Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 Rethinking Analytic

Politicization Stephen Marrin: stephen.marrin@brunel.ac.uk or spm8p@yahoo.com Politicization as a term used in intelligence studies is poorly defined, conceptualized, and operationalized. Despite the negative connotations associated with the word politicization that equate it with a form of corruption, it is not entirely clear what it is a corruption of. In short, the concept of politicization is for the most part analytically useless. This article critiques the existing status quo conceptualization for being overly broad and insufficiently nuanced, explores the nature of analytic politicization as a subset of politicization writ large, and replaces it with a narrower conceptualization that explains what makes analytic politicization bad and deserving of condemnation. Specifically, the differentiation between political violence (a value neutral term) and terrorism (inherently condemnatory) based on the failure of the latter to be appropriately discriminate in its application of political violence can provide us with a conceptual framework to use to distinguish value neutral aspects of what is conventionally considered to be politicization from those aspects that are inherently bad or lead to negative outcomes. In both cases what matters is not the effect of the action but the intent of the actor. Based on this evaluation, one can conclude that much of what is considered to be politicization in a corrupted sense is really just a naturally-occurring consequence of analysis and interpretation in a policy or political context. PROBLEMS DEFINING ANALYTIC POLITICIZATION The formal definition of politicization is quite malleable and as a result there is much confusion in both literature and practice regarding its nature. In 1987, Harry Howe Ransom, an intelligence scholar and Professor Emeritus at Vanderbilt University, observed that the term politicization has multiple meanings. He then went on to identify three different kinds: (1) partisan politicization, when an agency or an issue has become .a point of contention between organized political groupings, normally political parties; (2) popularization, or publicity, which generates public debate over ends and means (frequently leading to) bipartisan politicization; and (3) when intelligence estimates are influenced by imbedded policy positions. When preferred policies dominate decision making, overt or subtle pressures are applied on intelligence systems, resulting in self-fulfilling intelligence prophecies or in intelligence to please that distorts reality.1 Despite the negative connotations associated with politicization, neither of Ransoms first two definitions inevitably lead to bad outcomes. Ransom is most interested in explaining why politicization occurs, and his core argument is that all three kinds of politicization are more likely when the varied interests of Americas plural society are at odds over the ends and means of foreign policy and intelligence becomes caught up on the resulting conflict.2

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 This is a value neutral conceptualization of politicization. That intelligence becomes intertwined with politics is an inevitable byproduct of the intentional production of useful knowledge to support foreign policy and national security decisionmaking. Such decisionmaking occurs within a political or policy context, so the fact that intelligence becomes embedded in politics should not be a surprise. Instead, the existence of this kind of politicization should be expected as part of the normal policymaking process. That an issue becomes a point of partisan contention or is debated publicly could be good or bad depending on context. To adjust Robert Jervis observation about intelligence failure slightly, any specific instance of (politicization) will, by definition, seem unusual, but the fact of the (politicization) is itself quite ordinary.3 Yet the last of Ransoms definitions, with its reference to intelligence to please that distorts reality is more interesting precisely because it has an inherently negative connotation. According to Jack Davis, a longtime analytic methodologist at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), this form of politicization is the distortion of analysis by setting aside or otherwise failing to meet the standards of objectivity in setting forth information and judgments in order to support a world view or policy preference.4 Specifically, this kind of politicization involves the incorporation of policy preferences into the analytic product as a corruption of the intelligence analysts de facto ethos of independence and objectivity. In terms of consequence, this form of analytic politicization (a new term used to distinguish it from other forms of politicization) is viewed as bad because of the implication that political desires and pressures can push the expert analysis and advice further from the truth and this can result in poor decisions or outcomes. Analytic politicization can lead to policy failure by preventing decisionmakers from incorporating into their policy discussions information indicating problems or potential for problems in their preferred course of action. As a result, decisionmakers can be overly optimistic, possibly even deluded, about the prospects for success of the policies they implement. According to this conceptualization, then, preventing analytic politicization is a part of the process of improving national security decisionmaking and foreign policy outcomes. But how does one know when analytic politicization is occurring? There have been only a handful of efforts to define the analytic form of politicization with enough precision to operationalize the concept in the real world. One effort to define politicization--part of a task force set up by former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates in the early 1990s--observed that politicization can involve forcing a product to conform to a policymaker's view or delaying a product thought to offend a policymaker.5 The problem with this definition is that forcible, outright, obvious analytic politicization--where the decisionmaker overtly pressured or threatened intelligence analysts, who then changed or distorted their analysis to conform to this pressure--rarely if ever occurs.6 Delaying the production of analysis that might offend, on the other hand, is more difficult to identify and represents a shift of attention from a simple definition of analytic 2

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 politicization to one that is much more nuanced and subtle. Two British scholars have pointed out the need to address the more implicit variations of analytic politicization in which the producers of finished intelligence .launder, tailor and even distort their product through various tacit means, none of which requires an obvious intervention in the analytical or reporting process.7 Some of these techniques are described in detail by John Gentry, a former CIA analyst, focusing on how the review, editorial, and managerial process involved in producing finished intelligence analysis can shape and change its substantive conclusions. Gentry explains how managerial suggestions couched in the form of editorial feedback that take political reactions of consumers into account really amount to orders, constituting an implicit form of politicization.8 He then goes on to describe how more generally, senior intelligence officers employ a variety of methods to move analysis in a direction of their liking.9 After looking at the issue, Gentry suggests that politicization entails the alteration of an otherwise objective, methodologically sound course of the conception, production, and review of an intelligence product to serve a personal, bureaucratic, ideological, policy, or political purpose.10 Using this definition, analytic politicization may have nothing to do with politics or policy at all, but rather is conceptualized as the distortion of the analytic product for any of a number of reasons including personal and bureaucratic. For this reason, Jennifer Sims made a clear differentiation between politicization (for political purposes) and privatization (the use of intelligence for personal or private institutional ends).11 Unfortunately, this differentiation has not been adopted by other observers who tend to characterize incidents of privatization as politicization. For example, Joshua Rovner suggests that analytic politicization may result from the presence of embedded assumptions in intelligence analysis that may match those possessed by policymakers, intelligence parochialism related to careerism and how that shapes their analysis, similar issues related to bureaucratic parochialism, and the scapegoating of intelligence for policy failures which may inspire reciprocal hostility, creating incentives to distort intelligence.12 This approach combines privatization and politicization together under the broad framework of the causes of analytic distortion. Paul Pillar has also addressed some of these kinds of indirect politicization in the context of the intelligence analysis on Iraq prior to the Iraq War. Pillar describes how decisionmakers can discourage analysis that challenges the efficacy of favored policies while at the same time encouraging analysis that supports those same policies. As he put it, intelligence analysts -- for whom attention, especially favorable attention, from policymakers is a measure of success -- felt a strong wind consistently blowing in one direction. The desire to bend with such a wind is natural and strong, even if unconscious.13 Pillar suggests that given the inherent uncertainty and ambiguity in intelligence analysis, in the case of Iraq WMD the differences between sound and flawed analysis had to do 3

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 mainly with matters of caveat, nuance, and word choice.14 Like Gentry, Pillar also suggests that politicization can be found in the streamlined review process for reports consistent with policy preferences.15 Finally, Pillar suggests that another form of politicizationis the sugarcoating of what otherwise would be an unpalatable message.16 At this point analytic politicization becomes quite subtle indeed. This shift of the definition of analytic politicization from the forced distortion or corruption of the analysis (black) to something that is more nuanced (a shade of gray) makes it more difficult to operationalize analytic politicization in a way that is useful for practitioners. As former CIA analyst Jennifer Glaudemans put it, politicization is like fog. Though you cannot hold it in your hands, or nail it to a wall, it does exist, it is real, and it does affect peoples behavior.17 But how do you operationalize a concept that is like fog? In 1996 CIA attempted to do so, with its definition of politicization as an unprofessional intrusion by intelligence analysts into the policymaking process, characterized by the skewing of information and judgments to support or oppose a specific policy or general political ideology. The analysts unprofessional manipulation of information and judgments can be deliberate for example, to please a policymaker or under pressure from an intelligence manager... The distortion can also be unintentional, arising from poor tradecraft practice.18 This CIA definition brings in two additional gray-like dimensions. Specifically, the inclusion of judgments (that) oppose a specific policy or general political ideology means that analysis that runs counter to policy preferences can also be considered politicized in addition to those that favor decisionmakers preferred policy. Also, according to this definition analytic politicization can be unintentional due to poor tradecraft practice, muddying the conceptual waters even further. Both of these extensions of the notion of politicization are logical if the goal is to improve intelligence analysis by removing any source of inaccuracy. But in both cases they are also counterintuitive given the popular and prevalent conception of politicization as the intentional distortion of analysis in a way that is consistent with policy preferences. Finally, in 1999 the then-CIA Ombudsman for politicization said that politicization is something that is as hard to prove as it is easy to charge-- in large part because it takes you into the area of intent, something usually very difficult to prove in any environment.19 As a result, politicization is not a term youll find defined in any Headquarters or Agency Regulations. The politicization of intelligence is an issue of professional ethics, not of law or regulation.20 So now the identification of analytic politicization is more a matter of perception than fact-driven investigation. In order to identify what is or is not analytic politicization one must first make a judgment call as to whether the analysis in question is either overly supportive of or challenging to policy preferences and then closely examine both analytic intent (intentional distortion) and tradecraft practice (unintentional distortion) to determine whether it is a legitimate difference of opinion or analytic politicization. The 4

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 same intelligence analysis could be either politicized or not depending as much on perception of intent as fact. The subjectiveness inherent in the determination of analytic politicization is problematic. Even John Gentry acknowledges that some analysts can see analytic politicization when none actually exists. As Gentry says, some undoubtedly are too quick to see politicization.A few take personal criticism too hard. A few fail to recognize fully the need to compromise in the production of CIA corporate products. Some indeed are whiners or malcontents. Some are poor analysts.21 These analysts, then, see analytic politicizationor the pressure to politicize--when all that is going on is an effort to improve their analysis. More recently, Gregory Treverton has reinforced this point when he says that for the intelligence analyst hurt feelings and damaged egos being what they are, a reviewers criticism could easily seemor be stigmatized aspoliticization.22 Treverton goes on to say that analysts could purport to see a policy agenda behind any criticism of their prose. As Jennifer Sims observed in the context of the Gates hearings, where some observers saw martyrs, others saw careerists with bruised egos and frustrated personal ambitions.23 This is significantly problematic from a conceptual standpoint; is analytic politicization in the eye of the beholder? Thus far this discussion of analytic politicization has relied on definitions derived from intelligence agencies that produce analysis. Since these definitions emphasize distortion in the analytic product as that which distinguishes politicization from legitimate analysis, this implies that intelligence analysts are the sole source of politicization. While decisionmakers can pressure analysts to politicize their analysis, or reward analysts who do, politicization (or distortion) of intelligence analysis is not something that decisionmakers can do. Therefore, preventing analytic politicization hinges on strict accountability to professional ethics rather than outright regulative prohibition. Inappropriately Broadening the Definition Despite this implication, however, some scholars have been conceptualizing and defining the term differently, adding decisionmakers and policymakers to the list of actors who can politicize. This is similar to Ransoms first two definitions but now the emphasis has changed. Rather than addressing this kind of broader polititicization as bringing the intelligence into the world of politics and political disputes, it is now being used to describe situations where decisionmakers selectively use analysis to support their positions, both as part of a partisan dispute or to advance a particular agenda.24 Sometimes the terminology of politicization is employed when decisionmakers cherrypick information in order to make their decisions. It is also sometimes used to describe backstopping, or the search for information to support a decision already made. These new usages do not conform to any of the three definitions of politicization that Ransom put forth, suggesting that a fourth definition has appeared in the literature. This is analytic politicization as applied to decisionmakers. Now, when policymakers try to ensure that they acquire certain kinds of analytic support for their policies such efforts are sometimes described as a form of analytic politicization. It is almost as if the norm of 5

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 objectivity and independence that applies to intelligence analysts is now being applied inappropriately to the decisionmakers themselves. As a result, the use of the term in actual cases or controversies regarding the distortion or corruption of the intelligence function has become much more widespread precisely because it is beginning to equate policymaking with politicization. A broader definition of politicization also makes differentiating analytic politicization from appropriate use of intelligence analysis in decisionmaking more difficult, leading to differences in interpretation over what is, and what is not, politicization. With this broader definition of politicization, operationalizing the concept becomes very difficult if not impossible. For example, is politicization the corruption of the analysis (analytic politicization) or perceived efforts to corrupt it? If pressure is defined as politicization as well, how is the legitimate challenge or question distinguished from the illegitimate pressure? As the discussion over the Iraq WMD intelligence case illustrates, one persons legitimate questions about the reliability or validity of intelligence judgments are another persons perceived pressure to change those judgments to conform to what the questioner wants to hear. Jeffrey Cooper, in a monograph published by the CIA, has observed that the intelligence community too often treats probing questions as attempts to shape (that is, politicize) analyses rather than genuine inquiries into the quality of evidence and the strength of inference chains.25 This means that legitimate efforts by decisionmakers to understand the logic underlying the analysis could be perceived as, and subsequently condemned as, politicization. Using an even broader definition, Gregory Treverton ultimately defines politicization as commitments to perspectives or conclusions, in the process of intelligence analysis or interaction with policy, that suppress other evidence or views or blind people to them.26 He goes on to say that, by using this definition, politicization can have at least five different if overlapping meanings which can apply simultaneously, including: direct pressure from senior policy officials; a house line on a particular subject leading to the suppression of alternative interpretations; Cherry picking (and sometimes growing some cherries), in which senior officials, usually policy officials, pick their favorites out of a range of assessments; the asking of leading questions or asking questions repeatedly, and a shared mindset, whereby intelligence and policy share strong presumptions.27 While both Rovner and Treverton appear to be trying to protect and advance national security by first diagnosing and then mitigating the various ways that political commitments can distort perception of truth or reality, or decrease receptivity to unwelcome interpretations, this approach makes the concept of politicization so broad as to make it unusable. If cherry picking or question asking is politicization, then what distinguishes politicization from policymaking? If something as simple as substantive agreement, a shared mindset between analysts and decisionmakers, constitutes politicization, how can it possibly be a bad thing? 6

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 This recent work on politicization fails to distinguish distortion in the analytic product from policymaker desire for (and in some cases, effort to) pressure or otherwise change the intelligence analysis they are provided with. This defines politicization in such a way as to equate the political use of intelligence with politicization. From a conceptual consistency standpoint, this is a significant problem. But even more generally, what meaning does politicization have as either a conceptual construct or operationalized in the real world of intelligence analysis as a thou shalt not if there is no agreement on how to define it, identify it, or prohibit it? PREVAILING CONNOTATION BUILT ON A FLAWED MODEL One explanation for why politicization is bad is that it is the distortion of intelligence in such a way as to provide intelligence to please that violates the independence or objectivity of the process. Independence and objectivity are key values embedded in the intelligence enterprise intended to provide decisionmakers with unvarnished truth, so far as intelligence professionals understand it. By speaking truth to power they are helping to ensure that national security is protected and national interests promoted. Politicization, then, threatens that value because it prevents policymakers from knowing what is really going on, and that prevents them from being able to adjust policy to address emerging problems. As a result, politicization is bad; a corruption of the way the process should work. Or is it? Because when you look closer at the core values that politicization is a violation of--independence and objectivityit is not clear that they are even achievable. Instead, both independence and objectivity appear to be unreachable ideals; the world the way some think it should be, but not the way it is. The prevailing conception of politicization is based on an idealized model of the intelligence analysis process and its role in decisionmaking that is flawed and does not have much real world validity. As has been argued elsewhere,28 the standard model of the role of intelligence in decisionmaking appears to be based on the presumed sequencing of intelligence collection to intelligence analysis to national security decisionmaking. According to the standard model, intelligence organizations were created separate from decisionmakers; to select facts and provide an objective assessment of them as an effort to get at one true answer which is then conveyed to consumers to be incorporated into their policy deliberations. Sherman Kent suggested that while this could be done by policy staff, they lack the independence necessary to ensure that the decisionmakers are well-informed which includes provision of the stubborn fact they may be neglecting.29 The value of independent and objective intelligence collection and analysis is, therefore, to provide decisionmakers with the inconvenient fact or unwanted interpretation. According to Roger Hilsman, this approach to separating intelligence and policy ensures that by having one man collect facts without thinking of policy and another use the facts to make policy, one at least guarantees that the policy man will have to face the unpleasant facts that do not support his policy. Thus the policy man who has become 7

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 wedded to an incorrect policy can be faced with the unpleasant facts which he has ignored and be made to see the one right solution.30 Presumably this provision of the inconvenient fact or unwanted interpretation will improve policy by preventing decisionmakers from fooling themselves into believing that their policies are or will be successful when more pessimistic indicators exist. Because of this emphasis on objectivity, intelligence scholar Michael Handel described ideal intelligence work as objective, autonomous, and free of political pressures.31 The standard model and its praise of objectivity and condemnation of analytic politicization is deeply embedded in the intelligence literature and the normative judgments that scholars and practitioners bring to bear when evaluating how intelligence analysts and decisionmakers should interact. But does the literature support the assumptions and premises that underlie the standard models incorporation of intelligence analysis into decisionmaking? After examining the intelligence studies literature, it appears that the answer to this question is no. In the real world, independence and objectivity do not appear to have much value at all. Analytic Objectivity Does Not Exist There are three significant problems with the standard model. The first problem is with the premise that intelligence analysts are objective assessors of the aggregate raw intelligence. The expectation of objectivity appears to be based on an assumption that intelligence analysts are idealized policy experts bringing neutral authority to bear on policy.32 As a result, Glenn Hasted has suggested that intelligence analysts are perceived to be like other experts in government in that they provide their objective input into an inherently political policy process as an expert intermediary between knowledge and action.33 The problem with this assumption is that analytic objectivity in an absolute sense does not exist. According to University of Virginia history professor Allan Megill, objectivity in an absolute sense involves representing things as they really are, while objectivity in a procedural sense aims at the practice of an impersonal method of investigation or administration.34 Objectivity in intelligence analysis is intended in this procedural sense, by excluding both analyst and decisionmaker preferences and therefore subjectivity due to motivated bias. This was clearly Sheman Kents model as he argued for the importance of having the intelligence analysis function independent of decisionmaking.35 However, as Megill goes on to observe, this kind of procedural effort to achieve objectivity is conducted under the presumption that this process will better enable the attainment of truth, or representing things as they really are.36 In other words, the premise that procedural objectivity is based on is to approximate absolute objectivity through the elimination of subjectivity. But subjectivity cannot be eliminated even through procedural mechanisms. According to the standard model, independence of intelligence analysis from decisionmaking is a procedural way to eliminate motivated sources of bias or subjectivity, and bring the 8

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 analyst closer to absolute objectivity. As Kevin Russell has argued, however, even with this kind of independence intelligence analysts determination of likelihood of any particular situation is inherently subjective because they do not have accurate models like weather forecasters do to use to derive the calculations of likelihood.37 As a result, intelligence analysis, like the social sciences it is based on, contains a relatively high level of ambiguity in terms of the meaning of data and this causes relatively high levels of uncertainty and error in analytic conclusions and estimates. The weather forecasters foundation in a scientific discipline provides much less opportunity for incorporation of analytic judgment, subjective though it may be, to explain and forecast the weather as compared to the intelligence analyst whose explanations and forecasts of international developments are much more uncertain and therefore much more subjective. Independence Does Not Lead to Objectivity or Truth This brings us to the second problem with the standard model: it appears to embrace an inductive model of intelligence analysis where the independent evaluation of data will bring one closer to the truth. For example, at one point Sherman Kent, in seeing analysts come to significant analytic disagreement while looking at the same set of data, suggested that the fact that there have been such differences of opinion among supposedly objective and impartial students who have had access to substantially the same material, is evidence of someone's surrender to his external pressures.38 The only reason Kent can think of for two groups of analysts to come to different interpretations is that one bowed to external political pressures. This is an example of Kent falling prey to the inductive fallacy, that facts either speak for themselves or, when aggregated, that a set of data has a single, optimal, interpretation.39 But various experts have been taking issue with the implication that intelligence analysis is inductive, including Willmoore Kendall in 1949, Roger Hilsman in 1952, Klaus Knorr in 1964, Thomas Hughes in 1976, Richards Heuer in 1999, and many more since then.40 All of these experts from the 1940s onwards take issue with the assumption that intelligence analysts can get closer to the truth because of their independence from policymaking. Specifically, they argue that subjectivity is inherent in the analysis process due to the reliance on constructs known variously as conceptual or cognitive frameworks, mental models or normal theories which are necessary in order to infer meaning from incomplete data. As Thomas Hughes observed in 1976, facts alone have no meaningin other words, facts do not speak for themselves--but rather aquire meaning when they are integrated into what he calls ideas or conceptual frameworks.41 This is a point that Richard Betts has also made; that conceptual frameworks are not just useful in the interpretation of intelligence; they are absolutely necessary.42 But these conceptual frameworks, by their very creation and use, impose biases and preconceptions on the resulting analysis and interpretation. As Richard Betts observed, Some degree of bias is inevitable. (Bias) simply means the general view of international reality, the set of assumptions that any analyst has about how the world 9

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 works, the notions that form the complex of intellectual shortcuts that help analysts make sense out of information. Good analysts will question their own biases and revise them in the face of contrary evidence, but they cannot get along without some set of working assumptions.43 Even if analysts are independent from policy or objective in a procedural sense they still will not be able to acquire the one true answer (using Hilsmans phrase) or truth (as per Megills concept of objectivity) which is implicitly the goal of the analytic process in the standard model. This means that the accuracy of any particular intelligence analysis may depend as much on the conceptual framework employed in a deductive way to derive meaning as from the inductive accumulation and assessment of the data itself. In this environment, multiple legitimate interpretations of the same situation are possible.44 But even more significant than the existence of conceptual frameworks is that multiple frameworks can exist simultaneously that can interpret the same fact in different ways, based on the set of assumptions that are embedded in the conceptual framework. Since we cannot scientifically verify the objective likelihood of any of the different interpretations, subjective assessment is inherent to the process. Since all intelligence analysis involves at least some degree of subjectivity, this makes the argument that intelligence analysis as objective truth hard to sustain when it then intersects with policy. As Thomas Hughes points out, ideasmeaning the combination of fact and interpretation-- are used and abused by people, including policymakers with power and agendas.45 This interplay of fact, concept, and agenda means that any particular fact or set of facts can be interpreted any number of different ways based on the concepts and agendas doing the interpretations. This is significant, because it means that some form of interplay between fact, concept and agenda may be necessary for intelligence to influence policy at all. This is a very important point. If multiple interpretations are possible from the same set of data, how can one imbue the intelligence analysis with any more credibility or legitimacy than an analysis of the same situation produced by decisionmakers? Why is the intelligence analysts possession of independence as a proxy for procedural objectivity assumed to imbue the analysis with greater accuracy? In fact, it is entirely possible that decisionmakers could employ more accurate conceptual models in their evaluation of the same set of raw intelligence and come up with an assessment that is different from, and more accurate than, that produced by intelligence analysts. Sometimes policymakers have more accurate understandings of international relations than intelligence analysts do due to their expertise, knowledge and alternative sources of information. 46 For example, Robert Gates has said that on more than a few occasions, policymakers have analyzed or forecast developments better than intelligence analysts.47 Or, as former National Intelligence Council vice chair Graham Fuller has observed, sometimes the policy-makers analytic instincts might be better than the analysts (Q)uality of judgment may be found anywhere.48

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Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 Would the positive influence of this more accurate policymaker judgment on intelligence analysis be considered politicization as well? This kind of influence involves exactly the same mechanism as that posited for the negative outcomes of politicization, but has a positive outcome instead. If the problem is with the mechanism of influence (incorporation of decisionmaker insight, understandings and influence in intelligence analysis) then how can a bad thing (the influence) result in a positive outcome (more accurate assessment)? While decisionmaker preferences and to a lesser degree assessments are invariably portrayed as negative in the intelligence literature, presumably because of the incentive for policymakers to be influenced by motivated bias, the inclusion of such preferences and assessments in intelligence analysis can have either positive or negative effects on policy depending on the accuracy of the policymaker assessments. The expectations built into the standard model are unable to account for such positive influence of policy on intelligence, further highlighting its limitations as a foundation for the conceptualization of politicization. Intelligence analysts can try to be objective, and they can try not to bring their underlying biases regarding the meaning of the information to the table when decisionmakers are debating policy options. But bias cannot be completely removed. Even if procedural efforts to achieve objectivity are followed and decisionmaker preferences are not taken into account, the fact that absolute objectivity is not attainable undermines the rationale for a nominally objective contribution of analysis into the policy process especially when the analysts possess different starting assumptions, or cognitive frameworks, or biases, than the respective decision makers do. Decisionmakers Ignore Inconvenient Intelligence Finally, the third problem with the standard model is that there is no evidence that it works in improving foreign policy or national security decisionmaking. Implicit in the standard model is an assumption that when decisionmakers are confronted with assessments from experts that differ from their own, they will change their assessment, and by implication their policies, to bring them into conformity with what the experts believe. On receiving the inconvenient fact or unwanted interpretation, policymakers would realize the errors of their ways, incorporate this new knowledge into their deliberative processes, and use it to change policy for the better. If decisionmakers were willing to adjust their policies then perhaps there is some value of speaking truth to power (assuming that intelligence analysts in fact have some advantage in getting closer to absolute objectivity and truth). But there is little evidence to indicate that this actually occurs.49 Policymaker disregard of intelligence analysis is so prevalent that it forms its own theme within the intelligence studies literature. Perhaps most indicative of this tendency is Robert Gates observation that based on his experiences in working for five Presidential administrations, the usual response of a policymaker to intelligence with which he disagrees or which he finds unpalatable is to ignore it.50 This is worth repeating; Gates is 11

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 suggesting that the usual response of a decisionmaker to the inconvenient fact or unwanted interpretation is to ignore it. Perhaps this is because just as intelligence assessment appears to involve some form of deductive process, so does decisionmaking. When decisionmakers are provided with analysis that differs from their own interpretation, perhaps due to the use of a different conceptual model, the analysis is usually ignored. As Roger Hilsman observed in 1952 while describing intelligence analysts whose analysis is ignored by decisionmakers, it is, of course, a humiliating experience to feel useless and unimportant.51 Then Hilsman goes on to describe the views of one humiliated analyst who said Before they did anything else, policy people should call on intelligence for the information and an estimate. Then they should make their policy. In reality, however, policy was made without intelligence or was only supplemented by intelligence. Intelligence people always had to analyze what had already happened, or merely to give support for policy decisions that were already made. Intelligence did nothing but hack work and research. In practice, the thing was all backwards. When one reads the writings of Sam Adams, or Mel Goodman, or John Gentry, or Paul Pillar, the disillusionment of the analyst in the face of the policymakers decision to ignore their analysis is obvious. So what is the value of independence? Why speak truth to power? In the case of Vietnam, you have Sam Adams complaining that he was not listened to. In the case of the Gates Hearings, you have Mel Goodman and others complaining that they were not listened to. In the case of the Iraq War, you have Paul Pillar complaining that he was not listened to. All of them use the term politicization because they think someone else was listened to instead who provided the decisionmaker with the intelligence that they wanted to hear. Are these cases of what James Wirtz has called policy-to-please when analysts desire to or even pressure intelligence consumers to modify policies in response to estimates?52 Now we are at the crux of the issue related to politicization and independence: because there are a number of different analyses possible from almost any single set of data, the only way to tell the difference between someone who is distorting their analysis to curry favor with or influence policy for partisan purpose (ie. politicizing it) versus actually believing in their interpretation of the situation is to know their true intent, and as the CIA ombudsman for policitization observerd, that is something very hard to do.53 In the end, a lot of the politicization controversy may really be sour grapes complaining by those whose interpretations lost in the competition for influence over decision. Analysts who have not had the influence they thought they should have had may shout politicization even though the actual analysis itself might begiven the information available--a legitimate interpretation if perhaps different from their own. Because of these and other problems with the standard model, over the years there have been various efforts to counter the pernicious effects it has had on normative expectations of the influence that analysis should have on policy. For this reason, some authors have criticized the standard model by comparing it to mythology,54 or theology,55 or 12

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 suggesting that its belief in a strictly professional intelligence process is nothing but an idealized normative fiction,56 or that it may be an unrealistic application of pure science norms to areas where fact and value are inseparable and judgment must preside.57 Yet despite these criticisms, the standard models praise of objectivity and condemnation of analytic politicization remains deeply embedded in the intelligence literature and the normative judgments that scholars and practitioners bring to bear when evaluating how intelligence analysts and decisionmakers should interact. As a result, because absolute objectivity is both embedded in the standard model of intelligence analysis production and an unattainable goal, intelligence professionals have struggled for literally decades to pursue objectivityor prevent subjectivity and politicization--while at the same time maximizing relevance to and influence on policy. In the end all that has been accomplished has been confusion in concept and ineffectiveness in practice. WHAT MAKES ANALYTIC POLITICIZATION BAD? What is needed is a better understanding of the intersection of analysis and decision than that provided by the standard model. A more accurate conceptualization of the role of intelligence analysis in decisionmaking, relying more on a deductive rather than inductive approach to both analysis and decisionmaking, portrays it as a duplicated and subordinate assessment function providing a check on decisionmaker judgment rather than the foundation for it.58 With this model as a starting point, it is clear that there can be many possible legitimate interpretations of the same set of data. As a result, legitimate differences of opinion are a natural part of the process; analysts can disagree with each other, decisionmakers can disagree with analysts, analysts can disagree with decisionmakers, and decisionmakers can disagree with each other. Some interpretations may be better than others but, contrary to Sherman Kents interpretation, disagreement in and of itself is not a sign that there is anything wrong or corrupted. Nor are policymaker decisions not to accept and use the analytic assessments that are provided to them. There is a negative normative judgment associated with analytic politicization (to the point that Betts calls politicization a fighting word59) but it is not entirely clear what exactly it is a corruption of. So what makes analytic politicization a bad thing? To achieve conceptual consistency one could reconceptualize the term in a descriptive rather than pejorative way; defining analytic politicization in its broadest sense, weakening the opprobrium that it is associated with. As the term becomes associated with actions that are intrinsic to the intelligence function, it shouldover timebecome solely descriptive of the use of information to create and implement policies rather than condemnatory. The result would be politicization as something that is, not something that is bad. Richard Betts has taken this approach in his study of politicization. He has suggested that some forms of politicization may be necessary for intelligence to influence policy for the 13

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 better. In other words, he conceptualizes moderate politicization as something that could be interpreted as good.60 Betts approach is to suggest that the term should be considered afresh, without the pejorative assumption. According to Betts, the core of what constitutes bad politicization is the fabrication or distortion of information to serve policy preferences or vested interests.61 But he goes on to say that the strict definition of politicize is not ipso facto pejorative but rather to give a political tone or character or to bring within the realm of politics. Since policymaking and the use of intelligence occurs within the realm of politics, Betts suggests that what passes for politicization in an intelligence context is really normal controversy on other issues. So his approach is to view politicization not as a pejorative, but rather as a value-neutral descriptive term, with some bad manifestations as well as some good ones. The problem with this is that there is a negative connotation associated with politicization that is unlikely to be changed even if academicians and practitioners begin to use it in a value-neutral descriptive way. More useful might be the approach taken by Glenn Hastedt who uses the term publicization to describe the public use of intelligence to advance political or policy agendas rather than employing politicization as an umbrella term.62 Publicization does not have the same negative connotation that politicization has, and provides an opportunity to parse out the descriptive value-neutral use of intelligence in decisionmaking from those that are inappropriate and thus deserving the label politicization. Additional efforts like this would provide a descriptive taxonomy of activities that currently are labeled politicization but do not have negative connotations.63 At the same time that the various kinds of politicization are relabeled to more effectively distinguish one from another, it is also important to identify exactly what makes analytic politicization inappropriate and rebuild the pejorative meaning of the term around that aspect. This involves isolating on the aspects of politicization that is inherently bad or worthy of condemnation and to then limit the use of the term solely to that aspect of politicization. A model for doing this can be found in the study of political violence in general and terrorism in particular. What Makes Terrorism Bad? Like politicization, the term terrorism contains the same sort of normative judgment and is implicitly condemnatory. But not everyone possesses the same norms. Sometimes we agree with the way the label terrorist is used. Sometimes we do not. A closer examination of the word terrorism reveals that what some people perceive as bad others perceive as good. The classic example in terrorism studies is the observation that a terrorist from one perspective is a freedom fighter from another. The difference in normative expectation frequently has more to do with whether or not one agrees with the goal that the terrorist or terrorist group is fighting for rather than anything intrinsic to the actions taken by the terrorist or terrorist group. As a result, in the study of terrorism there is a conceptual differentiation between the descriptive term political violence and the pejorative term terrorism. Political violence is a term that can be used to describe the range of violence pursued for political ends; from 14

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 war to insurgency to terrorism. As a value-neutral term, it does not make a value judgment about the acceptability or legitimacy of this violence but rather takes its political nature as a descriptive characteristic. By way of contrast, the term terrorism is implicitly condemnatory. So what is it about terrorism that makes it a form of unacceptable or illegitimate political violence deserving of special condemnation? Although a number of scholars have tried to create a single, universal definition for terrorism, they have not succeeded. A good place to start, though, is Bruce Hoffmans definition of terrorism as: the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change with its specific criteria being that it is political in aims and motives, violent or threatens violence, designed to cause fear beyond the immediate victim or target, and perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate entity.64 This definition helps clarify one unacceptable form of violence (terrorism) from another (crime) due to the latters lack of political purpose or intent to cause fear. It also helps distinguish war from terrorism by specifying that terrorism can only be committed by non-state or substate actors. But there are a few problems with it as well. First, all of Hoffmans criteria except for the last regarding the non-state nature of the group could be used to condemn actions taken by governments during wartime. This means that an action taken by a government may be deemed acceptable as warfare but the same action taken by a subnational group or nonstate entity could be considered terrorism and thus morally reprehensible. This is a double standard based solely on the status of the group as state or non-state, and as such requires additional examination. Second, there is nothing in Hoffmans definition that prevents it from being applied to insurgents or revolutionaries that we might believe are pursuing legitimate, justified ends with the goal of promoting freedom, democracy, and self-determination against the forces of tyranny and oppression. Are these good terrorists? Maybe they are freedom fighters? For example, the kinds of terrorists that might fit Hoffmans definition but be inconsistent with the negative normative judgment about the action include the American Revolutionaries who participated in the Boston Tea Party, or the Irgun, a forerunner group that helped create the state of Israel. In both cases, the terrorists in question may have (arguably) been justified in terms of the violence committed to advance their particular political agendas. If violence can be committed by legitimate state actors to pursue national interests--not even a positive vision for the world, but pragmatic power acquisition--why is violence conducted by non-state actors in pursuit of a positive vision (as they see it) of the world a bad thing? Is violence necessarily bad if it is put toward good ends? This is a crucial point: can terrorism be good? Or is there something intrinsic to the term terrorism itself that has a negative connotation, implying that the action described should be condemned? And if there is, does the existence of good terrorism mean that there is a conceptual problem with the definition of the term? How can a bad thing be a good thing? Or maybe we just have not yet defined the best criteria to use to make that 15

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 distinction between good and bad political violence. So there is a problem with consistency of the normative framework applied and there is nothing in the definition of terrorism that makes it inherently bad. In the end, Hoffmans definition does not provide a framework for clarifying what it is about terrorism that is worthy of condemnation. A more refined approach to the definition of terrorism requires distinguishing its activities from more conventional forms of violence applied in warfare. This can be done using Just War Criteria. While these criteria are usually used to evaluate the justification of political violence conducted by state actors, the same framework can also be used to evaluate the justification of political violence by non-state actors.65 In using the Just War Criteria to evaluate terrorist action, it becomes clear that the key criteria that separates the kind of political violence that deserves moral condemnation and that which can be evaluated with more equanimity is discrimination. Discrimination in this context means ensuring that any violence employed is targeted against combatants rather than non-combatants. This does not mean that non-combatants or civilians cannot be killed. Sometimes such deaths, tragic as they are, are the unintentional byproduct of legitimate, justified warfare. They become collateral damage, as per the modern day euphemism. The key distinction here in operationalizing the criterion of discrimination is intent. If the intent is to target an enemy, and the targeting was mistaken or the missile goes off course or civilians get caught in the crossfire, then civilians may die but we can excuse it or justify it as an awful cost of war. Yet the specific, intentional targeting of non-combatants or civilians is something different; an indiscriminate violation of moral norms established for the just use of violence. It is the intentional targeting of non-combatants or civilians that makes the violence bad. Discrimination, then, becomes the defining criteria to use in addressing the normative issues related to evaluating the justification of political violence. If a state violates this criterion in wartime, it would be considered a war crime. But if a non-state actor violates this criterion, then it would be considered terrorism. Given that there is no such distinction in intelligence studies between acceptable differences of analytic interpretation from unacceptable analytic politicization, we can use the foregoing discussion as a model for deconstructing and parsing the terminology of politicization as part of the re-conceptualization process. Intent Makes Analytic Politicization Bad The argument made here is that intent may be useful to distinguish analytic distortion worthy of condemnation from other forms of analytic distortion. Just as one cannot distinguish legitimate political violence from illegitimate terrorism based solely on the end result, good politicization cannot be distinguished from bad politicization based solely on how ideas or concepts influence interpretation. Instead in both cases that determination must hinge on a judgment of intent.

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Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 First, the act of politicizing must be committed by an intelligence analyst rather than a decisionmaker. So decisionmakers sometimes incentivize (reward, co-opt, pressure) the provision of information or analysis to support their views or a particular policy option. But it is important to point out that decisionmakers are not themselves distorting the analytic product. Even though an incentive may be present, only an analyst can distort the analytic product to create intelligence to please. Therefore decisionmakers cannot commit analytic politicization. Policymaker desire for intelligence analysis that supports their agendas is, in this extended analogy, roughly equivalent to the insurgencys political leadership desiring an effective attack against the adversary. But desire to achieve objectives alone is not an adequate reason to condemn the decisionmaker. In the terrorism example, if the leader of an insurgent groups political wing presses his military leadership to identify suitable targets for achieving the objective, he is no more committing terrorism than a decisionmaker who questions the intelligence analyst to explain and defend his or her interpretation of the situation. Just as the military leadership should not suggest and then indiscriminately attack a civilian target just to make the political decisionmakers happy, or else a war crime may result, neither should the intelligence analyst distort his or her findings in accordance with what the decisionmaker wants to hear. In other words, perceived or even real pressure alone is inadequate as a basis to make the determination that analytic politicization has occurred. If the analysts control the message and politicization is defined as the inappropriate distortion of that message, then decisionmakers cannot be responsible for analytic politicization. Second, the key criteria for distinguishing legitimate analytic differences of opinion from analytic distortion worthy of condemnation as politicization is the intentional changing of analysis to conform to (or oppose) policymaker preferences. Unintentional changing of analysis to conform to policymaker preferences, while sloppy and leading to the same consequences (distorted analysis) is a different case, just as it is in the threat or use of political violence. What matters most is intent. Government militaries can kill civilians without being accused of war crimes so long as the attack was proportional, discriminate, and aimed at opposition forces (i.e. civilian deaths were unintended collateral damage). Similarly, insurgents or non-state actors can kill civilians without being condemned as terrorists so long as the same criteria apply to their actions. The argument here is that the same kind of equivalency should exist in the field of intelligence analysis and politicization. Intentional distortion of the message is to be condemned, while unintentional distortion, unfortunate or tragic though it may be, is not analytic politicization. It is that simple; the presence of intent alone is the sole mechanism to use in distinguishing legitimate differences of interpretation or unfortunate unintentional distortion from the intentional form of analytic politicization that should be condemned. 17

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 PARSING AND PREVENTING ANALYTIC POLITICIZATION For conceptual coherence and consistency it is important to identify precisely why analytic politicization is a bad thing. Politically-driven violence provides a useful prism with which to view the concept of politicization because just as there are many different views regarding the acceptable use of violence, there are many different views regarding the appropriate intersection of intelligence and policy. Pacifists opposed to the use of violence in one domain might be equivalent to purists in the other who have objections to the intersection and engagement of intelligence and politics. In both cases they might be viewed as idealists hoping for a perfect world and both frustrated and disappointed by the one they encounter. Alternatively, there are those in both camps who fight to win regardless of consequence; they believe the ends justify the means and are perfectly willing to do whatever is necessary to win regardless of whether that involves indiscriminate use of force or intentional distortion of the analytic product. These are the two extremes. Somewhere in the middle is everyone else. Use of a single set of criteria hinging on the significance of intent can provide conceptual clarity and a means to adjudicate between these different perspectives. An implication of this argument is that politicization as a term is over-used partly due to the norms of analytic politicization being inappropriately applied to condemn decisionmakers for their use of intelligence analysis in a way that is entirely consistent with their responsibilities. Most of us accept that complete independence and separation from politics is an unreachable, idealistic vision for intelligence analysis; that politics is necessary for the healthy functioning of democracy, and that the interplay of intelligence and politics is necessary in the same way that political violence is sometimes necessary, and perhaps even a good thing. One byproduct of democracy is that policymakers frequently cherry pick information to sell their policies to the general public. People in democracies want to be convinced that their elected leaders know how to solve their problems. They are not interested in what may be the truth: that there is a lot policymakers do not know; that they think the proposed policy may work to solve the problem but are not really sure. Now what political leader is going to be able to convince people to support his policy with that kind of message? So in order to make the message more appealing to the electorate, the politicians strip out uncertainty and ambiguity, and present their case with more confidence than they really possess. They use information to support their case in the same way that a lawyer doesto convince the jury, and win. In this context, what is the difference between politicizing and policymaking? Cherry picking information to make a case and then using that information to sell the case to the electorate may actually be a normal part of politics and decisionmaking. Is this really a bad thing? Maybe this is a form of politicization that really is not bad at all; on the surface it may have similarities to analytic politicization, but in reality is just normal policymaking. As a result, according to one intelligence scholar, the putatively desirable nonpolitical relationship between intelligence estimators and policy makers is a fiction. 18

Submission Draft to Intelligence and National Security Accepted as part of special issue on Politicization Forthcoming 2013 It would not be desirable to separate analysis and policy, even if it were possible. However, a politicized relationship between analysis and policy need not be corrupt.66 Which brings us to the second implication of this argument, that preventing corruption of the analytic product requires that intelligence analysts retain a strong sense of professional identity and integrity. This is something that Robert Gates identified in the early 1990, suggestion that the first line of defense against politicization and analytic distortions is our own personal integrity with the absolute integrity of our analysis as the most important of the core values of the professional intelligence analyst.67 Reinforcing these points, Melvin Goodman, coincidentally one of Gates harshest critics, comes to the same conclusion; that prevention of politicization requires analytic integrity. Even though Goodman believes Gates himself politicized analysis when he worked at the CIA, he says that in the final analysis, the only protections against politicization are the integrity and honesty of the intelligence analysts themselves as well as the institution of competitive analysis that serves as a safeguard against unchallenged acceptance of conventional wisdom.68 If what makes analytic politicization a corruption of the process is the intent to distort, then prevention of that corruption requires the creation and promulgation of an analytic code of ethics that has at its core the requirement for integrity based on individual judgment and a fair reading of the information available. This does not mean that the intelligence analyst can or should be objective, for objectivity is not possible. Nor does it mean that independence from policy and other efforts to protect the analyst from the negative effects of motivated bias will result in a more accurate assessment than that of the policymaker. Nor does it mean that analytic consistency or inconsistency with policymaker preferences matters. All that is required to prevent analytic politicization is a fair reading of the information available combined with integrity in its interpretation and honesty in its communication. Accordingly, the motto of the intelligence analyst should not be related to seeking truth or speak truth to power but rather call it as you see it.
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Harry Howe Ransom. The Politicization of Intelligence. Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society. (Ed. Stephen Cimbala). Transnational Publishers. Dobbs Ferry, NY.1987.(25-46). 26. 2 Ransom, 44. 3 Robert Jervis. Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq. The Journal of Strategic Studies. Vol. 29. No. 1. February 2006. (3-52).11. 4 Jack Davis. Facts, Findings, Forecasts, and Fortune-telling: Defining the Analytic Mission. Studies in Intelligence. Fall 1995. 5 Conversation with the-then CIA Ombudsman for Politicization. December 15, 1999. 6 Paul R. Pillar. Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq. Foreign Affairs. Mar- Apr 2006. V85 N2. 15-27. 7 Anthony Glees and Philip H.J. Davies. Spinning the Spies: Intelligence, Open Government, and the Hutton Inquiry. The Social Affairs Unit, London. 2004. 41. 8 John Gentry. Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis Misserves the Nation. University Press of America, Maryland. 1993. 230-231 9 Gentry 233. 10 Gentry, 233-234. 11 Jennifer Sims. What is Intelligence? Information for Decisionmaking. U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform. (Eds. Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt). National Strategy Information Center Inc. 1995. (3-16.) 5.

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Joshua Rovner. Pathologies of Intelligence-Policy Relations. 2005. Unpublished paper. 61-64. Pillar, 15-27. 14 Pillar, 15-27. 15 Pillar, 15-27. 16 Pillar, 15-27. 17 US Senate. 1991. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Hearing on the Nomination of Robert M. Gates, of Virginia, to be Director of Central Intelligence. 5 November 1991. 102 nd Congress. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/Z?r102:S05NO1-73: 18 Conversation with the-then CIA Ombudsman for Politicization. December 15, 1999. 19 Conversation with the-then CIA Ombudsman for Politicization. December 15, 1999. 20 Conversation with the-then CIA Ombudsman for Politicization. December 15, 1999. 21 Gentry, 246. 22 Gregory Treverton. Intelligence Analysis: Between Politicization and Irrelevance. (Eds. Roger George and James Bruce.) Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations. Georgetown University Press. Washington DC. 2008. (91-104). 92. 23 Sims, 5. 24 For example, see Scott Lucas. Recognising Politicization: The CIA and the Path to the 2003 War in Iraq. Intelligence and National Security, 26: 2 (2011). (203- 227). 205-208. 25 Jeffrey R. Cooper. Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Dec. 2005. 34. 26 Treverton, 93. 27 Treverton, 93. 28 For more on the standard model, see Stephen Marrin. Intelligence Analysis and Decisionmaking: Methodological Challenges. Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates. (Eds. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian). Routledge. 2008. 131-150. 29 Sherman Kent. Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Archon Books, Hamden CT. 1949. (Reprinted 1965). 182. 30 Roger Hilsman. Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs. World Politics. April 1953. (1-45). 12-13. 31 Michael Handel. The Politics of Intelligence. Intelligence and National Security. Vol. 2. No. 4. (Oct 1987). (5-38.) 7. 32 See chapter 2, A Theory of the Politicization of Expertise in Bruce Bimber. The Politics of Expertise in Congress: The Rise and Fall of the Office of Technology Assessment. SUNY Press. 1996. 12. 33 Glenn Hastedt, The New Context of Intelligence Estimating: Politicization or Publicizing?, in Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society (ed. Stephen J. Cimbala) Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers Inc., 1987: 54. 34 Allan Megill. Introduction: Four Senses of Objectivity. (Ed. Allan Megill) Rethinking Objectivity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994. (1-20). 1. 35 See chapter on intelligence producers and consumers in Kent, 180-206. 36 Allan Megill. Introduction: Four Senses of Objectivity. (Ed. Allan Megill) Rethinking Objectivity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994. (1-20). 1. 37 Kevin Russell. The Subjectivity of Intelligence Analysis and Implications for the U.S. National Security Strategy. SAIS Review. Winter-Spring 2004. (147-163). 157. 38 Kent, 198. 39 For more on the inductive fallacy as applied to intelligence, see: Klaus Knorr. Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences. Research Monograph No. 17. Center of International Studies. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Princeton University. June 1, 1964. 40 Willmoore Kendall. The Function of Intelligence World Politics. 1/ 4. (July 1949) pp.542-552. 41 Thomas L. Hughes, The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: Foreign Policy and Intelligence-Making, Headline Series #233 New York: Foreign Policy Association, December 1976, 10. 42 Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 46. 43 Richard K. Betts. Intelligence for Policymaking. Washington Quarterly (Summer 1980) (118-29) 126. Note that Betts definition of bias is not that of a subjective preference shaping the assessment, but rather

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intended in the scientific sense of bias meaning something that shapes our perception in such a way as to prevent the achievement of perfect accuracy. 44 See Richards Heuers distinction between data-driven analysis and concept-driven analysis at: Richards Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. CIA: Center for the Study of Intelligence. 1999. 59-62. 45 Hughes, The Fate of Facts, 10. 46 At times this more accurate understanding is due to possession of more accurate models or cognitive frameworks; at other times it is due to their expertise, knowledge and alternative sources of information. 47 Gates, The CIA and American Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs 66, no. 2 (Winter 1987-1988). (215230). 221. 48 Graham E. Fuller. Statement of Graham E. Fuller, Former Vice-Chairman, National Intelligence Council, CIA. For the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 1 October 1991. 11. As cited in John Gentry. Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis Misserves the Nation. University Press of American, Maryland. 1993. 244. 49 Stephen Marrin. Intelligence Analysis and Decisionmaking: Methodological Challenges. Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates. (Eds. Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian). Routledge. 2008. 131-150. 50 Robert M. Gates. The CIA and American Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs. Winter 1987-88. Vol. 66. No. 2. 215-230. 227. 51 Hilsman, Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs, 23-24. 52 James J. Wirtz. Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), (pp. 239-263). 262. 53 Conversation with the-then CIA Ombudsman for Politicization. December 15, 1999. 54 National Estimates: An Assessment of the Product and the Process. Intelligence Monograph. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency. April 1977. 37-38 55 Thomas L. Hughes. The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: Foreign Policy and Intelligence-Making. Headline Series #233; the Foreign Policy Association. New York. December 1976. 5. 56 Michael I. Handel. Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise. The Journal of Strategic Studies. V7. N3. (1984). 235. 57 Richard K. Betts. American Strategic Intelligence: Politics, Priorities, and Direction. Intelligence Policy and National Security. Eds. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Uri Raanan. The Macmillan Press. 1981. (245-267). 257. 58 Stephen Marrin. Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and Predicting Analytic Responsibilities. Intelligence and National Security. 22:6 (December 2007). 821- 846. 59 Richard K. Betts. Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security. Columbia University Press. New York. 2007. 67. 60 Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 67. 61 Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, 74. 62 Glenn P. Hastedt. The New Context of Intelligence Estimating: Politicization or Publicizing? Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society. (Ed. Stephen J. Cimbala). Transnational Publishers, Inc. Dobbs Ferry, NY. 1987. (47-67). 63 See, for example, Glenn Hastedts effort to parse out different kinds of politicization in this issue. 64 Bruce Hoffman. Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. 2006. 40. 65 For a good discussion of the employment of just war theory to terrorism, see: Andrew Valls. Can Terrorism Be Justified? Ethics in International Affairs : Theories and Cases, Andrew Valls, ed. Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. 65-79. Also see: Scott Lowe. Terrorism and Just War Theory. Bloomsburg University. 1-7. 66 Stephen J. Cimbala. Introduction. Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society. (Ed. Stephen J. Cimbala). Transnational Publishers, Inc. Dobbs Ferry, NY. 1987. 1-23. 67 Robert M. Gates. Guarding against Politicization. Studies in Intelligence 36, no. 5 (1992): 5-13. 68 Melvin A. Goodman. The CIA and the Perils of Politicization. International Policy Report (A Publication of the Center for International Policy). March 2008. (1-9). 9.

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