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Iwo Jima Campaign (1945)

Iwo Jima Campaign (1945)

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Published by CAP History Library
South Pacific
South Pacific

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Published by: CAP History Library on Oct 20, 2012
Copyright:Public Domain

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12/25/2013

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MARINE DIVISION
REINFORCED
JIMA
CM.,..
ACTION REPORT
31 OCTOBER 1944-16 MARCH 1945
GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12 year intervals; notmaticalli/ declassified. DOD
Dili
52o0.10
sJE.
COMKwJffllWi
A 'GEN: G. B. ERSKINE,
11 MAY
1945
'
COPY NO.4
 
Ser,032lB
3 June I9U5.
V AMPHIBIOUS
c/o
FRAM3ISC0, CALIFORNIA..
1st 3ndorsement toCG -JfiMarDiv Itr SerOI33O dtd
D
From; The Commanding General.To :The Commandant of the Marine Corps.Via :
(1)
The
Commanding General, Expeditionary. Troops.(2) Commander Joint Expeditionary Force.-
{
«
(3) Commander Fifth Fleet*
(k)
Commander-in-Chief
U< S.
Pacific Fleet
and
Facific OceanAreas.
.
.
SubjectAction Heport,
IWO
JIKA Operation.1.Forwarded.
-
2.
The 3&
Marine Division
was
initially
in
Expeditionary Troopsreserve.
One
regiment
(HOT 21)
landed
onD
plus
2 and was
assigned, temporarilyto
the
1+th Marine Division.
The
remainder
of the
Division landed
onD
ulus
5
and succeedingdays,except
HCT 3
which
was
never released
to
Landing-Forcecontrol.
The
Division
was
committed
as a
Division
onD
plus
6
between
the
and
5*^
Marine Divisions
in
the'vicinity
of
Airfield'Uo.
2.
The 3^
Marine Division carried
out its
assigned tasks aggressively,efficiently
and
with dispatch.
It was the
first
to
break through
the
enemy-linesin
the
Northern part
of the
island.
k.
The
following comments cover statements, comments,
and
recommendations contained
in
like-numbered pages-.of
the
basic report:
p.
17 The
statement is. made that
the
1+th Marine Division consistently erroneously reported
the
location
of its
left flank. This statementcould -be applied both
to
flank
and
front line positions
of all
Divisions,this-being due"
in
considerable part
to the
inaccuracy
of the
battle map.
The
particular situation mentioned was.
one in
which
the 3d
Marine Division was'onthe higher ground which still contained
a
considerable number
of
enemy
1
installations which were able
to
fire into
the Uth
Marine Division zone
of
action;consequently,
the 4th
Marine Division bowed
its
left flank back
in
order
not to
retard
the
entire advance.
p.
23
Heconraendations concerning
the
necessity
for
closer
con
trol of
replacements utilized initially
in the
shore marty .are-concurred
in.
These recommendations
are
largely
a
matter
for
handling
by the
Divisions. Higherauthority should make replacements available,
in
time
for
integration into
the.
Division for instruction both
in
their duties
as
coidbat troops
and
their
c
duties with
the
Shore Party.
kl
3
JUN 1945
 
Ser*03213Action I^epoyt IW0'
0
p.
38 Paragraph 7a* In connection with the remarks concerning massing of artillery fire contained in paragraph 7. the 3& Marine Divisionwas consistently furnished the bulk of the supporting fires available to Corps.Ihere were an insufficient number of Corps ArtilleryBattali.ons. The. 3d MarineDivision artillery was not all landed at the time this Division was committedand battalions were borrowed from the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions to support'the 3& Division attack at the expense of adequate artillery support for theflank Divisions. On several occasions fires were massed in support of attackbut in no case did this result in an immediate advance of any consequence.The effects of th.ese concentrations were, however, usually noted on the daysfollowing that
%n
which they were employed*
p.
i+5 The statement that elements of the 8th Field Depot andG-arrison Forces were laiided too early in the operation is not concurred in.The Landing Force,had the responsibility for the employment of three divisionsand the execution of.the Base Development Plan, particularly the readiness ofairfields.It is realized that the landing of
(
such elements used lighteragethat could have been used by other units, but the solution to this problem isto provide more craft suitable for landing equipment and supplies,"That an adequate Shore Party be trained and equipped,tomeet any contingency regardless of whether the unit is a reserve unit" is concurred in. The 3& Marine Division had available the same facilities^as the4th and 5th Marine Divisions with the exception of a construction battalion.At the time the 3& Marine Division landed all LVT'.s and DUKttf's had been pooledfor utilization wherever required.
p.
46
He
commendations have been made concerning armored
bull
dozers and concerning the supply of an adequate number of .Weasels for any,projected operation. It is considered that Athey track-laying trailer-tractorsare desirable in special cases.
p.
4-9 At the time the 3
d
- Marine Division was committed thefast carriers had been withdrawn and there was a limited amount of close airuppQirt'available. All available aircraft were employed daily. It was noted,,iowever, that-fewer requests for air support were received from the.3d MarineDivision 'than'any other unit of the Landing Force. This was probably due ingreat measure to the restricted area occupied by the 3& Marine Division andthe practicability of executing missions on the flanks with less danger to-adjacent units.- 2 

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