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In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

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Published by: Alexander Buere on Oct 22, 2012
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IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIAG.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He
averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mother’s middle name andsurname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name be changedto Garc
ia, her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to“Catindig” his surname.
 The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code, the minorshall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of hisbiological mother as his middle name.Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she issubsequently adopted by her natural father.Held: One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for allintents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law toa legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and hermother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact,it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of thefather.
Diwata Ramos Landingin vs. Republic, G.R. No. 164948
5
FACTS
: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and aresident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and
Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother
(deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her secondmarriage and no longer communicated with her children .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological mother?
HELD:
 No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the naturalparental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard thebest interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. When she filed her petition with the trial court,Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biologicalparents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed bypetitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adducedthe written consent of their legal guardian.
Vancil vs. Belmes, 358 SCRA 707, GR No. 132223
5
 
FACTS:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) childrennamed Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianshipproceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No.1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the petitionthat the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their
father’s death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.
 Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for hearing after a 3-consecutive-weekly publicationswith the Sunstar Daily.On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estateof Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subjectguardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship under SpecialProceedings No. 2819 before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardianand Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercisingparental authority over the subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanentlyresiding; that the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed BonifaciaVancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or
to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil toenter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. Thesubsequent attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988.
ISSUE:
 Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.
HELD:
YES, the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be hisguardian.Article 211 of the Family Code provides:
“ 
 Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicialorder to the contrary.” 
 Being the natural mother of the minor Vincent, she has the corresponding natural and legal right to be in her
custody. Petitioner‘s claim to bethe guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of 
substitute parentalauthority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:
 Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
 Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only incase of death, absence orunsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is verymuch alive and has exercised continuously
parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor‘s guardian,respondent‘s unsuitability.
 Petitioner asserts this based on the allegation that Valerie was raped several times by the a live in partner.However this case pertains to Vincent and is thus not directly attestable to that fact. Moreover the status asU.S.resident, her old age and her conviction of libel in the country deem her unlikely to be able to execute the
duties of a guardian (has not been in RP since 87‘). Moreover
courts should not appoint persons as guardians whoare not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.Republic vs. Hernandez, GR No. 117209, February 9, 1996_digestedPosted byPius MoradosonMarch 27, 2012
(Special Proceedings
– 
Adoption: Change of Name)
 
Facts:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted theprayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surnameMunson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
 
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing thatthese petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which,in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed bydistinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of theadoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would
involve a substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly
be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of namepredicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicityof suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is noprohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate butrelated causes of action in a single petition.
Issue
: WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if the adopteein a petition for adoption.
Held
: No.Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption:(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquirethe reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of theadopted to use the surname of the adopters;The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance
of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s
 
surname
to follow that of the adopter which is thenatural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of thecourt, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.However, the
given or proper 
name, also known as the
first 
or
Christian
name, of the adoptee must remain as itwas originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the
adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof,
premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it amere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in apetition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a
change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.A petition for change of name being a proceeding
in rem
, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor isindispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discretespecial proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A
 fortiori 
, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be todenigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
DSWD v. BELEN
 275 SCRA 645 (1997)DIANNA
FACTS
 - Administrative complaint initiated by Corazon M.Layug, Social Welfare Officer IV of the DSWS FieldOffice in LaUnion.- Respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen is chargedwith rendering an erroneous decree of adoptioninviolation of Article 33 of Presidential DecreeNo. 603 and the corresponding SC Circular No.12.-Respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social WelfareOfficer II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional TrialCourt of Lingayen, Pangasinan is chargedwith disregarding the provisions of the sameCircular No.12.1. Spouses Desiderio Soriano and AuroraBernardo-

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