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Testimony of Luigi Zingaleson"Causes and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy”Before theCommittee on Oversight and Government ReformUnited States House of RepresentativesOctober 6, 2008
 
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Causes and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy
Luigi Zingales
*
October 2008
 Abstract 
I argue that the demise of Lehman Brothers is the result of its very aggressiveleverage policy in the context of a major financial crisis. The roots of this crisis have tobe found in bad regulation, lack of transparency, and market complacency brought aboutby several years of positive returns. Lehman’s bankruptcy lead to a reassessment of therisk, in particular in the market for credit default swaps.
*University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, National Bureau of Economic Research and Centerfor Economic Policy Research. Address correspondence to Luigi Zingales, University of Chicago GraduateSchool of Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637 or e-mail atluigi@chicagogsb.edu.I thank Federico De Luca for excellent research assistantship.
 
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The demise of Lehman Brothers can only be understood within the contextof the current financial crisis, the biggest financial crisis since the GreatDepression. The roots of this crisis have to be found in bad regulation, lack of transparency, and market complacency brought about by several years of positive returns. I will start by explaining these three roots and then I willdiscuss how Lehman contributed to its own demise and what theconsequences of its filing for bankruptcy are.
1. Market Complacency
The seeds of current crisis were sewn during the real estate boom. AsFigure 1 shows, a prolonged period of low interest rates lead to a rise inhouse prices that was completely abnormal by historical standards. FromMarch 1997 to June 2006 the Case and Shiller national index of real estateprices increased every month, except for two. During the same period theaverage increase in real estate prices was 12.4% per year. This increase wasin part fueled by extraordinary low interest rates. Between January 2002 andJanuary 2004 the average 3-month T-bill rate was 1.3%, while the average inthe previous forty years was 6.1%.This sustained price increase engenders the illusion in many actualand aspiring home owners that prices will always go up. In a 2005 survey of San Francisco home buyers Case and Shiller find that the mean expectedprice increase over the next ten years was 14% per year, while the median9% per year (Shiller, 2008).As Table 1 shows, during the real estate boom delinquency ratesdropped. The reason was not only the relatively good economic conditions,but the sustained real estate price increase. First of all, home owners fighthard to be able to pay their mortgages when their home equity increases.
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