Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
The energy policies of both Russiaand Ukraine are inconsistent withthe principles of EU energy marketreform.
authorities’ inability to place Ukraine’s energy policieswithin the context o the declared goal o Ukraine’sEuropean integration.Te energy policies o both Russia and Ukraine areinconsistent with the principles o EU energy marketreorm, since administrative methods o state manage-ment prevail in both countries, giving rise to corruptionand unair competition. Tis hampers proper coordi-nation among the “elements” o the European energy equation (the EU, Russia, and Ukraine), and conse-quently enhances the risk actors or European energy security.Joining the Energy Community has given Ukrainean opportunity or ull accession to the EU commonenergy space. Te next step, regulatory-legal compat-ibility o the gas markets o Ukraine and the EU, wouldpromote air competition, ensure the saety o the gassupply, and strengthen Ukraine’s position in negotia-tions with Russia. It is up to Ukrainian government totake this next step, i they so chose.
Ukraine’s security policy in general,and vis a vis Europe in particular, is characterized by inconsistency. Te security decit Ukraine perceives islargely due to its inability to ensure adequate deensethrough its own orces, and a lack o reliable oreignsecurity guarantees. Te non-bloc policy has providedUkraine with no security guarantees, and has notprotected it rom being dragged into the Russian sphereo inuence.Ukraine-EU cooperation contributes to the enhance-ment o security, stability, and democratic values on anational, regional, and global scale. Further develop-ment o partnership between Brussels and Kyiv in thesecurity sector poses no threat to the interests o otherstates and international organizations, and should besought.Cooperation with Russia in the security sector is impor-tant or Ukraine, especially in those sectors (trainingo troops, deense industry cooperation) where Russiatends to abide by European standards. However, oneshould be aware o the considerable dierences betweenthe two countries, caused by the dierent scales o geopolitical interests and political, nancial, andeconomic resources available to pursue those interests.
Humani-tarian, socio-cultural, and individual contacts betweenUkraine and the EU are rather limited and unstable, inparticular due to the language barriers and rigid visaprocedures in the Schengen area.Te socio-cultural aspects o Ukrainian-Russian rela-tions are overly politicized and concentrate mainly onsubjects sensitive or both countries: dierent interpre-tation o some historic events and gures, the grantingocial status to the Russian language in Ukraine, etc.Humanitarian and socio-cultural aspects o theEU-Russian relations are complicated by dierentperceptions o democracy, the rule o law, human rights,and reedoms by both parties. Tis aects not only bilateral relations but also relations in the “triangle,”where Ukraine has been subject to opposite inuencesin choice o its values.Based on this, we can imagine three scenarios or Ukraine’surther “drif” within the East-West coordinates:
where Ukrainecontinues to pursue a non-bloc policy, remaining in the“grey” zone between the two integration groups (theEU and the Customs Union) and two collective secu-rity systems (NAO and CSO). However, the window o time Ukraine can indulge in remaining “non-bloc”shortens. Growth o Russian pressure urther reducesthe Ukrainian authorities’ possibilities or maneuver,and, in the absence o a strategic decision, pushes themto hasty and unreasonable decisions. In the absence o reliable security guarantees, risks to Ukraine’s sover-eignty will soon occur.