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Table Of Contents

1.1. What Are Institutions?
1.2. Developmental Vs. Predatory Institutions
1.3. Institutional Origins in the Social Conflict Theories
1.4. Towards a Framework
1.5. References
2.1. Aggregate Correlations
2.2. “Exogenous” Differences in Institutions
2.5. Weak and Strong Institutions?
2.6. Which Institutions Matter?
2.7. Within Country Variation
2.8. Micro Evidence
2.9. Interpreting the Evidence
2.10. References
3.1. Basic Definitions
3.2. Some Basic Results
3.3. Application: Repeated Games With Perfect Observability
3.4. Application: Common Pool Games
3.5. References
4.1. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
4.2. Voting and the Condorcet Paradox
4.3. Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem
4.4. Party Competition and the Downsian Policy Convergence Theorem
4.5. Beyond Single-Peaked Preferences
4.6. Preferences with Single Crossing
4.7. Application
4.8. Probablilistic Voting
4.9. Models with Party/Candidate Ideology
4.10. Commitment and Convergence
4.11. References
Dynamic Voting with Given Constituencies
5.1. Myopic Dynamic Voting
5.2. Dynamic Voting and Markov Perfect Equilibria
5.3. References
Dynamic Voting with Changing Constituencies
6.1. Dynamic Voting in Clubs
6.2. Voting over Coalitions
7.1. Swing Voter’s Curse
7.2. Policies and the Evolution of Beliefs
7.3. References
8.1. Basic Retrospective Voting Models
8.2. Agency with Asymmetric Information
8.3. Career Concerns
8.4. Political Economy of Mechanisms
8.5. References
9.1. Lobbying
9.2. Application of Lobbying to Distributional Conflict
9.3. Campaign Contributions
Politics in Weakly-Institutionalized Environments
10.1. Introduction
10.2. A Model of Divide-and-Rule
10.3. A Model of Politics of Fear
10.4. Incumbency Veto Power and Persistence of Bad Governments
10.5. References
11.1. Motivation
11.2. Baseline Model
11.3. Inefficient Economic Institutions
11.4. Modeling Political Institutions
11.5. Further Modeling of Political Consolidation
13.4. Inefficient Redistribution to Maintain Power
13.5. References
14.1. The Role of the State in Economic Development and in Economics
14.2. Weak Versus Strong States
14.3. The Formation of the State
14.4. References
15.1. Basic Model
15.2. Political Equilibrium: Democracy
15.3. Political Equilibrium: Oligarchy
15.4. Comparison Between Democracy and Oligarchy
15.5. New Technologies
15.6. Regime Dynamics: Smooth Transitions
15.7. Regime Dynamics: Conflict Over Regimes
15.8. References
16.1. The Power Function
16.2. Economic Power
16.3. Electoral Corruption and Resource Allocation
16.4. Employment and Power
16.5. References
17.1. Basic Issues
17.2. A Simple Model of Non-Democratic Politics
17.3. Incentive Compatible Promises
17.4. References
18.1. The Emergence of Democratic Institutions
18.2. A Model of Democratization
18.3. Subgame Perfect Equilibria
18.4. Alternative Approaches
18.5. References
19.1. Basic Model
19.2. Discussion
19.3. References
20.1. A Simple Model of Economic Structure
20.2. Political Conflict
20.3. Capital, Land and the Transition to Democracy
20.4. Costs of Coup on Capital and Land
20.5. Capital, Land and the Burden of Democracy
20.6. References
21.1. Baseline Model
21.2. Analysis of Baseline Model
21.3. Generalizations: Markov Regime-Switching Models and State Dependence
21.4. Durable Political Institutions and Captured Democracy
21.5. Effective Reform
21.6. References
22.1. Model and Definitions
22.2. Preferences over Voting Rules
22.3. Self-Stability
22.4. Stability and Reform of Political Institutions
22.5. Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions and Clubs
22.6. Conclusions
22.7. References
23.1. Modeling Political Compromise
23.2. Political Stability and Political Compromises
23.3. References
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political economy

political economy

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Published by miriamnaka
political economy lecture notes
political economy lecture notes

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Published by: miriamnaka on Oct 23, 2012
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial


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