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GAO Drones by Nation 04-175 2004 Jan

GAO Drones by Nation 04-175 2004 Jan

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The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) evaluates how these serious weapons should be controlled, and finds US state-of-art of non-proliferation to be somewhat inept.
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) evaluates how these serious weapons should be controlled, and finds US state-of-art of non-proliferation to be somewhat inept.

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Published by: Alister William Macintyre on Oct 14, 2012
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommitteeon National Security, EmergingThreats, and International Relations,Committee on Government Reform,House of Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
January 2004
NONPROLIFERATIONImprovements Neededto Better ControlTechnology Exportsfor Cruise Missilesand Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-175.  To view the full product, including the scopeand methodology, click on the link above.For more information, contact Joseph A.Christoff at (202) 512-8979 orchristoffj@gao.gov.Highlights ofGAO-04-175,a report to Chairman, Subcommittee on NationalSecurity, Emerging Threats, andInternational Relations, Committee onGovernment Reform, House ofRepresentatives
January 2004
Improvements Needed to Better ControlTechnology Exports for Cruise Missilesand Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
The growing threat to U.S. national security of cruise missile and UAV  proliferation is challenging the tools the United States has traditionally used.Multilateral export control regimes have expanded their lists of controlledtechnologies, but key countries of concern are not members. U.S. export controlauthorities find it increasingly difficult to limit or track unlisted dual-use itemsthat can be acquired without an export license. Moreover, a gap in U.S. exportcontrol authority enables American companies to export certain dual-use itemsto recipients that are not associated with missile projects or countries listed inthe regulations, even if the exporter knows the items might be used to developcruise missiles or UAVs. American companies have in fact legally exported dual-use items with no U.S. government review to a New Zealand resident whobought the items to build a cruise missile.The U.S. government seldom uses its end-use monitoring programs to verifycompliance with conditions placed on the use of cruise missile, UAV, or relatedtechnology exports. For example, State officials do not monitor exports to verifycompliance with license conditions on missiles or other items, despite legal andregulatory requirements to do so. Defense has not used its end-use monitoring program initiated in 2002 to check the compliance of users of more than 500cruise missiles exported between fiscal years 1998 and 2002. Commerceconducted visits to assess the end use of items for about 1 percent of the 2,490missile-related licenses we reviewed. Thus, the U.S. government cannot beconfident that recipients are effectively safeguarding equipment in ways that protect U.S. national security and nonproliferation
A Chinese SILKWORM Cruise Missile in Iraq
Cruise missiles and unmannedaerial vehicles (UAV) pose a growing threat to U.S. nationalsecurity interests as accurate,inexpensive delivery systems for conventional, chemical, andbiological weapons. GAOassessed (1) the tools the U.S.and foreign governments use toaddress proliferation risks posedby the sale of these items and (2)efforts to verify the end use of exported cruise missiles, UAVs,and related technology.The Secretary of Commerceshould assess and report to theCommittee on GovernmentReform on the adequacy of anexport administration regulation provision to address missile proliferation by nonstate actorsand on ways the provision mightbe modified.The Secretaries of State,Commerce, and Defense eachshould complete a comprehensive assessment of cruise missile, UAV, and relateddual-use transfers to determine if U.S. exporters and foreign endusers comply with conditionsrelated to the transfers.Commerce and Defense partiallyagreed with therecommendations. Statedisagreed to complete anassessment, but said it would payspecial attention to the need for more checks on cruise missileand UAV transfers.
 Page i GAO-04-175 Nonproliferation
Results in Brief 2
Background 5
Proliferation of Cruise Missiles and UAVs Poses a Growing Threatto U.S. National Security Interests 9
Key Nonproliferation Tools Have Limitations Addressing CruiseMissile and UAV Proliferation 14
Compliance with Conditions on Exports of Cruise Missiles, UAVs,and Related Dual-use Items Seldom Verified through End-useMonitoring 23
Conclusions 32
Recommendations for Executive Action 33
 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33
 Appendix I Scope and Methodology 
 Appendix II Comments from the Department of Commerce
40GAO Comments 47
 Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense
 Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State
52GAO Comments 56
 Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
58GAO Contact 58
 Acknowledgments 58
Figure 1: Diagram of a Cruise Missile 6
Figure 2: Examples of UAVs 7
Figure 3: Chinese SILKWORM Cruise Missile in Iraq 16
Figure 4: Black Shaheen Cruise Missile 17
Figure 5: Predator B UAV 24

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