UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT NO.

12-2145 MYRNA COLON MARRERO PLAINTIFF, APPELLANT v. HECTOR CONTY, ET AL DEFENDANT-APPELLEE EMERGENCY MOTION REQUESTING INTERVENTION ON APPEAL TO THE HONORABLE COURT: Comes now Intervenor1, John E. Mudd, pro se, and very

respectfully state, allege and pray: 1. On Sunday, November 4, 2012, the District Court in

Marrero-Coln v. Conty, civil case 12-1749 CCC has issued an order requiring the Puerto Rico State Election Commission to allow all inactivated voters, I-8, from the 2008 election, to vote in the added-by-hand polling station following the

established procedures for these voters2. As the order does not specify that these voters are to vote only for the position of Resident Commissioner, it is clear that it would include voting for all Commonwealth electoral positions. Also, the order states at page 6, that the adjudication of said ballots shall be

postponed to allow for this Courts resolution of the merits of

1 2

A motion to intervene has also been filed today. Exhibit 1 of this motion.

the I-8 voters constitutional challenges now pending before it. 2. Intervenor, as a registered voter and resident of Puerto Rico. He has an interest that the elections be conducted in this Commonwealth in clean, transparent and prompt fashion. In fact, he has a constitutional interest in these elections. The District Courts order of November 4, 2012 will severely disrupt said elections, is contrary to her own determination on the

injunction, is contrary to this Courts denial of a preliminary injunction and is contrary to the Federal Courts longstanding policy of not interfering with local elections and should be set aside by this panel, as discussed in the Emergency Motion

Requesting Relief from Court Order. 3. Plaintiff represented a party who attempted to intervene in the District Court case but later withdrew the request given the Circuit Courts orders for an evidentiary hearing and its findings of probability of success. In addition, given the

Circuit Courts orders denying the injunction, there was no need for further intervention. It is only after todays order that plaintiff is moved to file this request which is of an

extraordinary election. See, Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 211 F.3d 515, 519 (10th Cir.2000). I. THE STANDARD FOR INTERVENTION PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. 24(A)(2) 4. F.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) states as follows: (a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court

must permit anyone to intervene who: . . . (2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest. 5. A person seeking intervention must show (1) that the intervention is timely made; (2) it has an interest in the

property or transaction involved in the suit; (3) the disposition of the action threatens to create a practical impediment and (4) no existing party adequately represents its interests. See, B. Fernndez & Hermanos, Inc., v. Kellog U.S.A., Inc., 440 F.3d 541, 544-45 (1st Cir. 2006) and Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Patch, 136 F.3d. 197, 204 (1st Cir. 1998). 6. A presumption exists, however, in those cases where the intervener would be a defendant and the Government is also the defendant, against the lack of an existing party to adequately represent the formers interests. This presumption, however, is rebuttable. Presumption means no more in this context than calling for an adequate explanation as to why what is assumedhere, adequate representation-is not so. . . The facts of these cases vary greatly of and whatever the proposed be interveners in

explanation

inadequacy

suffices

must

determined

keeping with a commonsense view of the overall litigation. Maine v. Director, U.S. Wildlife Fish and Wildlife Service, 262 F.3d

13, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) and Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Patch, ante. IV. APLICATION OF THE FACTS TO THE LAW 7. As discussed in the motion requesting relief from order,

the District Court has granted the injunction that itself and this Circuit Court denied without any of the safeguards

admonished it her findings. Intervener fears a total disruption not only of the elections and the plebiscite but also certainty that on November 7, 2012, Puerto Ricans will not have a certainty of who won the election, who won the plebiscite and whether this was a valid election. As a citizen, Intervenor does not believe this should be allowed and hence requests leave to intervene. WHEREFORE, Intervenor-Appelle respectfully requests that he be allowed to intervene. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 4th of November, 2012. CERTIFY: That on this same date I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court, using CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all parties in this case. /s John E. Mudd John E. Mudd Bar Number: 201102 First Circuit No. 28804 Attorney for Plaintiffs LAW OFFICES JOHN E. MUDD P. O. BOX 194134 SAN JUAN, P.R. 00919 (787)413-1673 Fax. (787)753-2207 E-Mail jemudd@yahoo.com

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT NO. 12-2145 MYRNA COLON MARRERO PLAINTIFF, APPELLANT v. HECTOR CONTY, ET AL DEFENDANT-APPELLEE EMERGENCY MOTION REQUESTING RELIEF FROM COURT ORDER TO THE HONORABLE COURT: Comes now Intervenor1, John E. Mudd, pro se, and very

respectfully state, allege and pray: 1. On Sunday, November 4, 2012, the District Court in

Marrero-Coln v. Conty, civil case 12-1749 CCC has issued an order requiring the Puerto Rico State Election Commission to allow all inactivated voters, I-8, from the 2008 election, to vote in the added-by-hand polling station following the

established procedures for these voters2. As the order does not specify that these voters are to vote only for the position of Resident Commissioner, it is clear that it would include voting for all Commonwealth electoral positions. Also, the order states at page 6, that the adjudication of said ballots shall be

postponed to allow for this Courts resolution of the merits of

1 2

A motion to intervene has also been filed today. Exhibit 1 of this motion.

the I-8 voters constitutional challenges now pending before it. 2. Intervenor, as a registered voter, has an interest that the elections be conducted in this Commonwealth in clean,

transparent and prompt fashion. The District Courts order of November 4, 2012 will severely disrupt said elections, is

contrary to her own determination on the injunction, is contrary to this Courts to the denial Federal of a preliminary injunction policy and of is not

contrary

Courts

longstanding

interfering with local elections and should be set aside by this panel, as discussed infra. I. THE DISTRICT COURTS ORDER IS CONTRARY TO THE PANELS OPINION 3. The District Court denied plaintiffs preliminary

injunction saying that (1) it was not convinced it would prevail on the merits and (2) that it did not have the requisite

irreparable harm for its damages, i.e., not being able to vote in the general election, was self-inflicted. After the Circuit Court ordered a hearing to determine the other two factors in the preliminary injunction paradigm, where the District Court made many factual determinations, including one that [a]s stated

before, the Acevedo proposal will only be feasible if acted upon by this Friday, October 19, 2012.3 4. After receiving the Certified Findings, the Circuit Court denied the preliminary injunction stating, inter alia, that the
3

Page 14 of Findings Certified to the Court of Appeals. 2

National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NAVRA) did not apply to Puerto Rico, that the Help America Vote Act of 2002 did apply to Puerto Rico, that plaintiff had made the requisite showing of probability determination general of of prevailing whether was an in her HAVA that claim, she BUT, in the the In

HAVA

required and

vote

elections

open

difficult

question4.

addition, the Circuit Court was concerned with crafting a recusal procedure could very well be beyond the Courts power and it we would be ill equipped to do so in the short time remaining before the election.5 5. request however, election, Both for in District a its and Circuit Courts denied plaintiffs Court, the

preliminary November both 4

injunction. order, and just the

The two

District days

before by

reversed

itself

Circuit

granting

plaintiff more than she actually sought in her original claim, i.e., for all I-8 voters to vote on November 6. In addition, although Mr. Acevedo, upon which the District Court based her findings of the added-by-hand polling stations and procedure, made it clear that (1) this had to be done by October 19 and (2) that a recusal procedure had to be enacted because Puerto Ricos law did not allow for recusals for domicile on the day of the election. The District Court, however, failed to take the limited

4 5

See page 9 of this Courts opinion. See page 11 of this Courts opinion. 3

time available and far worse, did not devise a recusal procedure. This is of great importance because if the ultimate finding in this case was that all I-8 voters had a right to vote in the general election, this would mean voting for district senators, district members of the House and mayors, all of which are

determined by place of residency. As Mr. Conty stated, and Mr. Acevedo agreed, the possibility of these elections being decided by residents of different districts must be addressed but here it is not. Moreover, if there is no way of recusing votes on

Election Day, when will they be recused? What law will apply to this, federal or state law? The conflicts continue to multiply. 6. Moreover, the Circuit Court wisely decided not to grant the injunction due to the closeness to the election and the unsurmountable however, has problems in it would granted bring. said The District Court, in

effect

injunction

putting

jeopardy local elections. If the District Courts order is not reversed, on November 6, 330,902 additional potential voter will be allowed to vote. If, as Mr. Acevedo opined, only 40% of them vote, this would mean 132,361 votes. If only 10% voted, this would mean 33,090 votes. The Circuit Court may take judicial notice that elections in Puerto Rico have been decided by far less votes. Hence, if the District Court were to determine that those ballots are to be counted and given that there will be a hearing on December 1, 2012, and an appeal on whatever decision

entered, what certainty have Puerto Ricos voters of knowing their elected officials by January 2, 2013, the date of the inauguration of the new governor, etc.? The whole electoral

process of the island of Puerto Rico will have been taken over by the Federal Court system, something that is contrary to our

federalism. In addition, the Ninth Circuit held in Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 732 (1st Cir. 2012) that HAVA does not apply to local elections. 7. Hence, given that the District Courts order is contrary to this Courts decision on denying the preliminary injunction and violates the law of the case doctrine, it should be reversed. See, Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1250-51 (2011). II. HAVA DOES NOT PROVIDE A CAUSE OF ACTION AND PURSUANTO TO SECTION 1983 FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM INTERVENING IN LOCAL ELECTION DISPUTES 8. It is pellucid that HAVA does not provide a cause of action, see, Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir.2004); Taylor v. Onorato, 428 F.Supp.2d 384, 386 (W.D.Pa.2006) and Florida Democratic Party v. Hood, 342 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1077 (N.D.Fla.2004). Those seeking to enforce it have recurred to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Any attempt to do so, however, requires a thorough analysis via Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287-90 (2002). a The Court must analyze whether whether the the

provision

contains

right

creating

language,

provision has an aggregate rather than an individualized focus

and

whether by

there

are

other see

sorts

of

enforcement Grande

provisions Health

provided

Congress,

also,

Ro

Community

Center, Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 73 (1st Cir. 2005); Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2004); Sabre v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 2004) and Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2005). 9. The Court in Taylor v. Oronato, 428 F.Supp.2d 384, 386-87 (W.D. Penn. 2006) analyzed HAVA and determined that it did not provide a federal right redeemable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. It also made is clear that pursuant to sections 301, 302 and 303 of HAVA, the United States Attorney General was the party with the right to enforce said law. See also the Attorney Generals position concerning said enforcement Hence, at the

http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/hava/hava.php.

District Court in reality has no authority to require what she is requiring from the State Elections Commission. 10. Moreover, as plaintiff has informed the Appellate Court, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has issued an opinion on the voting rights of these I-8 voters. The District Courts order has caused a frontal clash between state and federal authorities, which strains our federalism. In Rosell-Gonzlez v. Caldern-Sierra, 398 F.3d 1, 15-18 (1st Cir. 2005) reiterated the Circuits

precedent in Bonas v. Town of North Smithfield, 265 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir.2001), that election law as it pertains to state and

local elections is the exclusive competence of state courts. See also, Gonzlez-Cancel v. Partido Nuevo Progesista, 2012 WL

4494967 (1st Cir. October 2, 2012). The District Courts order federalizes the Puerto Rico electoral system, will postpone the start of the new government in January, potentially have non residents of certain districts elect its officials and violates the sacrosanct tenant of one person, one vote. 11. Our federalism is of paramount importance. As the

Supreme Court stated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971): This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism," and one familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism." The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, "Our Federalism," born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future. 12. As stated above, the District Courts order cannot be based on section 1983 since HAVA does not confer a cause of action. Hence, the District Courts decision is contrary to our

federalism and must be reversed.

WHEREFORE, Intervenor-Appelle respectfully requests that the District Courts November 4, 2012 order be reversed. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 4th of November, 2012. CERTIFY: That on this same date I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court, using CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all parties in this case. /s John E. Mudd John E. Mudd Bar Number: 201102 First Circuit No. 28804 Attorney for Plaintiffs LAW OFFICES JOHN E. MUDD P. O. BOX 194134 SAN JUAN, P.R. 00919 (787)413-1673 Fax. (787)753-2207 E-Mail jemudd@yahoo.com

Case 3:12-cv-01749-CCC Document 81

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO MYRNA COLON-MARRERO; JOSEFINA ROMAGUERA-AGRAIT Plaintiffs vs HECTOR CONTY-PEREZ, as President of the Puerto Rico State Elections; EDWIN MUNDO-RIOS, as Electoral Commissioner of the New Progressive Party; EDER E. ORTIZ-ORTIZ, as Electoral Commissioner of the Popular Democratic Party; ROBERTO I. APONTE-BERRIOS, as Electoral Commissioner of the Puerto Rican Independence Party; JULIO FONTANET-MALDONADO, as Electoral Commissioner of the Movimiento Unin Soberanista; ADRIAN DIAZ-DIAZ, as Electoral Commissioner of Puertorriqueos por Puerto Rico; LILLIAN APONTE-DONES, as Electoral Commissioner of Partido del Pueblo Trabajador Defendants CIVIL 12-1749CCC

SCHEDULING ORDER The parties in this case shall abide by the following timetable: 1. Simultaneous memoranda on their respective factual and legal theories will be

filed no later than November 16, 2012, with reply briefs due by November 21, 2012. 2. A hearing on the merits of plaintiffs claims and defendants defenses is set for

Saturday, December 1, 2012, at 9:30 AM and continuing without interruption until its conclusion. SO ORDERED. At San Juan, Puerto Rico, on November 4, 2012.

S/CARMEN CONSUELO CEREZO United States District Judge

Case 3:12-cv-01749-CCC Document 79

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO MYRNA COLON-MARRERO Plaintiff vs HECTOR CONTY-PEREZ, as President of the Puerto Rico State Elections; EDWIN MUNDO-RIOS, as Electoral Commissioner of the New Progressive Party; EDER E. ORTIZ-ORTIZ, as Electoral Commissioner of the Popular Democratic Party; ROBERTO I. APONTE-BERRIOS, as Electoral Commissioner of the Puerto Rican Independence Party; JULIO FONTANET-MALDONADO, as Electoral Commissioner of the Movimiento Unin Soberanista; ADRIAN DIAZ-DIAZ, as Electoral Commissioner of Puertorriqueos por Puerto Rico; CARLOS QUIROS-MENDEZ, as Electoral Commissioner of Partido del Pueblo Trabajador; NORMAN PARKHURST Defendants CIVIL 12-1749CCC

ORDER TO PRESERVE THE COURTS JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO THE ALL WRITS ACT, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a) Before the Court is a Motion for Emergency Order filed by plaintiffs on November 1, 2012 (docket entry 69), supplemented by docket entry 73, in which they seek safeguards which would ensure that they, as well as other voters similarly situated, commonly referred to I-8's or I-A voters, are not prevented from casting a provisional ballot during the November 6, 2012 election. An opposition was filed by defendant Edwin Mundo as Electoral Commissioner for the New Progressive Party.1 Having considered the matters raised and Defendant Mundo alleges that this case has not been judicially certified as a class action. It should be noted that the Court of Appeals in the November 2, 2012 Per Curiam decision stated that: Two plaintiffs initially filed this action in the district court, but only one appeals. Plaintiffs brings a facial challenge to Article 6.012, requesting equitable and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Though plaintiff did not seek class certification, her requested relief would have applied to all similarly situated voters. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (When
1

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CIVIL 12-1749CCC

particularly taking into account the stage of the proceedings at this moment, the order set forth below is issued as necessary and for the sole purpose of protecting the Courts existing jurisdiction. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a) provides that: The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. The Supreme Court of the United States in 1969 fully addressed the purpose of the All Writs Act in Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299-300, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1090-1091 (1969). The following excerpt describes the scope and function of this statute upon which this District Court relies today to defend its jurisdiction: . . . the Courts may fashion appropriate modes of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial usage. Where their duties require it, this is the inescapable obligation of the courts. Their authority is expressly confirmed in the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651. This statute has served since its inclusion, in substance, in the original Judiciary Act as a legislatively approved source of procedural instruments designed to achieve the rational ends of law. The Act authorizes a Court to issue writs any time the use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve the ends of justice and trusted to it. Adams v. U.S., 317 U.S. 269, 273, 63 S.Ct. 237, 239 (1942). In U.S. v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174, 98 S.Ct. 364, 373 (1977), the Supreme Court observed that the Act invests federal courts with the authority to prevent parties and non-parties from frustrating a Courts exercise of its jurisdiction: the power conferred by the Act extends, under appropriate circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a Court order or the proper administration of justice and encompasses those who have not asserting a facial challenge, a party seeks to vindicate not only his own rights, but those of others who may also be adversely impacted by the statute in question.

Case 3:12-cv-01749-CCC Document 79

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CIVIL 12-1749CCC

taken any affirmative action to hinder justice. (Our emphasis.) The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has cautioned that in other for a Court to invoke Section 1651(a) and issue an injunction to protect its jurisdiction over an action, there must be at least a possibility that the complaint states a justiciable federal claim, Rosell-Gonzlez v. Sila M. Caldern, 398 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2004). Lower courts have expressed themselves on the role of the Act as an instrument against those who would undermine the courts power to bring a case to judgment. An order issued under the Act is directed at conduct which, if left unchecked, would have the effect of diminishing the courts power to bring the litigation to a natural conclusion. See Cinel v. Connick, 792 F.Supp. 492 (E.D. La. 1992). The courts power under the Act is limited to that which is necessary to facilitate the federal courts effort to manage that case to judgment. ITT Community Development Corp. v. Barton, 457 F.Supp. 224 (M.D. Fla. 1978). Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that an order is necessary, indeed required, under the Act at this critical stage of the proceedings precisely to protect this Courts power to bring the present litigation to its natural conclusion. Let this be clear: the writ being issued is wholly unrelated and separate from the Acevedo Proposal on the feasibility of reinstating the affected voters in time for the November 6 Election. That proposal was determined to be not feasible and this District Court is in no way attempting to resurrect it in contravention of the Court of Appeals decision. Our writ does not contemplate the actual, immediate reactivation on November 6 of any I-8 voter, as proposed by Professor Acevedo. What it does pursue is to preserve the power and authority of the Court to decide the merits of the plaintiffs First Amendment and HAVA claims, raised since the inception of this lawsuit and which are the object of the Courts ultimate resolution, after full briefing and argument. This case has evolved since the undersigneds first encounter with it on September 18, 2012 which resulted in the conclusion that the statutory construction

Case 3:12-cv-01749-CCC Document 79

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CIVIL 12-1749CCC

components related to the applicability of NVRA and HAVA to Puerto Rico did not allow for a favorable determination on likelihood of success. Since then the Court of Appeals has determined that plaintiff has established a likelihood of success on the federal election claim under HAVA (Per Curiam Opinion dated November 2, 2012). The appellate court stated that it is an open and difficult question . . . whether HAVA would provide a basis for a federal court ordering the reinstatement of voters in Commonwealth elections, page 9 of opinion. These and other issues, for example, whether the electoral system of the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has received federal funding under HAVA and, if so, whether it has failed to comply with a HAVA provision are yet to be decided. The ultimate resolution of this case will turn on whether plaintiffs fundamental right to vote under the First Amendment and/or HAVA, in the general election or only for the federal office of Resident Commissioner, was violated by the enforcement of a local electoral law, specifically Article 6.012 of P.R. Law No. 78, which removed them and others similarly situated from the voter registration roll because they did not vote in the 2008 general election. If plaintiffs prevail on the merits at the end of this litigation, the remedy to redress the constitutional violation would no longer exist. Notwithstanding that the preliminary injunction was denied, this action to declare a plaintiffs rights under the First Amendment and HAVA remains active. Given the time constraints, the Court understands that an order, analogous to that requested, must be issued to preserve its power to ultimately resolve the controversies before it instead of engaging in an exercise of futility. For this Court is not just declaring the rights of future voters to participate in future elections. The voters seeking redress are classified as I-8 voters precisely because they were removed from the active registry for not participating in the 2008 election and they claim they are entitled to participate in the 2012 election under the protection of the First Amendment and HAVA.

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CIVIL 12-1749CCC

Accordingly, the Court issues the following relevant findings and ORDER, pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a): 1. The provision of the Puerto Rico Electoral Code, Law No. 78-2011 (the Code),

under constitutional scrutiny in this case is Section 6.012 which in its relevant part states that If a voter fails to exercise his/her right to vote in a General Election, his/her file in the General Voter Registry shall be inactivated. 2. Plaintiffs and other voters similarly situated were inactivated pursuant to

Section 6.012 of the Code because they did not participate in the 2008 general election. 3. These voters are referred to by the parties in this case as I-8 voters, the

acronym to signify inactive voters for the 2008 election. 4. The principal claim raised by them is that they are entitled to be reinstated as

active voters in the General Voter Registry in order to vote in the November 6, 2012 election because they were illegally removed in violation of HAVA and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 5. this Court. WHEREFORE, given the importance of the constitutional and the federal statutory questions pending ultimate resolution on the merits before the Court, and, in order to preserve our power to bring this litigation to its natural conclusion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all I-8 voters, who show up on November 6, 2012 to vote shall be allowed to cast a provisional ballot in accordance with Section 9.042 of the Electoral Code of Puerto Rico, Law No. 78-2011, which provides: Those persons who demand the right to vote but did not appear on the voters list may be provisionally added in accordance with the procedure established by the Commission through regulations. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to the regulations promulgated under the Code, I-8 voters be allowed to cast a provisional vote at an added-by-hand Such claim is precisely the one ultimately to be resolved on the merits by

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CIVIL 12-1749CCC

polling station, following the established procedure used for all other added-by-hand voters in conformity with the Commissions regulations. Neither the parties in this case nor any official, employee or agent of the Puerto Rico State Electoral Commission (SEC) or poll watchers or persons rendering services at the different polling stations or at the special added-by-hand units may hinder the casting of provisional votes by I-8 voters in the November 6, 2012 election. When these provisional ballots cast by the I-8 voters on November 6, 2012 reach the State Electoral Commission (SEC), their adjudication shall be postponed to allow for this Courts resolution of the merits of the I-8 voters constitutional challenge now pending before it. A separate order establishing an expedited timetable for the disposition of this case will be entered. This order shall be personally notified forthwith by the U.S. Marshal of this District to Hctor Conty-Prez, as President of the Puerto Rico State Elections Commission and notified electronically to all parties in this case. SO ORDERED. At San Juan, Puerto Rico, on November 3rd, 2012.

S/CARMEN CONSUELO CEREZO United States District Judge