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SIGAR Afghanistan

SIGAR Afghanistan

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Published by qmichaud

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Published by: qmichaud on Nov 04, 2012
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Special Inspector General forAfghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit 13-1
SIGAR Audit 13-1/O&M Contracts for ANSF Facilities
For more information contact: SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil.
In February 2011, the North AtlanticTreaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) developed the
Infrastructure Training Advisory Group (ITAG) Campaign Plan
, whichcalls for the transition of operationand maintenance (O&M) of AfghanNational Security Forces (ANSF)facilities to the Afghan governmentand full Afghan-led sustainment by2014. Because the Afghangovernment currently lacks thecapacity to provide O&M, NTM-Aobligated $800 million to fund theseservices for ANSF facilities acrossAfghanistan until the Afghangovernment is able to handle O&M.In July 2010, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) awarded twocontracts covering the northern andsouthern parts of the country to ITTExelis Systems Corporation (Exelis) toprovide O&M for ANSF facilities andto train ANSF workers on the requiredtrade skills. As of early June 2012,the contracts covered 480 facilities—about 45 percent army and 55percent police—ranging from largeCorps headquarters to smaller policedistrict headquarters. This reportassesses the extent to which (1)NTM-A and USACE are developing thecapacity of the ANSF to sustain itsfacilities after full transition in 2014,(2) Exelis has implemented the O&Mcontracts within the contracts’ terms,and (3) USACE and Exelis haveprovided oversight of the contracts.SIGAR conducted this work in sevenprovinces in Afghanistan from July2011 to October 2012 in accordancewith generally accepted governmentauditing standards.
The Afghan government will likely be incapable of fully sustaining ANSFfacilities after the transition in 2014 and the expected decrease in U.S.and coalition support. The Afghan government’s challenges in assuming O&M responsibilities include a lack of sufficient numbers and quality of personnel, as well as undeveloped budgeting, procurement, and logisticssystems. We found:
As of June 1, 2012, the Afghan government had filled less than40 percent of authorized O&M positions. U.S. officials citedsalary discrepancies between these ANSF positions and privatesector jobs, such as contract positions, as a prime factor in thelagging recruitment efforts.
The ANSF lacks personnel with the technical skills required tooperate and maintain critical facilities, such as water supply,waste water treatment, and power generation.
The Ministry of Defense’s procurement process is unable toprovide the Afghan army with O&M supplies in a timely manner.The Ministry of Interior did not make its first budget allocation forO&M at police sites until March 2012.
As of August 1, 2012, 25 sites had started the transition process.However, USACE had not yet developed a plan and procedures
O&M trainees repairing heating and air conditioning units of barracks at the KabulMilitary Training Center, SIGAR site inspection, October 2011.
Special Inspector General
 Afghanistan Reconstruction
October 2012
 Afghan National Security Forces Facilities: Concerns with Funding,Oversight, and Sustainability for Operation and Maintenance
For more information contact: SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 545-5974 or sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil.
SIGAR is making threerecommendations to the Commanderof the USACE Middle East District. Toensure that USACE funds areexpended in accordance with theO&M contracts and enhance contractoversight, SIGAR is recommending that USACE (1) complete its plan andprocedures for removing partialfacilities from the contracts andreclassifying these facilities, (2)implement standardized proceduresfor overseeing the two contracts, and(3) direct Exelis to fully implement itsquality control program in southernAfghanistan. USACE concurred withthe recommendations and describedspecific steps it is taking to addressthem.
removing partial facilities from the contractsand continued to pay O&M costs for structuresthat were no longer covered under thecontracts.NTM-A and USACE have taken some steps to developthe Afghan government’s capacity to provide O&M, suchas training and mentoring ANSF personnel, but theAfghan government has resisted some of thesemeasures. For example, the Ministry of Interior wouldnot add O&M positions, even though it acknowledgedthat ANP facility engineer sections need to grow to meetincreased demand.With respect to USACE’s contracts to provide O&M untilthe Afghan government develops the necessarycapacity, we found that Exelis generally invoiced andprovided O&M services in accordance with the terms of the contracts. Exelis had difficulty mobilizing during theinitial phase of the contracts, slowing contractimplementation.
Factors outside the contractor’s control,including harassment of contractor personnel,poor construction quality, and irregular fueldeliveries, disrupted O&M services and, if thiscontinues, may lead to increases in contractcosts.
NTM-A analysis projects that the northerncontract will run out of funding in March 2014,16 months before the end of the contractperiod of performance. As a result, USACE willhave to award and fund a new contract toprovide continued O&M coverage.Oversight varied across and within the two O&Mcontracts, which may decrease USACE’s ability toensure that Exelis is providing services in accordancewith contract requirements.
USACE officials implemented ad hoc oversightand reporting procedures to oversee the twocontracts in lieu of standardized qualityassurance procedures, causing variations inthe quality of reporting and frequency of siteinspections.
Implementation of Exelis’ quality controlprogram in the south was incomplete. Exelisconducted few site visits to facilities in thesouth, and the contractor had not staffed hublocations in two southern provinces.Main electrical panel at Police District 3 inKabul, SIGAR site inspection, January 2012.

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