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Distributed Power System Automation With IEC 61850 61499 Intelligent Control

Distributed Power System Automation With IEC 61850 61499 Intelligent Control

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Distributed Power System Automation withIEC 61850, IEC 61499 and Intelligent Control
Neil Higgins, Valeriy Vyatkin, Nirmal-Kumar C Nair and Karlheinz Schwarz
 Abstract
. This paper presents new approach to power system automation, based on distributed intelligencerather than traditional centralised control. The paper investigates the interplay between two internationalstandards, IEC 61850 and IEC 61499, and proposes away of combining of the application functions of IEC 61850-compliant devices with IEC 61499-compliant “gluelogic,” using the communication services of IEC 61850-7-2. The resulting ability to customise control and automation logic will greatly enhance the flexibility and adaptability of automation systems, speeding progresstoward the realisation of the Smart Grid concept.
Keywords: Power system automation, IEC 61850, IEC61499, Smart Grid.
I.
 
I
NTRODUCTION
 
A significant challenge now confronting the ElectricityIndustry is that proven architectures based on 20
th
centuryperformance requirements are now looking increasinglyantiquated. The need to fundamentally change thearchitecture and performance of electricity networks hasrisen quickly to the fore in developed economies, as aresult of concerns about:
 
Energy security. The combination of dwindling low-cost energy sources (in some parts of the world), andthe vulnerability to terrorist disruption of existingenergy supply systems means that more resilient energyinfrastructure is desirable.
 
Global warming and greenhouse gas emissions.Replacement of fossil fuels with flexible, renewableand distributed energy resources brings a raft of operational problems which cannot be solved withexisting technologies.
 
International competition. The preservation andenhancement of traditional comforts (employment,community services, etc.) in developed economiesdepends on successful competition in internationalmarketplaces, and this in turn depends (at least in part)on “digital quality” electrical power.
 
Market failure. Customer demand response to marketprices is all but absent in deregulated electricitymarkets. New technologies are needed to facilitate end-user participation in electricity markets.
 
Performance of network service providers. Asregulated monopolies, such companies must strive tomeet ever higher performance expectations in aneconomically efficient way. New technology can helpto improve performance while containing costs.
 
The digital society. Private individuals increasinglyrely on “digital quality” electrical power to serve theirlifestyle needs.The agendas for technical reform are crystallised inEPRI’s IntelliGrid Architecture [1] (for North America)and the European SmartGrids Technology Platform [2](for the European Union). The most complex initiativesrequire significant research and development effort priorto commercialisation.In this paper a new approach to power systemautomation is proposed aiming at the challenges listedabove. It is based on the ability to automatically detectchanges and reconfigure the power system appropriately.The proposed solution aims at making power systemautomation more adaptable to uncontrolled environmentalinfluences such as:
 
Network topology - growth and/or alteration of thenetwork to cater for changing loads;
 
Network loads and embedded generators - coming andgoing in response to energy pricing signals;
 
Nature of loads - critical (e.g. hospital), industrial,domestic;
 
Weather - affecting conductor ratings, the level of solarPV and/or wind generation, etc.
 
Primary system failures - cars hitting poles, buildersdigging up cables, equipment failing;
 
Secondary system failures - loss of monitoring and/orcontrol, errors in measurements, etc.
 
Source impedance - affecting voltage profiles and faultlevels.Two upcoming international standards IEC 61850and IEC 61499 make the backbone of the proposedautomation architecture.The paper is structured as follows. In Section II thestate of the art in power system automation is brieflysurveyed. Section III discusses the IEC 61850 standard’srole in achieving flexibility of automation viainteroperability of components. Section IV presents theidea of implementing the control logic of automationsystems using IEC 61499 function blocks. In Section Vwe further investigate the potential interplay between thetwo standards using examples of automation andmonitoring functions. Section VI shows a scenario inwhich fault location, isolation and supply restoration areaccomplished by collaborating distributed components.Implementation of the corresponding distributedsimulation with IEC 61499 function blocks is sketched inSection VII. The paper concludes with future researchplans and References.The factual references in this paper often come fromENERGEX, one of Australia’s largest power distributionutilities.
 
2
II.
 
P
OWER
S
YSTEM
P
ROTECTIONAND
A
UTOMATION
 
 A.
 
Power system equipment 
The typical ENERGEX customer is supplied via a
servicewire
from a three-phase,
 LV (low voltage) distribution feeder 
with a nominal voltage of 240 volts (phase-to-neutral) / 415 volts (phase-to-phase). As exemplified inFigure 1, each LV feeder is supplied by an 11kV/415V
distribution substation
, typically a pole transformer orground transformer. Each distribution substation issupplied via a
 MV (medium voltage) distribution feeder 
,with a nominal voltage of 11kV (phase-to-phase), from a
 zone substation
. Each zone substation is supplied via a33kV or 110kV
subtransmission network 
from a
bulk supply substation
. Each bulk supply substation constitutesan interface to the
transmission system
.
Figure 1. Typical residential electricity supply structure.
In urban and rural settings, LV feeders and 11kVfeeders typically have a
radial
configuration, meaning thateach has a single point of supply – a distributionsubstation or a zone substation, respectively.
Paralleling
 of, and
load transfers
between, adjacent feeders may beeffected via
ties
.Feeders may be of 
overhead 
or
underground 
 construction. Overhead feeders comprise four (LV – threephases plus neutral) or three (HV – three phases only)open wires on ceramic or synthetic
insulators
.Underground feeders comprise
cables
, either
direct buried 
 or in
conduit 
.ENERGEX manages approximately 300 zonesubstations. Per zone substation there are typically 6-1211kV feeders, 80-150 distribution substations and 5 000-10 000 customers.
 B.
 
Protection
After supplying customers with electricity, theforemost mission critical function of the distributionsystem is
 protection
, i.e. the detection and clearance of 
 faults
and
overloads
. A fault is defined as the uncontrolledflow of electrical energy due to insulation failure. To putthings into perspective, human contact with a live 11kVconductor is usually fatal. Fault currents at 11kV are up to20kA; hence the energy released at the site of a fault canbe highly injurious to both humans and equipment.The simplest form of protection is
 fuse
protection, butfor a range of reasons this is used only at the extremitiesof the network. Elsewhere, faults are detected by
 protective relays
and cleared by
circuit breakers
. Aprotective relay processes voltage and currentmeasurements in order to determine the existence, andalso in some cases the location, of a fault.A circuit breaker is a type of 
switch
capable of interrupting fault current. Other switch types with lessonerous capabilities include
load break switches
(capableof interrupting load current but not fault current) and
disconnectors
(only capable of off-load switching for thepurpose of isolating equipment for maintenance access).Faults on 11kV overhead feeders can be temporary innature, e.g. caused by tree branches or animals.Accordingly the associated feeder circuit breakers areoften configured with
automatic reclosing
, a functionwhich re-closes the circuit breaker one or more times afterfault clearance in an attempt to restore supply. If the faultis permanent, a
lockout 
occurs and the feeder cannot beput back into service until repaired.To speed the process of restoring customers blackedout by a fault, an 11kV feeder may be divided intosections by
sectionalising switches
, and connected toadjacent feeders via (normally open)
tie switches
. Oncethe site of the fault has been located, sectionalisingswitches are opened to isolate the faulted section, and tieswitches are closed to restore supply to the unfaultedsections.
C.
 
 Automation
Computer-based remote control of power systemequipment simplifies such processes as restoring power tocustomers blacked out by a fault.For example, control of sectionalising switches can bedone by remote manual control using a
SCADA(Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) system
.SCADA has been a feature of zone substations (andabove) for at least three decades. With improvements intechnology, SCADA has become cost effective fordistribution system equipment as well.Recently, automated
FLISR (Fault Location, Isolationand Supply Restoration)
products have begun to appear onthe market. These products use the SCADA system as“eyes and arms” to gather information about faults andeffect the necessary control actions (opening and closingof switches). In the most common architecture, FLISR is asubsystem of a centralised
 DMS (Distribution Management System)
. This architecture leverages theexisting role of the DMS as a repository for network-related data such as connectivity, equipment ratings andhistorical load records. One product (S&C IntelliTEAM II[3]) features an agent-based, decentralized architecture.Both FLISR architectures rely heavily on SCADAdata communications. The centralised architecture is morecompatible with existing SCADA communicationsnetwork architectures, which have traditionally beendesigned to support centralised monitoring and control.The decentralized architecture works best with peer-to-peer communications. In either case, cost effectivecommunications with distribution equipment, widely
 
3dispersed on poles and in metal cubicles, has been andcontinues to be difficult to achieve.
III.
 
I
NTEGRATION VIA
S
TANDARDISATION
 
Protection systems are so critical that they have alwaysbeen designed very conservatively. Wherever possiblethey are designed with
overlapping zones of protection
toensure that any fault will be seen by at least twoindependent protective relays. Transmission systemprotection is usually designed with high degree of redundancy.Only recently have protection engineers accepted thenotion that protection, SCADA and local control functionscan be integrated into a single, microprocessor-baseddevice. Integrated solutions are appearing on two forms:“Smart” distribution switches, and integrated solutions formajor substations.Integration improves the capability and reduces thecost of distribution switches by allowing all of theprotection and control functionality to be delivered on asingle, purposed-designed circuit board, which is closelymatched to the other components of the switch.In major substations, integration improves capabilityand interoperability by allowing a redistribution of functions, once heavily dependent on heavy (110V / 5A)secondary wiring, across “smart” components whichexchange information via a high speed data network. Theleading standard in this area is
 IEC 61850,Communication Networks and Systems in Substations [4]
.Tempering this evolution in secondary systemstechnology is the presence of an enormous “legacy” of oldbut otherwise perfectly functional (according to theoriginal requirements) secondary systems.IEC 61850 introduces various elements of the power-system-related automation architecture called SubstationAutomation System (SAS).According to IEC 61850, a substation automationsystem can be represented in 3-layered form (Figure 2).The lowest,
 physical
layer is implemented in intelligentend devices, such as circuit breakers, remotely operatedswitches, current and voltage sensors, and conditionmonitoring units for switchgear, transformers, etc. Theseare connected via communication channels to protectiverelays and bay control units that implement the protection,monitoring, control and automation tasks in a particularresponsibility area (called a
bay
)
.
On the top level of hierarchy there is the substation automation unit, which(
a
) integrates several bays within a substation, (
b
)implements the human-machine interface (with a humansubstation operator), and (c) communicates with controlcentre(s).IEC 61850 defines a number of architecturalartefacts intended to structure the intelligence of protection, monitoring, control and automation functions.These functions produce and consume signals that areusually communicated by thousands of wires – betweenthe primary equipment and protection, monitoring controland automation devices. IEC 61850 defines so called dataobjects for the many real world signals, e.g. the circuitbreaker position signal is defined as the data object withthe standardized name
Pos.
A capsule of data (e.g.
Pos
) and functionality(position indication of a circuit breaker) is called a
 Logical Node.
The Logical Node that represents a circuit breakerhas a standardized name
 XCBR
. We may now think of aspecific substation
Subs_ENERGEX_NMK 
that has acircuit breaker 1042 (one of many). The reference
Subs_ENERGEX_NMK/XCBR1042.Pos.stVal
identifiesthe position of this circuit breaker. Any change of thecircuit breaker position may be immediatelycommunicated (via peer-to-peer communication) to otherlogical nodes, e.g. an instance of the Logical Node
CILO
 (interlocking), protective relays, SCADA systems, etc.In the case of CILO, the required input data (statusinformation from a few or many switches) arecommunicated through IEC 61850. They are modelled asdata objects of other Logical Nodes, e.g. XCBRs.Several logical nodes can form the virtual analogueof a physical electronic device (e.g. a bay control unit).This is called a
 Logical Device
and it can be implementedon a single physical device.Thus, IEC 61850 can describe the interdependenciesbetween the Logical Nodes within a device and beyond itsborders (i.e. the use of communication over a network).Moreover, the functionality of the whole substation can bemodelled by a collection of Logical Devices populated byLogical Nodes.IEC 61850 does not define any internal details of Logical Nodes. For the interlocking node CILO, thestandard just defines two data objects that represent theoutputs of the interlocking logic:
 EnaOpn
Enable Openand
 EnaCls
Enable Close.
Figure 2. Physical and logical structure of the substationautomation system according to IEC 61850.
Two functions for SCADA and conditionmonitoring are defined as built-in communicationfunctions:
 
Functions for supervising status values: Any change of a status value may issue a message (report) to aSCADA or other system or may post the changed valuein a log (the log may be read later)
 
Functions for supervising analog values: An analogvalue can be monitored for violation of absolute limits

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