention to the fact th a t the legal.owner and economic owner m ay be t ^ o different, persons. The former holds legal title, the latte r derives the actual benefit from the Use of a thing (B ajt, 1968) . In this sense social ownership implies the non-rexistence of exploitation which in tu rn implies the distribution of income according to work performed. If a person or a group of persons are earning nonlabor income, they are exploiting others, and in so far as this happens social prop erty is transform ed into private property. T hus self-m anagem ent per se is not a sufficient condition for the existence of social property. , The institution of property already undergoes gradual disintegration under capitalism. Shareholders are legal owners . but m anagem ent exerts real economic con trol. T h a t is why I prefer to replace the traditional concept of property by a more fundam ental concept of economic control (H orvat,. 1969a, Ch. 15). The latter al ways m eans control over labor and its products which is M arxs definition of capital as a social relation (M arx, 1953, p. 167). In this respect legal titles are irrele vant. If artisans or peasants possess no monopoly powerwhich in an orderly m arket system , is likely to be the case then they represent no alien elements in a socialist society. And there can be little doublie th a t they 'practice self-m anage m ent. H orvat and B ajt came to the con clusion th a t individual initiative is not . only compatible .with b u t is an integral p a rt of a socialist system. In fact the pro cess of production can be organized in dividually of collectively and th a t is why B a jt talks about two forms of social own ership: individual and collective. Agreement about the m atters mentioned so far is quite universal by now. Differ ences in views appear when interm ediate cases are considered. Yugoslav law makes ;it possible for artisans and inn keepers to

employ 3-5 workers. V. Raskovic (1967a, pp. 106-107) and many; others consider this to be a form of exploitation a rem nant of the old sofciety, something alien to the system but which has to be tolerated a t the present level of development. In support of this view Raskovic argues th a t the em ployer would not hire workers if this were not profitable for him. I t may, however, be argued in reply th a t a worker, by choosing a n individual employer instead of a firm, reveals th a t he finds such employment more profitable for himself. Such a fine of reasoning leads clearly to an impasse. To resolve the question whether workers tnay be hired by individual employers, and if so how m any of them a sociological argum ent has been advanced as a criterion. As. long as an individual employer works himself in the same way as his employees and has not become an entrepreneur merely .or ganizing the work of others, employees m ay be considered as (often younger) as sociates in the work process, direct per sonal relations of a prim ary group are pre served and the alienation phenomena of wage labor relations are not present. Discussion of the scope and role of in dividual work was invited by political bodies and very soon decisions were m ad e. following more or less the ideas expounded above. Individually organized production became a constituent p a rt of a socialist economy.7 IV. Price Policy Price Policy represents ah incessant series of attem pts to control the famous law of value (supply and demand rela tions). Its history is instructive since it
1 The private sectorwhich Yugoslav economists prefer to call individual sector" in order to avoid various connotations of the attribute privateac counts for 29 percent of GNP and this percentage has not changed in the last fifteen years.

Market and Prices

provides an insight into the working of various institutional arrangem ents. Administratively Set- Prices: Im m edi ately after the war, -with the economy al m ost totally destroyed, there was an extreme scarcity of all goods. The prime putpose of economic policy was to prevent profiteering and to generate output by any m eans available. This was the period of profitability a t all costs (Radulovic, 1968, p. 143). Prices were determ ined on the free m ar k et only for a few luxury products. M ostly prices were set on the basis of actual costs incurred and could vary from one producer to the other. The Price Offices would ex amine each case and m ake the relevant decisions (norm iranje cijena). This was not a very efficient procedure. Since actual cost was taken as given, there was no in centive to economize on inputs. W ages were fixed, and products could always be sold. In order to minimize risk, producers tended to inflate costs in their price pro posals and1 in order to keep prices down the Price Offices tended to apply linear reductions to proposed prices. The authori ties and the businessmen began to play at hide-and-seek, which is so characteristic for an adm inistratively controlled econ omy. The launching of the First Five-Y ear P lan in 1947 required a system of uniform prices (jedinstvene cijene). Uniform prices were determ ined by the planning authori ties and were expected to be rigidly stable. T he aim wa s to provide a link between the physical and the value p a rt of the plan, to have a control over the im plem entation of plans and to avoid the adm inistrative costs of changing prices frequently. Prices were formed by adding an average rate of profit to average cost for a product. The less efficient producers had planned losses, the more efficient ones extra-profits; in both cases differences were settled w ith the budget. Through the establishm ent of the

system of uniform prices, the law of value was considered to be subject to an efficient social control (Kidric, 1948, p. 143). I t soon became evident th a t uniform prices did not. equilibrate supply and de m and. There was chronic excess demand. P rivate producers (peasants and artisans) held a large share of the m arket arid their incomes could not be easily controlled. M ost consumer goods were rationed and sold a t the existing uniform prices, but available quantities of consumer goods were not sufficient to satiny the needs of the entire population at thu lower uniform prices. By the end of 1947 the first quanti ties of consumer goods were supp!i< 1o the free m arket at higher uniform priu*. (vise jedinstvene cijene). These price:?. w.*.ic de rived from the existing uniform prices by applying multiplying factors varying from 2 (for potato and beans) to 6 | (for gar m ents). The resulting trading profit was absorbed by the budget. In 1948 about 45 percent of consumer goods were supplied a t higher uniform prices (Sefer, 1956, p. 376). In this way, it was hoped, excess money incomes would be absorbed. In agriculture a system of compulsory deliveries (obavezni otkup) was applied. Peasants were obliged to sell most of their products to the state at prescribed low prices. For the money they' obtained they could not buy all those industrial products they wanted. Thus they tried to reduce deliveries and substitute their own con sum ption for money incoines. The govern m ent reacted by creating a m arket for in dustrial goods at higher uniform prices. Peasants reciprocated by evading com pulsory deliveries and supplying more goods to the free peasant m arket, the only section of the m arket where the prices were equilibrating supply and demand. These prices tended to rise fast and so the govern m ent decided to substitute a carrot for the stick: in 194S the government introduced linked prices (vezarie cijene). Agricultural

4 -0 . prices were linked w ith industrial prices in such a way as to establish the pre-w ar parity. Peasants sold their products to the governm ent a t lower prices and in return obtained coupons which enabled them to buy industrial products a t prices th a t were about 16 percent lower th an commefcial prices (Dobrincic et al., 1951, p. 141). Local m arkets were less rigidly con trolled. After 1949 local enterprises could in principle sell their products a t com m ercial (higher uniform) prices. Trading establishm ents th a t were supplied by two different producersnational and local were now unable to sell commodities a t one single price. And so sliding prices (klizave cene) were invented. The selling price slides in a span determined by the lowest and the highest supply price. These prices were approved by the local authorities. Thus two different m arkets were created: one for enterprises th a t traded a t lower and higher uniform prices, and the other for retail trade and population where prices approached free m arket prices. The system of linked prices did not work too well. The supply of industrial goods was inadequte and richer peasants began to speculate w ith coupons. In 1950 only some agricultural products could be sold at linked prices. M ore of the peasants products w ent to the free peasant m arket whose counterpart in the state sector was the system of sliding prices. H igher uni form prices, being adm inistratively set, were lagging behind the free m arket prices. O u tp u t of consumer goods was stagnating, even falling, while incomes were rising (Cobeljic, M ihajloic and Djurovic, 1954, p. 49): (see table 4A). The widening gap betw een supply and dem and could be controlled by adm inistra tive or economic means. The government chose the latter. In the transitional year of 1951 there were eight different price cate gories coexisting simultaneously (D obrin cic et al., 1951, p. 143). Sliding prices were superseded by higher prices for consumer goods. R ationing was abolished. Consumer goods prices were left to be regulated by the m arket while producer goods prices were increased one to twelve times and then frozen for about half a year. In' 1952 compulsory deliveries of agricultural pro ducts were abolished. By the second half of 1952 all prices were freely formed with the exception of a few goods (bread, sugar, electric power etc.) for which ceiling prices were established. ' Development of the Market: The strategy of the 1951/1952 price reform can be summarized as follows: (a) a sufficiently large increase of prices to absorb all excess money incomes; (&) a sufficiently large in crease of retail prices of m anufactured consumer goods relative to agricultural prices to generate the capital accumula tion necessary for fast growth, (c) a smaller increase in producer goods prices to stimu-. late investm ent and the expansion of com p artm ent I (producer goods industries). The first two goals were achieved with re m arkable success. As a result, industrial producer prices were k ep t stable over a period as long as a decade. The third strategy proved to be deficient and gen erated a lot of trouble. While the general index of industrial producer prices was declining for alm ost three years, prices of certain raw m aterials (ferrous and nonferrous m etallurgy, build ing m aterials, wood products were rising.

T a b l e 4A

1948 100 Consumer purchasing potential R etail trade in real terms excluding peasant trade 100

1949 128 100

1950 125 94

1951 245 70

1952 327 77

T h a t is why in 1954 ceiling prices were set by the governm ent for a num ber of raw m aterials, and in the next year the list of controlled interm ediate goods was further extended. In 1955 industrial producers prices rose by five percent, which led to the creation of the Federal Price Office in the same year. Since theh a system of adm ini strative control of prices has been gradu ally developed. The essential features of this control are as follows: 1. The governm ent sets fixed prices for electrical power, cigarettes, transportation rates, sugar, oil, salt and some other com modities. . 2. T he governm ent sets ceiling prices for m etallurgical products, coal, petroleum and some other goods. These two categories of prices are changed a t infrequent intervals. B u t when they are changed, the change is rather drastic. 3. Control on the basis of prior price registration is the m ost frequent kind of control. I t was introduced in 1958. P ro ducers intending to raise prices are obliged to notify the Federal Price B ureau th irty days beforehand. If within this period the FPB does not veto the price increase, it can be effected. The principal criteria for placing a product under control are: (a) its im portance for the standard of living or for production costs of other products; (b) scarcity on the m arket and (c) the mo nopoly position of the producer (Vukovic, 1968). 4. Control of trade margins is imple m ented by republics for wholesalers and b y local authorities for retailers. 5. Price freeze. This instrum ent was used only on two occasions, in 1952 and in 1965, during two price reforms. 6. A gricultural prices are placed under a special regime. Guaranteed prices are ap plied to staple food products. This m eans th a t the Federal Food Reserve Board is obliged to purchase all quantities of the products offered for sale and to pay

guaranteed prices. For milk and industrial crops m inim um prices apply. This means th a t if these products are bought a t least the minimum prices have to be paid for them . An industrial crop is normally not grown unless the producer has a prior con tra c t w ith the buyer. Prices used in such cases are agreed-upon prices. Industrial prices have been most heavily controlled. In the last decade this control was exercised over the following percen tages of the value of industrial o utput (Radulovic, 1968, p. 282; D rutter, 1968, p. 113; In stitu t, 1969, p. 6):
T able 5 1958 1962 1 9 6 2 -6 5 3 1 .2 6 7 .0 6 0 .0 1965 1966 1967 1968 70 66 ' 53 46

The tim e series of prices, given in Table 6 m ay give an idea of how efficient the price policy and price control were. After 1961 the adm inistrative control of prices was increased and so was the infla tionary pressure. W hat in fact happened? The m ost frequent form of price con trolprior price registrationcould not be adequately applied to new products. By m aking small changes in the design of a product an enterprise would transform it into a new product and so could evade price control. In 1964 almost tw enty five thousand new products were launched. Low and rigidly controlled prices of raw m aterials made their production unprofit able and so depressed o u tput; in agriculture prices were particularly depressed. T h a t is why in 1964 prices were raised ad m inistratively in agriculture, the food processing industry, energy generation and nonferrous m etallurgy. Next, differential taxation, a system of premiums and sub sidies, and adm inistrative interventions in foreign trade tended to preserve and even increase price disparities (P ertot, 1966). As

T a b l e 6. C h a n g e s i n P r i c e L e v e l s i n P e r c e n t a g e s p e r Y e a r

1952-1963 Producer prices in manufacturing and mining + 0 .9 Agricultural producer prices + 8 .6 Retail prices (including services) + 3 .9 Sources:' Jugoslavia 1945-1064. SGS-1969.

1964 +5 +24 +9

1965 + 15 +43 +29

1966 +11 +16 + 23

1967 +2 -3 +7

1968 0 -4 +4

a consequence individual enterprises con ducted their business under highly unequal conditions. Producers whose prices or wages were lagging behind were trying to catch up w ith their neighbors. The Federal Price Bureau received 12,800 re quests for price increases in 1961 and 69,000 requests in 1964 (D ru tter, 1968, p. 107). B u t the m ost im portant reason for the break in price trends in 1961 lies else where. U ntil 1961 personal incomes were quite efficiently controlled by fiscal and nonfiscal m eans (Trade Unions) . T h a t is why prices were quite stable (except in agriculture) and adm inistrative controls relatively few (In stitu t, 1968b, pp. 37-41). In 1961 income controls were abolished, very soon a cost-push inflation occurred and, despite increasing adm inistrative control, prices w ent up. A few years later the In stitu te of Economic Studies sug gested th a t the Federal Price B ureau relax adm inistrative price, control and focus its attention on income control (In stitu t, 1969, p. 41). The suggestion was not fol lowed and instead m onetary policy was used as the chief anti-inflationary weapon. B y 1965 the econo.my was ripe for an other radical price reform. In M arch prices were frozen and a tax reform carried out. Various subsidies were drastically re duced and the tax burden of enterprises alleviated. In the next few m onths a new price structure was prepared. In July the dinar was devalued; new prices were in tro duced and frozen. Relative prices of cer tain raw m aterials, interm ediate goods (electric power, petroleum , ferrous and

nonferrous ores and m etals, chemicals, tim ber products and agricultural prod ucts) and transportation services were substantially increased. W orld prices (as registered in exports or imports) were taken as a basis fo rth e new price structure. This was to m ake possible a rapid integra tion of the Yugoslav economy into the world economy. W orld prices were cor rected upwards or downwards jiiy taking into account capital accum ulation needs of various industries and other specific pur poses. A new custom s tariff was to iron out these differences. T he price stabilization proceeded rather slowly, as can be seen from Table 6. The lifting of price controls w ent even slower. In 1968 prices looked stabilized, b u t al m ost one half of industrial prices were still under control. D isparities between- con trolled and uncontrolled prices began to emerge. The o utput of certain industries tended to become depressed. In 1969 prices began to rise again. The experience of 1964 seems to have been repeated. The reform of 1965 elim inated the worst price dis parities, b u t subsequent price controls created new ones. The price game seems far from being successfully completed. There has been a lively discussion about the appropriate pricing system for a labor m anaged economy. This discussion hardly touched the classical controversy on m ar ginal cost versus full cost pricing. Since m arginal cost pricing requires government intervention, the lack of interest in this, procedure among Yugoslav economists is understandable. On a more theoretical

4$.
level it was pointed out th a t allocational efficiency as represented by m arginal cost pricingis inferior to growth effi ciency as represented by full cost pricing which m akes possible the business au to n omy of an enterprise (H orvat, 1964, Ch.
2).

The price debate was centered around the problem of how the price is to be formed. I t started in 1950 when Kidri5 opted for the value price (1950b). In his last writing in 1952 the late Kidric de scribed the value price as the one con sisting of costs of production (including wages) and accum ulation (gross profits) calculated as proportional to wages. These prices -were actually tried out in 1953 and 1954. KidriC compared the rate of accum u lation principle w ith the traditional av erage rate of profit principle (profit pro portional to capital invested is character istic of M arxs price of production) and came to the conclusion th a t only the former was appropriate for a labor m an aged economy. In his view the average rate of profit principle represents a con tradiction to socialist planned m anagement of the economy, and leads to a kind of cooperative capitalism (Kidri, 1952 pp. 42, 46). A decade later M. Todorovic who was to become the secretary of the League of Com m unistscame to the op posite conclusion. He m aintained th a t in a system of comm odity production, includ ing its socialist variety, in which fixed capital is used, prices m ust take the form of prices of production. Since capital is socially owned and production is planned, the use of prices of production cannot lead to .the same consequences as in a laissez faire framework of liberal capitalism. (Todorovic, 1965, pp. 60, 65, 78). Strange as it m ay sound, there is no basic disagreem ent between Kidric and Todorovic. The difference between their views prim arily reflects the difference in the degree of economic sophistication. In

1952 K idrics view was commonly ac ceptedby'T odorovic as wellwhile to day hardly anybody would be prepared to support it. Todorovics theory of the spe cific price of production (specific because social planning is one of its basic ingre dients) as an equilibrium price in the Yugoslav setting has been accepted by a certain num ber of economistsZ. Pjanic, V. Rakic, M aksimovic (In stitu t, 1968) but by no m eans by all. In a heated debate in Sarajevo in 1964 another group of economistsK orac, Sirotkovic, Dabcevic, T. Vlaskalicexpounded the theory of income price (Savjetovanje, 1964). In their view the Yugoslav enterprise m axi mizes income in relation to suitably de fined inputs. O ther economists were busy inventing new types of prices: gravita tional (Mesaric, 1965), normal, actual,, social reproduction price (Cerne, 1966, p. 233), etc. Radulovic was able to describe six different price theories of this sort (1968, pp. 299-326). Price theory is closely linked to distribu tion theory which we shall consider in the next chapter. Distribution Policy I t is not conventional to talk about dis tribution policy. One is accustomed to speak about wages policy and distribution theory. However, as we proceed, it will be come evident th a t in the Yugoslav setting distribution policy is also a meaningful concept. Wages Policy: In the adm inistrative period 1945-1952 workers were govern-, m ent employees classified in a certain num ber of salary categories according to their skills. Directorates set work norms whose overfulfillment brought an increase in pay. M anagerial personnel would get prem iums for the fulfillment of the govern m ent plan. The salary span was 1:3.5 (Tomic, 1968, p. 6), as compared with 1:16 before the war (Bilandzic, 1967, p. 56),

The lack of m aterial incentives was com pensated for by m oral incentives such as public praise, the trophy-flag, the. title of shock Worker or of innovator. In the p o strevolutionary atm osphere these incentives were very powerful. After several years the lack of m aterial incentives became a serious obstacle to efficient production. D ue to post-w ar scarcities and to an egalitarian ideology, by 1953 the salaries of office employees in industry had been reduced by one third and of civil servants by one half relative to workers wages and compared with the prew ar levels (Berkovic, 1969, p. 81). N on-w age income fringe benefits) was higher th an wage income. Since 1952 both trends have been reversed. T rade Unions advocated higher skill differentials. Econ omists (B ajt, 1956) urged an increase in the share of discretionary income (income after taxes and contributions left to free disposal of an enterprise) in order to in crease productivity. W achtel finds th a t in terskill differentials increased until 1961 and then began to fall. The average income span between the highest and th e lowest paid job is now 1 :4 (Berkovic, 1969, p. 82). M . Jankovic estim ates th a t wage income increased to 65 percent of to tal workers income in 1956 and to 73 percent of to tal income in 1967 (1968,.p. 159). The idea was to leave to the m arket the job of. de term ining the appropriate income dif ferentials and to stim ulate efficiency by increasing the discretionary p a rt of work ers income. The latte r was also thought nece'ssa:ry in order to curb centralist dis tribution of income. Since 1952 it has been the task of work ers councils to determ ine wage differen tials and work incentives. The distribution of income between the enterprise and the com m unity was settled in a very simple way. On the basis of the social plan, the expected income of the enterprise and the corresponding wage bill were determined.

The difference between gross income (de preciation excluded) and wages was called accum ulation and funds (AF), The ratio between AF and wages was called the rate of accum ulation and funds. This rate was applied to actual gross income earned in order to derive wages. I t was mentioned in section 10 th a t the AF rate was considered an appropriate socialist substitute for the rate of profit, and th a t was its theoretical justification; whatever the m erit of th a t argum ent, the practical effects were good. The A F rate helped to bridge the institu tional gap between complete adm inistra tive control and a relative autonom y of the enterprise. I t also induced workers to economize on labor. In 1953 employment in m anufacturing and mining increased by 5 percent, and labor productivity by 6.2 percent. In 1954, when the A F system was abandoned, employment increased by 13. percent and labor productivity slightly fell. The A F rates were, of course, not uni form. The 1952 plan envisaged a rate of 19 for agriculture and another of 582 for m anufacturing and mining. This difference reflected the already described goals of price policy: industrial prices were inflated , in order to facilitate the collection of in vestm ent resources. However, even within m anufacturing different industries had widely different rates. In industries with high rates there was no incentive to reduce costs. Since the rates could not be es tablished .very precisely, some collectives began to earn high wages. The government reacted by introducing a tax on the sur plus wage fund (the difference between the standardized and the achieved wage bill). Since the standardized wage bill was the product of an average wage rate and the num ber of employed, the enterprise increased employment often fictitiously of less skilled workers in order to reduce the tax basis. The governm ent reacted by differentiating taxation according to skill

categories. Enterprises countered by a rti ficially changing the skill structure, de claring their workers to have higher skill. The A F rates were clearly a not very re fined instrum ent of economic policy. They were introduced in the belief th a t they could be standardized for all enterprises witKin an industry group. Soon, however, individual rates had to be prescribed for each particular enterprise. This implied direct adm inistrative interventions which were a t variance w ith the basic intentions of th e new system . In 1954 the.A F system was replaced by a system called account ing wages, which lasted for the next three years. Yugoslav economists had been com plaining for some tim e th a t in their eco nomic calculus enterprises do not consider Capital services as a cost item (Lipovec, 1954, p. 142), T h a t was a natu ral result of the fact th a t capital was given to enter prises free of charge. This practice was dis continued in 1954 when a capital tax of 6 percent was introduced. This tax was considered as a pricc for the socially owned capital and was also levied on capital in vested from enterprise funds. A part from th a t, the enterprise was obliged to pay normal interest rates on credits granted by the bank. Also the profit and turnover taxes were introduced, the la tte r becoming the chief instrum ent of accum ulation. In this way instrum ents of economic policy became more varied and more flexible. The new system implied a division of the wage fund into two components: ac counting wages and wages out of profit. Accounting wages were derived by apply ing prescribed wage rates to skill categories taking into account actual working time. Again skills were fictitiously increased. W orking tim e as a basis of accounting led to a disregard of work norms. The next year wage schedules (tarifni pravilnik) were introduced. Wage rates were deter mined by the social plan. Wage schedules

of individual enterprises represented a kind of collective agreement between the enter prise and the T rade Union and local gov ernm ent (Tomie, 1968, p. 11). Differential efficiency was accounted for, and a p a rt of profit was used as a premium for improve m ents of quality, reduction of costs etc. Since profit was taxed a t 50 percent, enter prises tried to reduce profit by increasing wage rates and reducing norms. The government commissions for wages were unable to prevent this from happening. In 1957 the First Congress of W orkers Councils was held. The Congress asked th a t the autonom y of the enterprise be widened. This prim arily implied greater independence in income distribution. The division of income into wages and profit was considered inappropriate and rem i niscent of wage-labor relations. In order to meet these demands, in 1958 the incom e: distribution system was changed and a compromise reached. The wage schedules rem ained and were still subject to ap proval of local authorities and trade unions. The enterprise income was treated as one single whole and was distributed by workers councils into wages and contribu tions to various funds. The difference between income and accounting wages (called minimum personal income) was progressively taxed. The wages in excess of the basic pay were also progressively taxed (Pejovich, 1966, pp. 98-99). Progressive taxation was very m uch re sented. And so was the outside tutorship as far as wage differentials were concerned. I n 1961 both were abolished. W orkers councils became completely independent in determ ining wage rates and distributing income. Progressive taxation was replaced by a flat 15 percent levied on income. In 1965 even this tax was abolished. Changes in wages policy implied drastic changes in relative factor shares. If we divide value added into gross wages (wages and taxes levied on wages) and gross

rentals (depredation, interest, net profit and taxes levied on capital), the percent age share of the latte r in m anufacturing alid mining varied as follows ( a o r v a t, 1969b, p. 41):
T able 7 1952 1953 1955 1957 1959 1960 10% 11% . 74% 77% 67% 62% 1961 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 54% 53% 50% 48% 46% 45%

Percentage shares of gross wages repre sent, of course, complements to 100% of the' figures quoted for rentals. In the AF system depreciation was the only capital cost. The introduction of profit and capital tax in the system of accounting wages increasedcapital cost drastically. The grad ual reduction and final elimination of profit taxes, which implied a relative increase in wage tax, reduced the share of gross rental to somewhat more th an one half of the value added. On these changes price changes were superimposed. The increase of food and services prices after 1960 in creased nom inal wages; the abolition of various subsidies a t the satne tim e a;nd in p articular after 1964 m ade possible a re duction in taxation which to a certain ex ten t offset the effect of wage increases. The next effect was to lower the share of gross ren tal below 50 percent. The adaptation of an enterprise to these changes required an extraordinary effort oh the p a rt of the m anagem ent. B u t Enterprises did react. Sim ultaneously w ith increased capital charges the capital coefficient (the ratio of gross fixed capital to gross m aterial prod uct) in m anufacturing a n d mining fell from 3.6 in 1955 to 2.5 in i964 (H orvat, 1969b, p. 51). If enterprises are m arket oriented and if the production function is linear homogeneous' (which proved to be an acceptable approxim ation), the elastic

ity of output with respect to capital in the .. last decade m ust lie somewhere in the re gion 0.45 to 0.62. The actual elasticity co efficient turns out to be 0.48. This is taken as one indication th a t the economy is fol lowing m arket rules (H orvat, 1969b, p. 42). While wage systems with wage sche- . dules and progressive taxation were ap plied, real wages lagged behind productiv ity increases and producer prices were stable. From 1958 on real wages began to increase faster th an labor productivity, and the discrepancy between the two series was widened particularly in the cyclical trough in 1961/62 and after 1964 (Popov, ; 1968, p. 627). The peculiar m ovem ents of prices th a t followed were considered in the section on Price Policy. A nother peculiar ity was established by W achtel: inter industry wage differentials continued to increase, and interindustry wage structure appeared as a function of average pro ductivity which explained 80 percent of the variance (W achtel, 1969, pp. 151, 175). Popov found a high correlation between the rate of growth of industrial o utput and the productivity of l a b o r 'l l 0.86) (Popov; 1968, p. 622). If all these bits of informa tion are p u t together, the following inter pretation begins to emerge. T rade Unions announced the principle: wages should increase proportionally to the productivity. The principle was widely accepted, and it is a sound principle when applied to the economy as a whole. If applied to individual enterprises, it gen erates great trouble. In a rapidly growing economy various industries expand at widely different rates (petroleum industry a t 19.2 percent, tobacco industry a t 5.1 percent per annum in the period 19521966). Thus rates of growth of labor pro ductivity are bound to differ very much (11.7 percent and 1.2 percent respectively). Thus wages m ust differ and differentials m ust increase in time (money wage rates

4-7.
-

increased 12.8 times in the petroleum in dustry and 8.3 tim es in the tobacco indus try in 1952-1966) (Popov', 1968, p. 630). Kovac found th at in 1966 wage rates for the same category of skill in the highest paid and the lowest paid industry group were related as 2:1' (1968, pp. 130-33). All this is, of course, in flagrant contradiction to the principle of distribution according to work. T h at is why B ajt rem arked th a t the principle of rem uneration according to productivity actually denied the principle of rem uneration according to work per formed (1967b, p. 363). Deviations of productivity income from labor income have been analyzed by the present author. They represent (after deductions for other facto cost's) a form of rent which I call the rent of technological progress (H orvat, 1962b). The faster the rate of growth, the more im portant this rgnt becomes. Raskovie (1967b, p. 230) and others suggested th a t the principle of distribution according to work be replaced by a more appropriate principle "according to the re sults of w ork. I t is not the process of work as such b u t its results th at have to be re warded. Raskovic noted th a t grossly im perfect m arkets in Yugoslavia m eant ex ploitation of one group of collectives by another, more privileged, group (1967b, p. 218). The m eaning of the principle, accord ing to tlie results of work has been stretched by Sefer in a father curious fashion. Sefer notes th a t in developed capitalist countries free m arket wage de term ination has been replaced more and more by a policy of equal pay for equal w ork. H e feels th a t such a policy is in applicable in Yugoslavia because workers bear business risks, i.e., they share in both profits and losses. W ork cannot be re m unerated autom atically; it has to be socially recognized, .which happens a t the m arket where the exchange determ ines the result of work. The principle equal pay

for equal work could be implemented only in a system of state ownership and state m anagem ent of the economy (Sefer, 1968b, pp. 74 75). Thus Sefer, Korac and a certain num ber of others in fact argue th a t the principle, considered M arxian, can be im plem ented in a capitalist and Statist setting, but not in a self-govern m ent system. The fallacies of this laissez faire reasoning are obvious: m arket im perfection provides no criteria for the social recognition of somebodys work; the re distributive effects of m arket imperfec tions can be eliminated also by means other than the etatiste ones. Other Issues: On income differentials due to technological and other rents, differen tials due to variable entrepreneurial abil ities of various working collectives are superimposed. Sefer quotes data for Bel grade enterprises in 1967 when the Same jobs in various enterprises were paid Tates as different as 1:3 or 1:4 (1968a, p. 434); I t is clear th a t such extreme differences generate enormous inflationary pressure. There is also an additional consequence. Capital intensive enterprises are able to improve their personal income position by distributing a p art of profit in wages. T hat is why wage rates are positively correlated w ith capital intensity. Yet, if profits tend to be reduced, enterprises become more and moTc dependent on outside sources for financing their investm ent. This generates new difficulties which we will coiisider in the section on Banking and M onetary Policy. A part from technological rent, the classi cal forms of rent were both discussed in the literature and applied in practice (Bakari6, 1950; H orvat, 1953). Agricul tural rent is absorbed, in principle, through taxation according to cadastral revenue. M ining rent represented a separate item of income of mines and crude oil producers for several years. However, it was deter mined in a rather arbitrary way and gen

4-8 u
erated regional differences. Consequently, it was resented by the enterprises and was eventually abolished. All urban land be longs to communes and- urban rent "is used to finance communal investm ent. J. Dirlam , an American student of Yugoslav economic affairs, points out th a t the Yugoslav system can be viewed as one in which labor employs capital, instead of a system in which capital employs labor as is the case under capitalism . T he social ownership of capital requires a somewhat different approach to capital charges in the labor-m anaged enterprise as compared w ith its capitalist counterpart. The floor and not the ceiling is set for depreciation rates. Profits need not be taxed and instead payroll taxes are suggested (In stitu t, 1968b). A tax on capital is prim arily an instrum ent for allocating resources and not necessarily a device for collecting revenue for the governm ent. The revenue from capital taxation has been used by the governm ent to finance m ajor investm ent projects and also to finance the Fund for underdeveloped regions. Resentm ent against these redistributive activities of the Federal Governm ent has been grow ing, and recently a political decision has been m ade to abolish the capital tax. M any economists, disagree w ith this decision. Some argue th a t the abolition of capital tax, which represents the price for the use of social capital, will initiate a transform a tion of social ownership into collective ownership. D. Gorupic and J, Peri sin argue th a t the price of a product should contain an elem en t'o f grow th (1965, p. 124). This is to be achieved if accum ulation is determ ined by the social plan in the form of interest on capital used. B ut this money m ust not be expropriated by the state; it ought to rem ain in the enterprise ear m arked for investm ent. Thus this internal interest is to be treated in the same way as depreciation. In order to cope w ith busi ness flu ctu atio n s,' m inim al depreciation cum accum ulation m ust be determ ined in a cum ulative fashion (Gorupic, 1968, pp. 12, 13). Lavrac m aintains th a t the accu m ulation-protecting interest rate m ay be differentiated according to industries and regions (1968). S. Popovi6 suggests th at the compensation for the use of social capital will provide the bulk of develop m ent resources. After all factors of pro duction, except labor, are paid their shares, the remaining net income is to be distributed among . workers. Additional accum ulation can be derived only from this private income,, which means th a t workers remain owners of th a t p art of capital (S. Popovic, 1968). Similar is the position of Cerne who m aintains th a t the participation of workers w ith their own means in the development of the enter prisewhich implies receiving adequate interest or dividendswould stim ulate rational behavior of workers and manage- . m ent bodies (1967a, p. 21). Oil the other hand, Sam ardzija argues th a t this is both economically irrelevant and socially d an gerous. Contem porary ^shareholders p ar ticipate in the profits of their corporations with only small percentages th a t accrue to dividends. And attem pts to make workers co-owners m ust end in the establishm ent of a separate group of owners of means of production within the society (Samard2ija, 1968, pp. 145, 303). We have thus reached the point a t which the general principles of an adequate distribution policy may be discussed. There seems to be considerable agreement on two issues. (1) As great a p art of income generated as possible should remain under the direct control of the working collective. (2) Only labor income should be distrib uted in wages. These two principles imply a sharp division of income into two com ponents: labor income appropriated by in dividual workers and nonlabor income be longing to the society but remaining under the control of the working collective and

used exclusively for investm ent purposes. In order to be able to divide net income into its labor and nonlabor parts, we need a theory of factors of production. !.n this respect B ajt follows the traditional ap proach and defines factors of production as sources of productive services. He enu m erates five such sources: labor, entre preneurship, invention, land and capital (1967b, p.. 351). The first three generate labor income, although normally a small proportion 6f income from inventions is appropriated by inventors. This theory leads B ajt into difficulties when he has to explain monopoly income. He then argues th a t in a m arket economy monopoly par ticipates in income; monopoly does not add to o utput but. only adds to income of all factors (1967b, p. 357). In order to avoid the shortcomings of the traditional theory, the present author defines factors of production as types of forces th a t influence the generation of out p u t. Factors have to be priced in such a way as to lead to an optim al allocation of resources. The la tte r means achieving m aximum ou tp u t from given resources or m inimum input of resources for a given output. There are four factors: labor, en trepreneurship, capital and monopoly. The first two generate labor income (wages and profit), the latter tw o generate non-labor income (interest and. rent). Creative work and organizational work as well as routine work generate labor income. The income due to the activities of the work collective as a whole represents entrepreneurial in come. Capital services are priced in the usual way and have already been discussed. A few more words need to be said about the morphology of rent. R ent is the price of monopoly in the sense th a t it represents the surplus over the m inimum supply price of resources. Land rent appears in three forms described by M arx (differ ential rent I arid II- and absolute, rent), then there is mining rent and a somewhat

special urban rent. The rent of techno-, logical progressdue to the fact th a t cer tain industries expand faster and enjoy economies of scale effects, or participate tnore in general technological advance, or both has already been described. B ajt adds the rent from m arket monopoly, which he describes as a situation when the selling prices are above normal and the buying prices are below normal (B ajt, 1962, p. 93). After land, natural resources, technology and m arket monopolies are accounted for, the remaining p art is a monopoly in the narrower sense. Except for the last, the prices of the other m onop oly factors may be in principle determined either by the m arket mechanism (land and mines) or by economic analysis (tech nology and m arket). As far as the latte r is concerned, progressive taxation m ay in practice prove a more efficient procedure. If taxes are designed in such a way as to be generally considered as just, they will not affect the supply of resources and this is how in fact we defined rent (H orvat, 1964, ch. 3, 4, 6). Actual business practice and legislative measures do not quite follow the principles, discussed above. The productivity-w age practice leads to an appropriation of a con siderable p a rt of non-labor income. The same consequences follow from the facts th a t mining rent is included in undiffer entiated income and th at there is no pro gressive taxation. In 1968 the new law on the distribution of income in the enter prises included income from capital in vested in other enterprises in the undif ferentiated income of the collective-investor. P. Jurkovic prom ptly called th a t a rath er dubious theoretical solution (1969, p. 50). In general, the distribution of in come according to the work performed is still a goal to be reached. Foreign Trade Policy Background: The pre-w ar trade struc

ture was rather simple. Food and other agricultural products represented about one half of to ta l Yugoslav exports. One fifth of exports consisted of wood and al m ost an additional fifth ,o f non-ferrous ores and m etals (Dobrincic et al., 1951, p. 408; Fabinc el al; 1968a, p. 144). Thus close to ninety percent of export earnings were provided by these three sectors producing raw m aterials and sem i-m anufactured goods. Im m ediately after the war the de velopm ent strategy consisted in (1) ex panding the exploitation of natu ral re sources in these three sectors and (2) in using the export proceeds to finance im ports of equipm ent and other producer goods. I t was also expected th a t (3) the Soviet Union would provide great help in speeding up economic developm ent. The second p a rt of the program was carried out successfully, the share of consumer goods in im ports was reduced from 22 per cent before the war to only 11 percent in the period 1947-1951 (Cehovin, I960, p. 59). The first and the third parts encoun tered Unexpected difficulties. Due to a decline of per capita agricul tural production and rapid industrializa-

te n t left unpaid, in particular by W estern Germany and H ungary. Im m ediately after the war about 75 percent of foreign trade was conducted w ith the Soviet Union and her E ast European allies. In 1947-1948 the. trade shares with these countries were stabilized around 50 percent in exports and 42 percent in im ports. In the middle of 1948 the ominous Resolution of the Cominform m eant the end of good relations. B y 1949 the Soviet group reduced the trade to one-third and in 1950 it was cancelled al together. The Soviet Union and her allies applied a total boycott to all relations with Yugoslavia. Thus the country was cut off from the E ast completely. I t w as' separated from the W est as well, as it did not enjoy the facilities m utually provided by western, countries to each other. I t was not included in the M arshall Plan; it rem ained outside GATT. In short it was isolated in a hostile world. The five-year industrializa tion planim bued w ith so m any hopes had only been initiated, when suddenly the contracts were broken, and supplies of equipm ent and m aterials ceased to arrive. Trade was declining:

T able 8

1948 E x p o rts' 100 Im ports 100

1949 79 95

1950 74 86

1951 64

1952 87 115

1953 80 106

1954 102 103

1955 99 130

1956 122 142

1965 328 311

114

Sources: Jugoslavija 1945-1064, p. 77: 5G/-19S9, p. 121.

tion, agricultural export surpluses were re duced and so was the to tal volume of ex ports. I t soon became fashionable to ex plore the question whether Yugoslavia was not becoming a perm anent net im porter of agricultural products (Srdar, 1953). The nationalization of foreign prop erty imposed a new burden on the balance of paym ents. On the other hand, repara tions for w ar damages were to a large ex-

Foreign exchange reserves dropped from 43 percent of the value of im ports in 1937 to 12 percent in 1948 and to 4 percent m 1952 (M rkusic, 1963, p. 186). Personal con sum ption was declining. Defense expendi tures am ounted to tw enty percent of n a tional income. Two severe droughts, on in 1950 and the other in 1952, proved unex pected allies of the Cominform and reduced agricultural o utput to 25 percent below the

51pre-w ar average. The- situation looked hopeless. T h at is why Stalin expected sur render. - ! ' . Y et this nation was not accustomed to surrender; it was m ore.at home in fighting back. And it did so, for the first two years struggling practically alone. Investm ent plans were changed* trade was channelled towards the W est, even the economic sys tem was changed. From 1951 on, foreign economic aid began to flow, m ostly from the U nited:States. I t consisted prim arily of food, raw m aterials and m ilitary supplies. The aid am ounted to 38 percent of to ta l im ports in i 951, and over the next decade was gradually reduced to zero. The crisis was soon overcome and the economy entered a period of unprec edented growth. The effects of the heavy capital investm ent of the F irst Five-Y ear Plan began to m aterialize in rapid ex pansion of industrial output. The new agricultural policy soon generated phe nomenal grow th of agricultural output. E xports were catching up with imports. I n 1954 the first trade contacts were es tablished with the E ast European coun tries. After the conciliatory visit of Pre m ier K hruschev to Belgrade in 1955, nor m al trade relations were established and so a precious outlet for increasing exports was found (Obradovic, 1962, p. 40). In the decade th a t followed, exports increased 3.3 tim es, i.e., a t a rate twice as high as in the world as a whole. These developments were too good to last long. In 1957 the Common M arket was born in Rome. Two years later E FT A was created in Stockholm. Practically all W est European countries became m em bers of the one or th e other trading group. E ast European countries belonged to COM ECON, created in .1949, b u t actually operating since 1954. Yugoslavia found herself isolated again. At first it did not m atter too much. B ut gradually intrazonal tra d e in all three areas began to increase tapidly and to depress trade with th ird parties. This was tru e in particular for the Common M arket, the most im portant trading partner of Yugoslavia. Common M arket countries account for 30 percent of Yugoslav exports, 38 percent of im ports and tw o-thirds of financial transac tions. W hat makes this trade so vulner able is the fact th a t between one third and half of Yugoslav exports to Common M arket countries consists of agricultural products. Regular and variable im port tariffs in the Common M arket am ount on the average to 50 percent of the Yugoslav export prices, for beef even to 60-70 per- cent, which clearly cannot encourage ex ports. Variable protection rates, when first announced to GATT, were said to be an exceptional instrum ent, the customs tariff remaining the basic one. In fact, however, variable rates am ount to 2.5 times the regular tariff, they are changed daily, weekly or quarterly and represent a per m anent instrument, of total protection (2iberna, 1969; M itic, 1969).' Yugoslavia reacted to the new situation by trying to increase her trade w ith the developing countries. This attem pt met w ith a limited success. Im ports from de veloping countries increased to a maximum of 14.1 percent of Yugoslav im ports in 1964 and there has been a perm anent balance of paym ents surplus w ith these countries (Pelicon, 1968). Next, close re lations were established with GATT. At first an observer, Yugoslavia became an associated member of GA TT in 1959 when she also enacted the Customs Law. In 1961 a tem porary customs tariff was pro duced and next year Yugoslavia became a tem porary member of GATT. In 1965 a new, perm anent customs tariff was en acted, and a year later full membership was granted by GATT. COM ECON was also approached. Its members absorb almost one third of Yugoslav trade. In 1964 Yugoslavia be

52 .
came an observer in COM ECON. W ith the Common M arket special agreements are negotiated. . India and the United Arab Republic account for one third of Yugoslav trade with developing countries. In 1966 the heads of the three countries initiated a scheme which became known as Tripartite Co-operation. The agreement, ratified in 1968, comprised 500 products to which preferential rates of 50 percent became applicable, and envisaged also industrial co-operation. I t was also suggested this tim e by economists and not be politicians (Biland2ic, 1967, p. 33)th a t a Danubian trading area be formed. If th a t had proved possible, it was hoped th a t the area could have been extended N orth and South. The occupation of Czechoslovakia rendered th a t idea utopian for the tim e being. A ttem pts to develop economic relations with as m any countries as possible and the foreign policy of an uncom m itted nation enabled Yugoslavia to establish trade with 120 countries. Trade is not only geo graphical^' dispersed, it is also diversified in term s of products exchanged. As a result a theory of capillary tra d e emerged. Vi P e rto t argues th a t small quantities reduce m arketing difficulties, and S. Obradovic adds th a t highly diversified trade reduces risks of business fluctuations. Em pirical research lends some support to this hy pothesis. P. M ihajlovic finds th a t the con centrated pre-w ar export was very much dependent on external business fluctua tions, while no such dependence appears to exist after the war (M ihajlovic and Tanovic, 1959, p. 77). Capillary trade also has its drawbacks. Obradovic points out th a t it. increases m arketing costs and quotes ap provingly Bicanic, who m aintains th a t ex port concentration is a precondition for a perm anent Export position on the world m arket (Obradovic, 1962). F ast growth after 1955 led to profound structural changes. The share of exports of commodities and services in social product increased from about 13 to about 20 per cent. The Yugoslav share in world trade doubled, b u t being still less than one per cent, provides a justification for the ca pillarity theory. The share of those three traditional natural resource sectors in ex ports has been reduced from 90 to 50 per cent (Fabinc et al., 1968a, p. 144). Raw m aterials and m anufactured goods changed their places in the structure of exports (Guzina, 1950:6 in 1939 to 13:50 in 1968). The once self-sufficient peasant economy is now only a m atte r of historical interest. I t has been replaced by a relatively open, industrialized economy participating ac tively in development of the world m arket. Prologue: Rigid central planning in the period 1945-1951 implied a state monopoly in foreign trade. The domestic m arket was completely cut off from the outside world. The rate of exchange, was ju st an account ing device without economic meaning. Ex port and im port trade were conducted at prescribed domestic prices. The Fund for Price Equalization, created in 1946, com pensated exporters for the differences be tween the domestic and export prices;. Each transaction implied a separate foreign exchange rate. T hat was consistent with the principle of profitability a t all cost applied in the home m arket. Exporters were obliged to surrender their foreign exchange proceeds to the National Bank which, in tu rn , supplied im porters with w hat they needed. Foreign trade enter prises acted as agents for the M inistry of Foreign Trade and were obliged to imple m ent im port and export plans. Plans were defined in physical term s and so traders were not interested in prices and other trading conditions. The system was simple and consistent, b u t not very efficient. Yet, in the turbulent post-w ar years it did the job it was designed for. The most im portant event in those years was the Cominform economic b o y c o t t . At

53th a t time details about operations of mixed Soviet-Yugoslav companies became pub licly known and stirred great indignation. A certain num ber of these companies were created with a proclaimed aim of helping to develop the country. Capital was in vested in even shares, profit was divided evenly, the Russians appointed their own people as genera! m anagers, insisted on preferential treatm en t and objected to Yugoslav financial control. All this re m inded people,too m uch,of their pre-w ar experience w ith foreign capital and mixed companies were gradually liquidated. B ut the problem was more complex th an th a t; economic relations among socialist coun tries were a t stake. In an interesting 1949 article M . Popo vic, then a m em ber of the governm ent and now the President of the Federal Assem bly, explained the position th a t had been taken (1949). If a less developed and more developed country meet in the world m arket, th ey will exchange commodities w ith different labor contents. The more productive country will get back more labor th an it gives away. This implies ex ploitation. F urther, if in mixed companies profit is divided according to capital in vested, a principle, of distribution alien, to socialism is introduced and as a result exploitation appears in yet a n o th e r form. According .to socialist principlessaid Popovic the entire surplus value, i.e., the entire profit obtained by the society after it had sold the comm odity in the world m arket, belongs to the proletariat which has created th a t value . . (1949, p. 108). To such theories, and not quite unex pectedly, Russian negotiators reacted rather laconically: Torgovlja torgovlja, a druzbadruzba (trade is trade and friendship is friendship). B ut for Yugo slavia, then a year or two after the Revolu tion, socialism m eant immensely more than trad e; to p u t the two on an equal footing was profoundly, shocking. Economic rela tions among socialist countries were seen as similar to the relations of the various regions within one country. Developed socialist countries had an obligation to grant aid to the less developed ones in order to speed up their growth and enable them to reach the same level of develop m ent in the shortest possible time (Obradovic, 1962, p. 39; M. Popovic, 1949, p; 70). These were not abstract ideas; they were applied in relation to Albania. Yugoslav and Albanian partisans fought together during the war and relations between the two countries were very close. As a more developed country, Yugoslavia sent ex perts and m aterial supplies to Albania. Tariffs were abolished and m onetary units were given the same nominal value. A t tem pts to design a single system of prices failed because productivity differences be tween the two countries were too great. B ut they then continued to trade a t their internal prices which m eant th a t Albania exported a t Albanian prices and im ported at Yugoslav prices (the hitter were some w hat lower than the Albanian on the aver age). In this substitution of world m arket prices by respective domestic prices. Popo vic saw the elimination of the exploitation' characteristic of the world m arket m ech anism (M . Popovic, 1949, p. .128). In fart, however, this conclusion does n o t neces sarily follow. To find out whether and how m uch Albania gained, one would have to calculate the entire trade in Albanian, Yugoslav and world prices and compare the value aggregates. And in order to make exchange equivalent in labor term s one would have to apply in p u t-o u tp u t anal ysis. A nother policy measure had m uch more obvious implications. Albania was granted interest-free loans for an unspeci fied length of time. This was an early an ticipation of the now familiar aid program s for underdeveloped countries. Bulgaria was another country with which

54.
Yugoslavia expected to elim inate tariffs and possibly even form a confederation. Yugoslavia Avaived Bulgarian .reparations obligations for war damages, and after the Bled agreement in 1947, hopes went high in both countries. A few m onths later Stalin launched his attack, and soon all achievem ents were forfeited, all hopes buried. Form er friends became enemies. The Coininform economic boycott and the need to finance the Five-Y ear Plan compelled' Yugoslavia to establish con tacts ith the world capital m arket. Ideo w logical reasons and unpleasant experience w ith W estern capital before the war and with Soviet capital afterw ards made joint stock companies and mixed companies an undesirable form of im port of foreign cap ital. Loans remained the only available alternative, B u t loans m ay also affect the economic and political independence of the country unfavorably. I n order to prevent tliis from happening, V. Guzina suggested, in a paper representing the common opin ion of the tim e, th a t foreign trade be. con ducted according to the economic plan, and a specified volume an d -stru c tu re of exports be secured (1950, p. 71). Guzina also held th a t autarchy was b oth impos sible and undesirable, and favored de velopm ent of an open b u t controlled so cialist economy. These ideas were charac teristic of foreign trade policy in the next decade. Three Steps Towards Free Trade B y the m iddle of 1951 the new economic thinking reached.' the sector of foreign trade. As. usual, m arket experim entation began w ith agricultural products. Ex porters of certain agricultural commodities were allowed to sell their foreign exchange proceeds a t a price which was obtained by m ultiplying the official rate by the factor 7. T his foreshadowed the new official rate determ ined on January 1,1952 a t 1$= 300 din (the old rate was 1$= 50 din). Ex porters were granted a retention quota of 50 percent with which they could finance im ports o f'th e ir own choice and sell im ported commodities a t free prices. The transition from complete state monopoly to a system of free trade was not a simple affair. Various alternatives were discussed. In an im portant article early in l9 5 2 , D. Avramovic, now a staff member of the World Bank, argued th a t a fixed exchange rate and, in p a rtic u la r its exclusive use, cannot be practiced in a socialist economy. In order to secure the m inimum volume and the necessary stru c ture of exports and im ports consistent with production and investm ent targets, the fixed exchange rate should be replaced by either physical allocation of goods or a system of m ultiple exchange rates. The latter is more consistent w ith a socialist m arket economy. Since foreign prices con stantly fluctuate and since a full em ploy m ent high rate of growth economy needs stability, thereought to be ah Equalization Fund to absorb violent fluctuations. Thus, not only is there a need for ;m ultiple ex change rates, b u t these rates should also fluctuate. The capitalist principle of a fixc-d exchange rate cum busihess fluctua tions m ust be replaced by a socialist, principle of m ultiple fluctuating exchange rates cum economic stability; ahd growth (Avramovic, 1952). .v ;;! " ;" :' M ost of these ideas were sobn tried o u t' I n July of the same ye;ir the bystem of l7 price equalization coefficients was set in operation. Coefficients, applied to export prices calculated a t the official'exchange . rate, ranged from 0.8 (for exports of agri cultural products) to 4 .0 . L o w coefficients were applied to im ports of equipm ent and raw m aterials in order to keep their prices low. A high degree of liberalization was en visaged in foreigu trade, b u t in comparison to the liberalisation of the home market.,, th e liberalization of th e foreign trade sys tem proved to be a m uch tougher job. F irst of alland again in contrast to the

exporters as the only seller of foreign ex change was set too low. Already in 1951 change (M rkusic, 1963, pp. 301-315). the actual average export exchange rate The first free trade attem p t failed be was 354 dinars for One dollar, and in 1952 cause the initial price for foreign exchange it increased to 585 dinars which was alm ost was set too low, initial, reserves were too twice as m uch as the official rate. The small, the share of the free m arket in average iniport Exchange rate was lagging foreign exchange supply was too small and behind;1&ptjreciably (1$=%440 din). Cheap . disparities between home and foreign im ports exerted pressure oh the balance of prices too great. I t would nave Deen r a th e r. payihchts. The foreign exchange reserve of 'A difficult to find elsewhere in the world such . 4 percent of im ports m ade economic interr relative prices, rem arked V. M eichsner, as Ventipns impossible. \N o Wortder th a t the existed in Yugoslavia in 1955: one type newly created foreign exchange market} w riter ribbon (2.800 din) equals a pair of DOM (Foreign' Exchange A ccounting: shoes equals two yards of woolen fabric Pla.ce)', did not work: A t first, exporters equals one third of an average employees Were obliged to sell only 55 percent of salary equals tw o-day full board in a first their foreign exchange to the B ank; the class hotel in a tourist resort eqUals 56 remaining 45 percent, representing their haircuts equals the m onthly rent of a fiveretention quota, could be used for im room apartm ent (M ajhsner, i956, p. 193). ports of their oWn choice of sold to im A t th a t tim e three different foreign ex* porters a t the DOM . Already in October change regimes coexisted : the official rate, the'retention quota was lowered to 20 per the regular an d .th e separate DOM rates. cent, and th a t m eant the d eath sentence ; M eichsner suggested th a t the num ber of for DO M ; In the next y e a rD O M rates coefficients b e gradually reduced to only soared to iie v e l 6.8 tiihes higher th an the two, one for industrial and one for agri official rate. Averiage actual exchange rates cultural products. In 1957 M . Frkovic went up as well. : calculated deviations of actual exchange In 1954 a series'of desperate attem pts rates of various product groups from the was m ade to save the systemv The ac- : average actual rate of 1$= 779 din. I t counting exchange rate was increased to turned out th a t industrial exports and 632 dinars for a dollar. Coefficients w ere. food, equipm ent and invisible im ports revised and applied to DOM rates, and were subsidized a t rates between 21 and 35 nOt to the official rate. A steep tax on the . percent, th a t there Were export taxes be-; gains a t DOM was.introduced. A num ber tween 16 and 21 percent for agricultural, wood and invisible export's and a protec of other complicated procedures were ap tion rate of 105 percent for consumer goods plied. D O M rates were brought close to im ports (Frkovic, 1957). the new accounting rate, which the au ; By 1960 it had become clear th a t the thorities aimed for. Y et im porters of raw foreign trade system needed a thorough; m aterials could not compete any more a t revision. D. Cehovin evaluated the situa DOM for foreign exchange and so separate tion in three points. Enterprises were stim sales were organized for them . This re ulated to press for an increase in coef duced the am ount of available free foreign ficients, not to compete in the world m ar exchange to something like one percent of ket. Coefficients had ceased to be passive the dem and. T he retention quota was re equalization instrum ents and were in fact duced to only one- percent. Prices of transform ed into active devices for in foreign exchange spared and by 1960 creasing price disparities^ Profitability cal reached a leyel 12.3 tim es as high as the culations were m ade practically impossible official rate. The R ational B ank replaced

home market the price of foreign ex

(Cehovin, 1960, p. 125). M rltusic noted th a t in an economy where exports are price elastic and imports are not, there will be. a constant tendency for export ex change rates to move away from the im port ones. T hat required physical re strictions on im ports (M rkusic, 1963, p. 297). B oth did happen. Higher export ex:change rates were bound to produce in flationary pressurevia the money supply as Avramovic had already warned (1952, p. 24). The recession th a t started in 1960 made things worse aiid stim ulated the author ities to Undertake a reform in 1961. This timV'an ample supply of foreign exchange was! secured by foreign loans. B ut the other two mistakes of the 1952 reform w ere'com m itted again: the new accounting rate was set too low (750 dinars for one dollar) ; the actual export rate in 1960 was 981 din and in 1961 went up to 1021 dinars (O. Kovac, 1966) and price dis-. parities were corrected in only a few cases. The strategy Of the reform call be de scribed as follows. M ultiple exchange rates were abandoned and coefficients were re placed by a customs tariff. Instead of ex change rates varying between din 500 and din 1200 for a dollar, there was to be a single 750 rate with no protection for agriculture and lumbering, with 10-40 per cent protection for consumer goods and 17-60 percent protection for equipm ent and other industrial products. E xport was free and was supported by premiums and tax reductions. Exporters were supposed to sell foreign exchange to the National B ank b u t in most cases could buy back 7 percent of the amount sold for their own needs. About one fifth of im ports was liberalized, and for the rest commodity quotas or foreign exchange allocations ap plied. The deficiencies of such a strategy soon became apparent. Exports were retarded, im ports accelerated. In order to keep the .

balance of paym ents deficit under control, im port restrictions were multiplied and in 1964 the tariff protection was increased from 20 to 23 percent. Exports were stim ulated by making foreign exchange alloca tion conditional, upon export sales. Export premiums and tax reductions were rapidly expanding. Soon the old system of m ul tiple exchange rates reappeared with all , its inefficiencies (In stitu t, 1964). The situation was worsened by the fact th a t about one half of Yugoslav foreign trade was oriented towards clearing cur rency countries, most of it towards . COM ECON. B oth import and export flows, with the COM ECON countries are much more unstable, th an with the- con vertible m arket (M adzar, 1968). B oth im port and export prices on the COM ECON m arket are higher than' on the world m arket. Besides, it is easy to export to this m arket but difficult to im port from it and vice versa for the convertible cur rency m arket. As there was one single exchange rate for both m arkets, the con sequences should be obvious.' Im porters were oriented towards convertible cur rency countries, exporters towards clearing currency m arkets. The balance of pay m ents deficit w ith the former increasedrapidly, while there was an unabsorbed surplus on the trading account with the latter. A boom in 1964 produced unbear able pressure on the balance of paym ents. In the same year the cycle was reversed. The recession helped to induce the authorities to undertake another reform in 1965. This time the structure of dom estic prices was radically readjusted as ex plained in section 10. The actual export rate of exchange in 1964 was 1050 din; it was expected to increase in 1965 to 1200 din and the new official rate was deter mined a t .1$= 1250 din. Thus two fatal m istakes of two preceding reforms were avoided. v

57.
An additional element in the strategy lated. Im port restrictions were multiplied. . consisted in th e lowering of tariff protec Export inducements were reintroduced. tion from 23.3 , percent to 10.5 percent Differential exchange rates were back. The dinar was stable on the tourist m arket w ith the traditional difj'crehli : lion of rates from 5 percent for prim ary commodities dinar notes could be bought a t rates close to 21 percent for consumer goods (Dom- . to the official one at.all foreign exchanges andzic, 1966). The- necessary supply Of b u t a quiet devaluation was proceeding under the surface. None of the objectives foreign exchange Was secured through the; quoted by Anakioski was achieved. c ooperationdfthe Intem atio n aiM o n etary -' Fund (IM F)'. ; The ways in which the free trade reforms were carried out did not indicate an im The am bitions of the reform were great pressive professional competence. B ut in D. Anakioski, One Of the directors in the this respect Yugoslavia is not unique in the" Federal Plahnirig Bureaii, describes the present World. The most popular m ethod objectives of the reform as follows. The of policy making seems to be the method Yugoslav economy was to be integrated of trial arid error. I t has its drawbacks into the wdrld m arket. Trade was to be but, if applied w ith sufficient persistance, gradually liberalized and the djhar made it also produces useful results. cohvertible, E xports were to rise relative So far 1 have been examining deficien to im ports Which would perm it building cies. L et me riow briefly evaluate the re u p substantial foreign exchange reserves. sults. Since 1952 the span between exThe balance of paym ents deficit was to be trerne actual (resulting from actual rev eliminated (Anakiovski, 1969). enues of exporters and actual paym ents of Thie rieW foreign trade regime became importers) exchange rates has been con operative in 1967. About one q uarter of im ports; was liberalized and retention . siderably narrowed. Actual exchange rates have become considerably more stable. quotas remained in m ost cases a t 7 per The positive difference between the actual cent. F o r the rest there was a complicated export arid the actual im port exchange system of inducem ents and restrictions; in rates of 303 din. in 1955 Was transform ed order to achieve a proper regional dis into a negative difference of 100 din in tribution of trade, a category of im ports from the convertible area was m ade con " 1967. Government interventions in foreign trade operations have been reduced iii ditional upon the purchase of a Specified every respect. A bout one fifth to one am ount of clearing currency (Saveafia, fourth of im ports is firmly and completely 1966). E xport premiums and tax subsidies liberalized either directly or via retention were abolished. T ight m oney policy was to quotas and other arrangements. The keep prices stable; reduce internal de tourist dinar is a stable and convertible m and and compel enterprises to export. currency. The stage is set for the lastif Once again the new regime failed to there is such a thing in economicsas produce the results expected. A fter an sault on free trade and convertibility. initial b urst of exports and a contraction of im ports which in 1965 produced a small The W h a l-lo -d o -N ext Controversy balance of paym ents surplus, im ports be The misfortunes of the third reform gan to expand faster th an exports. In te r were n o t entirely unexpected. M rkusic, nal dem and was checked, but so were A. Giin-Sain and other economists eval exports. A balance of paym ents deficit uated various governm ent objectives as reappeared and was increasing. Unpleasant unattainable given the policy pursued. clearing currency surpluses were cum u

Soon cl lively discussion developed focus sing on three: them es: protection, the nature of exchange, rates, and converti bility. I. Fabinc argued .that every protection policy ought to be associated with v. de velopm ent program . Developing coun tries encounter serious, bottlenecks in o ut p u t capacities and shortages in material, and financial means. Therefore, unlike developed countries whose protection pol icy aims a t changing the structure of prices and incomes, developing countries m ust have a protection, policy oriented tow ards changes in the structure of pro duction. T he m ain objective of tariff pol icy i s . to protect national production by producing a desirable differentiation of in ternal prices as compared with prices on the world m arket. There are, however, three im portant tasks which a tariff policy cannot perform. I t cannot regulate the volume of im ports, it cannct achieve the desirable structure of imports and it can not regulate a regional distribution of trade (Fabinc, 1963, 1968b). One has to find other devices to do these three jobs. Evidently, adm inistrative interventions of the governm ent are one possible al ternative, I t is, however, not acceptable as a dom inant alternative in the Yugoslav setting. Next, a proper exchange rate system could.do a t.le ast p a rt of the job. This system could be based on one single rate, or on m ultiple rates, and the rate or rates could be pegged or be fluctuating. O ut of these elements four m ain com binations and a number of variations m ay be jorm ed. On the one extreme there will be a single pegged rate and on the other fluctuating m ultiple rates. In the debate the In stitu te of Foreign T rade noticed an inconsistency in', the traditional approach. The policy of a single rate usually imposes the elimination of m ultiple rates on the export side, while on the im port side they are retained in 'th e

form of a customs tariff. In fact, however, the economic, justification for multiple rates is the same for both components of foreign trade (Institut, 1964, p. 75). M rkusic and 0 . Kovac of the IES sug gested th a t the pegged rate be made flexible by the application of exchange. rate ingredients such as tax reductions,, preferential transportation. rates and the like. B ut they find direct export subsidies, unacceptable, presum ably because they fear a proliferation of arbitrary govern m ent interventions (Bilandzic, 1967, p. 34). As far as the import side is concerned, Fabinc noted th a t fixed customs rates do not prevent their flexible application (by an appropriate definition of the customs value or by introducing point clauses) (Fabinc, 1963, p. 38). Other devicessuch as a customs registration taxare avail- r able as well. Thus even if the single fixed exchange rate is chosen as a basis for the system, the prevailing expert opinion favors making it flexible in both senses: it ought to be changeable in time and dif- : ferentiable w ith respect to the fixed stan dard. The justification for this approach had already been provided by Avramovic in the cited paper of 1952: a planned economy cannot tolerate th a t outside economic conditions and fluctuations be autom atically transm itted to the internal m arket. This was now reiterated by U, Dujgin, who advocated not only flexible, but also fluctuating rates (Dujsin, 1968, p. 593). Mrkusic: pointed out th a t if one wanted to keep Lhc balance of paym ents in equilibrium either the exchange rate or internal prices will have to be continually adjusted. Since internal stability is ob viously the first priority, the flexibility of the external value of money follows as a natural consequence. (M rkusic, 1967). The government chose to base its policy on the pegged rate. This decision now came under attack,, A pegged rate implied government interventions, which were

repented. Murln.'iliiu; rates involved risks of in~!abilily, which the governm ent was not willing In assume. Cicin-Sain thought Oui.t llicsc risks could not be so great, th a t (lud.im.1ing rales required much smaller reserves and m uch less stringent conditions in term s of financial discipline, organization, of the m arket etc. (C icinSnin, 1968!)). A few years earlier, G. JVtacesich, an American economist of Yugoslav extraction, also argued in favor of fluctuating rates. He believed th a t such a system would serve to integrate tin; countrys economy more effectively with (lie worlds economy by quickly in dicating to planners when m istakes in the planning have been made. The correction of m istakes would not. have to depend on interm itten t changes in rigid official ex change rates (Macesich, 1964, p. 202). . On the other hand M rkusic argued th a t fluctuating exchange rates would generate speculation and would be destabilizing. He cited the Canadian tw elve-year ex perim entation with fluctuating rates which he'claim ed ended with trade restrictions for about one half of imports (M rkusic, 1969). Cicin-Sain suggested th a t specula tion could be avoided if enterprises were obliged to sell foreign exchange as soon as it. was earned. Capital m ovem ents would clearly require separate control. Fluctuating exchange rates implied the existence of a foreign exchange m arket. The governm ent feared th a t this might m ean repeating the failures of the DOM. On th e . other hand enterprises and bus iness cham bers were pressing for higher' retention quotas. The prevailing export opinion seemed to bo in favor of the m arket, even if not for iill currencies. Since the country ran a chronic surplus on its trading account with the clearing area as a whole and with m ost individual clearing currency countries, it seemed advisable to s ta rt m arket operations with these currencies (ilandzi, 1967, p. 34).

T h at would m ean fluctuating rates for about one half of the foreign exchange, proceeds. I he next phase m ight be trading in convertible currencies, and finally a proclam ation of the external convertibility of the dinar. Cicin-Sain examined the pros and cons of approaching full convertibility via ex ternal convertibility, i.e., . by satisfying .Article V III of the IM F agreement, or via internal liberalization. In favor of the former, he advanced the following three reasons: (1) the dinar m ight become a re serve currency, which would mean an in terest-free credit for Yugoslav im ports; (2) clearing countries might find it advis able to liquidate their clearing deficits in order to accumulate convertible, dinai: balances and (3) the financial prestige of Yugoslavia would increase. He felt, how* ever, th a t these reasons wore not par ticularly convincing. Even if fully con vertible, the dinar would probably not be held as a reserve currency in any substan tial am ount, and in so far as clearing deficits were structural, they wo*;!d not be remedied by financial devices. o j : the other hand, external convertibility would require substantial reserves and is the more difficult to achieve the higher the degree of internal liberalization (CicinSain, 1967, 1968a). Liberalization would result in lower inventoriesinventories are notoriously high in the Yugoslav economywhich would mean a consider able saving in foreign exchange and in working capital. Later in the debate professional opinion swung in the direction of external con vertibility. M rkusic argued th at in fact Yugoslavia maintained external conver tibility with the convertible currency countries. If Yugoslav traders pay foreign exporters in their own currency, this is the same as if they paid in an externally convert!ble dinar. The official proclamation of external convertibility would lead

to greater financial discipline, greater in fluence of the world m arket on internal costs of production and also to some foreign exchange economizing beca.use foreign exporters would not insist or. con verting dinar balances im m ediately into their own currency (M rkusic, in press). The Economic In stitu te in Zagreb pointed out th a t external convertibility would facilitate m ultilateralization of trade with the CO M ECO N countries (Fabinc el al., 1968a, p . 191). As already noted, Yugoslavia belongs to neither of the trade areas in Europe and is. politically uncom m itted. As a result she encountered considerable difficulties in trade w ith her neighbors. However, why hot transform this position of weak ness into a position of strength? A country which went through underdevelopm ent, central planning and m arket organization and which is economically and politically uncom m itted m ight perhaps become a desirable economic meeting place for three different worlds. If so, external conver tibility is certainly one of the precondi tions for m aking the m ediating role of the Yugoslav m arket attractiv e for her p a rt ners from the W est, the E ast and the Underdeveloped South (Ciin-Sain, 1968a, p. 82). V. Money, Banking and Public Finance Banking and Monetary Policy There has been a lot of experim entation in the Yugoslav economy. This is tru e for th e m onetary field m ore'than any other. Banking can be organized in a cen tralized or decentralized fashion. D e centralization can be (1) regional, (2) func tional or (3) both. C entralization can be (1) absolute or (2) paxtial. Thus there are five possible organizational solutions. All of them have been tried out a t one tim e or another.

Banking for a Centrally Planned Econ omy: According to the In stitu te of Finance, in the. socialist economy of 1949 money was a tool used by the state authorities to dis tribute social product in proportion to the labor of each working-man, to establish economic ties among enterprises and to exercise control over their activities. Money was also a means of accumulation and an instrum ent of control over plan fulfillment (Finansiski, 1949, p. 63). The banking system was expected to provide money which had such properties. From pre-w ar times Yugoslavia in herited, a certain num ber of private and state banks. The former were eliminated by 1947 and the latter were reorganized. The N ational Bank was a descendent of the Serbian N ational B ank created in 1883. The former State M ortgage Bank the heir of a state bank set up in Serbia in 1862 (U prava fondova) continued to operate as the State Investm ent Bank. The Agricultural B ank.of 1929.continued to operate in the same field. There was also a H andicraft Bank and, in view of am bitious industralization program s, it. ap peared advisable to set up a separate I n dustrial Bank. The war had not yet been ended when a process of creating regional banks began: six republicssix regional banks. For a country aiming a t central plan ning, all these banks did n o t represent a very purposeful arrangem ent. In Septem ber 1946 a consolidation of the banking system began. All existing banks were merged into the N ational Bank, entrusted with short-term transactions, and th e State Investm ent Bank, which was to deal with investm ents and foreign loans. A part from dealing with short-term credit, the National Bank issued currency, p er formed general banking and agency ser vices for the governm ent and served as a clearing house for the entire economy. In 1948 the tw o-bank system seemed overly

61.
centralized. Since local enterprises and agricultural co-operatives pjayed, special roles a t th a t tim e, ,89 Communal -Banks and 6 regional Slate Banks for Lending to Agricultural Co-operatives w ere formed. Communal banks were universal i;anks: they were for servicing local budgets, ex tending short and long-term credits, col lecting savings, controlling plan fulfill m ents of local enterprises. Banks charged a one percent interest rate which was in fact a commission charge for their ser vices. It was not deemed appropriate for a socialist system to charge interest a,s a price for capital. Since it is m uch easier to control finan cial transactions conducted via bank ac counts th an those made in cash, already in 1945 all enterprises and other non-private transactors were obliged to have drawing accounts with the bank. Soon about ninetenths of paym ents were conducted w ith out using cash. This was one of the lasting results of the early period of banking de velopment. Paym ents through bank bal ances developed into a unique internal paym ent system, channeled through local offices of the N ational Bank. I t embraced all banks, post offices, enterprises, govern m ent funds aiid a considerable p a rt of the private sector and connected all money stream s of the economy into a single con sistent system (Vuckovic, 1963/p. 366). .In m any respects the early Yugoslav m onetary system was a replica of the Soviet model. This is particularly true for the three instrum ents of m onetary con trol: credit planning, cash distribution and the autom atic collection of invoices. Credit planning was the only instru m ent to survive the adm inistrative phase. U ntil 1950 credit planning simply m eant summing up the credit needs of individual enterprises. This was done by planning authorities. The. bank was supposed to implem ent such plans in a routine way. Later, credit plans were transform ed into credit balances, which m eant that needs were: balanced with means. Banks were made responsible for drawing up credit balances ('Vuckovic, 1956. p. 172) The . planned am ount of credit tor individual enterprises was obtained by dividing the output target into an individual capital- turnover coefficient'and then subtracting the enterprises working capital (Vuckovic, 1963, p. 366). The m ain purpose of cash distribution plans was to control rccipts (mainly in retail trade, catering and passenger tran s port.) and expenditures (primarily for wages and paym ents to peasants) made in cash (Stevanovic, 1954, pp. 145-46). The cash plan was made .'for territorial units and for separate money streams and so provided useful information about- re, ceipts and expenditures of the population and about various channels in which the money was circulating in the economy. B ut it was a ra th e r rigid instrum ent with not much, use outside central planning and was therefore abandoned, in 1951. In order to enhance financial discipline, enterprises were forbidden to grant trade credits to each other. The autom atic col lection of invoices served .the same pu r pose. The bank would autom atically credit the sellers account when goods were shipped and then.charge the buyers account. In this way no m utual crediting could be practised. PayittOllts were carried out smoothly.. If there was no money in the buyers account, credit was auto m atically extended. This, of course, m eant' th a t credits would expand beyond the limits set by the credit plan. At first, such m atters did.not worry planners too much; physical targets and not money- flows were im portant. Other consequences were more disquieting. The total volume of credits depended more on debtors then on banks. The necessary discipline was jeop ardized. Sellers did not care about the solvency of their buyers, and also tended

not to pay sufficient attention to delivery term s, assortm ent and quality of goods, Buyers did not mind accumulating exces sive' inventories. After a. while careless buyers had to be p u t-o n black lists, their drawing accounts were blocked and in m any cases they were brought before the courts. T he. autom atic paym ents mechanism broke down and was in 1951 replaced by free contracts among the . trading partners (Vuckovic, 1957, p. 21); ; Learning by Doing: W hat sort of bank ing system was appropriate for a selfm ahagem ent economy? Centralized or Decentralized? There was a lively discus-, sion on th a t issue. E. NeUberger surveyed the principal: argum ents advanced in favor of the one or the other alternative (1959a). W hatever the m erits of these argum ents m ight have been per se, the . governm ent decided to play safe. No one could be sure of the, busitless behavior of lEtbbr-rmanaged enterprises. I t seemed ad visable th a t decentralization in the m arket ,:'';|pr;gQbds and services be Accompanied by ^.strict centralization in the financial sphere. All other control instrum ents, rem arked J. Pokorn, Were td be replaced by bank . control and supervision (1956). In M arch 1952 Communal banks ceased to exist and other banks were merged with the N a tional B ank into one single giant bank w ith 550 offices and 16,000 employees. in order to make control as efficient as possible, the working capital of enter prises was transferred to the Bank. E n ter prises were to pay a reasonable interest rate, which was to. induce them to econ. omize w ith the credit money. The shorter-term interest rate was dif ferentiated according to turnover velocity of working capital and ranged from two percent for crude oil production and agri culture to 7 percent for electric power plants. This span was reduced to 5-7 per cent in 1953. I t was again increased and th e rates differentiated in a somewhat different way, for different kinds of credits,

in 1954. Experim entation with interest rates continued even later, and in 1956 there were 25 categories of active interest rates (Vuckovic, 1957, p. 183). The so-called "social accounting rep resented one lasting result of the 1952 re form. The Bank established special ac countsa t first thirteen of them for all im portant transactions of each enterprise. All changes th a t took place in the current account of an enterprise were entered here. In this way: the Bank and the government had U p-to-date inform ation; the Bank was able to exert stringent con trolit would stop any irregular pay m ent, which was particularly im portant for paym ents related to wages; the Bank checked the fulfillment of tax and other obligations of an enterprise towards the state. The system was later simplified, the num ber of separate accounts was gradually reduced and the Bank began to rely more on quarterly accounting statem ents by the enterprises. A standard accounting scheme, obligatory for all enterprises, made this task a routine m atter. In 1959 the social accounting with its drawing accounts system for the entire economy Was separated from the N ational Bank' and turned into an independent social . service. The work was. computerized and the service became very efficient. A little later it was discovered th a t the Social Accounting ' Services monopoly on the paym ents traffic- was not an obstacle to enterprises keeping their financial re sources with the banks of their own choice. Today every non-private income earner has a drawing account w ith the Social Accounting Service, and pays commission charges, and a t the same time has a de posit account with one of the banks, and receives interest on deposits. The proper procedure to be used in extending short-term credits was one of the im portant problems the all-em bracing National Bank had to solve. In those days of romantic beliefs in the possibilities

63.
of inventing simple problem -solving de vicessuch as the R ate of Accumulation and Fundsth a t would eliminate the arbitrariness of a bureaucratic apparatus,, the B ank hired a couple'of m athem aticians and asked them to invent appropriate formulae for credit extension. A booklet With several dozens of such formulae was published in 1952 (MiJjanic et al., 1956). They were based on turnover coefficients of credits and ratios of sales to costs. Since param eters to be used in formulae could be calculated only as some sort of averages, it was soon discovered th a t some enter prises got some more credits th an they needed, while others badly lacked the money to keep production going. For mulae were, abandoned and in 1953 the am ount of credit extended was related to the maximum quarterly credit used by t h e . enterprise in the previous year. This favored last-year debtors and penalized good entrepreneurs ahd had to be aban doned. But the idea of some autom atic credit evaluating mechanism was not abandoned. In 1954 the Bank experimented with credit auctions. Vuckovic explained th a t credit auctions were to be a kind of social ist credit, m arket where the supply and the demand of money would meet and de termine th e general conditions for credit extension (1957, p. 38). The Bank ex pected th a t less profitable enterprises would refrain from asking for credit be cause they would not. be able to bear high interest rates. I t turned out th a t precisely the less profitable or unprofitable enter prises were prepared to offer the highest interest rates up to 17 percentbecause they considered credit the only available solution for their problems. The B ank tlien set the m arginal interest rate a t 7.5 per cent. B u t this was a negation of the whole idea of auctions. Soon credit was extended autom atically to every enterprise th a t had satisfied the formal conditions of an auction. Sincc all autom atic devices provde inefficient, in 1955 the Bank fell.back on ; the traditional banking practice of an individual evaluation of every credit re quest. By 1954 two facts were established: (1) the.N E S worked well as a whole but (2) the centralized bank left much to be desired. As soon as that had become clear , regional and functional decentralization were initiated. One of the m ain justifica tions for decentralization was the socio economic incongruity between self-m an agement in the commodity m arket and state monopoly in the financial m arket. Vuckovic quoted approvingly the governor of the N ational Bank, who declared th a t in a decentralized banking system the credit function would be subject to the control of social self-government instead of bureaucratic management (Vuckovic, 1957, p. 86). Communal banks w ith all their diverse activities were re-established. The banks were obliged to keep reserves w ith the N ational Bank of up to 30 per cent of demand deposits and 100 percent of investm ent funds. I n the next three years three specialized federal banks were added: a foreign trade bank, an invest m ent bank and an agricultural bank. The N ational Bank was relieved of investm ent and some other banking operations. Each bank was ruil by a managing board whose members were partly appointed by the authority th a t founded the bank and partly elected by the bank's personnel in the proportion 2:1. After all these changes had taken place, it appeared appropriate to give back working capital to enterprises. This was done, in 1956, and the system was stabilized for the time being. Working capital was not given back free of charge; enter prises were obliged to pay an interest rate of six percent. Banking for a Self-Government Economy; I t took eight years before a formerly administratively run economy learned how to handle a few basic financial mech

anisms. The task of creating an adequate institutional system in the financialsphere was yet to be accom plished/It took eight more years before an outline of such a system became visible. The deficiencies of the banking system as1it developed until 1960 were described by V. Holjevac as follows (1967a). The N ational Bank offices were inefficient, unim aginative, engaged in distributing the planned increase in credits and execut ing the decisions of the head office. Com-, m unal banks fell under the complete con trol of local authorities which often made it impossible to conduct a sound business policy of profitable and safe investm ents. T he federal governm ent often directly in terfered w ith the banking business by immobilizing certain kinds of deposits or by running a deficit inconsistent with the social plan. In order to overcome these deficiencies a Series of reforms was under taken. As in the post-1952 period, reforms were carried out in tw o-year intervals starting w ith 1961. Iii 1961 communal banks became basic and universal credit institutions. In order to eliminate the monopolistic influence of political authorities, a tw o-thirds m ajority of m em bers of the banks managing boards were nom inated by workers' councils of the enterprises located in the territory of the bank. N ext,"eight regional banks re appeared; They were to serve as m ediators between communal bankswhich were required to keep a 5 percent reserve with respective regional banks-and tlie N a tional Bank.- T h a t was a rather unfor tu n ate arrangem ent, since it caused the disintegration of the national credit m arket into six regional m arkets with dif ferent business conditions etc. (Miljanic, 1964, p. 53). This m istake was rectified four years later. In 1952 an interesting new institution was created. I t was called Jo in t Reserve Funds of the Enterprises. D. Dimitrijevic

describes jo in t Reserves as a sem i-finan cial intermediary. Joint Reservescreated a t communal and republican levels grant credits to those enterprises which have losses, are not competitive, have an unsound financial'''position and are not eligible for regular bank credit (D im itri jevic, 1968a, p. 19). For more than a decade Yugoslav bank ing practice, and m onetary theory, m ain tained a fundam ental difference between fixed capital and working capital financing. This made sense in a centrally planned economy, b u t led to m istaken policies in a m arket setting. I t was now realised th a t working capital was not homogeneous: it consisted of a constant part, which could and should be financed as fixed capital, and a fluctuating p art which was a proper object of short-term credits. In 1961 en terprises consolidated the fixed capital and working capital funds into one single business fund. Thus all liquid assets could be used both for current paym ents and for capital form ation.8 In order to increase the financial independence of enterprises, they were encouraged to finance the con sta n t p a rt of the working capital out of their own funds and to rely on bank credit for the fluctuating p a rt only. B ut th a t was not enough for a full-fledged credit policy. Policy makers had to solve the following problem : design a flexible credit policy with a minimum of adm inistrative alloca tions when there is no proper money and capital m arket. They decided to use socalled qualitative control, which implied regulating the dem and for credit. The new
s However, enterprises were still obliged to hold five separate accounts, apart from the drawing account, with the Social Accounting Servicc. These accounts (depreciation, undistributed profits, non-business ex penditures, and two types of reserves) were operated under special rules designed to induce enterprises to bebave in a proper business fashion (Miljanic, 1966). Separate accounts, of course, reduced the possibility of rational use of money, since it could not be freely trans ferred from one account to another. However, gradually separate accounts have been eliminated.

policy was introduced in 1963 and one of its architects, N. M iljanie, governor of the N ational Bank, gave a detailed account of' it in a hook published a year later (1964). According to M iljanic, .final ekmand ought to be financed out of income pro duced. This implies th a t inventory form a tion should be financed out of accum ula tion. The Governm ental budget deficit could be used as a source of new money, b u t th a t is not desirable because in the absence of a money m arket, the distribu tion of such money occurs in a haphazard way and cannot be controlled. M iljanic even insisted th a t the federal budget should be balanced in any case (1964, p. 3J). This contention, though clearly not defensible in theory, has some justifica tion in practice in view of th e sometimes less then responsible deficit financing of governm ent agencies. The official docu m ent of the N ational Bank adds th a t in case of a recession it is pieferable to in crease, selectively, the money supply rather th an to run a budgetary deficit (N arodna banka, 1965, p. 28). Since the liquidity trap is non-existent in the Yugo slav economy, this is a valid statem ent. New money ought to be used to finance prim arily the circulation of commodities. T hus credit is given on the basis of some evidence, invoice or bill of exchange, th a t a com m odity has been sold by a producer or bought by a m erchant. Credit cannot be given for sales to final buyers (govern m ent, investors, consumers). As excep tions to the rule and on the basis of in dividual evaluation by the bank, credits can also be given for seasonal stocks and for stocks clue to some circumstances be yond the enterprises control. (In fact, credit for stocks, far from being an excep tion almost reached the level of credits for com m odity circulation) (Miljanic, 1964, p. 72). A part from this first category of credits, which creates some sort of neutral money, credits can .also play an active

role in supporting production. Such are credits for specific ventures, prim arily for exports, agricultural production and for building apartm ents for sale. Miljanic. also noticed one difficulty with his system. Busi ness operations require th at an enterprise always have a t its disposal a certain am ount of money pure and simple. This money is a p a rt of constant working cap ital, but, being money, should not be financed out of income. On the other hand, if it is financed by credits, they are clearly not short-term ones. M iljanic feels th a t revolving credits m ight do the job (1964, p. 88). This system lasted for four years and produced some good results. Enterprises knew in advance w hat conditions they m ust fulfill in order to obtain credit from the bank. Commercial banks were sure to get credits from the National B ank if they fulfilled the prescribed conditions. B ut the system, was also deficient in m any ways. B. Mijovic, a director in the N a tional Bank, pointed out that, qualitative control (conditions, purpose, duration and kinds of credits) could not quite achieve the aims of quantitative regulation of the money supply. The N ational Bank had to generate a constant stream of detailed and extensive instructions, which became par ticularly cumbersome. Since not all prac tical cases could be envisaged and regu lated in advance, the handling of border line cases caused considerable difficulties. Frequent institutional changes elsewhere in the economy caused additional difficul ties (Mijovic, 1967, pp. 73, 112). By 1967 the credit system was ripe for a new re form. This time supply ofand not de m and forcredit was made a prim ary object of m onetary control. Selective con trol was accommodated within a system of quantitative regulation. The three types of creditsinvestm ent, commercial and consumerled to a law providing for the setting up of three types

of banks: investm ent banks financing fixed and constant working capital, commercial banks extending short-term credit, arid savings banks dealing with consumer credit. Table 9 summarizes the latest organizational changes (Basaraba, 1967, P..78). Organizational changes reflected very definite policy changes. (1) Federal, Re publican and communal banks disap peared. AH banks can in principle conduct their transactions over the entire territory of the country. This deterritorialization policy came as a response to frequent complaints against parochialism and un sound political pressures of local and re publican authorities. (2) The m arket orien tation: of banks resulted in a concentration process th a t reduced the to tal num ber of banks by one half in only three years. By the end of 1968 the num ber of banks was further reduced to 74. This num ber ought to be compared w ith 700 private banks before the war. B ut the most im portant was (3), the change in the setting up and running of the banks. Here a t last, a solu tion consistent w ith the organization of the rest of economy was found. Banks are now established by enter prises and socio-political communities (federal, republican, local) as equal p a rt ners. In order to be independent business establishm ents, banks have their own Capital, called the credit fund. The founders invest their capital in the credit fund of the bank and become shareholders. A t least 25 founders are required for any bank so as to preserve the essentially service function of the bank. The bank is managed by enterprises and socio-politi cal communities in proportion to the am ount of their capital invested in the credit fund. Shareholders are entitled to dividends depending on business success. These dividends cannot be distributed in wages,, b u t can only be used for capital fprm ation. I n order-to prevent monopoliza-

T auee .9.B anks in Yuc.osi.avsa November 1964 Type of Bank Communal banks Republican invest ment banks Specialized federal banks Total June 1967 N um ber 61 39 11 111

N um Type of Bank ber 206 8 3 217 Commercial banks Mixed banks Investm ent banks Total

tion, no single shareholder can have more th an ten percent of the to ta l num ber of votes in a banks assembly regardless of the am ount of capital invested.-'Also no enterprise or socio-political community can be refused the right to invest in a bank and take p a rt in its m anagem ent. The Assembly of a bank consists of inves tors and representatives of the banks personnel. I t appoints the Executive Com m ittee, the director and his deputy. The Executive Committee implements the banks general business policy. The Credit Committee deals with individual requests for credit except in some special cases. In order to ensure an objective and expert business evaluation of requests, the Credit Com m ittee is composed of the banks own experts. The employees of a bank have their own self-management bodies which deal w ith the distribution, of personal in come, use of various funds, personnel m atters and the like and, through repre sentatives on the Executive Committee and in the Assembly, participate in the m anagement of the bank. After a netw ork of commercial' banks had been established, the N ational Bank discontinued its direct business contacts with enterprises and became a central bank in the traditional sense.9 In its function of regulating the money
9 Neuberger examined the role of central banking under three types of economic, systems, the Yugoslav system before 1961 being one of them (1958).

supply, in!961 the N ational Bank had the following weapons a t its disposal (Golijanin. 1967, pp. 95-104). 1. Currency issue. 2. Sales of foreign exchange. . 3. Fixing of term s for extension of short-term credit by communal banks. 4. Legally required reserves held by communal (later by commercial) . banks -with' the N ational Bank. The . upper lim it was set at 35 percent of liquid deposits. 5. Lim its for interest rates (in practice : 8-12 percent). 6. Restriction of the use of certain kinds :of deposits. This instrum ent was often and indiscrim inately used, which greatly annoyed the owners of funds. I. P erilin points out th a t in the period 1954-1962 between 24 and 45 percent of to tal deposits were blocked in this way (1967). 7. Special credits extended by the N a tional Bank to other banks. These credits were used to finance about one half of all short-term credits extended by commercial banks to their clients. 8. Consumer credit policy. 9. Consultations and recommendations. Compared with traditional banking, some items appear superfluous, but one im por ta n t item is missing: there is no place for an open m arket policy since there are, so far, no treasury bills. Instrum ent 7 is a substitute for th a t. By special credits new money is created and the liquidity of commercial banks ensured. If a bank w ants to reduce excessive liquidity, in order to avoid paying passive interest, it can do so by repaying its credit to the N ational Bank. As already mentioned, the 1967 reform replaced credit dem and control by credit supply control, and so the functions of the

National Bank had to be adjusted ac cordingly. Instrum ents 3 and 6 were abandoned and the. existing am ount of special credits was frozen and could not be increased. Several new instrum ents were added: 10. Rediscount credit, which is used as an instrum ent of both global and selective control. I t am ounts to about 12 percent of all commercial credits. In order to qualify for get ting this type of credit a commercial bank, m ust fulfill two conditions: (a) its total indebtedness w ith the N ational Bank cannot be greater than its demand deposits; (b) at least one-half of its short-term credits m ust consist of credits with repaym ent periods shorter than three months. Condition (b) is a special type of liquidity reserve re quirem ent designed for tb.e Yugo slav environm ent where there is enormous pressure to use short term sources for investm ent loans. 11. Discount rate. 12. Q uantitative restriction of credit as an exceptional measure. This is an impressive array of weapons which, if inappropriately used, can cause considerable damage. In the section on m onetary policy we will see how this can happen. . In 1967 a daily m arket was set up within the Association of Banks as a particular kind of stock exchange for supply and dem and of short-term capital. Banks in need can obtain credit for a period not exceeding 15 days (Basaraba, 1967,, p. 81). A t the tim e these lines were w ritten, the Federal Parliam ent passed a package of financial laws providing, among other things, th a t shares in a b an k s capital can -be sold to the business public, b u t not to socio-political communities and to banks, themselves. These two events m ay be con

sidered as proper beginnings of a stock exchange developmentof the Yugoslav variety, of course. Let me close this section with a note on m onetary planning. On the basis of reliable and u p -to -d a te inform ation provided by the Social Accounting Service, a sophis ticated system of flow-of-funds accounts was designed. Since 1967 this system has also been used for annual and m onthly m onetary planning, thus replacing the old-fashioned credit balances. Its author, D im itrijevic, gave a technical description of the m ethods used in his 1968b article. Investment- Financing: The am ount of professional literature on investm ent fi nancing varies in inverse proportion to the num ber of complaints against the state of affairs in this field. I t is difficult to figure out why this is so. Perhaps it is because . investm ent finahcing is in a sense a border line case: neither m onetary theorists nor fiscal policy experts nor predom inently physical planners feel com petent to deal w ith it. In any case investm ent financing has been one of the weakest links in economic policy for a long tim e, and yet no serious study of its problems has been undertaken so far. Thus I will confine the exposition to a description of actual de velopment. C apital form ation m ay be financed by fiscal m eans, i.e. out of taxation, or out of enterprises own funds, by bank loans or by m eans of securities of various kinds. This is roughly the-order in which the var ious kinds of investm ent financing have been tried out in Yugoslavia. E arly in 1945 the governm ent created the Fund for Reconstruction whose re sources consisted of confiscated/war prof its10 and of proceeds from sales of goods
10 In a similar setting after the First World War the government had great difficulties in introducing the tax on war profits and once the required law was promul gated, it could not be implemented (Milojevit, 1925, pp. 168-82),

supplied by CJNRRA. Very soon loans given by the Fund were w ritten off and capital form ation was financed in the budgetary fashion typical of a centrally planned economy. Investm ent resources were allocated by the plan and given to enterprises from the budget free of charge. Enterprises could not sell capital goods; they could only transfer them to other enterprises after having obtained permis sion to do so. Since the state was the only owner of capital and prices did not m atter m uch anyway, this arrangem ent was con sistent with the rest of the system. The crucial year of 1952 inaugurated im portant changes. The Federal budget as a source of investm ent finance was re placed by the Fund for Basic Capital De velopment. Investm ent resources were still allocated w ithout repaym ent obliga tions, but the creation of the Fund led to a division of the budget into two separate parts: one was .related to adm inistrative expenses and the other consisted of various investm ent and interventionist funds. This was to become a perm anent feature of the Yugoslav budget. In 1952 the federal governm ent concen trated just about all investm ent resources in its Fund. T h a t served the purpose of .gaining time for the preparation of a more thoroughgoing reform. Already the next year Funds for Crediting Investm ent Activities were formed. Enterprises es tablished their own investm ent funds fi nanced out of profits th a t by the plan were left to them . B oth measures led to a con siderable decentralization of capital forma tion financing. The system assumed its more perm anent shape in 1954 when Social Investm ent Funds (SIF) were created a t all levels, federal, republic, district and communal. Since then, until the latest re forms, Social Investm ent Funds were, granting loans to business enterprises, while capital form ation in the non-busi ness sector (schools, hospitals, governm ent

69.
offices, etc.) continued to be financed out of the governm ent budget. The creation of S1Fwhich tended to m ultiply as time went byhad an interesting behavioral consequence. Since all levels of the govern m ent were under constant heavy pressure t 9 invest, and funds were separated from the budget, their resources tended to be inflated beyond anything envisaged by the Social Plan. In the period 1955-1960 the volume of investm ent surpassed the target established by the Social Plan by 20 per cent (Vasic, 1963, p. 2157). The reform of 1954 introduced two other im portant innovations. One consisted of the transfer of capital assets to enter prises. For the privilege of using social capital, they had to pay an interest rate of 6 percent, which was in 1965 lowered to 4 percent. Interest had to be paid on capital used regardless of the source of its finance. The proceeds from this interest as well as the repaym ents of the loans granted rep resented resources of the General Invest m ent Fund operated by the federal gov ernm ent. The interest rate on social capital was differentiated according to the aims of price policy and according to the capital intensity of particular industry groups. I t ranged from close to zero for agriculture to 1 percent, for electric power generation and coal production, to 2 percent for transpor tation, to 4 percent for ferrous m etallurgy and to 6 percent for m ost other industries. In this way the interest burden, as a per centage of net product, was more evenly distributed among various industry groups. The average rate of interest am ounted in 1961 and 1966 to 2.8 and 1.3 percent re spectively in term s of capital and to 3.8 and 2.4 percent respectively in term s of n et products (Trklja, 1968, p. 23). The second innovation is related to in vestm ent auctions. There are four types of investm ent allocation decisions: (1) the level of to tal investm ent, (2) the allocation of investm ent funds among sectors of the economy, 3) the allocation among firms within a Sector, and (4) the allocation among technological variants within a firm (Neuberger, 1959b, p. 103). The last, de cision is m ade by the enterprise, while the first two are determined by the plan. After priorities have been determined, and in vestm ent allocated to the various industry groups, the allocation among the enter prises m ay be carried out by auctions. This is an old textbook idea. In various tex ts on socialist economics w ith neoclassi cal background one can find statem ents th a t run roughly as follows: In principle, the applicants would be listed according to the level of the rate of interest they offered and if two offered the same rate, the one who offered the shorter period for repay m ent of the loan would be given preference.' The bank would go down the list until the am ount allocated for this auction, or cate gory within the auction, was exhausted, and the rate of in terest offered by the first intram arginal applicant would become, the one that, everyone paid. In fact, this is not an invented quotation, but Neubergers description of actual.in vestm ent auc tions in Yugoslavia (1959b, p. 93). In theory one could, of course, improve this scheme in various ways. One could apply price discrimination in order to siphon out all non-labor income contained in the dif ference between the offered and paid in terest rate, or one could replace point of fers by schedule offers. In practice the ex perim ent did not achieve great success. I t was soon discovered th a t the two price criteriathe interest rate and the repay ment period:were insufficient. Thus other criteria were added: the percentage share of participation .with own resources (dif ferentiated according to industries and ranging from zero for electric power t.o 80 percent in m anufacturing), the shortest period of construction, the lowest cost per unit of output, and regional effects (Vuckovic, 1963, p. 372; IlanZekovic, 1967b, p.

T a b l e 10. T h e C o m p o s it io n o f I n v e s t m e n t i n F ix e d C a p it a l by S o o r c e o f F i n a n c e , E x c l u d in g P r iv a t e I n v e s t m e n t (i n p e r c e n t a g e s )

1948 Social Funds and Budgets Federation Republics Communes and Districts Werk Organizations Business Non-BusinessJ Banks 99 60 27 12 1 1

1951 98 50 41 7 2 2

1952 98 95 2 . 1 2 2

1953 87 71 11 5 13 13

1954

1955

1960 52 37 7 18 37 31 . 6 1

1962 59 30 9 20 38 30 8 3

1964 36 7 8 21 32 26 632

1966

1968

74 64 50 47 12 9 12 8 26 35 26 27 8 1

16 16 6 9 3 3 7 4 46 r 3.7 39 31 6 .7 . 39 47

' Sources: For years 1948-1955:' Yugoslav Survey, 1963,15, p. 2167. For years 1960-1968: Stalislicki billen SD K , 1969, 3, pp. 68-69.

220). The main defects of auctions ap peared to be the following ones. I t takes tim e and it is Very costly to prepare an application for credit. Auctions are held at .widely spaced points of time which may not correspond with the enterprises need for investm ent funds. As in the case of credit auctions, enterprises were ready to offer high rates bf interest just to secure the loan. They did riot worry too much about future repaym ents because the tra dition of free social capital was still very much alive arid because it looked obvious th a t a plant of any size ca,nriot be closed down ju st because the loan cannot be re paid." Thus the authorities in charge of S IF had to examine every case very thor oughly as they would have had to do eVen w ithout auctions: According to Neubefgers estimates, a t most one-third of all in vestm ents a t any time were allocated through auctions. In such circumstances auctions gradually degenerated into an old-fashiOned- adm inistrative distribution of investm ent from, government funds. Auctions failed. The criteria used for in vestm ent allocations from S IF had never been very transparentanother reason for the lack of analytical literatureand had always been greatly influenced by political considerations. As a result political factories appeared. All im portant invest m ent projects were somehow ihultiplied

six times, one for each republic. Besides, Social Investm ent Funds absorbed tw o thirds of to tal investm ent resources, and owing to participation requirements, con trolled directly an even larger share of total investment. Inefficiency and bureau cratic control were not quite compatible with the self-management aspirations of the economy. Enterprises pressed for an increase in their share in investm ent fi nance. The data on actual development in characteristic years are given in Table 10. A considerable share of investm ent money in the SIF was obtained through taxation. W hen in 1962 these contribu tions to Social Investm ent Funds were raised by 50 percent (Vuksariovic:* 1966) there was a general outcry against the expropriation. I t . was requested th a t state capital be done away with. Two years later the contributions to SIF. were abolished, and the funds transferred to bank credit funds. T hat is why. barik in vestm ent loans increased so sharply in 1964. The starting principle of the reform of 1965 was: to leave at the disposal of en terprises a larger share of their savings and consequently to restrict the role of socio political communities in investm ent deci sions (Jovanovic, 1965, p. 3222) j The pendulum was pushed a little too far in the decentralization direction because it was requested th a t even large capital in

tensive projects (pow er'generation, com munications) also be financed o a t of capi tal concentrated in banks. The role of the Federation in investm ent was reduced to the operation of the Fund for Undeveloped Regions th a t would dis tribute . annually to undeveloped regions close to two percent of national income as investm ent funds. Republican and com m unal funds also diminished considerably. B ut the share of enterprises, w ith the ex ception of a short-lived post-reform in crease, remained stagnant. As Table 10 shows, w hat actually happened was th a t the Federation and the banks simply changed places in investm ent financing. In a situation of chronic excess demand for investm ent resources, banks could easily assume a dom inant role. The sum of the, regular and penalty rates of interest could be as high as 18 percent. The first recession which in fact followed the re formwas bound to reduce the invest m ent funds of enterprises and make enter prises more dependent on banks. D. Vojnic points out th a t in 1968 the repaym ents of bank loans am ounted to 111 percent of net profits of enterprises (1969, p. 89). W ith almost one-half of investm ent re sources under their control, banks es tablished them selves as a dom inant force in the investment, m arket. W hat should be done to safeguard the independence of enterprises? The answer is by. no means clear. The present discussion has concen tra ted on possible improvements of the capital m arket. In 1963 government bonds became negotiable and in 1968 the first enterprise bonds appeared. In 1969 bank shares were invented and the present author has suggested th a t participating debentures be introduced (1967b). The securities m arket could supply a t least p a rt of the capital outside the bankers control. Pooling resources and joint ven tures are encouraged. After the Social In vestm ent Funds had been abolished, in

terest on social capital became a mere capita] tax th a t flowed into the govern m ent budget. A political decision was taken to abolish this capital tax as soon as possible. I t is now being suggested th a t this interestam ounting to about oneeighth of business investm ent be given to enterprises as resources earm arked for in vestm ent (i.e., it would be treated similarly to depreciation funds). I t will not be sur prising if in a little while another reform in this field is carried out. After a money m arket has been to a certain extent ade quately organized, its twin, the capital m arket, can surely not lag behind for very long. Anli-Irtflalionary or (A nti-) Anticyclical Monetary Policy: I n a centrally planned economy m arket disequilibria resUlt in physical shortages; in a m arket economy they are reflected in inflation. The age-old discussion about the real causes of inflation was resurrected among Yugoslav econo mists, in particular after 1961. M onetary theorists, not. unexpectedly, tended to see the source of all troubles in an uncontrolled expansion of money sup ply. M . Cirovic argued th a t the increased commodity prices represented the way in which the economy adapted itself to an excessive expansion of credit and money supply (1966, p. 183). Similarly M. Vuckovic believed th a t inflation was essen tially a product, of excess demand. Since new money brings along ivew dem and un accompanied by supply, a m arket dis equilibrium arises and generates increases in prices. The excessive expansion of short term credits is a consequence of the follow ing deplorable practices: short-term credit is used (irregularly of course) for long term investments, for non-salable stocks, to cover losses, to finance budget deficits and to finance taxes a t all levels of govern m ent (Vuckovic, 1967, pp. 12S-29). The last mentioned practice is probably also one of the Yugoslav inventions in the field.

Owing to a fairly completely budgetary decentralization, local governments are very keen on squeezing out of their en terprises every possible dinar. In the early days of the NES they could do so by tailor ing taxes so as to leave the coffers of the enterprises empty-. This phenomenon had been described by M iljanic and Vuckovic already in 1956 (Miljanic, 1956; Vuckovic, 1956). Thus in 1954 in one single year, communes m anaged to increase their bud getary revenues by 98 percent (Vuckovic, 1956, p. 173). In order to comply with these patriotic requests, enterprises would have to increase prices or ask for credits or both. Credits were readily granted because pay ing taxes on tim e had always been con sidered a first priority. After the budget system had been somewhat more effi ciently designed, the arbitrariness in taxa tion was reduced, b ut whenever in need communes would simply delay payments, for goods and services they bought. In this respect republics and the federation have also been guilty until this very day. I t is not surprising, therefore, th a t the business com m unity does not tru st their govern m ents too m uch and tries to get rid of any bureaucratic control. Now, though it is true th a t credit was excessive and money supply inconsistent w ith stable prices,; it does not necessarily follow th a t prices were the consequence and credit -the. cause in the inflationary process. The hypothesis was tested in the IE S and it turned out th a t there was either no correlation between credit and prices or there was a slight negative correlation: higher credits-lower prices. This paradox will become understandable in a moment. Prices are predom inantly determined by changes in wages, and so inflation is most of the tim e a cost push inflation. As already m entioned in the section on Price Policy, wages appear to be a function of capital intensity, technological rent and in s titu tional monopoly (banks, insurance com

panies). Wage increases in privileged workorganizations 'initiate wage increases throughout the economy, and whenever prices cannot bear a cost increase, they are revised upwards. B ajt adds th a t the high degree of price control increases the pres sure of excess demand on the free section of the m arket, which then generates price increases, and th a t inefficient investm ent planning produces an inadequate structure of output which in a semi-closed economy makes it difficult to m atch demand (B ajt, 1967a; Bogoev, 1967). Business cycles complicate m atters even further. Prices are formed in Yugoslavia in a rather peculiar way. Depreciation and interest on social capital represent fixed elements. Wages, as everywhere, are in flexible downwards. For reasons explained in the next chapter, all taxes are tied up w ith wages and vary proportionally to wages. Since ta x paym ents enjoy high priority it m ay happenand did happen th a t the total am ount of taxes collected in creases in the trough of a depression. Fi nally, repaym ents of loans represent an additional fixed element. Thus, as soon as there is a slight retardation of production, the enterprise finds it impossible to cover costs and has to run-losses,or increase prices. In a downswing a labor-m anaged enter prise will not dismiss workers. Thus pro duction will be continued and inventories accumulated. Inventory accum ulation is financed out of profits and credits. When these two sources are exhausted, involun ta ry trade credits and price increases will replace them . As far as inflationary pressure is concerned, we may expect price increases in the downswings and stable prices in the upswings. Figure 1 confirms such an ex pectation. The analysis ju st sketched-a result of research of the IE S was unknown a t the time m onetary reforms were designed and implemented. The traditional view th a t in

flation m eans "too m uch money chasing too few goods gained wide acceptance. All one had to do, so it was thought, was to curtail the supply of money and the econo my would be stabilized* Stabilization was envisaged exclusively as price stabilization. In the program of the 1965 reform em ploym ent targets were not even m en tioned. Foreign exchange reform, mem bership in G A TT and co-operation with the IM F were interpreted as an interna tional obligation to keep the dinar stable at all costs a task which even a Tory governm ent would nOnadays be reluctant to undertake, but which was cheerfully attem pted in an economy innocently un aware of w hat it m ight mean. Tight money policy was to be the only device for achiev ing price stability. There were some doubts about the wisdom of such a policy, but critics were frowned upon and the policy was implemented. T hat proved to be. fatal. Since prices vary inversely to the cycle, an anti-inflationary m onetary policy m eant an anti-anticyclical policy, a policy of continuous and direct destabilization. The vicissitudes of m onetary policy in the last eight years have been analyzed by Holjevac (1967b) and Perisin (1969), re cently appointed Governor of the N a tional Bank. I will m ainly draw on their work and on the research conducted in the IES in the text th a t follows. In 1960 the cycle reached the upper turning point (see Fig. 1). T hat passed unnoticed, b u t price increases were noticed. The analytical device used in such situa tions consisted of a comparison of com m odity funds (social product in real terms) and purchasing funds (personal and government consumption and invest m ent in money term s) which good and u p -to -d a te statistics made possible. The differences between the two were inter preted as excessive money supply. In 1960 the difference was considerable and called for m onetary restrictions. In addition, in

1961, during the recession, a m onetary re form was undertaken with the purpose.of instilling business discipline. Enterprises were forced to increase the share of their own funds in total working capital a t their disposal. This share was indeed raised from 7.8 percent in 1960 to 22.4 percent in 1961; the operation was financed, out of savings which m eant less investment (Vuksanovic, 1969). Recession was deepened, retail prices continued to rise a t a rate of 6-9 percent, inventories accumulated a t a rate of 20-25 percent per year, and m onetary authorities decided to tighten up the policy. As a result one enterprise after an other found it impossible to settle its debts and m utual indebtedness was expanding a t a rate of about 50 percent per year. The Federal government ran out of money and obtained a substantial credit which the National Bank; also the moneylessness a new term coined for the occasionhad to be cured by .some credit expansion. All this, of course, ruined the credit balances. The year ended with money supply in creased a t a rate more than twice as high as the one envisaged. Holjevac complained about the absence of m onetary discipline and the fact th a t the National Bank, lost control over credit expansion (1967b, p. 36). B ut as a consequence the cycle was re versed and the rate of growth accelerated. The upswing continued through 1963 and with all th a t excessive (from the point of view of m onetary planners) money in the economy, prices were rem arkably stable; industrial producer prices rose by one, percent retail prices by four percent. By the end of the th a t year the upswing developed into a boom, industrial output was expanding a t a rate of 15-20 percent per year, and the balance of paym ents deficit was increasing. Several m onths later the cycle reached the upper turning point and in the second half of 1964 the reces sion was already in full swing. All sym p tom s of the 1961 recession were repeated,

,.*and so was the planetary p o l ic y I n . the .second half of -1964 and th e.= beginning of 19,65 .reserve requirements^-were raised up.to ;t;^Nlegal Umit of 35 p e rc e n t, en te rp ris e s v w ^ . to use savings for increases in working capital, investm ent banks had to use one quarter of their loans for working capital financing, consumer credits were reduced. All this, together witli the upheavals caused by the price re fo rm ,. reduced aggregate demand and output growth from about 15 percent in 1964 to about 4 percent by the end of 1965. Siilce the tax reform left the Federal gov ernm ent w ithout money, it had to resort to substantial deficit financing, which once again upset m onetary planning. B ut the downswing was arrested for a period of four quarters, and all symptom s normally pres ent a t an upwards reversal of the cycle be came apparent. However, this time the N ational B ank had formidable m onetary weapons a t its disposal and it decided to use them to combat excessive liquidity. For some reason, not explained in the documents, the N ational B ank established the rule th a t liquidity reserves of com mercial banks held as balances w ith the N ational Bank should am ount to no more th an 6 percent of m onetary demand de posits (Perisin, 1969, p. 515). These re serves ran around 10 percent in the, second half of 1966. As purchasing funds were, appreciably ' higher than commodity funds-which is reflected in price in creases it looked obvioUs th a t there was too m uch money in the economy. The N a tional Bank reduced its special credits to commercial banks and p u t an absolute limit on their credit operations. Consumer credits were further reduced. In 1967 ex ports were retarded, and so it was decidcd to depress internal demand even more in order to achieve an export drive. As one m ight have expected, this did not help exportsin fact their rate of growth was . soon reduced below zero in spite of selec

tive export creditsbut liquidity reserves . were brought down to 5 percent, even, lower th an planned. As a result of this anti-inflationary policy output growth was reduced to minus two percent, which had not happened since the Cominform days. The p resent. author estim ated losses due to the m istaken mone- . ta ry policy a t eleven percent of social product. Perisin found th a t gross savings had been reduced from 43 percent of GNP in 1964 to 30 percent in 1967 (1969, p. 517). Unem ploym ent was increasing fast. B ut price stability was not achieved (see Table 6). The new system of regulating the money supply proved to be very efficient in re ducing money supply, to any desired level. This conclusion, follows from the foregoing description of its practical operation b ut can also be illustrated by a series of indices. If we compute ratios of money supply per 100 dinars of transactions, expressed as a sum of gross national product and the output of interm ediate goods, we get the following data (Perisin, 1968, p. 63):
T able

11
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 19.4 18.3 14.9 12.3 11.3 13.1

1957 . 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962

15.3 15.3 14.5 15.1 15.3 18.7

In the three years after 1964 the relative money supply was reduced to 62 percent of its original level. One m ight be tem pted to think th a t this simply m eant increasing the transactions velocity of money. B ut th a t is not so; the lack of banking credits was compensated for by involuntary trade credits. The latter amounted to 69 percent of short-term bank credits in 1964, to 138 percent in 1967 and surpassed bank credits alm ost two tim es by the middle of 1969. One other fact is worth noting. Figure 1 shows th a t boom periods of business cycles

75.
occurred in 1960 and 196.3 and recession periods in 1961 and 1967. A glance a t Table 11 suffices to see the extent to which m onetary policy was cyclically synchro nized: there was an abundant. money sup ply in the boom and tight money policy in the recession. Consequently m onetary policy has been an im portant destabilizing factor preventing the economy from ex ploiting its growing potentials. The second half of 1967 brought the re vival and the acceleration of growth .con tinued through 1968 into 1969. Prices were stabilized for a while, inventories reduced, exports soared in 1969 and m onetary policy had a relatively easy job to support these favorable, trends. I t remains to be seen w hether m onetary authoritiesand mone tary theoristshave learned, the lesson and w hether they will be. able to avoid making the same mistakes once the trends are reversed. Public Finance and-Fiscal Policy Budget for a Centrally Planned Econ omy: In the first two years after the war th e new state tried to m ake the best of the inherited financial system. Taxation was improved in two ways. Before the war a sales tax levied on consumer goods was a m ajor source of government budgetary revenue. T h at represented a great burden for poorer sections of the population. Next, income tax progression was mild (up.to 32 percent) and there were several separate income taxes for various sources of income. T hus people w ith several sources of i n come i.e. the richer ones could easily evade paying high taxes. I t was only n a t ural th a t the new revolutionary govern m ent would make the necessary correc tions. The sales tax was reduced from 62.8 percent of governm ent budgetary revenues ill 1939/1940 to 46.5 percent in 1946, and separate income taxes were replaced by a single one applied to the entire personal income a t increased rates (Finansiski, 1949, p. 25). However, uneven taxation reappeared, soon and even in 1969 B. Jelcic. complained th a t the differential tax burden for the same personal income of dif ferent taxpayers m eant the negation of principles proclaimed and guaranteed by law (1969, p. 159). W hen in 1947 central planning was in augurated, the financial system of the country had to be changed radically. In the old system the government budget used to finance the work of public admin istration and some social services. .That corresponded to the adm inistrative char acter of the old state. The new socialist state as described by the In stitu te of Finance (Finansiski, 1949, p. 16)acts as ah organizer of the entire economy. The targets are-annually elaborated in the economic plan and the budget ought to re flect them financially. Each planning organ has its own budget, which is a constituent p a rt of the overall budget. The sum of all financial plans of all ministries, i.e. of all industries, represents an annex to the budget. Thus the budget becomes the fi nancial plan of the entire economy (Finan siski, 1959, p. 11; M atejic, 1958, p. 170). The budget am ounted to 64-83 percent, of national income (Perid 1964, p. 126). About one half of budgetary revenues was spent on investm ents. R. Radovanovid describes four princi ples on which such a budget was based. (1) Centralization of all resources a t the disposal of a political-territorial unit (municipality, district, county, province, republic, federation) in the budget of its government. (2) Financing from the bud get of all social activities. As far as business firms are concerned, only net revenues are entered into the budget. (3) Concentration of the budgets of all political-territorial units in the Federal budget to ensure cen tra l direction in carrying out the m ost im p o rtan t tasks. This is the famous principle of budgetary, monism. (4) As a result of

(3) funds are allocated among various bodies in accordance with their recognized needs and irrespective of their budgetary potentials. Lower bodies are obliged to im plem ent general policy and higher bodies arc expected to provide the necessary re sources. This had a t least one negative con sequence.. Lower organs were not stim u lated to economize with their funds. In stead of. trying to expand production in their territories, they were busy in their budget expenditures and exerting pressure on higher bodies to find necessary resources (Radovanovic, 1962, p. 1112). Taxes in such a system are ju st a tech nical means for channeling gross profits into the budget (Tisma, 1964, p. 29). The price of a product consists of cost of pro duction, profit and the turnover tax. Profit is generally a small item and is mostly left to the enterprise. If individual planned profit is higher than the average one, three is extra-profit half of which has to be paid into the budget of the higher adm inistra tive organ. A planned loss is covered from the higher budget. If achieved profit is higher th an planned, half of the difference is left to the enterprise as an incentive. Turnover tax is ju st a balancing item in an adm inistratively set price. Since it is charged on all commodities and is p a id .as soon as a comm odity is shipped, itu s also used as an indicator of how th e implemen tation of the plan is proceeding. Iiu order, to- accommodate,, productivity change i p :su.eh a rigid price structure the decrease; io, full: cost ;of, production Was explicitly planned as a separate item . This decrease is partly paid into the budget and so ,a ,ra th er unusual new type of tax was created. Finally, various types of prices, discussed in the section on adm inistra tively set prices generated so-called com mercial profit, which was m ostly absorbed by the budget. In 1949 the four items enum erated were (in billions of d in ars): turnover tax 66.6,

share of profits 4.6, decrease in cost of pro duction 3.8 and share of commercial profits 13.1 (Tisma, 1964, p. 96). Turnover tax represented, of course, the bulk of budge tary revenues. The m ajor proportion of budget reve nues came from the business sector. Taxes paid by the population were steadily de creasing in importance, from 22.4 percent of all revenues in 1946 to 9.7 percent in 1952. As a consequence taxation of the population was governed by extra-fiscal considerations. In 1950 the tax on income earned in the state sector was abolished. (It was to be. reintroduced only in 1960). This did not m atter much, since wage and salary differentials were greatly reduced and income distribution was extremely egalitarian. B ut income taxes were retained for the private sector and the progression was rather stiff. For peasants the tax rates went up to 70 percent in 1947 and up to 90 percent in 1948, as.compared w ith the flat rate of .3 percent for the members of peasant work cooperatives (cooperatives organized similarly to state firms) (Finansiski, 1949, p. 34). This tax policy was inr spired by the idea of the class struggle and! was aimed at inducing peasants to join cooperatives^ . The policy of stiff taxation of peasants and artisans was continued also later and for the same reasons. In agriculture i t was discontinued after the second agrarian re form in 1953, which reduced the maximum size of agricultural estates to 25 acres and so eliminated any possibility of capitalist development. In 1954 taxation on the basis of cadastral1 income was introduced, and 1 rates were lowered. Both proved to be stim ulating. I t is interesting to note th a t Radovanovid described the tax on cadas tral revenue as an instrum ent designed to replace compulsory deliveries while making
1 Cadastral revenue is the value of the average yield of 1 a specific land category under average weather condi tions and using an average land cultivation technique.

sure th a t a minimum ou tp u t wilL be pro duced (Hanzekovic, 1967a, p. 91)..There was no possibility of capitalist development in handicrafts either, because artisans could employ a t most five workers. How ever, public opinion held th a t there was something vicious about private business. Tax rates were substantially reduced only in 1963 (Hanzekovic, 1967b, p . 33). The policy of containm ent continued until the ownership discussions in 1967 analyzed in the section on Ownership Controversy. In th e m eantim e the num ber of artisan shops was substantially reduced, which caused economic difficulties. Taxation Experiments: After th e French Revolution in 1789,rem arked J. Lovcevic, the C onstituent Assemly abandoned taxes in favor of contributions. A fter the Yugoslav Revolution 2 h w on taxes passed in 1946 declared th a t a tax was a contri bution. . . given to the state for economic developm ent, cultural advancem ent . . . and for the m aintenance of the state ap p a ra tu s (M ilatovic, 1967, p. 34). In spite of all its protests of public finance experts.1 2 the term stuck. From 1952 enterprises have been paying , contributions (turnover tax representing an exception) and individuals taxes. Contributions somehow em anated from social property, taxes from private p ro p erty .' Since the 1965 tax reform con tributions have become synonyms for di rect taxes or taxes levied on labor income and the term tax is used to denote various forms of turnover tax or property tax. The terminological confusion did not m at te r very much. B ut lack of professional competence in designing an appropriate taxation system did m atter. In the period 1952-1965 the tax system was changed five
a Fiscal theory distinguishes taxes, contributions and stamp duties. A tax is a compulsory payment for, in principle, no specific service. A contribution represents a compulsory payment for a specific service and in principle covers the cost. Stamp duty is a paym ent for a specific service a t the initiative of the payer, but it bears no necessary relation to the cost.

times with obvious consequences as far as, the efficiency of conducting business was concerned. ' In 1952-1953 the system of AF fates whose rationale was discusscd in the sec tion on D istribution Policypredeter mined the taxation system. O ut of accumu lation and funds obtained by the applica tion of a rate, prescribed by the social plan, to the net product of an enterprise, the social contribution was paid to the budget. I t contained social insurance paym ents, was proportional to the wage'bill and was paid a t the fiat rate of 45 percent. Wage bills above the standard prescribed were taxed a t steeply increasing rates. A tax on extra profits was envisaged by law, but never applied due to technical difficulties (Tism a, 1964, p. 97). Turnover tax was greatly reduced, and 'am ounted to 9-14 percent of budgetary revenues (Jelcic, 1967b, p. 14). Its task Was to absorb monopoly profit and to influence price for m ation (Rad ovanovic, 1953, p. 62). The system of- AF rates helped to eliminate adm inistrative ties between en terprises and planning authorities, but soon degenerated into adm inistrative de term ination of A F rates- for each indi vidual enterprise. I t had to be replaced by a system working more in a m arket fash ion. I t was not clear how to design such a system. I t seemed advisable to-m ake use of the experience of traditional m arket economies. Instead of net product, profit was the base of taxation for the next four years (1954-1957). Wages became p a rt of costs of production. Profit was taxed a t a flat 50 percent rate. The other half of gross profit was used for contributions to S IF s for supplem ents.to basic wages, for enter prise funds and for some other purposes. Wages from profits were linked w ith con tributions to local budgets which amounted to same sort of progressive payroll taxa tion. A tax on monopoly profit was en visaged b u t never applied because it proved

impossible to established which p a rt of the income resulted exclusively from the work of the collective. The share of the en terprise (wages and undistributed profits) gradually increased, to one third of net product generated (net product included turnover tax) (Tism a, 1964, p. 99). : In this period two interesting new taxes were introduced. Mines, hydroelectric power stations and some other firms were to pay rent; A rtisans and peasants were obliged to pay tax on hired labor. The latter tax was insignificant in quantitative term s, because only one-eighth of the artisans and almost no one among peas ants hired labor; but served as a reminder th a t hiring labor m eant exploitation. Wages as p a rt of cost of production were ' deemed inappropriate for a self-m anage m ent System. Thus the new system , in augurated in 1958, wa.s based on the dis tribution of to ta l enterprise income. T hat was. a switch back from profit to net prod uct, reduced for turnover tax and some other items. There was also a terminologi cal change: wages and salaries were re placed by personal income. W ith m any changes the system lasted until 1964. The m ain tax, surpassed only after 1961 by the turnover, tax, was the contribution from income. The rates were progressive up to 80 percent. Tax progression was in 1961 replaced by a flat rate of 15 percent and a surtax of 25 percent. In the m ean tim e another development took place. I t appeared reasonable to link collective consumption and public services to the level of personal incomes earned in any particular territory. For this purpose con tributions to budgets were made out of the wage bill. In 1958 these contributions were progressive, in 1959 a flat rate of 11 percent was charged; the rate was increased to 15 percent in 1963. In 1964 some tax rates were reduced, and mining taxes and con tributions to S IF abolished. The abolition of progressive rates led to a reintroduction

of the progressive personal income tax (Tism a, 1964, p. 207). This indicated th a t the economic functions of the payroll tax and personal income tax, as discussed be low, had been confused. The share of the enterprise in its net product increased to about one half. In order to increase this share still fur ther, the last reform of 1965 abolished all contributions from enterprise income. The share in net product jum ped to about two-thirds. Since then enterprise taxation has rested exclusively on payroll taxes. If we count social insurance contributions, labor has been m ade about 60 percent more expensive th an necessary. This has serious consequences. Before 1960 taxa tion created capital saving inducements (Pejovich, 1964): in a labor surplus economy th a t was rational. Since 1964 taxes have stim ulated labor saving prac tices. Enterprises did in fact re a c t: coal was being replaced by oil, cotton growing and cattle raising by w heat cultivation and so on, and thousands of workers be came redundant. Further, flat rates intro duced an awkward rigidity and tended to. intensify cycles. Finally, the abolition of progressive payroll taxation after 1958 and the lifting of wages control in 1961 m eant th a t two im portant checks on inflationary pressures were eliminated. We have already. . discussed the consequences. Taxation experiments have clearly not been completed. Is there anything one could say about how an appropriate taxa tion system ought to be designed?. On various occasions the IES has naade. sug gestions in this regard, and they m ay be summed up as follows. The equilization of personal income distribution can be achieved by the familiar progressive per sonal income tax. There is no need to tax profits, even less to tax them progressively, since capital is socially owned. B ut there is a need to tax payrolls and to tax them progressively. In order to do this wages

ought to be standardized by applying ac counting wages for , certain categories of skill. (The skill rating should, of course, n ot be left to enterprises themselves, ju st a s school diplomas are not issued by pupils themselves.) W hen faced with the alterna tive of either losing a greater p a rt of the excess wage fund through taxes or using th a t money for developm ent purposes the working collective will often opt for the latter. This will check wage, increases in the m ost profitable enterprises-which have continually been generating, wage pushes and expand their investm ent, increasing the supply of their products relative to demand and lowering prices. L abor should be made as cheap as possible (for the enterprise, of course, not for the workers) in order to stim ulate labor in tensive production. If some taxes still prove necessary, they m ay be levied on the enterprise income a t a flat rate. Such con tributions from income m ay be consid ered as a self-m anagem ent counterpart to the familiar value-added tax. While direct taxes have received little attention in professional economic litera ture, turnover tax has been extensively discussed. And with good reason. I t sur vived through all tax reforms as one of the principal taxes. Since 1954 the share of turnover tax in to ta l budget revenues has oscillated between 29 and 43 percent (Hanzekovit, 1967a, p. 28). B y 1964 six kinds of turnover tax were in operation (Lazarevic, 1965). Producers turnover tax was in herited from the days of central planning I t was levied on some- 250 products a t rates varying between 2 and 81 percent: it was contained in producers prices, represented a p a rt of enterprises gross receipts and was collected a t the time the invoice was is sued. I t was easily and quickly collected, even before bills were paid, a.nd was liked by the governm ent. I t was also used as an instrum ent of price policy. In order to provide independent sources for communal

budgets, ii} 1956 a communal sales tax was introduced. In 1961 owing to the abolition of progression in enterprise income taxa tion the governm ent ran short of money and. introduced the one percent general turnover tax. This was a m ultiple-stage tax and was intended to reduce the num ber of middlemen between producers and final consumers: however, apparently no effect of this kind was achieved (Hanzekovic, 1967b, p. 47). There was then also pur chase tax on specific products, service sales tax and duty on real estate and other transfers. Producers turnover tax has been, se verely criticized. Both the governm ent and the enterprises tended to abuse it as a price form ation device. In twelve years its tariff was changed almost one hundred tim es (JelCic, 1967c, p. 4). Its handling re quired a large am ount of working.capital on the p a rt of the enterprise. I t tended to distort prices, and so did the multiple stage general turnover tax: In the case of exports, tax deductious had to be com puted and made. For all these reasons the two kinds of turnover tax were abolished and in 1965 replaced by a sales tax levied on consumer goods in retail trade, added to retail prices, charged directly to buyers and collected when the commodity was sold. B ut a retail trade sales tax cannot be changed often and cannot be differentiated for m any products. Thus its use as a price form ation instrum ent is rather limited. I t is now prim arily a device for collecting budget revenue. Budget fo r a Self-Government Economy: A budget is more consistent with a cenr trally planned economy the more allembracing it is. Ideally all financial tra n s actions of the economy are to be regulated by the budget. I t is the other way round in a self-government economy. Here, the budget ought to be restricted to as small a section of the economy as possible in order not to interfere w ith the economic activi

8o.
ties of work collectives. Ideally the budget should cover only the activities of various state agencies-..'In' th is, respect the 1952 reform initiated three im portant, develop m ents. They were related to the organiza tion of the non-m arket sector of the economy, to the creation of various social funds and to the decentralization of budgetary revenues and expenditures. The Yugoslav tradition had m ade a sharp division between enterprises (poduzeca) and institutions (ustanove). The former were .business establishm ents, the la tte r were financed from the budget and roughly corresponded to non-profit insti tutions in the USA and elsewhere. Since the la tte r depended on the budget, i.e. on the governm ent adm inistration, for their .revenues, it was clear th a t self-m anage m ent had little chance of developing. Thus institutions th a t performed public ser vices and could be financed partly or wholly by selling their services1 were 3 separated in a special group of institu tions w ith independent finance. G rad ually it became evident th a t there were two fundam entally different types of public services: the one (governm ent ad m inistration, judiciary, police, defense) rendering various adm inistrative services to society, the other (education, science, medical care, etc.) increasing the welfare of the m em bers of society. I t seemed ap propriate to finance the form er from the budget (public expenditure) and to organize them in a more or less traditional fashion, b ut the latter ( collective con sum ption) required a different approach. M. Hanzekovic suggested th a t taxes be used to finance the former and contribu tions the latter (Hanzekovic, 1967a, p. 17). Next, while there was to be a free mar1 Thelaw of 1959 changed this condition into insti 3 tutions organized according to the principles of social self-government.' The institutions were renamed in dependent institutions. In 1965 they obtained the status of work organizations with the same self-man agement rights as enterprises.

ket for the short-run operations of enter prises, it 'appeared advisable, to retain substantial central control in the field of capital formation. B ut capital financing was to be on a credit basis and budgetary financing implied grants without repay ments. Thus 'investment resources were separated from the budget and concen trated in investm ent loan funds. The budget continued to finance investm ent projects in the nonm arket sector (schools, hospitals, etc.). . In 1952 social insurance had also been separated from the budget; This decision was m otivated by the fact th a t social in surance could be efficiently operated as an independent social service under a social self-government regime. The latter m eant th a t the governing bodies were composed of representatives of various social inter ests (physicians, social workers, citizens, government representatives). Very soon there was a proliferation of various funds for housing, for advance m ent of agriculture.and forestry/for roads, for cultural activities, for education etc; M any of these funds had their independent m anagement bodies and obtained their resources from special contributions or from budgets. Han2ekovic suggested the following three-fold classification (1967a, p. 13): (1) funds for capital formation (SIF) or for financing public services; (2)' funds for financing without repaym ent obligation or for granting credit; (3) with self-government bodies or without. Defi nite trends have appeared in further de velopments. Loanable funds were mostly transferred to the banks. Funds without independent m anagement bodies are used as often tem porary instrum ents of budge tary financing for special purposes. The third category, perm anent funds with in dependent self-government, represents an innovation. The social-insurance fund set an ex ample. A decade later the example was

81. followed by education. At first, T. Konevski remarked, th a t was ju st a transmission meoha.uism in budgetary financing (1968, p. 10.'). Bui in 1967 Education Unions were formed to operate the funds. As semblies a t communal and republican ' levels vote m oney to be allocated to educa tion funds. Education Unionsselfgovernm ent bodies composed of represen tatives of schools, outstanding figures in cultural life, government agenciesdis tribute. the money b}' negotiating the ser vices to be rendered by various educational establishments. In 1969 Research Unions were formed. They operate funds for re search work created in 1960. Unions are shown iu the quasi-m arket sector of Figure 2. ITanzekovic points out th a t in 1965 funds absorbed 8.8 percent and institu-r tions 14.2 percent of national income, which had to be compared with total budgetary expenditures th a t am ounted to 20.1 percent of national income (1967a, p. 14). Institutions obtain about one third of their income from selling their services to direct buyers (to the m arket), 50-60 percent of their revenues come from vari ous funds (quasi-m arket) and only onete n th derives from budetary subsidies. Such a structure of revenues enabled the non-m arket (not non-profit, because they do make profits) institutions to gain a con siderable am ount of independence. Also, they established closer contacts with the buyers of their services and with the rest of the economy. Is there, one m ight ask, any . economic activity in which an Archeology D epartm ent of a University, a museum or a rt gallery can engage? Yes, there is, though perhaps not directly. Tourist agen cies and hotels may be, and in fact are, interested in financing the development ol an archeological site, a local museum or a rt gallery. Sometimes these are rather .roundabout ways for achieving ce rtain : gpais, b u t if they eliminate government control and increase independence, Die pricc m ay not be too high. Yet there are other costs involved. Konevski points out some, of them (1968, pp. 128-65). To ad minister a fund an adm inistrative appara tus has to be set up. Unlike business enter prises in the m arket, a school or a hospital is in an inferior position when it negotiates contracts with the funds. Commercialism m ay and does have detrim ental effects in such fields as culture, education, science or medical care. The consumer m ay be. and often is, victimized. Since it is trio early to evaluate the working of the system, one can only invoke the wisdom of the ancient Greeks concerning the organization of hu m an affairs: right proportions, no ex tremes. The creation of funds and the establish m ent of self-financed institutions repre sent two aspects of decentralization. As a consequence th e share of budgetary rev enues in national income was reduced from one-third in 1952 to one-fifth in 19674 The third aspect of decentralization was re lated to the division of revenues among budgets of various socio-political units. The federation was gradually transferring its responsibilities for various, social ser vices to republics and communes. As a result the share.of federal, expenditures in total budgetary expenditures dropped from 74 percent iu 1952 to 53 percent in 1968. The trends have been reversed as com pared with what happens elsewhere.1 4 The division of budget revenues among various budgets is a somewhat complicated technical problem. N ot less than five laws in the period 1952-1965 tried to solve it and with only limited success. In theory there arc two possibilities: a separation.of revenues, and joint revenues. Both have
1 In the USA the .share of federal revenues in total 1 budgetary revenues increased from 42 percent in iK90 to 75 percent in 1954; in Switzerland federal expendi tures amounted to one half of ciiifonai expenditures in 1913 and to 111 j>ei;ccnt in l*58'(.'logoev, W64, p. 10).-

been tried out a t one time or another. After 1952 the budget monism of a centrally planned economy was replaced by a budget pluralism better suited to a self-governm ent economy. The former budgetary System was based on participa tion in joint revenues, the higher govern m ental bodies determining the conditions of participation. If lower budgetary units were to be made more independent in the developm ent of revenue sources in their ovm territories, a system based on a sepa ration of revenue sources seemed more ap propriate. . T h u s sources of revenue were allocated to budgets a t various levels. Only the federation was entitled to in troduce new taxes, but, if introduced, taxes had to be immediately allocated to specific budgets or funds. In principle ' every unit was to cover expenditures from its own revenues. This principle was not fully implemented, b u t there was a great change as compared with the former prac tice. In two characteristic years republics and communes obtained their revenues in the following ways (Radovanovic, 1956a, p. 4 4 5 ) V ;
. T a b l e 12

v: : 1948 53.7% .43.3% 3.0 % . 1954 ' 72.5% 22.5% 5.0 %

Otvn revenues ' Participation in joint revenues Federal subsidies V

; W ith m any changes this system lasted for nine years (1952-1959). I ts m ain shortcomings, as described by Radovano vic (1962, p. 115) and K. Bogoev (1964, pp. 188-90) were two. Sources allocated to lower units were not sufficient to meet, the recognized needs. Deficits were substantial and were covered by sharing in revenues and by subsidies. These were discussed every year anew, which made lower units very dependent on higher authorities. Next, the lack of objective allocation cri teria generated t bargaining process. For

both reasons the system failed to provide stability and incentives. In the period 1960-1964 the budgetary system was again based oh participation. Separate sources were allocated only to the federation (they covered 90 percent of its revenues) and to communes about 20 per cent of their revenues). Republics and districts had no separate sources. The par ticipation of all units was determ ined by federal and republican laws. The higher units could not arbitrarily select more favorable sources for themselves. In order to eliminate another source of arbitrari ness, participation rates were riot dif ferentiated according to sources as before, but instead one single, participation rate was applied to all sources of revenue. P a r ticipation rates were increased for less developed units, and if this was not suf ficient, subsidies were granted. Increased shares and subsidies were to be determined on the basis of the funds heeded for carry ing out m andatory tasks and services. However, since objective criteria were not established, the familiar arbitrariness crept into the process. In 1960 only 9 percent, and in the following year only 3.6 percent of all communes were able to cover their . needs in the regular way (Bogoevi 19^4, p. 205). About one-half of all comrriuhes, had to rely on both increased participa tion shares and subsidies. W hat was in tended to be a corrective device turned out to be the main instrum ent for balancing budgets of lower units. The 1965 tax reform introduced the sep aration principle once again. The sources were allocated as follows. Taxes on per sonal income and sales taxes may be in troduced by all socio-political communi ties. A part from th at, taxes on property (and some other taxes) belonged to com^ munes, estate duties to republics and cus toms duties to the federation. Communes and republics are empowered to decide in dependently what kinds of revenue to in-

83.
trodiKT. [or (heir lerritories and to fix the tax: rates. There are two safeguards. The fedora.) government:' can fix tem porarily the limits for the tax rates set by republics and communes. Communes and republics are legally obliged to cooperate with one another in fixing the level of their revenues in order to assufe citizens equal tre a t ment. Republics and provinces are en titled to federal subsidies provided their per capita revenue is below the Yugoslav average and they have exhausted a llp o ssibilities for collecting revenue through taxation of personal income, in conformity with the economic potential of their pop ulation (Turcinovic, 1968). This tim e the criterion for subsidies has been defined somewhat more precisely. B ut it has also been criticized. Hanzckovic argues th a t approxim ately equal budge tary revenue per capita cannot be an ap propriate criterion. Instead appropriately defined necessary and justified expenditure should provide, a basis for allocations : (1967a, p. 7). In fact this seems to be the problem of the Yugoslav budget system. Yugoslav territories are extremely un evenly developed. Per capita income in the Republic of Solvenia is 5.4 times higher th an in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo. Communal budgetary revenues are, of course; even more unequal: in 1965 the m ost developed commune in Slovenia obtained per capita revenue almost 16 tim es higher than th e least developed com mune in Kosovo. Such extreme differences inevitably ruined all schemes in which al location criteria were not precisely defined. Konevski complains th a t in the new sys tem. more than one-half of communes in Serbia have to rely on subsidies, which is inconsistent with the philosophy of selfgovernm ent (1968, p. 116). I n 1968 the governm ent asked a research institute to study the problem. A group under the chairmanship of P. Sicherl pre pared a voluminous report (Sicherl el al.\ 1968). Sichcrl finds th at although differ ences between the developed and the un derdeveloped regions in per capita income are. extreme, differences in noliagricultural income per.w orker are small. He used a a special statistical method developed by his colieague;B. Ivanovic (1964) to es tablish ; th a t ' the distance between de veloped and underdeveloped regions'is ap preciably greater in the economic sphere th an in the sphere of social services and living standard. In a later article Sicherl argues th a t it is easier to reduce the dis tance in the latter sphere (in term s of flows of services) than in per capita na tional income (1969). As a basis for sub sidy computations, Sicherl takes account ing budgetary revenue which he defines as revenue obtained by applying th e average Yugoslav tax rates to actual tax sources in the region. The dilemma of whether policy should be based on the equalization of needs or of revenues is resolved in favor of revenues, on the ground th a t it is difficult to determine, needs in an objective way and th a t to do so is also inconsistent with the philosophy of decentralized decision making.- There follows a long and involved discussion of the most appropriate method of determining standard revenue. The dif ference between the standard and the ac counting revenue is t o . be covered by federal subsidy. Sicherls R eport has been discussed in government and parliam en tary committees b u t has not produced practical results as yet. Communal Economy: In daily life every man appears in a double capacity: -as a producer and as a-citizen. Thus direct democracy will also have two aspects: one relating to the work place, the other to the territory where citizens live. As m em bers of working collectives, people engage in self-management. As inhabitants of towns and villages, they manage th e ir af fairs by establishing local self-government. The territorial association th at corresponds

to the collective a t the work place is the 'commune. There has been a strong tradition in local governm ent in Yugoslavia since the. days of the N ational Liberation AVVr. Peo ples Liberation -Committees, as local governm ent bodies, worked with great in dependence, initiative and resourcefulness to supply the partisan arm y and organize daily life in the liberated territories. I t is hardly a m atter of chance th a t the first Peoples . Committee and the first Com m ittee of W orkers m anagement appeared simultaneously in the fall of 1941 in the mining town K rupanj. Peoples Com m ittees continued to exist after the war, but th an as components of a rigidly cen tralized system. The system was based on the principle of democratic centralism, which m eant th a t higher bodies could abro gate decisions of Peoples Committees. This practice was radically changed in the fateful year of 1952. The principle of democratic centralism was replaced by the principle of legality control (DordeviC, 1957, p. 24). D istrict Peoples Committees became organs of self-government and Communal Peoples Committees organs of local government. D istrict Committees had assemblies with two houses: one com posed of political representatives, the other of representatives of producers. The next crucial step was taken three years later. The; 1955 law on local self-government proclaimed th a t the Commune was the basic political-territorial organization of self-governm ent by the working people and the basic socio-economic community of the population on their territory. The C onstitution of 1963 changed the phrasing slightly to make the commune the basic socio-political com m unity. The develop m ent of the communal system has been greatly influenced by the historical ex ample set in 1871 by the Paris Commune, th a t finally discovered political form in which emancipation of labor can be carried o u t (M arx). I t is useful to notice, as D.

M ilivojevic.points out, ^hat the. commune has not been conceived as just a form of otherwise familiar local government. I t is a community of those living, working and producing, satisfying their basic needs, and realizing their civil and self-governing rights in a particular territory (1965, p. 8). For a while districts retained certain co ordinating functions and then gradually withered away. Since the commune is a territorial as sociation, one of the first problems to be solved was to determine the size of the territory, The problem was solved by practical experim entation over the period of a decade. Consistent w ith central plan ning was a hierarchy of governm ental levels. There were three levels below the level of republic: county (oblast), district (kotar) and local committee (mjesni narodni odbor). In 1951 counties disap peared. The orientation towards a m arket economy, made excessive adm inistrative fragm entationthere were more than 7,000 local committees unnecessary and so in 1952 the number of local committees was halved and committees were replaced by communes. In order to bring local government closer to citizens, in 1955 the : commune was made the basic self-govern m ent unit. Since, however, the commune was expected to exercise a wide variety of functions, its territory had to be increased. Table 13 depicts the process of territorial transform ation. Each new law on terri torial changes, remarked E. Pusic, was announced as the last and the definite one (1968, p. 245). Communal territory was growing larger and larger and by 1967 the average poulation size of the commune (40,000 in 1967) almost reached the poulation size of the district a t the beginning of the pro cess (48,000 in 1952). The district became superfluous and disappeared. The larger commune was more efficient, but less selfgoverning: th a t is why the new C onstitu tion provided for the creation of local

85.
T iMi i .f, 1^.- \ u m iie r o f T e r r i t o r ia l U n it s o p L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t (e n d o f t h e y e a r )

1948 Local corn rnil tee;/communities Communes Districts 7967

.

1952 V A

1955 1479 , 107

' 1967 : 4968* : 501 v-

_.
4052 351 V

427

* 1965. ; . ; -V'-.;, Sources: Jitgosldvija 1945-1954, pp. 35-36. SGJ-1968, p. 62. Yugoslav Suney, 1965) p. 3296. . . v

communities. These were to be selfgoverning communities of citizens in rural and urban localities concerned with all activities connected w ith the satisfaction of the needs of citizens and their families. J. Duricic describes three functions of a local com m unity: it is (a) a form of self-governm ent including traditional political activities, (b) a unit of town planning and (^) an -organization taking care of some social services, public utilities,etc. (1965), Pillsic .is rath er skeptical about local com m unities contributing, in any im portant way t6 self-government. In his view their activities are too restricted to be par ticularly attractive to the citizens and in a m odern urban setting territorial close ness per se generates no specially active social ties (1968, p. 243). There are 27,706 localities in Yugoslavia, and by 1965 sta tu tes of communes provided for the crea tion of 4,968 local communities (7.7 per cent of communes did not establish local communities a t th a t 'time). The organiza tional circle seems to have been closed: communes have replaced districts and local communities have replaced local commit tees. B ut considerable social experience has been accum ulated-in the process. A part from exercizing the functions of traditional local government, which in clude local politics, public utilities, educa tio n , social welfare, e tc ./a commune is also . responsible for other aspects of local life, D. Miljlcpvic explains this in detail.' The commune is^expected to harmonize indi vidual and sodalinterests. I t is responsible

for social property, either tinder its own control or belonging to enterprises, I t takes care of economic development aiid cultural advancement. It coordinates all economic, social and political activities on its territory, prepares a social plan and makes it possible for citizens to participate in the process of social decision-m aking (Miljkovic, 1961: Jelcic, 1969) . B ut com m unal self-government is a contradictory institution, remarked Djordjevic, as. it carries w ith it forces of Unification and disintegration Bpth forces will soon make: themselves felt. The 1955 law was preceded by extensive discussions about the functions of the commune. In a paper presented a t the annual meeting of Serbian economists in 1954 J; Davico m aintained, and those'! present agreed, th a t a labor m anaged en terprise had no incentive to embark upon substantial capital formation. In his opin ion large investm ent would imply creating a new enterprise which would be equally labor managed and so could not be dom inated. For this reason Davico argued th a t the commune was the natural investor in our circumstances (1954; p.; 192). As Table 10 shows, communes indeied became large investors. In 1964, when a m aximum was reached, 25 percent of all investm ent in fixed capital was financed by communes (and districts). Since 1959 commUnes .have ' been entitled' to initiate the setting up of all kinds of enterprises, to bring about mergers or carry out liquidations ( Bogoev, 1964, p. 129). However, the last economic

reform p u t an almost exclusive reliance on enterprises as far as capitalform ation was concerned, and by 1968 the communal share in investm ents dwindled to four per cent. B u t th is left other economic func tions of the commune intact. In cases of : failure of . an enterprise, the commune shares a good deal of the financial respon sibility involved. The commune also gives > guarantees for Credits and loans granted by the banks to enterprises located on its territory. For people accustomed to central plan ning, i.e. to adm inistrative m ethods in running an economy, it was difficult to imagine a really free m arket. They were determ ined to get rid of governm ental controls. I t seemed obvious th a t the best way to achieve th a t was to replace it by communal control. The self-governing commune would tell enterprises w hat to do and how to behave. In 1954 alid 1955 com m unes were empowered to determ ine the needs of enterprises and to distribute their profits after federal taxation. Since they were entitled to determ ine their shares in profits and since they were inde pendent in budget expenditures, com m unes taxed incomes of enterprises more th an t h e . latter could bear. The conse quence was a general price rise as shown in Table 6 and Figure 1. In 1956 taxation rights of the communes were again reg ulated by federal laws (Radovanovic, 1956b, pp. 113-16; Bogoev, 1964, p. V 166). / ; ' Gradually rom antic views of conflictless communities; local or otherwise, had to be revised. Hopes have been directed towards an impersonal m arket mechanism, b u t ex pectations have again been a little un w arranted, I am sorry to say as an econo m ist. B ut a t least people were willing to learn from experience. Enterprises gained communal boundaries. Communal banks, which kept appearing in the period 19481964, became ju st commercial banks. The

approach to communal economy, selfgovernm ent and life became far more so phisticated. The actual economic, social and political importance of communes has not decreased, though lately republics show a tendency to encroach upon com m unal finance. In an excellent study Bogoev surveys the development of communal finance (1964). In this context one difficult fiscal problemadequate finance for adm inistra tive and, in particular, for social services m ay be singled out for closer scrutiny. Bogoev and Petrovic point out th a t .the 1957 Resolution of the Federal Assembly on public expenditure and collective con sumption which together comprise gen eral consumption in Yugoslav term inol ogy as distinct from privately financed consumption) demanded th a t such ex penditure be tied to the economic po tentials of the area in question (Bogoev, .1964, p. 179; Fctrovic, 1968, p. 57). L ater the new constitution insisted on the prin ciple of work performed as one of the ta x ation criteria to be applied to revenues of socio-political units. Tax laws interpreted these two principles to mean th a t taxes should be collected in proportion to per sonal income. For this'reason the propor tional payroll tax gained in importance until after 1964 it became the only tax paid by the enterprises. Since collective consumption is a kind of personal con sumption collectively financed, it seemed just and proper to link it w ith personal in comes earned in a particular territory. The payroll tax was made even more attractive when it was arranged th a t it be paid into the budget of the commune where people lived and not where they worked or where the enterprise head office was located. I t is only recently th a t the short-com ings of the payroll tax and the fallacy in the rea soning by which it was introduced have begun to be discussed. Let me close this section by a brief re-

87.
view of the main activities of a commune. W hat communes do is best seen from a breakdown of budgetary expenditures, as shown in 1 able 14. Public utilities, education, infrastructilral investm ent and public adm inistration are activities controlled by the comm une more than by either republics or federation. Bogoev points out. th a t the communal share in to ta l budgetary expenditures is one of the highest in the World (29-35 percent or 50 percent without defense in Yugoslavia as against 30 percent in W estern Germany, 25 percent in Switzerland, 22 percent in Austria and 20 percent or 35 percent w ithout defense in the USA) (1964, p. 329). W hether this share has reached the upper lim it remains to be seen. Fiscal Policy: I add this section for the sake of completeness. BUt it m ight as well have been om itted. Strange as it m ay sound, there is no fiscal policy in Yugoslavia. In fact, this is quite consistent w ith the belief in the absenceor with the ignorance of the presenceof business cycles. ' Fiscal policy can affect aggregate dem and via the revenue or the expenditure side of the budget. The revenue side, taxatioii, has been recognized as a legitim ate tool of fiscal policy in theory and is sometim es used in practice. Producers turnover ta x has been occasionally used to affeet the general level of prices in order to absorb excessive purchasing power. Otherwise numerous tax changes have been made in order, to affect individual prices or to increase'the discretionary power of enterprises over their incomes and have not been intended to affect aggregate demand, To a certain extent selective'turnover tax reductions have occasionally had price stabilization effects. The federal government occasionally ran a substantial deficit in recession years, as for instance in 1962 and J965. B ut th a t was purely accidental, a consequence of the. combined effects of ta x reforms and the lack of revenues. Textbooks on public finance, w ritten invariably by people with training in law, keep on reminding students . of the tim e-honored principle of sound finance: the balanced bitdget. And since governments on all levels were not too scrupulous in their spending practices, insisting on. balancing the budget was quite justified. Bogoev points out th a t the budget has alw ays been balanced when presented to the Federal Assembly for acceptance and th a t only in implem entation would deficits appear. Deficits have am ounted to 10 percent of the federal 15 budget and up to 5 percent of republican ' a n d communal budgets, b u t have been much larger for extrabudgetary expenditures (investm ent, social insurance) (Bogoev, 1966* p. 159).

T a b l e 14. B u d g e t E x p e n d it u r e i n 1966

Total expenditure Total expenditure effected Education . Science and culture Social welfare and medical care Public utilities Public administration N ational defense Infrastructural investment Source: Turfinovie, 1968, p. 71. 100 ioo 100 100 loo 1Q & 100 100

Federation Republics and Commnnes ^provinces .4 5 .'8 0.1 5.3 52.0 19.4. 21.5 58.1 11.6 16.2 40.0 38.8 34.8 78.4 36.6 36.4 83.8 43.3 0.3 55.9

16.7 99.7 5.3

88.
The first public debate about fiscal policy took place in 1967. At an economic conference in Ljubljana Bogoev (1967), Hanzekovic (1967b) and Jclcic discussed the absence of fiscal policy in Yugoslavia and made various suggestions. Bogoev quotes the Resolution of the Federal As sembly on Economic Policy in 1967 which stated th a t there was excess demand and th a t not only had all budgets to be bal anced b u t also reserves had to be accumu lated. As our Figure 1 shows, Yugoslavia experienced an unusual depression in 1967. Bogoev also points o u t th a t proportional tax rates levied on payrolls have cycleintensifying effects and that, the small aAiount of transfer expenditures (unem ploym ent compensation, debt repaym ent subsidies) lim its the possibilities of an ef fective anticyclical policy. In the post-w ar period the federal government raised three internal loans (for the First Five Year Plan, to counteract the effects of the Cominform economic boycott and to finance the rebuilding of Skopje, destroyed by an earthquake). The sole purpose of these loans was to transform a p art of personal consumption into investm ent. Bogoev be lieves th a t the rigidity of the existing fiscal pluralism m ay be softened and an effective anticyclical use made of appropriately de signed federal budgetary subsidies to other budgets. B. Soskic is the only other economist who has made w ritten contributions re-, lated to fiscal policy (1969a). Soskic was primarily interested in the expansionary effects of public wqrks. In his view the most appropriate objects of increased pub lic financing are: housing and communal construction, road construction, land re clam ation and irrigation projects, and power generation projects. Such invest m ent projects are desirable also because of their very low im port content, as was pointed out by the IES. Soskic added th a t they were.also very labor intensive, which is of great importance for a labor surplus economy (1969b). VI. Self-Government, Market and Socialis?n Lim itations of space preclude discussion of two im portant lines of economic policy, agricultural policy and regional develop m ent policy. B ut there is one perm anent theme of Yugoslav social science discus sion which cannot be neglected: the in terrelationship between socialism selfgovernment and m arket. Recent discus sions of this problem will be surveyed in this concluding chapter. I have already discussed the familiar contention th a t socialism and m arkets ( commodity production) are incom pat ible. I t was the basis of P. Sweezys criti cism of Yugoslav economic policy as a gradual transition from socialism to cap italism (1964). Sweezy argues th a t the m arket restricts socialist relations arid transform s social ownership into a sort of collective ownership. M aterial incentives : and m arket orientation necessarily gen erate a profiteering m entality. The evalua tion of social usefulness by profit is char acteristic of a capitalist system. Gadgetry and acquisitiveness replace socialist values. This sort of criticism is fairly common. J. Bjordjevic argues in reply th a t the undesirable social phenomena are the re sult of industrial civilization a!nd not only the consequence of the.m arket. The aboli tion of the m arket means a return to etatism and state property. Self-govern m ent implies free disposal of earned income and, more generally, business autonomy which, in turn, implies m arkets. If this is not understood, the alternative is an old one: the eschatological idea of state rule and the re-education of man. M an would be placed under the tutelageof the state (or party, or some other mechanism) to be prepared and educated, so th a t one day he may become an adult socialist subject (1966, p. 96).

Yugoslav economists arc quite unani mous in believing th a t the m arket ought to be maximally exploited as a device of . economic organization. Philosophers, how ever, have their doubts. M. M arkovic, a leading philosopher actively interested in economic affairs, believes th a t initial forms of workers self-m anagem ent cannot be achieved w ithout m aterial , incentives which imply m arket competition. How-; ever, if exclusive reliance on money rela tions became a perm anent feature of the society, self-m anagem ent m ight gradually degenerate into a sort of capitalist co operative. If the results of work were per m anently evaluated in term s of income, and if the desire to earn as much money as possible became a perm anent and basic in terest of a worker, this would produce a personality type not; basically- different from the type produced by a capitalist ' society (1965, p. 70). Referring to M arx, some of my philosopiier colleagues declared th a t socialist com? m odity. production was a ,conlradiclio :i n ., adjeclo. In M arxs sense commodity pro- , duction implies m arket relationships w hich. result in commodity fetishism and vari ous alienation phenomena. I tried to clarify m atters in the following way. The.fam iliar statem ent th a t commodity production gen-, erates capitalism ought to be reversed. C om m odity production existed in slavery, feudalism, and capitalism as well as in 6tatism . I t clearly did not determine' all these socio-economic system s; on the con trary, it was determined by some more fundam ental social relationships and was shaped by respective ocial systems. Thus, for instance, capitalism resulted from pri vate ownership, etatism from state owner ship. Since there a.re so m any types of com m odity production, it need not be surpris- ; ing if we also find socialist commodity pro duction. The elimination of private owner ship does not necessarily produce social ism, although it m ay restrict the role of the'

markel considerably. If private ownership its replaced' by slate ownership, capjtalism is rep laced 'b y etatism and commodity fetishism by office fetishism. Jn bo(h cases relations among people are reified, social inequality preserved, class exploitation continued, essentially hum an existence made impossible. In socialism social owner ship makes social capital equally acces sible to anybody while the authoritarianism of -a privately managed or a state m an aged firm is replaced by self-management. In this context/the m arket and planning are not goals but means. If a working col lective is to be really autonomous in eco nomic decision-making, the m arket is in dispensable. B ut planning contradicts the business autonom y of an enterprise and so the choice is between planning and the m arket says a tim e-honored fallacy. In fact social planning, far from restricting, enlarges the autonom y of enterprises for a t least three reasons: (1) it reduces un certainty- which' is the basic restriction on free decision-making; (2) it increases the rate of growth, the m arket expands and so the num ber ^of available alternatives in creases; (3) it equalizes business conditions and so makes th e success of a producer less dependent on external conditions which he cannot control and which are economically and socially irrational (H orvat, 1968c). , The nature of the relationship between the m arket and the plan is a frequently discussed subject. Plan and m arket have been traditionally contrasted as two sepa rate mechanisms. B ut some economists try to develop a monistic approach. Bakaric argues th a t there can be no contrast ing, th a t the law of value reigns supreme and th a t planning is just one', although the most im portant, element in it (1963, p. 52) . This statem ent seems to be the reverse of w hat I said in the preceding paragraph and in the section on decentralization, b u t the contradiction is more apparent than real. W hat Bakaric tries to do is to combat the

voluntarism of etatist planning and (o show th at there is an -objectively given, frameWork within which . planners ;u- : obliged to move. Maksimovie understoo-.; this statem ent to mean too mucli laissez. faire to his taste. He criticizes t he inconsis tencies of the oflicially pro claimed economic polity and warns th a t an insufficiently con trolled m arket causes damage to individ uals (negation of distribution according to work), and io enterprises (different business conditions in various industries) as well as to the society a t large (less th an optim al production). All this tends to. generate an ideology which m aintains th a t socialism is not economically superior to organized capitalism, th a t inequality and exploitation are products of hum an nature and cannot be eliminated (1964). D. Mi sic sees the shortcomings of self m anagement, as it. exists today in Yugo slavia, prim arily in the fact, th a t it is con fined to the enterprise. Investm ent re sources arc not allocated rationally; in the present situation self-m anagem ent and planning contradict each other, the socialist distribution principle is negated and there is a tendency for group ownership to arise. As a result a laissez-faire approach is ex tolled. M isic suggests th a t the self-m an agement structure be completed upwards. He believes th a t the integration processes, which was discussed in the section on enterprise, are neither fast enough nor quite appropriate. M isic pleads for an integral system "of self-m anagem ent in which co-ordinating self-m anagem ent bodies would be created on the level of in dustries and also regionally. M embership in such associations would be obligatory (1965). M isics system resembles the system of Higher Business Associations which ex isted in th e tw o-year transitional period 1951-1952. A few years after self-m anage m ent became operative, the present au thor suggested a somewhat different ap

proach. A careful study of the economics of the oil industry showed th at there w a s ' very little to be gained by competition and a lot to lie achieved by a co-ordinated policy based on independent and compe ten t research. I suggested th a t industries possesing similar characteristics establish common b u t independent economic-tech nological research institutes. The institutes would prepare alternatives for major policy decisions. The most acceptible alternative, perhaps modified in the process, would be chosen by the representatives of enter prises through some sort of self-m anage m ent mechanism. The industrial research institutes would also serve as develop m ent planning institutions and as such would co-operate w ith territorial planning bureaus (H orvat, 1962c, ch. 24). Self-management in enterprises is just one element in an integral system, of social self-government. Fusic points out th a t such a system has three basic components: territorial (various levels of governm ent); functional (enterprises a n d ' institutions, i.e., work organizations); and social (cul tural, religious and other associations of individuals). Pusic is mostly concerned w ith the first component.. He is thus the first among Yugoslav authors to sLudy system atically the problem, of the w ither ing away of the stategenerally consid ered utopian outside Yugoslavia. The state will wither away when governm ent over individuals is replaced by the m anagement of things. Engels took this famous phrase o v er rom Saint-Sim on. The latter, as well f as other writers of his time, m aintained th a t public adm inistration was exclusively an instrum ent of power but th a t it was otherwise unim portant for the life of a na tion. M arx and Engles argued with the first p a rt of the statem ent, b u t regarded public adm inistration as very im portant. L ater an im portant duality appeared: public ad m inistration Was no longer exclusively an instrum ent of power, but was also en

-9 1 .
trusted with various socially necessary activities: education, medical care, social welfare etc., basically differ from defense, police and judiciary. The monopoly <f physical power m ight occasionally be use ful is not a t all necessary when social services are concerned. In socialism public adm inistration w ithout state political power becomes the question of the day. In other words, system atic planning and co ordination of social services does not pre suppose any longer the existence of a com m anding center such as is political power (Pusic, 1968). The interest unions and the quasi-fliarket, discussed in the section on institutional framework, represent an a t tem pt to move in this direction. Self-governm ent is not a purely eco nomic phenomenon. While economists are, naturally enough, prim arily interested in economic aspects, other social scientists explore additional dimensions. Lj. Tadic, the political scientist, points out th a t Yugoslav self-government socialism is mostly confined to the economic sphere. I t has been developed on the micro level w ithout a Corresponding reflection oil the macro level, th a t of the global society (Simpozij, 1969, p. 55); S. Stojanovic, the philosopher, m aintains th a t w ithout faster political democratization it is impossible to create self-government on higher levels of social organization (Simpozij, 1969, p. 34). R. Supek, the sociologist, explains th a t political pluralism does not meaii a m u lti-p arty system which can also be bureaucraticized. In a self-government setting political pluralism means direct control of various centers of power. How this is to be achieved is an open problem. Supek expects a certain duality of power to develop at first, a combination of classical representative democracy and self-govern m ent. Evidently, self-government is .not a closed and complete system. M any ques tions are still open,'m any problems unre
solved. Tin' Y ugoslav social laboratory is bound to be active for some tim e to come. Reference.'; D. Anakiovski, Foreign Trad, in the Yugo slav Reform, Yugoslav Snrvcv, 1969, 3, 71-84. D. Avramovic, Funkcija deviznog kursa u socijalistickoj privredi, Ekonomist, 1952, ' 3, 3-31. A. Bajt, "Osebni donodki in delovna storilnost, Ekonomska revija, 1956, vol. VII, 97-134.. ------, Raspodela nacionalnog dohotka i sistem licnih dohodaka u naso) privredi, Beo grad 1962. --------- , Optimalna velicina investicija iz nacionalnog dohotka, Ekonomist, 1958, vol. XI, 79-91. - ., Stopa rasta u nacrtu perspektivnog plana, Ekondvtist, 1963, vol. XVI, 584-91. :---- , Izvori inflacije u razdoblju posle reforme, Ekonomist, 1967a, vol. XX, 141 46. ----- , Faktori dohotka i osnovne ekonomske zakonitosti u njegovoj raspodjeli u so cijalistickoj trzisnoj privredi, Ekonomist, 1967b, vol. X X , 347-87. ----- - , Yugoslav Economic.Reforms, Mone tary and Production Mechanism-, Eco nomics of Planning, 1967c, vol. VII, 201-18, ------, Drustvena svojina-koektivna i individualna, Gledista, 1968, vol. XIX , 531-44. : , Fluctuations in Growth Rates in Post War Socialist Economies, Internation al Economic SeminarCESES, Balatonfured 1969a. . . ----- : Privredna kretanja i ekonomska politika u 1969. i 1970. godini, in Akfitelm problemi ekonomske politike Jugoslavije, 1969/1970, Zagreb 1969b, pp. 5-17. V. Bakaric, Problemi zemljiisne rente U prelaznoj etapi, Zagreb 1950. ------ ,, Aktuelni problemi izgradnje naseg privrednog sistema, Zagreb 1963. --------- , Aktuelni problemi sadasnje etape revolucije, Zagreb 1967. P. Basaraba, Changes in the Organization and Management of Banks, Yugoslav sur vey, 1967, 4, 77-81. ; ;

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-------jOsnove sistema drustvenog planiranja,

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Dokurcsent l>r. 3

N E K A O B E L E Z J A P R IV R E D N IH K R E T A N JA U S E D A M D E S E T IM G O D IN A M A B.Horvat MKovaCevic, Z.MthtSic, M.Ostmcanin, S Popov, S.Stajic. i saiwinict Reilaktori: OKovac, Z,Popov

Eiutitut ekonomskih nauka BeojjraJ F?76.

Serija DOKUMENTI 1 Uzroci i karakteristike privrednih kretanja u 1961. i 1962. god Autori: B. Colanovic, D V. Pertot, S D im itrijevic, V, Frankovic, B Horvat, I. Perisin,

Popovic, V, Stipetic, V, Trickovic, F Vasic. Fledaktor: B Horvat

BEOGRAD, oktobra 1962

2, Ekonomske funkcije federacije Autori: B Gluscevic, H D Vojnic Redaktor: B Horvat Hadziomerovic, B. Horvat, N Kljusev, B Sosklc,

BEOGRAD, decem bra 1970.

niclca redakcija: 'isiiJiir; A.

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Povodom savetovanja ..Aktueini jKoblemi. pnvrednili kretanja i ekonomske politike Jugoslavije 1976/77 , In^titut'^kqnomskili nauka u oyoj svesei objavljuje ona istrazivanja svojih saradnika koja se odnose na neka IdjujSna obelezja' privrednih kretanja u sedamdesetim godinsuna. Institut, na zalost, ne pripada krugu institucija koje su namensta finansirane za pracenje tekufiih privrednih kretanja. Stoga on i ne moze redovno da priprcma i publikuje kratkorocue analize ekonomskih tokova. Medjutim, po prirodi svoje osnovne delatnosti izueavanje pnvrednog razvoja, privrednog si* stema, planiranja i ckonomske politike u svim znacajnijim oblastima Institut raspolaze rezultatima nesto dugorocnijih istrazivanja koji u ovom trenutku mogu biti relevantni. Posebno u ovoj godini, kada se rezultati prethodnog l prva d o stignna u okviru novog petogodisnjeg plana moraju posmatrati iz dugoroenije perepektive, Pristup analizi privrednili kretanja sa veceg vremenskog odstojanja nw~- biti opravdan i cinjenicom da mnoga obelezja aktuelnih privrednili tokova poticu od dubljiii korena, koji cak i predeterminisu neka bududa kretanja, Ovaj rad, medjutim, ne pretenduje na sveobulivatuost, Analiza u njemu odnosi se samo na neke kljucne probleme i segmente prlvredne aktjvnosti u sedamdesetim godinama.. Time je ujedno odredjena i njegova kompozicija. Polazi se od sagiedavanja promcna u stepenu razvijenosb zemlje i njenih komparativnili pnvrednih dostignuca, U drugoj glavi se, aaime, anaiiziraju unoredne stope privrednog rasta Jugoslavije, drugili eviopskih socijalistickih lOECD /iriiudja, kao i promene njihovih nivoa razvijenosti opsteg nivoa ccna. Naredni odeljak u celini je posvecen ispitivanju periodifinili, kratkorocnili i dugorocnih fluktuacija stope rasta osnomih privrednili indikatora. Ova ana3 Od drugih indikatora privrednili periormnnsi kompaiativno se iskazuju globalna produktivnost rada i stabilnost . .

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1*61101] druitvenok i A nvrednog razvoja naso zemlje

1970tin godiiw

sc u svakom slu-aju moie smatrati vrto mteresantnim i u odrcdjenom smislu kontraverznim U ovom momcntu se osivarena tareianja ne mogit ocenitj. niti se mogu aJekvatno evaluirati u svim svojim dinicnzijama Tek kvoz izvcsno vrcm^} kuda se budu akumuhrala potrebna saznanja i sve ieljene informacije kada se buJe nispolagalo sa vise parcijalnih nauonih istraiivanja, bie nioguce da se pruzi kompleksna anaiiza oceaa predjenog puta druslvunog i pnvrednog razvoja u ovom perioJu No, i pored toga ovaj rad pokuSava da izvrsi anahzu odredjenih obelezja razvoja nase x .e mlje tokom 1970till godina. Ukoliko se posmatraju uslovi u okviru kojili se odvijao nas diuStvum i piivridni razvoj u ovoj deceniji onda se izgleda moze reCi sledece: na poOetku avog perioda :!njStvcno politicka klima nije bila posebno pogodni! kako za tomeljit pristup planiranju c rustvenog i privrednog razvoja, t.ako in zu pnvrednog razvoja; u drugom delu ovog period a, sa usvajanjem uovog Ustava i razradom sistemski'i zakona, druStveno pditiSka klima postaje veoma pogodna. Toje i iskoristeno za resavanje nekiii otvoremii pitunja u privredi. kao i za pazljivu pnpremu tcr;ua zapostepeno resavanje azbAjnyihi uugorocmjih problema koji su ss nagomiluh u toku doaidaSnjeg razvoja; iiticaj nieujunarodnog okntzenja na na3 pnvredni i drtiSlveni rnzvoj u ovoj decjniji, gledaco it cehni, bio je nepovoljan, naroiito u 1974 i 1975 godini, DruStveni i privredni razvoj nase zemlje, ostvaren u ovakvim domacim i ekstemim uslovnna, imao je sledece ostiovne karaktemtike: stopa opstcg prjvrednog razvoja je bila relativno skromna: cistvarena dinaimka jc bila nizn nego u pretliodnoj deceniji, strukturni problemi zaoitnni, efikasnost investiranja nije poboljSana; akumulativna sposobnost privrede je smanjena, sto je uglavnom posledica: nedovoljvie dinamike i strukturc razvoja u duzem periodu, objektivnili neinoguc;iosti da se rashodi opste i zaje^nioke potrosnje usklade sa fluktuacijama tempa privrednili aktivnosti, dcfektnosti sistcma slicanja i raspodcle dohotka ltd.; zaustavljen je izrazito nepovdjan trend opadanja stope zaposljavanja, a kasnije 7 privrede su dalje
m-

aiironizovane napore u pravcu resavanja otvorenih problema u privredi i ubrziuijt.

je dosio do poslepenog povecanja zaposljavaiija. Na ovaj nacij je ublazen jedan krupan druJs ...ni problem i dehmiono su iivoreni uslovi da se on efikasnije icsava;
stopa rasta produk tivnosti rada jc u eelom pcriodu vrlo niska, a u poslednje d\ e

godine i riegafovna Ovaj krupan problem j poslcdica niza uerssemh sistemskih pitanja, kao i dosadasnje poliukc razvoja. te cc u narednirn godinainu morati biti od pnoiiletnog znaiaja, platni bila<5 kojijc u pooetnim godinama ovog perioda bio izuzetno nepovoljsin, izgbda ziiai-ajiio poboljinVt rnada mvu stvoreui sigurni ustovi za njegovo traj no '.'li nn nisanje; uspeSno je zaustavljen vrlo Hinamic&n rast cens. Medjutim,- jos uvek nisu n'ajno ehminisana osnovnazarssta mllaciju, tako da c c ovaj problem morati bin jedua od osnovmii preokupao.ija nasc ekouomske poUtike; lzgradjen je mehanizam drustvenog dogovaranja . . .

1 samotipravnog sporazumevanja,.

all on jos uvek ne pokazuje potieban stcpen cftlcasnosti*, stvorene su osnove za izgraanju novog samoupravnog pristupa plamranju naseg limStvenog i privrednog razvoja, sto treba da bude veca garancija da se nas buduci privrcdni razvoj vise ncde odvijatj numo utvrdjenih

1 pozeljnih pravaca.

Na osiiQvu ovili zapazanja, i na osnovu analizc u ovom dokumenuulruslvcni i prxvrcdni ravoj nasc zeinlje u 1970-tun godinania sc jnoze po1oljno.qccni. ti. U ovom penodu neka od izuzetno knipnih pitanja naSeg proieklog razvoja su uspeSno rcseua. O.no iiloje jos \aznije, stvoreni su pciyoljniji uslovi da.se postepeno i sinhro.uzovdnini naporuna efikasnije rcSavaju i dmgsi pitanja koja vec vrlo dugo spuhivaju br?.i druStvcui privrodni razvoj zemlje.
U narednoj godud. a i vio krnja ovog.srednjoroenog plana, nekuliko pi-> b le m a c c moraU bits u vizi inreiosa nasc sikonymske pohtike, l o su u pr\om redu a !:unuii:i!ivna Kposobnosi privrcuc1 sainaupravm m iiiianizm n alokacije.akum ulaciju, , proiiuktivnoM rada i ol'ikasiiosv pnvrsdjivaiija.,

Ukoliko se ovj problemi budu uspesno vesavali, naravno uporedo su )/ gradnjoni novog privrednos < ! ! etna. a posebno ofikasnog si stem a (melianizma) cin.)< stvenog dogo.-iranja samoupravriog sporazumov naja i opcraihnog sisieina surnoupravnog druStvcnos planirjfinju :>l\orice se potrebm preduslovi za osetno ubizanj? Jinamike privn'dnog rar.- nj;;, i-j.iy i za resavanje drugih kumuliranih, ali sekundarmh, problema u naSoj privredi. Msdjutim, ako se ovi problcmi rie budu efikasno resavali, nasa privredace da se razvija sa prosecniin stopama kojc nece omoguciti ostvarivanje osnovnih ciljeva drustvenoekonomskog razvoja..
S

II STEPEN RAZVIJENOSTI I KOMPARATIVNE Iw Y R E D N E PERFOSMANSE

Poznato je da su mnoga od osnovmli obclezja svnkspn* vrcde u nekom trenutku u sustmi odredjena ekonomsium proc^sima i param?. nma trajnije pnrode. Otuda analiza ncsto dugoroomjih tendencija u ldju^mm pnvridnim tokovima moze da pokaze

1 one karaktanstikc 1 uzroke 1 globalnoj

aktuelnih

ekonomskih perfoimansi koje konjukturni mdikaton ne registriju. l'emeljitije ocene o dostignucima efikasnosti ncke pnvvede se takodje ne mogu zasnivati samo na aktuelmm odnosuna njenili glavnih makroekonomsJdii vanjabli Takvi suclovi moraju da se oslanjaju na dugorojjiija ini'rijuuar^'jiia poreJjeija okonc-inskOi. performj'isi U ovom pnlogu sc sn tom namcrom prikazuju rszultati uporednog ispitivanja stopa rasta ..IrustvOiW, proizvoda, stcpena razvijenosti. globalnog ra sta prodnktivnosti ] cena u Jagoslaviji, drugim ovropskim socijalistiJkim zeniIjama i zemljitma OECD u pojedinim etapaina posleratnog razvoja.

KOMPARATIVNE S I OPE RASTA

Brzi privredni razvoj Jugodavjje u poslednjcm tndesetogodisnjein psnodu odavuo je poznata i mnogo puta lstieana cinjenica- Ona je u odredjejjom razdoblju spadala dju desatak sa

11 red zemalja

koje su se o2igledno najhrze razvija-

Je.. To razdoblje obuhvata ;;odine izmedju 1952. odnosno 1953.

1 I960.1 I mc

privrednun rastom u razdoblju 19531960 j:

fimo su St; sa pnvrcdnmi rasiom Jugosiawje mogh merit! Ja^au mediu kapitaiisticlam zemliama i DR NemaJka medju socijalistiolam zemljama. U Jugoslavjji je stopa rasta ukupnog drustvenog proizvoda lznosUa 8,6% godisiije, u iapa*A ko sc climiri'se 1952. odin?.'!:ac nc prcdnosti pri izracunavanju stope rasta, n jp u v o ijn a za Jugosiavijtt, stvari se ni u co rnu b itno nc m cnjaju, U slucaju da sc ova godiua uzm c za osnovu, to bi pruzalo izvcs-

iiu H,5% a u DR Nemackoj 8,0% Sve ostale zemlje (bilo kapitalistiCke, bilo socijalisticke) pokazivale su manji rast globalnog drustvcnog proizvoda (stopa rasta svili ostalili socijalisticlah zemalja iznosila je 7,6% prosecno godisnje), Shcno se moze reci i kad sc rast posmatra po stanovniku. U ovom iispektu. koji je znaiiajniji od prethodnog, prcdnjafie DR Nemacka, u kojoj pored wsokog globalnog rasta privrede stanovnistvo statno opada (stopa rasta per capita 3,9%) i Japan (stopa rasta per capita 8,3%). Jugoslavia sa stopom rasta dmstvenog proizvoda pet capita od 7,2% proizvoda od 6,0%), Period koji potom nailazi, od 1960-1975. godine, karaktcriSc se ^otovo zajedniukom tendencijom opadanja globalnih stopa rasta druJtvenog proiz voda, kao l rasta per capita, Sto se narooito ispoljilo u poslcdnjim godinama, To sc bolje uocava po pojedinim razdobljima, Penodizacija mje za sada mogla bitt ostvarena prema pravom ekonomskom rasudjivanju, vcc je privafiejia jedna zajedmcka za sve zemlje (po petogodiStima), da bi se omogiicila uporedjenjn, koja su i ovako instruktivna i isticu tendencije o kojima je rec, U razdoblju 19601965 stopa rasta jugoslovenskog druStvenog pro izvoda per capita (racunajuci po stalnim cenama iz 1972. godine) iznosila je 5,7% godisnje. U isto vreme je prosccni rast per capita bruto domaeeg produkta (GDP) svili zemalja OECD-a iznosio 3,9% (isto toliko i za evropske zemlje OECD-a, a za zemlje EEZ 3,8%), Nekoliko zemalja iz ove grupe kapitalistiCkih zcinalja is tice se osetno sponjirn rastoni (Kariada sa 2,9%, SAD sa 3,3%, Svajcarska sn 3,0%, Turska sa 2,9% i Velika Bufaiiija sa 2,5%), dok se brzini rastom izdvajaju Japan (sa 9,0%) i cri zcmlje juzne Evrope (Sprauja sa 7,5%, Grcka sa 7,3% i Po rtugal sa 5,8%). Prosecni rast evropskih zcmalja OECD-a bio je isti kao u periodu 1953-1960. (3,9%), dok je za sve zemlje OECD-a bio osetno sporiji (2,3%), sto je svakako posledica veoma slabog rasta SAD (0,8%), cija niasa produkta per capita znatno utice na formiranje proseka. Rast drustvenog proizvoda evropskih socijahstiCkih zemalja (bez Jugoslavije) per capita lznosio je u proseku 4,8%, ViSim stopama rasta isticu se Rumunija (8,7%), Bugarska (5.7%) i SSSR (5%). Izuzetno nizak rast pokazivala je Cehoslovacka (1,3%), Prema tome, svega nokoJiko zemalja je u ovom razdoblju pokazivalo veou stopu rasta drustvenofi proizvoda po stanovniku od Jugoslavije, Razdoblje od 19651970. godine odlikaje se u Jugoslaviji vidljivim opadanjern stops rusta diusivenuj; proizvoda per capita (4,8%), dok je u ostalim socijaiistickim zemljama u proseku rast znai.no ubrzan (6,4%). I pojediiiaono sve > dalje stoji na celu sviU ostalili ze rnalja (sve socijalisticke zemlje zajcdno imaju stopu rasta per capita drustvenog

10

Tabela 1. St ope rasta drustvenog proizvoda per capita lugoslavije, evropsloh socijalistickfli zemalja i zemaljaOEGD u periodu 19531975,

Zemlje, odnosno grupe zemalja SFRJ Bugarska MadjarSka DR'.Nomacka Poljska Rumunija SSSR Cehoslovacka Socijalisticke zemJje (bez Jugoslavije) Zemlje OECD-a (ukupno) Evropske zemlje OECD-a Zemlje EEZ

'1953 do 1960

1960 do 1965

1965 do 1970 .4.8 7.9 6.4 5.3 5:2' 6,4 6.6 6.5 6.4 3.6 3.9 4.0

1970 do 1975 4.8 7,3 5.9 5,6 8.3 10,4 4.6 4,6 5,3 : 1.7 2.0 1,8

1960 do 1970 5.2 6.8 5 1 4,5 5.0 7.5 5.8 3.9 5.6 3.8 3.9 3.9

1960 do 1975 5.1 7.0 5.3 4.9 6.1 8.5 5.4 4.1 5.5 3.1 3.3 3.2

1953 do 1975 5.9 6.8 5.0 6.1 5.9 7.8 5,6 4.7 5.7 2.8 3,4 3.7

7.5 . 5.7 . . 5,7 6.5 4.2 ! 8.9 5..5 6.4 5.9 ,5..7 60 2.3 3.8 3;7 4.8 8.7 5.0 1.3 4.8 3.9 3,9 3.8

4:8

3.9

Napomena: Stope rasta Jugoslavije i ostalih socijalistickili zemalja odnose se na druStveni proizvod, a za zapadne zemlje odnose se na bruto domaci produkt (zapadna definicija). Izvori : OECD, National Accounts of OECD Countries (1950-1968, 19601971, 1961-1972,1962-1973); OECD, Main Economic Indicators, Septembar 1976; SEV, Statisticesld ezcgodnik stranJlenov SEV 1975; SZS, Drustveni proizvod i narodni dohodalc po cenama 1972: 19521973, Statist!cki bilten br. 909 Beograd, 1975; SGJ 1976, str 134155; OUN, Year book of National Accounts Statistics 1969. ove zemlje imaju brzi rast od Jugoslavije. Kapitalisticke'zemlje, u'globalu-u ovom razdoblju ne pokazuju neke osobite promene u rastu. Znatno vise od prosecnili su.kao i ranije, stope rasta Japana (11,6%), Grcke (8,7%), Portugala (8,2%)! l Spanije (6,6%), dok izuzetno nizak rast ima Velika Britanija (2,0%}.' Razdoblje 1970^1975; karakterise seulaskom kapitalistickog sveta ii krizni period, stoje imalo odgovarajuceg odraza u stcipama privrednog'rasta. Stopa rasta svili zcmalja OECD-a u proseku svela se no thdnje od polo vine u poredjetiju sa prethodnim razdobljima'(1,7%), Sto vafi i za'zemlje EEZ (l,8%),Jok je priblizno na polovini kod evropskih zcmalja OECD-a, Na ovako slab rast zema-

Ija OECD u celinl svakako su znatno uticalc niskc stopc rasta velikili zemalja u ovoj grupaciji (SAD sa , %, SR Ncmacka sa 1,3% i Velika Britanjja sa 1,7%). prose ne stopc rasta isticu iste zemlje, kao i

11 1 ovog puta sa znatno vecom od

ranije, mada im jc rast osetno opao u poredjenju sa proteklim razdobljem (Ja pan samo 3,9%, Grcka sa 4,4%, Portugal sn 5,8% od 19701974. godine, Spamja sa 4,6%). Visu stopu rasta nego ranije una samo Turska (4,9%). Prosccna stopa piivrednog rasta Jugoslavije je u ovom razdoblju is tovetna sa onom iz prethodnog razdoblja (4,3%), dok je prosecni rast svih ostalili socijalistickih zemalja neSto opao u poredjenju sa ranijim petogodiStcm (5,3%). Samo SSSR i Cehoslovacka medju ovim zemljama imaju neSto nize stope rasta od Jugoslavije. U eelom periodu 19601975. stopa rasta Jugoslavije je znatno

1112a

nego u proseku 19531960. Rast ostalili socijalistickih zemalja je neSto b iii ne go privredni rast Jugoslavije, a stopa zemalja OECD krece sc na oko 3% u prose ku, sa izrazito visokim stopama u vec pomenute ietiri zemlje. Ceo period od 22 godme (19531975) karakterise sc rclativno viso kim stopama rasta druStvcnog proizvoda per capita socijalistifikih zemalja, pri demu je rast Jugoslavijc neSto bizi u proseku (5,9%) nego rast ostalili socijalistifikih zemalja (5,7%), dok je rast zemalja OECD-a u celini skroman (2,8%), neSto jaoi u eviopskim zemljama ove grupacije (3,4%) i u zcmljama EEZ-a (3,7%).

PROMENE U STEPENU R A ZV I3ENOSTI

U proseku znatno brii rast druStvenog proizvoda pa i bruto naeionalnog produkta (zapadne definicije) Jugoslavije nego zematja OECD-a, nesumnjivo svedoci o tome da se nag druStveni proizvod per capita osetnije prlbli io nivou odgovarajucili agregata per capita razvijenih zapadnili zemalja. Uporedjenje koje ovde dajemo odnosi se na bruto nacionalni produkt (GNP) u godinama 1955, 1968. i 1972, a prikazano je u relativnim brojevima na bazi tekuce vrednosti dolaia u odgovarajufiim godinama. Iz naredne tabele se vidi da se u posmatranom periodu od 17 godina Jugoslavija znatno priblizila nivou bruto nacionalnog produkta per capita ra zvijenih cvropskih zemalja i SAD. Pogotovu je znaCajno opao razmak izmedju -fugosiavije i SAD, kao i Jugoslavije l Velikc Dntanije Ovo nije cudnovato, s ob12

Tabela 2, Nivo GNP per capita osam evropskih zemalja i SAD u poredjenju sa Jugoslavijom 1955, 1968. i 1972. godhie (Jugoslavia = 100,0) Zemlja Danska Vchka Britanija Norveska Belgija' Francuska Holandija SR Nemacka Italija Qsam evropskiii zamalja SAD 1955 421.9 459,3 424.7 447 403.9 408.1 385,7 223 375.8 828 1968. 286.2 262.1 281.8 281 4 291.3 266.8 274.0 177.5 254.7 472.7 19 72. Stope rasta .1955-1972. 40

2 '5.9
214.6 259.5 273.1 283.7 247.0 245.7 157.2 229.6 392.9

6 8 6

2.0 36

3.6 4.5 3,5 3,9. 4,5 3.6

2.1

Napomena: Obracun GNP Jugoslavije u tckucim dolarima odgovarajucih godina izvrscn je na osnovu jedne detaljne komparacije izmedju Jugoslavije i Francuske (v. S.Stajic, .A il International Comparison of'Yugoslav National Product , Ekonomska analiza, 1971, br, 3 l konst eci 4) rezultate rada M Gilberts i saradnika (Milton Gilbert and Associates, ^ "Cowj)ara*ive National Products and Price Levels, OEEC, Paris, 1958). } &! Ove poslednje rezultate kasnije je korigovao Kravis (Irving B. Kravis, ' ? '^1-rV ^Extrapolations of Rea] Product and Purchasing > Power Comparisons" . ' li: John Pincus, Economic Aid International Cost Sharing, The RAND Corporation, 1965, Appendix, Chapter 3),. Prvi rezultati komparacija GNP Jugoslavije, SAD i navedenih evropskih zemalja za 1955. i 1968 godinu autor je izlozio u jednqm radu iz 1973 godine (v.S.Stajic, Neke ocene s'tepena razvijerioslt Jugoslavije putem sintelickih monetarnili agregata", Ekonomska misao, 1973, b r2 ) Ovi rezultati su medjutim kusnijc morali biti korigovani s obarom na nove po'datke u vezi sa obraeunom Jugoslavia/Francuska i Jugodavija/S AD. Izvori: OECD, National Accounts of OECD Countries 19501968, 19611972.; US.Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, Volume 56, Number 1, Part I January 1976; OECD, Yougodavie, Avril 1976; SZS, S G I- 1976. zirom da je rast GNP per capita u Velikoj Britanijl u ovom ntzdoblju iznosio 2,0%, a rast SAD 2,1%, dok jc u Tugoslaviji iznosio 6,7%, dalde preko tri puta vise Poslc Jugoslavije najvisu stopu rasta ovog agregata po stanovniku imale su Francuska i Italija (4,5%), a potom Danska (4,0%) Jugoslovenska stopa rasta je 13

u ovom slucaju za oko 90% visa od prosecne stope rasta svih osam evropskih zemalja. Prema najnovijim obraCunima, bruto nacionaini produkt (GNP) Jugoslavije po stanovniku 1972. godine iznosio je 1427 dolaia iz te godine, a druStveni proizvod 1130 dolara, na bazi pariteta internih ku^ovmh snaga dinara i do lara. Jedna detaljno izvedena komparacija izmedju Jugodavije i ostalih evropsldli socijalistickih zemalja za 1972. godinu omogucila je da se dodje do realnili odnosa GNP i dmStvenog proizvoda po stanovniku Jugoslavije i ovih zema lja, kao i da se utvrde razlike u mvoima ovih agregata u 1953. godim i nekim drugim godinama posmatranog dugorocnog perioda. Iz podataka ovih obracuna vidi se da se razmak u nivoima drustvenog proizvoda po stanovniku Jugoslavije i ostalih socijalistickih zemalja u celini smanjivao sve do 1964/65. godine, a da je otada ponovo poeo da raste, sto je u skladu sa vec prikazanim podacima o stopama rasta drustvenog proizvoda po stanovniku

Tabela 3. Ocinoci c niStvenog proizvocia po stanovnikii u socijalistiildm i zemljama 19531975. godine (Jugodnvija =100,0) Zemlje Bugarska Madjarska D R Nemacka Poljska Rumunija SSSR CSSR Sve socijalistioke zemlje (bez SF R I) 1953 130,1 185,6 189,1 188,4 96,1 187,9 268,4 184,6 1960 122,5 149,9 207,1 166,0 89,6 169,2 181,1 167,8 1965 1970 142,3 147,4 193,4 162,5 1972 146,6 148,6 192,9 170,8 123,4 175,3 1975 159,7 IS 5,2 201,3 191,9 144,0 177,3 211,S 178,2

122,8
136,8 188,5 159,0 103,1 164,2 196,8 161,0

111,2

179,4 213,7 174,0

211,0

172,6

Napomena: Navedeai obracuni radjeni su u okviru jednog projekta za Republicku zajednicu nauke Srbije. Projekt se nalazi u zavrsnoj fazi, Za obracune su koriSceni zvanicni, za sve zemlje jednoobrazni podaci, objavljeni u statistickom godisnjaku SEV. O primenjenim postupcima blize informacije se mogu dobiti u Institutu ekonomskili nauka , Beograd.

14

Pojovhnaciio uiev. razmak je a otinosu uu Jugoslavia u poslednjoj godini porastao znatnije koJ Bugarske, D R Neinacke sto takodje odgovara razlikama vnikii.

1 osobito kod
.

Ruimnije,

a neznatno kod Poljske, dokjc opao kod Madjarske, SSSR-';.i CehoslovaSke ,

li

stopama rasta drustvenog proizvoda po stan<> ,, ;

Uporedjcujasa bruto. nacioiu'ilmm produktom po stanoviuku pokazuju u ncznatnoj men nepovoljnije rezultale za Jugoslaviju. Veluwne ovog agregata izvazene u dolarima
iz

1972 godine omoguiiuju odrcdjena upuredjeuja sa na-

vcdemm zap adnocv raps kim zcniljama i SAD. Tabcla 4. Uporedjenja bruto nncionalno^ procIuUta po stanovniku razvijenih zapadnil: i socijalistiilcih zemalja u 1972. godi'ii ..GNP per capjta . fdolara) 5607,7 3937,9 3o63,l 3704,8 3S98,0. ' 4050,2 3525,1 3506,7 ' 2243.6 3277,7 1427,4 2095,1 2087,3 23lS,3 2485,4' 1840,0 2645,4 3084,9 2579,6
O d llO S l

Zemlja

(SAD = 100,0)

SAD Danska Vehka Britanija Norveska Belgija Francuska Holandija SR NemaCka Italija Osajn cvropskiii zm aija JugodavSja Bugaiska Maajarska DR Ncnia-ka Poljska Riimunija SSSR CSSR SocijalistiCke zcanlje (bez Jugoslavije)

100,0
70,2 54,6

66,1

69,5 72,2 62,9 62,5 40,0 58,4 25,5 .37,4 37,2 50,3 44,3' 32,8 47,2 55,0 46,0

Napbmena i izvori kao u Tabali 2. IS

Prethodna tabula pokazuje da je proscom nivo socijalistiukili zcmaljn u 1972- god m i bio iznad nivoa Italijo, sto je slucaj sa vecipom po jedm acm h zemulja ove grupa (D R N c m a Jk a , Poljska, S S S R i C S S R ). Bugarska i Madjarska su sc zn atno iJribhzile mvou Italijc, a D R N cm acka i Cehosiovacka tadasnjcm mvou Velike Bntam je, O vo je ucsumnjivo rezultat daleko br/cg pnvrednor; rasta ovih zemalja u porcdjenju sa rastom navedcmh zypadm h zemalja.

GLOBAI.NA PRODUKTIVNOST RADA

NaveJeiii obracum omoguduju da sc sagledaju na izvcstan nacm i ra zlike u nivou produktivnosti rad a izmcdju nckili razvjjeiiili zapadmh zemalja i Jugoslavijc, kao i izmedju Jugoslavije i ostalih socijalistiJLiii zamalja,* Bilo je moguce utvrditi koeficijentc za svodjcnjc bnito nacionalnog produkta na naiu dcfiniciju druStvenog pmizvoda samo zu dvx godinc (1968. i 1972.) za osam zapadnocvropskih zemalja i SAD Na taj naiin se mogu posmatrati razlike u mvou globalne produktivnosti rada izmedju Jugoslavijc i pomenutili zemalja, mada se mora reci da rezultati fcoje pokazuje uarcdna tabela za pnjedii)ac;ne zemljc imaju pnbhZnu vrcdnost, Vecu taOnost pokazuju rcruUali za cclu [jrupu evropskili zemalja
i

za SAD.

Bitnijiit promciia za ovo kratko vremc u odnosu na navedene cvropske zeniljc, 'Lao calinc, mje bdo, ali jc vjdnija promena uastupila u odnosu na SAD, sto je svakako posledica vrlo sporog privrediiog rasta ove zemljc Nasuprot ovome, obracum o kojima jc liilo icC'i pruzaju moguenosl da sc ,jrati uporedno krctanje giobalnc produktivnosti rada u nepoljoprivrodnim itelatnostima cvropskih socijalistickih zemalja i Jugoslavije od I960, do 1974. io dine.
* O v a r a lm a tia n ja su tlu lin iic iia i ni.ui u p o tp u n o s ti up o re d iv a m c d ju g r u p a m a ze m u lja k o je sc p o s m a tra jii, iz viJc razlo ^a: ( i) n a o sn o vu p o d a ta k a z a p a d n ih zcm .nlja tc sko jc u du~eni nizu C vojitl 5 >rochn.'; v u i ' m s t m a tc rija ln c p r o iz v o iln jc o d n u p r o iz v o d n ili Uclalno.'iti; (ii) O f o u o d g o v a ra ju ic m sm isiu c c s to v azi i za b ro j z a p o s lc n ih . S to g a n ijc m o g a ce pratiti c g za k tn o rasl i'lo h a liK ' p r o d u k t iv n o s ti rada, jcr p rae cn jc p r o r iu k iiv n o s ti rada na o s n o vu G N P a p o z a p o s lc n o m u svim p r o iz v o d n im i n e p r o iz v o d n im d c la tn o s tim a n c da jc pravu slikii d in a m ik c i n iv o a p r o d u k li v n o s t i ; (iii) u s o c ija lis tic k im z c m lj a m jc v tlo lir.iko utv id ii i p tav i b r o j z a p o d c n ih u p o ljo p r iv r c d j, ta k o da j c m o y u c e p r a t it i k rc ta iijc g io b a liie p r o u u k tiv n o s ii iiiu'a sam o u v a iip o ljo p r iv r e iln im d c la tn o s lim a u k u p n o , i n a isti nafiin uporcdjivati nivo p r o d u k tiv n o s ti la d a u p o jc d in im godinam a-

16

Tabela 5 Odnosi nivtta produktivnosii rada nekih evropskih zemalja, SAD i Jusoslavije 1963. i 1972- sofline (na bazi tekucih dolara) ;; * . 1968. 3,1 2,9' .3,5 3,1 3,2 3,3 3,2 Jugoslavia = 1,0 1972 3,3 2,3 2,9 3,0 3,4 3,6

Zcmlja

Danska ' Velika Britanija NorveSkn' Bclgija Francuska Holandija SR Nemaeka ltalija Osam evropsbh zsmalja SAD Jugoslavia

'

2,0

2,8 2,0

2,9 6,5

1,0

2,7 5,6

1,0

Izvori: Za 1968, godinu vidi: SStajjc, , >Jckc ocene...., Ekonomskn misao, 1973, br.2. str. 92; za 1972 godinu novi obraeum istogautora; Pored izvora navedemli u Tabeli 2. jos i- OECD, Labour Force Statistics 1962-1973, Pans, 1975

U razdoblju 19601965, yt!e netiostaju odgovarajuci podaci za Poljsku, rast produktivnosti rada u Iilgoslaviji bio je briii nego u ostalim socijalistiikim zemljama u proseku (stopa rasta 5,2% prema 4,7%). Pri tome valja pomenuti dii je rast u SSSR-u i Bugarskoj bio brzi nego u Jugoslaviji (5,8% i 5,4%), dok su u drugim zemljami stope rasta bile niskc ili je cak produktivnost bila u opadanju (Madjarska sa Q.ofy i Rummiija sa - , %). U sledecem razdoblju je globalna stopa rasia svih socijalistickili zcmalja vcea nego u Jugoslaviji, sto vaii i za sve zemlje pojedinacno, osim Cchodovakc, gde je stopa rasta ravna jugoslovenskoj. U razdoblju 19701974, razmak izmcdju stope rasta produktiviTosti rada u Jugoslaviji i ostalim soeijahsti3 kim zeiinljarria skupa jos vise rasta. Jedino se niskom stoponi izdvaja DR M cmacka (1,5%) i ncsto vcdoin od jugosloven ke,Ceh.oslovacka (3,4%), U celonipmodu 1960-1970. stopa rasta produktivnosti je u Jugo daviji ncito niia (za okec

11

10%) od stope lasia svih ostalili socijalistieldh zsma17

lja zajedno (bcz Poljske), a osetnije je uiza kad sc posinatra period od I960 -1974, godinc (5,6% prema 4,5%).

Tiibela 6 Rast "lobolne produktivnosii nido u Rcpoljoprivrcdnim delainoBtima soeijnlistiHuh zcmrija 1960-1974. Zsrnlja Bugarska Madjarska DR Nemacka Poljska Rumunija SSSR CSSR Socijalistioke zemlje (ukupno) Socijalisticke emlje (bez Poljske) Jugoslavia I960 do 1965 5,4 3,8 1965 do 1970 1970 do 1974 I960 do 1970 7,0 2,5 4,3 5,2 1960 do 1974 6,9 3,4 3,5 , ++> 7,0

0,6

8,6 12,0
5,7 4,9 5,0 6,5 4,8 6,3

6,8 11,6
4,6 3,4 5,9 5,7 3,2 5,8 1,5 7,3

5,8 1,9

1,1

60 6,1

6,1 6,1

5,7

6 . 1++)
5,6 5,0 5,6 4,5

4,7 5,2

6,4 4,8

++) 1965 1974, Napomena: vidi Tabelu 3.

Pri svamu tome..- razlike u nivou globalne produktivnosti fada nisu znacajne, csk su u nekim od izabranih godina celog perioda razlike bile za Jugoslaviju povoljne. U poredjenju sa podncima o nivou drustvenog proizvoda po stanovnikUjto bi kozivalo da je u nepoljoprivrednim delatnostinia ostalih socijalistitikih zemalja, po pravilu, procantualno prema stanovniStvu vise zaposlenih nego u Jugoslaviji, KarakteristiCno je da jc nivo produlctivnosti rada u odnosu na njyo u Jugoslaviji relativno opadao u DR Nemackoj, Celioslovackoj i Madjarskoj.dok je u ostalim zemljama rastao. Sve do 1970, godine razlike u nivou su ili u korist Jugoslavije ill su sasvim neosetno u korist ostalih socijalistickih zcmalja u celini. Razlike se neSto povecavaju naStetu Jugoslavije posle 1970, godine. Pored razlika u stopama globoJnog privrcdnog rasta u razdoblju 1970- 1975. (ostalc soci jalisticke zemlje 6,2%, Jugoslavia 5,8%), navedenim razlikama u nivou produktivnosti dopritico jc verovatno joS i br2i rast zaposlenosti u Jugoslaviji (3,67), nego u ostalim socijalistickim zemljama (2,6%) u razcioblju 19701974, godinc.

IS

Tabela 7,

Nivo globalnc produktivnosti rada u vanpoljoprivrednini delatnostima sodjaJisti5kih zemaJja 19601974. (lugodsvija = 100,0), Zemtja Bugaiska Madjatslca DR Nemacka Poljska Rumunija SSSR CSSR Socijalisticke zemlje (ukupno) Socijalisticke zemlje (bez Poljske) Napomena: vidi Tabelu 3. 1960 72,0 98,7 1965 72,7 74,2 113,9 106,9 56,6 96,7 109,8 96,3 97,6 95,3 1970 S6,7 77,4 114,3 107,6 78,9 1C4 109,9 103.1 102,7 1972
'7-1 ,4 83,5 107,1 117,8 98,8 US 114.6

1974 99,5 B5.7 107,1 126,0 108,1 116,0 111,4 114,4 113,2

122,2

77,2 94,2 129,3

,8

113,0 113,0

STABILNOST O P S lE G N 1V G A CEN a

Privred.ii cast u toku posmatranog dvadesetogodisnjeg razdoblja bio je praen u zapadnom svetu stalnim globainim porastom asna ICoreiativni (imlicitni) indeks cena ukupne privrede u svetu tiziSne privrede rastao je iz razdoblja u razdoblje. Karakteristicno je da su u periodu 195 31960. korelativni globalm indeksi cena u zapadnim zemljama bili znatno nizi od indeksa rasta globalnog domaieg produkta (GDP). Indeks rasta ukupnog GDP u zemljama OECD-a iz nosio je 3,6% (za evropskc zemlje ove grupacije 5,0%, a za EEZ cak 5,8%), a indeks cena 2, 7%, odnoaio 3,7% i 3,3% U dcceniji 1960-1970, indeks volumena GDP-a lznosio je 4,9% za sve zemlje OHCD u proseku, a korelativni masks cena 3.4% (odnosno 4.j2% za evropske zemtje i za EEZ), Razmak izmedju ukup19

nog produkta i rasta cena se u ovom vazdobljU osptna.snisiijioj tj. rasl ulcupnoh produkta se smanjio, a rast cena ubrzao ii poredjenjii.aa.pvetliodniin penodom. Ovo je jos ociglednije ako se posmatraju posebno razdoblja 1960-1965 i 1965 1970, gde sc jasno raspoznajc tendency a brzeg rasta cena od rasta GDP-a.. Pode 1970. godine rast privrede jc znacajnt) opao, clok je globalni Indeks cena po tn i vise puta nadmaSio rast drustvenog produlcta, sto se mo e vi videti u narednoj tabeli. Tabela

8Korelativni globslni iiickksd eena i rast ukajiuog dnistvenog proizvoda u zemljamn OECD i u jusoslaviji

Zemlja odnosno ;irupa zemalja

1953 do 1960

1960 1965 do do 1965 1970

1970

I960'

d0 ^ do 1973' r '- i5 7 [r

1960 do 7-i73+ )

1953 do 1973+)

A) Indeksi cena V.oinlje OECD (ukupno) E-/rnjs:.e zemije OECD-a Zemlje EEZ GNP J avjia DP 2,7

2,6
4,1 4,3 14,3 14,6

4,2

5,9 . . 7,4 7,1 19,2 19,0

3,4

4,0

3,5

3,7

4,2 4,1 S,0 8,4

4,2 4,2

4,9 4,9 13,7 13,9

4,5 4,3

3,3
5

..8

11,1
- 11,4

11,1
11,3

5.9

B) intleksi volumena Zernlje OECD (ukupno) Evropske zemlje OECD-a 2emlje EEZ GNP .ru^oslaviia DP 3,6 5,0 5,8 8,7 5,2 5,0 4,8 7,6 4,6 4,7 ' 4,6 6,9 5,8 2,6 4,9 ' ' 4,2 4,1 3,8 4,0 4,4 ' . ' 4,5 7,4 6,7

- 5; : 4,9 '47i 5,9 ' " 5,8,

"12 '
6,3

8,0 7

6,8

6,8 6,1

L Podaci o indeksima ccna n Jugoslaviju u ovim koloriama odnose se rta razdo ) blja koja se zavrsavaju sa 1975, "odinom. Svi podaei o indeksima rasta ukupnog produkta u navedenim kolonama iniaju Icao krajnju godinu 1975, Izvori: Jsti kao kod Tabele 1

20

Razmak izmedju stopa rasta cena i stopa rasta ukupnog produkta mora da je stvarno jos vciSi, posto podaci o rastu cena koji su nam bili na raspolaganju clopim do 1973- godine, kad je rast cena posebno bio dobio zmijajno ubizanje. Ideju o tome mogu da nam pmze podaci o rasta cena liene potrosnje u zemljama OECD u tazdoblju 19701975. Prosecno u svim zemljama OECD-a ove ccne su rasle po stopi od 8,4%, a u evro^slum zemljaina ove grupacije 9,9%. Inace su se cenc u oblasti licne potrosiije u psriodu 1960-1970, godinc ugiavnom kretale paralelno sa c ra n ia globalnog domaceg bruto produ kta (po goinjim grupacijama 3,0%;
i

4 2% u ovom desetosodjstu).

U toku resavanja druStvcnoekonomskih i sistemskih pitanja u re lacijama trzisne koncepcije privrede i rrotuceg otvaranja prcma spoljnom svetu, ciji sc uticaj morao osccati, u Jugoslaviji su prisutna (u toku celog pcnoda) m flaciona kretanja. fColiko utiou na taj proces intcnii uzroci, a koliko spoljni do sada nijc dovoljno istrazeno Saino u izvesnoj mcri su nckc tendcncije slicne o nima u zapadnim zcmljama: jcdino u periodu 1953-1960, godine globalni rast ccua jc sporiji od rasta ukupnog GNP-a,odnosno DP-a, U ostalim razdobljima je situaeija obrnuta. Rast ccna u Jugoslaviji je osctno veci od rasta cena u zcmljama OECD-a. Mada su i stope rasta dnistvenog proizvoda,odnosno bruto nacionalnog produkta vise nego u zapadnim zcmljama, odnos izmcdju stope rasta DP
i

stopa rasta cena je priblizno isti u Jugoslaviji i u zcmljamn OECD-a u periodu

i

19531960 i u razdoblju 19701975, dok je u razdobljima 19601965,

1965

4970. taj odnos u Jugoslaviji csetno nepovoljniji ncgo u zapadnim zcmljama. Tabela 9. Odnos izmedju stop;; ins la itlaipnog rimstvenog proizvoda j filobdnog rastn cena 1953 do I960 Zemlje OECD (ukupno) Evropske zemlje OECD-a Jugoslavia 1,33 1,35 1,36 1960 do 1965 1960 1965 do do -1970,., , 1970 1970 do 1975 0,31 0,28 0,31

2,00 1,22
0,47

1,10 1,12
0,69

1,44 1,17 0,55

O 1972,

globalnom rastu cena u ctslalitn sccijalistifilam Jtcmljano podaci

su dosta oskudni. Podaci icojima se trenutno nspolazc kredu se od I960, do odnosiio 1973. godine. I oni si-, medjutim , dovoljni da poka u netrzi-

21

sm karakter privrede oviii zemalja i da

mi

cene cvisto administrativno (planski)

regulisane, Istice se njihova gotovo potpuna nepomiCnost, Tabela iO, Sto-e rasta cena a cvn^skim socijalisti:lam zemljama Zemlja Koiclativni indeksi cena DP 1960-1972. Indeksi cena licnc potrosnje 1960-1973.

Bugarsla Madjarska D R Nemacka Poljska Rumu nija SSSR CSSR

0,8 1,6 1,6 0,1 0,0

0,7

1,2 0,1
1,4 0,5 (1961-1973)

0,0 0,8

Izvoii: U.N., Yearbool; of National Accounts Statistics 1972, 1973. i 1974; Apercu statistiquc tie k Tch?codovaquie 1975. Orb is. Prague; B.AskanasF Levcik, Entwiklung und Niveau tier Lohnc in der RGW-Lamder, Wie ner Institut fur Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, Reprint Serie, Nr 21. 1976. S obzirom da nismo raspolagali podacima za godine posle 1973, m je mogiiee rc'_ ia li svi x u kojoj rneri dogadjaji koji sn nastali na svetskom tiiistu imali nekog uticaja na kretanje unutrasnjili cena u ovim zcinljama.

22

Ill FLUKTUACIJE I STABILNOST 51ASTA

Ceo poslcratni drustveni i privredm razvoj jiase-zemljc nioguce jc dehti na razne podperiode, Sve ovakvc podele imaju odreJjcno opravdanje, Polazcci od osnovnih ekonomskiii karakteristika predjenog puta naseg razvoja i prmednog sistema na kome se ovaj razvoj bazirao, moguce jc razlikovati sledeea tri vrlo razlicita perioda; A, 19451952, odaosno 19451955: ovaj period je Josta heterogen jer obuhvata (ibnovu zcmlje, uvodjenje centralistiOkog adrrunistrativnog sistemaj jia I- rajli njegovo postepeno napustanje. Stope rasta u pojeiimm njegovim doloL vima su vrlo skromne Porast cena je vrlo visok, narocito do 1952. godinij ; B, 19521964. odnosno 19551964: uspostavlja se radnicko sanioupravljanje, stopa rasta se izvanredno ubizava, tc u industriji iznosi u proseku oko 12,5% Uz japansku, jugoslovenska privreda razvija se najbrze na svetu. InJustrijske cene su sLabiiiie (rast ispod nja; C, od 1965. Rodme, tj. od uvodjenja pnvredne reforme, cije intencije i njihovc posledice dominiraju celini rrecim razdobljem. U ovom periodu Vjolazi do osetnog usporavanja stope rasta, tako da ona recimo u liulustriji izaosi 7% za period 1964-1976. Jugoslavia vijy nc spa la u grupu zemalja koje se najbr ze razvijaju. Poiast cena u ovom periodu je izrazito dinamican. Potpuno iiov fenomcn je nezaposlenost i odlazak naSih radrnka na privremeni rad u inostranstvo ERkasnost privredjivanja opada Dobro je poznato i opste prillvaceno da se nas privredni razvoj od* vijao u ciklicnim oscilacijama. Na osnovu precizne kvantitativne analize utvrdjeno je da je do sada bilo sest ciklusa, a sedmi jc zapoeeo prosle godine. Takodje je utndjeno da postoji odredjena povezanost (uslovljenost) izmedju ciklicnog kretanja privrcJnili aktivnosti i mcia ekonomske politike (tj izmena u ekonomskoj 23

1%);

poljoprivredne rastu radi korigovanja ram-

jih neekonoinsldli pariteta. Brzo raste zaposljavanje i efikasnost pnvredjiva-

politic i, izrnena u pnvrednoin sistnmu ili njegovim clclovima ltd ) Polazei od

ovjli elemenata ciklusi b; se mogJi ovako po deliii (videti grafove la 1 lb):

Razcloblje A I cilJjus; od III kvartala 1949 do II kvartala 195 5 (23 loaiUila), Razdoblje B II ciklus: od II kvartala 1955 do II kvartala 1958 (12 kvartala); III ciklus: od 1 kvartala 1958 uo IV ' kvartala i960 (10 kvartala); 1 IV ciklus: od IV kvartala I960 do I kvartala 1965 (17 kvartala); Razclbblje C V ciklus'. od I kvartala 1965 do ;I kvartala 1972. (29 kvartala); VI cildust ad II kvartala 1972 do 1! kvartala 1975 (12 kvartala),VII cikills: od II kvartala 1975 .. ' Ovakva periodizacija ornogucuje da sa u ciklicnom kretanju privrcdnog razvoja uuce odredjene pravilnosti, Nakon dugackog prvog ciklusa koji je trajao gotovo

6 godina,

dolaze dva kraca ciklusa u okvim kojili su izvrsene pripreme

za novi privredm sistem. Sa privrednom rcformom je iiiiciran jedan dugacak cik lus, koji je trajao preko 7 godina. Oko 19711972. godine ckonofnska politika se koncentrisc na stabilizacione mere. U ovom kraccm medjupcriodu glavna paznja se posveeuje ublazavanju nastalih poremecaja u privredi (pre svega na obuzdavanje visoke inflacije) i na pripremanjo novili institucionalnili resetvja koja su inkoiporirana u novi Ustav. Dalja karakteristika svih ciklusa jeste da se reforme pacinju u siiaznoj fazi ciklusa ^ime sc recesija produbljuje, Ukoliko jo reforma radikalna kao 1951 51, 1965 ill 1975 67 76, stope rasta industnje i gradjevinarstva bivaju draiicno pogodjene. Amplitude oseilacija u razdobiju C manje su od amplituda u pretliodna dva razdoblja. Proizvodnja je znatno veca i privreda znatno sktfcnija pa se eksiremne oscilacije vise ne 1976. godini. Pogledajmo giaf 1 b. Institueionalne promene i opsta deflaciona politika Narodne bankc zausiavili su elspanzivna kretanja privrede i 1967 rast je zaustavljen. Zatim se reaguje upumpavanjem novca u privretlu sto dovodi do obrtanja ciklusa znatne akceleracije rasta i, posle 1969. godine, do inflacije Maksi* mum akceleracije postignut je 1969, godine Lad se oiklus ponovo obice na dole U ovom slucaju se cine pokusaji da se merama ekonomske politike- sprcci re > 24
mogLi

tolerisati.

U gornji okvir ireba smestiti interpretaciju efekata ekonomske politike u

cesija all i da se stabiliziraju cenc Rezultat je ncophodnost administrativnog uplitgnja

li

pnvredni zivot Od 1971. godine stabilizacija je isldjuoiva briga, a ad-

miiiistrativne inteji'vencijc u privredi su stalno prisutnc Svetska inflacija probija stabilizacione barijere industrijske cone u 1974. godini rastu za 29% (sto jc dva put a veci porast no sto je bio ukupni porast cena za citavo nizuobljc 1952 1964), a s njima l'infclustrijska proizvodnja koja ostvarujc novi vrh u 1974,godini. Taj vrh odgovava onom iz 1964. Ciklns se obice na dole ,a institucionalne promene pojacavaju iisporavanje i u prvoj polo vim 1976, godine, rast se zttustavlja sliCno onome sto se desilo 1967 U nastavku treba oeekivati da dodji do obrtanja ciklusa na gore kod relativno mirnih cena Medjutim, administrativno zadrzavanje ccna dovelo je do toga da u mnogim grupacijama cene nisu mogle piatiti troSkove tako da je doslo do smanjivanja akumulacije i pojave gubitaka. U medjuvremenu u privredu su ubacivane enormne kolicinc novca sto je dobrim delorri bilo uslovljeno institucionalnim promenama Kao rezultat likvidnost privrede je znatno poboljsana. 1 na kraju* odga-Jjanjem pnlagodjavanja kiirsa,dinar je u odnosu na valute nekib naSih Bpoljnotrgovinslcih partnera fakticki revalviran.a u celini je precenjen.Time je stvoreno jos jcjno ;::mste poremecaja trziSne ravnotezc Kako troSkovi moraju biti pokrivcni i.uesucije se ne mogu obustaviti zbog nedostatka akumu lacije, a spoljnotrgovinska I'uzmena ne moze se nastavjti daljnjim povecanjem premija, subveneija ili uspostavljanjem nekog administrativnog egalizacionog fonda, te je prilicno ocigledno da iduce godine mozemo ocekivati nove inflatorne pritiske, Stvorena likvidnost ce tu nacSi svoju upotrebu Proizvodnja ce verovatno biti iznad proseka za razdoblje C Izvesnu prcdstavu o tome sta se moZe ocelavati u narednc 3 go 4 dine dobicemo razmairanjein dugili ciklusa. Dugi cildusi u grafu 2 i 3 dobiveni su kao pomicni proseci kvartalno obracunatili ciklusa iz grafa I Do 1964, go dine primenjen jc 4godisnji prosek a posle te godine u naCelu eluninise uticaj kratldh ciklusa iz grafa

1.

6godisnji, sto treba da

Graf' 2 pokazuje da jc prvi dol drugog ciklusa postignut 195152, a drugi 1969 godine Prenia tome, cildus je trajao oko 18 godina Maksimum je postignut 1959, sredinom drugog petogcriisnjeg plana koji jc ispunjen za Getirl godine. Odonda pocinje iisporavanje. Treci petogodisnji plan i ni jedan posle njega nisu vise bili ispunjcnj Ipak, treba istaci da jc usporavanje posle 1959. go dine najvaitm delom (izuzev
li

poljoprivredi) rezultat nacina kako je sprovedena

refomia iz 1961, sto je svojevremeno delaljno analrziiano

1V idetj: U zro ci i karakteristikc privrednili kretanja u 1961, i 1962 godine , Savezni zavod za piivrcdno planiranje, D o k u m e n to cio n aanniilifiki matcrijali 7, Beograd 1962

25

Posledica oviii mera je bilo uspora'anje proizvodnje u 1961. i 1962. (v.graf 1 a), sto je narovno uticalo i na smanjivanje cet vorogodisnjc prosecne slope .rasta. Medjutim, 1963. i 1964. godinejjile su povoline. tako da privrcda pocinje da pokazuje znakove vracanja na ranije trend ove, Medjutim, reforms iz 1965, godine utice na iznicnu ovih tendencija, tako da se trendovi privrednilt kretanja obrcu na nize do novog dola dugog ciidusa u 1969, (videti graf 2). Posle ovoga zapocinje novo opravljanje trends razvoja koje je opet zaustavljeno 1975.godine U celini gledano privreda se sada nalazi ti^zlaznoj fazi drugog ciidusa te, ukoliko se ne dogodi nista na podrucju institucionalnih promena, u periodu 1976-80 , mogu se occkivati vise stope rasta nego u pcriodu 1969-1976. No te ce stopc biti jos uvek znatno nize od onih u razdoblju B. Graf 2, narocito upozorava na sporu ekspanziju poijoprivrede i izvoza, Graf 3 daje odredjene indikacije o performansama privrede. PojavIjuje se zanimljiva korelacija izmedju zapoSljavanja i efikasiiosti investiranja.Te dve linije se gotovo poklapaju, Objasnjenje toj pojavi treba traziti u cinjcnici da vcce zaposljavanje pod normalaim ekonomskim okolnostima, znaci i bolje koriscenje kapaciteta. Linije ^aposljavanja i efikasnosti investiranja razilaze se pre 1956, i posle 1972 godine sto bi moglo biti indikacija da okolnosti nisu bi le tada normalne. Trend produktivnosti rada pokazuje

6 godisnje zaostajanjc za tren-

dom efikasnosti investiranja, Maksimalna (dugorocna) efikasnost investiranja postignuta je u 1958, a maksimalni porast produktivnosti rada ostvaren je 1964 godine. Minimal na efikasnost investiranja ostvarena je 1968. godinc i od tada se blago popravlja uz piacajniji pad u 197.3, godini. Dugorocno usporavanje rasta pioduktivi'iosti rada i dalje se nastavlja. Ukoliko sc vremenski pomak zadrzi, taj pad stopc rasta produktivnosti mogao bi biti dugoroeno zaustavljcn u 1976. godini. Produktivnost je privremeno makroekonomski fcnomen To znaci da ona bitno zavisi o ekonomskoj politic!. Organi ekonomske politike inoraju stvoriti uslove za brz pnvredni rast jer ce samo tako organizacije udruzenog radn moei plasiiati povecanu proizvodnju, moci ce finansirati povecanje kapaciteta i instalirati novu tehnologiju, te ce moci poboljsati koristenje ljudskili i materijalndi resursa i kao rczultat tog procesa pojavice se povecana efikasnost. Evo i empirijske ilustracije. Razmotrimo sto sc desava sa zaposljavanjem i produktivno sti li godinama bizog i sporog porasta proizvodnje tj. u vrhovinia i dolovima ciklusa Privie^c ^ cz poijoprivrede,

-Ti j Icnom cn nije spucifican za jugpdovcnskii privrcdu vaj jn z u p a ic n . ma. Usp. International Encydop^ia of Socid Sciaiccs, sv, 12, i5 2 8 .

iu

drugim privruila-

26

Tabela 1, i'roduktivnost u vrhovimrs i f'^lavLtnn dklnm Godisnje Qodisnji porast zaposlcno p'.oduktivnoat] u Tada n % Marginalni proi^vodni koeficijent*

000

Vrliovi ciklusa Dolovi cildusa

167

6
3

Izvor: B.Horvat, Privredni cihinsi u iugjdaviji, Institut ukonomskih iv.mka.Geo grad, 1969, s 54. .. U vrhovima ciklusa privreda zoposljava gotovo civaput viSe novih radnika nego u dolovima, a u isto vreine porast produktivnosti rada i mnrginaini proizvodni kocficijent, (koji .meri efikasnost invest! ranja) dvaput su veci, Kod t rajno visoks stope rasta efekti nece biti toliko izrazeni kao kod ciklicnih kolebanja, ali jo3 uvck biti xnacajni. Obicno se postulira potreba ne samo povecanja produktiViiosti rada kao takva ve prvenstveno veci doprinos proizvodnji od porasia produktivnosti nego od povecanog zaposljavunja, U sporim privredania kao sto je npr. engleska uueo produktivnosti rada je vsci no u Jugoslaviji, ali je stopa privrednog rasta nekcliko put a niza Takodje, u razvijcnim privredama iiojc su iscrpile rezcrvoak radne snage iz poljoprivrede, doprinos produktivnosti je veci. U stvari same za ovakve privrede vaii zakljuCak o identicnosti brzog poveeanja produktiviic.:;ti rada u nupoljoprivrodnim sektcmma i opste stope privft'dnog rasta. U nianjo razvijeniin privredama s velikim nr/.ervssnu radne snngc. 'inprinos .'foizvodnji i'd novog zapoSljavaaja bice vwil U to mo ne sanio da nema niSia loScg vec, naprotiv,to prs-Jstavija r;wiomil.';ip';t i.^maksimaliiQin povecanju drust\ene proizvodnjc Ta ekspanzija proizvodnje bici; maksimaina samo onda ako je i porast produktivnosti rada dovotjno visok No kakvice biti iclativni dcpnnosi prouuktivnosti i zapoSljavanja sasvhn jc irelevantno, oni nisu determinants rasta, vec su rast cm determinisani. Sto je-brzi tempo privrednog razvoja. brze ce se iscrpiti rezervc radne snage i brzc ce ss menjati proporcije u; korist produktivnosti rada. Iz goinjeg razmatranja proizlazi nedvosmisleno da sc problem pro duktivnosti rada resava tempom privrednog rasta Razmotri li se poSetak i lcraj grafa 3, zapaza ss da perfomianse privrede nakon 1971. godine podsecaju na one od pre 1956 godine. Prc 1956, go27

dine, kad je zavrSena kljucna kapitahia izgradnja inicirana p m m 5goJisnjini planom, privreda je bila administnitivno regulisana Ekonomctrijska anaiiza izvrsena u fnstitutu ekonomskili nauka, pokazyje strukt)>mi preokret u 1956. gndini

.3 Prema tome imamo indikaciju da su perfonnanse

privrede posle 1971,go

dine slicne onim koje smo irnali u admimstrativnoin psriodu. Ekonometnjskom analizom ponovo bi trebalo utvrditi da !i je zsista doslo do novog sirukturnog preokreta u privrednoj orcjanizaciji Od intcresf-.i jo upozoriti da je pre vise godina u: Institute ekonoms kiii nauka izvisena prngnoza stnikturnih pokazatelja za 1971. i 1972. godinu Ta piognoza
i

.4
-

njeno ostvarenje izvanredno dobro se poklapaju Na osnovu

ov d

ga se moze zakljuciti da nam danas nase poEiiavanje pnvrednog meaanizma vec omogueava da prognoze ovakve vrste vrSimo s prilicno velikom sigunioscu. Ukoliko bi ova nasa izlaganja na neki nacin zeleli da rezimiramo,onda jc izgteda moguce reei sledece U narednoj godini bi trebalo oCekivati ubrzanjc rasta proizvodnje, viSu stopu mflacije i povecanje stope uvoza. Takodje treba ocekivati da stopa rasta produktivnosti rada postane pozitivna, a da se naslavi (pa i ubiza) porast zaposljavanja. U narednih nekoliko godina, a pod us]ovom da ne dodje do novih ostrili zaokreta u ekonomskoj politici, treba ocelavati vi se stope rasta i proizvodnje i zaposlenosti od oniii koje su ostvarene u poslcdnjoj decenijiu

3Up B,Horvat, .Tchuicki progres u Ju g o sla v iji", Ekonomska Hilflliza, 1 - 2 /1 9 6 8 , 29-57, 4Ta je prognoza objavljena u EUononistu, 1 - 2 /1 9 7 4 . i zatim u D Horvat, litika stabilizadje, N ap iije d , Zagreb 1976.

Ekonomska f >

28

iklii,jj rruiiiMiiK\ - n d je w:irsi*-n /

r ivo-

proifcvotlnju

I g4 9 19(>4,

i T fupoA ioj\ . Z i

!i;= | ; 'npDA^io.sd inuiuAJMup . U iM

L'^H j

"1
OqOJ 2 A 0 /.1

(\

irftipO Azicua niippjALTtlofio^_ _

r f u p o a /:i o jd :* s | j j s n p u i j
p o . v z i o . l j H J r .A J K i> ip

- H I

r:.r nticav

---- m dustrijska proizvoilriia

1955

66

67

oS

tiy

70

71

72

73

74

75

1976.

C-tniHr. CikhiM im hislnju. ITsdjuvinaiSTva i n'-poljormvrefiiie proizvoiinii: 1966 1976.

IV UTICAJ PK2VREDN0G SISTEM a I EK0NOMSKE m L n 'IK E Promene u privredncun sistemu i mere ekonornski; poliiiHu iiiaOajiiu uticu na privrednu aktivno;i u svim stklorima. Pri razniatraiiju sSanja pnyrade n:; prelazu iz 1976.. u 1977. godir.u, pcsebno je, mcdjutim, rslevantno sagiedati napredak u izgradnji sistema ssmmpravuog dniStvenog plansranja i njegove ufektc, institucionalno udovljcne faktore iuflacije i dejstva novog sisisma obracuna i plai'anja na monetamo kreditnu sfcnt U
svuti

ovim oblastima doslo je, n;|ime, u toku 1975. i

1976. godine, do bitnih privrednosistemskih, odnosno institutional nih promena

NEKE KARAKrERISTfKE EVOLUC1 SISTEMA JE DRUSTVENOG PLANIRANjA

U pojedinim fazama naseg razvoja stavljan jc nialicit akccnal ua pojedino funkcije planiranja, uslcd ccga sc menjao i njiliov medjusobni odnos i karakter, Sa protekom vremena, sve je vise bilo planskih pokazatelja sa osobenostima ditelttivnosti koji su popnmili obelezja indikativnosii, Fromcnc vredne paznjc odi grale su se i u domenn nosilacu planskc aktivnosti. ZnaCaj drzave n itsmcravanju kretanja slabio je.a uloga privrede, odnosno radnih oi;;nnizacija rasla je. Paralclnu sa ovim kretanjima odvijale su se i izineuc u nacinu fbimulisanja plana, kao i u karakteru l vrsti instrumenata l mera koji su korisccm za realizaciju planirantli kft tanja. Rastao je znaJaj vrednosnih pokazatelju u ptanuanju, a meuju instrumontima na znaiaju su dobijali indirektni, podstieajm instrument!. vc to dcivdo jc do jafianja trzisnog na racun planskog melianizma u icgulisanju process drastvenc it' produkcije Promene u sistcmu planiranja vrSene su kako bi sc ono uslikidilo sa novonastahm okolnoslinia kojc su prc svoga bite uslovljcnc: visim stcpi:nom pnvrednc

i lehnieke razvijcnosti zimlje i transformacijama u privreduoj strukiuri.kao

i socijalnoj i l;adrovskoj strukturi stanovnistva; uvodjejijein samoupiavljanja i svega onoga sto je ono znacilo za druStveno ekononisici i politioki sistem u celim. a posebuo za karaktcr svojine i prava upravljanja procesom dnistvenc roproduk cije; porastom odgovomosti republika i pokrajina za stnnje kako u njiliovim privrcdama, tako i u privredi zemlje u celini; vecim stepenom otvorenosti nase pnvrede prema inostranstvu itd

k'->:aa\ h so p iU iijc da h i Taa^a ! k m ja jijii i i n u o m

11.i a a d o u d i;a U;

iaa-aaa nan-a'-'Ta"

u I ' o h ic iii d s ia n a n la m n m ja r
r r e c t z iia a : i n r . ' i j an a M lo v u

D a kd - daa' vd aa ;a

p b a d ja

ueayk 'd < je ;- Q

ko g a

sa

us I

s1 i ;V;.u-'

piansktf akmnrstl Jedno od mogiKjih ro&enja je da su lai knlerj 2 asni!-i na cilK-i;na l zed scima k > sislem planiranja, odnosiio pojedini plano\ jsvoja aabi a:a \jc i =i;iu; poscavijajL! i . .op--a niedjii<xinu;.;u i okUu! a kodte a u tdijevi ; ::.nbaaj, aaaa aap i 5 O r u sc pa (> v iu jhutnrda na Uciuajn ;;anu> a np'u.ni-au na.'.u,. '.a.,: au^n. -G ;'ius!u poras: slope priviaulnos rasia. prKlsanja priarcdne stabilncadi, p---aU uvjo iie inve^ifij'.i, uravnni^/.eriio bilans::; piaautda. porns SivoaKpi atsrakni'bi, a:a;a iO c slc-nosii Ls .! xnatno cHovitije. ]' "mdadi ord inkorpc-riraiu i ? ^jhie^e 'irfe koj; se nostavijaju pred. pUnskoin aktivTwicu: dji\::ija jnstud.K Kmnunaaip;' polkike razvoja i elconoir.c.l:e nolduka, poboljaanje sisiema koordinacije i ItonTroV: pijvTsciiuh iokova. raiavijaapa r.ovih. ja'Tjenijilt dvusU a.-nQ ekonomskih odnosa i > j
u v u e & ; p r a k c iu iio p o d je d it a k z iia Q a j, ; v r u d jio v a n ju r e i u l t a i a p 'c n s k e a k l K n o s h P 'd d a n ja k a k r k ^ im u a M id ;n ;a ka . i io a lit a iiv n i n i c iljo u m ? . t n a d a c ira a - la a ia u a

da!ja ri-. na o s? -p .y n a n ju p o ja d id iii c tiita a i !;? a d a 'ta k a veu iia o s t v a iiv a r . ju sku p a , ea p a a ; - a J a ia k a ' ' v. I '

Mcpesto\ anje ovek\ prisiupa pri vrednovanju jednog sistema Qg da ih r'iaiui :a (> mote du\ d > raxhOfcih oeena o efikasnosti jadnog tv :;.'- ;a a'su v ^:aaa;n;r phdranja a pak ph-tia razvois. a to je upravo one s;o it- do sada po;ic ) kad dai;a\ i: prai^-i painr.uija nin'jaab Zi;radja, pa i naiie iiio

5?.t?.o sMadan razvej pojediniii komponsnti privrednog i drustvenog zivota vec i 6dr a : ' a - iaa^v^.j --'n l u ' -a.i ka - ' : ..a; " i ' c a h n i. A k o L; ."a iu o v j ja s n o i'p c > ijr:.a ju u \ r r i i w Lo rn a iia iu r il. ; a a a x 1,a: a a iiK ia ;a a ii! : a p i- a k ! v 'a t-a o p r a v d a n ili r a z lo s n da sc s iid o e n ka sn o a o n j; d o n o a l na o sn o '.'U 'to g a ;a kaa-'k i,v > -se .

a h i

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nastoji

da o l v.T.b-ad: na

- .a ira 'a t c - it v s r u ir . . --n \c?uc. f . r i u r i i c

spedifiuna le^ina pc<jvdn>}h

c>re vj$ i

-a d a ia k a ra / a o ja n i a ; a - ;i.; a [ac ;aa :.ix t feate ra a iic it a . ka t t o aa. a a!a...a. i a 'h , .:aa a p o jd ir ij ii' ! p : a r : ij - 'L r a ;k., aa- U s - a iiu v J ja v a d t 'je n L ia lj:; c iije a a t /a d a a a ka c;eda T o c ii 11 ia a v it a i a

Laa- v 'l'.: p'-aaa-j; i; " ia iio v a n a . o nd a o t r io ] o b a '.i^ n o '^ a a j,.ia j. ^ a 'a;-, a r a a jija p .a a a . ; o i:i.''U

iaa.aa b - i i na O i ',a riv a n ju p u ;a a i'n d , c a j- v ,

. .a a ru J iZ v sa n t s n ie i s p u s i i i i I u s t v a r iv a iij s p o s r c d r iih c iljo v a :

U o\o<ri kraikiaa^r^/-aiai na ni:j* aisterh p la n ira n ja nijo b l i i.i _ '/'y a .:c:c- Lidovodiia precaanaadbioj

'iM.i-K.-

za iite va k o ji sa pv'Si-a'.lj-aju u p ia a x a i jd-.po^a;

a v a ua u- n ja. I o jt, poaao aaaj; d a k k o prcv a ziia zi in o g u u n o s ii ue ia n io jodnar; kUaz v 'z c d :.'-i< : i jadjta irr-iifceik

v ado vsca pa2nja ]e zato-o\do usm erona Ktnto n a cd .

ciija k o ji su b ih p r o jd c m o n o ! naium p ifin o vim a rsz\oja. Prvi je jo 'ianjc oib raiB be ii'-

apkaobj;a'>D i.ac aa^Ha. hiro -..^a- . skspiiciaiao u t r i ad 1

u ku p n o sc sl

usvqjanih

plfttisvs srednjcroCaog ~ oj:: ono jo u at van inipiicitno sadr2ano u svun nasun nz\
! K a v a o d a in i h riio v iji r!K>cU t i a:-'eti ;!udedI" : : jk u -,-i p r iv r t u n i liiz y o j ii-ja i-S irn y v rio v iu u o d nnsu rui p t e tlu it ln i; b ; Jcdkvl se re z u lt a ti p a s iiiu u n a lo j.z o f r f ji u c la s s li p riv rc tln o g rifiV o ja u o dno 3U na tc su !sale a t in is im ze m lja m a :ia f ijc n im s-cpvnom p tiv re d w t n re v ije n o sti.

planovima. CInjcnica ila Jugoslavia vod 30 godiua ivj u mini, slobodi, da vodi specificnu (samoimrr.-nu) politiku na unuua&ijcni pi ami i nezavisnu ncsvrstanu pulitikii na medjuimrodnoin planu, najbolja je potvrda da je ovaj cilj razvoja uspesno ostvarcn, :ako su so pretnje i njencj slobodi i neravisnosti, iz vana, najmanje bar dva puta, '.i dosta lzraienom obliku, ispoljavalc Drugj, obezbedjivanje dinaimcuog r&sta ukupne proizvodnje je bio sialan cilj svih Scst (lonoscnili srednjoroenili planova, lako je ostvarcna stopa privrednog rasta u Oitavorn posleralnom pcriodu bila takva da je oniogucila smanjivanjc distance u stepcnu razvijcnosli izinsdju nasi zcntiji: i nnjrnzvijenijih kapitalisticki. i iecijdistiCIm z^malja

.3 miznb jc rcci da je rualizovana stopa raita proizvodnje biia niza od plamra

ne tokom sprovodjcnja svu naSih srednjorocnili planova, osimza vreme sprovodjeija Drustvenog plana privrednog nwvoja Jugoslav^ od 19571961, godinc (plamrana stopa rasta nacionalnog dohotka ovog plana bila je 9,1% proseeuo godisnje, a o stvarena'13% (za 4 godine). Drustveni plan razvoja Jugodavije od 1966 do 1970.godinc prodvidao je prosccnu stopu rasta drustvenog proizvoda od 7,5 do 8,5% godis.ije,a ostvarcna je sttipa od 5.9% Celovitosti radi treba reci da se ova ostvarena stopa rasta nalazi u okvinma stopa kojc si! bile predvidjene Rezolucijom o ekonomskoj politici i meramnza daiju r> ahzaciju drustvenog plana razvoja Jugoslavijc ocl 1966 do 1970 godine, koju je doiiesuna pred kraj 1968 godine i koja je predvidjala stopu rasta od 5,5 do 6,5% prose j no godisnje Drustveni plan razvoja Jugoslavije za period od 1971-1975 godine predvidjao je prosecni godisnji rast diustvcnog proizvoda po stopi od 7,5%, a ostvarena je stopa od 6,3%,. Kako stvari sada stoje, planirana stopa rasta za period od 1976!98Q."odine, od oko 7% prosecno godisnje, u nrvoj godini reaJizacije plana nailazi na o/'iiljne teSkoce. Procenjuje se da ee it ovoj godini ia stopa iznositi oko 4%, Suvisno je isticati '.a naSi srednjoroeni planovi, pocev od 60-t;!i gochna.m-

5u imaJi mnogo uspelia u ostvarivanju proklamovane politike u oblasti proniene privredne strukture u konst energije,3 sirovina i lirane, kao i stabilizovanju tokova proSiiviK'
reprodukcije, Ooekivanja nisu u potpunosti ispunjena ni u oblasti prodnktivnosli rada kaom u kontrohsanju razvoja naSili ekonomskili odnosa sa inostranstvoin, Zbof svega toga, u duzem vreinenskom intgrvalu prisutno je nezadovoljstvo sa efikasnoseu riaseg sistema pianiranja, sa njegovom usmenvackom funkcijom.Kako je doslo do tog:i? Od-

govora postoji vise Biee navcdeni samo neki od njili. Kod nas jc godinama sistem pia niranja bio nezaokruzen i to kako po vrstama planova, s obzirom na vremenski !iorizont, tako i s obzirom na subjekte koji ill pripremaju i donose. ,Sto se prvc vrstepla-

2 Itmcq)dja Jigjroaiosiazraja Tvigodavije "o 1985, godine, Konzorcijum ckonainskih insti Uustracije rad i
tuta, Beograd, 1974, sir. 2,
n a v o d i sc d a so r a c u n a lo d a cc lo k a m p la n a z a p e rio d 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 5 g o d investici-

ic za cnersetiku, m etaliirniju i hem ijv nvoju iioeiije u u k u p n im invcsticijaina u inclustrlji ud oko 60% na o ko 68%. M edjutim , njiliovo uccsce se smanjilo na oko 50%. Izvor: M.Birovljcv, lisjiesr.,}ostfiLnm sxeiijor;);ni rial clnistveno^nizvoja SFKJ 1971-1975. M cd juna ro d iiap o li tika, br '623d 16 III 1976.

oc

nova tice tek pre ^odinu Jana prihvacune ;U Osaove zajednieke politike dugorocnog razvoja SFR Tu^oslavijc do 1985, gaJuic.-Do tada plauiraiijo sc vise ivoUilo na godisnje nego n; uednjorocno U takviin okoinostima paznja je vise bila jiosvece*-

11a resavanju tekx ih nego dugorocnih problema.

Planovi dmStveno polilickih zajedn;ca, jako cesto sa zaka3njenjem,r-}dovaije su donoseni nego planov: radnih organizacija Pieina jednoj anketi Savezne privredne komore krajern 60-ti!i godina oko 5 5% naSih preduzeca razvijalo se bez pnhvaceniii programa razvoj a

.1 Usled toga nije postojala zadovoljavajuca vezaizmedju 1

nukro i inakrc planiranja. Dalie, veza izmedju razvojne politike focmulisanc u pianovima, te privrednog sistenia (pie svega. sistema prosirene reprodukcije), i ekonomske politike bila je dosta uopsteno skicirana. usled cega nisu obezbedjivana ni po obimu, ni po vremenu potrebna ninterijalna, finansijska i druga sredstvaza one punktov3 gde se to planom predvidjalo, Nasa planska aktivnost vise se svodila na proces fonnulisanja plana nego na njegovo sprovodjenjts. N o i pored toga planski ciljevi su bi ll dosta uopsteni i nisu delovah dovoljno podsticajno na ponasanje pojedinih subjekata u skladu sa pniivaccmm ciljevima. Do ovakve evolueije u nasein sistemu planiranja doslo je u izvesnoj me' ri iz objektivmh razloga, jer je trebalo razgraditi jedan centralizovani sistem upravljanja i plaiuranja i lzgraditi jedan novi, samoupravr.i sistem, bez uzora u svetu. Medjutim, bez ii;akve je suninje da je stari sistem brae razgradjivan, nego sto je novi sistem usrneravanja lzgradjivan. Zbog toga je dolazilo do pojave vakuina u politici reguhsanja procesa drustvene ieprodukeije Te situacije su dovodUe do to ga da su precenjivane mogucnosli trzisnog mehamzma u regulisanju privredmii i dmstveuih tokova. Donosenjjm novog Ustava,Osnova zajednicke politike dugoroenog razvoja SFR Jugodavije do 1985. godine, Zakona o osnovama sistema planiraiija i o druStvenom planu Jugodavije, i Drustvenog plana Jugoslavije za period od 1976, do 1980.. godine, kao i znatno veeim angalovanjem privrede ua donosenjn planova priviednih organizacija, stvoiene su znatno povoljnije idejnopoliticks, zakonske i dmge pretpostavke za izradu jednog efikasnijeg sistema planiranja. Da bi se te mogucnosti iskonsiile treba veoina organizovano raditi na daljoj razradi tog sistenia, a posebno na donoSenju dn.istvenih dogovora i samoupravniii sporazunia koji regiihsu i obe/.bedjuju razvoj delatnosti od zajednickog druStve* nog interesa, j drustvenih dogovora koji treba da regulisu razne sfere privrednog sistema koje su od bitnog znacaja za realizovanje proklamovane politike razvoja u najnovijem srediijorojnom planu,, 4prograniiranje, istruzivanje i razvoj n privredi,
1970 godinc, itr.3 s Usko povezan sa ovim je i jaz koji p osloji izmcctju fu nk cija koje sc o ce k uju da pojedini subjekti u privrcdnom sislemu obavljaju isrcdrfal'a koja im taj srstem i ekonomsfcu' polilSka ostavljaju na raspologanju 3ovczna privredna kom ora, Beograd, m arta

36

1NFLACIJA 1 NJEN! UZROCI

Inflatorm rast eena poslednjih godma karakterise pnvredc skoro svih zemalja sveia. Po tome m Jugoslavia mje zaostajala, naprot-v

.1

U penodu od 1960, do septembra 1976. godine cene na malo rasle su u JugosJaviji po prosEcnoj godiSnjoj stopi od 13,4%. Brie su rasle cene poljoprivredniii proizvoda (sa prosecnom godisnjom stopoin rasta 16,7%) dok ta sto pa za cene
na

malo industrijskih proizvoda iznosi 12,5%, Njihovo kretanje

iz

dine u godinu pokazuje tabela

1.

go

Ne ravnomeran rast cena (iskljucujuci njihovo reformsko povecanje 1965. godine) veoma je ubrzan pocev od 1970., da bi bio znacajno usporen od druge p'olovine 1975. godine, Jedan deo tog porasta svakako bi mogao biti objasnjen povecanjem uvoznih cena, Prosecna godisnja stopa rasta uvoznili eena za period 19601975. iznosi oko 6,5%. (Tabela ) Rast uvoznih cena je mtenziviran 197,3. da bi dostigao ktilininaciju 1974. godine, Time se, bar delimicno, moze objasniti ubrzanje rasta cena u zemlji u tom periodu. U proseku, u posmatranom periodu, uvozne cene su rade preko dva puta sporije od domacih, Pn tome je jos od znacaja iiijemca da uvozni proizvodi sa&njavaju samo oko 20% dmstvenog proizvoda.Stoga so neavosrnisleno moze zaMjuuiti da glavne uzrocnike snaznih inflatomih tendencija u nas treba traziti na pcdrufiju kretanja n zemlji2: Porsdjenjem kretaiija cena na malo i ceha proizvodjafia (tabela 1) dolazi se do interesantne infonnacije da su cene proizvodjaca rasle ztiatno sporije nego cene na malo, Raskorak je ruuoeitb ispoljen u industnji gde je prosecna go disnja stopa rasta ceua proizvocljaca za oko 3,5 proeehtna poena niza od stope ra* sta cena na inalo. Znaci, eene

11a rnalo dobvim delom su rasie pod uticajein krcta-

nja u prometu. Trgovina se mogia javiti kao znacajan faktor ispoljenih inflatornL'i krotanja. Medjutim, domiiiantnu ulogu u rastu cena na malo svakakoima poveca nje cena proizvodjaca koja cemo ovde uglavnoni posmatrati, l Vidcti cctvrli odeljak I glave i drug! oricljak V u)avc_
2 D etaljnija komparHf>v::a ai d iz a apojnii; : u n u iiM n jili determinant! p io m cn n cena u Jueosla. viji za period do 1972. jzodinc niozc se n a il u: Kovaccvic M ladjen i Popov Sofya: Komparalivna aralizo sp'ijiiil: i muitvisnjiJi defesniinanti jsoinena cena, In stitu t okanom skih nauka, Beograd 1972.

37

T'abela L
Iiitleksi porasta cena
Cene na Industrijski p ro izv od i P oljap rivre d .p io iiv. U vom t livo zne cane

* *. . ............. ' ' * "

Cene proizvodaca

... 1

--

---Poljopriv, pro izvodi

m a 0_______ Ccne na __________ _ m alo _

Cenc na m alo

Ceiic. pio- Cn " iivoda-n

IncJust. proizv,

1961. 1962 1963, 1964. 1965 1966 1967. 1968 1969. 1970.. 1971. 1972. 19 73. 19 74 1975. 1976,:t IL> 7:5/19(50, Stop a insta 19 76/60 Stopn rasta

107,0 108,7 104,0 10 7,7 130,4 123,3 106,7 104,2 107,0 110,3 114,7 116,3 119,0 126,0 126,0 10S,0X 687,5 13,7 742,5 13,4

104,5 105,7 101,4 105,7 127.,0 121,3 108,8 103,2 106,3 110,3 114,7 116,3 118,0 129,0 126,0 107,0 X 60S,7 12,8 656.6 12,5

103,8 . 100,0 101,2 106,0 115,1 111,5 101,5 100,0 102,9 109,9 115,4 111,1 113,0 129,0 121,3 105,0 X 3 70,2 9:1 388,7 8,9

112,5 115,6 111,5 117,2 144,1 120,4 103,4 101,6 104,8 112,3 117,8 116,3 121,0 116,0 123,0 114,0* 891,3 1.5,7 1016,1 16.7

115,4 113,3 109,8 123,9 142,4 117,0 96,4 96,2 107,8 116,4 126,6 123,5 125,0 114,0 113,2 114,0XX 870,5 i5 ,5 932,4 15,4

100,0 108,0 103,0 104,0 104,8 101,5 100,0 100,0 105,0 108,6 103,9 105,1 120,5 146,0 104 9 101.0X 270,6 6,9 273,3 * 6,5

101,2 101,2 103,5 104,5 108,2 100,0 100,0 100,0 105,1 108,4 ; 103,3 107,5 117,0 149,2 106,0 101,0* 2E5.4 7,2

95,0 104,0 101,0 104,0 95,9 101.1 98,9 97,9 105,2 106,2 96,1 101,0 145,0 119,0 92,0 115,0 5 169,-1 3,6

meseci :X J''6 meseci Isvori: SGJ 1976. sod.; Indcks SZS 1976/10.

.Sf.icta've cent -'loizvo ljaia i troSI.ovo proizvodnje Neosporno je da su ispoljcna inflatoma Icrctanja poslcdica spleta i sa dejstva lazlicitiii okdnosti kojc deluju kako sa stranc poaude, tako i sa strane trainjc. Uloga i intenzitct delovanja svakog od till faktora u miciranju pocctnih lnflatormh inrpulsa svakako su tazliCiti, narocito u pojedmim pciiodima nascg razvoja. Sa druge strane, oak
1

ako postoji jcdinstvcno inflatoriio zaristc; dolazi

do ops till, makar i pasivnih prilagodjavaLija, tako da je svnka inflacija, bcz obzira na pninamo poreklo, pmccnii mzom idcntiCmh pojava, Otuda nastaju tcskoce, u teoriji i praksi, u nzluoivanju poslcdica od uzroka i odrcdjivanja uloge pojcdinili komponenti u proccsu razvijanja inflatomog mchanizma, sto jc uslov za koncipiianjc adckvatne antiinflatorne pohtike. Ipak, cini se da teoiijska i empirijska istraiivanja3 daju dosta osnova za zakljucak da su na dugi rok inflatorna kictanja u nas; uz znacajnu ulogu struktumili disproporcija u proizvodnji, dorninantno opredeljena institucionalno iidovljenim bujanjem troskova proizvodnje. Ako sc prati dinamika hcrnh dohodaka i njen odnos sa kretanjem produktivnosti rada, proizilazi da su licni dohoci, dugoroCno posmatrano, m o rail genensati snazne inflatomc iirpulsc, (Krctanje prosefinih licnih dohodaka i produktivnosti rada nepoljopri'rednc proizvodnje u periodu 1960-1976. gqdine dato jc tabclom 2). Tabela ,
Kiefimje lijnili (toli.'Ktata t.: privrcdi i produk tiTnasti r&:!a Lifini dohoci Nommalni Realm 1960 1961.' 1962. 1963. 1964. 1965. 1966. t09fl 108,J; 107.7 121.4 129,4 135,4 156,7 114,6 lQffjS 115,7 U S,6 121,4 100,0 100,0 109,0 m ,o 1*7,5 toQ.Q 111,9 106,7 102,3 107,3 108,0 104,2 Ptpduktlviiost 100,0 1CK ),8 102,3 1404 7|4 it>4.g P9j2 104,5 103,3 103,8 103,0

t o
1968; 1970. 197,1.

104,7

1969,

'VrSenB, uslmmoin, u InsUtutij akoneSakJi nnuka u Bcagiwlu i Institutu pravnc takultote u Ljolilani

39

Nastavak Tabele 2

Licni dohoci Nominalni Realni 1972: 1973,. 1974. 1975. 1976 1975/1960 Stope rasta 1976/1960 Slope rasta
XXt

Produktivnost 101,4 102,0 104,8 99,6 97;5X 167,7 3,5 163,6 3,1

117,6 .1.16,0 128,0 123,0 1 1 4 ,7 ^ 1571,0 20,2 1802,0 19,8

101,0 97,0 106,0 99,0 lOl.O** 205,9 5,0 208,0XX 4,7

7 meseci x8 meseci

Izvor: 5GJ 1976; Indeks SZS od 1960-1976/10.

Nominalni licni ilohoci rasli su jos brzc od cena. Oni su za nspunih sesnaest godina, u proseku za privr * '- poveiani za preko seilamnaest i po puta, 0 Takav porast licnili dohodaka ni izdaleka nije mogao biti apsorbovan povecanjem produktivnosti rada, jer ona u istom periodu nije ni udvostrucena To bi se, veo ma pojednostavljeno posmatrano, moglo uzeti kao ubedljiv kvantitati'vni dokaz samostalnog inflatornog delovanja licnih dohodaka. Medjutim, brzi rast licnih dohoeaki od produktivnosti rada moze se smatrati. kao sto to cine mnogi ekonomisti, karakteristikom svake inflacije. Tako bi se samo na osnovu preticanja po rasta produktivnosti rada od strane porasta licnih dohodaka tesko moglo reci da li su licni dohoci autonomna komponenta inflacije, ili se samo prilagodjavaju opstem rastu cena sledecifi porast troslcova zivota. Daleko odredjenije informacije o mogucirn dimenzijama samostalnog inflatornog delovanja licnih dohodaka dobijaju se kada se u analizu odnosa xas ta Iicnih dohodaka i produktivnosti rada ukljuci i kretanje cena na malo, odnosno troskova zivota.Iz prikazanih podataka vidi se da su licni dohoci rasli znatno brze i od zbira rasta produktivnosti rada i cena na malo Zbir prosecnih godisnjih stopa rasta produktivnosti rada i cena na malo isr.osi cko 17,2%, nasuprot stopi rasta licnih dohodaka od oko 21%. {Kretanja relevantnih vanjabli llustro-

40

PR1VRUDA Wm

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U tom pogledu poslereformskl penod takodje je vdo nehomogen. Sasvim je evident tendencija ubrzanja rasta nominal nih liCniii dohodaka paralelno sa ubizavanjem rasta cena, sve do 1975, kada se usporava tempo rasta

be kategorije, Nasuprot tim kretaiijima, tempo rasta produktivnosti rada pokazu je izrazit trend pada i uljjuoijutfi i najnoviji penod od posledije dve godine kada je produktivnost apsolutno smanjena. Medjutim, potrebno je imati u vidu da os novu takvog kretaiija produktivnosti rada cine kv anti tat ivno razliciti faktori. Prosecna godiSnja stopa rasta produktivnosti rada u periodu 19651969. od 3-4% ostvarena je uz stopu rasta proizvodnje od 4,1%, to znaci uz neznatan rast zaposlenosti. Period od 1969. do 1974, godine u kome je ostvarena neito niza stopa nista produktivnosti rada (od 3%) karakteriSe daleko srainija ekspanzija proizvodnje sa prosefinom godiSnjom stopom rasta od 7,4%, uz rast zaposlenosti. Pad produktivnosti rada u poslednje dve godine rezultira, pak iz brzeg rasta zaposlenosti od proizvodnje fiija stopa rasta iznosi samo 4%. Mada je rast lifinili dohodaka u prvih sedam meseci ove godine znat no usporen (iznosi 14,7%), on prevazilazi povecanje troSkova zivota, tako da lini dohoci u privredi realno rastu. Istina, samo za 1%. Medjutim, kako je produ ktivnost rada opal a za 2,5%, takav rast liCnih dohodaka ini sna2no inflatorno 2arite; pa je pitanje koliko je ostvareno usporavanje stope rasta cena trajno, ZnaCi, cene su u ovoj godini rasle sporije od licnili dohodaka za o ko 6,5 procentnih poena uz pad produktivnosti od oko 2,5% , Sime je znacajno umanjena, lonako si aba akumulativna sposobnost organizacija ' udruzenog rada. Doda li se tome i podatak da je ostvaren tri puta brzi porast raznii optereienja privrede no sto je porast dohotka (po5ev od troSkova kredita, pa, posebno do doprinosa za opStu i zajednifiku potroSnju)5 onda je jasno koliko je reproduktivna sposobnost privrede ugro2ena. To ne samo da mora da vrii prititisak na cene, nego se postavlja pitanje realnosti i mogucnosti odolevanja takvim pritiscima, Dva su fundamentalna uzroSnika razvijanja inflacije troskova u nasTj sistem raspodele dohotka i sistem fonruranja cena. Oni deluju dugorofino i C I ine poseban problem za tekucu ekonomsku politiku budui da su van domasaja | njenog delovanja.

Pcema govern polpredscdnika Savcznog izvrjiiog voia dr Bcridava Sefcra 27, Oktobra u SkupSlini Jugoslavije, 43

Inflatonsa dejstvs sistems sticanja i raspodele dohotka Sistern sticanja i'faspodele doliocfca'i licnih dohoaaka kao generator inOatorilbg mehanizma u vise navrata je istrazivan u Instjfutu ekonoinskih nauka, kao i

11 Instinitu Pravne fakultete' u Ljubljani

te nema potrcbe na ovom me

stu ulaziti u tu problematiku6. Ovde bismo skienuli paSnju na neke empirijski utvrdjene karakteristike delovanja fog mchanizma u najnovijcm periodu nascg razvoja. T oje razdoblje node 1970. godine kada se rast cena. enormno ubrzava. !'Su5tina inflatornog delovanja sistema sticanja 3 raspodele dohotka je u tome 3to on. zbog odsustva objektivnfli ikriterija taspodele'na trzisturrealizovanog dohofka u skladu sa osncvama njcgovog sticanja, do.vodi do narugavanja jednog :od osnovnih socijaJisiicldli principa principa raspodele prema radu. Osnovu;-tog naruSavanja prsdstavlja prihvatanje twiitaproizvoda (kojec-jc,

102

ic, u savremenim usloviina nuzno imperfektno) kao regulatora primametraspo dele na jednoj strani, ir nepostojanja jedinstvemh kriterijuma iisistema irepiodukovanja faktora proizvodnje kao regulatora raspodele;dohotka,

11a dmgoj stra-

nL b'Ujga su odredjene giane, odnosno gnipacije preduzeca, zbog tehnoloskih, irzisnih i instUucjonafno uslovljenih pogodnostiza reaittovanje .viseg dbhotka

po zaposlenom. u stcnju da ostvaiuju vise licne, dohqfke nezayisno od.ulozenog; rad?. Ekonomcki neoprgvdano pove6anje lifinilis dohodaka liK aektora jnicira njii'.ov opiiti od: -<kn rnonopo! iiii i Mz-poftojanjo snafiajno nezaposlenosti jer-zaposleniirnajn Pri tiw c :o pretpostavlja; da ras t IjSnih dohodaka pxiviiegovamot? da bud? <xU":u a bez'povccajija cerni (jar strugiavnbrn upilafiju

iaip'.talno Intenr.iviv; i viiokn jsrodukiivne grane). mada jetinirn delom (u slucaju

laovopoi': 'iiioi-: h v pieviiSi-'i\ :r, com-.. ivic'djurim, sirenjo poraste licnih dohoda-

na ::r?- in lfsn?.;vne i sporr- prcduktavno grana moguce je samo uz poveca rio

.jii '-eus. J'ako a b w m ifH n.'^pfavdanu povecanje licnili dohodaka privrednih !:> deluje wflatorno cUigor<*':n i po?redno, Cini se da je teudensija lakvih

!vct;nj:i i.-.poljenn triij na iia'"i

11 pcriodu do reforme

1965. godine.

Regrcsiono korclaciona auoliza kretanja cena proizvodjaCa

indus-

p r ^ k a za podcdnjih pet godina pokazala je, medjutim,

da ra .c licirh dchudakft '.odflGih graua dclujc calc i dircktno inflatorno. LiCni : :o!ioei biH su vJsi u gra*i?.ma kojo su mojde br^o da povedavaju svoje ccne. U n ;:.i i T ojiov .jofiju i .(m ioic- Milo'is (uclaktoi Ilutvslt ihanko) Ulicaj iiiirih <n (vitiiKyeceiia, insiirui t- onormkill nuuka, radtivi 20, [jim l, 1971. H:ijt k i.'.riK ..!'.v:nf.[Kdmt-zem jc tnSacija osobnai dchottem, !:lk .o if);,<, in'-tflut I'ravin: {.;fcal<e!r. i.jiibijrui;-. 1971. y.:ih 'V -

uslovima eksplozivnog rasta licnih dohodaka i cena, uz relalivno sporo povecanje produktivnosti rada, teznju za odrzavanjem relativno visokill liJnili doho daka privjjegovane grane ostvarivale su i preko 'ddprosefi'iogpovecanja svojih cena, Takvo ponasanje grana sa neopravdano visokim licnini dohocima jedan je od uzroka ubrzanja inflacije u periodu od 1970. godine, Ono istovremRno implicira jacanje monopoJske moci koje je i sjrjpirijski verifikovano, Direktno inflatomo delovanje grana sa najvisini lienim doliocima posledica je Lzmedju ostaiog, opadanja tempa rasta produktivnosti rada, slabljenja reprodukcione sposobnosti privrede, kao i rasta fiksnih troskova, Produktivnost rada uopste i posebno u visoko produkrivnim granama, zbog svog usporenog rasta u uslovima snazne ekspanzije hcniii dohodaka, mje mogla imati znaiajnije stabihzirajuce efekte na cene, Tako cene grana sa brzim tempom rasta produktivnosti rada (na nivou industrije) nisu pokazivale tendenciju sporijeg rasta. Sta vise, za period od 1969. godine ispoljava se statistioki znacajna tendencija istosmernih kretanja cena proizvodjaoa

1 produktiv

nosti rada. To je suprotno logici trzisne privrede Objasnjenje za taj paradoks mogue je naii u brtem rastu fiksnih troskova u tim granama (kao posledica povedane kapitalne opremljenosti rada koja je upravo rezultirala u porastu pro duktivnosti rada) i eventual no brzem rastu materijalnih troskova, Talcvo obrai.lozenje konzistentno je sa drugim empirijskim rezultatom da cene pokazuju ten dcnciju brzeg rasta u kapitalno intenzivnim nego

11 radno intenzivniip granama,

Zbog velikog ucesca fiksnili troskova, nizak stepen korisianja kapaciteta, kao bitna karakteristika najnovijeg perioda naseg razvoja, naiocito je pogadjao gra ne koje su na visokotn nivou telmioke opremljenosti rada Statisticki znacajna povezanost izmedju medjugranskili varijacija porasta cena proizvodjaca i tempa rasta mdustrijske proizvodnje u periodu od 1969, godine, na odredjcn naem, potvrJjuje gornji stav Ekspanzija proizvod nje naime, pokazujs odiedjene stabilizacione efekte. Kako porast cena nije bio usporovan rastom produktivnosti rada, to se moze zakljuciti da se amortizirajuci efekti dinamike proizvodnje ispoljavaju, uglavnoin, preko kretanja fiksnili troSkova po jedinici proizvoda Uz to, efekti Jinamike proizvodnje na medjugranske varijaeije poiasta cena uglavnom su znacajni samo ukoliko su dopunjeni efektima razlika u nivou licnih doliodaka (po uslovno nekvahfikovanom raJniku), Cenc rastu sporije u granama sa niznn licnim dohocima i briitn tcmpom rasta proizvodnje odnosno sponjim rastoni fiksnih troskova Grane sa visim lic nim doliocinia ivoje aspuacije u pogiedu oJr/.avanja tog nivoa hcnih dohotlaka 45

mogu ostvariti preko ubrzanja rasta proizvodnjc. odnosno usporavanja rasta fiksnih troskova i (Lli) preko brzeg povecanja cena. Moze se zakljuciti da jc rast licruh dohodakn

1 iroskov?. proizvodnjc

osnovni faktor ubrzanja rasra cena {do ijoga Jolzzi 70till godina. To jelprc sve/ ga opste pove6anje licnih dohodaka,-injpirano ekonomsld ncopiavdanim poveda' njem Ucnih dohodaka u sektorima gde su oni inace visola, u uslovima usporavanja rasta produktivnosti rada, Zathn, to je rast fiksmh troskova kao posledica slabog koriscenja kapaciteta, Od znacaja je i rast uvozinh ceua 1973, a narocito 1974. godins, Znacajm uspea na podiucju uspoiavanja rnsta cena tokom ove godi ne treba da budu posmatrani u svetlu uslova u kojuria su ostvareni. izgleda da je, s obzirom na daleko br2i rast licmh doliodaka od ce-na u uslovima pada apsolutnog nivoa produktivnosti rada,
i

na relativno nisku stopu rasta proizvodnje kao i

rast raznih opterecenja privrede ovo jedna od najkriticnijih godina u celom posmatranom penodu. To je nuzno imati u vidu kod koncipiianja mera ekonomske polmke za narednu godinu. Uz sistem raspodeie doliotka, na dugcrocne tendencije razvijanja inflacije troskova u nas deluje kao Sto je navedeno i sa:n sistem cena( odnosno nafiin njihovog formiranja.

NaSin fonnirniiju eeaa faktor razvijnnja inflaeije iroskova

Dva su osnovna modela kojinia je maguce objasniti proees fbrmiranja i kretanja eena u savremenini tiiisnim uslovima, Pm je ktasiSni model forrniranjs cena delovanjem mehanizma ponude i traznje, a dmgi je fonniranje oligopolskih cena. Dnistvena kontrola cena kojom se defarmiSe delovanje odnosa ponude i traznje nioze, vile ili manje. usmeravati pnvredu na oligoplosko formuanje cena, Drustvanom kontrolom cena onemogucen je uticaj traznje, talco da kretanjem ce na domimraju troskovi proi;:vodnje. Prdr.gcdjavanje cena poraslim troskovima zna tno je sporije, mada ne i teze, nego u granama sa razvijenom konkurencijom. Administrativne cene rastu (slicno oligoploslam) nakon odredjenog kumuhranja tros kova proizvodnje i pritiska na organe za kontrolu. Mogucnosi vehkiJi skokova ce na implioira pretpostavku da su one konstantno njze od ravnoteznih i da je na trzistu odnosnili proizvods stalno prisutan visak traznje. Dok se kontroJom na jed-

46

no] strain spreeava rast cena pod pritjskom neza.tovoljenja traznje na drugoj stra in destimulise sc el-spaiizija proizvodnje i potencira odr/avanje, pa jak Ijivanje postojccih trzismh neuskladjenosti
Sprecavanjem delovanja trzisnili snaga administrativna ^outrola c^ua stinuihse pieduzeca da teznju za povccanjem .loliotka ostvarujti irvenstveno preko povccanja cena l i periodimn pn.'u trn;- i/ i 'miuistvativne c.'iic deluju direktno inflatorno jc[ su rigidne na dd:\ ; :! nsb i rasta troskova proizvodnjs. Tako, u usiovima niske traznje i nepiil;yodjenosfi as'Jitimana proizvodrije zahtcvima tr/.ista mozc .loci do kumuliranja prekomcmih zaliha ,5a sc nje tog problema zahtevaju drustvene akcije.
1

1 produb-

za resc-

Pola/cci od Jmjenice da u nasim usiovima Jomiuiniju oligopolske trzisne stiukture, od toga da postoji visok obulivat konirole cena kao i od neki'.i specif'icnu lnstitucionalnili uslova moze se prelpostaviii da su u praksi naj jcsci dementi formiranja ccnaprcma tz.v punun troskovinia Ocenom i'e"vcsioni!i jcdnac'tia kretanja cena praizvocfjaca 17 industnjskiii grana m '.uizi k potvrdjuju tii postavku 7 Navesccmo neks n.ajosnovnije. Prvi opsti rezultat je da liretaiijem svih cena domimrajii troskovi pro izvodnje. U tome najznacamji neposrecian utieaj :ia kretanje cena skoro sviii grana pokazuju cene materijala One su uglaviiom dctormiiusane kretanjern cena proizvodjafia industnjskih proizvoda. Takav rezuliat mogan sc i o^efcjvati tuiduci da su materijalni troskovi najcistije kategorije trosl ova u nasoj privredi i ekonoinski l drustveno najprihvatljiviji razlog povccaiija ccua bez obzira na koji naein sn one foniiinine.Licni dolioci. naime, ne mogu biti prilivacem kao osnov povecanja ce na grana u kojima su oni inace visoki. Zato jc uticaj lic n ih dohodaka na varijacije ccna proizvodjafia slabiji od uticaja troskova materijala, Treba imati u vidi}, medjutim, da su u pitanju samo neposredni efekti licnili dohodaka u jednoj grani na cene same te grane. A licrii dolioci deluju na kretanje cena i uidirektno preko eena materijala u kojtma sti sadrzani h in i dohoci drugih grana Na nivou cele pnvrede, ustvari troskovi materijaia sa redukuju na licne dohotke, amortizaciju i akumulaciju. Dntgi bitan nalaz u tom kontekstu jeste da je u najveecm broju grana porast cena izazvan rastom cena materijala bio visi od porasta troskova mate rijala Takvc reakcije cens proizvodjaca izazivale su permanentno ubrzanje rasta cena i jacanje inflatornih pritisaka. Objasnjenje takvog ponasanja cena moguce je
7Poijov; Sofija: Uioga li:n i!i d .iluidala u :u'Ocesti forn iian ja i iotitnnja cera prtHzvodjaca l'estiranjc inSacijC- {roSl-ora, ir.stitut L-koiionisl.-iii r.uaV.a, Beoiati 1976
ji :i

, (>

dataka za period od 1960. do treceg kvartala 1975. dolazi se do rezuUata koji

47

naci u okviru oligopolskog models

fo rrrsra u h .

:;na prama punim troskovinsa.

Ovaj nxsdcL fomviranja sastoji se u tome da se sia troSkove proizvodnje dodaje izvesna inarza. Sa rastom troskova rasie i ta nuT/a (apso!utno).koja, kao monopolska dobit, cini osnovu rasta licniii doliodaka- Kako si cane proizvodjaca nsjbrite rasle bas u tim gransma u kqiinia je njiliov porast iniciran rastom cena materijala, prc\azilazio obim narastanja troSkova, i kako je uocena tendencija da su licni dohoci visi u gramma sa b::>.ira rasiom cena, potvrdjuje se stav da je povecanje cena po osnovu rasia cona malcrijaia korisceno za dalje povecanje licniii ddiodaka. Na takav z a k J ju ia lc upucuje
i

statiscicki utvrdjena medjugran-

ska povezanost u kretanju cone materijala i licnih dohodaka, A posto je u pita* nju povecanje licnih dohodaka koji su mace aajvisi, to i po tom osnovu dolazi do narusavanja principa rn?podeio prema radu i iniciranja njiiiovog rasta i u Jaigini selaorima, Uz to, tako povecane cene postaju osnova za njihov rast u dm gin': gran am a pa se pocetni efekti tog ekonomski ncopiavdanog povecanja ce-m 'dsesiniko muiiipliciraju. Tt::o i nacin foimiranja cena, uz si stem sticanja i i ra^pix-ele dcholka postajc uzrocnikom inflatornog pritiska dohodaka. Bitan element takvog rasta ceria koji, iniciran povecanjem troskova pievazilazi osim samog tog povecanja, sadrian je u ocekivanju njiiiovog daljeg pO ecanja uslovljenog predvidjanjem inflacije. Gcekivanje inflacije postaje direk. tna vaujabla njer-o ubrzanja. U tom svetlu posmaiisno. rezultati postignuti

11

usporavanju resta cena u ovoj godini postaju vrlo znaCajni, I dolt se porastom troskova moze sporiti trajncat ostvarenog usporavanja rasta cena, sasvim je si* gnrno da je ona otupilo efekts predvidjanja inflacije jiao bitne komponente njencg ubizanja. i adrninisirauvna kontrola cena u tom kontekstu ispoljava pozitjvne eftkle. Njojne ss u datom periodu odredjene ccnc iskljucuju iz opste trke rasta cena (i licnih dohodaka) Sto slabi intenzitet inflatornili tokova. A upravo ui utaicmica u podi anju cena, fundirana na telnji pojediniii radnili orga* nizaeija. za poveoanje ucesca u raspodeli nacionalnog dohotka, bitna je komponema ubrzanja inflacije.

M ONETARY

tKSi'AM -iJA 1Lir.ltMi.lJu KERAVKOiEZi.

FINANSIJSKfc

Voonia aktivni iinioci fmansijske ueravnoteze u 1976. godini znafiajno sa suzili akumulatjvrii potencijal prlvnkfc i ugicsdi regulacjio odvijanjc procesa tckiice reprodukcije.. Prcrncscivauje nasiolih debalansa odvjjalo se pu tern intenzivnog kreditiranja, odnosno povecanjeni novcane masc znatno iznad ' obinm potrcbnog za realizaciju proizvodnje po tekuuim eenama. Kako je porast depozitnog novca privrednog sektora bio pracen istovremenim povecanjein sredstava likvidnosti nepitvrednlh subjekata, doslo je do ekspanzije u kupne kolieine novca u opticaju". Sa porastom od 53 milijarde din. u perioilu januarSeptember i godissnjom atopom rasta od 54 procsnta; tiovcana rnasa je zabelezila najdinamicnije fcretaivje ostvareno do sadu u nas. ZalivaJjujuci tome finansijska neiavnoteza je suzena ali je istovremeno osetno pogorSana monetania ravnoteza. V i;:oka monetarna ekspanzija piodubiia je jaz izmedju raspolozive kolicine novca i rcahuh privrednilv kretanja razmaknuvsi granice prostora za slobodntje ispoijavanjc mfiatornih Cinilaca koji su se kumulirali u proteklom fazdoblju, n aroc i to na strani troskova,

R c z n it a ii fin a n a js k o g p o d o v a n ja privrede

Privredna aktivnost u 1976. godini odvija se pod uticajemniza K ta bilizaciouih mcra preduzetih 2a savladjivanje inflatoniog rasta cena, poboljsa iijc spoljnoirgovinskog bilansa i smanjcnje nelikvidriosti. Foaubno su znacajne mere sistermkog karaktcra usnitirene ka odstranjjvanju nepoknvene potrosnjc i finansijskih ulaganja izvan okvjra cstvarenog dohotka (tj. medjusobmii potrazivanja organizacija udruzenog rada). Kako je u proteldim godinama medjusobnim zadruzivanjern formirana nepokrivena polrosnja od oko 20% vrednosii dniStvenog proizvoda, njenim eliminisanjem je suzeiu.i ukupna trnznja na dti maeem tizistu Usled visokih zaliha, prenstih iz 1975 godine, i nedostatka finailsijskili sredstava za njiliovo pokriie. po ovoni osnovu se nije mogao prih 49

vaUti veci deo prirasta p ro izv o d n je i a n a je usporavana K.ako se krc ta n j*

F ik s n i trc sk o v i ;-u r-ss!i

zaposlenosti o d v ija lo bize od privredne akiivno .sti, p r o d u k ij.

nost radii je o p a ls usavSi cak u zonu negativiuh stopa rasta. Dlnanucnim k m a

n jem rdra

licnili doliodaka (o p r e d d je n ih , pre svega, rastorn troskova z jv o u i) i ubr?:.:v isplatama p o osnani zakonskih i ugovornsh obaveza, pogoriani su odnor.'

u sekundomoj raspodeli na stetu organizacija udnizenog radu u privrcdi. 3 '1 m ; se pokazalo u rezultatima finansijskog poslovanja (rideii tabclu i). Tabela 1.
F e r io d i 5 ni o b r a iu n z a prvo p o lu g o d iste 1 9 7 6 . go d in e u m iiio n it m din In de ks

1 ..VI 1 9 7 6 .
Ufcupan p rilio d utroiiena sredstva G u b ita k na supst. O stvaroni d o h o d a k A m o rtiz a c ija D ra s iv s n i .pro lzvo d

(5 .V I 1 9 7 5 - i GO'I 104 108 964 89 141

761,361 641.369 5.938 125.930 30.777 156.707

56

Ifliu p n e ebaveze koje su za 33 indeksna p o e n a rasle b il e od ost\n f d o h o tk a . reduciralo sn sredstva za raspodelu, talco da je nakon isplate !i vni> d o h o d a k a a k u jn u lo c ija to io s ila

tuk polovinu v rc d n o sli svog proilr<jjodis-

n|:vr- i~!!osa ( id cfi tnb clu 2).

Raspodela osfvarenog dohoili pjlugodiStu 1975. go dine.

jrvoii)
u ire lio njiiia din

I V I 1976.
E a s p o d e h (io S ic -tk a

(I-VI 1975-<00; 1G&

122

In dcks

155.441 61.875 20 141 47.734 93,566 74.984 18.582

Obavese iz tiftlioiKa ug o vorn c r.havezc

- zukonski: uba'iiizc i dopmtoii

Sredstva z a raspodelu privrede

137 116 98 122 55

neto lijn i doliod - fondovi

Fondovi i izdvajanja za amortizaciju (iijem porastu ja doprinela rcvalorizacija osnovniii sredstava sa efektom od oko lom su angazovani za otplate dospelih bankatskih kredita, tako da su preostala

1 milijardi din.) znatnim der

sredstva -merilo reprodukcionc sposobnosti ptivrede - smanjena za oko 20 procenata u odnosu na obim koji su imala u isto vreme godinu dana ranije (videti tabelu 3). Tab el a 3. Investkioni potencijal privrede u prvoin polugodBiu 1976. godine u milionima din. r' I-V I 1976. Ostatak dohotka (fondovi) Amortizacija Ukupno fondovi Otplate investicionih kredita Sredstva za reprod. 18.582 30.777 49.359 11.869 37.490 InQeks (I-V I 1975=100) 55 141 88 123 . 81

K ada se ovome doda da je iz um anjene akum ulacije privr;da moral a alimentiruti nagomilane zalihe (u ukupnom iznosu od 277 milijardi din., to je za preko 11 milijardi7 odnosno 4% vee nego pofictkom godine),kao i to da je znatna sopstvena sredstva koristila za pokrtfe tekuiili i gubitaka iz ra nijili g o d i n a o n d a je uocljivo da se neravnoteZa u finanajskom bilansu mogla premostiti samo uz pomod eksternih izvora, odnosno augazovanjem kredita. Sa svoje strane, porast bankarekili plasmana u toku. proteklih meseci ove godine , prcdstavljao je osnovni kanal kojim je dodatna koIiCina novca ulivana u tokove reprodukcrje, a novCana masa rasla po stopi daleko lznad one koja je bila potrebna za opsluzivanje diultvenog proizvoda u nominalnom izrazu.

Faktori rasta novca Krediti banaka za devet meseci 1976, godine poveani su za 8 1 milijardu din. ili oko 22% u odnosu na stanje krajem 1975. god, Pretezan deo ovog porasta dobile su organizacije udruzenog rada u privredi (preko 80%)^ iinw je na* stavljena ranije formirana tendencija preovladjujuceg uea jirivrcde u ukupnim 51

kieditima. U strukt'uri kredila odobicnm ovorci sektoru najveci deo otpada na dugorocne plasmanc, clok kratkorocni izvori nisu izrazitije porasli (oko 15,6 milijardi din., sto je u okvim proseka za 19741975. godinu), Ovakva tendencija u kretanju bankarskih kredita moze se smatrati regularnom u uslovima kada sredstva nisu posudjivana za potrebe tckuceg prometa 1 rcalizacije, vsc prevashodno za alimcntiranje dugorocnog bilansa (gubici, zalihc, supstitucija potrazivanja, porast fiksniii troSkova, f'inansiranje smaiijcne produktivnosti). Trcba istati da je traznja privrede za kreditima ostala visoka uprkos tome sto je usporenim rastom cena realiia kamata ulla u zonu pozitivnih stopa i na taj naoin doprinela poskupljenju eksternih izvora akumulacije.1 Traznja za kreditima jc bila opredeljena i raskorakom koji je postojao izmedju stope rasta cena proizvodjaa te licniii dohodaka i troskova poslovanjui? Zbog posustale traznje taj se raskorak nije mogao zatvoriti posredstvom viiili cena, jer je za veliki broj proizvodjada i plasman po postojecim cenama bio otezan. Ipak da je porast cena u 1976, godini bio veci, traznja za kreditima verovatno bi bila manja, a rast novcane mase umereniji. Umesto toga, monetarna ekspanzija je kratkorono nadomestila dohodak koji je izostao stag nacijom ill nedovoljnim rastom ccna, Na duzi rok ovaj mehanizam prestaje da funkcionise jetj ukohko emitovani krediti ne pokrenu odgovarajuu proizvodnju njiliovi efekti ce se naknadno pokazati u produbljivanju neravnotcze koja je zalivaljujuci njima sada premoSccna. Pored kredita, na formiranje novoane mase u proteklom dehi godine delovale su
i

devizne transakcije sa inostranstvom, cjji ekspanzivni efekat iz

nosi oko 17 milijardi din. Ovo je rezultat pozitivnih kietanja u platnom biiansu, odnosifo priliva deviza ijom se zamenom za domaca sredstva pbianja podstice rast ukupne kolicine novca. Cinjenica da je doslo do multiplikovanja ekspanzivnili tokova i! formiranju novfiane mase po osnovu kredita i deviznih transakcija, rezultat je funkcionisanja kreditnomorietarnog sistema. Naime, taj sistem je prilagodjen uslovima ostvarivanja defieita u platnom biiansu i odlivanja uovca preko deviznih transakcija, Najznaoajnija institucionalna komponenta kreditno monetarne politike je odobravanje kredita Narodne banke ncposredaim komitentima i poslovnim bankama. Pocetkom godine utvrdjuje se obim primame e 1B uduiii da jc m aksim alna kam atna stopa 12%, a inflacijn - mercna porastom cena na m alo - u pcriodu ja n u a r- s c p ic m b a f 1976. iznosi 9,8%, izlazi da jc rcnlna pozitivnn koin aln a slopa bila prcko ;izmc li sc u o bzir rast ccna proizvodjaCa pozitivna kam alu cak i viia,

2%,

2 U peribdu [ - IX 1976. masa licn ih d o h o d a k a jc povedana za 20,2%, b ru to ncplaficni p i* hod i opste i z a je d n iik e potrosnje za 21,3%, a cene proizvodjacn za o k o 60%,

52

iH ^je i fijena capodeSa, BuuuSi Isogiysi sfe saa^istwi sisoes ts jlsateani $>2saa
i ona sa u^to&u

m t o o ^ itas^sti & gttsrt afircas pssesiavijs flftstu

veliSnu aezaVisao c>4 i^ da M &ogf fiiaiesi,, l s $ m a sstea na ^vaiaaja . novtan bjsss,-Ov^sjn 11 ptedp'fr^egJiQ ^ s a ta o ^ 'fU ^ s iv & (fe s 3 csived siriisjt postovanjs s* inostnwuivtari, tj\ k^eSa, devizae tsaasakoijs fewregu novae, 3 pretfnodao se totiHnalo s s^ovim oaUvai^ejn, iaa djugej jfcfsai &

fevgiGso (usied aedosteika DdgovsnsjaSSi ja^jwiiKSnatajL po vkfiiil viM uovdsitlk sredask

tava, k d to 'o i $* njihova. kgetnajt i^siigJaaiiQ' e profi|gooai diaStwnog prazvoda, odno3&6 xsaadtatiaia profsvodaja I ofclmeSi tobao^EoirSsaog prom&la. U 1976. go'dia b3o je ptkfeBO Mfeb w sj utisaj deviznlh tismstoija' ja r f t Rtgo!uc|oia'-o- elsaa$&&af p<$iiisi 1975, godJni predvidjeno da atopo obaveane reseEW poddvsih ban ski- fcod Nsrodne baake Jugoslavia ns inoga biti i a a d gsaaiet ^ssvaiene-decoffibfa 1975 (refiumlo sa da ie u ovoj godini pe> tsaovi? devisaifii 'titaiisDlaijti doci do SHanjonja nov^ane mass) Time je manfeveisla presto? aa ia'oditno jssgatoar^e sa^en, piemda je m ^ o v^rova^nd da M tsg pri tte& fc^ivcim ivild& ntipm u prosvodEji i utam aajeau sslimfEalEEfjju, kraditl'm o^i oseSEp redaeiretia safe i d j inai''u tHiniiat 'obattjtad i a a w b io opwsiivan. ' Sa mQjdtadu% sfeneviaiS dctofeae nog u io ^ ). oied nj& aatoriojftao. a ti (E&saonetaam psld^avij^u Srianja 4 ^ v / a e m o ^ a p ii dapp/ osrio* fee aOyaa$ masa np jnjtf f jo osoipra pt^Jp. isal tok fonttkonja ToovfiEjse'jnsse (nfl hjega kc^djtoa jcJitU a uems jiepoja^dT o ssi ittbvesia ^ ijs iv a feqja # po

vaj^fi, ns dbki 83 tecfi w fc p M a te iz d p ^ a i t m ja. V 1076. godfos, 'ihbg m ^ t g Obirm va imeefetono izgmdrge, fcao i

uapcmlQg te<iv&np uvegaah d e p ^ ^ ,

iaossdo je testage poviBier^ Ji&vca t? a^Qoji6?aciij pM'AS. 'C/sted t c ^ 3 } i a . 5 Gfckti kredita i d&ViaEii tsans^tojs ^sa^rf6.sre5c m3fi isfKd|fli u pGve^S 4 j^Jh aovfione H5S33 feo^a za iti. i$ % . ^'odMe p o a d a fee gkoso isti isflOa ktMko u eoloj I97&. i J975. godisi useife z ^ d n a {\ideti tabelu 4),

53

Tabela 4. Tol'ovi formiranja noviane mase (godisnje promene u milijardama dinam) Krediti i ostali Devizne Nemonetama NovCana pi asmam bnnaka transakcijc pasiva masa 1971. 1972. 1973. 1974 1975. 1976.(1IX) 36,7 36,9 43,2 68,6 93,5 89,2 -5,2 7,6 7,7 -9,8 -3,8 16,8 26,0. 26,5 28,7 37,2 56,1 52,9 5,5 18,0 22,2 21,6 33,6 53,1

Efekti povecanja uov ;ane mase Najveci deo ovo^odisnjeg prirasta novCane maso dobile su oiganizacije udruzenog rada u privredi: 36,3 milijarde din. (januarscptembar). ZaiivaIjujuci tome privreda je nakon niza gocina postala dominantan nosilac likvidno^ sti i sektor sa najvecim uceSdem u strukturi ukupne koli&ne novca.3 KarakterisliCno je da su u razdoblju od devet meseci 1976. godine privredne oiganizacije stalno povedavale jznos sredslava na svojim ziroracunima (koji je u proseku rastao za oko 4 milijarde din. mesecno). Bez obzira sto su primanja iz ukupnog pri'ioda kao i pladanja za matcrijal i usluge osetno osci( lirala, nov^ana sredstva oiganizacija udruzenog rada u privredi nitu s: prilagodjavala ovim promenama (videti tabelu 5). Tabela 5. Varijacije u realizaciji, plnianjima i depozitnom novcu privrede u 1976. godini (kvartalne proniene u milijardama dinara) I 1 1 II! -12,5 - 3,9 15,5

Realizacija -12,3 56,5 Hadanja za materijal i usluge -23,3 - 9,3 Depozitni novae 3,9 16,9

\ j p e ria d u 1965 -19 74 , u5c2ic p iiv ic d n ili organizaejja u u k u p n o j novfianoj masi iz n o a lo jc 1975. godine 33,5%, u scptcm biu 1976. ovo uccscc sc p op clo n a 42,0%.

26,0%.

54

Cinjenica da su oscilacije u obiimt likvidnog novca u posniaUaiiGiu periodu imale znatno manji varijacioni prostar (ali sa tendencijom stalnog uvecanja) nego promene u realizaciji i ispbtania muterijalnih troskova, ukazuje da je zadrzavanje date likvidnosti uslovljeno drugini faklonma a tie potrebama proms ta. Ovakvo ponasanje jc prevashodno opredeljcno nastojanjem da se sacuva potre bni obim likvidnosti u uslovinia primene nov'ih firiansijsloh propisa i da se osigu raju blagovremene isplate liini!) Johodaka i ostalih obaveza S obzirom da je srcdstva, potrebna za placanje (elaice reprodukcije, privzeda u prvom redu obezbsdjivala putem bankarskili izvora oscilacje it prometu su vige uticale na dinamiku traznje za kreditima, nego sto su se odrazavaie na iznos novca na ziroracuniina. PovCcanje depozitnog novca pii opadnjucoj realizaciji i skromnom rastu prometa bilo je praceno padom njegove brzine opticaia, 5to predstavlja ne^utivnu tendenciju koja se pokazuje u smanjenoj efikasnosti upotrebe raspolozive mase likvidnosti Koeficijent brzine obrtaja novca, izrazen odnosom ukupnih i;1 . davanja i prosefinog stanja novcane mase organizacija udruzenog rada privredc, imao je sledece vrednosti: 1971. 80,0 1972. 78,9 1973. 54,3 . 1974. 56,3 1975. 56,8 1976 (1IX) 18,5

Ako se za trenutak pretpostavi da je iznos novcane mase, ostvaren u periodu januar-septembar 1976 (53,1 milijardu din ) istovremeno kolicina prometnih sredstava koja je stvamo potrebna za opsluzivanje drustvenog proizvod:i pri datoj brzini obrtaja, onda bi se pove<:aiijem te brzine na proseinu vrednosi koju je imala u protekle tri godine (55,8) efektivni iznos novcane mase mo^ao smanjiti za oko 28 milijardi din, Drugacije refieno, brzom cirkulacijom novca njegova ukupna kolicina potrebna za realizaciju proizvodnje po tekucini cenama bila bi manja; Kako su privredne otganizacije deo svoje novcane mase ostvu rile posredstvom kredita, cija je cena zbog usporene inilacije ove godine relativno poraslit, izlazi da bi efikasnijom upotrebom raspolozive likvidnosti bile nizo ugovorne obaveze (kamate i anuiteti), a akuniulacija srazmerno veca (do istog zakljucka vodi i pretpostavka o brioj realizaciji zaliha buduci da je upravo za njihovo pokrice koristen veltki deo kredita) Da je dio proizvodnje zaglavljen u zaliliama prelazio bize u potroSnju, vreme cirkulacije obrtnih f'ondova bi bilo krae, a kreditna sredstva angaiovana za pokrice zalthn srazmemo manja, Stopa rasta aovcane mase bi takodje bila niza, ceteris paribus. 55

Novae i cene Najveci deo tnunje za dod a(n ini bank arskim sredstviina potice od st'rane privrednog sektora. Medjutim, u UsTovhna funkeionisauja postojeceg sis tema raspoclele i drustvene reprodufceije, svako povecanje kredita,' odiiosiio n'avcane mase privrede (NMp ) praceno je istc''ineram porastom ufciipne novcane masc /NMZ) Privredni sektor veoma br/.d guhl dobijeui novae, odnosno form:ra setakva smiktura novcane mase koja he odgovara srazmeri kredita koji sii privredi upuceni Da bi radne organizacije osigurale potreban oblm depozil'iios? novca za placanje u toku procesa leprodul.cije, moral a je i iikilpna novcaria m asa da poraste i to znafiajno, Naime, da bi novcana masa privrede hnala iznos ko ji ima, ukupna novcana masa je povecana srazmeri u kojoj su ciriioci odlivanja novca iz privrede umanjili njena likvidna sredstva. Dimenzija oviii cihilaca moze se kvantitativno predstaviti agregatnim koeficijentom, Agregatiti koeficijenti predstavlja inverznu vrednost ufieSda prirasta NM_ u prirastu ukupne nov cane mase. lv

0 _Nm

On pokazuje koliko je ukupno novcanib jedinicu

kreirano na svaku jedinicu novcane mass koju su dobile privredne organizacije Evo vrednosti agregatniJi koeficijenata u nekoliko poslednjih godina: 3976.(IX) 1,46 1975. 1,80 -4974.. --- 1973. 4.41 2,27 . ......1912 3,70 1971. 8,29

Delovanje svih cinilaca, kako onili sistemskog karakteia tako i fall tora autonomne prirode,bilo je takvo da je za 1 dinar likvidnog novca koji je privreda priimla istovremcno poveianje ukupne novcane masa tznosile 829 < linara u 1971. godini, 3,70 dinara u 1972, godini, i tako dalje, a ],46 diriara u 1976 godini (septembar).Bucbdida v! porastom NMp odvjja ekspaiizija ukupne novcane mase, poboljSanje tfckucc likvidnosti organizacija udruzenog rada, po osnovu kredita banaka, uvek nosi scbom opasnost jacanja iriflatoniog pritiska kroz dodatnu traznju. Medjutim, malo je verovatno da ce se ovogodisnj;i poplava novca osetnije odraziti u cenama. Na to upucuje nekoliko razloga Efekti povecanja novca na cene ispoljava sc nakon :vremenskog pomaka od 79 meseci,premda je najsigjiifikantniji uticaj utvrdjeh 'za pomak oJ 15 meseci. Uzlazni trend rasta novcane mase u sadaSnjem irionetamom ciklusu zapoceo je jula 1975 i iiz neznatnc oscilacije oii traje do dimas U medjuvre5.6

menu noveana ekspanzija nije se od n r.ib u;>

(novae sans po si?bi

11c m i

ce na cene neposredno vec povecnnjcm potroSnjc). foved fahlora autonomuc prirode od tcojih zavisi ntam trazujc na trziSiu.

11a nju jc

uiicala i cinjemea da

jfc pretezan deo priiasta novcane mass zadr>.a kao rczervs likvidncstt, odnosno

nije bio upucivan na'tiziste.4 Ovo stoga sto taj deo. ustvari. i nije bio namcnjen
finansiranju prometa i proizvodnje v - jc luiotrtbljen da bi ziadornujftjt* pouaic

.anja koja su novim sistemcni pl;;;s.nja eiuiiinisana 1. lukc\ a reprodakejje ? Zbog smarijen; inflacije baiilcas'ikt izvori su postah skupi. Treba ooekivati da ce ih privredni alctcii kod.sit5 vadonalnije, tj. da ce ih uzdrzanije irosiii za alimentiranje

i pqdov/uh operacija koje nc obecavaju cvist i aguPored togu, u protcklom penodu odobren je znatan deo

ran finansijski efekat

IcraikorojJnih kredila Uoji pcstepeno dospcvaju za naplatu. Njihovim vrocanjem raft depozitnog novca privrode ee se usporiti, pod prctpostavkom da ss kociVcijcnt obrtaja novcane mase ubrza i tako supstituiSe sredstva koja sc povlace iz opticaja. Medjutim,.. kiiitjuHrani troskovi poslovanja stvaraju stalni pritisak na Zbog pad a produktivnosti rada oni dolaze jos vise do izrazaja. Treba ocekivati da de oZivljavanjem traznje ovi troSkovi poccti da se postepeno ugiadjuju u proizvodicike cene. Sioga ce inflaciju u 1977, godini biti opicdeljena prevashodno ciniocima troskovae piiiode, a ne faktorima na strani novca (odnosiio iraiHje). Buduci da.je uspofeni riiam-protevqdjackili cena u 1975. l 1976., L'i.iH lazlicito jiticao na poiozaj pojedinili delatnosti,.njihovo nastojanje da potuliiaju svojupoticiju u primarnoj laspoddi.odraziCe se na ubizanje pjocesa pte;:- ja-. anja grana u odnosima ccna. Sa svoje strane, ovo ce utie ait na njihoyo*ne !;O st abtl no kretanje~ T skladu sa u6it?ilos6u i intenzitetoin pomeranja ccna siroJ mskui i bazicnih delatnosti u primarnoj raspodeli, uporedo tecs proces ugraajivanja povecanih cena sirov ina i repromaterijala u troSkove grana koje proizvode robu za finalnu potrosnju (i za cije je potpuno ispoljavanje potrcbun vremenski pomak od 34 me seca). N a porast ovih cena troSkovi zivota reaguju veoma brzo: zakasnjavsnje iznosi 12 meseca. Ovini s . komplerirnju u.ilovi za n e logu liCnih u chodaka u iiflatornoj spirali, sto pokazuje da Ce iiiflaeijn i dalje r/iitati kJjucm problem stabijizacije i prvi izazov ekonoinskoj politici u godiui koja je pred nama
U i& uii, dizuiiie iie u p o ^ e n li srcdstnva na ziro - rafiu n im a (ko ji su u septembru 1976. 2a I 5% vc-dj nego goriinu dana TanijL-) prcdstavlja najm.anje ck ano m ican vUI ulaganjii kojeg icdino opriivdnvii naslojanje da sc u p ram enjenim uslovima poslovanja socuva aadovoljav jju ia satvenmost s ob ziro m na lekuce obavczc

57

MOGUCl ST1MULATIVM! EFEXTI STAMI3EWE i2GP,ADN.<F.

U liafielu su potencijaini stimuialivni uticaji siambcnc izgradiytf na ozivljavanje privrednui aktivnosd, bez nepovoljnili iiiflatornih impuisa,do* voljno poznati, Iako sa znEoajnim zakasnjonjsni, od nove politikc usmerene dmstvene stambene izgradnje u tom poglcdu se mogu occlavati ncsumnjivo znaoajni efekti. Medjubra, nckako jc van te politike ostala problcmatika stambene izgradnje u individualnom sektoru gde postoje znaCajne inoguciiosii za mobilizaciju i svrsisliodno angazovanje srcdstava stfcnovniStva. U ovom prilogu prvo sc pruza dijaguoza stanja u pohtici ; renin angjizovanju srcdstava gradjana za starnbenu izgradnju,a zatim se prcdJazu mere za rtjeno nuiikaSno poboijsanje, 1.i Ekonomska i socijalna pohtika stananttc drze znatno ispod njihove ekonomske vrednosti- U isto vreme na stotine hiljada jugoslovenskih poiodica ill uopstc nemti slan ill ncma adekvatan stan, Kako svi placaju porez iz kog sc subvencioniraju neekonomske stanaiine, proizlazi da oni koji namaju staii subvencioniinju statiovanje oniina koji imcju staii. 2, Iz slatistifce se vidi da najveii broj porodiiinih kuca i sisnova u licr.oj svojint grade radaici i seijcici. Same jedna trc&na mkovodioca i struonjaka \ h*snici su stanova u kojima zivt\ prcma 5E% radmka i golovo 100% seljskVU-isto vreme mkovodecc osoblje i drugi pojedmci sa visokun dohocsma dobivaju stanove od dnistva* a sa ustcdjsnim sredstviina grade vikendicc. Froizlazi da radnici 1 seljaci subven'doiiiniju vikendice za privjlegovanji ve dnistva. 3. Konuinalna tereti sa svun oiurn
ju p o lit ilc a

gradova jc takva da zemljista za gtadnju zemljista putevi i vodovod

d aSbm am u

koje stanari u postojecim stariovirna ne pluCa

(gradska

re n t a

iz g r a d n ja s ld a d iS t E , u r c d jo n je

itd.), Tj dazbine placaju se i za doyradnju vec postojefiih zgrada. Opstina V o zdovac trazi za izdavaiijS dozvole za dogradnju 100 m 3 u postojccoj porodionoj kuci 23 miliona stanli dinara. U Beoyradu sc na novogradnjc plaia Calc i porez. Proizlazi. da se gjfidjr.Ei, koji v'astftim snagamu rcsavaji: svoj stnrnbfi-

iti problem kaziijavaju, a om koji zahvalaju

iz

drustvemh jasala nngiHdjuju s:

Ovj potonji zatim koiiste syoja-sredstva.za m n a putovanjn oko sveta, kako nas.-o tome svakodnevno lnfprmisu ogtasi lunstickih agencija u novmama. .. 4.\DrugaJkaraktcnstika komunalne poiitike jeste odugovlacenje s urbaiiistiOkim resenjima. Stpga. u svakom daton) trenutku postoji beznacajno mall broj pareala pogodmli za gradnju. Kombinovani rezultat 3. i 4. jeste tb su ^radjcvinske parcdc u Beogradu i Zagrebu skuplje nego, recimo, u atnerickim gradovima, Na primer. op$tina-ukarica trazila je rezultat

1 naplatila za jednu

par

celu za porodionu kucu 74,miliuna starih dinaia po danasnjoj vrednosti. Kao

1 cene zemljiti):u.hcnqjn.vlasniStvu astrontimski su visoke. Proizlazi

5. Treca.karakterisd.ka koiminalnepolitikc jeste trazcnje beskons.

da oni koji vlastitim snagama .-esavsju svcj stambeni problem moraju finansirati ne sama opstinu yed i sluiajne privatne vlasnike. cno mnogo potvida i uvcrenja .oci inyestitora tako da zadovoljavanje onsiinske admmistracije'zalrtcva?ffTsc,vremena nego izgradnja kuce. A kad je jednoro stambeni objekat gatov. ylasnik je-u nckim gradovnna za njega pnkovaa A-O je premcsten u.dru&i grad, on ne.moze s-voju kucu prodati i kupiti novu jcr je p.oreska stopi^na prpcjlaju, na pr, u Beogiadu skoro prolubitivna, Prema to me ako ncko ieh.podici do.rn za svoju porodicu mora imati izuzotno mnogo novapa, mora biti u stanjn da. ceka-izuzetno dugo vreinena, i mora biti sproman da zauvek ostanc u gradu u kom je lzgradio kucu,. A pored till zrtvj nzikuje da se posumnja.u njegovu socijalisticlcu orijentaciju, dok se socijaltstionjentaejja onih kojrtrosc drustvena a ne svoja srcdstva ne dovodi u pitmyj. 6 Cenu gradjeiija dalje povedavaju nesicdjena gmdjevinska opsrutiva i visoke cene gradjevTnjkog. ^aterijala. Do licdavno porcz jia proniet ur;: djevinskog materijaJa iznosio je koliko i porez na predmete luksuza. Mo2e se dqdati jog i to da je cena s^ambenog kredita prohibitive, Otpiata anmteta i:a dvospbni stall iznosi toliko kdiko i mcsecni licru dohodak onoga l:o u tom stanu. treba dn stanuje: : , . . . Iz 1-^6 proizlazi. da jc siambena politika orijentisana na to da Sto vise sprecava individualnu izgradnju stanova U tonit i uspcva jer sc u Jut;t).slaviji gradj znatno manje stanova ne^o u nekiin drugim evropskim zcniljama na slicjiom stepenu prjyri;diie razyijcnpsti.* Ove godine stambena izgradnja sc oak rclativno i smpnjila. stotioe.liiljada.porpdiea ostajc i datjc bez stana a spekulativne zarade iie mogu ss sprqcj.ti nikakvim administrativnim zalitevima.
* V 'i d c t i s t a t i s l i c k i . p i i l o E i L .

59

Reseuje problems lie sasioji se u admimsUalivuim me ram a kao Sto su ogramccnje velicine vikendica ili ogramoenje velicine stana. Pra svega talcvim merama ne postize se nista Sredstva koja msu utroSena na vikendicu utrosice
sg

na

,-I^an^u

1 na Karnevalu

jahtu? na letovanja

Australiji i Havajuna ill

11a provod u Hong-

u Riu a porodice bez stana ostaie i dalje bez stana, O-

sim toga administrativne mere nespojive su sa samoupravnim drustvom. Resenje se sastoji u odgovarajucoj ekonomskoj politici. U stvari vise jc no ocigteJno sta treba uraditi: 1. Postepeno podizati stanarinu do visine ekonomske stananne, j* ventualno diferencirano prema imovinskom stanju. Dobivena sredstva koristiti za ubrzavanje stambene izgradnje davanjem kredita gradjanima l radnim or ganizacij am a. Na taj nacin ce se konacno obmuti sadasnja praksa prehvanja dohotka pa ce oni koji imaju stanove pooeti finansirati one koji ill nemaju. 2. Zemljiste za gradjenje osloboditi svili tereta i tc terete raspodeliti na celokupni stambeni fond tj na stananne di sredstva prikupljati puteni komunalnih poreza, 3.. Obavezati gradove da u toj men ubrzaju urbanisticko reSavanje da bi ponuda gradjevmskih parcela uvek bila veda od potrazrvje. Gradske opstine moraju organizovati posebne sluzbe u kojima svaki stambeni investitor moze dobiti sve podatke o raspolozivim parcelama kao i administrativnu pcmoc za pripremanje gradjevinske dokumentacije. Osnovati gradske agencije za promet nekretninama. 4 . Ukinuti porez na novogradnje ] zavcsti jedinstven porez za finansiranje komunalnih radova spomenute u t2, Ukinuti porez na prodaju ;;ada se zbog preseljenja stan ill kuda prodaje u jednom mestu Tadi kupovme ili lzgradnje u mestu preseljenja. 5. Gradjevinske matenjale osloboditi svakog poreza na promet l.a W 'sp cena gradjenja Ito vi5e smanjila, 'ko1 6. Stambene kredite davati pod takvim uslovima da otplata anuiteta za prosecan stan (kategonzovan u odnosu na velicinu i komfor stana veliiiinu poiodice i visinu licnili prunanja) ne prelaze dvostmku stanarinu u vrcme otplate, AJternativno, kao Sto je predlozeno u Sloveniji otplatu anuiteta odbiti od poreske osnovice. 7. Organizovati dugorocnu pditicku akciju koja 6e finansiranje stambene izgradnje odnosno kupovinu stanova u kojima se stanuje tretirati kao patriotsku duznost svili onili koji su u stanju da stambeni problem rese vlastitim sredstvima, Ukoliko budu osigurani dovoijm kreriitm toridovi, takva obaveza moze se politioki postaviti za svako zaposicno lice pod uslo-

60

vima t.6- (Nesto siicno je odavno sprovedsno npr, u Bugurskoj i Rumumji) Ukoliko budu sprovedene mere 17; grartnja vikendiea* lutanja po svetu

1 uvoz skupili automobila bice uskoro zamenjem iibrzanom stanibcnoin

izgradnjom. U rclativno kratko vreme stambena izgradnja inoze se udvostniiiiti. Sta bi to znaeilo ne samo za zivotni standard nasih ladnili ljudi vec i za ubrzavanje privrednog razvoja nije potrebno posebno objaSnjavati.

Statistijld prilog

Od 23 cvropske zemlje za koje postoje podaci, od Jugoslavije n proseku za 1973 i 1974. broj novoizgradjenih stanova na 1000 stanovnika bio je manji u Austriji, D R Nemackoj Bugarskoj, Vchkoj Britamji Pcrtugalu i Ita liji. Za ueke zemljc je to razumljivo (na primer DR Nemacka), s obzirom da sii to zemlje koje imaju vrlo povoljan odnos stanova i stanovnika. Kod izvlaoenja zakljuiaka na osnovu ove tabele moglo bi se postaviti pitiuije uporedivosti podataka pn moguioj pretpostavci da dostignuti m vo per capita dohotku determiniSe obim stambene lzgradnje i da je zbog toga nephiviluo upotedjivati relativan broj izgiadjenih stanova u Jugoslaviji i zeinljama sa znatno visim dohotkom po stanovniku Mcdjutim takav pngovor nije pnlivatljiv zbog sledeeih momenata: > Iz tabele se vidi da Grclca koja ima slicni nivo per capita doiiotIca izgradjujo u pojedinim godinama (1 9 7219 73) cak i tri puta vise stanova,u odiiosu na broj stanova, od Jugoslavije, Od 1969. do 1974, dohodak po stanovniku u Jugoslaviji je znutno povecan a apsolutni i relativan broj stanova skoro da stagnira odnosno u sporeno raste. Jzvestan skok navise u apsolutnom i reiativnom broju stanova zabelezen je u 1974, medjutim, u 1975 se belezi ponovo stagnaeija.

61

Brjj izsnicijenih stanova irevropskim zemijama *Zemlje 1969 1, Oi^ka 2. Finska 3. Svajcarska 4. Svedska 5 Hoiandija ,. 6, Danska 1. SR Nemaika 8. Norveska 9 Spamja 10. Francuska 1.1. Cehoslovacka 12. Madjaiska 13. Irska 14 **Rumumja 15, Poljska 16 **Belgija 17. luEoslavija 18. Austrija 19. DR Nemacka 20 Bugarska 21 Vehka Britamja 22. **Ponugal 23. **Irahja 5,5 14,8 8,6 9,5 13,7 9,6 10,2 . 8,5 8,6 8,2 8,7 6,7 6,0 4,8 7,2 6 ,1 5,9 5,6 6,7 4,1 5,6 6,9 Na hiljadu stanovnika . 1970 13,0 10,6 10,6 13,6 9,1 10,3 7,8 9,4 9,1 9,3 8,6 7,8 4,6 8,0 6,0 4,8 6,3 6,1 4,5 5,4 6,6 3,2 7,0 .19 71 14,1 10,8 10,8 13,2 10,4 10,1 9,1 9,9 9,3 9,5 8,0 7,3 5,1 7,3 ; 5,8 4,6 6,1 6,0 4,5 5,7 6,7 ' 4,3 6,7 1972 20 1 12,9 11,5 12,8 11,5 .10,0 10,7 10,4 9,8. 10,9 8,7 8,7 6,9 6,8 6,2 , 5,5 6,4 6,7 5,0 5,4 6,1 5,1 4,8 1973 2 1-0 13,4 13,0 12,0 11,6 11,1 11,5 10,6 10,0 9,9 8,9 8,2 7,9. 7,4 6,8 6,7 6,4 5,8 5,7 6,3 5,6 5,2 3,6 6,85 6,6 6,1 5,1 5,2 6:8J 1974 9,1 15,4 11,8 10,5 10,9 9,6 9,7 9,8 10,2 9,8 9,0 8,4 8,2 . 1975

* t . 74

Izvori; Za Jugosluviju izrajunato na bazi SGJ 1976, a za sve ostale zsmlje kortscini su podaci u Annua] Bulletin of Housing and Budding Statistics for Europe 1974, United Nations, New York, 1975 *Redosled zemalja napravljcn je na bazi velicine proseka izgradjeniii stanova u na iilljadu sianovnika za 1973, i 1974, **Zbog ne^oscdovanja podataka za ove zemlje za 1974 umesto prosaka uzct je podutak koji se odnosi na 1973. 62

V UTICAJ MEDJTUNARODNOG OKHUftENJA

Jugoslovenska pnvrcda jc zbog znatnog stepena svoje otvorenosti prcma svetu izlozcna uticajima medjunaiodnog okruzenja. Meiinnizini traasnu sijc till uticaja su brojm i sloisni Pored ct'ekata na kretunje cena, snalntevenost iz uvoza i uticaja na kratkoroiSne oscilacije dtnurnike proizvodnje oni se poseb no ispoljavaju u oblasti robnc razmcne sa most rand vom. Elcsterne okolnosti su znaCajne

1 u izboru odgovarajucc politike

platnog bilansa i deviznog kursa.

DUGOROCNI [ KRATKOROCNI 1 ROBLEM I r o b n e r a z m e n e

SA 1NOSTRANSTVOM

Dugoro3nc tenJencije Proecsu privrednog razvoja jc svojstveno pravdo c!a sc nakon dostizavanja odrcdjenog mvoa razvijenosti, poCinje ispoljavati tendencija ublazavanja trgovinskog dcficita. Medjutim, i pored toga Sto je u periodu 1965 1975, realan obim dnistvenog proizvoda (obnicunatog po ccnama iz 1972- godine) porastao za 76% i sto je u tom raziioblju nivo per capita dohotka znatno pro masio 1.000 dolara, trgovtnski deficit Jugoslavije je zaldju^to sa 1975. godinom, gledano u cclini, imuo izra/.enu tendeneiju pogorsanja Poknce uvoza izvozom u penodu 1960- 64. iznosio jc 70 12%, u godinama 1965-?69. 73,98%, a u raze! obiju od 1970-1975. godiiij 56,59%. Trgovjnsla deficit je u perioJu (960-1964, Jostigao 42,61% lzvoza, u ra/.dobkliz 1965-1969 oko 35,17%, a u god mama 1970-1975 eak 76,71%, Druga odizakonitoiti koje se ispoljavaju sa porastom mvoa razvije nosti jedne zemljc jeste povccirtijc iijenc .savisnosti od izvoza i uvoza, U slu.3aju Jugosiavije u poslcdnjili dcsetak godina zavisnosti od uvoza se vrlo znaoajno povecala, a zavisnost od izvoza stagnira, Tako je u 1966. godini robm uvoz anosio 22,75% drustvenog proizvoda, u 1970. godini 29,1%, u 1974. godini 63

.'Si rgOVti i

^' iibdu- '1965 i975. rrD (ii m il.'In , tck-ccjie U5i Jotar - 17.0C

S ' ' ',

! If.VOZi tivoz

- Pokric'e uvoi'a j'ti (vr'iby-!

; Qduos; iE-c/n p; (i* %)

GrocUaa-' 9 -L- 6 5 >1966. iyp7. 1968' 1969 1970 1971. 1972, 1973 1974. 1975.
o r;

- i S',5 55 3! 94'i- 3 j339 '! - -20.741: .26.782. 6,04-1; ; 2.1 -27.8. 25-Q24> : 7-7#' ; 21.482 30.545 ' 9.063 25 065 36.273 n . k is 28.544 48.557 20 3 ! 3 30.84 5 55.284 24.-:";9 -38.033-'-54:957- 'l-5:92'4. 48 494 76i6S9 ' . 64.678 127 S3 7 63 159 69.228 B0 844 61 6 i6
S G J 1976, s tr . 231

B4JI.:. : -- .- . .17,9.9 . i 2.9,,12. . 364,0 . ,73,3,: . 70,3 42.19 44,7: 69,1 58,4 71,16 55,8 79,23 69',2 ii ...44,50 63,2 58,14 50,6 97,65 52,9 89,00

jO.'c^T-, a u u'a brse'ii jc inanje

1975

godiiil

2S,7% .*

S dhig i stranfe;'iicegde- i z v o k a u UruSt^enorri pro

iz'.'bd.i j j , hiikoii ranije rspoljene tenddfiBije rasta, d&Sfigdo'-196'G godine . *Wzavarira od''

20,79%,

1970: godifii sinaftjilo na 20;40%*. U perfociu 1971^-1975.' ucece iz19,2% do 22, 1 0973. g ),' a ii 1975. godiiii je iznosJo 19,3%st ? % - dS'ucesda u 1956. godini "'.....
Iz'dvtjg kratkog pregleda moie'se 'shvat'iti'da se Jugoslavia' u periolit

*19ti'51970- siisretalii Sa problemom znaOajnog ub'rzarija rasta uvoza l uvozne zavisnosti ujiirie' [bnvrede i istovrcm'c'ho sa usporavanjern dmamke robnog iwoza. U 'peilcidu '1970I975.v iKnI:nuka izvoza jc i daljfe nezadavoljrfvajuift, all s s i dm iiB fa uvozu osctlio uspbrava. He'fcoliko' dodatnili infonnacija to-jos jacc osveiljava .... Dole jc irpcriodu 1953- 196$-'proseorta stopa rasta feiCkog obima ii',oza iznbi'Ua 13,4% a n pcriodu I960-1965' god; 3,9%',:n perlodu 1965-1970 ond"se poVcdava ha 13,6%, a il'penodu 1970-19T5.se siflanjtije'na 5,9%
UCcSce'jugosiovensko'g uvoza u'svetskbm uvbziis se povecavalo o j
sii m iio ic n c sa iiicleitsiina f i^ ic k o g o b im a u v o za i tako Jo b ije n e v d iu ir ie

0, 7-

5 VelKHne uvoza o unwtrashjim cenam n 19fci> gotiiris, Satc'ii in p u t'output label ama te codin
su stavljene n .dn o s ia ;!ristv i:riim n r o iz v o d a m n s ta ln im cc n a m a 19 66 godine. 3O i*racu!i u c c k s k v o /.a u tlm s tv c n o m p io iz v o d u izvrscn je na isti n a c in kao i je vec nLjasiijeno !j sveiski uvoz n ije u k lju c e n uv oz zem a lja c e n tra ln o p ln n sk ih pri'/redn i

za

uvoz, kako

64

k^liko je iznosilo
io na 0,9 6% /J

1965

godine

u j 970 Ji: bi S3 u

5575

goduu snianji-

S drugo strane, dok jc u peri Kin & o i- 1960. prosecna stop;- rasla tizickog obima jugoslovenskog jzvoza iZivi.-iihi Cak 16,2%. u razdoblju i9t0.. -1965. ona sc smanjujc na 9,3%, d bi u sjocHaama 19651970. pal:-. nn Sjy** a u periodu 19701975. na samo 5.1% U pcriodu 1955-1965 ii^ickl o h m i izvoza se povecavao po proseonoj stopi od 12,6%. a u razdoblju posledujih 10 godina (19651975) po prosecnoj stopi od samo
5,5 %

UoeSCe jugoslovenskog izvozc u svoiskom izvozu se dinamiCno uuvecavao do srcdine 60-tiii godina, a on Lada sc i::ipo!java lendencija pads. Tako jc u 1965. godim ucesee naSeg izvoza n svetskom isvozu iznosilo 0,66%, u 1970 se smanjuje na 0,60%, u 1974 godun je jos m&iji i lzaosi 0,50%,a u 1975. godim 0,51%5 Uz dinamicart rast uvoza l usporavajuOu dinanuku izvoza istovnmieno su ostvarene osstne proniene u rcgionalnoj stmkturi robne razmsne Spoljnotrgo-nnska razmsna Jugodavijs sa zcmljama SEV-a je god ma ma bila manja od objcktivno mogucc pa jc zbog toga bilo normal no occkwali d a ' ce se razmena sa ovun zemljamn dmamtcno razvijati pogotovu u uslovivna njiaovog sve veceg otvatanja prema svetu. I zaista ukupna spoljnotrgovinslca razincna Jugoslavije sa ovim zcmljama se u poslednjih 15tak godina tlinamicno povecava la Medjutim, n podednje vrenie dmainlca jugoslovenskog izvoza u ovs zemlje je pi'avazilazila dinamiku uvoza iz ovih zemalja. Zbog toga jc u 1975 godini uccsce ovog regiona u apsorpciji jugoslovcnskog izvoza (47,25%) gotovo dvoslruko vecc od ucesca ovog region;! u jugosiovenskoni uvozu (24,78%), sto je samo po selii nije optimalno sa stanovista nase zemlje..
ftakon dugo diSnjo stagnacijc robne razmenc Jugoslavijc sa zemljama u iTiZvoju. u penodu 197,i 1975. doslo jc do njenog vdo dinainiCnog povedanjn. Tako jo jugoslovenski uvoz. rzrazen u tekucim dolarima, iz zemalja u razvoju a

i975. godim bio za oko 3 5 :nita veci nego 1972 godine i dostigao jc 14,04% \ ikupnog jugoslovcitskog uvozft U jsioni penodu jugoslovcnski izvoz u ove zeniije se povc6ao fcak
23

4.32 puta i u 1975 godim jc dostigao 16.71% ukupnog jugo vtio znaCojna kako sa slanovisia dunjenog zalaganja za ve-

slovenskog rob nog izvozh. Ova dostrguuca su njcnih pozicija u pokretu ncsvrstanih

gorociiin inleresa nase pnvrede lako i sa stanovista spoljne polilike nase zemlje,
1

zemalja u razvoju

eu mediusobnu ekouomsku saraduju ovih zemalja

;i I z r a e u n a t o ii;i n M iriv u ji c u la t a k a d u t ill

1 U N M n jit iily B'-iHptiu o i S ta tistic s , la n n n ty .1

1972' i A u r u s t 1976

^ Ibidem

Jugoslavia ur.a nsjw.ce pioblcaw u debslansu trgovinske razmena *a zemljama trzisne pnvjtede Uvcz sz ovih zemalja se godmama vrlo c b namiono povec 'a, te je u 1975, godini njegove uce&e izncsilo 61,16% ukupiiog jugoslovenskog robnog uvoza. S dm?,-: stranc, u peaodu 1965-1975 dmaiiiika po rasta jugoslovenskog izvyta u ewe y.emlje je bila nezadovolyavaiurs. pa Ck oak nije prstsla dinamiku uvoza ovih xemalja. Tako je ucelce jugodovenskiii pnv izvoda u uvozu zemalja OECD palo sa 0.39% kdiko jc lznosilo u 1965 godlni, na 0.36% u 1974. god ini odnosno na samo 0,3 i% u 1975. godini. * IH u ukupnom uvozu sadasnjih cianica EEZ uceScc jugoslovenskih oroizvoda ie u 1965.godim iznosilo 0,50%, u 1974 god ini 0,48%, a u 1975. godini Q,43%7. Dodajmo da su u 1970, godini zemlje OECD-a apsorbavalo 55,9% jugoslavenskog izvoza, 1975. godini samo 35,7%.8

'.1 1974 . godini 46,6%, a u

Ostvarenja
li

1976. godini

Rczultati u spoljnotrgovinskoj razineni Jugoslavije u pivih devet me

seci 1976. godine su u p n lic n o m neskladu sa d u g oiocn o isp d je n im tendencijama

1 po

pravilu su povoljnija od prosecmh ostvarenja u sedamdesetim godinama.

1. U poredjenju sa istim penodom prosle godine,

jz v o z

je nommahio

puvefian za 22%, a realno za 17,3%. MoZc se ocekivati da ce u toku cele ove go dine renin povccsnje izvoza iznositi oko 15% Ve6i porast izvaza zabelefcen je sanio tri puta u poslednjili dvadeset god|jia. 2. I pored realnog smanjcnja uvoza u 1975. godint, u prvih devci niaseci
se 1 9 7 6.

vivoz je za olco 10% jnanjt nsgo u

ua ce u

is t o r n

penodu

1975.

godine. Mu2c

oockivan

to leu cele
ce

1976

godine realai, obim uvoza bill manji negti

i'J li. godinc Jugoslavia

daldc u dve uzastopnc godine zabelcijili realno sma\

njonje uvoza 5to injc- z d u fe e n o od 195S-1959. sodinc.

J. jpokrjco u-.'oza izyozom iznosi 67,55%, a trgovinski deficit iziioy,: 4S.o:<% robnog izvoza, sto je znauio po\oljnije ncgo pretliodne Ln godine. 4 Izvoz u ruzvijcrw zernlje je pevefiau za 44%, a izvoz na konvc-ri ibili;o podnioje za 24%

Nasuproi oviii pozilivmli ostvarenja, u prvili devei meseci ove godiiw ikvoz L zemlje i

11 razvoju je poveean za samo 4%, a uvoz iz njiu smanjan za

7% ,

^'tOECDT&Kelgn Trade Statistics, series A. 71 itfehi b ibidem 66

sto iiije u skladu su ramje ispoljcuiiii itMiMi-iuMjium i iiUutegiiom, udnosno politikorn razvoja ekouomskih odnos:1 si o 1,,;. . .

2-Hiljnma.
.'nja u robnoj

Osnovno pitanje kqj? s i sada pr;sla\ jt-siv da h > < lj!.! -

razmeni u 1975, a pogotovu u 1976 oclini, daju povoda da se po\evujc da sc nasuprot nepovoljnilt dugorocnih K-.ndop.cija poieo ispoljavati pu'.oljmji trend u robnoj razmeni nnse zemlje sa inostrausUom Prvo sto tveba konstalovati jeste da ne u prineipu dugoroenijim lendencijama mora davati veei ziiaOai Same w ::-.uz;rtnim ducajcvima, uz veoma u bcdljivu aigunicntaciju.ov -Davila se nc troba pndrzavaii, U slucaju naSe spo' ljnotrgovinske razmene nern.: xfbvoljno argumcnatn koji bi govonli u prilog bitne, pozitivne pteorijentacijc u uugorociio ispoijcnim trendovuna. Sta vise, >ma puno argumcnata koji govoro da su ovogodistija ostvarenja vezullat spccifiCnili eksterniii i mternih faktora koji r:c mogu dugorocnijc delovatj na nastavljanjn o vogodisnjeg trenda pozitivntli osLvarenja u sten spoljnotrgovinsks razmene nase zemlje. Navedimo nek? od tiii specififinili faktora koji su uticali na spoljnotrgovinsku razrrienu Jugodavije u J9 76 godint. Nakon rifsilnoa pud a u 1975. godinin toku prvog pohigodja ovc godine svetska trgovina se osetno pavecala
i

veiovatno je da ce za ccln godinu biti za-

belezena visoka stopa rasta Vrlo dinarniono se povccavala i spoljna trgovina zemalja OECD, narocito uvoz u ove zemlje ciji je votmncn u prvom polugodju povecan za 14%, a ooekuje se da ce u ioku cele godine stopa rasta uvoza ovili zemaija iznosiEi 11%, a uvoza
iz

zemalja koje nisu jlanice ove orgauizacije oko

11,5%. Vredno.sc uvoza nekih zenialja, nasih vazniji'i trgovinskih partnera.kao sto su Italija, SR Neniaoka, Francuska, V..Bnt.nnija, Austrija i dr. povcCala se u prvih 67 meseci ovc godine za preko 20% Takvi uslovi su u vetikoj meri omoijuiiili i nasqi zenilji da ostvari visok porasl izvoza. 1) prvom polugodju ove godine, zbog dinamicnog ozivljavanja pnvredue aktivnosti
li

najrazvijenijim zemljarna Zapada i ispoljene zainleiesovanosti

preiadjivaoa da popitno svoje zaiihe koje su a toku reccsije osctno smanjsne.tra znja sirovina i rt-produl-xionog maleajala su znatno povecala. sto je imalo za po sted ieu vrlo izrazen porast cena ovih pvoizvoda na svetskom t.iztslu S obzironi da su cene jugoslovunskili sirorina i vclikog del a rcprodnkcionog materijala krajem 1975. godine bile nekonkurentne (jer nisu pratile pad ccna n:i svetskom trzi9 Pti;ina poditcim a l.'MCTAD-a, krajem jim a 1976 sodinc t;eno sirovina i hnine izraztsic n U'kucim dolniim u bilt: su za 2ii,62% a cone prcliram beniii p toizvoda za 33% viSe nc^o ]ioe otkoin ju m iara, a pjri-iiin podncim a lomionskcig casopisa T lic E caiio inisl u islo vicme cene sirovina i litnnc, u?.ftc skiipa bile su za oka 25,8%, ccnc hrane za 25,1r i , a cone imiuslrij, ^kili sirovina a k n ?.i vise

19

7.;i

i .JiHh

" 1 '1

: :cgi: su i jz.'G Uiiii p .-:

' -'I'Qlloj godini osetiio smanjio)

1 da gu

.rc-i'vijisOi imali visoke zaliiie oviii pro^z-.odn. jugoslovenski izvoznici, glcdatio ; ..hni rsisu mogli ove go dine i:c.',ec:ri; -c :.ir: cene, vec su ih c;d< u toku prvih . sjst mcseci smanjili za 5%. odnc-sno u tcku dcvet meseci za gosiovensld izvoznici uopste, pa i . nuioguji skicajvvima, nar^iito kada sc racli o !?. - u mvijcno zcniljc Ir/nSin; gnvrede, ju.".u ovih proizvo'da, zbog celokupnc situaeije u kajoj su se nasli, izvoziit su po cenarna koje su oselno bile niic od odgparajucih ceiia na doniacem trzistu a ponckad i po cenama koje nisu mogle pokvitil ni csnn kostanja. Usporena ekonomska aktl' nont u nasoj zemlji i u \ sa tiin smanjtiezi na mogucnost povecanja realizacije na doniaCcm trzistu cinili su ovaj, sa stanonsta piivrcde nerenfabilai\i izvoz. nuznijim ncgo sto bi bio shicnj da je prhrcdra alaivnost u zemlji toila gMjs. Sticaj svj]? tin okolnosti je uticao da je n toku devet meseci ove godme real an oblm izvoza wprodukcionog uialcrijala p.ovecan za 22,4% uprkos einjeiiici da pioazvodnja repxodukcionog materijala u. zemlji u pr' osam meseci nije po-.ecana i; odnosu na isti period prosle godine,1 Od celolit 1 kupnog realnog povecanja jugoslovinskog iz\oza u prvih devet meseci ove godine na reprodukcioni materijal otpaaa okq 85%. Nakon viSegodiSnje vrlo skromne stope icalnog rasta izvoza pottosne robe,1' u prvih devet meseci ove godine stop;!, rasta izvoza je osetno poveeana ij za 26% (reaino 16,7%). To je pre svega posledica dob re rodnosti ptosle i ove godsnc so je omoguciio-povecanje iz\oza poljopriuednih proizvoda u_.prvih devet meseci ove gcdine za 45% (reaino 15,1%) Znacajnn porast izvoza opreme u prosioj godini (35%) l u devet me; seci ove'godine (22%) rezuitat su \ izrazcnog rasta njenih izvoznih cena koje rlo su u prosioj godini porasle za 31%, . ::/nCi. . ,f
a

u pcriodu januar-scptembar 1976. godtije

Treba iiaglasiti da je rast cena u nasoj zemJji u ovoj godini,bio na prils!om nivdu kao u razvijenim zemljama trzisne privrede,. pa je strano trtiSe za nase UVosnike-bilu sitgtbuaijc ncgo u prclhodiiim . mama kada jc rast u nasoj zeinlji ino znatnn veci od iasia tena u Uni zo.Vhj.mia. Na krflju \ cro\atrio jc da jo v ovoj godmi porast sredsiava za iz.cziv; i sUirtulacije bio vrlo iz.raz.en

1 da je niihov

obim dostigao za nase usi ove vrlo visok

iir-o, sto je omogucavalo veci izvoz.

1 S a p p s ts n ja S av ezno g z a v o iia za sUH isliku b ra j 20 8 o d 28 V JI 1976. i 2 9 5 o d 2> X 176.

^odint itulcl;

iO/1972 ftr ] } .

15N1a p f im f r ; u p o r io d u 1 9 67 - i 975. realnu stopa rasta izvo za p r o iz v o d a Siroko p o tro iin io

nosita j i 's-amo

l .i %

68

Smanjenje uvoza u 1975. i 1976. goilmi, Jcoje je bilo oniogucciio pre sveg3;ngoi;o7^ujn1a4niinw^6tivtium.:pie^'^av,potci(l;p.(}7.it>vf)j!v;c f c ^ a 1 tr^ia , gQ? n kirbil^iiSL,i;iyeroyatao(.Ey,esH sqpstiWcijc, L\ ; ;ijpririci^vezivanja uyoza

45

,tioni3QPjjj! proizvodnjom, jrrtijtave

je iauz n.egati y;t]jU efetfcatju Rigorpana ajrau^jijy^.yyoz^, )&75,. godwi ssikjtptjj.privr.^p kpji.^i. netj* iivozniqi U;Vrlo ggiig^dnu PJ^MjM$iP98H.4f?Pst .,; n^qvke.p,otrebnog.Qlp.i,fna u.vpziiogv ieprflc^keiono&}ii^.cnj^:i,rita , ^ 5 falo mok .p ^ i^ i^ jip p q y ^ o a jti^ ^ p in p o , rar^ta, tiji]iova;proiz.vgdnj3.ija^pnmsr^V ( iij4ti&trijj..j fle)um;dmgim,fir^ianV3.-lRazuiTie .se. da, je, p^U .di.stagnacija yroixvodnje ovili sektota uticao na usporavanje dinamike rasta proizvodjnjc^.u^kio:-fiinA^p}\ su..yfci..wyo^ufci. ncgo uvf>zijii:i: reprodukaouqgrnaterijala. .v : s .-QSHfltfenjP, u uifozu. opreme. u 197JS. ,godii^.s^ {Mro.$?9:f!HWvljno delovala na pad investicipne a&ivnos^.u j ^rpro^uJcJ^no^t J^ada. i
l

riR^S0', ^ J^ n je na;dpbijaiije,dozv.ola za uvpj; pojedinih profevoda ili

; rezprvniijj -deVov^ Jakpdje se u iz-vesnoj mejj peppypljno pdfaaavalOjnftjjroiz^vocl-

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. < .. ! Jo'goslavijaii njena-pnvipdarjsutppodflvriai&JtateizaJ^ijftQi^.&yoza ! i uegoStOibi bilo,;nqunalno $ obzirom na vgliciRU.seroye,i:iir?0;poy i ;.jfenosti. OsDovni ciKteg tome, sit stniktufne ii^idadjijnpstiip4'fip^no,,za.()^jaiije < razv.oja^u,ovii)aK?:baz^ u.utjnosu .na tazvoj sektpriit&naip.Q piojzvQdpjifi &tyta* rijanje dqljcg .poyaja^ija ii:vo^ne zavisnos.tiiS.--1teskp:jiio;.u.spc4o 3''irbpiE'.^ps.ili ncprijatnih,posteciica ostyariti admimstrativmn^ifleransf, SaW9iraqi<j|>3Jpf?n?(^?lV S Ci.

tteim ofn pplftikqin mpgu<-se ostvrfnti: yeti zahvq^

.ayoziK

i Pditp-tak.ye politi^esmjp bilp, n usiayima. ozbiljnih;. pr/Jbi<?tnn sa plaJ^ijjj-b^an>Som adrnnijstrativne me,re-u veliltim ^elom bile.izn^djcn.e.ijpda^n^tHfls^yjiiEiipjH'-pbMu. S;pbziro.m; d'jf jc trenutna ,platp(},biJfln^va,^i}j1 ificija.ppvpJjnija< o ()d ne.iz i ,19.75 gqdiflc, realnp je ocekivati li.bei-alijasij^.i. astaB.,poiast u;voza:Ut l$7?i-ga(lnii, ppgptovu oko s.e zcli pst,yaritj..yi^a/stQp j^syj.tJni^vi;' upg pioizvetda i industrijske pioiz.odnjet ,n : ; , t ; ;.| , j; Ako se u 1977.-30.dini ostyari vis.okq.^tppq.fast^'Uidustfjj^ke .pjo< izvotlrije; tivQgucuosti<7-a p.orast izvozaije.produkcionogrmaterijsla ce biti oset smaiijene > porcidjeiyn sq Qvom/gi|KHnqm, Upplte^ .ivc dpk 'egzistir^^vijave. hq u | ueuskiadjqiosti ijjvoz strpvina j reprodukcioaoB ir i^ le o j^ iie 'i.:-:: v .. .: r : 1 : vi ^ ;j\

59

m o z e 'b ift rtosilac u k u p n c d in a m ik c u k u p n o g jug oslo vcnsko g izvoza.

'

MiK) jc vcrovatno'da ce u iducoj godini izvoz opreme moci da se

zhaCajnije pdveCa uz poraSt-izvoziiih cena kakav jc zabelezen 1975, i 1976,go dineJJkst^vljanje tak'o izr&zeritig rasta izvoznih cena ovih proizvoda bisigurno sfnanjilo Sanse haSili izvoznika'na trziStu zemnija u ra voju koje je poscbno osetljivb na visinuceiia ,pa se zbog toga u stranoj literatim sve c^e karakterr Je kao price'iriarkdt??;' VrIo je vcrovatno da je i ovogodisnji skroman p o m t jUgcalovenskdg izvoza u ove zumlje posledtca rasta izvoznili cena u proSloj i 1 oVoj godini; 1 ; - ; - r - Eventualnr vaJ^rast cena u nasoj zemlji od rasta cena u konkurcn tskim zBhtljartia u 1977s godirii svakako bi se nepovoljno odrazio na dinamiku naseg^zvOzai'a^atoiCitb' izvoza;u zemlje u razvoju, ' -Problematic no je da li e Jugoslavia i u iducoj godini moi tako znaiiajno'poVecati izvoz poljopiivrednih proizvoda, pa je samlm tim tesko pretpostaviti dace se izvoz proizvoda Siroke potrosnje povedati kao u ovoj godini. DugroCno posmatrano dinamifian izvoz ovih proizvoda se moze ostvariti samo ako se njihov kvalitet bude brzo poboljSao. To pogotovu vazi za izvoz u razvijene zemlje tizisne privrede. Veliki deo dugoroiino ispoljenili problerna usporavanja dinamike naSeg izvoza u ove zerrdje lezi u sferi stagnacije, pa i pada kvaHteta mnogih proizvoda Siroke, potroSnje.1 Naime, u pryih 1015 godina pos3 leratnog perioda nosioci dinamike naseg izvoza u ove zemlje su bili siroyinc i osnovni reprodukcioni materijali. Uz to, trzista tih zemalja su bila tzv. triista prodavaca.'pa se na njimaimogji prodavati i proizvodi siabijeg kvaliteta. Sa p o rastom dohotka i sve vece koakurencije prodavaca, ova trzista su sve viSc postajala triiSta kupaca, Zbognasih strukturnih problema, izvoz sirovina i repro dukcionog materijala nije nVogao obezbediti dinamican rast ukupnog izvoza na trziSta ovih zemalja. S druge strane, dinamika izvoza proizvoda Siroke potroSnje je trebalo da kompenzira nemogucnost dinamicnog povedanja izvoza siro vina i reprodukcionog materijala u ove zeinlje. Medjutim.nedovoljno dinarrnCan rast, stagiiacija pa i pad kvaliteta mnogili nasih proizvoda siroke pottosnje nisu mogli obczbediti dinamican rast izvoza na ovo podruCje, jer su potroSaiii na njemu postali vrlo oselljivi na kvalitet ptoizvoda, zbog Sega se ovo triSte sve ceice IcarakteriSe kao quality market". Izgleda malo verovanim da bi se i u iducoj godini.bez vetfih ncjjri jalnih posledica, mogao obezbediti takav dalji porast sredstava za izvozoe sti~
^D ctaljnije o tome se rnspiavija u lanku dr Mladcna Kovacvida ,,Kvalitet proizvoda kao faktor konUuiontnosti izvoza" E ta n o n s k a tTBSao br.2-1976.

70

mulacije koji bi bio nuzan za ostvarenjii visoke slope rasla izvoia Dodajmo na kraju da pad produktivnosti rad a u nasoj privredi u o voj i proStoj godini.pogotovu ako bi bio nastavljen i u iducoj, inozc imali nepovoljne efektc na konkurentnost nascg izvoia u slcdetfoj godini. I ekstemi faktori u .iducoj godini necc. bajr kako sada izgtcda,biti tako povoljni kao ove godinc, Ooekuje se da ce porast svctskc trgovino bin maijji nego u ovoj godini. Hast tininjc i cena.siroviiia i, baziCnih reprodukcionih maferijala te biti znatno manji ncgo a prvoin polugodistu ove godine.Procenjuje sc da e i porast uvaza u vecini zemalja u lcoja najvise izvozimo biti manji nego u ovoj godini. Zbog svega nayedenog ne Ircba ofiebivati da co Jitgodavija u 1977 godini ostvariti visoku stopu rasta izvoza Kao sto smo napomenuli, ako se ostvari zadovoljavajuca stopa ra sta drustvenog proizvoda i industrijskc proizvodnje, bice nuzno da uvoz osetnije poraste, sto znaCi da ic deficit trgovinskog bilansa bit) pogorsan u odnosu na ovogodisnji. Pogorsanje trgovinskog deficita inojjjo bi delimicno bili kompenziiano mogucim veim prilivom dcviza po osnovu nerobnih stavki, a narocito po osnovu turizma, 1 pored toga, vrio je varovatno da ce platni bilans u 1977. godini biti nepovoljniji ncgo u ovoj godini,. Na kraju, moze sc zakljuciti da se nikako nc bismo smeli zadpvoIjavati trcnatium uspesima na planu ekonomikih odnosa sa inoslranstvoni. Tra jan uspeh u ovoj sferi moze se ostvadvati samo napretkom u fundamental iiini sferama koje dugorocno udovljavaju spcljnotrgovinsku razmenu svakc. pa i nasc zemlje, a u nasim usiovima se posebno istiou povccanje efiknsnosti privredjivanja, povecanje produktivnosti rada, poboljsanje kvalitetn proizvoda i usluga, usporavanje inflacijt i brze resavanje strukturnih problems u privredi,Za uspesno reiSavaiije svih ovth znacajnih problems biie potrebno dugo ulagaii jnnogo napora.i sredstava, pa sc zbog toga moramo pomiriti sa mogucnosdu da 6e problenii ekonomsldh odnosa sa inostranptvom jos dugo bili jed'an od centralnih problema nase privredc, Upravo, zbog toga se inora encrgicno raditi na brccm picvazila&nju problema koji oncmogucavaju brzi naprcdak u navedenim fundamentalnim sferama koji najvise deternunisu nasu spoljnotrgovinsku razrnenu.

71

ro L lT lK A DEV1ZN0G KURSA, IN F L A C IJA .I S1*QUNA

KO N KUREN TN OST '

Kaliznlltct ccne devizni kura deluju u dvojajconi pr.avcu: ecne utiflu na devlzni kura, all 1 deviznj fairs uticc na ccms. Prvi pravae utic^ja je jaci
otl diugog, jei na cene ne uticc samo dcvizni, kura ye6 i dottiaia iiiottetama i ftskolna pdlltlka, Troba imatl u vidu i iftjcnleudiiposiojir fldredjiii vfcmcnski Juz Izmedju promena Cenu 1 adraisa tUi promcita na devteti|.kurs( s obaifom da. proiiiefic cctia dolazc do izM aja

11 pomidi i traztiji dqvlza tek kad

d&tefii do pla-

tfanja, tako da taj vfcmcnski jaz mo2c iznositi 30 dp 90. datia. Treitutni deviZili

kunievi su, dakta, tezultat Odtiostt cona iz razdoblja dd pre 1^3

Mcdjutim, poiiuda 1 traznja dcviza na dcviznoin MiStUj p i pfctiw tome l ftekaibdiii kiift, odraf ava he saiiib fclativne cen^ yea! reiativne realne^, uohotko, jcr ic ae prema dohodnim elasticitctlma traznje,. a tie samo prema cenovnim dastla tetinvj, afekllrati iivoz i uvoz robe i.ttskiga,Tc ptorticiw u veatnini dohocima, jcis krtsnijc ncgo pronicnc u ccnainU, uticu lid Ikk&lbiltM devijijtl fairs1, i Aku je ti jUgoslovcnskoni slucaju pi-etp,03tavl|eiid da je jflicijaln^ faviioteza data pbslednjom Jevaivacijom pre piclaska na .,,pliVajuSi kUis { 1973 ), foda bi za procciill roainog fleksibiiiiDg devizribg kiina, kdji bj StJ.daiiiis Foriiiiftia ria deviZrictJn tiliifil b il^ reJevantne prbiliSiid U felativnim efcfiaftia I re^ltiirn ddliocima Sto S se dflgodilc od oiida do U

danas, fdZUltie SS pfgtfia estalpfn avetu

ti Cdlini, Kills bi, dftkie, sarflo piatio ukorak kreta'nje cetia i 4&\PtJak&i Fiekaifoi!1 ili kui samom svojom fleksibilndscu cgzogetio odrzava koiiktfrdUttlU fipbstibiltisl ckspbrtorfl iia spoljnim ti2istimflj pa iiiiie atiti i pi at ill bilatii. Ipak, MlSa flekalbllridat mora biti ijfukovudjeiiau' tipa, jef mko tie tncrZe unapiod prcdvidetl poim^anjc svlli ckonomskih subjekata na tlevialidnl tr2iStU, ili saldo svlli irhplilsa i sokov'a do kbjtJt i t t dodt, a ilS tfeba ill dtiiVolitl A.f'aiag and iJav'itJ j.Ott: (.Escliangc ka(e Del^fiiiliiiitfoil Uiltief Pltl6tUilfi.i)g ESfiitt n o Rflttfs" ii istiifti fisejii pod riaziv'oni RfoueV in (lie IrilSniiitltJia! Ofd0( iid> J;d8H6l Hllp fe piiy1 Dftiiss, 15*6 ) st84-Blg. , 4 72

da in fla cio n a p o lilik a p ritiskuje sarno na spoljna p n ln gcdjavan ja a He i isa u:;ut raSuja, T o sc .^ ik o v o d jc n je " sprwvodi jn tervcueijo m na d evizn o m trzistu i odredjivanjem lim its fluktuiran ja kurseva, s tim da tra in ja m ora b ill zadovoljavan a, ako ae iia lim itu nc bj izravnala s pom idom , N ik o nc zn a k d i k i bi b io p o tcn cija ln i ju g o d o v e n sk i d e ficit jilaLiiog bilansa, koji bi se fo rm irao u uslovim a slo b od n ijc trg m in e , p odrazu inci.ajuei ovdc vccc o d o b o d jen jc u voza o d dcvizn ih i kv an tiiaiiv n ih irgo vin ski'i o gia n icen ja . Na duzu stazu rcalan fleksibilni kurs, tipa J im ilir a n e i ru k o va iljen e fleksibd-

nosti, ncsum n jivo m o te biti snkced iran sam o uvodjcnjum spoljne kon vcrtibdnosti dinara, zadrzavajuci safiio n cka kvan titativn a ogram ccnja u o blastim a gde se dom aca tra in ja nc m a te k red itn o m i fiskaln om p c litik o m odrzaii u razum nini okvirim a. D o tada diiem a su m o zc o v a k o d cfin isa li: D a h jc u naSim uslovnna p rihvatljlviji sistcm v c lik ili i retkih p ro m cn a " ili a stcm ..mqlili i c c s tih " prom e 11a kursa, K a k o jc p ro ccs o d lu civ an ja o vahiln ini prom cn ain a i in a ce slo zcn , m o zc se d o go d tli d j sc k riza o zb iljn o p o ja ea uslcd sarnog karaktera proccsa od~ lu Jivan ja, sto dolazi do izrazaja n a r o jito u apstincnciji izvo zn ika i pojatianju aktivnosti uvozn ika. T o m o zc p aralizo vati c c o p ro ccs o d lu o ivan ja, ta k o da su vladc po prirodi stvari sklo n ijc da p n bcgavaju drogim m cto d am a prilagodjavan ja, npr, p o litici d o lio tk a , oak i o n d a kad jc izmcrna kursa in acc pravilna tcrap ija. V lad e su p rin cip ijeln o m n o go slo b od n ijc kad sc radi o m alim p ro m t' nama d cvizn o g kursa i to nc sam o sa te h n ic k o g glcd ista, vec i sa e k o n o m s k o - p o litie k o g . P roblcm i d cv izn o g kursa postaju u tak vin i uslovim a p redm et dn cvn oy reda k a o 1 svaki dm gi sastavni d e o n o m ialn o g to k a p rivrcdn c a k tiv n o s ti, 'kao sto je npr. kretanje cena, kain atn c s lo p e , ritnia p ro izvo d n jc, p ro d u k tiv n osti rada, zaliiia itd. Z a p ra vo se ko d rnanjili ali ScScih p rom cu a d cvizn o g kursa vise radi o p rcvcn tivi za razliku od velikili i rcdjili prom cna koje o b ic n o predstavljaju zvaniCno p rizn an jc d avn o u o ilen c p o treb e rcalin eacijc kurscva, .Ako se nc prcduzim aju m anjc i Ccsce p roin en e, ond a jc m n o go verovatn ijc da ce kunuiliranjc elcm enata p rcccn jcn o sti valu tc m o rati prc iti poslc dovcsti d o d ram aticn ili prom ena. N aravn o, m anje ali ce stc p ro m cn c m ogu u tica ti u pravcu slabljenja in a c c nedovoijn e discipline u je d n o m iiiflato rn o m ra sp olo zen ju . Prilagodjavanje nedisciplin i jc , n ied ju tin i, karakt e ristic no z a sre Jinn u ko jo j jc n cobuzd an a traznja sas

tavni d co glcd an ja na svet. U tukvnn o k o ln o stim a p rilagodjavan jc n cdisciplin i prisutiio je i k io z sva ostula p ia v ila ponasanja, ta k o da m cto d m anjili i oestili prom ena n ecc baS nista u tica ti na p rom cnu situacijc,

73

Kail je piecea;enosi vaiute popmnlla siroke razmere faktor ocekivaiija deluje desiruktivno, Ccka se sa izvozom a zun sa uvozom je

1 citava ekonomija 11 stavu iScekivanja dramaticnih promena. Faktor ocekivanja detuje i kod siste-

ma manjih a coscili promcna. ali jc ublazen postojanjem nomutniti manevarskili mogucnosti piilagodjavanja kod svih.privrednih agensa. Izvoz i uvoz ce ac inak irretati u granicfrma normalnog ponasanja. Ako se uzme u ra?:matranje citav uoip picks deviziiog kursa, stabilnost cena, stepen korisccnja resursa, stopa liberalisaciit* spoljnih ekonomskih trail sake ija. uldjucuju6i ovde

1 pditiku

uvoza kapi-

ial:-, u o', uj iii onoj formt, onda 6e verovatno azumija menjanja deviznog kursa ^erm'iaeuino pothrsnjivati sve ostale insfetucionalne aranzmsne relevantne za za* dobijanju i;omrole nad stopom indacije. Tejktsio n platmm bilansima mnogih zemalja novijeg vrem.ena poticl

o.:i no!;.:;:;].: cLi se suviSe dugo odrzi nexealan dcvizni lairs, Sto neizbezno vodeUbsnilizaciju jddnoin vec oslobodjenog uvoza, a poostravanje kondajs novi impuls inflatornim krctanjiina. Diferenairane stope infla-

di ka oicoiiornskoiu nacionalizmu. To podstice na zadizavaiije kontrolnih inera, f- ^ n

uje ridjaju i difirencirane mogucnosti za eliminisanje odnosno ublazavanje ograsuccnja u modjunarodnom kretanju robe usluga i kapitala. Zato je harmonizi* rai-je pokuka deviznog lairs a i politika liberalizacije uvoza zapravo linrmomzirajijfe lUiiaonahiih stopa milacije. ivfcdjutiin, ako se radi o stalnom kretanju kurseva stranih valuta prejaa gore, oni ce se pro ill posle zalepiti uz gornju granicu maize i resenje moic biii aaiiio u aovoj izriicn.i kursa. Zbog toga ovakvu fleksibilnost deviznog kursa ne iieb,: ;ii uzirnati u razmatranje ako se pretpostavlja neprclddno kretanje kurs;-va slrsiiiii valuta lsldjucivo prema gore. Bolje je onda primeniti ciJcanski mo dal rtiiauicnog rekalkulisanja kurseva prema kretanju stope inflacije. Pngovor bi sc iia ovo niogso staviti u torn smislu da devizni kuis postaje neutralan pre ma iin'k:ciji, unvsTO da jc sa svoje stranc suzbija. Zapravo se kod realne lcuisne fleksibjlnosti radi vise o tome kako vlasti odgovome za devizni kujg shvataju a Jarmnc signale koji dolaze sa dcviznog trzista. Namie, dcvizni kurs ne mora bitt slepo pedvrgnut tim signaiiraa, vec im sc mole preppustiti samo indikativna ulogis u prccc-su odluiivanja monetarr.ih vlasti, Takvu indikaioxnu ulogu mogu n^r, .nfon:iacije o kroranju cena u zcmlji i svetu i uopste ma koji vid sisUostalom, zaSto bi proces odlucivanja u ovoj oblasti bio bitno druk< i sk-dia lii-lai sup rot nu logiku od one koja je katalcreristicna u procesu odlu5iji Sivanja na 74 lli opStcm moneramom planu, npr, u propisivanju poreslcih iemais!-;ih inlormacija o nitsnim Icreianjima..

stopa ili eskontnc slope, Isto tako, opste je poznato da :;e u doinsnu kciuro le cena rclativno lako odlucujcmo na prihvatanje porasta cena, Sto po svojim efektima ne predstavlja neSto bitno dnikejje od promcna tlcviznog kursa. Izglcda da kod deviznog kursa u mnogo veeoj men (IoIkl * do izrazaja piestizni motivi u proce'su odlucivanja, iako je ekonomski posmatrano cfekat fiskalnih m era i inera opste monetarne politike, kao i politilfe cc.na, >iesto daleko rclevantillji. Pored toga, postoji odredjeni paralelizam izmedju mkovoujenja koiv trolom ccna i rukovodjenja dcviznim kursom. Stepen rigidnosti kontrole cena i stepen rigidnosti kuisne strukture idu obicno pari passu, Doduse, ako se cene libcralizuju tako da inogu slediii ritam u svetskoj ckonomiji, onda ce se preko cena ostvarivati otvorenost domace prema svetskoj ekonomiji. AJi to implicira tarifu bolje harmoniziraiia od dosadasnje. Ako se to izdrzi, ondn ce i devizni kurs kao generalna cena doci

1 liberalizaciju uvoza, barem supstaneijalnu, i carinsku 11a liniju

\ iijegovim oscilaeijama. ati

normalnih intervahi tmli odnosa i jos cc samo platni bilans dingo-

Poslednja dekada i po naseg ciia pokazuje stalnu eroziju unut i^m rasnje vrednosti novcn ti cclom svetu. Ovo dovodi u sumnju efikasnosr svih metoda manipulisanja putem mehnnizma cena, pa prema tome i putem izmena deviznog kunsa Ovaj proces erozije naslanja se na upome i relativno visoke stope inflacije. Da li primena realne fleksibilnosti dcviznog kursa ubreava ovaj proces? Ako se uzme u obzir sitma promena tcoje su u posJednjoj dekadi i po izvrscnc u spoljnoj vrednosti novya pojedinih zeinalja, inoglo bi se prilicno pouzdano zakljiiciti da bi suma lili promena bila manja pod sistemom fleksibilnog kursa sa evrsto odredjenom marzem Chakav zakljucak se namece ;iko se posmatra prosecna gotfisnju stopa obezvredjivanja novca u dekadi od I960--7G gociinc i dalje od 1971-75. Prosccne godisnje stope obezvredjivauja novca za pojedine zemlje za koje postoje podaei izglcdaju ovako: Slopa p.ii Zcra1^ Grcka Australia Laksemburg Juzitpairicka Unija Kanada SR Nemadka SAD 1960-70. 2,1 2,4 2,5 2,6 2,6 2,6 2,6 197175. 15,3 11,2 8,0 10,5 7,9 6,9 6,6
75

JiZvor:

9,8 17,4 9,4 15,5 14,0 14,0 17,6 10,7 13,8 38,0 7,0 10,0 6,0 11,8 9,6 7,0 3,9 13,7 15,0 22,7 Jnmajka 17,8 Ekvador 16,3 4,2 Filipmi 5,2 19,9 Bolivija 5,2 34,1 [zrael 5,3 38,1 indija 5,9 15.0 Peru 8,8 11,9 Kblurribija 10,1 28,9 fugoslavija 10,9 28,4 Koreja (Juzna) 12,1 18,9 Argentina 106,4 17,5 Vietnam 17,6 58,4 Ciis 21,0 3211,2 Brazil 30,6 26,8 Indouszija 57,6 27,4 First National City Bank : ..Monthly Economics Letter", i IFS

Belgijii Svajcarska Australija Novi Zeiantl Italija Francuska Svedska Veiika Britanija Holandija Poitugalija Norveska Irska Finska Japan Turslca Danska Spanija Island Salvador Gvaiemala Venecuela Iran Tajland Maroko Kostanka Meksiko Kina (Tajvan) Pakistan

2,9 3,2 3,5 3,7 3,8 3,8 3:8 19 4,0 4,3 4,3 4,5 4,3 5,4 5,5 5,7 5,7 10,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,7 2.0 2,2 2,3 2,6 3,3 3,4 3,9

9,6 9,0 7,9 OQ 13,6 9,9 8,4 15,3

76

Ako analizira'mo devaivacije knje sii u jxiom pcriudu

ic-dciu.,

onda 03 sc moei zaliljuJjti da je s.mui devahxionili scop-i li prvom penodu kod sviii odnosmii zcmaljs visa od stopa obezvvedjenja novca, a saldo promcnc fls!csiinlnog dcviznog Itiirsa u jsioin penctiu
s tn ja n

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mnuiD floksibilaosti niksda ne odiaiava u celini fakucko smanjenje u.nuirasnj< vrcdnosti novca, vec samo jeUnim vccim celom Treba imali u .id

du l:oji neposredno sbcn tzj. uvoajenja marginiranc flcksibilnosti po piavilu dolazi ao lzniy.r.ja porast uavnje ua terrains kom trZiStu dsvtza. Ovo ixr.a za poslcuicu da dijapazon lznieJj.s oeiic prmude 1 cene tiaznjc bade veci na terminskeni tnustu, Sto opet povlaii

2 a sob cm 1 j:u: pnlisak na mutzu u pravcu

njenog pio-

sireiija Zbog tciga, p o iic lu mtcivcneijc itnutar m aiie postaje posebno izrazcna u jirvoj f'azi po uvodjenju novog sistema deviznog kursa U sistemu realne flcksibilnosti povecava se siguinost da ce do promenc Jevizaog Lirsa doth ako jc domaca stopa mflaeije relativno visa, do!: takve sifjnmosti liema 1: sistenn; rot kill promena kursa, jer upornost li odrzavanju stauja procenjouosu "alute maze vrenienski dalcko prevazici moguenosti kojo se monetarnim vlastirna akazujw u prvom sistemu Dakle, nzsigurnost u pogledu vcheine promena, all sign most u pogledu brzog reagovanja na signale eena. U iisiovimn sistema realne fleksibilnosti promene u deviznom kuisn

3 !:

po svojoj vchwiiu takve da ueesniii u mudjunarodnoj razmeni po prirodi stva-

vi moraju obratiti vci*. paznjn svojiin vlastitim performansama nego efikasnosti svojih vlatla u odnosu na vlade konkure tniii zeinalja. Ova okolnost je od vclikog zaaoaja

11

1 p n k lie n o in 1

sprovodjenju u Zivot ovog sistema, jer sc pn drukcijcm si*

slcmu :iaro ju o iz .o z n u i u preterano velikuj men oslanjaju ua peiformansc svojiii vlada sio dabt njihove vlastite iz\ozne performause

Posebno ic uttanje koliko treba u ovom sisiemu obezbcOin odgovornosi nionelarmh vlasti na trzisne signalc. Sigurno je da danasnji sistein flc!:^I>il* iiosti ucvrznog kursa po aef'miciji ukljue'uje veliku doau diskreciomirnosti nionelarrali vlasti Medjutim, ije moze sc osporiti potrcba da ne mo '.atarne saradnje ireba ceo proees odlucivanja sicrecionarnosti

11 inters:! medjunarodvelikim ,ieiom vezati 1 za si

gnale sa trziSta. Sivar je mere koliko treba ovaj kompromis lzmcdju pnncipa iidrtigi prineip, U svakom slucaju il a p-..Ji

1 naoela irzisnog korespondiranja nasloniti 11a prvi a koliko 11a 11c treba podlegati straliovanju da bi slepc snu

gs triJlxa u veeoj men deterniunsale odluiai monetarnili organa.. Medjutim, tra

1 od

opasnosti da suviss velika doza ciiskrceionarnosti ne oslabi mtercs

pnvrtdc. Pu iui'iic si nc aiuC itibuiaviii da se problem diskrecionarnosti odnosi 77

iglavnom aa biranje trenutka za interm ieiju na dev-'iznom trzistu, kao 1 na inro* lzitet ie mtervencije. Nikakva proizvljna diskrtjcionarnost lie dolazi u abzir Dakle. ne radi se o automatskom odgovaranju na trzisi'e signale, ah sc u svakom slucaju racii o pnncipijelno trzisnom metodii foimiranja kursa unutav date marze macili 1 stramli cena.

apsolutrioj obaveznosti rcspektovanja indikativne uiogi- inlurmacija o kreianju lo

78

FAKULTET ZAVANJSKU T R G O V IN U SVEUC LlSTA U ZAGREBU

DR BRANKO HORVAT

ODABRANE TEME IZ EKONOMSKE ANALIZE III

ZAGREB 1978

to ? -/

so

FAKULTET ZAVANJSKU TR G O VIN U

SVEUClLISTA U ZA G R E B U

DR BRANKO HORVAT

ODABRANE TEME ANALIZE 1 !I

IZ EKONOMSKE

ZAGREB 1978

ttZ k fcW f-L

/ / '

R je S e n j e m Z n a n s t v e n c - n a s t a v n e k o m i s i j e P a k u l t e t a za v an j s k u t r g o v i n u - Zagr eb s od 2 4 . t r a v n . j a 1978. o d o b r e n o j e p r v o i z d a n j e s k r i p t a "Odabrane tewe i z E k o nomeke a n a l i z e I I I " za v r e d m e t : Ekonomska a n a l i z a .

* Za i z d a v a S a : * Urednik:

Dr Ma ri n C e r o v a c -

dekan FVT

Mr Karmen M i l a d i d Ljevka P e tr o v ski Dr Mate Ba bi d

* TehniSki urednik: * Recenzi.ja:

* Kovek.tv.Ta: Song a G a z a vo v id

O f f s e t umnoSavanje :

" G r a f ok o n -

Z a g r e b t K r a i s s v i d e v c 10a

Predgovor

Osnovni tekst za studij ekonomske analize predstavlja moja knjiga Ekonomska analiza I (Oeconom ica, B eograd). Knjiga obradjuje analizu proizvodnje i tehnoloskog p rogresa. U 1976. godini Fakultet za vanjsku trgovinu izdao je moja skripta pod naslovom Odabrane teme iz ekonomske analize 11, Tu su obradjeni znacajni problem i iz analize potrosnje, ponasanja poduzeca, investiranja i modeliranja narodne p rivred e. O vaj, tr e c i, svezak posvecen je problemima drustvenog racunovodstva i medjusektorske analize i primjenama u planiranju i ekonomskoj teorijio Ukljucena je i analiza privrednih ciklusa. Odabrane teme predstavljaju dopunu, a ne zamjenu za udzbenik ili predavanja. Radi se o zbirkama naucnih radova koji treba da pomognu mladim ekonomistima da nauce kako se slozeni teorijsk i i prakticni ekonomski problem i rjesavaju metodama suvreraene ekonomske ana liz e o Od postojecih udzbenika mogu p rep oru citi: za medjusektorsku analizu B. H orvat, Medjusektorska analiza i M . Sekulic, Primiena strukturnih modela u planiranju privrednog ra zv o ja ; za ekonomsko m odeliranje M Babic, Mikroekonomski modeli i za drustveno racunovodstvo Go G rdjic, Sistem narodno privrednih bilansa.

Zagreb, 4. ozujka 1978.

Branko Horvat

SA B SZ A J Strar.a Prsdgovor
I. DRUSTVENO 1. UVOD EiCUNOVODSTVO ............ I 1

. . ................................... ....... ......... . . . . . . . . .

2. 3. 4. 5

RAC UNI DRUSTVENOG PROIZVODA .............. . ...... TABELA MEDJUSEKTORSKIH ODNOSA .................. RAC UNI FINANSIJSKIH TOKOVA .................. ....... DRUSTVENA BILANCA ....... .................... . MEDJUSEKTORSKIH .................................................. * ...............

S 47 52 63

I I. A N A L I Z A ODNOSA

73

1. IZRA C UNA VAN JE FINALNE I UKUPNE ....................................... ................... 74 PROIZVODNJE 2. ENTENZIVNOST UPOTREBE FAKTORA PROIZVODNJE ..........................- ..............................76 3. PROMJENE CIJENA ......... ....................................... 73 4. VA NJSKOTRGOVINSKI EFEKTI .................. 80 5 . MEDJUREGIONALNI MODEL ............ . .................. .... 81 6. ZAVRSNE NAPOMENE ......... ..................... - .......... .... 84
IH .P R I M J E N A MED J U 3 E K T O R S K E

ANALIZE CISANJU

U PLANSKOM BILANPRIVREDE ........... .

87

1. ZNACENJE MEDJUSEKTOHSKE TA SLICE ZA PLANSKO BILANCIRANJE NARODNE PRIVREDE ......................... * ................... ........87 2. POTREBA ZA IZBA DOM METODCLCCT KORISTENJA MEDJUSEKTORSKE T - 7~. 7Z U PLANIRANJU ............................................... . . . . 3. PRVE INDIKACIJE ZA OHIJENTACIJU ISTRAZIVANJA ....................................................... 4. FORM IRAN JE PRIVREDNIH KOMPLEKSA ................ 5. EFIKASNOST IZVRSENOG GRUPIRANJA . . . . . . . . . . . ..... ................................. 6 . DALJNJA POBOLJS AN J A 7. IZGLED, FORMIRANJE I UPOTREBA PLANSKE MEDJUSEKTORSKE TABLICE ................. *

89 91 94 98 102 104

8. BILANCIRANJE UNUTAR POJEDINIH .............................. ............................ KOMPLEKSA ------ . . . . . . . . . . ----9. ZAKLJUCNA RAZMATRANJA IV .D V A T E O R I J S K A PROBLEM A ................

Ill 118 123 123 126 133

1. O PROBLEMU PORASTA ORGANSKOG SASTAVA KAPITALA ............................................. 2. SAVREMENO RJESENJE RICARDOMARXOVOG PROBLEMA RADNIH CIJENA V ..P R I V R E D N I CIKLUSI ..................... ..................

1. SUMARNI PREGLED EMPIRIJSKIH ISTRA2IVANJA PRIVREDNIH CIKLUSA U SVIJETU . . . . . . ..... ....................... 2. INHERENTNA NESTABILNOST PRIVREDE .......... ( a) Jed an jugosiavenski model fLuktuiranja zaliha .............................. . (b ) Kumuliranje slucajnih poremecaja kao izv o r ciklickih fluktuacija ....... ........... . ( c ) Autoregresijski m odel, linearni o s cilator i servomehanizam kao moguci modeli ........................................................ 3. METODOLOSKA OSNOVA ZA EMPIRIJSKA ISTRAZIVANJA CIKLICKIH KOLEBANJA JUGOSLOVENSKE PRIVREDE .................... ( a) Uvodna razrnatranja ..................... ................ (b ) Osobine odabranog modela ......... ..............

133 141

142
145

149

154 154 159

II

DRUSTVENO

RACUNOVODSTVO

1.

UVOD

Pionir izradjivanja sistem a drustvenih racuna kod nas bio je Albin Orthafaer cija studija "Predlog m etodologije drustvenih racuna!l bila je objavljena 1958. godine. Zajedno s Orthaberom rad su nastaviii strucnjaci Saveznog zavoda za stadstiku V . Zivadinovic i B. M arkov ic te je 1959= g. uz ra z lic ite m odifikacije objavljen '''Nas sistem drustvenih racuna i b ila n s a ". Na osnovu tog sistem a SZS prisao je statistickim procjenam a. Dosad su objavljene c e tiri publikacije Privredn i bilansi Jugoslavije 1952-1957, 1952-1962. 1962-1965. i 1965-1966. - svaka sa sve bogatijim i raznovrsnijim statistickim m aterijalom kao dodatkom osnovnim racunim a. Pionir u staustickoj obradi tablica medjusektorskih odnosa bio je N i kola Petrovic iz Saveznog zavoda za statistiku. Njegovom zaslugom danas imamo objavljene tablice za 1955. g . , 1958. g . i 1962 - svaka sa sve vecim brojem sektora, posljednja s njih stotinjak - a nekoliko drugih neobjavljenih tablica stoji na raspolaganju naucnim radnicima i planerima u Saveznom zavodu za statistiku, Pionir u konstruiranju racuna financijskih tokova kod nas je B im itr ije B im itrije v ic , A pionirske radove u oblasti procjene narodnog bogatstva iz v r s io je Ivo Vinski. N . P e tro v lc, D D im itri je v ic i I . inski aktivno su sudjelovali u izra d i ove studije. Svi ti radovi izvrserd su u proteklih deset godina, sto pokazuje koiiko je ta m aterija sistematsko re g is trira n je makroekonomskih transakcija - kod nas nova (a i u svijetu situacija nije bitno dru gacija) . No cinjenica je , takodjer, da su pocetni te o rijs k i, metodoloski i e m p irijski radovi Iz v rs e n i, pa je tako sazrela situacija da se pridje izg ra d nji jeanog iiiiegriranog sistem a. Pored radova u Jugoslavenskom instxtutu za ekonomska istrazivan ja, p rvi korak u tom pravcu ucinio je Gojko G rdjic p rip rem ivsi 1962. godine univerzitetska skripta, P riv redni bilansi i njihovi ekonoraetrijski m odeli, da bi nesto kasnije 1967. dao znatno obuhvatniju icjelovituju analizu u k n jizi, Sistem narodno privrednih bilansa

Nastavljajuci rad na csnovu spomenutih istrazivanja i k oristeci usm ena savjete i sugestije svih spomenutih autora, u Jugoslavenskom in stitutu za ekonomska istrazivanja izradjen je ovaj nas p rvi integrirani si stem drustvenog racunovodstva.

Neke kriticke prim jedbe u v e zi sa sistemom drustvenih racuna Saveznog zavoda za Statistiku

Osnovu integriranog sistema predstavljaju racuni drustvenog p ro izv o da. Te racune obradjuje Savezni zavod za statistiku. Zadatak ove studije nije u tome da ulazi u potanku kritiku biio tin racuna, bilo racuna i tabela koje priprem aju druge institucije i pojedinci. Razlike se xnogu uociti prostim uporedjivanjem , a kritika je im plicirana u ra zlik a ma. No iako je nas zadatak pozitivna izgradnja novog sistem a, bit ce korisno da se istaknu neki nedostaci i pogreske u dosadasnjem s is te mu. Jedan od faktora koji je kocio adekvatniju izgradnju sistema sastojao se u odredjenom dogmatizmu u pogledu d efin icije drustvenog p ro iz v o da. Veci dio strucne i nestrucne javnosti in zistirao je na tome da p ostoji "jedna jedina pravilna definicija drustvenog proizvoda" i da sve transakcije treba uklopiti u tu definiciju* Iz sovjetske literatu re n ekriticki je preuzeta teza da je ta pravilna definicija ona koja ukljucuje samo materijalnu proizvodnju i da je to, osim toga, Marxova de~ fin icija, No nista od svega toga nije tacno. D efinicija ovisi o zadatku koji zelim o r ije s iti. Svakom zadatku odgovara druga pravilna defi nicija, U tom smislu u nauci su se do danas p ojaviie tri defin icije dru stvenog proizvoda; m aterijaln a, sveobuhvatna i definicija proizvodnie sa stanovista zadovolienja ljudskih potreba. 2 } to se tic e drustvenog racunovodstva t osnovni je zadatak reg istrira n je svih transakcija ko je se odigravaju u nekoj p riv re d i. Tom zadatku najbolje odgovara s v e -

1) Vidi L j. M adzar, "A ltem ativn e d efin icije drustvenog p ro izv o d a ", Ekonomski p regled , 3-4/1967. 2) Usp. EL H orvat, "The Conceptual Background of Social Product'1, Int. A ss. for Research in Income and Wealth, Income and Wealth, Series IX , Bowes and Bowes, London, 1961.

obuhvatna definlcija proizvodnje. No odatle opet ne slijed i da ostale defin icije nemaju sm isla ili da u drustvenom racunovodstvu ne treba r e g is trira ti agregate koji odgovaraju ostalim dvjema definicijam a. N adalje, to sto se godinama obracunavao samo m aterijalni proizvod - a i danas se nem aterijalne transakcije reg is trira ju veoma manjkavo - dovelo je ne samo do nekih akademskih vec i do veoma osbiljnih privrednih posljedica. Sva paznja planera, javnosti i ekonomske p o litike bila je upravljena na m aterijalnu sferu . Ostalo je nezapazeno sta se desava u nem aterijalnoj s fe r i. A tu su bujali rashodi za javnu potrosnju, tran sferi su se m u ltip lic ira li, m jere za ogranicavanje d rzavne interv'encije propadale su. Jedan pogled na nase racune pokazuje da je n p r. u 1964. g . jedna petina svih licnih dohodaka ostvarivana van m aterijalne proizvodn je, da su dvije trecin e rashoda kolektivne i javne potrosnje ostvarene van m aterijaln e proizvodnje, da se transfe ri (dakle, intervencija u poslove p riv re d e ) priblizavaju polovini drus tvenog proizvoda iz m aterijalne proizvodnje itd. Za citav niz transakcija iz ove sfere ne postoje objavljeni podaci pa se tako one i ne analiz ir a ju . Ne zna se, npr. na sto su od lazile subvencije. 1) Na kraju, m aterijalna definicija ne samo da nije M arxova, vec je , obrnuto, upravo M arx ukazao na njenu teorijsku neodrzivost, ukoliko se m aterijaln ost, kao fizick a osobina uzima kao k rite rij za od red jivanje jedne ekonomske k ategorije koja odrazava drustvene odnose u p roizvod n ji.2 ) Navedeni dogmatizaxn ogranicio je fleksibilnost sheme SZS. No posto je i drugi nedostaci od kojih bismo vazni je m ogli ovako sistem atizir a ti.

1) Up. Privredni fail ansi Jugoslavije 1962-1965, s . 28. 2) K . M arx, T e orije o visku vrijed n osti, Sv. I , "Pojam proizvodnog rada" , passim , K ultura, Beograd, 1953.

Neki nedostaci

(1 ) P rije svega racuni SZS nisu integrirani u jedan jedinstveni sistem s racunima financijskih tokova i medjusektorskim tablicam a. (2 ) Sistem SZS - racuni i tabele - ne odgovara za potrebe planiranja tako da se u Saveznom zavodu za privredno planiranje moraju v r siti tegobna preracunavanja umjesto da se uvijek upotrebljavaju isti bilansi. (3 ) Sistem je opcenito nedovoljno rasclanjen, teorijsk i nedovoljno p re cizan i nepodesan za obracune. U skoro svakom racunu nalaze se stavke "ostalo i ra z lik e "; element! tih stavaka nisu statisticki iz m jereni i one pored osta log, sluze za prem oscavanje metodoloskih neuskladjenosti sistem a. Posebno otezava analizu fiksiranja triju raspodela: tz v . prim arne u m aterijalnoj p ro izv o d n ji, sekundarne izmedju m aterijalne proizvodnje i organa zajednice i tercijarn e izmedju radnih organizacija u m aterijalnoj i nem aterijalnoj p ro izvodnji i organa zajednice. Na ovo posljednje se cesto zaboravlja , a nepotrebne teskoce p ro sjvete, kulture i naucnih istrazivanja danas jedan su od odraza tog zaboravljanja. (4 ) Sistem nije u skladu s nasim ustavnim poretkom koji zahtijeva je dnako tretiranje radnih organizacija nezavisno od toqa u kojoj su sferi drustvene aktivnosti angazirane. Autori konstatiraju da se " i u sektoru javnih sluzbi razvio i uspostavio sistem poslovanja privrednih organizacija" (s , 2 9 ), ali nisu izvukli odgovarajuce konzekvsnce, (5 j N ije omogucena direktna uporedivost sa sistemom Ujedinjenih nacija koji se upotrebijava u vecini zem alja u svijetu. (6 ) N ije omoguceno direktno razlikovanje drustvenog standarda od jav nih sluzbi koje nemaju zaj karakier,

Neka nezadovoljavajuca metodoloska rjesenja

Pored navedenih nacelnih prim jedbi vjerojatno je potrebno upozoriti i na neke statisticko-metodoioske propuste i pogreske. Citiranja se odnose na puolikaciju SZS iz 1966. godine Privredni bilansi Jugoslaviis 4

1962-1965. (1 ) T retiran je subvencija u racunu radnih organizacija nije rijeseno na najbolji nacin. U alternativi I prikazano je rjesenje SZS, a u alternativi II rjesen je JIEI.

Radne organizacije

I M aterijalni troskovi Licni dohoci Doprinosi Fondovi Minus: subvencije Bruto drustveni dohodak. 500 200 200 300

II 500 200 200 300 100 M aterijalni troskovi Licna potrosnja Opca potrosnja In vesticije

I 500 350 200 150

II 500 350 100 150

1200

1100

Bruto drustveni p ro 1200 1100 izvod

Zajednica

I Opca potrosnja Subvencije Rashodi zajednice 200

II 100 100 200 Doprinosi

I 200

II 200

200

Prihodi zajednice

200

200

-Alternativa SZS (.1) p olazi od reg istrira n ja tz v . cijene proxzvodjaca, koia ukljucuie i re g re s e odn. subvencije. -Alternativa JIFI ( I I ) polazi od trzisn ih cijena. Konzekvence alternative 1 su slijed ece: (a ) Dohoci na liie v o j strani racuna dani su po cijenama p roizvod jaca, dok je potrosnja na desnoj strani dana po trzis n im , t j. drugaci-

jim , cijenam a. Dosljednost fai zahtijevala da je i potrosnja iz r a zena po cijenama proizvodjaca, kao sto je to uradjeno u m edjusektorskim tablicama. (b ) Da bi se osigurao racunovodstveni bilans, a uslijed ( a ) , na d esnoj strani u opcu potrosnju pored stvarnih m aterijalnih troskova kolektivne i javne potrosnje, ukljuceni su i cisto novcani izn osi subvencija,, Na taj nacin nedosliednost iz (a ) radja sad drugu nedosljednosl. Na lije v o j strani trebalo bi da budu samo dohoci, a desnoj strani samo p ro izvod i; u stvari na desnoj strani se uz p ro izvode nalaze i novcane subvencije. Kod izdataka zajednice treba razlikovati one izdatke koji predstavijaju samo novcane tra n s fe re , od izdataka za stvam u potrosnju opceg, tj javnog ili kolektivnoa, karaktera o ( c ) Vjerojatno najozbiljniji nedostatak obracuna SZS jest u tom e sto dovodi do dvostrakog obracuna subvencija kao elementa dohotka i tako previsoko iskazuje velicinu drustvenog dohotka. Poduzeca najp rije daju zajednici 200 doprinosa, a zatim zajednica vraca preduzecim a 100 i tih 100 SZS dodaje ostvarenom dohotku. (d ) Pos! jedica ( c ) je u tome sto cisto organizacione prom jene u tok o vima doprinosa i subvencija dovode do promjene velicin e dohotka cirae se krsi jedan od osnovnih principa drustvenog racunovodstva, po kortt obracun dohotka i proizvoda mora ostati invarijantan u od~ nosu na organizacione prom jene. N aim e, zajednica m oze smanjiti doprinose - kao sto je to doista i uradila u pc-sljednjoj privrednoj reform i - 1 na taj nacin omoguciti smanjenje subvencija. No tada se po obracunu SZS automatski smanjuju i dohoci i proizvodnja, iako se u realnoj proizvodnji n ije nista izm ijen ilo . Zfaog navedena c e tiri nedostatka treba napustiti altem ativu I i usvojiti alternative II. Kod toga se moze upozoriti na jedan opci princip dru stvenog racunovodstva: txansakcije treba obracunati u trzisnim cijena ma, Sva odstupanja od trzisni-h cijena uslijed raznih intervencija treba prikazati posebno u obliku tran sfera. Time se ujedno olaksava rad na provodjanj u reform e i dugorocnij'oj izgradnji naseg p iivred n og s iste ma c iji je c ilj maksimalno elim iniranje intervencija pa stoga i transfernih tokova iz privrednog procesa. (2 ) Dosadasnji sistem SZS ne razlikuje drustveni i domaci p roizvod , sto sa sve vecim integriranjem na medjunarodnom planu, posta ge znacajno.

(3 ) Na desnoj strani racuna proizvodnje (s . 35) ne mogu se pojaviti istovrem eno i saldo uvoza i izvoza obracunatih po deviznim c ije nama i saldo razlika izm edju obracuna po deviznim i po domacim cijenam a. Moguc je ili samo saldo po deviznim cijenama ill saldo iz obracuna po domacim cijenama koji je onda korigiran razlik ama u cijenam a. Stvar je u tome sto, ukoliko se registruju transakcije u deviznim cijenama (racuni proizvodnje i inostranstva, s s . 35 i 42) onda se ne m oze pojaviti rSzlika izm edju domacih i stranih cijeria (racuni proizvodnje i in v e s tic ije , s s . 35 i 4 0 ), jer su te razlik e vec obracunate u transakcijama izm edju drzave i p ri vred e (uvozne carine i izvozne p r e m ije ). O tim knjizenjima bit ce potanko jos govora kasnije. (4 ) Potrosacki kredit ( s . 37) nije transferno prim anje stanovnistva, vec kredit i kao takav spada u racune financijskih tokova zajedno s drugim k red itim a. Uslijed ovakvog tretiranja kredita pojavljuje se nekonzistentnost kod form iran ja racuna in vesticija. (5 ) Racun investicija (s s . 40. i 41) treba da na lije v o j strani ima fizicke in ve s tic ije, a na desnoj iz v o r e njihovog financiranja. Ovdje s e, m edjutim , na lije v o j strani uz fizic k e in vesticije pojavljuju i tra n s fe r!. (6 ) Ponekad nisu reg istrira n e stvarne transakcije vec se v rs e a rb ita rni obracuni, koji nemaju ekonomskog sadrzaja. Na p rim je r saldo bilance pi acanj a u racunu inostranstva (s . 42) podijeljen je na inv e s tic ije , za koje je arbitrarno uz-eto da su jednake neto uvozu investicionih dobara; na stanovnistvo, kod koiega se jos jednom ja v Ijaju iste stavke koje su vec navedene u gornjem dijelu racuna ( i seljenicke doznake, socijalna prim anja i s i . ) ; i ostalo, sto p red stavlja negativnu aiitm eticku razliku . Ovdje, pored ostalog, ostaje nejasno sto se desilo s kreditim a za psenicu, koji niti su in vesticioni niti predstavijaju poklone stanovnistvu, a u stavci !,ostalo " nema za njih m jesta. Ispravan postupak bio bi ovakav, U odnosima s inostranstvom (kao i u citavom sistemu drustvenih ra cuna) treba razlik ovati trgovinske transakcije, transfere i kapitalne transakcije. Ove potonje treba k o rigira ti s promjenama u deviznim re z e rv a m a . Tako dobiveno zaduzenje u inostranstvu tre ba odobriti racunu in vesticija kao dodatak domacoj akumulaciji t j. kao jedan od izvo ra financiranja in vesticija. (7 ) Racun 4. Bilans neproizvodne potrosnje (s s . 40 i 41) ima identic-

ne sve stavke na lije v o j i desnoj. Na taj nacin on nema in form ativnu vrijednost pa je stoga suvisan.

2. RAC UNI DRUSTVENOG PROIZVODA

Osnovni pojmovi

M aterijalni i nem aterijalni proizvod

Polazim o od postulata da jedan efikasan sistem drustvenih racuna m ora reg istrira ti sve transakcije novcane p rivred e i , posebno, mora r e g is trira ti sve doiiotke. U vrijerne kad cak i drzavna uprava zavodi d vojno racunovodstvo i pokusava raspodjelu dohotka vezati za produktivnost rada, neophodno je da sve radne organizacije budu obuhvacene i tr e tirane na is ti nacin - sto je i ustavna proklam acija - i da se tako om oguci ekonomska analiza njihovog ponasanj a i donosenja odloka. Prema tom a dosadasnje svodjenje drustvenog proizvoda na m aterijalnu _ 'c.liiju postaje preuskc i zahtijeva p ro siren je. Ono je veoma nezc _ > zd analizu i za vodjenje ekonornske politike je r zahtijeva ne jed~ na - kakc se obicno m isll - vsc d vije, odnosno tr i preraspodjele dohot: a 1- A tim preraspedjelam a zamagljuju se uzrocne veze i nepotrebno x 1

i ) Priviedne organizacije ispiacuju dohotke pojedincim a, a dobar aio "akumulacije i fondova" zajednici - Zajednica i pojedinci kupuju us~ luge od neprivrednih organizacija (prva p re ra s p o d je la ), S tim srsd stvima neprivredne radne organizacije financiraju svoje kupovine od privrednih i namiruju obaveze drustvu (druga p rerasp od jela) . A viskovi na tekucim racunima svih tih privrednih aktera p re ra s podjeljuju se onda po treci put posredstvom financijskog niehanizma.

kom plicira analiza. Osim toga to svodjenje u bar c e tiri slucaja dovodi do kontradikcija: (a ) Nemogucnost konzistentnog izracunavanja troskova zivota, je r za - potrosace troskove predstavljaju ne samo robe vec i usluge. S razvojem p rivred e ove posljednje postaju sve vazn ije i utoliko je nuznije njihovo obracunavanje. Licna potrosnja u kojoj nedostaju usluge (stanarina, razonoda, obrazovanje, licne usluge it d . ) je agregat bez analiticke vrijed n osti. (b ) Po pretpostavci, van m aterijalne proizvodnje, ne stvara se drustveni p roizvod . Prem a tome ni izv o z koji ostvaruje radne organiza c ije van m aterija ln e proizvodnje (n p r. obrazovne institucije od skolarina stranih studenata, ili autori od publikacija u inostranstvu) ne povecava drus tveni p roizvod . A kako se izv o z ne moze tretira ti ni kao preraspodjela dohotka, to takav izv o z metodoloski - ne p ostoji! A buduci da ipak p ostoji, onda se tre tira sasvim a r bitrarno. ( c ) Nemoguce je konzistentno tretira n je usiuga radnih organizacija van m aterijalne proizvodnje s onima u m aterijalnoj proizvodnji. Na p rirn jer, ako neki naucni institut izrad i jednu studiju za neko poduzece, onda trosk ovi izrad e studije predstavljaju ma terijalne troskove preduzeca, a dohodak instituta po d efin iciji ne ulazi u drustveni p ro izv o d . N o. to dovodi do kon tradikcije, kao sto se vid i iz slijed eceg p rim jera , Uzimamo da se p rivreda sastoji iz dva poauzeca, od kojih prvo p ro iz vodi sirovin e za drugo, a drugo p roizvod i finalni p roizvod . Institut prodaje svoju studiju drugom poduzecu. Dobiva se ova slika (R - r a s hodi. F - p riliod i):

R Institut Place Studija Dobit

P Poduzece

I Foduzece Place S iro v iDobit na

Sir ovine Finalni Studija proizvod Place Dobit

Finalni proizvod mora biti jednak drustvenom proizvodu. Medjutim, ukoliko u drustveni proizvod ulaze samo dohoci prvog i drugog poduzeca, javlja se diskrepanca izmedju finalnog i drustvenog proizvoda i to upravo za dohodak Instituta. (d ) Poznato je da su prakticni ra zlo z i i do sada d ik tira li odstiipanje od proklamirane form ule m aterijalne prozvodnje ukljucivanjem u drustveni proizvod putnickog saobracaja, trgovinskih usluga i s i.

Privredne i neprivredne djelatnosti

Obuhvacanje nem aterijalne proizvodnje jos ne znaci da je treba poistovjetiti s materijalnom proizvodnjom . P rije svega, za neke analiticke svrhe korisno je im ati poseban agregat m aterijalne p roizvod n je, pa je korisno osigurati direktnu uporedivost. Na kraju, rad i se i o iz v je s noj r a z lic i u ponasanju radnih organizacija u oblasti m aterijalne i ne m aterijalne proizvodnje. M aterijalna proizvodnja uglavnom je o rije n tirana na trzis te , te se u .nasoj statistickoj i analitickoj praksi s iz vjesnim razlogom izjednacuje s privredom . Nem aterijalna proizvodnja - obrazovanje, zd ravstvo, drzavna ad m inistraciia i slicno - organizirana je na drugi nacin i id en tificira se s neprivrednim djelatnostima. Ima i odstupanja, kao sto je vec spornenut putnicki transport, koji je nem aterijalan, a ukljucen u privredu , i li licne usluge koje predstavljaju privredne djelatnosti, a pripadaju nematerijalnoj s fe r i. N o, ta su odstupanja kvantitativno mala pa se mogu zanem ariti da bi se sacuvale znacajne analiticke prednosti klasifik acije na privredne i neprivredne djelatnosti i njenog poklapanja s raaterijalnom i nematerijalnom proizvodnjom .

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Licna i opca potrosnja

Kad potrosac iz svog licnog dohotka kupi olovku, onda se ta kupovina nedvosmisleno svrstava u licnu potrosnju. Kad tu istu olovku kupi neki drzavni sek retarijat, onda je to opca potrosnja. M edjutim , sta je s izdacim a za zdravstvo i skolstvo? U nasoj statistickoj praksi prvi se tretiraju kao lic n a , a drugi kao opca potrosnja. 1 > Cini se da je to zato sto se nekada zdravstvo financiralo iz fondova socijalnog osiguranja, k oji su se alim en tirali iz licnih dohodaka, dok je skolstvo financirano iz budzeta, sto se desava i u mnogim drugim zem ljam a, pa se tako dobiva odredjena m edjunar odn a uporedivost. Danas je to r a z likovanje bespredmetno je r se i skolstvo, bar djelom icno, financira iz doprinosa iz licnih dohodaka, a osim toga za neke skole postoje i skolarine. Za rjesavan je ovog problem a vazno je da se uoci da opca potrosnja kako se ona definira u nasoj statistici ili u m etodologiji OUN, odnosno kako se ona obicno tre tira - nije homogena i da postoji bitna r a z lika izm edju zdravstva i npr. drzavne ad m in istracije. Povecani izdaci za zdravstvo znace po pravilu povisenje zivotnog standarda, poviseni izdaci na adm inistraciju imaju obrnuti efekat j efikasna privredna p olitika nastojace da fo r s ira ekspanziju p rve oblasti i da sm anji troskove d ru ge.2 ) Zbog toga se te djelatnosti ne mogu pro sto zb rajaii u jednom jedinom agregatu. Ako se ne mogu zb ra ja ti, onda ih treba prikazati odvojeno.

1) SZS, Pri'/redni bilansi Jugoslav!je 1952-1962, s tr . 17, 2 } Problem je dobro uocen u citiranoj publikaciji SZS: "Znacajno je da se na bazi osnovnih racuna i dcdatnih tabela m oze raziik ovati kateq o rija opste potrosn je, koja predstavlja dio m aterijalnih dobara koji se tro si na funkcioniranje drzavnog aparata i ostalih neproizvodnih djelatnosti, od ukupnih troskova ovih djelatnosti. U praksi se, naim e, cesi'.o p ri analizama. raspodjele drustvenog proizvoda k ategorija opce potrosnje izjednacava s ukupnim budzetskim rashodim a, iz cega p ro izla zi deform irano prikazivanje ucesca lic n e , opce i in vesticione potrosnje u raspodjeli drustvenog p roizvod a" (s tr . 13).

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Ukoliko izdvojim o sve izdatke koji uticu na zivotni standard, onda je razlikovanje licne i opce potrosnje interesantno samo sa stanovista tko ih financira, pa ih tako mozemo tre tira ti. Buduci da visoko obrazovanje i nauka imaju s jedne stran e, karakteristike standarda, a s drug e, investicija - i u svakom slucaju, njihova ekspanzija je drustveno pozeljna - to je prikladno da se i te djelatnosti k lasificiraju zajedno s ostalim djelatnostima standarda. Predlazem o stoga da se opca p otrosnja podijeli u dvije k a te g o rije : (a ) potrosnju koja ima znacenje drustvenog standarda, u koju ukljucujem o rashode naucnih istrazivanja i koju cemo zvati kolektivnom potrosnjom . 1) (b ) potrosnju drzavnih i drustvenih organa i drugih javnih sluzbi, ko ju cemo zvati javnom potrosnjom . Kolektivna i javna potrosnja sacinjavaju opcu potrosnju. Javna potrosnja predstavlja neku vrstu drustvene r e z ije . O k riterijim a razlik ovanja licne i kolektivne potrosnje bit ce v is e govora kasnije.

Robna i nerobna proizvodnja

Poznato je da se sva proizvedena dobra i usluge ne iznose na trzis te i ne razmjenjuju za novae. Uobicajeno je i korisno da se naturalna pro izvodnja p o ljo p rivr ie, rudarski deputati i slicno tre tira kao da su prodani na trzistu, tj. da im se po odredjenom k riteriju imputira v r ijednost. Time se osigurava da organizacione prom iene ill iscezavanje naturalnog sektora usiijed indu strijalizaciie ne dovedu do fiktivnih promjena u volumenu drustvenog proizvoda. ftOj s druge strane, uobicajeno je da se rad dornacica, rad u vrtu i uopce razne kucne aktivnosti - bilo da stvaraju m aterijalne predm ete

l ) Britanska statistika takodjer ponekad upotrebljava term in "kolektiv ne potrosnje1 (CSO. National income Statistics, s t r . 6 1 ), a i inace 1 se taj termin pojavljuje u razrdm statistickim radovim a. 12

ili usluge - ne obracunavaju u drustvenom proizvodu. Ako ovdje dcxije do povecanog zaposijavanja zena, pa funkcije domacica preuzmu razni s e rv is i i ustanove za djecu, doci ce do fiktivnog povecanja drustvenog p roizvod a. Ipak, te nekonzistentnosti se to ie rira ju , je r se sm atra da je imputiranje vrijednosti radu domacica vezano sa suvise a rb itra rnim ocjenama. M i u tom pogledu slijedim o opcu praksu, ali ne zau zimamo dogmatski stav. Ukoliko se pokaze da su moguce relativno pouzdane statisticke p rocjen e, a sami podaci da imaju odredjenu analiticku vaznost. nista ne p rije c i da se i rad domacica tre tira recim o kao neka vrsta ugostiteljstva u domacoj radinosti.

Drustvena (kolektivna) i privatna ( individualna) proizvodnja

Sa stanovista ekonomske politike veom a je vazno razlikovanje sektora ySjj&yjjtva, pa je to razlikovan je striktno i provedeno u racunima pro-

Drustveni p roizvod, drustveni dohodak, potrosnja drustvenog p ro iz voda

C ilj proizvodnje je m aksim iranje finalnog proizvoda koji se u toku godine moze potrositi biio u oblasti zivotnog standarda. bilo za zadovoIjen je opcih drustvenih potreba i in vesticija. Vrijednosni agregat k oji odgovara fizickom i finainom proizvodu jest drustvsni p roizvod, ukoliko se zbraja ^ijodn ost koju pojedine djelat nosti dodaju u p roizvod n ji; drustveni a^l^. cuv, ukoliko se zbrajaju sv i ostvareni prim arni dohoci; odnosn: pozrosnja drustvenog p rc izv o d a5 ukoliko se zbroje licna , opca i investiciona potrosnja i korigixaju za saldo vanjskotrgovinske razm jen e. Sva t r i agreqata su numericki identical i predstavlj aju tr i nacina iz r ac imavan j a drustvenog p roizvo da. 13

Buduci da je drustveni proizvod osnovna analiticka k ategorija, k o ris no je u odnosu na njega definirati bruto i neto pojm ove. Ponekad je potrebno - npr. u analizi form iran ja cijena, kod bilanciranja i d r. ob uhvatiti i m aterijalne troskove. Tada se dobivaju bruto agregati, t j . bruto drusv/eni p ro izv o d , bruto drustveni dohodak, bruto potrosnja. Poriekad je potrebno od drustvenog proizvcda odbiti am ortizaciju ill zamjenu. Tada se dobivaju neto ill novi agregati, Vazno je uociti da neto (H i novi) agregati nernaju svoj fizic k i ekvivalenat i da predstavIjaju kalkulativne k ategorije. l ) N adalje, vazno je uociti da neto agregat ne predstavlja ono sto se ob icno sxnatra da predstavlja, tj. volumen proizvodnje koja se m aze potro s iti, a da se ne smanji proizvodni kapacitet p riv re d e . U p rivred i koja se brzo ra zv ija najveci dio am ortizacije predstavlja akumulaciju, a ne trosak habanja osnovnih sred stava.2 ) Zbog toga je teorijsk i is pravniji pojam novog proiz voda. N o, njegova je analiticka vrijednost u jugoslavenskoj p rivred i relativno mala je r se novi proizvod i drus tveni proizvod numericki razlikuju za svega 1-2% (tako dugo dok su stope rasta v is o k e ) Tu se sad javljaju i term inoloski problem i. U dosad uobicajenoj te rm ino'iogiji upotrebljavaju se drustveni proizvod i narodni dohodak. Ne iz~ gleda logicmm da se atributi mijenjaju od agregata do agregata, pa stoga predlazem o uniforrnnu upotrebu agregata "drustveni" . Nadalje. poaelcad se umjesto lerm ina "bruto drustveni p ro izvo d " upotrebljava termin drustveni bruto p ro izv o d ". Buduci da bruto p roizvod u statist dekoj term iiiologiji obicno znaci i isto sto i drustveni proizvod to se tu iavljs mogucnost nesporazuma; ne m isli se na bruto proizvod vec na bruto bruto proizvcd* Zatim , drustveni dohodak, kao sinonim za drustveni p roizvod , nije uobicajen; cesce se upotrebljava 'bruto dohcdak" n znacenju "drustveni p roizvod 1 Takodjer nije uobicajeno da 1 se bruto dodaje (odnosno, neto oduzima) agregatu koji sam po sebi ni~

1) U posiiednje v rije m e raste uvjerenje o relativno m aloj analitickoj vrijecmcsti neto agregata, pa se bruto agregati tretira ju kao osnovne kategorije. V id i npr. obrazlozenje britanske statisticke prakse U CSO, National Income Statistics, six. .6. 2) OP. Bc Horvat, Ekonomska teorija planske p riv re d e , Kultura, Beo grad, 1961, g l IV*

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je ni brute ni n e t o .^ N o, buduci da im a dva dodavanja - am ortlzacija, odnosno zamjena i m aterijaln i troskovi - to je alternativa uvodjenje termina "bruto bruto" i l i kovanje nekih novih term ina. Prvo je jezickx ruzno i term inoloski nespretno, drugo je neprakticno i nepopularno je r bi trebalo iz m is liti tr i nova term ina: za proiz vo d 2 ) , za dohodak i za potrosnju. Ova razm atranja objasnjavaju p rijed log da se upotrebi terminoloska sekvenca: novi neto p roizvod , drustveni p roizvod , bruto drustveni p roizvod i slicno za dohodak i potrosnju. Kod ove posljednje potrebna je dodatna napomena. Predlazem o da se upotrebi terrain "potrosnja drustvenog p ro izv o d a ", a ne "drustvena p otrosn ja", je r potrosnja maze biti veca i l i manja od drustvencg proizvoda zavisno o saldu vanjsko-trgovinske razm jene.

Domaci i nacionalni proizvod

M etodologija OUN razlik u je dom aci p roizvod - rezultat proizvodnje na te r ito r iji odredjene ze m lje - od nacionalnog proizvoda k oji se izvodi iz prvoga dodavanjem dohodaka koji poticu iz inostranstva i odbijanjern dohodaka koji oticu u inostranstvo. Ta distinkcija ima znacenje za ze m lje koje u vecoj rnjeri iz v o z e ili uvoze privatni kapital il i radnu sna-~ gu. U Jugoslaviji ona analiticki do nedavna n ije im ala mnogo sm isla, je r je razlik a izm edju domaceg i nacionalnog proizvoda kvantitativno

1) Drustveni proizvod je bruto agregat u torn sm islu stc ; _ ~zav& z ro skove osnovnih sredstava. Mo, on je ustvari nego agr~ ,ar ne sa~ d rzi nikakva dupliranja u obracunu. 2) Na prim je r na engleskom je moguce razlik ovati !:qross product (drustveni p ro izvod } i "g ro ss output'* (bruto drustveni p ro izvod ) . Kod nas bi se mogao razlik ovati !ibruto p roizvod " (D P) i "bruto obrt" (5DP/c M edjutim , striktno uzevsi bruto obrt je BBP plus obrt trgovine, koji BDP povecava jos za nekih 70%. Bruto drustveni doho dak mogao bi se zam ijeniti bruto prihodom , a bruto drustvena po trosnja izrazom M bruto rashod!!.

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bila beznacajna. Sada se u tom pogledu situacija m ijenja.

Neto proizvod i dohodak

Veom a cesto razllkuje se neto proizvod i dohodak (neto dohodak u nasoj te rm in o lo g iji). Neto proizvod predstavlja bruto proizvod umanjen za am ortizaciju, a dohodak je dobiven iz neto proizvoda odbijanjem pore za na prom et i dodavanjem subvencija. Na taj nacin dohodak treba da predstavlja agregat dohodaka faktora proizvodnje. Izdvajanje p o re za na prom et vazno je u komparativnoj analizi pojedinih proizvodnih gradna. Na nivou p rivred e u cjelin i ono je bespredmetno i zbog toga je nepotrebno trositi nasu oskudnu zaLihu termina na pojm ove koji imaju samo axitmeticko znacenje.

Transfer! i prim arni dohoci

Transfer! su tokovi samo u jednom pravcu, tj. usluge bez protuusluge Tako, na p rim je r, razni doprinosi predstavljaju tran sfere. M edjutim , razlikovacem o doprinose (u koje ukljucujemo i p o r e z e ), subveneije i transfere u uzem sm islu, kao sto su socijalna prim anja i davanja i pokloni. Transfer! ne povecavaju drustveni dohodak koji predstavlja zb ir prim arnih dohodalca.

Obracun i ll izvrseno placanje kao k riterij

V rijem e nastanka obaveze se cesto ne poklapa s vrem enom naplate. Postavlja se pitanje: da li re g is trira ti transakcije na bazi obracuna ill na bazi stvarno izvrsenih placanja? Ocigledno je da se drustveni pro izvod moze ispravno m je riti jedino ako se obracuna cjeiokupna p r o iz 16

vodnja i potrosnja, bez obzira na to da l i je stvarno placena ill ne, A ako taj k rite rij prim ijenim o kod racuna drustvenog proizvoda, onda, rad i uporedivosti, isti k rite rij treba p rim ijen iti i kod racuna finansijskih tokova. To iza ziva dodatne teskoce, koje m edjutim , nisu neprem ostive. Ukoliko se rad i o p orezim a , m ozem o ukupne obracunate p oreze p od ijeliti na isplacene i poresku rezerv u . Kamate ce sad rzavati stvarno isplacene kainate, kao i imputirane kamate. Kada je vazno da se re g is trira ju i isplate, pored obracuna, to se moze uciniti memorandum stavkama.

Osnovna racunovodstvena shema

Bit ce korisno da nasu shemu drustvenih racuna izgradjujem o postepeno polazeci od najprostije strukture. Na taj nacin m oci ceino dovoljno precizno fik sira ti sve pojm ove i an alizirati efikasnost svakog daljnjeg koraka u pravcu slozen ijih strulctura.

Drustveni dohodak i njegova raspodjela

U p riv re d i postoje t r i kategorije ak tera: radne organ iza cije ( i in d ividualni p ro izvod ja ci) koji stvaraju dohodak, domacinstva (stanovnistv o ) 1) koja primaju dohodak i tro s e ga i organi zajednice koji in tsrveniraju u raspcdjeli dohotka u svrhu ostvarivanja pozeljnih. proporcija

l ) Buduci da stanovnistvo ucestvuje i u radnim organizacijam a i u o r ganima zajednice cini se da je term in "dom acinstva" adekvatniji je r se, kao 1 os tala dva term ina, odnosi na drustvenu instituciju. U je d noj francuskoj publikaciji rezon ira se ovako: Population - menages v ie p erson elie entreprises vie p rofession elle administrations v ie collective M . C ou reier, Manuel de com ptabilite nationale, s tr. 30, 17

licn e, opce i investicione potrosnje. Sve to pokazuje numericki p rim je r u tabeli 1.

Tabela 1. DRUSTVENI DOHODAK I NJEGOVA UPOTREBA

Radne o r - Doma Zajedniganizacije cinstva ca _________ R DRUSTVENI DOHODAK Drustveni dohodak (p ro izvod ) Neto licn i dohoci Doprinosi zajednici Drustveni transferi Subvencije radium organizacijama. Saldo: raspoloziv doho dak SVEGA: RASPODJELA DOHOTKA Raspsslozi'f dohcdak Potrosnja Saldo:bruto stednja SVEGA: R - rashodi, P - prihodi 190 190 190 450 50 190 500 500 500 200 110 310 1000 500 410 500 50 50 100 190 500 550 50 100 310 460 P R P R

P r iv r e da

P _ _R____ P

1000

1000

1100 1100 550

460 460 1000 1000

1000 650 350

310 310 1000 1000

Radne organizacije stvaraju drustveni dohodak (p ro izv o d ) u visin i od 1.000. Od toga 500 isplacuju domacinstvima u vidu licnih dohodaka, a 410 zajednici u vidu doprinosa, poreza i drugih tran sfera . Stanovnis-

18

tvo takodjer dale svoje doprinose i p oreze zajednici (5 0 ). Zajednica prim ljenih 460 rasporedjuje tako da stanovnistvu vraca 50 u vida penz ija , socijalnih dvanja i slicn o, a radnim organizacijam a 100 u vidu subvenciia, tako da postoji visak od 310 za daljnju raspodjelu, Slicno, nakon svih tih preraspodjela radnim organizacijama ostaje visak od 190, a domacinstvima od 500. Ta tr i viska predstavljaju krajnju r a s podjelu onog originalnog dohotka od 1.000 na rasp o lozive dohotke tr iju kategorija ak tera. Oni sad te rasp o lozive dohotke trose ili stede; u m jeri u kojoj ih stede oni postaju izv o r za financiranje investicija. Navedeni p rim jer sad rzi sve osnovne karakteristike sisterna racuna drustvenog proizvoda. No sama shema nedovoljno je rasclanjena i nedovoljno inform ativna za prakticnu prim jenu.

Sumarna tabela racuna drustvenog proizvoda

P rije svega uniformnost u registriran ju izvrsen ih transakcija postizava se prim jenom principa dvojnog knjigovodstva: svaka transakcija b iIje z i se dvaput na racunu jednog aktera kao zaduzenje i na suprotnoj strani racuna drugog aktera kao odobrenje. Kod toga treba uociti da su tokovi proizvodnje usm jereni suprotno od tokova placanja za tu p ro izvodnju. Time sto se upotr eblj ava j u racuni. od kojih svaki predstavija samostalni bilans, a svaka stavka zahtijeva dvostruko knjizenje, autornatski je zajamcena kvantitativna uskladjenost svih stavaka (cega ne bi bilo kad bi se upotrebljavale ta b e le ). M ozem o raz-Iikovati c e tir i tipa ekonomske aktivnosti. To su proizvod n ja, potrosnja, preraspodjela i akumulacija. Eventualni saldo ukupne proizvodnje i ulaipne poti'osnje izra za va se razrnjenom s inostranstvom . Prve tri ak'dvnos'ti poklapaju se s tr i navedena sektora (radne organizac ije , domacinstva i z a je d n ic e ). Svaki od ta t r i sektora moze akumulirati I m oze v rs iti razm jenu s inostranstvom . N o, prikazivanje tih ak tivnosti na svakom od tr i sektoraska racuna ne cini se prakticnim . Z a to cem o uvesti jos dva posebna racuna - racun akumulacije i racun inostranstva - na kojima ce se navedene aktivnosti prilcazati skupno za c ijelu p rivredu . Time dobivamo standardnu strukturu od pet racuna, kako je navedeno u tabeli 2. 19

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Transakcije u tabeli 2. navedene su onim redosljedom kako se pojavljuju u prvom , pa zatim u drugom racunu i tako do posljednjeg racu na. U dva slucaja - subvencije i uvoz - iznosi se odbijaju, je r su to korekcije za odredjivanje velicin e drustvenog proizvoda. Sto se tice ostalih transakcija, od in teres a je uociti da je licna potrosnja definirana kao potrosnja financirana od strane dom acinstava, a opca potros nja kao potrosnja financirana od strane zajednice. Potrebno je sada'jos samo da se pojedini racuni izd voje u samostalne bilance i da se nelce transakcije rasclane pa da se dobije osnovna shema racuna proizvodnih tokova.

Osnovna sherna racuna drustve nog proizvoda

Osnovna novina u shemi je grupiranje radnih organizacija u privredne i neprivredne. Dohodak jednih i drugih predstavlja ukupni drustveni dohodak, koji se onda tro s i na materijalnu i nem aterijalnu proizvodnju. Ovo grupiranje dovodi do izvjesn ih problem a koje treba r ije s iti. 1. P rije svega licna i opca potrosnja sastoje se iz m aterijalnog 1 nem aterijalnog d ije la :p r v i se k n jizi u g o rn jo j, a druci i donjoj polovini racuna. I* Ako na p rim je r, Zavod za socijalno osiguranje (Rn III) ill individualni seljak (Rn II) placa bolnici {Rn I ) troskove lijecen ja , on da ta placanja treba rasclan iti na dio koji pokriva m aterijalne troskove boinice (gorn ja desna cetvrtina Rn I ) i dio koji pokriva dohodak bolnice (donja desna cetvrtina Rn I ) . To ra scla n jeva rje treba iz v r s iti na bazi -c --rosjecne p ro p e rc ije . Eventualne \ <od rasclanjavanja pojccL-.afnih transakcija ne Igraju nikakvu v _ *_ oliko se sacuvaju tacni globali m aterijalnih troskova i dchotka. 2. Rasclanjavanje potrosnje na licnu, kolektivnu i opcu potrosnju pred stavlja svojevrstan problem je r je analiticka upotreba visestruka i ne postoje jecLnoznacni k r it e r iji. Na p rim je r licna potrosnja se m oze d efin ir a ti: a ) kao potrosnja koja se financira iz Jicnih dohodaka, b) kao potrosnja za koju daju inicijativu pojedinci, bez obzira na to tko je f i nancira. c ) kao potrosnja pojedinaca, bez obzira na inicijativu i financira n je, d ) kao b) il l c ) , ali sa zahtjevom da ima sadrzaj zivotnog 21

standarda. Odredit cem o nasu deflniciju na bazi slijedecih ra zm a tra nja. Potrosnja koja nema karakter zivotnog standarda predstavlja javnu po trosnju. Javna potrosnja se u cjelin i financira preko zajednice, sto znaci identitet odgovarajucih stavaka racuna I i III (H I-3 + III-4 = I -13 + 1-23). Ukoliko pojedinacni gradjanin kupuje iz svog licnog dohotka sudske usluge ili pasos, njegova kupovina ne k n jizi se direktno kao prihod na racunu I, vec kao prihod racuna III (111-13), odakle se osda financira aktivnost sudova i pasoskih ureda na racunu I (1-13 i 1 -23}. Nakon sto smo iz potrosnje izd v o jili javnu potrosnju p reostaje da se ostatak rasclani na licnu i kolektivnu potrosnju. Uzim am o da sva po trosnja koja se financira iz licnih dohodaka i im a sadrzaj zivotnog standarda treba da se ukljuci u licnu potrosnju. Na slican nacin sva potrosnja Icoja ima sadrzaj zivotnog standarda, a financira je zajednica, bit ce odredjena kao kolektivna potrosnja.Prem a tome naturalno identicna potiosnja koja se ne financira iz licnih dohodaka - npr. hr ana i odjeca u bolnicama - treba da bude ovdje ukljucena. Kolektivnu pot rosnju (hrana i odjeca u vojarnama i zatvorim a ulazi u javnu potros nju) Kolektivna potrosnja rcoze se odrediti i kao proizvodnja djelat nosti drustvenog standarda ( stambeno-komunalne i kulturno-socijaln e) umanjena za dio koji odgovara financiranju iz licnih dohodaka i di~ rektnim kupovinama p rivred e i uvecana za financiranje licne potrosnje od strane zajednicec Da bi se iz-bjegla sabunas predlazem o da term ini licn a. kolektivna i javna potrosnja oznacuju sadrzaj potrosnje, da se za zbroj m a terija lnih rashoda i dohodaka opcih sluzbi upotrebe term ini bruto drustveni proizvod sluzbi standards i javnih slu zb i, a da se za njiiiovo financira nje apotrebe term ini rashcdi stanovnistva, p rivred e i zajednice na us~ luge sluzbi drustvencg standarda, odnosno javnih. sluzbi. 3. Poseban problem predstavljaju stanarine Moguci su pet siu cajeva: ( l ) stanovanje u vlastitom star.u (2 ) stanovanje u tudjem privatnom stanu, (3 ) stanovanje u sfanu drustvenog vlasnistva, (4 ) privredna ajelatnost u vla s tito j, privatnoj il i drustvenoj zg ra d i, i (5 ) n ep rivredna djelatnost u vla s tito j, privatnoj ili drustvenoj zg ra d i. Podjimo tim redosljedom .

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1964 4.744 21. Licna potrosnja nem aterijalna ( II 2) 22. Kolektivna potrosnja nematerijalna ( III 2) ' 23. Javna potrosnja nem aterijalna. ( III ) 4 24. Potrosnja p rivred e (1-5) 25. Izvoz ( IV -2 ) Raspolozivo za potrosnju 26. Minus: Uvoz (IV - 8 ) 27. Greske u obracunu ( - 6 ) B. Potrosnja nem aterijalnog drustvenog proizvoda

1960

1964

538 2.306

972 4.041

1.327 1.080 599

3.063 1.699 900

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1.624 2.306 2.035 2.394 1.170 2.743

2.072 4.041 2.990 4.696 2.131 5.164

9. Doprinosi iz llcnlh dohodaka p r iv r . organizacija (1 2) 2.979 9.713 10. Doprinosi iz licnih dohodaka n e p riv r. organ.(1 -2 ) 1.327 3.065 11. Doprinosi privrednih o r ganizacija (1-4) 11,074 15.386 12. Doprinosi neprivrednih o r ganizacija (1-10) 900 599 13. Doprinosi stanovnistva 557 1.925 ( I I - 3) 14. Transferna prim anja is 251 inostranstva (IV -4 ) 139

2 2 4.510 10.032 16.784 31.928 Prihodi zajedrii.ee 16.784 31.128

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28

(1 ) Stanarina se imputira kao licn i dohodak u II-7 i licna potrosnja u II-2 s protustavkama u 1-7 i 1-21. (2 ) Placanje gazdarici tre tira se bilo kao placanje za licne usluge, b ilo kao placanje u oblasti turizm a i ugostiteljstva. (3 ) Odobrava se 1-21 i zaduzuje II-2 . (4 ) i (5 ) Ukoliko p rivredn e organ izacije k oriste vlastite poslovne p ros to rije ili p ro s to rije drugih privrednih organ izacija, transakcije ostaju unutar privrednog sektora i tretira ju se kao i sve ostale. Ukoliko privredne organ izacije placaju stanarinu stanovnistvu ili n ep rivred i, ta se stanarina tre tira kao izdavanje za licne dohotke ili kao placanja n ep rivred i ( v . d a l je ) . Ukoliko neprivreda i stanovnistvo placaju stanarinu p riv re d i (sto je sasvim izuzetno) , to se tre tira kao i ostala kupovina robe i usluga od p riv re d e . Na slican nacin knjizenje se v r s i i u slucaju ( 5 ) .

4. Na taj nacin r ije s ili smo problem e do kojih dolazi kad neprivredni dio racuna I kupuje kod privrednog d ijela . No ja vlja se i obrnuti p ro b lem , kad p rivredn i sektor kupuje kod neprivrednog. U u strirajmo to ran ije navedenim p rim je ro m , kad proizvodno poduzece kupu je studiju kod jednog naucnog instituta. Tada lijevu stranu prr/rednog dijela racuna I trefoa povecati za dohodak instituta sadrzan u c ijeni studije, da bi se zb iro v i lije v e i desne strane tog sektora izjecln a cili, Protustavku mozerno la ijiz iti na tr i nacina: (a ) odobrenjem racunu zajednice, (b ) odbijanjem istog iznosa od lije v e strane neprivrednog d ijela racu na I u svrhu izjednacenja s desnom stranom ? ( c ) odobrenjem neprivrednom sektoru racuna I . K o je cem o rjes e n je odabrati o v is i o tome kako definiram o ukupnu drustvenu proizvodnju. Ako je definiram o kao zb ir m aterijalne proizvodnje i dohotka ostvarenog u nem aterijalnoj p roizvod n ji, onda treba p rim ije niti rjes e n je ( a ) . Ako je definiram o kao zb ir svih dohodaka u p rivredi i n e p rivre d i, onda va zi ( b ) . No 11 slucaju (b ) drustveni dohodak v a r irao bi od organizacionih rjesen ja : kod budzetskog financiranja instituta
29

drustveni dohodak bi bio v eci (je r se budzeti financiraju Iz doprinoss privrednih organizacija) 5 a kod direktnih transakcija izm edju p r iv r e de i instituta bio bi manji (je r placanja institutu predstavljaju m aterijalne troskove poduzeca), Buduci da je postulat nezavisnosti drustvenog proizvoda od institucionalrdh i organizacionih promjena osnovni k riter i j obracuna volumena drustvenog p roizvod a, to je neophodno p rim je niti metodu (a ) ili ( c } Predlazsm o da se prim jeni metoda ( c ) je r d i rektno preslikava stvarne transakcije i omogucuje direktno sagledavanje proporcije ucestvovanja p rivred e u financiranju kolektivne p otrosnje (uglavnom obrazovanja i naucnog r a d a ). Kod toga valja uociti statisticku teskocu koja se sastoji i u tome sto kupovine u stavei 1-5 tr e ba prikazati bez m aterijalnih troskova (t j. samo dohodak) , kako se ne bi obracun duplirao. U tom smislu to su "neto kupovine". 5. U ostaiim odnosima izm edju pojedinih racuna nema bitno novih mo rnenata. Dok se neprivredni sektor racuna I razliku je od privrednog na desnoj strani po tome sto ne sadrzi in v e s tic ije , na lije v o j se r a z likuje po tome sto se ne odbijaju subvene ije . To se objasnjava tim e sto za neprivrednu proizvodnju ne postoji trzis te koje bi odredjivalo cijen e, pa se stoga ukupni isplaceni dohoci ujedno smatraju i drustvenim dohotkom. 6. Osnovna shema racuna drustvenog proizvoda m oze se v'eoma p re g ledno i graficki prikazati. Na dijagraxnatskom prikazu radi vece preglednosti privredne i neprivredne aktivnosti su agregirane u j e dinstvenu aktivnost radnih organizacija, a s tr ije lic e prikazuju usmjarenost tokova placanja (koja je , kako je vec i istaknuto, obrnuta od tokova proizvoda i usluga} Ovaj dijagram pokazuje najprostiju mogucnu sliku priirrednog procesa zadrzavajuci jos uvijek sve osnovne znacajke tog procesa. Vidi se kako ss osnovni z a ic .x c placanja za potrosna dobra iz zaradjenih dohodaka - prik? .-r. - vorn i zslenom bojom, ostvaruje tek uz pomoc mnogobrojmn arugm xaitsakcija. Posebno pada u oci smedja boja koja prxkazuje ranne tran sfers; od kojih se vecina cdiiosi na intervencije zajecinlce u pri vrednom prccesu ti tran sfer! nisu do*/oljno proucerd -- a z e. to je opet osnoviii preuuslov da budu tacno izm jeren i - oni mogu lake Ji.ati, sto se onda pojavljuje kao fenomen cen traliziran ja sred so'.a Takodjer pada u oci zuta boja koja oznacava iz v o ie f l n a n ciranja investicija i koja takodjer prikazuje jednu vrstu tran sfera . U v e zi s ovirn dijagram om od fundarnentalne vaznosti je cinjenica da je on invarijantan u Gdnosu na institucionalna prom jene kao i u odnosu na ekspanziju p riv re d e , te zbog toga m oze posluziti kao stabilna osnova za izgradnju sistema drustvenih racuna.
30

I y

M atrica medjusektorskih placanja

Medjusobni odnosi pet arustvenih racuna mogu se preglednije p rik azati u matricnoj form i (Tabela 4 . ) . M atrica je rastavljena analogno tabelama isporuka-utrosaka. No kako su isporuke i placanja suprotno usm jeren i, to su ovdje prim aoci i davaoci izm ijen ili m jesta u odnosu na opis standardne medjusektorske tab el e . P rvi red prikazuje isporuke radnih organizacija ostalim sektorim a, odnosno racunima; on u stvari predstavlja prihode desne strane racuna I. P rvi stupac predstavlja pla canja radnih organizacija, ostalim sektorim a, odnosno racunima i ta ke odgovara rashodima na lije v o j strani racuna I . Ostale transakcije ocigledne su iz legenda u odnosnim poljim a. Zbirovi stupaca i redaka jednaki su. Oni se od zbirova u racunima r a z likuju samo u toliko sto se uvoz i subvencije ne odbijaju od doprinosa radnih organizacija, odnosno izvoza.

Obracun s inostranstvom

Obracun uvozno - izvoznih transakcija

Uobicajeno je da se uvoz obracunava fob, a izv o z c if, sto ima o d red jeaih konsekvenci kod tretiran ja, n p r . usluga nase trgovacke m orn aric e . Mediutim, problem koji ovdje zelim o obraditi odnosi se na a lte r nativu: obracun po deviznim ili po unutrasnjim cijenania. Uzm imo da su ostvarene slijedece transakcije: vriiednost na unutrasnjem t r z . .din 1.200 1.400

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Zbog toga sto je subvencioniranje izvoza vece no sto je oporezovanje uvoza - izvozni kurs je v is i od uvoznog - vanjskotrgovinski deficit je manji po domacim cijenama nego po deviznim . Postavlja se pitanje kako cemo ove transakcije re g is trira ti u nasem sistemu drustvenih ra cuna. Poci cemo od pretpostavke da se njima ni u cemu ne m ijenjaju transakcije stanovnistva. Prema tome preostaje da se usklade ostala c e tiri racuna. Kod toga rimsko I oznacava proceduru kod koje se obracun izvoza i uvoza v rs i po deviznim cijenam a, rim sko II obracun po cijenama unutrasnjeg trzis ta , a rimsko III jednu kombinaciju u kojoj se izvoz i uvoz opet obracunavaju po deviznim cijenam a. Izvoz i uvoz registriraju se na racunima radnih organizacija i inostran stva. Radne organizacije placaju carine Zajednici = U slijed subvencioniranja izvoza dohodak poduzeca je za iznos izvoznih p rem ija v eci no sto bi bio kad bi se rea lizacija v rs ila po trznim cijenam a. Kako smo p r e ipostavili da domacinstva ostaju neutralna u ovim transakcijam a, to svo povecanje dohotka odlazi u fondove radnih organizacija i tako pred stavlja izv o r financiranja investicija na racunu akumulacije. M edjutim , da bi se izkazala realna vrijednost drustvenog dohotka, lijevu stranu racuna radnih organizacija treba smanjiti za iznos izvoznih prem ija i njima zaduziti Zajednicu za koju to predstavlja rashod. Tim e su sve stvarne transakcije reg istrira n e. Preostaje jos da se svi racuni iz r a v naju. Saldo racuna radnih organizacija predstavlja In vesticije. Kod za jednice se pojavljuje manjak koji treba pren ijeti kao neg Iv m iz v o r financiranja na racun akumulacije. Na racunu inostranstva se pojavlju je platni deficit koji postaje dodatnim izvorom financiranja in vesticija, Carine, p rem ije, povecanje fondova i in vesticije m oraju, ocigledn o5 po oba postupka biti is t i. Razlike se javljaju jedino kod obracuna iz v o za i uvoza pa stoga i kod platnog d e fic ita . Kod toga obracun po uriutrasnjim cijenama treba k origirati raziikam a u cijenam a, Od p rve dvije prikazane altern ative, prva izgleda prikladnijom . Ona je jedr.ako informativna kao i druga alternative!, izhjegava imputirano ioijizsnje (razliK e u cijen a m a ;, koje^ osim toga, postaje v rio nezgodno kod prelaska na racun financijskih tokcva, prikazuje racun inostranstva i piatni deficit neposredno u dsviznim vrijednosiirna cirne s e, ujedno, direktno uklapa u racune financi jskih tokova i ne narusava iedno o q pravua cirustvencg racunovodstva po koin transkacije treba re q is trirati po trznim vrijednostim a. Prva aizemativa znaci striktno pridrzavanje p raviia da se obracun v r si po trzism m ciienarna No to ovdje dovodi do jedne nezqcde: devizne

34

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cljene nisu cijene unutrasnjeg trzis ta . Kao rezultat pojedine komponente drustvenog proizvoda obracunate su po ra zlicitim cijenam a: unutrasnja potrosnja po unutrasnjim cijenam a, a saldo izvoza-uvoza po svjetskim cijenama. Time se, kako izgleda, narusava princip in va rijantnosti obracuna je r bi kod iste stvarne proizvodnje promjene ucesca izvoza i uvoza dovele do fiktivnih promjena drustvenog proizvoda. Taj nedostaiak izbjegava treca alternativa u kojoj su na desnoj strani racuna proizvodnje izvozne prem ije odnosno takse prikljucene izvo zu , a carine uvozu, cim e je saldo izvoza-uvoza obracunat po unutrasnjim cijenam a, a u isto vrijem e je v id ljiva i devizna vrijednost izvoza i uvoza. Slicno rjesenje prim jenju je i SZS. Ovo rjesen je priblizu je obracun racuna proizvodnje obracunu u medjusektorskoj ta b lic i. Medjutim, pojavljuju se odredjene kom plikacije koje smanjuju p red nosti treceg rjesen ja. Razmotrimo pribliznu procjenu za 1964. godinu.

Izvoz po deviznim cijenama Izvozne p rem ije Oslobodjenja od direktnih poreza Oslobodjenja od poreza na prom et Izvoz po unutrasnjim cijenama Uvoz po deviznim cijenama Carina Porez na promet proizvoda Minus: regres Uvoz po unutrasnjim cijenama

717 mrd d 66 !l " 199 24 n " 1006 mrd din. 991 mrd din. 231 " " 58 !l '' 21 " " 1259 mrd din.

P ro izla zi da se dodavanjem carina i prem ija jos ne dobivaju unutrasnje cijene. A ako se dodaju oslobodjenja od p o re za , onda za is ti iznos tr e ba na lije vo j strani racuna proizvodnje p ovisiti doprinose zajednici i onda s tiro, istim doprinosima zaduziti zajednicu- A to su fiktivne tran sakcije, koje osim toga mijenjaju v e lic inu drustvenog prozvoda. Nadaije , ukolilco bismo u svojili to rjesenje korigiranja ostvarenih izvoznih cijena, nema razloga zasto ne bismo na isti nacin k o rigira li I unutras nje cijene kadgod su izvrsena poreska oslobadjanja (sm anjenje kamata, smanjenje doprinosa i s i . ) . A tada uvodjenju fiktivnih transakcija

36

nema k raja. Takodjer, insistiranje na unutrasnjim cijenama ofcracu na drustvenog proizvoda dovelo bi do toga da se porez na promet i r e g re s i pojavljuju i na lije v o j i na desnoj strani racuna proizvodnje, c i me se smaniuje preglednost tog racuna, zam agljuje velicin a tran sfernih intervencija i unosi zbrka u klasifikaciju transakcija. I na kraju, za suvremenu jugoslavensku privredu koja tezi konvertibilnosti nacionalne valute strano tr z is te ravnopravno je dom acem . N i na domacem trzistu nisu cijene uvljek is te , pa ill zato ne svodimo na neke fiktivne jedinstvene cijen e. A ukoliko v e ci ili manji izv o z Hi uvoz dovodi do promjena u dohocima, onda te promjene nisu rezultat organizacionih zahvata, vec predstavljaju realne efekte trzisn e p rivred e koje kakve takve treba r e g is trira ti. Iz navedenih razloga usvajamo prvo rjesen je kao najadekvatnije. A ukoliko se za potrebe ekonomske analize z e li izracunati uvoz i izvoz po unutrasnjim cijenam a, onda to treba uraditi van standardnog siste ma drustvenih racuna.

Obracun s inostranstvom u cjelin i

Pored izvoza i uvoz-a roba - koji sacinjavaju trgovinsku bilancu - postoje i citav niz drugih transakcija s inostranstvom . K lasifikacija tih tran sakci ja ra zlicita je kod Medjunarodnog monetarnog fonda, nase N arod- . ne banke (ciju klasifikaciju usvaja i SZS) i kod sistem a drustvenih ra cuna OUN. Nema pot reha da cvdje ispitujem o ra zlik e u tim klasifik aciiam a, vec cdmah prelazim o na rjes e n je koje najvise odgovara potrebama jugoslavenske p rivred e i sistem a drustvenih racuna kcji izgradjuje ova studija. Mozem o dodati da se to rjesen je samo neznatno razlikuje od rjesenja Narodne banke Jugoslav!je, je r se in zistira lo na tome da se postojeca statisticka praksa m ijenja samo onda kad je to zaista neophodno, Sve transakci je k lasificiran e su u dvije osnovne gru pe: ..A tekuce transakcije, c iji saldo predstavlja d eficit il i suficit bilance placar.ja I. B. ostale transakcije kojima se nnancira saldo tekucih transak c ija .

37

A . Tekuce transakcije 1= Izvoz i uvoz p rivrede a) b) c) d) e) Robe Nemonetarno zlato Usluge Nerobni p riliv i odliv Dohodak faktora proizvodnje

2. Izvoz i uvoz neprivrede a ) Usluge b ) Dohodak faktora proizvodnje BILANCA PLACANJA B. Transfer! i kapitalne transakcije 1. Transfsri stanovnistva 2. Transferi drzave TRANSFERI UKUPNO 3. Kapitalne transakcije radnih organizacija (b ez bankarskih ustanova) a) Dugorocni kapital b ) Kratkorocni kapital 4. Kapitalne transakcije zajednice a) Dugorocni kapital b ) Kratkorocni kapital KAPITALNE TRANSAKCIJE 5. Davizne rezerv e FIN.ANCIJSKI O BRA CUN

Saldo bilance placanja je , naravno, jednak saldu financijskog obracuna. Transferi bi m ogli da se ukljuce i u grupu A i u grupu B. Odabrano je potonje rjesen je, je r se tekuce transakcije re g is trira ju na racunu radnih organizacija, a transferi na racunima domacinstava i zajednice, pa ih stoga ne treba m ijesa ti. Prelazim o na obrazlozenje pojedinih v r sta transakcija. 38

( l - a ) Izv o z i uvoz roba korisno je rasclaniti na izv o z i uvoz ( I ) s iro vina i rep ro m a te rija la , (2 ) investicionih dofaara i (3 ) potrosne rob e. ( l - b ) Nemonetarno zlato treba dodati izvozu , je r se kod prebacivanja u devizne r e z e r v e , kad postaje monetarno zlato, pretvara u odbitnu stavku, pa se tako te dvije stavke anuiiraju. Kako nemo netarno zlato predstavlja malu vrijednost (oko 2 m r d . at.din) m oze se u standardnim racunima p rib ro jiti izvozu roba, um jesto da se iskazuje zasebno. (1 - c ) Us luge se d ijele na slijed ece c e tiri k ategorije: (1 ) transport, ( 2 ) osiguranje, (3 ) razne usluge i (4 ) nerobni p r iliv i odliv. T J nerobni p r iliv i odliv ulaze tu riza m , putovanja, privredna pred stavnistva i strana diplomatska predstavnistva u Jugoslav!ji. Tu rizam se odnosi samo na p riliv deviza od stranaca i buduci da se izv o z za tu sumu povecava, treba licnu potrosnju za istu sumu smanjiti da bi potrosnja na desnoj strani rna radnih organi zacija ostala neprom jenjena. Putovanja mogu biti privatna te poslovna u privredn e i neprivredne svrh e. Privatna putovanja treba dodati licnoj p o trosn ji, je r se u isto v rije m e odbijaju kao od liv deviza na desnoj strani rna R .O . Privredna i neprivredna poslovna putovanja predstavljaju troskove i odliv deviza tako da se odbijaju i na lije v o j i na desnoj strani m a R.O. Neto p riliv od stranih diplomatskih predstavnistava treba odbiti od licne potrosnje, a poslovanje nasih diplomatskih predstavnistava u inostranstvu treba obracunati s n ep rivred om . Stavka (3 ) sadrzi veoma raznovrsne transakcije. P rije svega tu je grupa transakcija koja se odnosi na transport ( spediterske usluge, kvalitativni prijem rob e, PTT, Brodospas, aerodrom ske i lucne p ristojb e, ukupno oko 9 mrd d p riliv a u 1964. g o d .) i m ogli bism o je p rib ro jiti stav c i ( l ) . Buduci da pojedine stavke nisu v e lik e , a Narodna banka ih razvrstava u ostale usluge, to i ml prihvacamo tu soluciju. Zatim su tu relativno velike zastupnicke pro v iz i je {14 mrd, d, p riliv a u 1964. godini) , placene bankarske p ro v izije (prim ljene p ro v iz ije idu na racun n e p r iv r e d e ). sajm ovi, licence i patenti. Posebnu stavku predstavljaju radovi u inostranstvu kojih v rije d nost brzo ra s te . ( 1-d) Dohodak faktora proizvodnje predstavlja uobicajen naziv za do hodak prim ljen iz inostranstva ili placen inostranstvu. Kad se sal do tog dohotka odbije od drustvenog dohotka (p roizvod a) dob ije se domaci dohodak ( proizvod.) . Razlikujemo d vije k ategorije:

(1-) dohodak od licnog rada i (2 ) dohodak od in vesticija. U do hodak od licnog rada ubrajamo ustede od rada u inostranstvu (a li ne iseljenicke doznake, pomoc i socijalna prim anja) , u do hodak od in vesticija , kamate, zakupnine, p ro fite , dividende. Vazno je uociti da vrijednost usteda od rada treba dodati i na l i jevoj i na desnoj strani rna R .O . Neprivredne usluge predstavljaju prihodi i rashodi nasih diplomatskih predstavnistava u inostranstvu, prim ljene bankarske p r o v iz ije , putovanja u neprivredne svrhe, prihodi i rashodi od kulturnih i sportskih priredbi u inostranstvu. U neprivredni dohodak faktora proizvodnje u~ l a z i : (1 ) licni prihodi od patenata i autorskih prava te (2 ) kamate i drugi prihodi od bankarskih plasm ana. P rije nego sto prijedjem o na grupu B, treba upozoriti na odredjene kom plikacije koje nastaju kod uskladjivanja transakcija s inostranstvom sa zahtjevima racunovodstvenog sistem a, Osnovno nacelo dvojnog racunovodstva jest identicnost lije v e i desne strane. Odatle slijed i da sve devizne rashode, makar se odnosili i na licne dohotke, kamate ili p o re z e , treba tretira ti kao m aterijalne troskove i odbiti od dohotka na lije voj strani rna R . O . , je r se u vidu deviznog odliva odbija na desnoj stra n i. N pr. neko gradjevinsko poduzece izvodi radove u inostranstvu i sav m aterijal kupuje na lieu m jesta, a licne dohotke isplacuje u devizam a. Ako v rs i obracun dohotka na isti nacin kao i u domacoj p ro izvod n ji, na lije vo j strani ce se pojaviti cjelokupni dohodak (vrijed n ost proizvodnje minus m aterijalni trosk ovi) , a na desnoj strani cjelokupna prozvodnja kao izv o z , a m aterijalni troskovi kao uvoz. Osim toga licni dohoci rad nika u inostranstvu pojavljuju se kao devizni odliv na desnoj strani ra cuna, koja je za toliko manja od lije v e strane. Da bi se uspostavila ra v noteza, treba iste dohotke odbiti i na lije v o j strani. Kad radnici zatim jedan dio zarade transferiraju kuci, onda ce se ti izn osi pojaviti na l i jevoj i na desnoj strani kao "dohodak od licnog rada" i za toliko ce se drustveni dohodak odn. proizvod povecati, Ustede od rada u inostran stvu mogle bi se tretira ti i kao tran sfer. No s obzirom na prilicn o m asovno privrem eno zaposljavanje u inostranstvu, izgleda mi da gornje rjesen je ima vise ekonomskog sm isla i daje vece analiticke mogucnost i . U stvari predlazem o da se usvoji rjesen je Medjunarodnog m onetarnog fonda pa da se samo iseljenicke doznake, ostavine, pomoc i poklon - paketi tretiraju kao tran sfer. U statistickoj shemi Narodne banke i seljenicke doznake i pomoc usle su u nerobne prihode i tako u tekuce transakcije pa je stoga saldo tekucih transakcija za oko 21 rard d u 1964. godini manji od naseg salda.
40

Slicno kao i izvodjenje radova u inostranstvu tretira se i poslovanje m jesovitog poduzeca iii naseg predstavnistva u inostranstvu: d evizni rashodi odbijaju se odn. prihodi pribrajaju se i na lije vo j (sm anjenje ili povecanje dohotka) i na desnoj strani (povecanje uvoza ili iz voza ) rna R . O . Poseban problem predstavlja obracun kam ate, odn. uopce dohotka od investici ja . Za privrednu i l i neprivrednu proizvodnu organizaciju p lacanje kamate inostranstvu predstavlja m aterijalni trosak (dok domaca kamata predstavlja dio dohotka) , a prim anje kamate iz inostranstva dohodak od investici ja . Sto se tice banke - centralne ili poslovne - ona u unutrasnjim transakcijam a ne prim a niti daje kamatu kao radna o r ganizacija (rn R . O . ) vec kao institucija zajednice (rn Z a je d n ic e ). To je nemoguce kod vanjskih kam ata, je r zajednica ima samo redistributivnu funkciju pa stoga ne rnoze ulaziti u neposredni poslovni kontakt. Osim toga vanjske kam ate, za razliku od unutrasnjih, predstavljaju povecanje ili smanjenje realnih re z e rv a ze m lje . Problem se m oze r i je s iti na dva nacina. Prvo prim ljena i dana inostrana kamata r e g is tr ira se na desnoj strani m a R .O . i na odgovarajucim stranama rna ino stranstva. Time je porem ecena ravnoteza na rnu R. O. ( je r je lijeva strana ostala neprom jenjena) pa na njegovoj desnoj strani treba ponovno odbiti saldo kamata i vezati ga s racunom zajednice. Nezgoda ovog postupka je s t u tom e, sto onemogucuje iskazivanje cistih agregata domaceg drustvenog proizvoda (drustveni p roizvod je manji za odbijani saldo kamata banaka, a domaci proizvod je veci za prib rojen i saldo ka mata i drugog dohotka od in vestici ja ) radnih organ iza cija . Druga m ogucnost sastoji se u tom e da se investicioni dohodak kod banaka iz r a cuna na is ti nacin kao i kod drugih radnih organ izacija. No tim e se do hodak banaka kao radnih organizacija povecava za jedan elemenat koji pripada bankama kao institucijam a (neto prihodi od kamata ijlaze u k r e ditni fo n d ). Ako taj elemenat ne tran sferiram o zajednici u s fe r i re a l nih tokova, sto je bila p rva alternative., m oram o ga tran sferirati p r ilikom prelaska na financijske tokove.-. Ova potonja alternativa izgleda prikladnijom i ona je prihvacena. Prelazirno na transakcije grupe B. U tran sfere stanovnistvu uiaze so cijalna prim an ja, naslijed ja, r e p a trija c ija , poklon - paketi, darovi C r venog k riza i UNICEF-a i drugi vidovi pom oci. U drzavne tran sfere u~ laze rep aracije i drzai/na darovanja u naturi i novcu. Kod kapitalnih transakcija shema MMF ima v is e ekonomskog sm isla nego shema NB koja je prilagodjena operativnim potrebama. M edjutim , i shema MMF zahtijeva znacajne r e v iz ije , a od statistike MB uzimamo 41

izdvajanje kretanja deviznih r e z e r v i iz kapitalnih transakcija, je r je to veoma spretno rjesenje* Nasa osnovna racunovodstvena shema za htijeva razlikovanje transakcija radnih organizacija od transakcija za jednice (d rzave i banaka). N adalje, s ekonomskog stanovista kljucno je razlikovanje dugorocnog i kratkorocnog kapitala. P rvi je jeftin iji i stab iln iji, potonji je skuplji i veoma mobilan i o s je tljiv na konjukturu. Zbog toga ce se u ekonomskoj p olitici nastojati da se uvozi sto vise dugorocnog kapitala, a iz v o z i sto vise kratkorocnog kapitala. Oba navedena razlikovanja postoje u shemi M M F, a ukljucena su u nasu shemu. Zbog ranijill zakonskih ogranicenja radne organizacije u dugorocne kapitalne transkacije do sada gotovo nisu ulazile (izu zev nekoliko m jeso vitih poduzeca u inostranstvu). M edjutim , u buduce se m oze ocekivati znacajna aktivnost u ovoj s fe r i. Uvoz i izvoz dugorocnog kapitala od vijao se do sada u cjelin i putem drzavnih aranzmana. U buduce ce se vjerojatno angazirati i poslovne banke. Klirinska zaduzenja i potrazivanja se ne prebijaju, je r imaju donekle razlicitu funkciju. Zaduzenje znaci da je u neku grupu zem alja iz v e z e no manje no sto je uvezeno, sto je po svojim efektiina slicno kao da je dobijen kratkorocni robni k red it. K lirinsko potrazivanje ima slican e fekat kao da se raspolaze valutom odredjene ze m lje , pa je stoga u vrsteno u devizne r e z e r v e . Valja uociti da u financiranju salda platne b i lance smanjenje deviznih re z e r v i ( slucaj u 1964. godini) ima isti e fe kat kao i uvoz kapitala, je r predstavlja p riliv sredstava za placanje, i obrnuto kod povecanja.

K iasifikacija djelatnosti

Klasifikacija oblasti i grana

Kiasifikacija djelatnosti polazi od Nomenklature za rasporedjivanje privrednih i drugih organizacija (SZS, Metodoloski m aterijali 190, Be ograd, 1962) uz izvjesna drugacija grupiranja i manje m odifikacije. Kiasifikacija djelatnosti data je u tabeli 6. Od vecih m odifikacija treba
42

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spomenuti jedino defm iciju zanatstva za koje se predlaze da se svede na usluzno i proizvodno privatno zanatstvo. Proizvodno drustveno z a natstvo treba rasporediti u odgovarajuce grane je r ne postoje nikakvi p rivredn i ni analiticki ra zlo zi da se i dalje tre tira kao zanatstvo. A kod privatnog zanatstva njegovo m aterijaino proizvodno znacenje s daIjnjim privrednim razvojem postaje sve m anje. Na taj nacin oblast VI postaje prvenstveno oblascu licnih usluga. 0 principirna na kojima se zasniva ta k lasifikacija rasp ravljali smo na drugom m je s tu .1) Oblasti i grane navedene su redosljedom od sirovina prem a preradjenim p ro izvod im a , od reprodukcionih i investicionih dobara prema potrosacklm dobrim a, od m aterijalne proizvodnje prem a privrednim i zatim , ne~ privrednim uslugama. V alja napomenuti da je za neke svrhe korisno, a u stranim statistikama je to cest slucaj - da se oblast "indu strije i ru d a rstva ", koja je po vrijednosti daleko najveca oblast, p odijeli u dvije oblasti "rudarstvo" i "preradjivacku industriju" . Tim e se postizava izvjesno ujednacavanje velicin a oblasti a li takvo razbijanje zahtjeva drugacije definiranje i z vjesnog broja gran a, sto ima svojih nedostataka. Jos jedno grupiranje je dosta c e s to : prim arne djelatnosti (p o ljo p riv re d a , sumarstvo i ru d arstvo) , sekundarne djelatnosti (preradjivacka industrija i grad jevin arstvo) i te r c ija m e djelatnosti (s v e ostale, t j . ob lasti V do X ) .

Industrijski kompleksi

V elika oblast industrije i rudarstva rnoze se posefano rasclaniti i na osam kompleksa. To su: 1. 2. 3. 4. Energetika (gran e 6 -9 ) M etalurgija (gran e 10-11) Metaini kompleks (gran e 12-16 j Nem etalni kompleks (gran e 17 i 18)

1) B. Hoii'at, Medjusektorska analiza, g l, 5,

45

5. 6. 7. 8.

Kem ijski kompleks (grane 19 i 20) Drvni kompleks (grane 24 i 25) Prehrambeni kompleks (grane 24 i 25) T ekstil, koza, guma i ostale (gran e 26-29)

Podjela na komplekse ima prakticnu vaznost u medjusektorskoj analiz i i planskom bilanciranju p r iv r e d e .1)

Prlvredne i neprivredne djelatnosti

K lasifikacija iz tabeie 6. omogucuje direktno podjelu na privredn e i neprivredne djelatnosti. Prvih sedam oblasti - p o ljo p rivred a , sum arstvo, rudarstvo i industrija, gradjevinarstvo, saobracaj i v e ze , trg o vina i ugostiteljstvo, zanatstvo i slobodne p ro fes ije - obuhvataju p r i vredne djelatnosti. Obuhvat je r a z lic it od uobicajenog obuhvata m aterijaln e proizvodnje od strane SZS samo za licne i kucne usluge i slo bodne p ro fesije. Volumen tih dodatih djelatnosti je relativno m ali, ta ko da je numericka razlika u obuhvatu minimalna. Preostale tri oblasti - stambeno-komunalna, kulturno-socijalna i ja v ne sluzbe - obuhvataju neprivredne djelatnosti koje su gotovo isk lju civo usluge (izuzetak, npr. predstavljaju voda i para u komunalnoj d je la tn osti). Od ovih tri p rve d vije predstavljaju grupu djelatnosti drus tvenog siandarda, Na taj nacin postigriuto je potpuno poklapanje k lasifik a cije djelatnosti i transakcija u drustvenim racunima, cime se znatno uproscuje statisticki rad kao i ekonomska analiza-

l ) Za metodolosko obrazlozenje ovih grupiranja na em pirickom m aterijalu vidi B. Horvat, Primjena medjusektorske analize u planskom bilanciranju p rivred e, Radovi 1, JIEI, 1963. 46

3. TABELE MEDJUSEKTORSKIH ODNOSA

Opca razm atrania .... .. >j

T eorijsk e, anaiiticke i aplikativne karakteristike tabela medjusektorskih odnosa potanko su izrazen e u mojoj k n jizi-^ , tako da se na njima ovdje necu zad rzavati. U okviru integriranog sistem a drustvenog racunovodstva tabele medjusektorskih odnosa imaju dvostruki zadatak: a ) da p rije svega rasclanjavanjem pruze nove statisticke inform acije i b ) da k o risteci standardno definirane i prem a tom e uporedive kategor ije u novom analitickom okviru, znatno p ro s ire saznajnu v rije d nost analize. Navode se samo osnovne tabele i samo na osnovnom nivou ra.sclanjavanja, tj. na nivou oblasti i industrijskih kompleksa. Sasvim iste ta bele mogu se zatim izra d iti i na nivou rasclanjavanja po granama ili po grupacijam a. N adalje, analiticki su korisne i razne kombinacije kao i specificne tab ele. Sve ovo je ispusteno iz dva r a z lo g a : a ) sto je zadatak ove studije da da samo osnovni i standardni sistem koji ostaje invarijantan. a li k oji dozvoljava n a jra zlicitija p ro s ire nja i b ) sto p rosiren ja i rasclanjivanja zahtijevaju znatno produzenje rokova izra d e, a nas sistem drustvenog racunovodstva bit ce utoliko e fikasniji ukoliko su k ra ci rok ovi u kojima ce u c je lin i svake godine bit! pubiiciran. Prem a tom e, svake godine izla z ila bi najprije publilcacije cjelokupnog sistem a u njegovoj osno^/noj, standardnoj fo rm i koja omogucuie upored ivost, a zatim s r a zlic itim zakasr.javanjima samostalne publikacije

l j B. H orvat, Medjusektorska an aliza5 J^arodne novine, Zagreb, 1962. 47

o pojedinim djelovim a tog sisiem a, u kojima rasclanjeni i razradjen L

ti d jelovi b ill dalje

Medjusektorske tabele oslanjaju se na I, IV i V racun drustvenog p ro izvoda. Racuni II i III (domacinstva i zajednice) nernaju paralelnih M tabela.

Ubracun uvoz a, izvoza i reg resa

Obracun izvoza i uvoza

I ovdje se pojavljuje problem alternativnog obracuna izvoza I uvoza po deviznim odnosno unutrasnjim cijenam a, Razm otrit cemo alternativne postupke pomocu dvosektorske tablice u kojoj p rv i sektor p red stavlja izvozna industrija koja znatan dio svoje finalne pr oizvodnje p lasira na vanjskom trzistu , a kao utroske ne k oristi uvozne m aterijale i drugi sektor predstavlja uvozna industrija koja nista ne iz v o z i, a uvoz i jedan dio svojiii reprodukcionih xnateriiala. U reprodukcionom polju m atrice svaka transakcija je rasclanjena i.a c v ije komponente: gornja brojka predstavlja domaci reprcdukcion.. v.a.' .rijal, a drugs uvozni. T prvoj tablici izvoz i uvoz su cbracunati po deviznim cijenama. a u J drugoj po unutrasnjim , tj= s ukljucenim izvoznim prem ijam a, car ma ma i porezom na prom et, Eksportne prem ije iznose 10. Uslijed toga eksport po deviznim cijena ma izncsi 5 a po uimtrasnjim 15= Takvu razliku smo i ocek ivali. No sad ss javljaju jos t r i neprijatne konsekven ce: drustveni p ro izvod , bruto drustveni proizvcd i ukupna raspoloziva sredstva m ijenjaju se zavisno od toga da 11 se eksportne p rem ije dodaju vrijednosti izvoza ili ne. Slicno je i s uvozom , Carine Iznose 5. u slijed toga uvoz po de viznim cijenama iznosi 20, a po unutrasnjim 25. Sada bruto drustveni proizvod ostaje nepromjenjen, a li se mijenjaju trosk ovi, drustveni p ro izvod i ukupna sredstva. Vazno je uociti da odabiranje cijena predodredjuje obracun drustvenog proizvoda. Ukoliko su to unutrasnje c ijen e, onda treba ignorirati drzavne intervencije carinama i prem ijam a pa se tada drustveni proizvGd u tablicama razlikuje od drustvenog p r o iz 48

Xabela 1. ILUSTRATIYNI PRIMJER OBRACUNA PO DEVIZNIM I UNUTRASNJIM CIJENAMA I Obracun po deviznim cijenama Prim aoci IsDorucioci Izvozna industrija Uvozna industrija 1 2 Reprodukciona p oMnalna potrostrosnja nja F E U I 2 r 10 0 10 0 20 0 20 -10 10 30 0 30 5 0 5 10 10 10 15 5 20 40 20 60 15 0 15 10 20 10 35 5 -10 30 70 20 90 10 25 45 5 0 0 30 60 90

U trosci Dodana vrijednost (bez carina i p rem ija ) Plus carine Minus p rem ije Drustveni proizvod Bruto drustveni p r o iz v . T + V = X Ir Ui - i raspolozivo

M U

il Obracun po unutrasnjim cijenama iT im a oci isporucxoci Izvozna. industrija Uvozna industrija Utrosci Dcdana vrijadnost (bez carina i prem ija j Carins/preuiije Drustveni proizvod Bruto drustveni p ro izv . I -r v = X Import Ukupno rascolozivo i n T Reprodukciona potrosnja 1 2 10 0 10 0 35 0 20 0 20 40 0 40 5 0 5 15 10 15 15 0 15 40 25 65 15 0 15 15 30 15 33 0 35 80 25 105 Finalna p otrosnja u F E 10 35 43 15 0 15 40 65 105

1 7

- final na potrosnja u z e m lji (lic n a , koiektivna i javna potrosnja i in v s s tic ije )

*v > V ~ 'i-

voda u racunima Koju alternativu treba odabrati? Ovdje kao k rite r ij za odluku sluzi zahtjev da se postigne maksimalna moguca stabilnost tehnickih koeficijen ata. A to ce se postici ako se sve transakcije v rs e po jedinstvenim , tj. unutrasnjim cijenam a, je r bi inace prom jene u p ro p orcijam a uvoznog i domaceg reprodukcionog m aterijala automatski dovodile do promjena tehnickih koeficijen ata. Osim toga , ako izv o z i uvoz nisu dani u domacim cijenama nemoguce je utvrditi - bez dodatnih obracima - u kojim proporcijam a oni ucestvuju u ukupnoj p ro izvodnji odnosno sredstvim a. Ako medjusektorske tablice obracunamo po unutrasnjim cijenam a, onda radi jedinstvenosti integriranog sistema treba odrnah ugraditi i korek cije da bi se dobila identicnost drustvenog p ro izv oda u tablicama i racunima. To cemo uraditi na slijed eci nacin

G r an e 1 Drustveni proizvod (iz racuna) Plus prem ije Minus carine Dodatna vrijednost iz tablice 10 10 2 20 -5 20 15 z 30 10 -5 35

Na taj nacin racuni drustvenog proizvoda i tablice medjusektorskih odnosa potpuno su uskladjeni.

Qbracun regresa i dotacija

Poseban problem predstavlja obracun reg re s a i dotacija. SZS u m edju sektorskim tablicama ukljucuje re g re s e i dotacije u vrednost p ro iz -

50

vodnje.-^ Taj postupak im p licira pretpostavku da drzava regresom kupuje samo ostvarivanje proizvodnje, a im a opravdanja ukoliko je tacno - cini se da je s t - da je vrijednost proizvodnje stabilnija s ukljucenim regresom nego bez njega. Konsekvence su da se u sektorima k oji kupuju reg resira n e proizvod e drustveni proizvod smanjuje za v e licinu reg res a sadrzanog u utroscim a, a finalna potrosnja je vec a za velicinu reg resa u njoj sadrzanoj u odnosu nafinalnu potrosnju iz dru stvenih racuna. Da bi se postigla kategorijalna istovjetnost, potrebno je iz v r s iti odredjene k ore k c ije . Razm otrim o tablicu s d vije industri je , od kojih je prva reg resira n a i prodaje svoje proizvode drugoj. Gornja brojka predstavlja transakcije po stvarnim cijenam a, a donja pridodane re g r e s e .

Reprodukciona potrosnja

Finalna potro snja U

1
Regresirana industrija Ostale industrije U trosci Dodana /rijednost Regres Drustveni proizvod Bruto drustveni p ro izvod (3 -4 )

2 10 1
15 25

Z 30 3

1
o C l 3 4 5 6 n i

20 2
5 25

20
50 3 32 -2 30 85

20 2 10
30

2
28 -3 25 55

1
4 -:~ 1 5 30

2
-2 30

60 5 30 so 5

V rijednost proizvodnje re g re s ira n e industrije po trzisnim cijenama izn osi 50, re g r e s izn osi 10%, prem a tome ukupna vrijednost proizvod nje po racunovodstvu te industrije izn osi 55.Regres se rasporedjuje proporcionalno isporukaxna, pa tako smanjuje drustveni proizvod dru ge industrije za 1 i povecava vrijednost finalne potrosnje za 2 (u od-

1) Medjusobni odnosi privrednih delatnosti Jugoslavije u 1962= godini, s s . 28:35. 51

nosu na drustvene racune, gdje je ofaracun vrsen po trzism m c ije na m a ). Regres u prvoj industry i povecava njen drustveni proizvod za 5 , ali od toga 2 odlazi kao imputiranje viastitim troskovim a p roizvod nje Finalna potrosnja s ukalkuliranim regresom i dodana vrijednost prem a tablici moraju biti jednaki (= 3 2 ). Ti su agregati veci od finalne potrosnje i drustvenog proizvoda u racunima (= 3 0 )

4. RACUNI FINANCIJSKIH TOKOVA

Osnovni pojmovi

Svrha racuna financijskih tokova

U trzisnoj p rivred i proizvodnja, raspodjela i potrosnja cdvijaju se u financijskom mediju. Kod toga se novae ne k oristi samo kao instru ment placanja ili sredstvo obracuna vec on aktivno sudjeluje u re g u liranju cjelokupnog privrednog procesa. Na taj nacin na realne tokove' i sekundarnu raspodjelu putem raznih transfera nadogradjuje se i v e oma slosena struktura financijskill odnosa.Te odnose treba prikazati racunima financijskih tokova. Pojedini obracunskI sisteirn koji ulaze u integriran i sisiem drustvencg racunovodstva imaju sled ecu namjenu: 1. ftacunovodstvo drustvenog proizvoda sluzi za m jeren je proizvodnje i potrosnje i utvrdjivanje dohodaka, 2= Tabele m edjusektorskih odnosa sluze za utvrdjivanje prozvodnih. funkcija. 3. Racunovodstvo financijskih tokova utvrdjuje iz v o r e i upotrebu finan cijskih fond ova koji su neopliodni za nesmetano od.vijanje privredne aktivnosti.

4. JJrustvenim bilancama utvrdjuju se stanje i struktura drustvenog bogatstva kao i financijska nadgradnja nad realnim bogatstvom. Svi ovi p arcijaln i sistem i ra zv ije n i su prakticki tek p oslije posljednjeg rata. Najduzu tradiciju ima sistem racuna drustvenog proizvoda, koji je ra zv ije n u toku rata. Prve tabele m edjusektorskih odnosa izra d je ne su neposredno pred rat u SAD (L eou tief) kao pionirska naucna stud ija . Otada su te tabele za razne godine izradjene za mnogo zem alja, no jos i danas u svega nekoliko zem alja te se tabele izradjuju sistematski u okviru redovne statisticke sluzbe. P rije rata u svega d vije zem lje (SAD i Kanada) b ile su publicirane p rve rudimentarne tabele financijskill tokova. Finska je bila prva zem lja ( 1949. godine) koja je zapocela s redovnim godisnjim objavl jiva n je m analize financijskih to kova . ) Holandija je izgleda jos uvijek jedina zem lja gdje se drustvene bilance redovno izradjuju i objavljuju. 2; U medjuvremenu ucinjeno je nekoliko pokusaja integriran ja oviri parcijalnih sistem a (u SAD, Ja~ panu i d ru g d je ). Medjutixn, nakon onoga sto je receno ne iznenadjuje da jos ni jedna z em lja ne objavljuje redovno podatke za takav jedan integriran i sistem . R azlozi su tome statisticke i teorijsk o-m etod oloske p riro d e . Za izradu efikasnog integriranog sistem a drustvenog racunovodstva potrebno je raspolagati dobro organiziranora i azurnom statistickom sluzbom , sto je jos uvijek 'van realnih mogucnosti vecine z e m alja. No osim toga potrebno je izgra d iti i odredjenu teoriju ponasanja osnovnih ekonomskih institucija doticne ze m lje . A to je mnogo te ze no sto se obicno rnisli. Moguce je izra d iti mnogo ra zlic itih in tecriranib sistem a drustvenih racuna koji ce im ati sve potrebne podatke, no koji ce bit! tako kom plicirani i nepreglecini da ostaju neupoti'ebivi za prakticku analizu. Ono sto se tra z i je s t jednostavan i konzistentan s is tem koji poznaju i oni koji ga nisu saini sastavljaii, O apsoiutnoj neophodnosti takvog statistickog sistem a za jechiu sociialisticku plansku p rivredu jedva da je potrebno jos g o v o r iti.

Ilustrativan p rim je r Najjednostavnije je an alizirati osnovne problem e i prikazati p red lozena rjesenja ako ss podje od pojednostavljencg numerickog p rim je ra . To je ucinjeno u Tabeli 1. 1) lAEiv/, Income and Wealth Series IX , s tr. 100, 2) Is to . s tr, 123 *

abela 1. NUMERICKA ILUSTRACIJA RACUNA FINANCIJSKIH TOKOVA I Radne orqam z. ___________________ v TEKUCE TRANSAKCIJE U Reprodukciona p roizvodnja i potrosnja I. Neto licn i dohoci j . Transfer! a ) P orezi b) Penzije c ) Subvencije 4, Licna i opca potros nja 5. Uvoz i izvoz So Stednja i investicije UKUPNI RASHODI I PRIHODI 3, IN VESTICI ONE TRANSAKCIJE 1 . Stednja . inv esticije . Financijski visak UKUPNO C* FINANCIJSKE TRAN SAKCIJE io Financijski visak 2, Bepoziti 3, K red iti 4. Zaduzenje u inostranstvu 5, PROMJENE U FXNANCIJSKOJ AKTIVI I pASIVI
- upotreba sredstava J

II Doma, . IV Inos- T1 T III Zajednica . Ukupno cinstva_________________________transtvo D rzava Banke U I U I U I U I U____I_

100 100
50 30 30 15 10 10 50 20 20 15 60 10 40 50 35 20 15 10 -5 70 40 40 10 5 15 15 40 40

100 100
50 75 40 20 15 60 25 40 50 75 40 20 15 60 25 40

15 30

10
70

225 225

15

350 350 ;

;
J

t to o

30 40

10 10
-5 10 -5

-5 5 -5 5

-10
30 30

40 * ' 40 0 \ 40 40 !

10

-10 20 30 5

10 10 -5

-5 35 15 40 5 5

0 35 40 5

0 35 40 , I 5;

20

20

10

10

40

40

80

80.

t - iz v o r i sredstava
>4

Izmedju tekucih transakcija prikazanih na racunima drustvenog p ro iz voda i financijskih transakcija vezu predstavljaju investicione transak c ije . U slijed toga ovaj sistem ima samo 4 racuna (t j. nema zbirnog racuna in v e s tic ija ), ali su oni podijeljeni u tr i d ijela prema navedenim trim a grupama transakcija. Pored toga racun zajednice podijeljen je u dva podracuna s posebnom namjenom. Analiza se svodi na to da se stednja, koja p ro izila zi iz prim arne i sekimdarne raspodjele dohotka, putem transfers jos jedamput p reraspodjeli putem financijskog mehanizm a, tako da financira in vesticije upravo tamo gdje je to potxebno. K orisno je ovdje uociti da se prim arnom raspodjelom raspodjeljuje proizvodnja. sekundarnom dohoci stvoreni prim arnom a tercijarnom stednja form irana u p rve d v ije . Te tr i raspodjele i cine privredni p ro ces tako kom pliciran im . Zapocinjem o tim e sto radne organ izacije kupuju reprodukcioni m aterija l u visini od 100 m ln,isplacuju dohotke domacinstvima (50 m ln )i por e z e d rzavi (30 m ln ), placaju za uvoz 15 min i utvrdjuju visak na tekucem racunu od 30 mln. Radne organ izacije prim aju 100 mln za p rodani reprodukcioni m a te rija l, 15 mln subvencija od d rza ve, 6 o mln od prodane poirosne robe i 10 mln za izvezenu robu. Transakcije ostalih sektora su ocigledne. Paznju zasluzuje stednja koja je u svim sektorim a pozitivna osim kod d rzave koja tro si vise no sto prim a. Sted nja se kod sektora "inostranstvo" ja vlja zato sto je uvoz veci od izv o za , te stoga inostranstvo "s te d i" za nasu privredu . Stednja svakog sektora predstavlja pocetnu stavku investicionih tran sakcija. Radne organ iza cije investiraju 40 m ln, dok irn raspoloziva sredstva p oslije p rve i druge raspodjele iznose 30 mln (15 mln od prodaja na trzistu i 15 mln od su b ven cija). Javlja se financijski manjak od 10 mln, koji treba da se p ok rije financijskim transakcijam a. Kako u nasem sistem u mogu in vestirati samo radne organ iza cije, to je kod ostalih sektora financijski visak jednak stednji. u treco j fa z i zapazamo da radne organ izacije za potrebe normalnog poslovanja povecavaju depozite kod banaka za 20 mln i da im je stoga potreban kredit od 30 mln k oji ce pokriti depozitne potrebe i nepokrivene in vesticije. Domacinstva iz svog viska izdaju 5 mln na stedne k n jizice, a za preostalih 5 mln otplacuju potrosacki k red it. D rzavni d eficit financiran je na slican nacin kao i kod radnih organizacija, sa mo sto je to tekuci, a ne investicioni d e fic it. Kako ukupne potrebe za kreditim a iznose 40 mln a banke raspolazu sa svega 35 mln (d e p o z it), to su p risiljen e da se zaduze u inostranstvu za preostalih 5 mln. Till 5 mln upravo odgovaraju r a z lic i izinedju uvoza i izv o z a , sto je i o c i55

gledno: trgovinski d eficit financira se zaduzenjem u inostranstvu. Nas prim je r dozvoijava jos jedan zakljucak. Kako stednja radnih o r ganizacija i domacinstava upravo pokriva in vesticije, to se zaduze njem u inostranstvu financira samo drzavni d eficit . Da- bi se ostvario prom et robe i usluga od 225 mln, bilo je potrebno k reira ti razne financijske aktive od jos 80 mln d. Razlika je jos uocljiv ija kad se uzme u obzir samo drustveni proizvod koji iz n o s i: iicna i opca potrosnja izvoz minus uvoz investicije drustveni proizvod 60 mln -5 mln 40 mln 95 mln

odnosno nesto ispod polovine ukupnog obrta. Za re a lizira n je te finalne proizvodnje od 95 mln bilo je potrebno em itirati 30 mln zajm ova radnirn organizacijam a, odn. 40 mln ( zbroj retka) c ije lo j p riv re d i.

Racunovodstvene oznake i identiteti

Kod racuna drustvenog proizvoda lije v a strana prikazuje rashode, a desna prihode. Kod financijskih racuna na lije v o j strani prikazana je' aktiva, a na desnoj pasiva. Kad se ti racuni nadju zajedno, kao u nassm slucaju, potrebno je uvesti ter mine koji im pliciraju jedno i drugo znacenje, Zbog toga navodimo term in "upotreba sredstava" za lijevu stranu 5 a term in f,iz v o r i sredstava" za desnu stranu svih racuna. Va lia uociti da ista stavka moze prom jeniti stranu zavisno o racunu na korn se nalazi. Tako stednja predstavlja upotrebu sredstava u racunu A , a izv o re sredstava u racunu B, Umjesto dvostupacnih racuna m oguce je prim jeniti, a to se cesto rad i, i jednostupacne u kojima se pasivne stavke zbrajaju, a aktivne odbijaju. Smatramo da dvostupacni racuni imaju prednost iz bar dva r a zlo g a : 1, cuva se jednoobraznost prikazivanja u ,odnosu na racune drustvenog proizvoda,

2 . moguce je re g is trira ti i transakcije unutar jednog racuna (n p r. m edjusobno kreditiranje p r iv r e d e ). 56

Nadalje u prvom i trecem dijelu racuna svaka transakcija zahtjeva dva knjizenja, a u srednjem dijelu samo jedno. Ovo posljednje rezuliat je cinjenica sto se u tom dijelu ne radi o pravim transakcijam a, vec sa mo o povezivanju realnih i financijskih transakcija. Stoga, zan em arivsi srednji dio u sistemu financijskih tokova svaka transakcija zahtijeva 4 knjizenja: 2 za realn i dio (n p r . isporuka robe i njena naplata) i 2 za financijski dio ipovecanje novcanih sredstava poduzeca - prodavca i depozita kod b an k e). Na fcraju: a ) u svakom od sektora upotreba je jednaka izvoru sredsta va, b) is to va zi za svaki od tr i d ijeia sektorskih racuna i c ) upotreba i iz v o r i jednaki su i za svaku vrstu transakcije, kako se vidi iz zb iro va redaka. Ta svojstva im pliciraju automatsko provjeravan je uskladjenosti podataka, tako doprinose tacnosti statisticke izrade racuna, a smisao im je o v a j: svaki sektor je interno izbalansiran je r ako stedi, mora a) investirati is ti izn o s , ili b) steci financijsku aktivu (upotre ba) ili c ) otplatiti financijsku obavezu (sm anjenje p a s iv e ). Pored toga mora postojati i eksterna izbalansiranost, tj. ukupna stednja jednaka je ukupnim investicijam a, je r je sticanje aktive od strane jednog sek tora uvijek jednako: a ) smanjenju aktive drugog sektora, ili b ) povecanju pasive drugog sektora, ili c ) njihovoj kom binaciji. Ovo znacenje m oze se p rim ijen iti i na nas ilustrativni p rim je r. Ukupna stednja upravo je jednaka ukupnim investicijam a ^cako se vidi iz zb ira retka A - 6 . Iz istog razloga ulcupan financijski visak mora biti jed nalc null ( B ). 3

Uporedjenje s racunima drustvenog proisvoda

Racuni tekucih transakcija potpuno odgovaraju racunima drustvenog proizvoda, samo sto je izostavljen racun akumulacije i sto su racuni dani u oblilcu tabele ( slicno kao u tabeli 2, u poglavju I ) . Postavija se pitanje da li su onda uopce potrebni posebni racuni drustvenog p ro iz voda? Smatrarao da jesu iz bar tri r a z lo g a : a ) Kad bi ovdje bilo izvrsen o onakvo rascianjavanje transakcija. kao 57

sto je to uradjeno kod racuna drustvenog proizvoda, sistem bi postao veoma nepregledan. b ) Za standardni sistem racuna drustvenog proizvoda dovoljno je pet racuna Za sistem FT neke sektore treba rasclaniti na podracune, tako da ce u standardnom slucaju biti ukupno 14 racuna. c ) Racuni drustvenog proizvoda konstruirani su tako da odmah daju pojedine osnovne ekonomske agregate, kao sto je drustveni p ro izv o d i njegova struktura. Za financijsku anaLizu k orisnije je da se neki agregati daju u vecem stepenu u bruto izrazu . Doduse, negativnirn stavkama krajnji agregati m ogli bi se izjed n aciti, a li to bi bilo na ustrb preglednosti. U financijskom racunu I dani su ukupni prihodi i rashodi radnih orga n iza cija . To znaci da su ukljuceni i reprodukciona potrosnja i trgovin ski p rom ets a subvencije i uvoz se ne odbijaju, vec se dodaju na odnosnim stranama kao prihod, odnosno rashod. Takodjer, neki transfe r i kao sto su kamate i osiguranje, daju se u bruto, a ne u neto izn osu. Kako se iz tih podataka izvodi drustveni proizvod koji je jednak onome na DP Rn-I, pokazano je ran ije. Racun domacinstava dan je bez izm jene samo s inanje rasclanjenim transakcijama. Racun zajednice rasclanjen je na nekoliko podracuna i osim toga navedeni su interni transferi (dotacije budzetim a). Racun inostransiva takodjer ostaje neizm jenjen, samo su transakcije v is e agregirane. Osim kod novih tokova sve stavke svih racuna A , rnogu se iden tificirati i u DP Rn--L To je narocito vazno za redak 6: stednja. Prema tome postignuta je direktna i apsolutna uporedivost, sto je osnovni preduslov in teg rira nja u jedinstveni sistem = Odatle p ro istice jos jedna izvanredno vazna posljedica. Financijska evidencija je v rlo azurna i omogucuje m jesecno publiciranja podataka uz minimalna zakasnjenja. Prema tom e m ozemo ocekivati da cemo drustveni proizvod i uproseenu v e rziju drustvenih racuna ubuduce dobivati kvartalno, pa raozda i m jesecno, a ne samo godisnje, Nepotrebno je nagiasavati od kolike bi to bilo vaznosti za efikasno vodjenje ekonomske politike.

Razdvajanje funkcije kod istog privrednog subjekta

Kao sto je to kod konstruiranja sistem a racuna DP istaknuto, razlikujem o tr i osnovne kategorije ekonomskih fenom ena: proizvodnju, potrosnju i raspodjelu (d oh otk a). U tom smislu postulirana su i tri sek to ra , a svojim racunim a: radne organ izacije, domacinstva i zajednica. U zivoiu , m edjutim , k lasifikacija nikad nije precizn a. Tako se lja c ko ili obrtnicko domacinstvo pripada i radnim organizacijam a i domacinstvi ma, banka i drzavni aparat pripadaju i radnim organizacijarna i zajednici. Veoma cesto se stoga individualni proizvod jaci grupiraju zajedno s dom acinstvim a, a zajednici se daju svojstva proizvodjaca (re g is trira n je licnih i m aterijalnih rashoda budzeta i s i . ) . To r je s e nje olaksava pribiranje statistickih podataka, ali znatno otezava analizu i dovodi u pitanje in tegriran je racuna. Stoga predlazem o da se p rimjeni strogo funkcionalno odvajanje. Proizvodne aktivnosti individualnih proizvodjaca re g is trira ju se zajedno s radnim organizacijam a, a potrosne zajedno s dom acinstvim a. Banka i drzavni aparat, ukoliko is placuju licne dohotke, kupuju reprodukcioni m aterijal it d . , predstavljaju radne organ izacije. A li u svojstvu organizacija prikupljanja poreza i davanja kredita oni su organi zajednice. U nasem ilustrativnom p rim jeru drzava niti isplacuje dohotke, niti ima m aterijalne troskove; citava njena aktivnost svodi se na intervenciju u raspod jeli dohotka, tj. na prim anje i davanje tran sfera. Slicno v rije d i i za banku koja in terven iia u oblasti financijskih tokova.

Jedno term inolosko pitanje

Kod nas, a 1 u inostranstvu, indiskrim inirano se upotrebljavaju te rm i ni !!k re d iti!! i "za jm o v i1 Cini se da se ran ije term in "k re d iti" upotreb'. Ijavao v is e za "k cm ercijaln e k red ite" i "potrosacke k re d ite ", dok se govorllo "zajraovi banaka , "dugorocni za jm o v i". Danas se termin "k red iti" pronio i na ovo posljednje podrucje. To je vjerojatno zbog to ga sto postoji glagol !,k red itira ti nekoga ili n e s to ", sto je nemoguce i z r e c i glagolom "p o z a jm ljiv a ti". Tako nerijetko dolazi do ovakvih je z ic kih konfuznin situacija: "za jm ovi fondova za kreditiran je in v e s tic ija ". Vjerojatno bi bilo korisno ra zg ra n iciti upotrebu ovih term ina za ozna59

cavanje tacno odredjeni h transakcija. No za sada nemam nikakav de bar p rije d lo g . Da se izbjegne konfuzija mozemo se jedino ograniciti iskljucivo na jedan term in i to na "kred ite" i "k re d itira n je ". Jedino u slucajevima kao sto je "narodni zajam 1 upotrebljavat cemo term in ' "z a ja m ".

Osnovna shema racuna financijskih tokova

Kao i kod racuna drustvenog proizvoda najprije cemo izra d iti osnovnu shemu, a onda cemo iz v r s iti rasclanjavanje i transakcija i sektora. Ta je shema dana u tabeli 2. Sam a shema se mnogo ne razliku je od naseg ilustriranog p rim jera , izuzev sto je rasclanjenija. Investicione transakcije zahtjevaju jedno objasnjenje. Prem a ranije izlozenoj koncenciji investicije mogu v rs iti samo radne organizacije i domacinstva (s ta n o v i), a ne drzava. Stoga u odjeljku B drzava i drustvene organizacije daju svoje investicione dotacije p roizvod jacim a Z a to se kod njih financijski visak razlikuje od stednje za velicinu in vesticionih dotacija (u kojima su uldjucene i novcano nepokrivene investi c ije ) . Posebno valja uociti da je svakom racunu dodana i bilanca alctive i pas iv e , Ta bilanca moze se rasclaniti na financijsku i realnu (to n ije uradjeno zbog nepostojanja podataka). U stvari ova potonja izvod i se iz prethodne putem viska financijske pasive. To je neortodoksan p rik a z, a li odgovara nasim institucijama, gdje ne postoje dionice ni burza. U stvari "nefinancijski fondovi radnih organizacija a F--2 donekle cdgovaraju dionickom kapitalu i predstavijaju rezidualnu stavku. N eorto doksan je prikaz i u tom sm islu sto su z l a t o i d evize ukljuceni u finan cijsku, a ne u realnu aktivu. Ovo rjesen je objasnjavamo tim e sto r e a lna aktiva treba da predstavlja samo sredstva za proizvodnju ( osnovna sredstva po nabavnoj vrijednosti i zalihe radnih organ izacija, odnosno trajna potrosna dobra domacinstava) . Zlato i d evize mogu se smatrati potpuno likvidnim sredstvim a i kao takvi upotrebiti za pokrivanje pasi ve prema inostranstvu. Buduci da su osno\ma sredstva dana u bruto izra zu , potrebno je u p asi60

v i navesti dosada izvrsen e opise, ''Visak financijske p asive pokriva neotplaceni dio osnovnih sredstava, "nefinancijski fondovi" dio l:u vlasnistvu" preduzeca, a oba zajedno odgovaraju sadasnjoj vrijed n osti. Stoga treba dodati izvrsen e otpise da se dobije nabavna vrijednost. I obrnuto, kad je to poirebno, sadasnja vrijednost osnovnih sredstava m oze se dobiti iz prikazane nabavne vrijednosti odbijanjem otpisa. Nakon sto su ukijucene i odredjene jednostruke stavke, (npr. neto dugovanje prem a inostranstvu) viskovi financijske pasive pojavit ce se samo kod radnih organizacija i domacinstava a viskovi aktive kod k reditnih ustanova, tj. kod onih k oji ta sredstva k red itiraju . Ostali racuni imaju izravnatu aktivu i pasivu, Suma viskova pasive jednaka je sumi viskova aktive. Sve te viskove rnogli bismo p ren ijeti u racune F i nastaviti s dvostrukim knjizenjem . No to je nepotrebni form alizam ; stoga prenosim o samo viskove pasive radnih organizacija i domacin stava i vrsim o jednostruka knjizenja kao i kod racuna B. Da bi se to p ostiglo, potrebno je prethodno iz v r s iti odredjena uskladjivanja. Te korekturne stavke (sm anjenje fonda osnovnih sredstava, efekti v a io r iz a c ije , ukljucivanje trajnih potrosnih dobara koji se kod tekucih trans akcija ne smatraju investicijam a i s i . ) navedene su u grupi D . Na taj nacin dobiva se zatvoren i potpuno konzistentan sistem . Stednja i in vesticije iz tekucih transakcija izra v njavaju se u svakom pojedinom slucaju putem financijskih transakcija. In vesticije sa racuna B kom uliraju se na racun sredstava F. Financijske prom ene s racuna C kumuliraju se na racunu financijske aktive i p asive E. Ovaj potonji o sim toga pokazuje kako se v r s i fm anciranje "tudjeg" djela osnovnih sredstava. Ovdje je bilanca dana po institucionalnim sektorim a i treba da pokazs opcu strukturu financiranja realn e i financijske aktive. U bilanci na rodne im ovine financiranja je dano po privrednim oblastim a. Prema tome ove d vije bilance iscrpljuju oba moguca aspekta finaneiranja.

Razlike u odnosu na shsmu Narodne banke

Predlozena shema direktno se oslanja na dosadasnji rad u Narodnoj 61

b a n c i,^ gdje su finane ijsk i racuni vec u znatnoj m je ri usavrseni i ' odrazavaju institucionalne osobine nase p rivred e. To znaci da se ve cina podataka vec i do sada prikupljala i da postoji odredjeno iskus tvo u njihovoj obradi. Stoga nece biti tesko da se iz v r s e potrebne m od ifikacije. Te m odifikacije nastaju uglavnom tamo gdje treba osigurati jednoobraznost u svrhu izgradnje integriranog sistem a. Osnovne razlik e u odnosu na dosadasnji sistem Narodne banke jesu ove: (1 ) Sistem je dovrsen time sto je unesen i sektor "Inostranstvo" koji je do sada nedostajao. (2 ) Sistem je dovrsen i tim e sto je umjesto dosadasnjeg racuna "s ta nje obaveza i potrazivanja prem a financijskim organizacijam a" li nes ena potpuna bilanca financijske i realne aktive i pasive. (3 ) Rasclanjavanjera broja selctora je podvostrucen. (4 ) U grupi A transakcije su rasclanjene tako da budu direktno uporedive s transakcijama racuna drustvenog p ro izvod a . (5 ) Iz sektora stanovnistva izdvojeni su individuaini p ro izv o d ja c , takodjer radi uporedivosti s racunima drustvenog proizvoda. U v e z i s tim jedini ozbiljn iji problem prakticne statistike ja vlja se kod odvajanja novca i depozita koji d rze domacinstva od d ijela koji se odnosi na proizvodnju. Taj problem m oze se r ije s iti anketnom akcijom pomocu uzorka ili konvencijom. (6 } K rediti su navsdeni bruto, a ne neto, iz razloga o kojima ce biti govora u narednorn odjeiiku* Time je omoguceno da se ukljuce i podaci o otplati kredita, \7) Drzava je tretirana kac financijer i kupac, a ne kao proizvodjac i im restitor. (8 ) 1 na koncu 5 racu rl su dani dvostupacno iz razloga koji su ran ile n a vedeni.

1) Uporedi Godisnji izvjestaj NBJ za 1963., s t r . 7 9 ,

62

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2. Bespovratno fin a n c i ran je,p ren osi sre d . i si. 3. I n v e s t .u o s n . s r e d . 4. Povecanje zaliha 5. Greslce i propusti 6. Finansij. visak ili manjak UKUPNO C . FINANSIJSKE TRAN SAKCIJE 1. Finansijski manjak i l i v isa k 2. Novae 3. O stali likvidni depoz. 4. Nelikvidn i depoziti i obveznice 5. K ra tk o ro cn i k r e d i t i banalca 6. Investicioni k red iti 7. Otplate in v e s tic . kredita 8. N e p o s re d n i krediti 9. Financijski transfexi lO .Tran sa lcc.u stranoj valuti -95 725 32 63 2700 3063 2974 117 53 50 62 157 1272 30 1657 -300 2110 621 2404 400 6 649 229 6 - 2110 1403 10139 1599 232 878 1610 13207 261 724 277 6 -55 736 153 565 338 146 15876 -657 831 92 1067 248 -15404 210 1490 28 523 24829 3751 1233 1435 1094 1600 30 -473 26429 26429 3751 3751 1233 1645 1233 1645 10139 24781 24781 2848 261 2848 2200 15876 24829 153 2200 24069 24069 24829 24829 1600 1600 1600 26429 26429 80327 80327 82 17298 7483 137 109 100 888 2711 2200 23960

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Tretiran je ki'edita

Ako se otplate kredita uvrste u tekuce tran sak cije, onda je stednja po-jedinih sektora nepravilno prikazana. A ako se ne u v r s t e onda p rividno izgleda da npr. radne organ izacije imaju znatno vise vlastitih sredstava nego sto stvarno imaju, Drugim rije c im a dobiva se znatno veci stepen samofinanciranja nego sto je on u s tv a ri. Pcduzece ima fiksnu obavezu otplacivanja ran ije prim ijenih kredita i te otplaie r e alno smanjuju raspoloziva sredstva za sam ofinanciranje. Samo izuzetno poduzece m oze novim kreditom otpiatiti s ta ri. U normalnom slucaju novi leredit se odnosi na. novi projekat. N i ponasanje potrosaca n ije neutralno u odnosu na tretiran je kredita. Otplata potrosackih kredita realno smanjuje rasp oloziv dohodak potro saca. Od nedavna, doduse, mogu se novi k red iti uzeti i p rije otplate starog (nakon otplate polovine starog k r e d ita ), sto znaci da se njima mogu ajelom icno otplacivati stari k re d iti. No ipak, os taj e ona polovina i kad bi se obustavilo davanje novih k redita, doslo bi sigurno do kontrakcije potencijalne i licne potrosnje, Iz ovih razm atranja s lije d i da je p o ze ljn o : a ) da se otplate kredita ne navode kod tekucih transakcija, kalco se ne bi d eform irala stednja, ali b ) da se ipak navedu, i to kod kreditnih odnosa, kako bi bila moguca analiza stvarnog stepena sam oiinanciranja, c ) da se stoga u fm ancljskim transakcijam a prikazu bruto k red iti, Od interesa je upozoriti na jos jednu racuijovodstvenu karakteristik'i tretirar.ja kredita. Otplate kredita mogu se prikazati kao minus stav ke ili kao aktiva kod prim alaca kredita i pasiva kod davaoca kredita.

67

5= DRUSTVENA BILANCA

Pojmovne problem e m jerenja drustvenog bogatstva obradio je u nasoj literatu ri dr I. V in s k i.1^ Buduci da najveci dio njegovih objasnjenja usvajamo, dovoljno je da se ovdje samo ukratko ob razloze rjesen ja koja predlazem o.

D efinicija drustvenog bogatstva

Pod drustvenim bogatstvom podrazumjevamo proizvedeno m aterijalno bogatstvo, tj. osno'ma sredstva i zalihe koja su rezultat ljudskog r a da. V alorizacija prirodnog bogatstva - zem lja, rude, p ejsazi - ne ukljucujemo u nase tabele je r a ) ona ne predstavlja rezu ltat akumuliranja investicija i stoga se ne raoze povezati sa sistem om drustvenih racuna i b) je r je to bogatstvo tesko ili nemoguce na zadovoljavajuc i nacin v a lo rizira ti.

Proizvedena bogatstva mogla bi se eventualno p ro s iriti pojmom rep ro ducibilnog bogatstva. To znaci bogatstvo koje se raoze reproducirati i koje bi ovdje obuhvatilo sumski fond. Ipak to p ro siren je necemo iz v e s ti iz. razioga navedenog pod a ) , ali kako se sumski fond moze m jeriti na relativno zadovol j ava j uc i nacin prikazat cemo ga u zalihama kao e v identnu stavku (u zgradam a) , koja ne ulazi u zb iro v e . Buduci da samo form iran je mat erijalnog bogatstva evidentiram o na investicionim racuiilrna, to "in ve s tic ije " u reprodukciju i obrazovanje radne snage ne tretiranio kao form iran je bogatstva. U izvjesnom srni-* slu to je nekonzistentno, je r akumulirano ljudsko znanje predstavlja najdraaoceniji vid drustvenog bogatstva. Medjutim, prakticni ra z lo z i govore protiv ukljucivanja te stavke. Drustveni racuni i tabele pruzaju potrebne elemente za analizu efekata obrazovanja na privredn i ra s t,

1.) Nacionalno bogatstvo Jugoslavije, s tr. 14-30. 68

no form alno ukljucivanje obrazovnih i zdravstvenih investicija u s is tem bilo bi suprotrio s v rs i sistem a, naime tome da se sto vj ern ije opisu transakcije radnih organ izacija. Iz slicnih razloga u drustveno bogatstvo ne ukljucujemo ni vrijednost naucnih otkrica. Umjetnicka djela - slike i kipovi - ukoliko su vlasnistvo radnih organ izacija, re g is trira ju se kao sav os tali inventar. Ukoiiko se nalaze u umjetniclcim g a le rija m a , obicno se ne procjenjuju kao eiemenat drustvenog bogatstva, djeiom icno zbog teskoca v a io riz a c ije , a vecim djelom zato sto je analiticka vrijednost tih agregata m ala, Smatramo da je njihovo ukljucivanje stvar prakticke situacije. Ukoliko nase gale r ije i m uzeji pridju procenjivanju svojih zb irk i, onda nema poteskoca da se one ukljuce u drustveno bogatstvo, No u tom slucaju radi ocuvanja konzistentnosti sistem a, nabavku umjetnickih djela - a slicno i arheoloske i druge predm ete - treba sm atrati investicijam a. A tada bi i neprivredni sektor racuna I pokazivao in vesticije na svojoj d esnoj strani. Medjutim, kako m uzeji i g a le rije normalno ne odredjuju cijenu uiaznica -ukoliko ulaznice uopce postoje - na bazi investicione vrijednosti svojih z b ir k i, to ukljucivanje umjetnickih investicija u s is tem drustvenih racuna, nema analitickog sm isla. Spomenuto je da se vrijednost zem lje ne ukljucuje. No m elio ra cije, koje zahtevaju rad , predstavljaju eiemenat bogatstva. U v e zi s tim sporno je kako treba tr e tira ti degradiranje zem ljista (e r o z ija , za s lo javanje i s i . ). Ako apsolutnu plodnost zem lje ne v a lo rizira m o , onda je nepotrebno da to radim o i s njenim sm anjenjem . N o, s druge strane, kao sto reg is trira m o stete od potresa i pozara, m ogli bismo r e g is trir a ti i stete od e r o z ije . V a lo rizira n je bi se m oglo iz v r s iti na ba z i kostanja uspostavljanja prvobitne plodnosti. K oje cem o od dva m oguca rjesen ja p rim je n iti, stvar je cisto prakticnih r a zlo g a . Ukoliko je to statisticki izvo d ljivo u postojecim uslovim a, sa stajalista ekonomske politike bilo bi nesumnjivo korisno da se sistem atski v a lo r iziraju stete od degradiranja ze m ljis ta . U drustveno bogatstvo ne ukljucujemo ni vrijednost specificno vojne oprem e (topovi, tenkovi, puske i s i . } . In vesticije u tu opremu tr e tiram o u drustvenim racijnim a kao tekucu potrosnju. Taj postupak ima i prakticko (vojna tajna) i teorijsk o opravdanje (topovi ne obogacuju dru stvo) .

69

V alorizacija

V alorizaciju treba v rs iti po kostanju zam jene. Tim e se postize da drustveno bogatstvo odrazava velicinu kapaciteta. Buduci da je samo m ali dio bogatstva proizveden u tekucoj godini, to ce zbog promjena cijena, ranije akumuLirano bogatstvo svake godine trebati r e v a lo r iz ira ti. Vrijednost bogatstva koncem godine dobiva se iz stanja pocetkom go dine umanjenog za rashodovanja i stete i uvecanog za bruto in vestici je . Bruto investicije smanjene za zamjenu daju nove in vesticije, kojih nema u drustvenim racunima. Neto vrijednost bogatstva - tzv. sadasnju vrijednost koja se dobija odbijanjem am ortizacije - ne navodimo, je r nema nekog analitickog sm isla. Am ortizacija se u racunima javlja kao zasebna stavka, je r predstavlja samostalan izb or financiranja i elemenat form iran ja c i jena. A m ortizacija u v e zi s bogatstvom odrazava stepen trosnosti. No kako osnovna sredstva imaju u raznim granama veoma r a z lic it vijek trajanja, to stepen am ortiziranosti nista ne govori o roku za mjene. Na prim je r trosnost osnovnih fondova gradjevinarstva m oze biti 10 %, a saobracaja 20 %, pa da ipak gradjevinarstvo treba da za m ijeni svoja sredstva dva ili tr i puta ranije nego saobracaj. Neravnom jernosti investiranja jos pojacavaju ove ra zlik e . M edjutim , u r e g io nalnom promatranju is till proizvodnih grupacija, trosnost inn analiticko znacenje.

Sistem u cjelin i

Dosadasnja istrazivanja indiciraju sliku integriranog sistem a drustve nog racunovodstva kakva je prikazana na dijagramu 2. Zapocinjem o s 5 racuna drustvenog proizvoda, kojima se u svrhu daljnjeg rascla n java-nja transakcija dodaje 8 dopunskih tabela, po d vije za svaki od prva tri sektorska racuna i po jednu za preostala dva racuna izravnanja. Zatim prelazim o na medjuveze bruto drustvenog proizvoda prikazane 70

IN'VklQilALm
V O D STV A

tMKT&M

O R U S T VI-JNOG

U AtfUNO

T iT ^ xiT ru T N fiT T iu W iw T ^ T

u 4 tabele medjusektorskih odnosa, kojima treba dodati jos 5 tabela raznih koeficijenata i eventualno 2 tabele za zalih e. U iducoj fa zi bruto drustvenom proizvodu dodajemo trgovinski obrt i na bazi ukupnog prihoda razmatramo proizvodne i financijske medjuodnose. To se vr~ s i pomocu sistema od 3 racuna financijskih tokova. Buduci da svaki racun FT ukljucuje i financiranje in v e s tic ija , to u tom sistemu nema posebnog racuna akumulacije. M oze se dodati i posebna tabela finan cijskih medjusektorskih odnosa (to u tekstu nije uradjeno, a ll takvu tabelu izradjuje npr. japanska sta tis tik a ). Dok se u p rve tr i faze ra zrnatraju tokovi, u trecoj i cetvrtoj se razm atraju sredstva i fondovi i to u 14 racuna drustvene aktive i pasive i d vije tabele drustvene b ilance. Tim je krug racuna i bilanca zatvoren i iscrp ljen je zadatak definiran ovim projektom . S ob ili smc sistem od 39 ( i l i 41) standardnih racuna, tabela i bilansa, potpuno uskladjen, relativno invarijantan u odnosu na institur.ionalne promjene i maksimalno fleksibilan u p o g ledu daljnjeg rasclanjavanja bilo po sektorim a, bilo po transakcijam a. Radi potpunosti navodi se da ce kasnije biti potrebno jos izra d iti i r e gionalne racune i bilanse kao i naturalne b ilanse. Ovi posljednji ukljucuju bilans radne snage i prirodnih resursa, naturalnu m edjusektorsku tablicu, bilans proizvodnih kapaciteta Na kraju potrebno je upozoriti da u dijagramu 2, ne postoji samo ho~ rizontalna, vec postoji i direktn 3 vertikalna veza medju racunima. U tome i jest fundam entalno znacenje ranije navedenog dijagram a 1 , ko ji dale osnove ne samo sistema racuna drustvenog proizvoda vec i c je l o l ' " ^2, sistema drustvenog racunovcdstva. Postoje tr i institucionalna = = < i dva racuna izravnanja i oni u c e tir i parcijalna podsistema CGr?.zavaju ra zlic ite karakteristike privrednog p ro c es a , a svi zajedno odralavaju taj proces u c je lin i.

II.

-A N A L IZ A

M ED JU S EK TO R S K I H

ODNOSA

Statisticke tablice utrosaka - prolzvodnje s vise deseiaka privrednih sektora omogucuju anaiizu medjusektorskih odnosa na veoma d ezagreqiranom nivou. Elektronske racunske masine omogucuju da se do r je senja dolazi reiativno b rzo i sa ne suvise velikirn troskovim a. To je uslovilo praktican interes i reiativno obiman istrazivack i rad u oblasti medjusektorske analize- Konstruirani su r a z iic iti modeli sa zadatkom da se iz statistickih podataka sistem atiziranih u medjusektorskim tablicama izvuce sto v is e inform acija prognosticke i analiticke v rije d n osti. U cjeiin i m oze se r e c i, da je obrada statickih modela uglavnom zavrsena, a li jos mnogo p reostaje da se uradi na dinamickim rnodelim a kako bi se oni m ogii efikasno p xim ijen iti. Medjusektorsku metodu m ozem o p rim ijen iti ( l ) za kvantificiranje kri~ te rija za donosenje ekonomskih odluka i (2 ) p ro jicira n je privrednog ra zv o ja , P rv i se zadatak sasvim uspjesno rjesava dosad razvijenim metodama medjusektorske an alize, i u tom pogledu medjusektorski pristup izra zito je efikasn iji cd alternativnih pristupa. Rjesavanje drugog zadatka zahtjeva jos mnogo istrazivackog rada, i teorijskog i em p irijsk og. U daljnjem izlaganju pozabavit cemo se samo osnovnim osobinama najkarakteristicnijih metodoloskih rjesenja koja su nasla svoju prakticnu prim jenu. i '

1 j Taj kondenzirani p regled uradjen je na bazi iscrpne obrade pojed inih modela u m ojoj knjizi Medjusektorska analiza, Ekonomski in stitut, Zagreb, 1962, dio II. L kniizi je citirana i najvaznija litera tu T ra 0 73

1. IZRACUNAVANJE FINALNE I UKUPNE PROIZVODNJE

Klasicni problemi medjusektorske analize su izracunavanje ( 1 ) final ne i (2 ) ukupne proizvodnje * Moguce je , naravno, i (3 ) rjesavanje mijesanog zadatka, kad su u nekim sektorima kapaciteti lim itirani pa za njih izracunavamo finalnu, a za ostale sektore ukapnu proizvodnju. Polazimo od tipicne bilansne jednadzbe

rs

, r = 1 ... n

( 1)

u kojoj Xrs predstavlja utrosak robe r u proizvodnji sektora s, X r je finalna, a Xr je ukupna proizvodnja sektora r . Sama pak jednadzba kaze, da je ukupna proizvodnja jednaka zbroju reprodukcione i finalne. U tu jednadzbu onda uvodimo strukturni koeficijent ars koji nazivamo tehnickim koefLcijentom proizvodnje ili koeficijentom utrosaka, a definiramo X

2 a

rs s (2)

rs

kao ucesce utrosaka robe r u proizvodnji sektora s. Jednadzba (1 ) sada postale

la s

(3

ili sredjena i dana kao sistem jednadzbi u kompaktnijoj matricnoj nota c iji:

gdje A = (a r s ) predstavlja rnatricu tehnickih koeficijenata. Jednadzba (4 ) kaze, da ukoliko poznajemo ili planiramo ukupnu proizvodnju pojedinih sektora, onda mozemo izracunati finalnu p ro iz vodnju tih sektora, a ukupnost finalnih proizvoda p red stavlja, naravno, drustveni proizvod , odnosno bruto dohodak p rivred e. Ukoliko, m edjutim , planiramo drustveni proizvod po sektorim a, onda mozemo izracunati ukupnu proizvodnju prem ultiplicaranjem lije v e i desne strane jednadzbe (4 ) invertiranom Leontief-m atricom (1-A )~^

(i -

-1

= X

(o)

Rjesenja

(4 )

(5 )

imaju dva osnovna ogranicenja:

( 1 ) daiu sistem e privrednih tokova, a ne ukljucuju i prom jene fondova, drugim r ije c im a , radi se o statickom modelu; i (2 ) pretpostavljaju linearne proizvodne funkcije i stalne tehmcke k oeficijen te. Sto se tic e ( 1 ) , o dinamickom modelu bit ce govora kasnije. Za e lim iniranje ogranicenja (2 ) potrebni su p rije svega em piricki podaci. Za sada ni u jednoj zem lji ne postoje vrem enske s e rije tehnickih k oefici jenata za m atrice s vecim brojem sektora. Prema iednom dogovoru Sai^plana i Saveznog zavoda za statistiku, SZS ce u buduce priprem ati dvogodisnje medjusektorske tab lice. Upravo je zavrsena tablica za 1958, koja ima 80 proizvodnih sektora, a zapocet je rad na tablici za 1960. godinu, koja 6e im ati preko 100 sektora. Nakon sto dobijemo vrem enske s e rije tehnickih koeficijenata, m oci cemo postojedim m etodama maternatske statistike utvrditi tendencije njinovih prom jena. Sistem aiizirana tehnoloska evidencija i konkretno inzenjersko pozna% r anje kapacitsta o kojim a se radi omogucit ce da se predvide p ro m jene u tehnickim koeficijentim a i da se te prom jene ugrade u rjesenja. Iterativno rjasenje uiDjesto in v e rzijs i dalje povecava ileksibiinost metode i priblizava rezuitate rea ln osti. Poseban interes predstavlja ukljucivanje licne potrosnje u reprodukciono polje tablice, Za sada se licna potrosnja nalazi u auiononinom polju , i njena struktura i obim izradjuju se posebnim metodama n eza visno cd rjesavanja medjusektorskog sistem a.

75

2. INTENZIVNOST UPOTREBE FAKTORA PROIZVODNJE

Tehnicki koeficijenti se mogu izracunati ne samo za proizvodne u troske iz reprodukcionog dijela tablice nego i za prim arne utroske rada, sredstava i prirodnih resursa. Te prim arne utroske zvat cemo faktorim a proizvodnje. Definicija tehnickog koeficijenta za faktor p ro izvod nje je analogna: a js predstavlja utrosak faktor a f na jedinicu p ro iz vodnje sektora s . Te koeficijente nazivamo direktnim koeficijentim a, je r m jere direktne efekte proizvodnje na prim arne i proizvedene ut roske. Slicno elemente inverzne m atrice mozemo zvati ukupnim koe ficijentim a (i oznacavati velikim siovom , A r s ) 3 je r m jere ukupne, tj. direktne i indirektne efekte. Prema tome uvodjenjem koeficijenata faktora originalne m atrice direktnih i ukupnih koeficijenata prosiruju se prema dolje:

D =

"a

rs

U = fA~ ~ rs A - fs_!

IS-

Za razliku od direktnih, ukupni koeficijenti faktora racunaju se druk-=ci je od ukupnih koeficijenata proizvedenih utrosaka, buduci da nije moguca inverzija pravokutne m atrice. Postupak je ovaj

A = is

a.r

xt

-A , rs'

x=n+ l.m

odnosno u matricnoj notaciji

A (u f)

A (i}

(I - A )~ *

gdje A
76

predstavlja matricu uktpnih kosficijenata faktora, a

m atricu direktnih koeficijenata faktora. Smisao ovih jednadzbl je s lije d ec i: ako finalna proizvodnja sektora s treba da. poraste za jed inicu. onda ukupna proizvodnja sektora r treba da poraste za A rs da bi se pok rile indirektne i direktne potrebe za robom r uslijed povecanja proizvodnje s , a faktor koji se tro s i u proizvodnji r treba da se poveca za afr Ar s . Prem a tome A%s predstavlja direktni i indirektni utrosak faktora - rada ili sredstava, npr. - na jedinicu p ro iz vodnje sektora s , odnosno to je m jera intenzivnosti upotrebe faktora u toj proizvodn ji. Medju faktore raozemo ukljuciti i m a te rija l, i tada mozerno izracunavati m aterijalnu, radnu i kapitalnu intenzivnost p ro izvodnje pojedinih sek tora, Razlike izm edju direktnih i ukupnih k oefi cijenata faktora su v e lik e . Tako se npr. u Jugoslaviji (.1955) na dinar industrijske proizvodnje tro s i direktno svega 6 para p laca, ali zbog medjusektorske zavisnosti industrija u cjelin i apsorbira 26 para pla ca ili c e tiri puta \dse, Intenzivnost upotrebe faktora m oze se racunati ne samo za sektore proizvodnje nego i za sektore autonomne tra zn je, na prim je r za inve s tic ije , licnu i opcu potrosnju i saldo vanjske trgo vin e. Ispostavilo se da je m aterijalna intenzivnost ta ir i sektora podjednaka (oko 0,5 j , a li da radna intenzivnost, m jerena placam a v a rira od 0,14 za inve s tic ije , preko 0,22 za potrosnju do 0,27 za saldo vanjske trgovine (uvozni visak ) Analiza pokazuje jednu interesantnu karakteristiku jugoslovenske p riv re d e u razdoblju oko 1955: protivno ocekivanjima te o r ije izv o z ila su se kapitalno-intenzivna dobra i usluge, a uvocila su se radno-intenzivna dobra. Heciprocne vrijednosti intenzivnosti upotrebe predstavljaju efikasnost upotrebe pojedinih faktora u pojedinim sektorima,, Ako je direktno i indirektno pot^eb'io 10 radnik-godina da bi . 1 2 .. ralo poljoprivrednih proizvoda u . nos ti od milijun dinara f .. j ^I'T.ost upotr-ebe ra d a ), onda jedan racmitc p rcizvodi godisnje svega 100.000 dinara p oljop riv rednih proizvoda (proizvcdnost rad a} . K oeficijen ti ukupne upotrebe rada mogu se takodjer smatrati cijenom proizvoda. izrazenom ne u novcu vec u radnom vrem enu. U 1955. ao~ dini m iiijun dinara poljoprivrednih proizvoda r'stajalo!l je 10 i _____ -godina, a miiijun dinara industrijsklh proizvoda svega 2 ,9 racr-k -g G o dina, Prem a tome njihove "radne vrijed n osti" odnosile su se kao 3,4 : * 1 , sto ujedno predstavlja i om jer nacionalne proizvodnosti rada u ta dva sektora.

77

3. PROMJENE CIJENA

Medjusektorsku tablicu mozemo bilansirati ne samo po redovirna, vec i po stupcima. Tada dobivamo jednadzbe cijena. Polazim o od s is tema jednadzbi m aterijalnog bilansa

rs

= Q

r, s = 1

(8)

gdje Qj, predstavlja ukupnu proizvodnju sektora r u naturalnim je dinicama, qr je finalna proizvodnja u naturalnim jedinicam as a qrs su utrosci u naturalnim jedinicam a. Utroske qxs mnozimo odgovaraj ucim cijenama da bismo dobili xrs i vrsirno sumiranje po stupcima

p + V =pQ =X rs * s s s s s

r ,s = 1 . . . n

(9 )

gdje QtsPs predstavlja troskove proizvodnje, a V s dodanu v r ije d nost u sektoru s . Podijelim o li jednadzbu ( 9) sa QS 1 dobivamo trazenu lednadzbu cijena

qr

no;

Kako m edjusektorske tafcllce norm aino nisu zzrazeno naturalno, vac vrijednosnc, morarno pretpostaviti da su sve cijene jednake je d in ic i 5 t j. da privreda proizvodi ne robe vec dinare. Tada je

t j. dodana vrijednost na jedinicu proizvodn je. Jednadzba prim a oblik

( 10)

po-

3^ a q rs ur r

+ v

=p

+ 1,

r,s=l...n

( 12;

cim e izrazava poznato svojstvo medjusektorske tablice da su zfairovi stupaca jednaki je d in ic i. Sistern (1 2 ) u m atricnoj notaciji izgleda ovako;

p 5( I - A ) = v

(1 >)

sto znaci da ukoliko su dane cijen e, onda je tim e odredjena i nom inalna velicin a dodane vrijed n osti v = (v ^ , V 2 , . . . vn) po sektorim a. No problem se m oze postaviti i obrnuto, pa uz zadane prom jene do dane vrijednosti po sektorim a tra ziti utjecaj na cijene pojedinih p ro izv o d a :

(I - A )

_1

(1 4 )

Dodana vrijednost sastoji se od a m o rtiza cije, placa, neto dobiti i por e z a . Mozemo m ijenjati ma koju od ovih kategorija i onda izracunati rezu ltiraju ci efekat na cijene nekih ili svifa p roizvod a. Tako bi na p r im jer 1955, povecanje placa u svim sektorim a za 10% dovelo do povecanja poljoprivrednih cijena za 6,7%, xndustrijskih za 2 , 6 %. a troskova zivota za 4,5%. Povecanje poljoprivrednih cijena za 1C%, uz neprom ijenjene v s u ostalim sektorim a, dovelo bi do povecanja industrijskih cijena za 1,8% i troskova zivota za 5% Ukoliko bi u svim sekto rim a stope dobiti b ile izjednacene s prosjecn om , poljoprivredne c ije ne p orasle bi za 16%, industrijske cijene pale bi za 3%, a troskovi z i vota p orasli bi za 4%. U ocjenjivanju em piricke vrijednosti ove analize valja im ati na umu njene im plicitne pretpostavke da prom jene cijena ne mijenjaju strukturne odnose i da se nova ravnoteza odmah postizava. To naravno ne 79

cdgovara stvarnosti. Ako place u nekoj Industriji porastu za 10%, c ijene ne moraju porasti u odgovarajucoj p rop orciji (cak i kad p ro iz vodnost rada ostane neprom ijen jena), je r jedan dio povecanja placa m oze biti kompenziran smanjenjem dobiti. Prom jene cijena dovode i do promjena proizvodnih funkcija, pa se prema tome i tehnicki k oeficijen ti m ijenjaju. I na koncu, kad u nekoj industriji cijene porastu, potrebno je odredjeno vrijem e da se taj impuls p ro s iri na cijelu p r ivredu. Nas sistem jednadzbi nista ne kaze koliko je to v rije m e (iako iterativno rjesavanje moze i ovdje dati nove in fo r m a c ije ). Prema tom e, medjusektorsku analizu cijena u dosada razvijenom obliku treba smatrati samo prvom aproksimacijom - Poireban je daljnji ozbiljan istrazivacki rad da bi se m ogli odm jeriti efekti proizvodnosti rada, utvrditi tipicno ponasanje privrednih subjekata i unijeti u a nalizu vremenski pom aci.

4. VANJSKOTRGOVINSKI EFEKTI

Kod analize vanjskotrgovinskih efekata osnovno sto nas zanima jest irnportni sadrzaj proizvodnje pojedinih sektora. U tu svrhu potrebno je p ro s iriti statisticke inform acije kako bismo m ogli izra d iti medju sektorsku tablicu uvoza (t j. rasclaniti uvoz po p oiijek lu i nam jen i). Kad od ;okupne proizvodnje odfaijemo stavke uvoza, dobivamo transakcionu matricu domace proisvodnje, a uvoz po namjeni dodajemo kao posehais red, koji sad iraa sve osohine utrosaka prim arnih faktora Zbog toga sada irnportni sadrzaj proizvodnje pojedinih sektora m oze mo naci kao "intenzivnost upotrebe faktora u v o z ", tj. p rem u ltip iiciranjern inverzne m atrice ukupnih koeficijenata (na bazi domace p ro izvodnja) vektorom - redom direktnih uvoznih koeficijen ata. Iz tih izracunavanja p ro izla zi da je u 1955. godini importni sadrzaj industrijsica proizvodnje bio oko 14%, a poijoprivredne svega oko 1%, Uvozna matrica omogucava da se utvrde efekti promjena uvoznih c ije na na cijene domace proizvodnje. Ukoliko na p rim je r uvozne cijene poijoprivrednih proizvoda porastu, to ce dovesti do odredjenog poveca' 80

nja nominalne vrijednosti utrosaka uvoznih poijoprivrednih proizvoda u pojedinim sektorim a. Tim e ce se povecati i zb irovi ukupnog uvoza za pojedine sektore. A analiza tog efekta v rs i se onda na isti nacin kao i analiza pcvecanja cijena prim arnih fak tora, Tako bi 10% povecanje svih uvoznih cijena dovelo do povecanja cijena domace p o ijo p rivredne proizvodnje za 0.1%, a domace industrijske proizvodnje za 1 53 /. 0 Kod analize vanjskotrgovinskih efekata treba voditi racuna o tom e, da se p rop orcije uvoza m ijenjaju i da prem a tom e koeficijenti na bazi domace proizvodnje nisu stabilni, Za efekte prornjena uvoznih cijena v rije d i isto sto je ranije b ilo receno za efekte promjena cijena uopce.

S. MEDJUREGIONALNI MODEL1 ^

Za izradu tablica m edjuregionalnih tokova potrebno je daljnje p ro si ren je sadasnje statisticke osn ovice. Potrebno je naime izracunavanje tehnickih koeficijenata za svaku reg iju posebno, a zatim i- m jerenje m edjuregionalnih tokova kako bi se izracunali koeficijen ti rajon izacije snabdijevanja- Kod nas Savezni zavod za statistiku za sada ne p r ikuplja potrebne podatke, a niti nam jerava da ih prikuplja u skoroj bu~ ducnosti, tako da u tom pogledu nase raspravljan je irna za sada samo teoretski znacaj. Uzmimo da zelim o lokaciono d ezagregirati privredu u dvije r e q ijetCC razvijeiiu i /b nerazvijenu. Tada bilansne jednadzbe po redovim a I maju ovaj obiik

1) Taj model r a z v ili su Chenery i M oses. Up, Chenery i C lark , Inter industry Economise , J. iley, New Y o rk , 1959, s tr . 65-71, 308W -32, Postoje i drugi m edjuregionalni m odeii. 81

proizvodnja robe r u re g iji a sastoji se iz isporuka toj istoj re g iji i isporuka r e g iji /3 , Xv . r s Po stupcima se v rs i bilansiranje raspolozivih kolicina za potrosnju u pojedinim regijam a

= X CC X ^ * C+ r r

(1 6 )

snabdijevanje regija O robom r v rs i se djelom icno iz izv o ra te C re g ije - X * * a djelomicno iz re g ije - X^fiaC. Snabdijevanje i proizvodnja neke r e g ije ne moraju biti iste ni za p ojedine sektore ni za sveukupnost proizvedenih roba. Potraznja reg ije m oze se ovako prikazati

=2 s

a^ rs

+ y^, r

r ,s = 1 . . . n

(17)

t j. da se sastoji iz reprodukcione i finalne trazn je. Nara^no, snabdi jevanje i traznja moraju biti jednake . Regionalne koeficijente snabdijevanja ili koeficijente rejon iza cije definirat cemo kao ucesce isporuka neke re g ije u ukupnom snabdijevanju dane reg ije odnosnom robom

( 18)

U toj defin iciji regionalnog koeficijenta sadrzana je restriktivna p re tpostavka da se svi potrosaci neke r e g ije snabdijevaju robom r iz obje reg ije u istoj p ro p o rc iji, t j. u p rop orciji r JV^ iz re g ije <X i

1 _

rfy~>iz r e g ije yS

82

Proizvodnju neke robe u danoj r e g iji m ozem o sada iz r a z iti pomocu koeficijenata rajon izacije - slicno kao sto srrio je ranije izrazavali po mocu tehnickih koeficijenata - te tako bilansna jednadzba (15) p re la zi u

X^= r

ifltoCS t+ r ^ S ^ r r r r

(1 9 )

Uvrstavanjem

(1 7 )

(1 9 ) dobivamo konacno

X Qr= ( X )

a ^ X ^+

rs

r sC t a . A x f i ) f

rs

+ ( t cC0^ c + r * / 5 y ^ )

(2 0 )

Ta jednadzba kaze, da je proizvodnja jednaka zbiru reprodukcione trazn je u obje r e g ije i isporukama objema regijam a za zadovoljenje finalne tra zn je. Kao sistem jednadzbi (2 0 ) se m oze kompaktnije dati u m atricnoj notaciji

( I - A *) X * = x 1

( 21 )

gdje A * predstavlja m atricu mnnozaka tehnickih i regionalnih k oefi cijenata - .4 = | r r ar s)J , X * je vektor ukupne proizvodnje po regijam a i sektorim a, a x * predstavlja vektor finaine proizvodnje po regijam a i sektorim a. Izra z (2 1 ) ima m atematicki sasvim is ti oblik kao 1 iz ra z (4 ) te se strogo rjesava na is ti nacin. Ukoliko je poznata ili planirana ukupna proizvodnja pojedinih sektora u pojedinim regijam a, vektor finalne proizvodnje se m oze izracunati. Ukoliko je pak zadana finalna traznja u pojedinim regijam a y^C i y ^ , onda treba najprije izracunati finalnu proizvodnju po sektorima i regijam a preko ( 2 0 ) ili putem direktnih procjena. Kad je poznat vektor finalne proizvodnje, ukupna proizvod nja se m oze izracunati prem ultiplici ran j em s invertiranom m atricom :

83

( i -

* r 1 x*

= x*

(22)

U Jugoslav!ji nerazvijeno podrucje obuhvaca 44% te r ito r ije , jednu tr e cinu stanovnistva i daje manje od jedne petine proizvodnje. Kao sto je vec recen o, ne postoje statistical podaci za rigoroznu empiricku analizu. Medjutim, jedna gruba prociena u svrhu ilustriran ia p ro b lema omogucila je da se ustanovi, da bi povecanje finaine potrosnje (in v e sticija , licne i opce potrosnje u nerazvijenom podrucju dovelo do veceg povecanja prozvodnje pa prema tome i dohodaka u razvijenom nego u nerazvijenom podrucju. Medjuregionalni m odel, koji je upravo opisan, predstavlja zatvorenu privredu . Vanjska trgovina se ukljucuje bez teskoca kao nova regija "o sta li s v ije t " . U medjuregionalnoj analizi veoma je vazno da se u r e produkciono polje uvede i sektor "d om acin stva", zbog toga sto domacinstva apsorbiraju proizvode i usluge niza potpuno lokalnih sektora, kao sto su gradjevinarstvo, zanatstvo. ugostiteljstvo i s i. N a d a lje, vazno je uociti da su regionalni koeficijenti znatno manje stabilni od tehnickih; prema tome bit ce potrebno da se oni stalno k origiraju . I na koncu broj sektora, tj. red m atrice raste s kvadratom broja r e g i ja . Rasclanjavanje jugoslavenske p rivred e na 130 pogonskih grupacija i 8 administrativnih podrucja (sest republika, jedna pokrajina i jedna oblast) zahtijevalo bi matricu velicin e 1040 x 1040 sektora. Takva je m atrica ocigledno nepodesna za prakticnu prim jenu, te stoga u osm oregionalnom modelu broj sektora nece biti veci od dvadesetak =

o. ZAVRSNE N.APOMENE

Opci je zakljucak da se medjusektorska metoda m oze korisno upotrijebiti u planiranju. Kao i svaka druga metoda ona ima svojiii ogranice-nja. Iskustava o njenoj prim jeni u planskim privredam a jos gotovo i nema. Mnoqi problem i jos nisu ni teoretski rijesen i.Z b og toga p red stoji ozbiljan i opsezan teoretski i praktican istrazivack i rad. Medju tim , kako to pokazuie nasa analiza, metoda je dovoljno fleksibilna da omogucuje stalna pobolisania i gotovo beskonacno priblizavanje s tv a r84

n osti. A to je potrebno za pozitivnu ocjenu upotrebljivosti neke m etode. Ipak, medjusektorskom metodom u njenoj tradicionainoj form u laciji ne da se r ije s iti jedan vazan p ro b lem . To ie problem optimalnog i z bora proizvcdnje i dualni problem optimalnog sistem a cijena, Taj problem rjesava se linearnim p rogram ira n jem , koje predstavlja specificno p ro siren je medjusektorske analize*

85

I ll

PRIM JENA

PLANSKOM

ME D JUS EKT ORS KE A N A L I Z E B I L A N C I R A N J U PRIVREDE

1 . ZNACENJE MEDJUSEKTORSKE
TABLICE ZA PLANSKO BILANCI RANJE NARODNE PRIVREDE

Nakon sto ie u Saveznom zavodu za statlstiku izradjena prva veca 76 sektorska tablica medjusobnih odnosa privrednih djeiatnosti Jugos la v ije * ) postalo je prakticki moguce da se p rid je sisteir.atskom iz gradjivanju m etodologije prim jene medjusektorske tehnike "utrosaka-isporuka" u p l a n i r a n j u .2 ) Svako planiranje znaci bilanciranje i p re ma tome pretpostavlja konstruiranje bar neke rudirnentarne planske tablice medjusektorskih odnosa. Medjutim, ukoliko to bilanciranje ne k o risti tekovine suvremene ekonomske an alize, ono je ( a ) veoma nezgrapno i neprecizno i prouzrokuje velik gubitak vrem sna, a osim to ga (b ) ne omogucuje sistematsku statistic1 ex post p rovjeru svakog ::?! koraka u konstruiranju pianskih b ilan sa, uslijed toga je gotovo onemoguceno otkrivanje pogresaka u radu, a to opet znaci da je veoma (;es-

1) N P e tro v ic , Medjusobni odnosi privrednih delatnosti Jugosiavijs u 1958. godini, SZS, Beograd, 1962. 2) U 1960 godini proucene su u Sektoru za ekonomska istrazivanja opcenito mcgucnosti prim jen e medjusektorske analize u planiranju. Kao rezultal tih proucavanja konstatirano je : "Medjusektcrsku m etodu roozernc- prim jeniti (1 ! na kvantiiiciranje k r iie iija za donosenje ekonomslcih odluka i ( 2 ) p ro jicira n js privrednog ra zv o ja . Prvi zadatak sasvim se uspjesnc rjesava do sad razvijanim nietodama medjusektorske analize i u tom pogledu mediusektorski pristup iz razito je efikasniji od alternativnih pristupa. Rjesavanje drugog za datka zahtijeva jos mncgo istrazivackog rada, i teorijskog i em pirijsk o g" (B. H orvat, "N eki problem i prim jene medjusektorske ana liz e u privredncm planiranju , Ekonomist. 2, 1961,, s . 216), Ota da rad je nastavljen I u ovoj studiji cini se p rv i korak u rjesavanju tog drugog zadatka.

ko poboljsavati efikasnost planskog bilanciranja. Osnovne poteskoce bilanciranja javljaju se u reprodukcionoj s fe r i. Znacenje reprodukcionog polja tablice u bilanciranju proizvodnje i potrosnje pojedinih privrednih grana vidi se iz tabele 1 .

Tabela ! , Ucesce reprodukcionih isporuka u ukupnim isporukama pojedinih grana umanjenim za izvoz M etalurgija Energetika Nem etali Kem ijska i papima industrija Drvna industrija Poljoprivreda i sumarstvo Saobracaj i veze 98 % 89 % 86 % 77 % 75 % 51 % 49 % T ekstil, koza i guma Zanatstvo Prerada metal a Trgovina i ugostiteIjstvo Ostala industrija Prehrambena indu strija Gradjevinarstvo 46 % 41 % 41 % 29% 19 % 16 % 5%

C ijela privreda 51 % Iz v o r : SZS, op. c i t . , tabela 2-1.

Ulcupna proizvodnja neke privredne grane raspodjeljuje se na s lije d e ce tri namjene: ( 1 ) jedan dio odlazi na iz v o z ; taj dio m ozem o odmah eiim inirati iz daljnie analize je r ie autonoman u odnosu na unutarprivredne medjuveze; preostala proizvodnja raspodjeljuje se na zadovoljenje ( 2 ) finalne potrosnje {in v e s tic ije , licna i opca potrosnja) i (3 ) reprodukcione potrosnje. Tabela 1 pokazuje da se kod nekih g ra na - gotovo c ije la proizvodoja trosi na reprodukcione potrebe. Stoga

1) Medjutim, zbog elim iniranja izvoza m orali bismo za alikvotni dio smanjiti i vlastitu reprodukcionu potrosnju, sto u tabeli 1 nije uradjeno i zato ona nije sasvim precizna. N o, takvom korekcijom red velicina ne bi se prom jenio.

nekoliko grana - trgovina i ugostiteljstvo, film ska i graficka industrija , prehrambena indusirija, gradjevinarstvo - isporucuiu manje od 40% reprodukcionoj sferi= U prosjeku polovina proizvodiije c ije le ju goslovenske p rivred e sluzi za zadovoljenje reprodukcioniii po treba. Prem a tome za ispravno postavljanje opceprivrednog bilansa od je d nake je vaznosti bilanciranje reprodukcione kao i finalne potrosnje. M edjutim , o finalnoj potrosnji ima znatno vise statistickih podataka nego o reprodukcionoj, a metode elconomske analize - i , posebno, ekonomsko m odeliranje - mnogo su razrad jen ije za finalnu, nego za r e produkcionu potrosnju. Pored toga, za razliku od utrosaka (k o ji odgovaraju stupcima m edjusektorske ta b e le ), za koje je i do sada bilo statistickih podataka, za isporuke (k oje odgovaraju recim o medjusek torske ta b e le ), b ilo reprodukcione bile finalne, jedine statisticke po datke daje m edjusektorska tabela. P ro izila zi da je za plansko bilanciranje koristenje medjusektorskih ta bela od izvanredne vazn osti. Postavlja s e, medjutim, pitanje kako te tabele koristiti?

2. POTREBA ZA IZRADOM METODOLOGIJE KORISTENJA MEDJUSEKTORSKE TABLICE U PLAN3SAN JU

Neposredno koristenje podataka tablice ima samo ogranicenu primjenu u planiranju* S jedr.e strane zato sto je za statisticku izradu tablice potrebno 1 1 /2 do 2 godine i u toj m jeri podaci zastarjevaju, narocito u jednoj dinamickoj p riv re d i jugoslavenskog tipa. S druge strane zato sto, zbog postojanja m 3juveza, promjena jednog elementa zahtijeva m ijenjanje i svih ostalih sto oneraogucuje eksperim entiranje s r a z licitim varijantama i odahiranje najbolje. U v e z i s ovim posljednjim korisno je uocifi da posljednja tablica SZS velicm e 76 x 76 sektora -

89

- a t a velxcina jos uvjek ne zadovoljava - teo rijsk i omogucava 5776 reprodukcionih m edjuveza, je r im a toliko p olja, a stvarno je p ok riveno 2666 polja. Prema tome kad izm jenim o jedno od tih p olja, trebalo bi mijenjati i ostalih 2665. Poznato je da je planiranje jedan proces postepenog usaglasavanja c iljeva i sredstava dok se konacno ne dobije uskladjeni bilans. U toku tog procesa v rs e se stalno mnogobrojne p ro mjene, x kad bi za svaku od njih trebalo citavu tablicu uskladiti, onda to ni s elektronskim racunarima ne bi bio za prakticne svrhe izvo d ljiv zadatak. Tom problemu pokusalo se doskociti na taj nacin sto se uocilo da sva polja nisu od jednake kvantitativne vaznosti za ukupni bilans. U torn pogledu za nas je od posebnog interesa rad sovjetskih strucnjaka za medjusektorsku analizu na planskom bilansu za 1962. godinu.2) U oceno je da je u posljednjoj postojecoj statistickoj tablici za 1959. godinu bilo pokriveno 4260 polja, ali da je u svega 500 polja bilo sad rzano 95% ukupnih reprodukcionih utrosaka odnosno isporuka. Na osnovu tog zapazanja bila je za 1962. godinu konstruirana planska medjusektorska tablica s istim sektorim a kao i statisticka tablica iz 1959. go dine s tim e da je bilanciranje zapoceto od unaprijed definiranih fin alnih isporuka uz upotrebu onih 500 najvaznijih tehnickih koeficijenata, koji su prethodno b ili podvrgnuti detaljnoj analizi i m ijenjani u zevsi u obzir promjene u tehnologiji, cijenama i drugo. Ostalih 3700 k oefi cijenata prenijeti su nepromjenjeni iz statisticke tablice. Opisani postupak cini primjenu med jusektorske telmike u planiranju prakticki mcgucom i dovodi do sasvim korisnih rezultata. N o , on ipak

1 ) Na osnovu istrazivanja u Sektoru za ekonomska istrazivanja Savplana doslo se do zakljucka da bi u jugoslavenskim uslovima zadov o ljila tablica velicin e od oko 120-140 sektora 2) L. B erri, F . K locvog , S. Satalin, i!M ezotraslevoj balans i jego is poljzovanie v p ianirovan ii", Planovoe hozjajstvo, 2/1962., 51-62. Isti autori, "Opyt rasceta eksperimentaljnogo planovogo m ezotraslevogo balans a na 1962. g o d .", ib id ., .9/1962., 34-43= Radovi su izvedeni u Sektoru medjugranskog bilans a Naucno-istrazivackog ekonomskog instituta Gosekonomsoveta.

90

iz v is e razloga ne zadovoljava . P rije svega, iako su prom jene svedene na svega 500 tehnickih koeficijenata, jos uvjek bilanciranje za htijeva elektronsku masinu, a svaka promjena m ijenja svih 4260 poija* Z a tim , iako sa stajaLista p rivred e u c je iin i 95%-ni obuhvat m oze izgledati zadovoljavajuci, od pojedinih grana taj obuhvat m oze biti znatno m anji. Tu se onda ja vlja rizik da neke grane nece biti bilancno uravnotezene cim e se u p riv re d i stvaraju uska g rla s m ultiplikativnim ajeiovanjem na kocenje proizvodnje u c je iin i. I na koncu, c ije li postupak suvise je krut da bi se mogao uspjesno prilagoditi organizacionim i adm inistrativno-politickim potrebama sastavljanja planova. Bit ce stoga od velike vaznosti ispitati mogucnost izgradjivanja jednog fleksibilnijeg postupka kojim bi se prevladale upravo opisane poteskoce.

3. PRVE INDIKACIJE ZA ORUENTACIJU ISTRAZIVANJA

Sveopcu m edjuzavisnost, a s njoin i elektronske racunare, mogli b ismo bar djelom icno e lim in ira ti, kad bi bilo moguce triangularizirati medjusektorsku m atricu. U tom slucaju opsta medjuzavisnost bila bi pretvorena j^dnosmjernu zavisnost ~ kasniji bilansi zavise od prethodrdh*, a li r e i obrnuto - sto bi ornogucilo da se do konacnog bi~ lansa dodje M lancirajuci sektor po sektor odredjenim redos!jedom . N azalost, ta se ideja ne da proves ti. U 37-sektcrskoj v e r z iji tablice SZS stavke isiiaci dijagonale sacinjavaju citavih 43% ukupnih reprodukeionlh isporaka, Prikladriom promjenom redcsijeda sektora taj p ro c enat mogao bi se sm an jiti} ali bi jos uvjek ostao znatno p re v e lik , a da bi se mogao zaneraariti. Ta cinjenica utjecala je vjerojatno na medju-

l ) T j. perm utirati retk e i stupce m atrice tako da se s jedne strane glavne dijagonale dobiju samo nule.

91

sektorske analiticare da ideju triangu larizacije nisu dalje is p itiva li. Medjutim, ako triangularna m atrica nije prakticki ostvarivana, mozda bi kvazitriangularna m atrica mogla dati bolje rezultate? T eorijsk i na mogucnost upotrebe kvazitriangularne mat r ic e ukazao je Oskar Lange1) , no prakticki, koliko je meni poznato, ta ideja nije jos nigdje bila p ri ntjenjena. Medjutim, nezavisno od Lange-a, u praksi planiranja Saveznog zavoda za planiranje u Beogradu pojavila se ideja tzv . "privrednih kom pleksa", cija algebarska interpretacija predstavlja kvazitriangularan bilans p riv re d e .^ ) Kvazitriangularna m atrica je takva m atrica u kojoj se na glavnoj diagonali m jesto pojedinacnih polja pojavljuju blokovi polja - "kom pleksi" - s jedne strane tih blokova polja su p ra zna, a bilanciranje (t j. rjesavanje sistem a) v r s i se tako da se od red jenim redosljedom jedan za drugim bilansiraju ti blokovi - kom pleksi. Prve indikacije o prakticnoj ostvarivosti kvazitriangularnosti dobit c e mo utvrdjivanjem stepena koncentracije utrosaka i reprodukcionih is poruka. Relevantni podaci navedeni su u tabeli 2 na bazi 15-sektorske v e r z ije tablice SZS za 1958. godinu. Rezultati tabele 2 su ohrabrujuci. Ako se c ije la p rivred a p od ijeli na 15 sektora, onda ni kod jednog sektora 80% utrosaka ne angazira vise od 7 sektora, a samo jedan sektor - saobracaj - 80% svojih reprodukcionih isporuka upucuje u vise od 7 sektora, ukljucujuci u taj broj i vlastiti sektor. Prilicno velika koncentracija i utrosaka i isporuka ukazuje na to da postoji izvjesna mogucnost trian gu larizacije m atrice. Tu triangularizaciju izvrsicem o u d vije etape. U p rvoj etapi utvrdicemo blokove - komplekse oniii privrednih grana koje su medjusobno najcvrsce vezane. U drugoj etapi utvrdicemo red osljed tih blokova - kom pleksa tako da se postigne maksimalna moguca aproksim acija triangularne m atrice tj. da sum a stavaka iznad glavne dijagonale bude m inimama .

1) O. Lange, introduction to Siconometrics, Fergamon P re s s , New Y ork, 1959, s. 244, 2} G algebarskim svojstvim a kvazi-triangularnih i k vazi-dijagonalnih matrica vidi u mojoj k n jizi: Medjusektorska analiza, Narodne novine, Zagreb, 1962, , s. 69-70 i 8 6 .

92

T ab ela 2 .
IConcentracija reprodukcionih isporuka I utrosaka

Broj sektora u koje odlazi p re ko 80% reprodukcionih isporuka danog sektora lo Prehrambena industrija 2. Tekstil, koza i guma 3= M etalurgija 4. Zanatstvo 5. P oljoprivreda i sumarstvo
6 Gradjevinars tvo

Broj sektora koji s preko SCfa ucestvuju u ukupnim utroscim a danog sektora 4 3
2

1
2 2

3 3 4 4 4

6
1
6 4 4 3

7, Nem atali
8 . Drvna industrija

9 = Prerada metala
10.= O stalo

11. Trgovina i ugostxteijstvo 12. Kemijslca industrija

14, Ostala industriji 15, Saobracaj

4. FOSMIRANJE PRIVREDNIH KOMPLEKSA (BLOKOVA K VA ZITRLANGULARNE RE PRODUKCIONE MATRICE)

Eadi vece preglednosti u form iranju privrednih kompleksa poci cem o o d 37 -sektorske v e r z ije statisticke tablice, koja predstavlja rasclanjavanje p rivrede na grane djelatnosti. V e rz ija od 76 sektora predstav lja daljnje rasclanjavanje grana na grupe djelatnosti, koje kod a g re g iranja u komplekse ulaze u iste one komplekse u koje i njihove maticne grane. To, medjutim, ne znaci da ne postoji mogucnost poboljsavanja nase nomenklature djelatnosti. Naprotiv, adekvatnijim definiranjem djelatnosti moci ce se, medju ostalim , poboijsati i ekonomski p ro fil kornpleksa. No uz postojeci statisticki m aterijal grane djelatnosti daju agregiranjem iste komplekse kao i grupe djelatnosti. Grupiranje grana u komplekse izvrsen o je na osnovu intenziteta ekonomsko-tehnoloskih veza i kompletiranja reprodukcionog procesa koji pocinje sa dobivanjem sirovine i zavrsava proizvodnjorn finalnog p ro izvod aKod prim jene ovih nacela koristene su ne samo statisticke o se bine pojedinih agregata, vec i konkretno organizaciono-analiticko iskustvo akumulirano u Savplanu. Dobiveno je na taj nacin devet kom pleksa. istrazivanja nije b i t a n p a s t o g a rnozek o ji ima neku o d r e d j e n u logiku. Na p rim je r - i B o z e m o p o c i o d k o m p l e k s a k o j i s e b a z l r a j u na p oljoprivredno-su _ ifciro sirovinam a, nastaviti s kompleksima k o j i s e baziraju n a ru lei le i zavrsiti s kompleksima koji opsluzuju citavu p rivredu , Izraea ji* pcsljednje i pretposlednje g r u p e interpolira s e kem ijski kom pleks, kojf. ima s p e c i f i c n s osebine. U t o m slucaju jugoslovenska p rivred a da l e o t u sliku:
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Kad jednom b u d e form irana ekonometrijska l a b o r a t o r i j a Jugoslavens t . o g insuiata za ekonomska istrazivanja bice vxlo instr uktuvno da s e elektronskim racunarom izracunavaju s t a t i s t i c k i najefikasniji blokovi reprodukcione m a t r i c e . Uporedjenje t i l l , mehanicki dobiven i h , K o m p l e k s a s ovima i z t e k s t a pokazace u kojoj s u r n j e r i b i l e is koriscene p o t e n c i j a i n e mogucnosti i eventualno c e indicirati moguca poboljsanja.

94

Pregled 1 A g reg ira n je grana u privredne komplekse K om p lek s: I Poljoprivredno- prehram beni kompleks Graria:

1. 2. 3. 4.

Z-emljoradnja Stocarstvo Prehrambena industrija Industrija duhana

II Tekstil, koza i gum a

5, Tekstilna industrija 6 . Industrija koze i obuce 7. Industrija gurae

III

D rvo

8 . Sumarstvo
9. Drvna industrija

1 0 . Proizvodnja i prerada
papira

1 1 . Graficka industrija
IV N em etali 12. Proizvodnja i prerada nemetala 13. Industrija gradjevinskog m aterijala 14, Gradj evinar stvo 15 Zanatstvo 16, 17. 18, 19. 20, 21, Crna m etalurgija Obojena m etalurgija Metalna industrija Erodogradnja Elektromdustrija Komunalne djeiatocsti

V M etali

V I K em ijsk i kompleks

22, K em ijska industrija OQ Film ska industrija

Nastavak Pregleda 1 Kom pleks: VII Saobracaj Grana: 24 = Zelezn icki saobracaj 25. Pomorski saobracaj 26 = Rijecni saobracaj 27. Z r a c n isaobracaj 28. Cestovni saobracaj 29. PTT 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. Trgovina na veiiko Trgovina na malo Vanjska trgovina Ugostiteljstvo Elektroenergija Prozvodnja i prerada uglja Proizvodnja i prerada nafte Stari m aterijal i otpaci za preradu

V ffl

Trgovina i ugostiteljstvo

IX

Energetika

Qvo grupiranje zahtijeva izvjesna obrazlozenja. P rije svega prva dva kompleksa mogla su bit! agregirana i u jedan. Sto to ipak nije uradjeno ra z lo z i su s lije d e c i: { D proizvodnja tek stila , koze i gurne samapo sebi veoma je velika -- 404 m ilija rd i dinar a ili 9,5% ukupne materijalne proizvodnje u 1958. godini - tako da je u nacelu p ozeljno da se ona izdvoji i posebno b ilan sira; ( 2 ) taj kornpleks zasniva se doduse na poljoprivrednim sirovinam a, all one se u Jugosiaviji ill t 'e proizvode (kaucul-' J se proizvode u nedovoljnim kolicinama ' r;v~\, _ yuna i , donekie, i\ _ _ , _ i 3) nesurnnjivi tehnoloski trend jest da se poljoprivredne sirovine u ovorn kompleksu sve v is e zamjenjuju kem ijski sintetiziranim m aterijaliina.

Zanatstvo je uvrsteno u kompleks nemetala, je r se najvecim dijelom radi o gradjevinskom zanatstvu odnosno zanatstvu koje snabdijeva g ra djevinarstvo. Od ukupnih reprodukcionib isporuka zanatstva 67% odlazi u gradjevinarstvo. Preostalo zanatstvo sastoji se uglavnom cd m etalopreradjivackog, tekstilnog i drvopreradjivackog zanatstva, Ekonomski 96

ispravno bilo bi da se zanatstvo k la s ific ira po maticnim granama, cim e bi se poboljsala ekonomsko-statisticka svojstva kompleksa. M edjutim , zbog nepostojanja podataka to je za sada nemoguce uciniti.

KomunaLne djelatnosti uvrstene su u metalni kompleks je r 49% rnaterijalnih troskova predstavljaju isporuke iz tog kom pleksa. Alternativno ta grana mogla je biti uvrstena i u energetski kompelks - s k ojim , po svojoj ekonomskoj funkciji, ima izvjesn e srodnosti - je r energetski troskovi sacinjavaju 18,5% njenih ukupnih troskova. Po svom kvantitativnom znacenju to je relativn o mala gran a: vrijednost proizvodnje iznosi 17,7 mrd d in ., u cemu m aterijalni troskovi ucestvuju s 6 mrd din.

Filmska industrija uvrstena je u kem ijski kompleks je r skoro svi njeni utrosci, ukoliko nisu proizveden i unutar grane, poticu odatle (ukupni utrosci iznose 1604 m iliona dinara, od toga 745 miliona dinara otpada na isporuke same film sk e Indust r ije , a 508 m iliona dinara na isporuke kem ijske in d u s trije ). Kvantitativno ova je grana beznacajna (ukupna vrijednost proizvodnje u 1958. godini iznosi 3,1 mrd d in .) .

Stari m aterijal i otpaci za preradu arbitrarno su ukljuceni u energet ski kom pleks, zato je r su se i jedan i drugi nasli na kraju spiska, a za svrhe ovog rada' nije im alo sm isla stvarati poseban kompleks za stari m aterijal. Inace stari m aterijal im a u p riv re d i mnoqo vecu ulogu nego sto se obicno m is li. Ukupna registrcvan a vrijednost utrosenog starog m aterijal a izn osila je u 1958. godini 23 m iiija rd e dinara. U tablic i SZS stari m aterijal tretiran je kao zaliha, sto znaci da postoji r e dak za stari m aterijal, dok je njegov stupac prazan. No postoje i druge mogucnosti gtatistickoq testiranja starog m aterija la . Stari m aterijal moze se i sasvim izu zeti Iz reprodukcione s fe r e . U tom slucaju ispor ifce starog m aterijala ukljucuju se u dijagonalna polja sektora koji ga isporucuju, a utrosci starog m aterijala form iraju poseban red ispod reprodukcionog polja siic.no uvozu. Organizaciono to statisticko r je s e nje znaci da svaka grana vodi racuna o svojoj proizvodnji i potrosnji starog m aterijala i sania ^rsi bilansiranje. To rjes e n je ima svoju ekonomsku logiku, je r se otpaci proizvode u onim granama koji ih i trose

l ) Vidi moju knjigu, ope- c i t . , ss. 98-100.

(metalni otpaci, staMenl k rs, stare krpe i s i . ) . Ukoliko s e , medjutim , inzistira na organizaciji prikupljanja starog m aterijala i otpadaka - na prim jer putem specijaliziran ih poduzeca "Otpad" - onda je zgodnije da se fo rm ira posebna grana "sta ri m aterijal i otpaci , koja ima svoje isporuke i utroske kao i sve ostale grane i koja se eventualno m oze ukljuciti u kompleks "trgovin a". Nezgoda tog rjesen ja je u to me sto trgovinski kompleks postaje u izvjesnom sm islu nehomogen: trgovina u medjusektorskoj tablici isporucuje samo svoje usluge, a trgovina starim m aterijalom isporucuje pored usluga i m aterijal- Kao sto se vidi pronalazenje najefikasnijeg rjesenja n ije teoretski vec praktican problem .koji ce se r ije s iti na osnovu iskustva u radu.

5. EFIKASNOST IZVRSENOGA GRUPIRANJA I UTVRDJIVANJE REDOSLJEDA KOMPLEKS A

Na osnovu izvrsenog grupiranja, 37-sektorska v e rz ija statisticke tab lic e dobice kvazitriangularan oblik kako je prikazano u &beli 3. Radi vece preglednosti ne navodimo cijelu tabiicu, vec samo prva, dva i z a vrsni sektor. Neposrednim posmatranjem tabele 3. mozemo odmah uociti kako je doslo do koncentriranja najvecih stavaka u uokvirenim blokovim a, na glavnoj dijagonali, kao sto smc i ocekivali. Ako unutar blokova stavke agregirarno. kao sto je to uradjeno u tabeli 9, onda - izuzev trgovine i saobracajat koji rsisu knmpleksni u pravom smislu r ije c i - koncentracija reprcrfukcioriih isporuka unutar blokova je reiativno velika te v a rira od 23% kod energetike do 84% kod poljoprivrecmo-prehrarnbencg kompleksa. Suma svih stavaka u svim blokovima iznosi 1328 mrd d in .; sto u odnosu na 2197 mrd din* svih reprodukeionih isporuka p rivred e predstavlja 60.4%* Drugiro rije c im a , blizu 2/3 svih reprodukcionih veza koncentrirano je u nasih devet blokova koje samostalno bilanciram o. Ukoiiko za svrhe neke veoma grube analize mozemo u prvoj aproksim aciji zanem ariti 40% reprodukcionih isporuka, tj. sve stavke van blokova, onda tim e nasa reprodulcciona m atrica postale kvazidijagonamom,, To znaci da se onda raspada na devet nezavisnih m atrica

98

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koje mozerno odvojeno bilancirati (t j. c ije slstem e jednadzbi mozemo rijesa va ti nezavisno jednog od drugog) . No takvo drasticno pojednostavljenje upotrebit cemo u p raksi, naravno, samo izuzetno. Pravi c ilj naseg istraziyanja je s t form iran je kvazitriangularne m atrice. Do tog cilja nedostaje sad jos jedan korak, utvrdjivanje redosljeda kompleksa - biokova. Ako posm otrimo v eze izmedju prva dva kompleksa utvrdicem o da poIjop rivreda isporucuje drugom kompleksu robe u vrijednosti od oko 52 m rd dinara, dok industrija tekstila, koze i gums isporucuje p o ljo p rivrednom kompleksu svega oko 5 mrd din. Buduci da zelim o m inim irati zb ir stavaka iznad blokovske dijagonale, to je ocigledno nuzno da p rvi i drugi kompleks prom ijene m jesta, je r se tim e smanjuju reprodukcione isporuke iznad dijagonale za 52-5 = 47 mrd din. Na slican nacin utvrdjen je i redosljed ostalih kompleksa ~ biokova i tako je dobivena tabela 4, Radi vece preglednosti sve stavke unutar pojedinih biokova a g re giraiie su u toj tabeli u jednu jedinu cim e se reprodukciona m atrica od kvasitriangularne po fo rm i pretvara u obicnu triangularnu m atricu. Zbrajanjeni stavaka iznad dijagonale utvrdjujemo da one iznose svega 10,0% ukupnih reprodukcionih isporuka, sto predstavlja cetvrostruko pob oljsanje u odnosu na pocetnu situaciju kad je suma tih stavaka izn osila 43%. Time je reprodukciona m atrica nesumnjivo poboljsana do tog stepena da se moze upotrebiti u prakticnom planiranju. No apsolutna suir-a iznad dijagonalnih stavaka jos uvijek je u apsolutnorn iznosu velik a . ukupno 220 m ilijard i dinara. Bilo bi stoga veoma korisno kad bismo bill u stanju da ostvarim o i daljnja. poboljsanja. Ta poboljsanja su doista i moguca-

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6 . D A L J N J A P OB OL JS A N J A

Svega 6 stavaka u tri kompleksa sacinjavaju 44% onih 220 zrtvovanih m ilijard i. To su: isporuka tekstila, koze i gume nemetalnom kompleksu isporuke nemetala i gradjevinskih usluga metalnom i saobracajnom kompleksu Saobracajne usluge u metalnom, drvnoin i energetskom kompleksu Ukupno

29 mrd din.

20
13

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" "

17 " 9 "
8

1 1
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96 mrd din.

Prva nezgoda. - velika stavka u isporukama prvog kompleksa - p osljedica je lose nomenklature djelatnosti. Od 29 mrd din. tekstila, koze i gume isporucenih nemetalnom kompleksu 27,6 mrd din. isporuceno je u stvari zanatstvu, tj. proizvodnim jedinicama koje (najvecim d ije lom ) proizvode odjecu i obucu i tako pripadaju kompleksu tekstila, koze i gume a ne kompleksu nemetala. Prem a tom e boljom nomeriklaturom djelatnosti oko 27 mrd din. moglo bi se elim in irati iznad d ija gonale. cim e bi se ucesce iznad dijagonalnih stavaka smanjilo od 1 0 , 0 % na 8 , 8 %. Ostale velike stavke ne daju se elim inirati tako lako. M edjutim , zapazamo da se cd pet preostalih c e tiri stavke odnose na saobracaj. Prema tome, osnovni se problem svodi na to kako uklopiti saobracaj r e la tiv no rano u redosljed bllansiranja. Sto se tice utrosaka u saobracaju moze se uz eti da obirn gradjevinskih radova u saobracaju nije suvise cvrsto zavisan od obima saobracajnih usluga, i da se prema torrB mo ze iiksirati i p rije no sto je*obim till usluga tacno poznat. Nesto je slozenija situacija kod utvrdjivanja obima saobracajnih usluga u navedene tri stavke koje se odnose na prevoz ruda, d rv e ta , ugljena i nafteKako je energetska potrosnja dosta dobro korelirana s promjenama u drustvenom proizvodu, potrosnja, pa prema tome i prevoz ugljena i na' fte moze se orijentaciono ocijeniti na toj osnovi. Prevoz drveta i ruda treba prosto procijeniti na osnovu orijentacionih podataka proizvodnje 102

odnosnih sektora jos p r ije pocetka bilansiranja, Od 20 m ilijard i dinara isporuka nemetalnog sektora metalnom treba iskljuciti oko 5?5 m ilijard i dinar a zanatskih proizvoda k oji bi se kod adekvatnije nomenklature djelatnosti nasli u drugom kompleksu. Ostatak od 14,5 m ilijard i dinara gotovo iskljucivo se odnosi na potrosnju nemetala u m etalurgiji i metalnoj industriji i tu potrosnju treba takodjer ocijeniti p rije pocet ka bilanciranja. Uzimanjem u ob zir sest navedenih stavaka, zrtvovani iznad di jagonalni dio smanjuje se na 124 mrd dinara ili na 5,5% ukupnih reprodukcionih isporuka. No zapravo nema potrebe da se zrtvuju i tih 5,5%. Moguc je ovaj postupak: prebaciti sve iznaddijagonalne isporuke - osim sest velikih stavaka - iz reprodukcionog u autonomnc polje tabele i z a tim bilanciranje iz v r s iti na bazi pretpostavke da te izd vojen e stavke cine fiksnu proporciju ukupnih reprodukcionih isporuka ili ukupne p ro izvodnje. To je , naravno, moguce jedino ako je sama pretpostavka opravdana i ako p rop orcija izdvojenih isporuka ne v a rira suvise od sek tora do sektora. Ukoliko se rad i o kom pleksim a, sliku koja se dobiva pokazuje label a 5, Iz tabele 5. vid i se da su izu zete stavke i apsolutno i relativno p r ilic no ujednacene i dovoljno m ale - narocito kad se uporede s proizvodnjorn - da dozvole prilicno precizno bilansiranje. Kod ovog postupka prebacivanje nekih isporuka iz reprodukcionog u autonomno polje tablice vaIja irnati u vidu i Iconzekvence koje se sastoje u tom e sto su sacuvani svi direktni efekti eventualnih prom jena; indirektni efekti su izgu bljen i. A li buduci da se rad i o svega 5 1/2% reprcdukcione proizvodnje odnosno 2 3/4% ukupne proizvodnje - zanem arivanje indirektnih efekata je daleko unutar granica raoguce p recizn osti jedne planske tablice. M e djutim , kakc ce se vid jeti kasnije, i ta mala nepreciznost rnoze se iz fajeci u drugom kolu bilansiranja. Gpisani postupak in z is tira , naravno, na nacelnim rjesen jim a , Prakticno iskustvo unijece nesumnjivo irsnoge korisne m odifikacije kojima ce se upotrebljivost medjusektorske tablice i daije poboijsati.

Tab ela 5. Iznaddijagonalne reprodukcione isporuke izdvojene iz reprodukcionog i prebacene u aiitonomno polje

Reprodukcione isp oruke, mrd dinara izdvojene T ekstil, koza i guma Poljoprivredno-prehrambeni kompleks Nem etali Saobracaj M etali Kem ijski kompleks Trgovina i ugostiteljstvo Drvo Energetika Ukupno: 24,2 16,3 19,7 11,3 32,5 9,4 4,9 5,1 123,4 ukupne 192,8 439,5 181,7 93,9' 648,8 124,2 63,0 206,6 246,6 2197,1

Izdvojene isporuke

Reprodukcione u % proizvodnje

1 2 ,6
3,7

6 ,0
1,5 3,2 4,7 3,4 7,3

1 0 ,8 1 2 ,0
LO

7,6 7,8 2,5 5 ,6

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2,9

7. IZGLED, FORMIRANJE I UPOTREBA -PLANSKE MEDJUSEKTORSKE TABLICE

Tabelu 4. mozemo preurediti tako da dobije izgied planske m ediusektorske tab lice. To je uradjsno u tabeli 6 . Sada, konacno, m ozem o opisati u giavnim c r tama plansko bilanciranje pomocu medjusektorske tablice = P rije no sto predjemo na analizu same tablice valja uociti da je izd vajanje reprodukcionih isporuka izazvalo potrebu da se is te stavke izdvoje 104

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i kao utrosci kako se ukupm bilans ne bi n&rusio. 1 >

Ti izdvojeni utrosci beznacajni su u prvih pet kompleksa te iznose ma nje od 4% ukupnih utrosaka. N o.on i postaju znacajni u posljednja c e tiri kompleksa i iznose 35%, 56%, 16% i 31% od ukupnih utrosaka kem ijskog, ixaovinskog, drvnog i energetskog kompleksa. Buduci da trgovina k od koje su Izdvojeni utrosci relativno daleko najveci - vjerojatno ne trosi neke specijalizirane m aterijale, to veiiko ucesce nespecificiranili utrosaka kod trgovine ne treba da nas zabrinjuje. O zbiljniji problem i mogu se javiti kod preostala tr i kompleksa, no da l i oni stvarno postoje , i ako postoje, koji su - to m oze pokazati tek prakticno iskustvo. Treba, medjutim 2 im ati u vidu (a ) da su ti utrosci doduse n es p e cific ira n i 5 ali kolicinski nisu zanem areni: (b ) da su kapaciteti s obzirom na asortiman donekle fleksibilni pa se cesto mogu uspjesno planirati i po asortimanu ne,specificirane kolicine; pored toga postoje za liiie , mo gucnost dodatnih srnjena i mogucnosti uvoza, i konacno ( c ) da spom enuti utrosci ostaju nespecificirani samo u prvom kolu bilanciranja, a da se vec u narednom kolu mogu b lize s p ecificira ti suceljavanjem izd vo jeniii utrosaka s izdvojenim isporukama. Sam proces bilanciranja m oze se organizirati ovako. Polazeci od p re tpostavke vjerojatnog obima drustvenog proizvoda i njegove osnovne raspodjele na investicije i potrosnju.. utvrdjujemo strukturu finalne d omace pctrosrije pojedinih proizvoda (stupac 12 u tabeli 6 ) . Pocinjemo s potrebair.a u proizvodims. tekstila, koze i g a n e . Finalnim potrebama domace potrosnje (u nasem slucaju 223 mrd L -.) dodajemo reprodukcione poc_-Dbe ( 14C mrd d in .) , koje dobivan' ^rlrnjenoin -i_iickiii koeficijenata, eventualne iznadciiiagonalne procjenjene reproclukcione isporuke (29 mrd din- j i izdvojene reprodukcione isporuke (24 mrd a in )s

l i ! d .iterrfsa js ds. so uoce slijedeco karakf.eristike bilarisa k cji iz r a J zbrciu reprodukcicnih utrosaka (reaak 10) xe izn osi 2075 mrd din. ^br^j izd-voienih reproduceionih isporu^a od 122 mrd din. (stupac 11/ jednak je zbroju izdvojenih utrosaka (redak 11), Drustveni proizvod. (re>lak 12) jednak je finalnoj domaccj potrosnji ( stupac 12) umanjenoj za neto uvoz (stupac 15}, 2004 = 2110 - 106,

106

koje dobivamo prim jenom fiksnog procenta od 12,6% na uktipne rep ro dukcione isporuke, il i , sto je u ovom siucaju sp retn ije, primjenom fiksnog procenta od 6% na proizvodnju (v . labelu 5 ). U ovom pojednostavljenom pritnjeru , gdje citav kompleks prom atram o kao jedan sektor ,upotrebljvamo samo iedan tehnicki k oeficijen t, no u stvarnom radu upotrebicerno za svaki sektor iz kompleksa njegov tehnicki koe fic ije n t. Ti tehnicki k oeficijen ti ne moraju se mehanicki pi'euzsti iz statisticke tablice, vec s e , naprotiv, mogu i moraju m ijenjati na os novu najnovijih in form acija. Zbrajanjem reprodukcione i finalne potrosnje dobivamo ukupnu potrosnju. Zatini utvrdjujemo mogucu p ro iz vodnju pa suceljavanjem proizvodnje i potrosnje dolazim o do podataka o potrebi uvoza il i mogucnosti izv o za . Opisani postupak m oze se upotrebom sim bcla nesto p recizn ije iz r a z iti. U stva ri treba r ije s iti slijedecu jednadzbu:

x , ,, + 0 ,0 6 X 1 = X.,

gdje X j predstavlja finalne isporuke (b ez iz v o z a ) sektora 2, a-|| je tehnicki koeficijent utroska viastitih proizvoda u sektoru 1 (a-. 1 = = 0 ,3451), X., je potrebna proisvodnja sektora 1, x'13 su iznaddijagonalne isporuke sektora 1 i sektoru 3 (onih 29 m rd din koje bi se kod b olje nornenldature izg u b ile ) , 0,06 je 6 % izdvojenih isporuka u cdnosu na proizvodnju, U nasoj jsdnadzbi nepoznata je jedinc veiicina X^, ko~ ju sada lako izracune.vamo:

>=

* x -

?,94 - a

11

0; 9 4 -0 ,3 -.

252 = 420 m.rd 0,60

Prem a tom e, da bi se za d o vo ljile potrebe domace potrosnje potrebno je p ro izv e sti tekstiia, koze i gume u vrijednosti od 420 mrd din, P retpostavim o da mogucnosti proizvodnje iznose 404 mrd din, kako to stoji u tabeli 6 . U tom siuacju pocrebno je v.vesti tic proizvoda u v rije d -

107

nosti od 420-404 = 16 mrd din. Tabela 6 daje neto uvoz od svega 11 mrd din. P jred efekata zaokruzivanja decim ala, ra zlik a u principu nastaje zbog toga sto manja moguca proizvodnja (u odnosu na izracu natu potrebu) zahtijeva i manje reprodukcione isporuke, stoga vise ostaje za finalne isporuke i utoliko su potrebe uvoz a manje. Zbog to ga, kad se potrebna i moguca proizvodnja ne slazu , te efekte treba izracunati i to je sasvim jednostavno. Na slican nacin bilanciracem o i sektor 2 za koji bilancna jed.nad.zba g la s i:

X2

a 21 X 1

+ a 22 X 2

0,02 X0 = X r

Buduci da je u ovoj jednadzbi nepoznato samo X 7 - X 1 smo izracunali prethodnim postupkom, a 22 i a2l su tehnicki koeficijen ti - to i ovu jednadzbu mozemo r ije s iti, a isto tako i jednadzbe za sve ostale sektor e , je r se u svakom od njih pojavljuje samo po jedna nepoznanica. To upravo i jest ona dragocjena karakteristika triangularne m atrice p riv rednih transakcija koja nam omogucuje da bilanciram o svaki sektor zasebno postujuci jedino cdredjeni redosljed. 0 upravo opisanom postupku vid jeli smo da kod suceljavanja potrebne 1 moguce proizvodnje valja naknadno iz v r s iti korekcije kod vlastitih reprodukcionih utrosaka. Te se korekcije mogu iz b je c i, aico prim jenimo obrnut redosljed biianciranja. Utvrdjujemo najprije ukupnu mogucu proizvodnju tekstUnih, koznih i gumenih proizvoda (X -j) Primjenom tsimickih koeficijenata i fiksnog procenta dobivamo ukupne reprodukcione poti'ebe. Po odbijanju reprodukcione potrosnje od ukupne p ro izvod r uporedjujemo s predvidjenom finalnom potrosnjom . Eveiituaini rnanjak nadoknadjuje se uvozom , a visak odlazi u izv o z . Biiansna jednadzba sada izgleda ovako

>,06

'13'

404 - (140 + 24 + 29) = 211

108

gdje x 1 predstavlja raspoloziva sredstva za domacu finalnu potros nju i ujedno je jedina nepoznanica u navedenoj jednadzbi. Rjesenjem jednadzbe dobivamo = 211. mrd din. Stvarna domaca final na potros nja iznosi Xj = 223. Prem a tome potrebno je uvesti x-j - x\ = 223-211 = = 12 mrd din. 1' Time je obracun zavrsen i nikakve daljnje korekcije nisu vise potrebne. Nakon sto smo iz v r s ili bilanciranje unutar prvog kompleksa, o cemu ce biti govora kasnije, i nakon sto su izbilancirane isporuke prvog kompleksa s potrosnjom proizvoda tog kompleksa, sto odgovara bilan ciranju prvog reda tabele 6 . p relazim o na utvrdjivanje utroska tog kompleksa koji poticu iz ostalih kom pleksa. Drugim rije c im a , nakon sto je izbilancirani p rv i redak p relazim o na bilanciranje prvog stupnja tablice. Prim jenom tehnickih koeficijenata utvrdjujemo potrebe za poIjoprivrednim proizvod im a, nem etalim a, saobracajnim uslugama i ta ko dalje niz prvi stupac. Kad su te potrebe utvrdjene one se predaju kao podaci za bilanciranje ostalim kom pleksim a. Zbroj stupe a m ora, naravno, biti jednak zbroju retka, a razlik a izm edju proizvodnje i utroska predstavlja drustveni proizvod grane odnosno kompleksa. Bilanciranje poljoprivredno-prehram benog kompleksa vrsim o na isti nacin kako je upravo opisano, samo sto kod reprodukcionih isporuka dodajemo i 52 mrd din. reprodukc ionih potreba prvog kompleksa utvrdjenih u prethodnom obracunu. Kod tree eg kompleksa uzimamo u ob zir prethodno utvrdjene reprodukcione potrebe prva dva kompleksa (2 + 11 m r d } Izuzetno dodajemo iznaddijagonalne isporuke saobracaju (13 m rd) i metalnom kompleksu (20 m r d ), o kojim a je ran ije b ilo govora da ih ocjenjujem o samo o r ijentaciono. Iznaddijagonalne isporuke ocjenjujem o jos jedino u narednom, saobracajnom kompleksu. Na taj nacin pom icem c se s bilanciranjem postepeno prem a ckm tablice, Kod posljednjeg, energetskog kom pleksa, predane su r e ^tcione po trebe sviii osarn prethodnih kom pleksa, tako da se ispc-i g komplek sa rnogu u potpunosti izb ilan cirati bez izdvajanja rna kakovih reprodukcionih isporuka. I tim e se zavrsava prvo kolo planskog bilanciranja-

1 ) U tabeli 1 1 mrd d in .; razlik a potice od zaokruzavanja decim ala.

109

Nakon ovoga. obrcemo redosled bilanciranja i zapocinjemo drugo kolo. Primjenom tehnickih koeficijenata energetski kompleks utvrdjuje potrebe za proizvodim a ostalih sektora. Tako se popunjava stupac 9. sa da u drvnom kompleksu takodjer vise nema potrebe za izdvojenim is porukama, izracunavaju se utrosci i popunjava stupac 8 Taj postupak se'nastavlja dok sva iznaddijagonalna polja tablice nisu popunjena. Na kon sto su tako izracunati utrosci u ranije praznim poljim a, m oze se desiti da se ti utrosci i ranije za njih u finalnom dijelu tablic e r e z e r virane izdvojene reprodukcione isporuke - ne podudaraju. Eventualne ra zlik e bilanciraju se promjenama u uvozu i izvozu. Slicno i rezervira n i utrosci po stupcima ne moraju potpuno odgovarati sada izracunatim iznaddijagonalnim utroscim a. Razlike se bilanciraju s drustvenim proizvodom sektora: ako su sada izracunati utrosci v eci od prethodno izdvojenih, drustveni proizvod sektora za toliko se sma-njuje i obrnuto ako su manji. Nakon sto je tablica potpuno izbilancirana odredjeni su tim e ujedno i tehnicki koeficijenti. Na elektronskom racunaru m atrica planskih teh nickih koeficijenata se in vertira da bi se dobila m atrica koeficijenata putem utrosaka. Na taj nacin dobiven je instrument za ispitivanje p o je dinih varxjanti i alternativa u proizvodnoj p o litic !. Jedan od prvih i najvaznijih poslova sada je uskladjivanje uvoza i iz v o za. Moze se desiti da je vanjsko-trgovinski deficit suvise v e lik . Tada treba smanjiti proizvodnju onih grana kod kojih je uvozni sadrzaj najv e ci i eventuaino povecati proizvodnju grana s velikim izvoznim sadr zaj em . Jedan od zadataka plana mbze bit! m aksim iranje xnogucnosti zaposljavanja novih radnika, U tom siuacju strukturu proizvodnje treba odredit i tai-co aa do jaceg izszzz~~ dcdju rad:r^~l.t:anzivne grane, Mogu se is tra zr ~ raz ' prom jena ili elemenata cijena u p ojedinim sektorima i slicno falcon sto su r a z lic ite varijante prodiskutovane i donesena generalr^ 'cXuka o tome koja varijanta najvise odgovara u danoj situaciji, naz lie a m oze ss fcvantitativno znatno izm ijen iti u odnosu na svoj prvobitni izg le d . Kvantitanvne promjene redovno vode i do prom jena u tehrdckim k o e fic ijentim a, a te promjene ne daju se otkriti elektronskim masinaraa, vec 110

treba iz v r s iti detaljno ekonomsko-analiticko provjeravanje svih stava ka bilansa. Za tu svrhu stoji na raspolaganju is ti onaj postupak triangulaxnog bilanciranja k oji smo opisali na pocetku.

8 . BILANSIRANJE UNUTAR POJEDINIH

KOMPLEKS A I FLEKSIBILNOST PREDLOZENOG POSTUPKA

Osnovna prednost prim jene m edjusektorske tehnike u planiranju sastoji se opcenito u tome sto se u nepregledno mnostvo cd v is e hiljada trans akcija unosi neki red i mogucnost statistickog provjeravanja i sto a lg ebarska svojstva transakcione m atrice dozvoljavaju primjenu m atem atickih metoda analize kojim a se postizavaju ogrom ne ustede u radu i v r e menu i znatno povecava efikasnost planskog bilanciranja Osnovna pak prednost postupka koji je obradjen u ovoj metodoloskoj stud iji sastoji se u tome sto je demonstrirana mogucnost da se privreda ra zb ije na devet relativno samostainih d ijelova cirne se snatno povecavaju pregledn ost, p recizn ost bilanciranja i mogucnost provjeravanja dohivanih rezultata u svakoj fazi rada. Budu'l se planiranje ne da fo rm a liz ira ti i m atem a tizira ti, vec kcd ~ _ sraka u radii z-ahujeva prirnjenu iskustva, profesionalnoc zn-i ' 'r i v o g razuit'cs uz koristenje posljednjxh in fo rm a ciia koje se .. c? sticu a toku sarnog rada, to efikasnu uloga u planiran ju mo^u n aa samo oni matematicki postupci koji su dovoljno fleksibilni da ukiope sva c e tiri navedsna elem enta. Stepen te fleksibilnosti mozemo ispitati na konkretnom p rim jeru biianciranja jednog od devet komple.'a-' i , na p rim je r re etalno-g rad j evinskog kom pleksa. Ti bilanci prikazaal sr a tabeiama ? i 8 i oni predstavljaju razrad jivan ie tree eg reda i tree C c stupca tab el e 6 Prikazani biiansi zasnivaju se na 76-sektorskoj v e r z iji medjusektor.- tablice SZS. Ziapocinjemo s bilanciranjem isporuka, sto odgovara bi-

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lanciranju redova u medjusektorskoj ta b lic i.1^ U tabeli 7 dan je jeelnostavniji od dva ranije opisana postupka kod koga polazim o od p re tpostavke punog (i l i nekog odredjenog stepena) koristenja kapaciteta proizvodnje pojedinih sektora, tj, pocinjemo s fiksiranjem prozvodnje za sve sektore kompleksa Buduci da je nemetalni kompleks tre ci po redu, to utvrdjivanje reprodukcione potrosnje njegovih proizvoda zapocinjem o registriran jem p otreba, koje su ustanovljene u orethodna dva kompleksa, tekstilnom i poljoprivrednom . Zatim dodajemo o r ijentaciono ocijenjene potrebe saobracaja i prozvodnje i prerade w e tala (kom pleksi IV i V ) s obzirom na kvantitativno znacenje potrosnje nemetalnih proizvoda u tim kom pleksim a. I na koncu, primjeaoir:- tehnickih koeficijenata na pretpostavljenu proizvodnju iz r acunavamo r e produkcione potrebe nemetalnog kompleksa za vlastitim proizvodim a. Z brojim o svu tako utvrdjenu potrosnju nemetalnih proizvoda svakog od deset sektora kompleksa i dodamo u odredjenom procentu izd vojene reprodukcione isporuke rezerv ira n e za one komplekse koji su, bu duci desno od dijagonale, zanemareni u prvom kolu bilanciranja. Na d alje, dodajemo potrebe pojedinih kategorija finalne potrosn je. Zapazam o da nemetalni kompleks - uz izuzetak lose klasificiranog zanat stva - gotovo sve svoje finalne isporuke upucuje u investicionu sferu , to je , dakle, predoxninantno investicioni kom pleks. Zbrajanjem rep ro dukcione i finalne potrosnje dcbivamo ukupnu domacu potrosnju neme talnih proizvod a. Ta domaca potrosnja m oze se djelom icno alim entirati smanjenjem za lih a , no osnovni je iz v o r , naravno, domaca proizvod nja. Uporedjenje potrosnje (umanjene za smanjenje zalih a) s p roizvod njom u prvom redu tabele pokazuje da li neke isporuke preostaju i za iz v o z , i l i , naprotiv treba uvoziti pojeaine p ro izvod e. Obicno, medjut im , ima i uvoza I izv o za , te njihov saldo uravnotezuie bilans . U drugorn mogucem slucaju polazim o od xinalne potrosnje pa izracunavamo p-otrebnu proizvodnju > U ovom slucaju k o m p le k s koji je u tabeli 7 uokviren. ponaa se kao medjusektcrska tablica cd dssat sektcra i finalnu potrosnju treba defin irati u odnosu r;a tu tablicu* Stoga. se sad finalna potrosnja sastoji od svih stavaka van tablice kompleksa, tj. od originalne finalne potrosnje (lic n a , opca i investiciona) , izdvojenib.

1 ) V alja uociti da u tabeli 7 stupci predstavljaju redove csnovne m edju-

sektorske tab lice. Ta izm jena ucinjena je zato da bi bilanciranje b i lo p regiedn ije. U tabeli 8 stupci opet odgovaraju stupcima osnovne medjusektorske tablice. 113

reprodukcionih isporuka te reprodukcionih isporuka kompleksima I, II, IV i V . Desetsektorsku rnatricu tehnickih koeficijenata invertiram o da bismo dobili koeficijente punih utrosaka pomocu kojih iz finalne po trosnje izracunavamo ukupnu potrebnu proizvcdnju svakcg od deset nemetalnih sektora. Medjutim, invertiranje se vjerojatno i ovdje moze izb je c i je r tablica ima izrazene triangularne karakteristike (sam o tr e ba iz v r s iti ootrebne perm utacije redaka i stupaca) pa se sad na nju m o ze prim ijeniti is ti onaj postupak koji je bio izgradjen za veliku tablicu c ije le narodne p rivred e. Bilanciranje utrosaka u tab el i 8 zapocinjemo tim e sto iz tabele 7 p r e pisujemo utvrdjenu proizvodnju i utvrdjene utroske vlastitih proizvoda unutar kompleksa (drugi redak u tabeli 8 jednak je stavkama p osljed njeg stupca u tabeli 7 ). Zatim primjenom tehnickih koeficijenata na ut vrdjenu proizvodnju izracunavamo potrebe za proizvodim a svih kom pleksa koji slijed e , tj. za proizvodim a kompleksa IV - IX U prvom kolu bilansiranja utroske m aterijala proizvedenih a kompleksima I i II ne izracunavamo posebno, vec ih ocjenjujemo primjenom odredjenog p ro centa na ukupne utroske ( i l i na p rozvod n ju ). Kad tako dobivene ukupne utroske odbijemo od vrijednosti proizvodnje, ostatak predstavlja druItven i proizvod odnosnog sektora. Bilanciranje utrosaka u tabeli 8 m oze se unekoliko pojednostavniti. P r ije svaga boljom nomenklaturom djelatnosti moglo bi se iz kompleksa elim in iraii sve negradjevinsko zanatstvo, uslijed cega bi stupac 9 dobio drugu strukturu, a utrosci kozmetickih proizvoda i nafte nestali bi sa lis te . Nadalje, ne postoji potreba da se utrosci usluga pomorskog saobracaja i PTT i zatim trgovine na veliko, na malo i vanjske trgovine cdvojeno iskazuju. U tom sm islu, o trgovini i saobracaju bit es jos ri~ je c i Na kraju, sa stano^'ista organizacije planiranja, spisak potrebnog n'.aterijala i usluga m oze se ra zviti po kompleksima i svakem kom plek'-y-i dosxavit i samo ajegov dio, a a sumarnom bilansu iz ra z iti samo zh rcpo kompleksima druge strane. razbijanjem p rivred e na devet d ije lc v a , rreqlednosl unmar svakog dijela povecava se u tolikoj m jeri da se pojavljuje mogucnost znarnog povecanja broja proiz</oda koji sa bilsnciraju, 3 a tog stanovista bilanse u tabelama 7 i 8 mozerno srnatrati agregatnirn bilansirna sastavijemm na osnovu pnm arnih bilansa koji su uzim ali u ob zir rnnogo vecx broj proizvoda, Tako na p rim jer sektori nem etalno-gradjevxnskog kompleksa mogu bxlancxrati isporuke slijedecih svojih p ro izv o da iu slu ga:
U4

Pregled 2. Sektori i proizvodi nem etalno-gradjevinskog kompleksa Proizvodnja nemetalnih m inerals nemetalni m ineral! peceni gips so Proizvodnja stakla ravno staklo suplje staklo (am balazno) ostalo suplje staklo Proizvodnja cementa i azbest-cementnih proizvoda cement azbest-cem entni proizvodi Proizvodnja keram ike i vatrostalnog m aterijala keram ika za domacinstvo keramika za gradjevinarstvo i sanitarna keramika izo la tori i ostali m aterijal od elektro-porculana sinterm agnezit samotni m aterijal bazicne opeke, m ase i m alteri ostale vatrostalne i term oizolacion e opeke Ostala prerada nemetalnih m inerala azbestne preradjevin e prirodni i vjestacki brasevi ostali nepomenuti proizvodi Proizvodnja kamena, pijeska i kreca kamen i pijesak krec Proizvodnja c ig le i crijepa m aterijal za zidove i ispune, stropni i tavanski elementi crijep

115

Os tala industrija gradjevinskog m aterijala proizvodi od vjestackog kamena i izrad e od cementa ostali nespomenuti proizvodi Visokogradnja neprivredne zgrade privredne zgrade Niskogradnja saobracajnice elektroenergetski prijen osi i ve ze Hidrogradnja Montazni i zanatski radovi

U ovom pregledu gradjevinarstvo smo rasclanili na tr i sektora. I sto tako bilo bi vjerojatno korisno da se i proizvodnja soli izd voji kao poseban sektor kao i da se proizvodnja keramike i vatrostalnog m ateri jala razdvoje u dva sektora, 1^ Prem a tome nemetalni kompleks bi umjesto 10 imao 14 sektora, a bilancirale bi se isporuke 30 proizvoda i usluga. Time bi sve potrebe bilanciranja jugoslovenske p rivred e b ile zadovoljene, a sacuvala se potpuna preglednost. Odluka o tome koje proizvode treba posebno bilancirati za v is i ne samo o kvantitativnom znacenju pojedinih proizvoda, vec i o njihovom "e k o nomskom profilu1 . Kod nekih proizvoda vlada kronicna oskudica; njih ' ireba pazljivo bilancirati,, Proizvodnja ili preorijentacija proizvodnje kod nekih proizvoda zahtijeva v rije m e , isto tako i njihov uvoz, a oni su potrebni kod neke masovne proizvodnje; stoga nedcstatak relativno malih kolicina tih proizvoda moze izazvati nesrazm ierno v e ci gubitak proizvodnje onih sektora kod kojih se javljaju kao u trosci. U tvrd jivanje takvih proizvoda i opet je stvar planskog iskustva,

1 ) Form iranje sektora kao i utvrdjivanje proizvoda vaznih za bilanci

ranje zasniva se na istrazivanjim a izvrsenim u Sektoru za ekonomska istrazivanja Savplana, US

S druge strane postoje p roizvod i i usluge cija se proizvodnja m oze relativno brzo povecati i l i koji imaju dob re supstitute. Na prim je r : lignit i m rki ugljen mogu se upotrebiti za grijan je p ro s to rija , prema tome r asclanjivanje proizvodnje uglja za te svrhe ne mora ( i , u stvar i , ne m o ze ) biti suvise p recizn o. N adalje, kod najveceg dijela pro izvodnje zanem arivanje specifikacije kod relativno malih vrijednosti ne m oze ugroziti proizvodnju. Zbog toga, kad god suvise veliki broj stavaka pocinje narusavati preglednost i kociti izradu bilansa, najm anje stavke m'ogu se a g re g ira ti u "n es p e c ific ira n o ". Mozem o upotrebljavati i matricu s po jednim redom i siupcem nespecificiranih is poruka odnosno utrosaka. Mogucnosti m odificiranja i prilagodjavanja prikazanog postupka prakticki su neiscrpive i zbog toga njim a se m oze u znacajnoj m jeri poboljsati efikasnost planiranja.

9= ZAKLJUCNA RAZMATRANJA I SUGESTIJE ZA DALNNJA ISTRA ZIVANJA

V ise hiljada transakcija, m edjuveze proizvodnje nekoliko stotina p ro izvoda odnosno 120-140 privrednih sektora - postaju pristupacni analiz i kad se grupiraju tako da se m oze izra d jiv a ti v is e parcijalnih bi lansa odvojenoo N ase je iscrazivanje pokazalo da se sve privredne transakcije mogu grupirati u devet koncentracionih kom pleksa, cim e transakciona m atrica dobiva kvazitrlagu laran1^ oblik i usiijed toga se postupak bilanciranja izvanredno pojednostavnjuje. Ti kompleksi po svom kvantitativnom znacenju nisu sasvim ujednaceni, kako to pokazuje tabela 9.

1) Kvazitriaugularnost m atrice uocava se dobro i u tabeli 9: kod p rvih c e tiri kompleksa utrosci su v e ci od reprodukcionih isporuka, kod petog su izjednaceni, a kod preostala c e tiri kompleksa utros ci su manji.
117

Tabela 9 Neke karakteristike form iranih privrednih kompleksa

U tros- Repro- P r o iz ci dukcio- vodnja ne is poruke m ilijard e dinara i . Tekstil, koza i guma II. Poljoprivredno-prehrambeni kompleks III. N em etalno-gradjevinski kompleks IV . Saobracaj V . Nem etali V I . Kem ijski kompleks V II. Trgovina i ugostiteljstvo V III. Drvo IX. Energetika Ukupno Prosjek 248 475 337 116 653 78 41 155 94 2197 244 193 440 182 94 649 124 63 207 247 2197 244 404 1056 612 242 966 128 242 314 237 4201 467

Reprodukcione isporuke v la s titom kompleksu u % ukupnih r e produkcionih is poruka 73 84 64 16 75 26 1 57 23 60

Napomena: Valja uociti da utrosci i reprodukcione isporuke sadrze i uvezeni m ateri ja i. Posljednji stupac predstavlja ucesce dijagonalnih stavaka u zbrojevim a redova tabele 4.

Znatno ispod prosjecne velicin e kompleksa nalaze se trgovina i saob ra ca j. U stvari to i nisu privredni kompieksi u onom sm islu u kom su to ostalih sedam kompleksa ier su isporuke unutar kompleksa m i nim alne kako se to vidi iz minimalnih dijagonalnih stavaka (tabela 4) 118

odnosno njihovog odnosa prem a ukupnim reprodukcionim isporukama pojedinih kompieksa (posljednji stupac tabele 9 ). Trgovina i saohracaj ( i , donekle, energetika) imaju.funkciju opsluzivanja ostale p riv red e. Njihovi "p rozvod i" relativno su m alobrojni i homogeni. Za r a z liku od svojih kolega u osialim kom pleksiraa, planeri saobracaja i trgovine ne moraju prim ati trebovanja" za usluge svojih kornpleksa je r , kad im je poznata velicin a i lokacija proizvodnje odredjenih p ro izvoda, sami mogu najbolje odrediti koliko i kakvih ce usluga biti potrebno. Zbog toga oni ne samo sto samostalno utvrdjuju troskove svojih sektora, vec takodjer raspodjeijuju i njihove isporuke. To je jos jedna od onih nesim etricnosti u planiranju, koja zahtijeva flek sibil nost osnovne sheme bilanciranja, Manji je od prosjeka i kem ijski kom pleks, ali on ekspandira znatno farze od ostalih tako da u tom sluacju postcji tendencija neujednacavanja. Ista tendencija, samo u obrnutom sm jeru, postoji i kod p oljo p rivred no-prehrambenog kom pleksa, koji je znatno veci od p ro sjek a , ali se sp orije ra zv ija . Kod ovog kompleksa postoji jedna inst ituc iona 1 komna plikacija o kojoj ce iduca statisticka tablica kao i m etodologija njene prim jene m orati povesti racuna: tehnicki koeficijenti indivddualnog i drustvenog sektora u p oljop rivred i veoma su r a z lic iti. Po proizvodnji vec gotovo izjednacen, a po ut roscim a cak I znatno v e ci od poljoprivredno-prehram benog kompleksa jest metalni kompleks. Medjutim 5 za razliku od poljoprivreano-prehram benog metalni kom pleks stalno povecava svoje ucesce u p riv re d i i ima mnogobrojne p roizvode koji se tesko definiraju. Kod povecanja broja sektora tablice veci dio tog povecanja otpasce upravo na metalni kompleks. U 134-sektorskoj klasifikaciii p riv re d e , koju je izra d io Sektor za ekonomska istrazivanja Savplana, 32 sektora J sa 135 proxzvoda pripadaju inetalnom kompleksu. To je prema tome kompleks koji je najteze b ilancirati i kojx zahtijeva posebno izucavanje. Kod rjesavanja tog p rob lem a, kao i opcenito u svrhu poboljsanja tehnike bilanciranja i ex post statistickog provjeravanja planskih bilansa, moze se is k oristiti cinjenica da svaki od devet kompleksa predstavlja

1) V iai 3. H orvat, Medjusektorska analiza, s tr . 211-212.

jedan parcijalni privredni bilans. Stoga bi Savezni zavod za statistiku pored sastavljanja tablice utrosaka - isporuka za cijeiu privredu , m ogao sastavljati mnogo rasclanjenije tablice za pojedine komplekse. Sastavljanje naturalnih medjusektorskih tablica dace nam daljnje korisne inform acije o jugoslovenskoj p rivred i - ali i nove metodoloske problem e njenog povezivanja s vrijednosnom tablicom . O tome u o vom redu nije bilo g o v o ra , je r u Jugoslaviji jos nije izradjena nijedna naturalna medjusektorska tablica pa nam nedostaju is k u s tv a .^ Za efikasno plansko bilanciranje od najvece je vaznosti studij tehnickih koeficijenata koji predstavljaju "norm ative utroska m a te rija la ". Do sada kod nas takvog studija nije b ilo , a nije ga ni moglo biti je r je nedostajala statisticka osnova, Pokusaji da se od tehnoloskih k oefi cijenata iz strucne literature dodje do tehnickih koeficijenata za p la niranje neke narodne p rivrede - ostali su bezuspjesni i kod nas i u inostranstvu i to iz veoma ociglednih razloga: tehnoloski identicna fabrika razlicito se ponasa u raznim ekonomskim sredinaroa, ako ni zbog cega drugog, a ono zbog razlicitih nacionalnih struktura cijena. Medjutim, kadjednom budemo im ali statisticke vrem enske nizove teh nickih koeficijenata, onda cemo moci izvuci tendencije njihovih prom jena, moci cemo izgraditi veze izmedju literaturnih i privrednih koe ficijenata i tako cemo povecati nas a znanja o strukiurnirn rnedjuzavisnostima i privrednim procesim a u ekonomici Jugoslavije. Pored tehnickih koeficijenata posebna izucavanja zasluzuju i agregatni medjuodnosi devet kompleksa. -o <c je vjerojatno da postoje jake korelacione veze u kretanjima poj kom pleksa -Ako se ta p re tpostavka pokaze opravdanom - a to cemo znati nakon sto Savezni za vod sa statistiku izrad i desetak medjusektorskih tablica - onda se nasa 9-sektorska tablica m oze sm atrati ne samo shemom bilanciranja vec i ekonomskim modelom pogodrdm za program iranje - narocito dugorocnog - privrednog razvoja,, Kao shema bilanciranja ona je u

1) Parcijalni failansi Savplana odncsno statisticke tablice za pojedine KompleKse mogu veoma korisno posluziti i vecim poduzecima, udruzenjima i komorama u postavljanju plan ova i koordiniranju p riv redne politike = 2) U SSSR-u je za 1959= godinu izradjena naturalna tablica sa 157 p ro izvoda,.
120

izvjesnom sm islu reievantna za organizaciju rada u jednom zavodu za planiranje. Na kraju da navedemo jos neke vazne metodoloske problem e koji jos uvijek ocekuju svoje rjesen je. P rije svega to je bilancirar.je invest! cione potrosnje. U izvjesnom smislu to je jednostavnije od reproduk-cionog bilanciranja, je r svega dva kompleksa - metalni i nemetaino-gradjevinski - isporucuju gotovo svu investicionu robu. No s druge strane to je bilanciranje mnogo siozenije zbog manje pravilnosti u ponasanju kapitalnih koeficijenata u odnosu na tehnicke i zbog slozenih metodoloskih problem a vezanih za aktivizacioni period in vesticija . Pored toga m atrica kapitalnih koeficijenata kod nas jos uvijek nije iz radjena i nema izgleda da ce uskoro b iti. Investiciono bilanciranje povezano je s dinam iziranjem rnedjusektorske tablice, a za to jos uvijek nigdje u svijetu nije pronadjeno zadovoljavajuce rjes e n je . N adalje. izracunavanje strukture licne i opce potrosnje usaglasene su strukturom medjusektorske ta b lic e , predstavlja jedan od problem a koji nije nacet. Osnovna je pretpostavka da se finalna potrosnja prati i a n a lizira po istoj nomenkiaturi kao i reprodukciona., no to za sada nije slu caj. Pored toga, kao sto smo cesto konstatirali tokora izlagan ja5 postojeca nomenklatura djelatnosti - a uslijed toga i na njoj zasnovana statisticka sluzba - veom a je manjkava te se im perativno postavlja izrad jivan je nove5 dosljedne, kompletne i naucno zasnovane nomenMature djelatnosti i p ro izvod a S lijedeci je zadatak rjesavanje problem a utvrdjivanja optimalne kom binacije, U rjesavanju tog problem a rnoci cemo vjerojatno prim ijeniti tebniku lineam cg program iranja. No za sada u tom pogiedu nismo urad ili jos ni prvi korak, Hjesavanje navedenih Droblema - a nefci od n-;f.h veoma su te s k i, sto ilu s trira cinjenica da nigdje u svijetu j< aaovoljavajuci nacirs. iako na njima rade ekipe visokokvalificiranih is tra ziv a ca -- jos uvijek se ne iscrp lju je m etodoiogija pianiranja 5 pa cak ni problem planskog bilansa. Pored bilansa tokova roba i usiuga u svakoj p riv re d i, a posebno u trzisn o-crijen tiran oj p riv re d i, treba. izra- diti i institucionalno zasnovan bilans financiranja tih tokova kao i sis tem ekonomskih instrumenata koji csiguravaju da se olanirani bilansi doista i ostvare. U izgradjivanju jugoslovenske m etodologije pianiranja to su danas dva vjerojatno najpreca zadatka.

IV .

DVA

T E O R IJ S K A

PROBLEM A

1. O PROBLEMU PORASTA ORGANSKOG SASTAVA KAPITAIA

Grundrisse, c iji prijevod je nedavno objavljen kod nas u redakciji Gaje P e tro v ica ,1) odrazava prelaznu faz-u izm edju Marksovih ranijih fllozofskill i kasnijih politekonomskih radova. Veiik dio Kapitala vec je u skici sadrzan u rukopisu Grundrisse. Stoga ce biti korisno da ss upozori na jedan problem o kome se i dalje vodi rasprava. Na s tr . 317. Marks pise: ''Cinjenica da kod razvitka proizvodnih snaga rada predmetni uvjeti rada opredmecen rad mora rasti u odnosu na z iv i rad (to je zapravo tautologija, je r sta drugo znaci rastuca p ro izvodna snaga rada nego da se tra zi manje neposrednog rada da bi se stvorio veci proizvod i da s e , dakle, drustveno bogatstvo sve vise i z razava u uvjetima rada koje je stvorio sam r a d ) . . M edjutim , nije r ije c o tautologiji, dakle, o logickom vec o em pirijskom problem u, c ije rjesen je zavisi od poznavanja ili nepoznavanja cinjenica. V a lja , naim e, razlikovati fizic k i obim ("drustveno b ogatstvo") i vrijednost ( "opredm eceni rad" ) . Ocigledno je da kolicina upotrebnih vrijednosti po stanovniku paste ukoliko proizvodnost rada ra ste, a stupanj zaposlenosti se ne mijenja,, Isto tako i kapitalna oprem ljenost rada - sred stava za proizvodnju (m jerena u tonama, ili instaliranoj sn a zi, ili staiiiini cijenam a) na jedncg radnika - raste. A li odatle nista ne s lijed i ii pogledu odnosa opredmecenog rada i zivog rada. Ukoliko p ro izvodnost rada raste istim tempom kao i kapitalna oprem ljenost ra da, onda se om jer opredrnecenog i zivoq rada nece rnijenjati j ukoliko raste b rz e , taj om jer ce padati i ,, obrnuto, u slucaju kad proizvodnost rada raste sporije od kapitalne oprem ljenosti rada = U Kapitalu Marks tacno razlikuje kapitalnu op ren lien ost i vrijed n osni o m jer. Prvu je nazvao tehnickirn sastavorn ' a, a potonji o r ganskim sastavom kapitala. A li u isto v rije m e o\k 0 5 taje pri

l ) K . Marks, Tem elji slobode, "N a p rije d ", Zagreb, 1974. 122

svom stavu iz Grundrisse usvajanjern pretpostavke o nuznom povecanju organskog sastava kapitaia. Odonda je teza o stalnom povecavanju organskog sastava kapitaia obisla svijet i usla u udzbenike politick e ekonomije. Iz porasta organskog sastava kapitaia Marks je izv e o tendenciju opadanja profitne stope . U svojim ranijim radovima Lenjin je sasvim lo gicki deducirao da porast organskog sastava zahtijeva b rz i rast odjeljk a I drustvene reprodukcije. To je cetvrt stoljeca kasnije postalo sluzbena dogma sovjetske ekonom ije. Buduci da su prom jene om jera opredmecenog i zivog rada 1 organskcg sastava kapitaia em pirijsko p itan je, treba vid jeti sto o tome govore em p irljsld podaci. Prethodno morarno r ije s iti problem usporedjivanja vrijednosti i cijena. Najjednostavnije se to m oze uraditi na slijed eci nacin. Neka je u p riv re d i zaposleno N radnika. U toku godine oni p ro izvedu neto-proizvod ( novostvorenu vrijed n o st) od N radnik-godina. Nazovimo tu novostvorenu vrijednost Y . Neka raspoloziva sredstva za proizvodnju imaju vrijednost od K radnik-godina. Prem a tom e, om jer opredmecenog i zivog rada iznosi . Kod poiedinacnih roba v rije d nost i cijene se razlikuju, A li za p rivredu u cjelin i transform acioni problem m oze se r ije s iti tako da suma vrijednosti bude jednaka sum! cijen a. Osim toga, ja sam na drugom m jestu rigorozn o dokazao da se vrijednost i cijene uvijek m ijenjaju u istom s m je r u .^ Posljednja teskoca sastoji se u tome sto K i Y nemaju istu gransku strukturu. No kako su to dovoljno velik i a g re g a ti m oze se pretpostaviti da dovoljnc dobro aproksim iraju strukturu cjeiokupne p riv re d e . O m jer ~ izrazen u cijenama n ije nista drugo nego dobro poznati kapitslni
k

koeficijent,, Prem a tom e, kapitalnim koeficijer.tom m oze se aprcksim irati on ijer opr earnecenog i zivog rada. Sve sto p reostaje jeste to da se iz v r s i komparativna analiza kapitalniii koeficijenata za ra z lic ite ze m lje u duzim vrem enskim razdobijim a, E m pirijski m aterijal postoii je r su u posliednje d vije deceiiije iz v r s e ne procjene odgovarajucih vrem enskih s e rija za izvjestan broj ra zv ijenih zem alja. Analiza pokazuje da se kapitalni koeficijent u XIX sto-

1) B. H orva t, Kadne cijene proizvodnje i transform acioni problem u socijalistick oj p riv r e d i, Ekonomist , 123

Ijecu povecavao, a da se od prvog svjetskog rata nadalje smanjuje. Analiza promjena organskog sastava kapitala je jednostavnija. P rije svega, valja ukloniti jos jednu dosta rasirenu zabludu: om jer opredme cenog i zivog rada nije isto sto i organski sastav kapitala. P rvi je K k predstavljen kao a potonji kao , gdje w znaci nadnicu a R broj radnika. Buduci da radnik samo dio svog radnog dana radi za reprodukciju svoje radne snage, slijed i vrijednosno wR < Y . Kad Marks govori o organskom sastavu, on ne m isli da ga treba nuzno i z ra ziti u vrijednostim a, vec dopusta da se ista zakonitost ispoljava i u cijenama. To po j ednostavl juj e analizu ier se em pirijski podaci mogu koristiti neposredno. Izrazim o organski sastav na ovaj nacin

= W

K wR

K/Y wR/Y

gdje K/Y prsdstavlja kapitalni koeficijent, a wR/Y predstavlja ucesce nadnica u narodnom dohotku. Promjene K/Y vec smo u tvrd ili, a u po~ gledu wR/Y podaci pokazuju da je ucesce licnih dohodaka u narodnom dohotku u XIX stoljecu bilo priblizno konstantno, a u XX stoljecu se p o v e c a v a l c . 2) Kako je K/Y ubrojniku, a v/R/Y u nazivniku, p ro izla zi da se i organski sastav kapitala u Marksovo v rije m e povecavao, a cd prvog svjetskog rata nadalje cak se iz r a z itije smanjivao nego om jer opredmecenog i zivog rada. Na taj nacin Marks je ispravno ocijenio da se u njegovo v rije m e opred meceni rad povecavao u odnosu na z iv i, a takodjer i da se organski sastav kapitala povecavao kao i da je postojala tendencija pada p ro fitne stope. No ta ocjena nema opce vazenje.

1) Za relevantne podatke i analizu vjeroiatnih uzroka vid , B= H orva t. Ekonomska analiza, 0 econom ica5 Beograd, 1971. ss. 220-235. Analiza svih reievantnih Marksovih stavova. osim onoga citiranog na pocetku teksta, izvrsena je na s s . 107-111. 2) B. Hor/at, op. c i t . , ss 232-35.

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2. SAVREMENO RJESENJE MCARDO-MARXOVOG PROBLEMA RADNIH CIJENA

Opcenito se smatra - i u tome postoji jedno od rijetkih slaganja izm e dju zapadnih i istocnih ekonomista - da radna.teorija vrijednosti nije i ne m oze biti teorija cijena. Za to se navode dva ra zlicita ra zlo g a : normativni i institucionalni. Neoklasicni ekonomisti isticu normativni razlog prema kome rad nije jedini faktor proizvodnje te bi stoga aiokacija resursa na osnovu utrosaka rada bila neracionalna. Ekonomisti m arksisticke orijen ta cije isticu institucionalni razlog prema kome u kapitalizmu struktura vlasnickih odnosa zahtijeva da izjednacavanje profitne stope udje u fo rm ira n je cijene sto dovodi do preobrazaja v r ijednosne cijene u cijenu p roizvod n je. Jedino u ravnotezi tzv . proste robne proizvodnje - obje skole se u tome slazu - u kojoj nema fiksnog ka pi tala i li je on relativno m ali i podjednako rasporedjen a vlasnici su ujedno i rad n ici, radne vrijednosti i trzne cijene se poklapaju (za r e producibilne r o b e ). U ovom radu se dokazuje da je moguce izg ra d iti (1 ) normativnu radnu teoriju cijena i (2 ) validnost neoklasicne normativne teo rije cijena o visi o tome koliko se poklapa s radnom teorijom cijen a. Radi se, naravno, samo o reprodukcibilnim robam a, je r cijena predmeta koji se ne mogu reproducirati za visi iskljucivo o tr a z n ji. Radi jednostavnosti analize izostavljam rentu. Prem a tome postoje dva faktora proizvod n je, rad i kapital. Ovaj potonji predstavlja minuli ili opredm eceni rad. Pretpostavljam o da svaka grana p roizvod i samo jednu robu za samo jednu kategoriju upotrebe. Ako s e , na p r . ugalj trosi u dom acinstvima i u in d u striji, njegova proizvodnja bit ce alocirana proporcionalno u d vije grane. Broj takvih grana nije ogranicen., Sve se one mogu k la s ific ira ti u dva odjeljka odn. u t r i sektora i , da ne izbjegne potreba za matricnom notacijom , mogu se a g re g ira ti na ovaj nacin:

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Prim aoci Davaoci Odjeljak I: Proizvodnja potrosne robe

Reprom aterijali X1 X2 X3

Finalni p ro izv o di

Ukup no

_ _

XI
X2

X1 X2 X3 R K

Odjeljak II:Proizvodnja in vesticione robe _ Proizvodnja r e prom aterijala Resursi Rad Kapital (sred stva)

*31
R1

x 32 Rp , K2

X33 R3 K3

K1

D aije pojednostavljenje se moze postici apsorbiranjem rep rom aterijala u proizvodnju potrosne i investicione robe. Na taj nacin ostaju dva odjeljka koji se poklapaju s dva sektora i koji u nacelu odgovaraju Marxovim odjeljcim a proizvodnje. Za ekonomiju je karakteristican dualni odnos izm edju proizvoda i c ijena Uz dane resurse (i tehnologiju) odredjena je maksimalna mogu ca proizvodnja. Iz vrijednosnih bilanci slijede relativne c ije n e . Dane relativne cijene odredjuju alokaciju resu rsa. Na taj nacin dobivamo dva skupa jednadzbi koje odredjuju proizvodnju odn, cijene,, U slucaju proste reprodukcije, to su ove jednadzbe.

Bilance resursa (1 )

Vrijednosne bilance

P 1Z 1 " poRl

= P 1X 1

(2)

P 2 Z 2

P q R 2

P 2 X 2

126

Z predstavlja zamjenu, a p^, p ^ , p^ cijene rada, pot r os nib i kapitalnih dobara. R je broj radnika, K i *X 2 ( i Z ) predstavljaju broj m asina instaliranih, proizvedenih u tekucoj godini ( i zamjenjenih zbog rashodovanja). Ako masine traju n godina, tada u prostoroj reprodukc iji vazi ova veza

X2 - Z 1 + Z 2 = - f R1 X.
1

(3)
Ki = ---- 1 xi

Definiraim o telmicke k oe fic iie n te : 1 Z. k. 1 I = = ~ i

, k

, '

S ?

Sad nase jednadzbe izgledaju ovako

(1 ) + - X2

Jednadzbe cijena:

P? ^ 1 + PQ X-, = n
(2 )

P2

Po >-2 = PS

R jelenjem sustava ( 1 ) dobivamo proizvodnju X-j i X ? ; rjesenjem sustava {2 ~ ) dobivamo cijen e. Ako stavim o p = I , cijene predstavljaju radne vrijed n o sti, tj= broj radnih dana sadrzanih u jedinici robe:

P1 =

A.

+ p

^2

(4)

p2 = '*~2 " P2 P rv i clanovi, i

, predstavljaju direktni utrosak rada odnosno

z iv i rad, a drugi clanovi,

i P2

predstavljaju minuli rad.

Od interesa je pogledati relativne cijene

P1 p2 " \

^2

*1 ' L1 x2

S2

Dobivamo poznati rezultat da su relativne cijene jednake odnosu zivog rada ukoliko je kapitalna opremljenost rada (organski sastav) jednaka .............. i 2 K2 . . f u oba sektora. Iz A V - K . , = = 0 slijed i naime -r = l 2 1 1 2 X2 E2

'

a1

Prosta reprodukcija predstavlja jednostavan slucaj. Ispravno, r je s e nje problem a radnih cijena bilo je onemoguceno nerazum ijevanjem m ehanizama prosirene reprodukcije. Buduci da bi rigorozno izvodjenje zahtijevalo suvise mnogo p rostora, ovdje rjesen je m oze biti samo skicirano. Teorijski je zanim ljiv jedino slucaj pune zaposlenosti resu rsa. Kod pune zaposlenosti do prosirene reprodukcije m oze doci jedino ako ( 1 ) radna snaga se povecava, (2 ) tehnoloski p rogres povecava produktivnost resursa ili (3 ) oboje se desava. U svakom od ovih slucajeva desava se neki cudan fenomen. P. Samuelson i C . von V/eizsacker su pokasali da povecanje radne snage dovodi do toga da tehnologija koja za htijeva vise rada m oze se pokazati racionalnijom od one koja zahtijeva manje r a d a Prema tome jednostavno zbrajanje radnog vrem ena v i se nije dozvoljeno. -Alokaciju resursa treba nekako drugacije odrediti. Medjutim. suprotno onorne sto tvrdi Samuelson, tim e hipoteza radnog vremena nije narusena. Ako se radna snaga povecava, onda se istim

1) "A Mew Labour Theory of Valne fo r Rational Planing Through Use o f the Bourgeous Profit Rate , Proceedings of the National Acedem y of Sciences, June 1971, 1192-1194.

tempom povecava i proizvodnja. To znaci da svake godine treba p roizv e s ti masine na kojima ce naredne godine biti zaposlena dodatna radna snaga. To opet znaci da je svake godine proizvodnja potrosne robe manja no sto bi bila u stacionarnoj altern ativi. "Dem ografske investi c ije '' predstavljaju dodatni trosak u sm islu radnog vrem ena. Stoga ni je dovoljno da se obracunava stvarni sadrzaj radnog vremena u robama da bi se izv e le cijen e. Radno v rije m e koje ce se re a lizira ti u r o bama tek kasnije mora biti kom prim irano u sadasnji proces rada. Sa da snja potrosnja i sadasnja radna snaga predstavljaju m jeru stva ri. U sadasnjosti zapocinje se proizvodnja koja ce biti zavrsena tek u v r ije me t = 2 ,3 , . . . i stoga zahtijeva ( l + r ) , (1 + r )2 . . vise rada na je dinicu sadasnje potrosnje, ako radna snaga raste po stopi r . Faktor ekspanzije rada ( l + r ) je prosto trosak zaposljavanja na jedinicu sadasnjeg utroska rada. Na taj nacin dolazim o do zakljucka da sve buduce i sve p rosle utroske rada treba p ro jic ira ti na sadasnju velicinu radne snage, a to znaci da buduci utroske treba reducirati po faktoru ( l + r ) t , a p rosle povecati na istom faktoru da bismo dobili uporedivost s tekucim troskovim a rada i prem a tome ispravne cijen e. Na drugi fenomen upozorio sam ja jos p rije dva decenija, iako je r ig o rozna obrada uslijedila k a s n ije .2 ) Radi se o tome da povecanje p ro iz vodnje dovodi do smanjivanja troskova zamjene po jedinici proizvodnje. Na taj nacin ustede u minulom radu djelom icno kompenziraju troskove demografskih in v e s tic ija . Poseban je slucaj tehnoloskog p ro g re s a . Najjednostavniji tip teim oloskog p ro gre s a , koji nazivam neutralnim u Marxovom sm islu, jest onaj u kom se oba radna koeficijenta s man juju po faktoru b (A-, = ). Tada, uz nepromjenjenu zaposlenost, sve radne cijene padaju po istom faktoru. Ako se z e li neki proizvodni ili investlcioni procc= aistribuiran u vremenu, evaluirati u stalnirn cijen am a, onda u trz" ~ 70 teku cim radnim vrijednostim a treba mnoziti ili d ije liti sul';cei;i'TiC fak torima b , b ^ , b^ . . . , Slijedi zan im ljiv zakljucak. Neka se investiciona ulaganja protezu na n godina. Neka je vrijednost tog projekta u stab ilnim cijenama

1) B. H orvat, "Fined Capital C ost, Depreciation M ultiplier and the Rate of In te res t". European Economic Beview, 1973, 163-80. P re v e deno u B. H orvat, Odabrane teme iz ekonomske analize II, Fakultet za vanjsku trgovinu, Z a g re b , 1976.

129

t=o Ako sad neoklasicni ekonomist z e li utvrditi sadasnju vrijednost tog projekta, on ce vrijednost u stalnim cijenama diskontirati po nekom trzisnom faktcru b. Ukoliko to uradi i b odgovara faktoru tehnoloskog p rogresa, on ce samo utvrditi radnu vrijednost tog projekta. To indic ira da ce neoklasicna teorija kapitala biti ispravna jedino ako se podudara s radnom teorijom vrijedn osti. Ocigledno je da ce se diskontni faktor b m ijenjati zavisno o tome kaIco se povecavaju fiksni fondovi ili radna snaga i o kakvom se tehnoloskom progresu rad i. Radna te orija cijena je u stanju objasniti sve te prom jene. Neoklasicna teorija kapitala i cijena n ije. Posebno neokla sicna teorija ne m oze utvrditi kakav treba da bude faktor b u nekoj p rivred i da bi se postigla optimalna alokacija resu rsa.

130

V.

P E IV R E D N i C l K L u S I

1. SUMARNI PREGLEB EMP1RIJSKIH ISTRA ZIV.ANJA PRIVREDNIH C IKLUSA U SVIJETU

Privredn i clklusi proucavaju se jos od M arxovih vrem en a. U stvari periodicne k riz e hiperprodukcijs smatraju se jednom cd osnovnih karakteristika kapitaiistickog nacina proizvodnje. U v e zi s tirn vee je odavno zapazeno da ne postoji samo jedna vrsta privrednih ciklusa. Ima ih v is e , neki su op ci, neki sektorski, odvijaju se simultano i superponiraju jedni na druge sto cini tako neregularnom periodic nost opcih privrednih kretanja. Schumpeter je p red lczio trociklicnu shem u :1' duge cikluse s valovim a duzine 54-60 g o d in a s r e d n je duzine 9-10 godina i kratke cikluse duzine 40 mje s e c i. Te je cikluse nazvao prema ekonomistima koji su ih p rv i opisali - a ta je term inolcyija usla kasnije i u literaturu - i povezao ih je tako da se k raci ciklusi sadrze u duzim: dug ciklus, K on d ratiev, sad rzi sest srednjih, Jugiaro, a ovi opet po 3 kratka, Kltcliina. Statisticka ispitivanja pckazala sa za tim postojanja 20-godisnjih ciklusa, koji se obicnc povezuju s dugoroc nom konjukturom u stambenoj izg ra d n ji. Utvrdjeni su zatim i kraci stambeni odn., gradjevinski ciklusi C itav niz ciklusa - tipa paukcve m reze - utvrdjen je u p o ljo p riv re d i: ciklusi svinja i stoke, ciklus kavs ltd. Potrebno je da ukraiko ispitamo em pirijsku osnovicu svih tih ciklusa, je r ce nam to saznanje biti od k oristi kod interprefciranja na il ill vlastitih ciklusa. Kondratiev, Diraktor Korjiinkturnog instituta ?i M oskvi, Nikolaj Kond r a iie v , ispitivao je pocetkorn 1920~tih godina statis:icl:e s e rije c ije na, kamatna slope, depozita,. nadnica uvoza, iz v o z a , proizvodnje i

1} J . A . Schumpeter, "The Analysis o f Economic Change , Review of Economics and S tatistics, 4/1935, s s . 2-10; Business C ycles; a Theoretical, H istorical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist P ro cess, M cG raw -H ill, Nev.- Y o rk . 1939 =

131

potrosnje uglja i ze lje za u Francuskoj, Engleskoj, A m e ric i i N jem ackoj za razdoblje 1789-1921= Kondratjev j e godisnje podatke podijelio s brojem stanovnika, elim inirao je trend, a d evija cije od trenda iz ravnao je devetogodisnjim pomicnim prosjecim a kako bi uklonio sred nje i kratke cikluse i slucajna odstupanja. Kao rezultat tog postupka pojavili su se dugi valovi u ekonomskoj aktivnosti u trajanju od oko pola v ije k a .* ) Kondratiev navodi ove datume za svoja tr i ciklusa: I Ciklus: uspon od 1780/90 do 1810/17 pad od 1810/17 do 1844/51

II Ciklus: uspon od 1844/51 do 1870/75 pad od 1870/75 do 1890/96 III Ciklus: uspon od.1890/96 do 1914/20 pad od 1914/20

Schumpeter je , u okviru svoje poznate te o rije o inovacijam a, pokusao dati sasvim odredjenu ekonomsku interpretaciju tih dugih valova ekonomske aktivnosti. Dok Kondratev rrijeri valove od dola do dola, Schum peter ih m jeri pocecim a prosperitetnih faza. Po njemu p rvi val obuhvaca razdoblje 1783-1842 i odrazava industrijsku revolu ciju . Drugi val, 1842-1897, predstavlja doba celika i pare i, posebno, doba iz gradnje zeljeznica u svijetu. Za treei val, koji zapocinje s 1897. g o dinom, karakteristicna je prim jena elektricne e n ergije, ra zvo j kem ij e I upotreba automobila. Dugi ciklusi ostaju i d alje predm et diskusije u strucnoj literatu ri. Za nase sadasnje istrazivan je oni, naravno nisu direktno relevantni, ali je potrebno da se imaju u vidu, je r predstavIjaju odredjeni okvir za analizu koja slijed i. Juglar. Kad se ran ije govorilo o privxednim ciklusim a, onda se red ovno m islilo na cikluse trajanja 7-11 godina. To su klasicni 10-godisnji

l ) Hipoteza je postavljena 1919-21, p rv i put objavljena je u iednoj stud iji u Moskvi 1922. g . , a konacno je obradjena u clanu "B oljsie cykly konjunktury" , Voprosy konjunktury, 1/1925. Buduci da mi o r i ginal nije pristupacan citiram prema engleskom prijevodu "The Long Waves in Economic L ife " (Review of Economics and Statistics, 6/1935, s s . 105-15) prestampanom u J .J .C la rk , M . Cohen, ed. Business Fluctuations, Growth and Economic Stabilization, Random House, New York, 1963.

132

ciklusi koji su se p o ja v ljiv a li kroz citav devetnaesti vijek , posebno u Engleskoj, I c ije je trajanje M a r x l) uporedjivao s prosjecnim vijekom trajanja oprem e u industriji. P rije jednog vijeka b ivsi lijecnik C le ment Jugler opisao je p rv i sistem atski ta periodiSna kolebanja analizira ju ci statisticke s e rije cijena, kamatnih stopa i salda centralne b a n k e . 2 ) Ako duzinu ciklusa m jerim o od vrha do vrha, onda je u En gleskoj za v rije m e M arxovog ziv o ta , t j . u razdoblju 1820-1870, bilo tacno 5 ciklusa s k rizam a , sto znaci da je prosjecno trajanje ciklusa bilo 10 godina. Taj p eriod icitet se nastavlja u narednom razdoblju 1870-1914, kad daljnja c e tiri ciklusa imaju period od 9, 7, 10 i 7 go dina. I na koncu u razdoblju 1920-1938 pojavljuju se jos dva ciklusa s k r i z a m a . 3) Prem a tom e u razdoblju duzem od jednog stoljeca u En gleskoj su se k riz e izm jen jiva le u razm acim a od oko 10 godina. To, m edjutim , ne vazi i za ostale ze m lje . U SAD je u razdoblju 1854-1938 bio svega jedan ciklus duzi od 6 g o d i n a . 4 ) A i engleske pcdatke Matt

1) K ap ital, sv. n , Kultura, Z agreb , 1947, s . 148. M arxovi pogledi na ekonomske k riz e obradjeni su iscrpno u studiji Z . Baletica M arksisticka te o rija ekonomske k r iz e , N aprijed, Z agreb , 1965.M arx je pom isljao na em pirijsku obradu privrednih ciklusa. U v e zi s tim od interesa je njegovo pism o Engelsu od 31. maja 1873. u ko ine k a z e : "Tebi su poznate tabele u kojim a su prikazane cijen e, d iskontne stope itd .itd . u njihovom kretanju tokom godina itd. u cik -cakim a koji se penju i spustaju. Ja sam nekoliko puta pokusavao - za analizu k riza - da ovo ups and downs izracunam kao nep ravilne k rivu lje i m islio ( i jos m islim da je to sa dovoljno preciscenim m aterijalom m oguce) iz toga matematski odrediti glavne zakone k riz a . M oore, . . . d rz i da je stvar za sada neizvodljiva, i ja sam odlucio da sa toga fo r the time being ostavim " (P rep isk a, s v .IV , Kultura, Beograd, s . 444) 2) C . Juglar, Les c ris e s com m erciales et leu r retour periodique en France, en A n gle te rre et aux Etats unis, 1860. 3) R .C .O . M atthews, The Business C ycle, The U niversity of Chichago P ress, 1959, s s. 216-220. 4) Dauten3 o p . c it . , 2, 246.

133

hews podvrgava jednoj rein terp retaciji za ra zd ob lje p oslije 1970.g. 1-' Danas medju ekonomistima jaca uvjerenje da kao srednje cikluse tr e ba cdrediti one s trajanjem od oko 20 godina. Kitchin. Nakon Prvog svjetskog rata engleski statisticar Joseph KitcMn analizirao je s e rije bankovnog klirin ga, cijena i kam.atne stope u SAD i Engleskoj za razdoblje 1890-1922 i otkrio je male ciklu.se duzine 1 3 godine (40 m jeseci. Kitehin je sraairao da su ti ciklusi psiholoski u s l o v l j e n i . ^ ) K asnije je utvrdjeno da ti m aii ciklusi nastaju akurrrnliranjem i dekumuiiranjem zaliha. U 5 medjuratnih ciklusa u SAD 23% prosjecne ekspanzije apsorbiralo je akumuliranje zaliha; u tri p o s lije ratne konstrakcije dekumuliranje zaliha apsorbiralo je 50-100% smanjenja drustvenog proizvoda. I kao sto su desetogodisnji ciklusi karakteristicni za englesku p rivredu , tro - ili cetverogcdisnji ciklusi prevladavaju u am erick oj. U razdoblju 1854-1961 u SAD je bilo ukup no 26 ciklusa, od kojih 17 ili 2/3 ukupnog broja duzine 3-4 godine.4 ) U periodu 1854-1958. trajanje tih ciklusa va rira lo je izm edju 27 i 90 m jeseci s prosjekom od 50 m jeseci od cega 30 m jeseci otpada na ek~ spanziju a 20 m jeseci na kontrakciju. Poslije Drugog svjetskog rata ekspanzivna faza se produzila za jednu trecinu, a kontrakcije su se skratile za 42% cim e se tempo rasta am ericke p rivred e osjetno povisio. Ti su ciklusi em pirijski veom a sistem atski istrazivan i. Tako je utvrdjeno da neke ekonomske s e rije stalno pretliode (prom jen e u za lihama 10 m jeseci, bankrotstva 7, zapoceta stambena izgradnja 6 , narudzbine oprerne 5, neto profit:' 2 m jeseca it d . ) u fa z i, neke su s i-

1) Loc. cit, Matthews . da je 10-godisnji p eriod icitet u drugom razdoblju slucajan i da is rezvltat posrojanja dva nesinhronizirana vala - svakog otpriliKe avcstruko duzeg ~ u invesiicijam a u zem Iji i inostranstvu. U trecem razdoblju radi se o strukturmm p ro mjenama. 2) J. Kitchin. !lCycles and Trend in Economic F a c to rs ". Review of Economics and Statistics, 1/1923, ss. 10-16. Prastampano u J. J. Clark i M . Cohens op .cit. 3) C .A . Dauteru o p .c it ., s. 260. 4y Ib id ., s.. 246.

134

multane (lic n i dohodak, nezaposienost, velikoprodajne cijene it d . ) , a neke kasne za promjenama drustvenog proizvoda (investicion i rashodi na opr emu 1 m jesec, potrosacki kredit 4 ,5 , kamatna stopa na faankarske kredite 5 m je s e c i) . 1 J To je znanje korisno u prognoziranju konjunkture, Sto se amplitude tic e , zna se da proizvodnja i potrosnja trajnih potrosnih i proizvodnih dobara fluktuiraju znatno vise nego proizvodnja repx'om ateriiala i usluga, a najvise fluktuiraju zalih e. Ve likoprodajne cijene variraju v is e nego m aloprodajne, cijene sirovina mnogo v is e nego cijene polupreradjevina i finalnih p roizvod a. Indus trijsk a proizvodnja fluktuira mnogo v is e nego drustveni p r o iz v o d .^ Na kraju, uvoz se usko prilagodjava privrednom ciklusu, a ll izvoz n e, ^ Jugoslavenski cetvorogodisnji ciklusi vrem enski su slicni am erickim , a li uslovljenost je , kako cem o vid jsti drugacija. N adalje, psiholoski m om ent!, o kojim a je g o vorio Kitchin, takodjer nisu presudni. A ii ne bi ih vjerojatno trebalo posve zan em ariti. Prom atrajuci flukcioniranje naseg javnog zivota s tic e se utisak da se nakon svakili 3-4 godine akumultra nestrpljenie i nezadovoljstvo s postignutim i postojecim , fo r miraju se uvjerenja da nesto treba rnijenjati, razni forum i pocinju v r siti reorgan izaciju, a pojedinci pocinju m ijenjati radna m jesta .4 ) Ukoliko je taj utisak tacan, odnosni fenomen predstavlja predm et studija sociologa i li politologa. Nasa istrazivanja dovest ce nas do zakljucka da presudnu ulogu u jugoslavenskim ciklusima igra odredjena sprega uvoza i izvoza koja irna veom a naglasenu ciklicnost i veoma velike am plitude Da l i u jugoslavenskoj p riv re d i postoje i ciklusi duzi od 4

1) C .A . Dauteii, o o . c i t , , s s ,2 dd i 373=. 2) E.G. Bra it, Business Circles and Forecasting, Irw in , Homewood, III, 1953 = 3} A.F,B urns, :!Mitchel on What Happens During Business Cycles J J , C lark, M . Cohen, o p . c it , , s . 10. 4] iMapr, u 14 godina, od 1951 do 1964. u Narodnoj banci Jugoslavije izm jenilo se 4 gu vorn era, u Saveznom zavodu za privredno planiranje 4 cirek to ra: u 13 godina izredala su se c e tiri sistem a oporezivanja M . H anzekovic, "Savrem ena porezna politika i op orezivanje privredriih orga n iza cija 1, Ekonomski p regled , 11-12/1965, s. 780), reizbornost direktora je fiksirana na c e tiri godine, izborni period za politicke forum e izn osi c e tiri godine itd. 135

godine i kakve su oni p rirode ne m oze se sa sigurnoscu u tvrd iti, je r je razdoblje od dvije decenije prekratko za empirijsku analizu. Iz vjesne indikacije postoje. Ubrzavanje rasta u deceniji 1952-1960 i usporavanje kasnije m oze se ra zv iti u jedan sesnaestogodisnji ili jos duzi ciklus ukoliko se stabilizacija postigne pod cijenu smanjivanja stope rasta. Ubrzavanje poljoprivredne proizvodnje p rije 1960. g . i uspor avanj e poslije te godine, uspor avanje industrij skog izvo za p rije 1961= g . i ubrzavanje p oslije te godine takodjer ukazuju na duze ciklu s e, ali je u ovom trenutku nemoguce predvidjeti njihovo trajan je. Valo v i ukupnih bruto investicija takodjer izgleda da su d u zi: jedan dol desio se u 1955/56, a drugi u 1965/66 sto ukazuje na desetogodisnji periodic itet. Gradjevinski ciklusi. Dvadesetogodisnji ciklusi otkriveni su najrpije u gradjevinarstvu, p rije svega u stambenoj izg radnji u SAD , Engleskoj, Njem ackoj, Svedskoj i Kanadi. ^) Amplitude tih ciklusa prilicn o su velike. Objasnjavaju se poznatom vezom izm edju ukupnih i m a rg inalnih velicina: neznatne procentualne prom jene ukupnih velicina dovode do ogromnih procentualnih promjena m arginalnih velicin a. Ukupan stambeni prostor funkcija je , cetoris paribus ukupnog stanovnistva, a li stambena izgradnja funkcija jeparasta stanovnistva. Prema tome ako se u toku vremena stopa porasta gradskog stanovnistva p oveca od 1% na 2% godisnje, stambena izgradnja u gradovima mora se povecati za 100%. Duzina ciklusa objasnjava se sporoscu populacionih promjena i trajnoscu zg ra d e . Navodi se takodjer da u kapitalistickim zem ljama gradjevinsku djelatnost nose uglavnom m ali poduzetnici. Kad ponuda prem asi potraznju oni tesko napustaju svoj posao, neuskladjenost se povecava i k riza produzuje i zaostrava. Kad p oslije o zivljavanja potraznja pocinje brzo ra s ti, nedostatak k valificiran e rad ne snage, koja se u gradjevinarstvu relativno dugo skoluje, i usitnjenost gradjevinskih poduzeca koja nisu u stanju angazirati v e ce kapitale i brzo p ro s iriti obim proizvodnje - onemogucuie brzo prilagodjavarije proizvodnje potrosnji. Za razdoblje 1862-1933 u SAD Gordon na-

1) R .C .O . Matthews, o p .c it. s . 98. 2) A .F . Burns, "Long C ycles in Residential Construction, J .J . C lark, M . Cshen, op. - c it.

136

vodi c e tiri gradjevinska ciklusa koji m jereni od dola do dola traju 15 do 22 godine. - ) Iz ovoga sto je receno vierovatno je da ce u grad jevinarstvu biti i kracih ciklusa. D a u t e n ^ ) navodi za razdoblje 1879-1933 u SAD ukupno 11 gradjevinskih ciklusa prosjecne duzine 59 m jes e ci. Guttentag je u posljeratnom periodu (1948-1959) u SAD utvrdio 4 stambena ciklusa duzine 31-35 m jeseci. Ti su ciklusi b ili uvjetovani prvenstveno obimom hipotekarskog kredita tj. raspolozivim sred stvima za financiranje. U Jugoslaviji, kao sto se vidi iz grafa 5 .2 ., gradjevinski ciklus poklapa se s industrijskim , ima znatno vece am plitude , a uvjetovan je raspolozivim sredstvim a za financiranje. Sto se tice dugog gradjevinskog ciklusa, on se ne m oze normalno ra zv iti dok postoji kronicna nestasica stambenog p rostora. Dvadesetogodisnji ciklus. Nakon sto je utvrdjen 20-godisnji gradjevinski ciklus, pronadjen je slican p eriod icitet i u drugim ekonomskim se~ rijam a A b ram o vitz^ ) navodi da je stopa rasta proizvodnje u SAD u razdoblju 1814-1938/39 p ro lazila kroz cikluse duzine 15-20 godina. Slicni ciklusi zapazeni su i kod cijen a, porasta stanovnistva i kretanja ljudi i k a p i t a l a , 4 j Ti su ciklusi vezani za grajdevinske cikluse. M a t t hews prim jecu je da se velik e k rize opce privredn e aktivnosti desavaju u dvadesetogodisnjim intervalim a i poklapaju se s dolovim a gradje vinskih ciklusao3 ^ Vazno je uociti da se dvadesetogodisnji am ericki i desetogodisnji engleski ciklusi ra z likuju od kratkih ciklusa po zestini kontrakcije koju nazivam o k riz o m . Dolovi tih k riza poklapaju se s do-

1} R .A . Gordon, Business Fluctuation, New Y o r k } 1952, s . 210* 2; Op. c it. s. 287. 3) M = Abram ovitZj 'The Nature and Significance of Kuzneis C ycles , Economic Development and Cultural Change far 3, 1961,s 229. Medjutim, kod statistickog odredjivanja duzin; d.._ "i cikiusa valja biti oprezan., je r neke tehnike izravnavanja kr, ciklusa dovcde do dugih ciklusa i tamo gdje oni ne postoje u originalnim podacima Up.R. C . Bird et a l . , "Kuznets C ycles in Growth Rates: The Mea ning", International Economic R eview 5 b r. 2, 1965, 229-39. 4) Matthews kom entirai . . dvadesetogodisnji ciklus je jedini sistematski periodical! elem ent u analima flulctuacije u SAD osim k ratkog ciklusa zaliha. Op. c it. s. 212.

137

iovim a gradjevinskih ciklusa. 1) Vazno je uociti da se dvadesetogodisn ji am ericki i desetogodisnji engleski ciklusi razlikuju od kratkih c i klusa po zestini kontrakcije koju nazivamo k rizom . D olovi tih k riza poklapaju se s dolovim a gradjevinskih ciklusa. R .A . Easterlin pise da istrazivanja dvadesetogidsnjih ciklusa pokazuju na to . . . da jedan od mehanizama odgovornih za duge cikluse ekonomskog rasta m oze ukljuc iti i interakcije izmedju agregatne potraznje, uslova trzista radne snage i rasta domacinstva s povratnom spregom od pot onj eg prema p r v o j. Uspon u rastu agregatne potraznje i time prouzrokovana oskudica na trzistu radne snage izazivaju ubrzano sklapanje brakova, rnig ra c ije i rast domacinstava. U zivotnom ciklusu to su kriticn e tacke odlucivanja kada se stvaraiu obaveze trosenje koje se protezu na nekoliko godina dok novi dom nije uredjen i obiteljski zivo t zapocet ili s re djen o. . Gomilanje takvih obaveza sluzi am ortiziranju utjecaja p riv rednih ciklusa i samo se postepeno is c rp lju je .^ ) Poljoprivredni ciklusi nesto su drugacijeg karaktera nego osta li. Oni p roizlaze iz cinjenice sto je proces proizvodnje relativno dug, a obim i troskovi proizvodnje ovise o vrem enskim p rilik am a. Ako je cijena soje ove godine niska, fa r m e r i ce smanjiti povrsine pod sojom i p osijati nesto drugo. Iduce godine ponuda ce biti niza od tra zn je, cijena ce porasti i proizvodne odluke ce se prom ijen iti. Takvi dvogodisnji ciklu si karakteristicni su za jednogodisnje kulture. U proizvodnji svinja i u stocarstvu opcenito, proces proizvodnje produzuje se vrem enom potrebnim za proizvodnju stocne hraijgj^Arnaricki svinjski ciklusi od 1900. g. traju u prosjeku 5 godina, a kod stoke su nesto duzi i manje praviln i. Kod kultura kao sto je kava potrebno je v is e godina da dodje do ploda. !'Kaveni" ciklusi traju u prosjeku 15 godina. ^ No i cik lu si} i l i bar ciklicke komponente, mogu i kod jednogodisnjih kultura biti duae zbog klimatskih kolebanja i drugih uzroka. Cuveni B everidge-ov periodogram indeksa zitnih cijena u Zapadnoj Evropi kroz t r i stoljeca pokazuju najiaci interizitet sa ciklicnu komponentu s periodom od

1) Ibid, s. 209.
2 ) i'v. A . ta s te rlin "Economic Demographic Interactions and Long

Swings in Economic Growth, "Am erican Economic Review, 5/1966, s . 1092. 3) Dauten, o p . c it . , s. 2S4, 138

15

godine.

*jj I

N ije mi poznato da li su takvi clklusi proucavarii u

jugoslavenskoj p riv re d i. U ovu studiju nisu ukijuceni je r , ako postoie, imaju samo sekundarno znacenje u odnosu na ogrom ne o scilacije poijop rivred n e proizvodnje u cje iin i. R azliciti utvrdjeni ciklusi ukazuju na mogucnost da je privreda inherentno nestabilna, tj. da je p riv re d a iniiGrentno nestabilni sis te m . Od interesa je ispitati da li je takva pretpostavka tacna.

2. INHERENTNA NESTABIL-NOST PRIVREDE

Cesto se srecu vjerovanja da trzis te m oze efikasno regu lirati p rivred ni p ro c e s . To laicko vjerovanje je , naravno, posve pogresno - i opasno. Trzisna p rivred a jeinherentno nestabilna i stoga je treba usm jerava ti. To usm jeravanje ne mora biti adm inistrativno - u stvari admir.istrativno usm jeravanje je n ajprim itivn iji vid usm jeravanja a ii u svakom slucaju mora ga b iti, ukoliko se ze le izb je c i ciklu si. Kako to usrnjeravanje treba da izgleda - n ije predrnet ove stu d ije. No ono sto bih ovdje htio pokazati jest kako u cistoj trzisn oj p riv re d i s em perijskim parametrirna iz jugoslavenske p riv re d e nuzno d olazi do ciklusa. Inner entail nestabilnost trzisn e p rivred e pokazao je davno jos Marx na osriovu p rop orcija koje su postulirale njegove sheme reprodukcxje i i kapitalistickih institucija koje nuzno narusavaju potrebne p rop orcije.

1 j V .H . Beveridge, "Wheat Prices and Rainfall in Western Europe ,

J .R .S .S ., 1922. Osnovni rezu ltati tog rada obradjeni su u knjizi M G Kendall-a, The Aavenced Theory o f Statistics, G riffin , Lon don, 1959, s s . 423-35. 2) Jednu interesantnu i jednostavnu form a lizaciju moguceg Marxovog pristupa dao je P. Sw eezy. Up. T eorija kapitalistickog razvitk a. Nap rije d , Zagreb, 1959, s s. 198, 201-204.

Medjutim, pored nestabilnosti m oze se pokazati i ciklicni karakter trzisne p rivrede kao i to da ti ciklusi nisu zavisni o institucionalnom V ,. . V. 1) sistemu. To se m oze uraditi na razne nacme: Ja cu za tu svrhu upotrebiti jedan svoj ranije konstruirani m atematsko-ekonomski m od el.^)

a ) Jedan jugoslavenski model fluktuiranja zaliha Pretpostavirno da su in vesticije u osnovna sredstva i zalihe u odjeljku I drustvene proizvodnje dane egzogeno, a form iran je zaliha potrosne robe v rs i se u p rop orciji ocekivane potrosnje. Pretpostavim o, nadalje da se planira da se potrosnja iz perioda u period povecava po nekom faktoru a. Uzet cemo takodjer da je planski period godina dana, sto je u stvari pretpostavka em pirijskog ponasanja, iako na p rvi pogled to tako ne izgleda. Prem a tome planirane zalihe na koncu godine t iznosit ce

= ha

t-1

(2 . 1 )

1) R .C .O . Matthews (The Busines C ycle, Univ. of Chicago P ress, 1959, g i. Ill i I V ) daje na jednom elementarnom nivou pregled modela c i klickih kolebanja. Najjednostavniji je model interakcije m ultiplikato ra i akceleratora il i multiplikatora i prilagodjavanja fiksnih fondova= Kad se uvede docnja, ovi modeli uz rea listic k e vrijednosti parametara gotovo neizostavno dovode do ciklusa. Nelinearni e fek - , ti postizu se uvodjenjem raznili ograriicenja u pcgledu raspolozivih resursa, cime se i obicno eksponenc ijalno kretanje pretvara u p eriodicno. Tehnicki p ro gres, obnova osnovnih sredstava i razni egzogeni sokovi mogu a k tiv ira ti prigusene o s c ila c ije koje su se s m ir i1e , ali koje su inace inherentne privrednom mehanizmu. 2) S. Horvat, "Dva modela efekta form iranja zaliha na kretanje drustve nog p ro izvod a", Ekonomski pregled 7/1964; Jugoslavenski institut za ekonomska istrazivanja, Separat 30.

14 0

gdje je h koeficijent form iran ja zaliha (recip ro k broja o b r ta ja ), a C t_ i je potrosnja u prethodnom periodu. Stvarne zalihe ( H j ) r a z likovat ce se od planiranih (f^.) za toliko za koliko se stvarna prodaja potrosne robe (C t ) razlikuje se od planirane (a Prem a tome

h a ct - i - (c t - a cw

(2 . 2 )

Uzim am o da stvarna potrosnja ak cijom drustveno-politickih foruma zadrzava stalno ucesce u drustvenom proizvodu ( Y t )

Ct = c Y t

(2 .3 )

P ro izla zi da ce planirani drustveni proizvod biti

( 2. 4 )
gdje izra z u zagradi predstavlja planirano povecanje zaliha potrosne rob e, a l t su egzogeno dane in vestici je Uvrsfcavanjem (2 ) i (3 ) u (4 ) dobivam o:

f t - c ( a

(l+ h ) + 1

Y t_ 1 + a c (l+h> Y

= I

Zbog jednostavnijeg pisanja neka je 1 + h = ^ ,

Y t - c (a x + 1) A t_ i + a c x

(2 .5 )

Uzim am o radi jednostavnosti da in vesticije ekspandiraju po faktoru a, If = I t. Za rjesen je d iferen cijsk e jednadzbe drugog reda (5 ) vazno
03.

141

je da li su korijeni njene karalcteristicne jednadzbe realm ill ne. Mo ze se pokazati da je potreban uslov da korjeni budu realni ovaj

4a ^
^ ( T T T T { 2 6)

U slucaju brzog rasta (a v e lik ) i zalihe su obicno v e lik e , pa je i umnozak^a relativno velik. Kad a ^ r a s te 5 izra z s desne strane ( 6 ) se smanjuje. Uzmimo ekstremne em piricke vrijednosti param etara u situaciji brzog rasta: a = 1,1, % = 1,7, cim e se dobiva najpovoljn iji slucaj za zadovoljenje re la c ije ( 6 ). P ro izla zi da c mora biti v eci 1 5 od ?" - 0,91. To je nerealno, je r je kod brzog rasta param etar c 3j 2 relativno mali (u Jugoslaviji izmedju 0,6 i 0 ,7 ). Prem a tome korijeni karakteristicne jednadzbe nisu rea ln i, pa rjesen je d iferencijske jed nadzbe glasi

Y.r = Ap 1 ccs (0, f1 ) + Y not f

(2.7)

sto znaci da drustveni proizvod o scilira s amplitudom A i uz fazni 9 . Na osnovu parametra jugoslavenske p rivred e p ro izla zi da je p veci od jedinice

I f .a c x

sto znaci da su osc ila c ije drustvenog proizvoda eksplozivne. M ogli bismo jos naci period osciiiranja. 4 = 0 9 2y a 2 V 1,06x0,6x1,3 1,66 5 p ro izla zi da je 0 = 0,45. Prem a tome period fluktuiranja iznosi I2cos e ,

^ 6,^3 P = = 2- = 8 0,4o

14 goarna
a

142

sto je nesto duzi period od kiasicnih privrednih ciklusa. Od interesa je jos zapaziti kako cosO raste s porastom X , uslijed cega onda raste i period P. P ro izla zi da vece zalihe povecavaju stabilnost, a manje zalihe cine privredu nestabilnijom . Cini se, kako csmo kasnije v id je ti, da tako nesto vazi I za stvarnu jugosiavensku privredu. M edjutim , prikazani model nije imao zadatak da bude reaiistican .E adilo se samo o tome da se pokaze kako se iz nekoliko v rlo prostih p r i vrednih vsza, koje su osim toga sasvim plauzifcilne, nuzno radjaju c i klusi. Ti ciklusi u nasern slucaju javljaju se i pored toga sto je uzet najpovoljniji slucaj kad in vesticije pravilno ekspandiraju po nekom faktoru a. Za pravilnu ekspanziju in vesticija i planiranje potrosnje intuicija nam govori da je to sve sto je potrebno za stabilnu privredu . No int.uicija u ovom slucaju, kao i tako cesto u ekonom iji, pokazuje se p ogresn om . Osim toga in vesticije se mogu kretati i sasvim nepravilno, s vlastitim oscilaciiam a, kao sto se to u stva ri desava u Jugoslav!ji (v : g ra f. 5 . 5 . ) . U tom slucaju se na o s c ila c ije uslijed investicija superponiraju o s c ila cije uvjetovane zaliham a. Ukoliko su periodi o s c iliranja s lic n i, a g r a fo v i: 5 .1 ., 5 .2 ., 5 .4 . i 5 .5 . pokazuju da su identic n i, javlja se kao i kod fizikalnih sistem a, efekat rezonancije, tj. sve vece i vece d evija cije . A u svakom slucaju, u odsustvu kontroie, nestabilnost p rivred e se p ovecava.

h ) Kumuliranje slucajnih porem ecaja kao izv o r ciklickiii fiuktuacija To sto s a o upravo utvrdili nije sve sto danas znamo o performancarna privrednih sisterna. Bit ca stoga korisno da prodiem razm oirim o s jos jedne, na p rvi pogled veoma r a z lic ite , strane. P rije cetrdeset godina sovjetski matematxcki ekonom.ist i statistic a r E S lackij1- uaeo je rdz ^

1) E.E Sluekij, 1 !Slozenie slucajnyh pricin kak istocnik ciklicestih p ro c e s o v , \ :.prosy kcnjuktury. Tom III, vyp 1, 1927, Frestampano u E.E. Slucidj , Izbrannye urudy. .AN SS3S, M oskva, I960, s s, 99-132. Taj je rad medju ekononiistima bio potpuno zaboravljen, dok ga au~ to r, s odredjsnim prosirenjem nije objavio u casopisu Econometrica, fcr. 2, 137, ss, 105-146 < "The Summation o f Random Causes as the Source of C yclic P ro cesses ).

143

posljednjih cifara iz tablica sovjetskih lutrijskih zajm ova i iz njih pomicnim prosjecim a od po deset clanova izracunao drugi niz b ro je va. Kad je taj drugi niz graficki p rik azao, dobivena je slika engleskih privrednih ciklusa u periodu 1855-1877 kako p ro izla ze iz indeksa Dorothy Thomas iz 1916. g . Sluckij je zatim na taj svoj drugi niz jos jednom prim jenio desetoclane pomicne prosjeke i nova krivulja pokazivala je takav raspored perioda fluktuacije kakav je Amerikanac Mitchel nasao em pirijski za 93 ciklusa 12 ra zlicitih zem alja. Ti rezu ltati izgledaju mozda kao neka vrsta erne m agije. U stva ri, m edjutim , oni otkrivaju jednu relativno prosto objasnjivu cinjenicu: da kumulacija slucajnih uticaja dovodi do ciklickih procesa. Da vidim o o cemu se radi. Uzmimo 4-clane pomicne prosjeke koje cesto upotrebljavamo u ovoj studiji. Neka su originalni podaci slucajni b rojevi - sto znaci da su medjusobno nekorelirani - i oznacimo ih s x i. Umjesto pomicnih prosjeka obracunajmo samo pomicne zbrojeve - d ijeljen je s 4 da bi se dobili p rosjeci nepotrebno je za izucavanje efekata koji nas zan imaju - koje cemo oznaciti s y^. P r o iz la z i:

y l = X1 + X2 + X3 + X4 y2 = y3 = X2 + X3 + X4 + X5 x 3 , x4 + x5 + x6

Zapazamo odmah da susjedni ipsiloni imaju po tr i zajednicka clana te si zbog toga, za raziiku od ik sova, medjusobno k ore lira n i. Prem a to me pomicni p rosjeci (z b r o je v i) nisu vise slucajni b r o je v i, vec b rojevi oarazavaju neku pravilnost: koreliranost je naijaca kod susjednih clanova I opada prema nuli s povecavanjem razm aka. U stvari k o e fic ileuu serijske korelacije iako se atvrdjuju Bez ogranicavanja opcenitosn rezultata mozemo uzeti E( X j} = 0, prema tome je i E{y,-) = 0, za tim * -i -

a ly. } = O . = TIB . 1 VI XI

2,

144

odnosno u nasem slucaju gdje je n = 4, serijain i koeficijenti xznose n-1 n _3_ 4 5 r2 ' r-l

= 1, r = r 1 - 1

_L 2

Ako su d vije v e lic in e medjusobno pozitivno k oreliran e, kao u ovom slucaju, onda postoji tendencija da se obje krecu u is tom sm jeru. Sto ga ako poraste postojat ce tendencija da i j i +\ poraste i slicno kod smanjivanja* M edjutim , ni rast ni smanjivanje ne mogu se dugo nastavl ja ti. U originalnoj s e r iji za svaki xj postoji vjerojatnost od da bude iznad ili ispod. danog prosjeka (n u la ). Da se i slijed eci clan, jq + , nadje na istoj strani od sredine vjerojatnost je ~ da i 1 tre c i clan, xj + 2 , bude na istoj strani vjerojatnost je itd. Prema tome vjerojatnost da sukcesivni clanovi budu dugo ispod ili iznad lin ije koja predstavlja p ro s je k , veoma je m ala. A buduci da se clanovi y,- sastoje iz. brojeva Xj, to znaci da u nizu y- mora doci do obrtanja sm jerova i presjecanja lin ije p ro sjek a . D osli smo tako do ovog re zu ltata: pomocni zb iro v i m ijenjat ce se postepeno udaljavajuci se neko vrijem e od prosjeka, zatim p riblizavaju ci se lin iji prosjeka uz p re s je canje od vremena do vrem ena. Osim postepenosti i postojanja obrtnih tacaka i prosjeka ta su kretanja dosta nepravilna. Izra zim o l i p rve d iferen cije naseg niza pomicnih zbrojeva

' H = y 3 " y2 = x 6 - X2

zapazamo da susjedne p rve diferen cije nemaju zajednickih clanova i stoga si! nekorelirane. Odatle i ona nepravilna koleban j a , na koja smo u prethcdnom odlomku upozorili,. Ako, medjutim, na niz y ; p rim ije n nimo takodjer postupak pomicnih zbrojeva tako da je z,; = y. . onda ce prve diferen cije im ati zajednicke clanove i bit ce medjusobno k oreliran e. Time ce se koleban ja malo isp raviti i pojavit ce se tendencija da se pojedini odsjecci pokazu kao p ra vci. Ako sad i po tre c i put prim jenim o xzracunavanje pomicnih prosjeka, novi niz r. / = y yj z\ imat ce korelirane i druge d iferen cije pa ce stoga od sjecci* ^valovs javljati kao parabolicni lukovi. Uzastopna prim jena pomicnih zbrojeva nije nista drugo nego m ijenjanje ponders clanova originalnog niza. Kako nema nekog razloga zasto bi ti ponderi b ill m edjusobno jednaki i uz to jednaki jedinici - sto im pliciraju prosti jednokratni pomicno p rosjeci - to u em pirijskim serijam a mozerao ocekivati koreluar.ost visih diferencija i uslijed toga krivolinijske odsjecke u Suktuaci ja ma Ako tu odsjecci valova krivolin ijski proces obrtne tacke i in flek cije (u okolirii. presjek a) , ne znaci li to da izm edju postoji i neka tendencija sinuso?idamosti? A to bi onda im pliciralo i vecu pravilnost u p ogleaa anrolinuda, faaa i periodicnosti. Razmotrimo diferencijsku jed nadzbu dzugog redas

tr_ =

j}

't-rl

(2 .9 )

Za 0 <r a < 4 rjesen je jednadzbe je sinusoids. ( v . niataiiianicki. dodatak) * .Regresioni koeficijent a uvijek zadovoljava potrebne uvjste jar je

146

-a =

[(y t+2 - 2 y t+ l * yt ) ( V

l )]

{2 .1 0 )

Prim jenjujuci is to rasudjivanje kao i u prethodncm odlumku Sluckij zakljucuje da ce tendencija k sinosuidalnom kretanju postojati ako postoji negativna k orelacija izm edju drugih diferencija i clanova y ^ i , Na p rim je r u nasem slucaju uprosjecenih indeksa industrijske p ro iz vodnje za razdoblje od sredine 1955. do pocetka 1965., t j. z a posljednja tr i ciklusa, odgovarajuci koeficijen t k o rela cije iznosi r = - 0,67; taj je koeficijent visoko znacajan i pokazuje postojanje snazne c ik iic ne komponente, o cemu ce jos biti govora. Kod svojih modela Sluckij utvrdjuje relativno niske koeficijen te k o rela cije (-0 ,3 do najvise - 0 ,6 ) pa zakljucuje da je to vjerojatno nedovoljan k rite r ij je r jednadzba (9 ) vazi samo za jednu sinusoiau, a stvarna kretanja mogu p red stavljati zb ir nekoliko sinusoida ra zlic itih perioda. Sluckij zatim upotrebljava diferencijsku jednazdbu cetvrtog reda, koja predstavlja zb ir dviju sinusoida, i dobiva zadovoljavajuce rezu ltate. Na kraju po kazuje uz koje se uslove dobiva potpuna sinusoidalnost. 1)

c ) .Autoregresijski m od el, linearni oscilator i servomehanizam kao moguci modeli Rad Sluckoga se rijetk o spom inje. vjerojatno i stoga sto je dosta te~ zak, a i kad ss spominje onda se prvenstveno is tic e njegova nerealnost ukoliko treba da predstavlja ofajasnjenje privrednih cik lu sa,^ Hipoteza Sluckoga im p licira da su privredna kretanja odredjena ponderiranom samcm slucajnih porem ecaja u toku sadasnjeg i nekoiiko Drethodnih periodc, Takvo kumuliranje stohastickih utjecaja dovodi do manje

1) Op. c i t . , s. 118-19- M z koji zadovoljava te uslovs predstavlja rn-ts d iferen cije n-to kratkih dvoclanih pomocnih zbrojeva slucajnih b ro jeva kad m i n teze u beskonacnost i to tako d. 2) Up. B .C . C. M atthews, op. c it. s . 201. n = const.

147

ili vise pravilnih ciklickih fluktuacija. U ovom obliku teorija nema mnogo sm isla, je r mi znamo da u p riv re d i pored slucajnih p orem ecaja postoje i sistematske ve ze . Zbog toga se privredna kretanja mno go realisticn ije iskazuju autoregresijskim modelom tipa

yt " f ( y t - l yt - 2

El>

(2 U )

gdje yt predstavlja sadasnji drustveni p roizvod , a je faktor p o re m ecaja. ) Tom tipu pripada i nas model izrazen jednadzbom ( 5 ) , sa mo sto u njemu stohasticki eiemenat nije eksplicitno naznacen zbog cega je bio k m ji i zbog cega je bilo potrebno potanje razm otriti re z u ltate Sluckoga. U ovom kontekstu korisno je spomenuti i jedno zanim ljiv o istrazivanje Irm e Adelman. Ona polazi od K lein -G old b ergerovog modela cije jednadzbe same po sebi ne opisuju cikluse, superponira na model stohasticke udare i dobiva sistem koji veoma dobro

1) Medjutim, ovdje valja takodjer uociti da form alno autoregresijski model predstavlja samo poseban slucaj kumuliranja slucajnih p orem ecaja, kao sto se vidi iz slijedeceg = Uzmimo diferencijsku je dnadzbu prvog reda cije yt = a V i + t opce rjesenje se sastoji iz zbroja rjesenja homogenog dijela i p a rtikularnog rjesenja. Za a < 1 rjesen je homogenog d ije la , y a", mozemo zanemariti je r s vremenom tezi nuli. Stoga se nakon do voljno dugog vremena opce rjesenje svodi na posebno rjesen je uz onu tacnost koju zelim o. A posebno rjesen je m ozem o izv e s ti ovako yt = t + a V r t + a ( ^ t - i + ayt. 2) = t + a t __1 + a2 ( \ _ 2

ayt _3)

= t + a t - l + a t-2 + Prqjna tome autoregresijski niz jednak je nizu pomicnih prosjeka slucajnih elemenata s odredjenim vrijednostim a pondera i beskonacnim brojem clanova.
148

predstavlja ciklicka kolebanja am ericke p r iv r e d e .* ) Nakon ovih is p itivanja znamo da i sistematska i slucajna komponenta kao i njihove kombinacije pokazuju tendencije ciklickih kretanja. Kako i jednu i drugu komponentu nalazimo u p riv r e d i, m oramo zakljuciti da je p r iv r e da inherentno nestabilna. Bit ce korisno da ovdje napomenemo jos jedan moguci pristup p riv re d nim kolebanjim a. Ako iz fizik e preuzmem o pojam opruge koja o s c ilira oko neke ravnotezne tacke, kao sto je pod utjecajem R. Frischa uradio J. Schumpeter, ^ ) onda privredna ravnoteza postaje neka vrsta p r ivlacne s ile koja je to jaca sto je odstupanje od ravnoteze v e c e . Ravnotezu Schumpeter cdredjuje tackama in flek sije na k rivu lji privrednih indeksa. M oze se stoga uzeti da je promjena b rzin e kretanja sistema od ravnotezne p ozicije negativno srazm jerna udaljenosti od te p o zic ije , t j.

= - ky

(2 .1 2 )

gdje y predstavlja odstupanje, n a p r ., drustvenog proizvoda od njegove ravnotezne ve licin e , a k 0 je konstanta proporcionalnosti. Zapazamo odmah da se radi o dobro poznatoj jednadzbi lineam og oscilatora k o ja , rijesen a, daje sinusoidu. Pored p rivlacn e s ile ravnotezne po z ic ije kod udaljavanja sistem a od te p o zic ije mogu se javiti i neka kocenja (uska g rla , n a p r.) koja su proporcionalna brzini kretanja s is tem a. Nova jednadzba

y 55 = -k y - r y 5

(2 .1 3 )

Predstavlja poznatu jednadzbu prigusenog ti+rania, koc oega je r > 0 faktor kocenja. Ukoliko se z e li izb je c i p .a viln o st u pogledu faza, p eriodicnosti i amplituda - a te pravilnosti. u realnoi p riv re d i nem a -

1 )1 . Ad elm an "Business C ycles - Endogenous o r Stochastic?" Econo mic Journal, I960; 783-96. 2) J . A . Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Me G raw H ill, New Y o rk , 1939, s . 210. 149

onda se konstantni koeficijenti u nasim diferencijalnim jednadzbama mogu zam ijeniti funkcijama vrem ena, sto u najjednostavnijem sluca ju znaci

+ f (t) y = o

(2 .1 4 )

Na kraju, ako je struktura sistem a takva da bi on sam od sebe p r iguseno oscilira o i nakon nekog vrem ena s m irio se na jednoj ravnoteznoj putanji, do toga ipak nece d oci, oscr'lacije ce se beskonacno nastaviti i uvijek iznova aktivirati egzogenim udarcima koji dolaze od stohastickih privrednih porem ecaja. ^) Od interesa je da se uoci slicnost jednadzbe (1 3 ) i (homogenog d ije la ) jednadzbe ( 5 ) . Prva je diferenci jalna jednadzba drugog reda potonja je diferencijska jednadzba drugog reda. To sto je jedna diferen ci jalna, a druga diferencijska jednadzba nije bitna razlik a, je r se i potonja jednadzba mogla izv e s ti tako da bude diferenci jalna. Stvar je u tome sto su ekonomski fenomeni cesto diskretni po svojoj prirodi na p rim je r in vesticije u ovoj godini dat ce novu proizvodnju tek naredne godine, zavrsni racuni se prave godisnje, a ne u svakom t r e nutku itd. - dok su fizikalni fenomeni obicno kontinuirani - sila d jeluje na neko tijelo kontinuirano tako dugo dok d jelu je. Stoga se eko nomski fenomeni cesto opisuju diferencijskim jednadzbama, a fizik a l ni obicno diferencijalnim jednadzbama. M edjutim, mnogo znacajnija je jedna sustinska razlik a. Kad fiz ic a r govori o linearnom oscilatoru on hipotezom da je "prom jena brzine kretanja sistem a od ravnotezne pozicije negativno srazm jerna udaljenosti od te p o zic ije " opisuje po-

1 j Ragnar Frisch je prvi obradio takav model privrednih cil-dusa u svom radu "Propagation Problem s and Impulse Problem in Dyna mic Economics" (Economic Essays in Honour of Gustav C assel, London, 1939). Frisch ovako cbrazlaze svoju zam isao: "N a jv a ziiija osebina slobodnih oscilacija sastoji se u tome sto su duzina ciklijsa i tendencija prigusivanja odredjene svojstvenim vrijed n o stima sistema koji titra , dok je intenzitet (am plituda) fLuktuacija odredjen prvenstveno vanjskim .impulsom . Vazna posljedica toga jest da manje ili vise pravilne fluktuacije mogu biti izazvane u zrokom koji djeluje nepravilno" (s . 171). 15 0

javu Kad ekonomist govori o tome da "p roizvod jaci nastofe da odrze zalihe u stalnoj p ro p o rciji od ocekivanih prodaja" - on objasnjava pojavu. A buduci da se u oba slucaja radi o sistem im a, to ce formalna algebarska prezentacija biti ista . Posljednji opisani model v rlo zorno ilu strira Kendall-ovim stavom : 11 "Z am islim o automobil koji se krece po vodoravnom putu s neravnom povrsinom . Automobil ima opruge koje mu dozvoljavaju da do iz v je s ne m jere oscilira ali su tako konstruirane da priguss osc ila c ije cirn udobnost putnika to d ozvo li. Ako automobil na putu udari u neravninu i l i rupcagu, k aroserija ce neko v rije m e o s c ilira ti g o re-d o le, ali ce se uskoro sm iriti . . . Ako, m edjutim , vozilo stalno p relazi neravnine, doci ce do neprekidnih oscilacija razlicitih amplituda i razmaka izm edju vrhova. Udarci ce neprekidno obnavljati o s c ila c ije , lako ra spored udaraca duz puta m oze biti sasvim slucajan. Pravilnost kretanja odredjena je unutrasnjom strukturom kola; no postojanje kretanja odredjeno je eksternim im p u lsim a". Vrijednost ove ilu stracije je s t u tome sto neposredno sugerira i rjes e n je . Ako zelim o povecati brzinu kola i udobnost putnika i sm anjiti troskove popravka, onda relativno malo rnozemo postici us avrs a van j em i stalnim zam jenjivanjem opruga; osnovno rjesen je le z i u izgra d n ji ravnog i trajnog puta koga kise nece izlokati i koji se nece krpati hxpicama sljunka. Zam ijenim o li opruge instrumentima ekonomske p o litik e , a put institucionalnim uslovim a p rivred jiva n ja , onda citav p rim je r ima svoju narodno-privrednu interpretaciju. Moguca je jcs jedna aiialogija, ovog puta s regulacionom tehmkom. P rivreda se m oze za m isliti kao jsdan slozen sistem s mnostvom po~ vratnih sprega (n apr. in v esticije uvjetuju dohodak 3 _ a dohodak u vjetuje in v e s tic ije ). U stva ri to i nije samo analogija, r =da jest u sustini jedan veliki servom ehanizam . Sei'vomehanizar. _.v_- jio n ira dobro jedino ako su svi njsgovi d ijelovi i op eracije precizno konstruirani ta ko da se tacno uklapajn u funkcioniranje sistem a kao c jelin e. Ukoliko to nije sluce.j , pojavit ce se sm etnje, v ib ra c ije i o s c ila c ije , koje mo gu biti tolikc jake da dovedu do razbijanja mehanizxna. U ovom slucaju sistem ne oscilira. zbog docnje u nekim reakcijam a; on o s c ili-

1) M .G . Kendall, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, V o l. II, G riffin , London, 1959, s. 423.

151

ra zbog svojih inherentnih dinamickih suprotnosti". ^ ) Preostaje da zakljucimo ovo poglavlje. Problemu privredne stabilnosti p ris li smo na c e tiri razlicita nacina. Ti p rila zi ne razlikuju se m edju sobom sustinski, vec predstavljaju v a rija c ije jednog jedinstvenog p rilaza s naglasavanjem razlicitih aspekata problem a. A u toregresijski model moze se shvatiti kao specijalan slucaj modela pomicnih p ro sjeka slucajnih porem ecaja. S druge strane taj model predstavlja s is tematsko objasnjenje modela linearnog oscilatora. Model servom ehanizma m oze se shvatiti kao p rosiren je autoregresijskog modela u p odrucja gdje eksplicitna matematicka rjesenja postaju nemoguca pa se do rjesenja dolazi sim ulacijom . M edjutim , ma kojim putem p o s li, uvijek smo nedvosmisleno utvrdili da nema nikakvog razloga zasto bi privreda sama po sebi bila stabilna, a da ima mnogo razloga za njenu nestabilnost. Zbog toga oscilatorna, a ne ravnotezna, kretanja treba smatrati p ra vilom . Ta inherentna nestabilnost p rivred e zahtijeva veo ma aktivno reguliranje i kontrolu putem adekvatno odredjene ekonom ske politike i putem adekvatno form iranih privrednih institucija koje djeluju kao automatski sta b iliza to ri.

3. METODOLOSKA OSNOVA ZA EMPIEIJSKA ISTRA Z IV A N JA CIKLICNIH KOLEBANJA JUGOSLAYENSKE PRI VREDE

[ a ) Uvodna razmatranja Ova studija je ogranicena na anaiizu manjeg broja strateskih fektora. Taj pristup ne im plicira negiranje postojanja i ostalih relevantnih fak-

1) R.M.Goodwin, "Econometrics in Business C ycle, A n a lys is ", u A . Hansen, Business Cycles and National Income, New Y o rk , 1951.453. Up. takodjer R .G .D . A llen , Mathematical Economics, M acG rallin, London, 1956. C h .9: "Economic Regulation: Closed-Loop Control , ss. 281-313,

to ra. No radi se o tome da se analiza nepotrebno ne kom plicira 1 da se s minimalnim brojem va rija b li ispitaju neke kljucne hipoteze. Statisticke s e rije na kojim a se analiza zasniva treba da zadovoljavaju slijed ece uslove: ( a ) S erije moraju biti dovoljno rasclanjene da bi se pojedini fenomeni m ogli p recizn ije vrem enski lo c ira ti i unutar perioda od jedne godine. (b ) Treba iskljuciti sezonsku komponentu. Da se zadovolji uvjet ( a ) godisnji podaci su nedovoljno selektivni, a m jesecni podaci zadrzavaju suvise veliku slucajnu komponentu. Zbog toga su odabrani kvartalni podaci. Uvjet (b ) se obicno zadovoljava upotrebom pomicnih prosjeka. M edjutim, pomicni p ro s jec i, upravo zato sto su p rosjeci ublazavaju odstupanja ( t j. pored sezonske dobrim dijelom elim iniraju i slucajnu komponentu) i zbog toga malo uijepsavaju sliku kretanja. Ukoliko takva slika pokazuje pravilnosti i bez po micnih prosjeka, onda ona m oze biti samo jos praviln ija s njima. Zbog toga je sezonska komponenta elim inirana tim e sto se kod izracu navanja stope rasta stavljaju u odnos is ti kvartali ra zlicitih godina. N adalje, upotrebom pomicnih prosjeka s e r ije bi b ile skracene za po dva kvartala na pocetku i na kraju razd ob lja. S obzirom na to da k vartalne s e rije postoje tek od 1952. g . odnosno od 1953. to bi bio osjetan gubitak. Upctrebljenom rnetodorn taj gubitak je elim iniraru Na kraju, pom icni p ro sjeci isk rivlju ju oscilatorna kretanja, sto moja metoda iz biegava. Bit ce korisno da prvu i trecu lcarakteristiku pomicnih p ro si eka odmah i form alno dem onstriram o. Uzmimo da se clanovi naseg niza yt = f j + 2 + 13, sastoje iz tri aditivne komponente, trenda f i ( t ) , oscilatorn e komponente 2 ( t ) i slucajne komponente f s ( t ) . Izracunajm o clanove trenda operacijom po micnih prosjeka T :

Tyt = T fl + T f2 + T f3 Pretpostavimo da je na taj nacin trend tacno izracunai, pa njegovim odbijanjem od originalnog niza dobijamo odstupanja koja sadrzavaju 153

samo oscilatorou i slucajnu komponentu:

y , - T> - t2 - T2) + ( f 3 - T3 ) rt Clanovi Tf2 i T f 3 mogu isk riv iti oscilatornu komponentu i uvesti nepostojece oscilacije u slucajnu komponentu. Ovo potonje, poznato kao Sluckij - efekt, ispitali smo u poglavlju 3 .2 . Ovdje m ozem o samo uociti smanjenje varijabilnosti slucajnih elernenata uslijed prim jene pomicnih prosjeka. Ukoliko varijanca slucajnih elemenata iznosi v , a pomicni prosjeci imaju n clanova, onda je njihova r ij v D. Prema tome kod cetvoroclanih prosjeka varijanca slucajnih elemenata svesti ce se na jednu cetvrtinu svoje originalne vrijed n osti. Za oscilatom u komponentu pretpostavim o da ima oblik sinusoide:

f 2( t ) = sin ( d + \ t )

(3 .1 .)

tada je n z* . i= 1 sin ( d + \ t) = sin - = sin - - (n - 1)XX X (3 .2 )

Ho znaci da ce pomicni prosiek imati isti period i fezu , ali, ce mu

_>

* . ^ } 2 = ~ nv n n

_v D

154

1 sm ^ r n 2 1 am pi it uda b iti reducirana faktorom --------- ^

- . Ovdje m ozem o

s in T uociti jos jedan efekat koji je intuitivno ocigledan i koji cemo upotrijebiti u analizi dugih ciklusa. Naim e clan T f , t j . iskrivljavan je os c iiacija , biti ce m ali ako je n veliko ili n A je mnogogratnik X

t j. opseg pomicnog prosjeka se poklapa s periodom osciiacija u f 2 ( t ) . Ako je osciliran je polagano t j. X je m a li, i ako je nX m alo, t j . op seg pomicnog prosjeka je kratak, tada se amplituda neznatno smanjuje i stoga clan f 2 - Tf 2 nestaje. To znaci da pomicni p ro sjeci sporu oscilaciju pretvaraju u trend i elim in iraju . Ako je opseg pomicnog prosjeka nesto duzi nego period o s c ilira n ja , n > faktor is k riv -

ljavanja m oze im ati negativan znak, uslijed cega ce se oscila cije pov e c a ti. ^ ) Prema tome pomicni p ro sjeci mogu povecati , smanjiti il i e lim in ira ti oscilatornu komponentu i zato je pozeljno da se oni za m ijene nekom drugom metodom* U proucavanju privrednih ciklusa upotrebljavaju s e, uz razne v a rija c ije , d vije m etode. Prva se sastoji u tome da se iz sezonski p rilagodjenih podataka najprije izd v o ji tren d , za koji se pretpostavi da ima aditivni (kao g o r e ) ili multiplikativni k a ra k ter, i zatim se prom atraju odstupanja od tog trenda. Ova metoda ima velikih nedostataka. P rije svega svako interpoliranje je arbitrarn o. Z a tim , ako se interpolira neka uobicajena matematicka k riv u lja , sa svakim produzenjem v r e menske s e rije treba trend iznova racunati. Ukoliko se prim ijene po micni p ro s je c i, dolazi do d isto rzija o kojima je gore bilo r ije c i. U ekspanzivnoj p r iv r e d i, a narocito ako je stopa rasta visoka, apsolutna odstupanja nemaju mnogo sm isla . A relativna odstupanja, zbog a r bitrarno sti trenda, nista nam direktno ne kazuju. Zbog toga druga m e toda m jerenja ciklusa nastoji izb jeci prethodno elim in iran je trenda Najpoznatija varijanta te aruge met ode p olice od am erickog instituta National Bureau of Economie R esearch ,2) pa je korisno upoznati se s tom tehnikom. NBER polazi od pretpostavke da su ciklusi stalna pojava

1) M .G . K endall, The Advanced Theory o f S tatistics, V o l. II, London, G riffin , 1959, s s . 378-80. 2) Up. C . A . Dauten, Business C ycles and Forecasting, South. Western Publ. C o . , Cincinati, 1961, glava I I I : "M easurem ent of Economic Fluctuations". 155

u kapitallsticko j p riv r e d i, da odrazavaju sustinske karakteristike funkcioniranja mehanizma te p rivred e i da prema tome nema s in is la odabrati samo jedan statisticki agregat za m jerenje opce cik licn osti. Zbog toga se na osnovu analize nekih 800 ra zlicitih statistickih s e rija odredjuje tz v . referentni cildu s, koji rep rezen tira tu opcu c iklicnost. Jedan od nacina odredjivanja referentnog ciklusa jest pom ocu indeksa difuzije. Indeks difuzije pokazuje koja proporcija svih se rija koje se promatraju otpada na s e rije koje ekspandiraju ili se sm anjuju u odredjenom mjesecu ili kvartalu. Obrtnu tacku pokazuje onaj +renutak kad nakon uspona indeks difuzije prestane da se s ir i i kad nakon silaska prestane da se skuplja i pocinje ekspandirati. Na taj na cin odredjeni su pocetni d ol, vrh i zavrsni dol referentnog ciklusa. Grana ciklusa izmedju pocetnog dola i vrha podijeli se na tri jednaka dijela, a isto tako i grana izm edju vrha i zavrsnog dola. Time se dobiva 9 referentnih toe aka odnosno 8 referentnih segmenata ciklusa. U odredjivanju specificnih ciklusa pojedinih ekonomskih s e rija em pirijsk i podaci se najprije ociste od sezonskih utjecaja, a zatim se u tvrdjuju dva dola i vrh koji odgovara referentnim datumima. Iz sezonski prilagodjenih pod a taka izracuna se prosjek za c ije li ciklus koji pred stavlja bazu ciklusa, a kvartalni ili m jesecni podaci izrazavaju se kao procentuaina odstupanja od te baze. Vrhovi i dolovi odredjuju se na bazi tromjesecnih prosjeka sezonski ociscenih podataka, da bi se elim n ira li slucajni uticaji, Zatim se specificni, isto kao i referen tn i, ciklus p odijeliu 8 segmenata. Ti segment! se uprosjece za nekoliko ciklusa da bi ss dobio tipican ciklus za razdoblje koje se ispituje Sad je m oguce direkfcio uporedjivanje tipicnog soecificnog i tipicnog referentnog ciklusa: m jere se razlik e u am plitudi. periodu i fa zi (doenje i p re thodjen ja), razlik e u poiedinim segrnentima, utvrdjuju se karak teristicne razlike u rstardaciji i ak celeraciji u pojedinim segm entim a, m je r i se varijahilitet amplitude i trajanja ciklusa. Ovako sistem atizirana znanja o em pirijskim osobinama privradrdh kretanja mogu se onda ko risno upotrebiti u prognozi p iivred n e Jconjukture. U pogledu iipotrebljivosti K3ER tehnike za nasu analizu mogu se napra'd u slijedece napomene. Ta tehnilca elim inira trend izmedju ciklusa, ali ne i unutar ciklusa = Kcd relativno spore am ericke p riv re d e i r e la tivno kratkih ciklusa to ne dovodi do nekih analitickih teskoca Medju tim , jugoslavenska privreda ekspandira dva i po puta b rz e od am eric ke te intraciklicki trend postaje znacajan faktor u an alizi. Zbog toga bi trebalo izv rs iti m odifikacije u tehnici. N ad alje, takva tehnika ima sm isla kad se analizira veci broj ciklusa. U nasem slucaju radi se,
156

kao sto cemo kasnije v id jeti, o svega c e tiri ciklusa, od kojih je p rvi sasvim atipican, tako da slozena tehnika ne bi dovela do saznanja koja nisu dostupna i na osnovu jednostavnije tehnike analize. I na koncu, posebni referentni ciklus ne izgleda mi potrebnim = Iako je tacno . da su u p riv re d i stalno prisutne ciklicke tendencije - o cerau je bilo govora u prethodnom poglavlju - tacno je i to da planiranje treba da te tendencije k origira i izravn a, Osnovni zadatak ekonomske politike jest stabiliziranje proizvodnje uz visoku stopu rasta. Prema tome nasa referentna serija trebala bi da bude s e rija drustvenog p roizvod a. U nedostatku te s e r ije , a uvazavajuci cinjenicu da u jugoslavenskoj p rivred i industrija direktno uvjetuje kretanje svih ostalih privrednih oblasti (osim p o ljo p r iv r e d e ), uzimamo seriju industrijske proizvod nje kao reprezentanta, a industrijski ciklus kao referen tni ciklus. Pored spomenutih nedostataka valja istaci i to da metoda NBER daje za ciklus odstupanja od baze koja unaprij ed n ije poznata. Zbog toga je tekuca prognoza otezana. T a j, kao i vecina drugih nedostataka, mo gu se ukloniti ako se za m jeren je ciklusa upotrebljavaju lancani indeksi p rivred n ih kretanja.Ta metoda upotrebljena je u ovoj studiji. Kako lancani indeksi, odnosno stope r a ta , nisu isto i ne m ijenjaju se jed nako kao apsolutne v e lic in e , potrebno je ovdje ispitati osebine te m eio d e , narocito s obzirom na mogucnost da dodje do iskrivljavanja am plituda, faza i perioda ciklicnih kretanja.

(b ) Osebine odabrancg modela Uzmimo da se nasa p rivred a k rece po nekom dugorocnom trendu uz stalnu stopu rasta (a - l ) Prema tome trend ce biti oaredjen jednadzborn j i = a ' Uzm im o, nadalje, da kratkorocno privreda praviino o s c ilira oko tog trenda po nekoj kosinusoidi, ali tako da amplitude od stupanja budu propcrcionalne vrijednostim a trenda u.s trenutku t. To je potrebno zbog toga je r je plauzihilno pretposta - ilI aa se s ek/ spanzijom p rivred e i kolebanja povecavaju apsolutno, ali ne i re la tiv no, Faktor proporcionalnosti k m ora biti manji od jedinice da se iz hjegne apsurdni rezultat stope rasta u nekom dijelu ciklusa vece od 100%. Putanja po kojoj se krece ta p rivreda dana je jednadzbom

= ka*" cost + a1 "

(3 .3 )

157

koja je po obliku identicna s jednadzbom (2.7) do koje smo dosli sasvim drugim putem. Jednadzba (2 .7 ) prikazala je ovako oscilatorno kretanje drustvenog proizvoda

Y = A p" cos (*0t - < ) + Y d . P . t ^ o Izjednacimo pocetni ravnotezni proizvod s jedinocom Y q = 1, sto je stvar jedinica m jere. Zatim podesimo m jerenje vrem ena tako da je 0=1, 9= 0= Na kraju uvedimo jednu pretpostavku, koja se m oze em pirijski p ro v je riti, a naime da obje komponente drustvenog p ro iz voda ekspandiraju po istom faktoru p = o = a. Tada se jednadzba (2 .7 ),. C koja je izvedena iz odredjenih pretpostavki o ponasanju privrednih subjekata i em pirijskih vrijednosti odredjenih strukturnih koeficijena ta, pretvara u jednadzbu (3 .3 ) t t

yt = k a

cos t + a

koja ce posluziti kao statisticki model za istrazivanja u ovoj studiji. Uz em pirijske vrijednosti iz jugoslavenske p rivred e y t doduse o s c ilira , ali se stalno povecava (v .g r a f 2 .1 ). Uporedit cemo sada amplitu de, faze i periode te jednadzbe s jednadzbama koje p ro izla ze iz p rim jene dviju metoda o kojima je bilo gore r ije c i. Pogledajmo najprije k re tanje relativnih odstupanja, dt , od lin ije trenda:

d. y - y -1 . . - t . t - , yt

. t t ( t o cost + a ) ,-J L _ _ fc cost a*

( 3. 4)

Relativna odstupanja osciliraju takodjer po kosinusoidi istog perioda i fa ze , a amplituda oscilacija je , naravno, manja i jednaka je upravo faktoru proporcionalnosti. Nesto je slozen iji slucaj kad se umjesto r e lativnih odstupanja posluzimo lancanim indeksima. Buduci da indeks predstavljaju zbroj 100 plus stopa rasta, bit ce jednostavnije da p ro matramo osciliranje stope rasta. Kod toga cemo se posluziti trenutnim

158

stopama rasta je r one omogucavaju jednostavniju matematicku analizu nego uobicajene intervalne stope rasta. Prem a tome

dy 1 ~7~- dt y

k Ina cost - k sin t + Ina = ------------ ;------ : :----------k cost + 1

v (3 .5 )

Za karakteristicne vrijednost t krivulja stopa rasta poprima ove v r ijednosti

t JO

0 Ina

1L. 2

ir

3
ina+k

2TZ Ina

Ina-k ina

Da bi se dobila predodzba o redu velicin e nasih konstanti, mozemo u vrsd ti em pirijske velicin e koje ce se u analizi najcesce p ojavljivati, Kao prosjecnu trenutnu stopu rasta industrijske proizvodnje m oze mo uzeti 12% godisnje sto daje Ina = 0,11. Iz tablice se vidi da ce naj3 visa ciklicka stopa rasta biti negdje u b lizin i t = H Kako em p irijs k i podaci pokazuju da se najvise cik lick e stope rasta industrijske proizvodnje krecu oko 20%, to bi faktor proporcionalnosti iznosi oko k = 0,20 - 0,11 = 0,09. Na osnovu tih konstanti nacrtane su krivuije na grafu 1. Ekstrerni k rivu lje dani su jednadzbom

(k + cos t) dt

= 0

(3 .6 )

cos t = - k = 0,09

159

M .T e S E & T T ? I2 I

PfflKAZi

P M V B E B H IH fr n r r .r e ^

s f 4.1

k I* l

Kako je cos t = - cos ( Tt - t) to je 180 - = 8450*. U minimumu t m in = 180 - 8450 = 9510 , u maximumu t max = 180 + 8450 = 26450 . Sto je faktor proporcionalnosti k manji - tj. sto su odstu panja od eksponencijalne putanje manje - to su ekstrem i b lizi tacka% ma (z a minimum) i 3/2 = (z a m axim um ). Kada uslov za ekstrem (4 .6 ) uvrstim o u jednadzbu k rivu lje (4 .5 ) dobivamo da vrijednosti ekstrem a iznose

(3 .7 )

sto znaci da krivulja o s c ilira oko Ina. Kako je a blizak jed in ici to vazi Ina = a - 1 sto predstavlja stopu rasta. Prem a tome krivulja sto pe rasta o s c ilira oko neke prosjecn e stope ra sta , koja odgovara stopi rasta iz trenda, a to je intuitivno ocigledno. Sto je faktor k m anji, to su ekstrem i b liz i vrijednostim a Ina k, tj. vrijednostim a koje su navedene u gornjoj tab lici. Za nasu vrijednost k = 0,09, korektivni fak tor je prakticki jednak jedinici 1 ^ V l-k ^

Preostaje jos da vidim o u kojim tackama krivulja stopa rasta stjece liniju prosjecne stope rasta oko koje o s c ilira * U tu svrhu odbijamo vrijednosti potonje od vrijednosti p rve.

k Ina cos t - k sint + ina k sint -------------- - Ina =---- ^ :

K CO S t r 1 l i - k COS t

, (4 .8 i

Dobiveni izra z ponistavat ce se za sve vrijednosti za koje se ponistava sint, tj. za t = n 7T5 n = 0, 1, 2 Sada mozemo re z im ira ti diskusiju svojstava k rivu lje stopa rasta (3 . 5 ). Ta krivulja o s c ilira oko prosjecne stope rasta dane trendom . Ona s ije V v v ce liniju prosjecne stope rasta - ta cn ije: liniju = liia - u pravilnim 161

razm acim a od po t = JT . Nasa krivulja lic i na kosinusoidu pomaknutu prem a ishodistu za ~~ (v . g ra f. l ) , medjutim, taj pomak vazi

egzaktno samo za nultacke, ali ne i za ekstrem e. Ekstremi se nalaze u ft 3 tackama ~ ~ + A t (m inimum) ft - A t (m a k sim im ), sto znaci & d t da je interval izmedju ekstrema za 2 A t manji od razm aka izmedju nultacaka, koji iznosi tacno7 t. To znaci, dalje, da pojedine fa ze ciklu sa nisu sim etricne. Retardaciona faza (r e c e s ija i d ep resija) je nesto produljena, a akcelarativna faza (ozivljavan je i polet)n esto skracena u odnosu na pravilnu kosinusoidu. Kako je u stvarnom zivotu retard a ciona faza ohicno kraca od akcelerativne, to se na taj nacin v r s i spontana korekcija u pravcu sim etricnosti em pirijskih krivu lja. No te su korektivne" d eviia cije sasvim m ale, u nasem slucaju A t = ~ ~ 7t , i
Jo

osim toga A t-*> 0 kad faktor k jednaka je k

0. A.mplituda k rivu lje stopa rasta

= k, za male vrijednosti k, koji se javljaju u Vl-k2 p ra k si, sto znaci da je prakticki jednaka amplitudi relativnih odstupanja. Mozem o, dakle, zakljuciti da za sve prakticne svrhe krivu lja sto pa rasta predstavlja krivulju relativnih odstupanja od trenda pomaknutu prerna ishodistu ~ . Fazni pomak od
v 71

7Z

ili jedne cetvrtin e

duzine ciklusa unaprijed u odnosu na ostale d vije kosinusoide ocigledan je i intuitivno. Stopa rasta postizava svoje ekstrem e u b lizin i tacaka inileksije originalne k rivu lje. a p rolazi kroz nule u b lizin i maksimuma i minimuma originalne kosinusoide. U em pirijskorn radu pojavlju ju se i daljnje kom plikacije, o kojima ce biti govora u narednom pogZavIju. N epoklapanje faz a cijena je koju je trehalo platiti za druge prednosti nase metode. No ta ciiena nije suvise vis oka. U ekspanzivnoj p r iv r e di prom jene u stopama rasta su od prvenstepene vaznosti. Jedan od ciklotvornih mehanizama, akcelerator, reaqira upravo na prom jene u stopama rasta, a ne prosto na apsolutne p ro m jen e.Treba, medjutim, stalno irnati na umu smisao faznog pomaka. Kad stopa rasta vec pocm js da se smanjuje onda tele zapocinje odstupanje od trenda prerna gore; kad stopa rasta prolazi kroz prosjek, odstupanje tek postizava maksimum; kad stopa rasta pocinje ponovo da se povecava, odstupanje je tek uslo u negativno podrucje. Ukoliko cikluse stopa rasta m jerim o - kako sto cemo to uraditi u ovoj studiji - od p rve infleksije kosinuso ide, onda tim. ciklusima odgovaraju ciklusi relativnih i apsolutnih od162

stupanja c ije su kosinusoide pomaknute tako da pocinju s vrhom u is hodistu. Drugim r ije c im a m jerenje ciklusa stopa rasta od silazne do silazne infleksije odgovara m jerenju ciklusa odstupanja od vrha do v rh a . Tim e smo stigli i do problem a odredjivanja pocetka i kraja ciklusa. U fiz ic i se oscila c ije m jere od uzlazne (s ila zn e ) do ulazne (s ila zn e ) in fle k s ije . Isti postupak prim ijen io je i J. Schumpeter za koga tacke in flek sije predstavljaju tacke privredne ravnoteze iz kojih sistem naglo potiskuju prem a gore p rovale inovacionih im pulse. No taj je p ris tup rijedak u proucavanju privrednih ciklusa. Trajanje ciklusa odredjuje se gotovo uvijek vrem enskim razmakom od dola do dola ili od vrha do vrha. Prednost takvog nacina m jerenja je s t u tome sto se v r hovi i dolovi mogu utvrditi relativno p recizn ije nego druge tacke i sto je tako odrsdjen period trajanja ciklusa onda relativno invarijantan u odnosu na kasnija zbivanja i l i dru gaciji analiticki pristup. Osim toga duzina ciklusa dobija se kao prost zbroj ekspanzivne i kontraktivne fa ze . Ja se za taj tradicionalni mehanicki pristup ipak nisam odlucio, je r smatram da osnovni k rite rij u odredjivaju ciklusa m ora biti njegova ekonomska in terp retacija. K asnije ce se vid jeti da svaki od pet nasih posljeratnih privrednih ciklusa pocinje nekom znacajnijom p riv re d nom reform om . Poceci tih re fo rm i padaju upravo u v rije m e kad retar dacione grane ciklusa sijeku liniju trenda, tj. padaju u okolinu tacaka in flek sije. Buduci da je trajanje em pirickih ciklusa ra zlic ito ako se m jer i po dolovima u odnosu na m jerenje po vrhovim a, a te ra zlik e su ponekad prilicno izra ze n e , to m jerenje po tackama in flek sije daje neku \rrstu prosjecnog trajanja i tako izbjegava ek stren e = Odredjivanje cildusa po tackama in flek sije istice i raznovrsnost pojedinih stadija ciklusa, kojih ima sest i koje mozemo nazvati slijedecim nerminima, redosljedom odvijanja ciklusa: ( l ) d ep resija, (2 ) donja obrtna tacfca ili dol ciklusa, (3 ) ozivljavan je, (4 ) polet, (5 ) gornja obrtna tacka ili vrh ciklusa i (6 ) r e c e s ija . 1) Ciklus zapocinje d epre-

1) Model privrednog ciklusa m oze se i drugacije odrediti. Tako npr. A . Spiethoff u svom cuvenom radu iz 1923. g . a n a lizira engleske i njemacke cikluse iz razdoblja 1822-1913 ovim modelom: pad ili dep resiia ( l ) r e c e s ija , (2 ) prvo ozivljavan je, uspon (3 ) drugo o z iv ljavanje, (4 ) p olet, (5 ) oskudica kapitala, k riza (c it. prem a p rije vodu: "Business C ycles", Int. Economic Pappers, 3/1953, s. 123).

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sijom - sto je suprotno od uobicajenog postupka u analizi ciklusa je r smo grani.ce ciklusa odredili u tackama infleksije silaznih grana. Prva tri ja odvijaju se ispod trenda, potonja tri iznad trenda. Uzlaznu granu zvat cemo akcelerativnom fazom , a silaznu retard acionom fazom ciklusa. Ozivljavanje i polet sacinjavaju ak celerativnu fazu, recesija i depresija retardacionu fazu. Vrhove i dolove, tj. obrtne tacke, oznacavamo kao posebne stadije ciklusa je r obrtanje privrednih kretanja predstavlja r a z lic it fenomen od njihovog kumulativnog produzavanja istim sm jerom i u stvari predstavlja osnovni teorijsk i i prakticki problem u oblasti analize privrednih ciklusa. U v e zi s terminoloskim pitanjima na mjestu je jos jedna napomena. U fiz ic i se razlikuju vib racije i oscilacije (titr a n je ); oscilatorna k reta nja su vibratorna i usto periodicna. U analizi vremenskih s e rija engleski statisticar Kendall predlaze da se u rezidualnim fluktuacijama (nakon sto su eliminarni sezonski utjecaji i trend) nesistematska komponenta nazove stohastickim kretanjem , a sistematska o s c ila c ijom ; oscilacije mogu, ali ne moraju sadrzavati i ciklicku komponentu. koja je periodicna funkcija vrem ena. 1) Privredna kolebanja nisu nikad strogo periodicke funkcije, ali je ipak uobicajeno da se nazivaju ciklusim a. U ovoj studiji bit ce upotrebljena ova term in ologija. Kolebanja znace ma kakva odstupanja od jednog ravnom jernog trenda ili stacioniranog nivoa, U koliko u tim odstupanjima otkrijem o sistem aticnost (pravilnost u amplitudama, izvjesnu periodicnost) govoi it cemo o c ik lusima. Kao alternativni term ini mogu posluziti fluktuacije i o scila c ije . Jes jedna uvodna napomena potrebna je u v e zi sa statistickim s e rija ma. Nasa statistika, na zalost, jos uvijek ne izradjuje kvartalne s e r iie drustvenog proiz-voda kao sto je to praksa u naprednijim statistic kim sluzbama. Izracunavaju se kvartalni indeksi kretanja industriiske proizvodnje, te zbroja proizvodnje industrije, sumarstva i g ra d je v inarstva (tz v . proizvodnja bez poljoprnTrede). Ranije istrazivanja u Jugoslavenskom institutu za ekonom ska istrazivanja pokazala su da su u jugoslavenskoj p riv r e d i kretanja svih privrednih oblasti (izu zev poljop rivred e) usko korelirani s industrijskom proizvodnjom . Stoga v je rojatno kvartaine indekse industrije i proizvodnje (b ez p oljo p riv re d e ) SZb raozemo upotrijebiti kao indikatore kvartalnog kretanja drustvenog

1) Op. cit. s. 370.

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proizvoda bez p oljo p rivred e. Daljnja poteskoca u analizi potjece odatle sto se u Saveznom zavodu za statistiku veom a nepotpuno obradjuju in vesticije. Ovdje ne samo da ne postoje kvartalni podaci, vec nema ni godisnjih podataka u stalnim cijenama i to niti za investicije u fik sne fondove niti za povecavanje zaliha. Zbog toga cem o se morati posluziti drugim statistickim serijam a kao supstitutima.

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