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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION SHANE BAILEY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) TIMOTHY DAVIS, in his individual ) capacity, ANDREW GODI, in his individual) capacity, ROBERT YOUNG, in his ) individual capacity, JANE DOE, in her ) individual capacity, and ) JEFFERSON COUNTY, MISSOURI, ) ) Defendants. )

Case No. 4:12-CV-2016 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT COMES NOW Plaintiff Shane Bailey (hereinafter Plaintiff), by and through his attorney, and for his Complaint against Defendant Timothy Davis (hereinafter Defendant Davis), Defendant Andrew Godi (hereinafter Defendant Godi), Defendant Robert Young (hereinafter Defendant Young), Defendant Jane Doe (hereinafter Defendant Doe), and Defendant Jefferson County, Missouri (hereinafter Defendant Jefferson County) and respectfully states to this Honorable Court the following: 1. This is a civil action arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and common law avenues of

recovery for deprivations of Plaintiffs rights and for state law claims against all Defendants. 2. 3. 4. 5. Plaintiff sues Defendant Davis in his individual capacity. Plaintiff sues Defendant Godi in his individual capacity. Plaintiff sues Defendant Young in his individual capacity. Plaintiff sues Defendant Doe in her individual capacity.

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JURISDICTION 6. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343. The

supplemental jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide claims arising out of state law is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367. VENUE 7. 8. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2). Defendant Jefferson County is a political subdivision of the State of Missouri acting

under color of State law, and is a person for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action of damages. 9. Defendant Davis, at all times relevant herein, was a Jefferson County officer

working under the direction and control of the Defendant Jefferson County. 10. Defendant Godi, at all times relevant herein, was a Jefferson County officer working

under the direction and control of the Defendant Jefferson County. 11. Defendant Young, at all times relevant herein, was a Jefferson County officer

working under the direction and control of the Defendant Jefferson County. 12. Defendant Doe, at all times relevant herein, was a Jefferson County duty nurse

working under the direction and control of the Defendant Jefferson County. COLOR OF STATE LAW 13. 14. At all relevant times, Defendant Davis acted under color of state law. Particularly, Defendant Davis acted under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances,

regulations, policies, customs and usages of the State of Missouri, and its political subdivisions. 15. 16. At all relevant times, Defendant Godi acted under color of state law. Particularly, Defendant Godi acted under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances,

regulations, policies, customs and usages of the State of Missouri, and its political subdivisions.

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17. 18.

At all relevant times, Defendant Young acted under color of state law. Particularly, Defendant Young acted under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances,

regulations, policies, customs and usages of the State of Missouri, and its political subdivisions. 19. 20. At all relevant times, Defendant Doe acted under color of state law. Particularly, Defendant Doe acted under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances,

regulations, policies, customs and usages of the State of Missouri, and its political subdivisions. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On Highway 30 21. On or about March 13, 2012, Plaintiff was driving his truck on Highway 30 in

Jefferson County, Missouri when he ran out of gas. 22. As Plaintiff ran out of gas, he pulled his truck off of Highway 30 to a grassy area just

off of the highway. 23. Jefferson County Deputy Don Feldman (Deputy Feldman) arrived at the location

where Plaintiff ran out of gas. 24. Prior to driving on Highway 30, Plaintiff had hit the side mirror of his truck with his

hand in frustration, causing a cut on his hand. 25. Prior to Deputy Feldmans arrival at the location where Plaintiff ran out of gas,

paramedics had arrived at the scene and treated Plaintiffs hand. 26. 27. Deputy Feldman placed Plaintiff under arrest for municipal infractions. In the process of handcuffing Plaintiff, Deputy Feldman took Plaintiff to the ground

and threatened to pepper spray Plaintiff. 28. processing. Deputy Feldman transported Plaintiff to the Jefferson County jail for booking and

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At the Jefferson County Jail 29. 30. 31. While at the Jefferson County jail, Plaintiff was taken out of a cell. Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi placed Plaintiff in a shower. Plaintiff was placed face against a wall when Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi

pulled Plaintiffs head back, then slammed the front of Plaintiffs head against the wall. 32. 33. Plaintiffs head was cut open and began to bleed. Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi then pulled Plaintiff back from the wall and

slammed Plaintiffs whole body against the wall. 34. Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi handcuffed Plaintiff and Defendant Young

peppered spray Plaintiff in his face. 35. While handcuffing Plaintiff, Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi squeezed

Plaintiffs hand that had been previously injured, causing great paint to Plaintiff. 36. 37. Plaintiff did not provoke Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Young. Plaintiff suffered injuries to his eyes and face from being pepper sprayed by

Defendant Young. 38. Plaintiff suffered injuries to his neck, head and back from being slammed against the

wall by Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi. 39. Defendant Young had the duty nurse, Defendant Doe, check on Plaintiff who failed

to provide medical care to Plaintiff. 40. Defendant Doe did not treat Plaintiffs head, despite Plaintiff later having stitches

applied to the wound on Plaintiffs head. 41. On March 14, 2012, after being released from the Jefferson County jail, Plaintiffs

mother took Plaintiff to the SSM St. Clare Health Center for treatment where he received treatment,

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including but not limited to, stitches being applied to the wound on his head. COUNT I VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS EXCESSIVE FORCE 42 U.S.C. 1983 AND FOURTH AMENDMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT DAVIS, DEFENDANT GODI AND DEFENDANT YOUNG FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES 42. 43. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. Defendant Davis used excessive and unreasonable force when he slammed Plaintiff

against the wall. 44. Defendant Godi used excessive and unreasonable force when he slammed Plaintiff

against the wall. 45. Plaintiff. 46. 47. The right to be free from excessive force is clearly established1. At the time of the use of excessive force by Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Young used excessive and unreasonable force when he pepper sprayed

Defendant Young, Plaintiff had not committed a serious crime. 48. At the time of the use of excessive force by Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and

Defendant Young, Plaintiff presented no threat to the safety of the officers or others. 49. At the time of the use of excessive force by Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and

Defendant Young, Plaintiff was not actively resisting arrest. 50. At the time of the use of excessive force by Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and

Defendant Young, Plaintiff was not attempting to evade arrest by flight2. 51. Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Young used greater force than was

necessary in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them3.

1 2

Howard v. Kansas City Police Dept., 570 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2009). Kukla v. Hulm, 310 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2002). 3 Id.

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52.

Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Young acted in a manner, which

was objectively unreasonable. 53. A reasonable officer, without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, would not have used

such force under similar circumstances4. 54. 55. This case is not in a hazy border, but is unequivocal5. The actions of Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Young violated

Plaintiffs civil rights under the Fourth Amendment and under 42 U.S.C. 1983, particularly including, his right to be safe from the unreasonable use of force. 56. The actions of Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Young violated

Plaintiffs civil rights under the Fourth Amendment and under 42 U.S.C. 1983, particularly including, his right to be safe from the use of excessive force6. Compensatory Damages 57. Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 Plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages

against Defendant Davis, in his individual capacity, Defendant Godi, in his individual capacity, and against Defendant Young, in his individual capacity. Punitive Damages 58. Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Youngs respective actions against

Plaintiff were reckless. 59. Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Youngs respective actions against

Plaintiff showed callous indifference toward the rights of Plaintiff. 60. Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Youngs respective actions against

Plaintiff were taken in the face of a perceived risk that the actions would violate federal law. 61.
4 5

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages against Defendant Davis,

Rahn v. Hawkins, 2006 WL 2707643 (8th Cir. 2006). Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001). 6 McGruder v. Heagwood, 197 F.3d 918, 919 (8th Cir. 1999).

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Defendant Godi and Defendant Young, in their individual capacity, in order to punish them and to deter others. Attorneys Fees 62. Under 42 U.S.C. 1988, if Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this litigation, then he

will be entitled to receive an award of reasonable attorneys fees, non-taxable expenses and costs. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 against Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi and Defendant Young in their respective individual capacity for compensatory damages in a fair and reasonable amount, for punitive damages, for reasonable attorneys fees, for and non-taxable expenses, for costs, and Plaintiff prays for such other relief as may be just under the circumstances and consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. 1983. COUNT II VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS DENIAL OF MEDICAL CARE 42 U.S.C. 1983 AGAINST DEFENDANT DOE FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES 63. 64. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. While in the Jefferson County jail on March 13, 2012, Plaintiff had a serious need

for treatment of a laceration to his head that required stitches. 65. Defendant Doe was aware of Plaintiffs serious need for treatment of a laceration to

his head that required stitches because she was the duty nurse of the Jefferson County jail, was requested by Defendant Young to examine Plaintiff and did examine Plaintiff. 66. Defendant Doe was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs serious need for treatment

of a laceration to his head that required stitches as she failed to treat Plaintiffs injury and failed to order that Plaintiffs injury be treated immediately at a medical facility7.

Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2006).

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67.

As a result of Defendant Does actions, Plaintiff sustained pain to his head for an

extended period of time. Compensatory Damages 68. Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 Plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages

against Defendant Doe, in her individual capacity. Punitive Damages 69. 70. 71. Defendant Does actions were reckless. Defendant Does actions showed callous indifference toward the rights of Plaintiff. Defendant Does actions were taken in the face of a perceived risk that the actions

would violate federal law. 72. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages against Defendant Doe, in her

individual capacity, in order to punish her and to deter others. Attorneys Fees 73. Under 42 U.S.C. 1988, if Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this litigation, then he

will be entitled to receive an award of reasonable attorneys fees, non-taxable expenses and costs. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 against Defendant Doe, in her respective individual capacity, for compensatory damages in a fair and reasonable amount, for punitive damages, for reasonable attorneys fees, for and non-taxable expenses, for costs, and Plaintiff prays for such other relief as may be just under the circumstances and consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

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COUNT III VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 42 U.S.C. 1983 AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT JEFFERSON COUNTY, MISSOURI FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES 74. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. Compensatory Damages 1st Alternative Basis of Municipal Liability Delegation to Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe 75. As the first alternate basis for liability against Defendant Jefferson County, the

policy maker for Defendant Jefferson County is an aldermanic board, the mayor, or someone else, and that person delegated full authority and/or empowered Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe to make policy. 76. The delegation of authority by the actual policy maker of Defendant Jefferson

County placed Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe in a policy making position, and acts of Defendant Jefferson County to liability for the constitutional violations committed by Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe. 2nd Alternative Basis of Municipal Liability Failure to Train, Supervise, Control 77. As the second alternative basis for liability against Defendant Jefferson County,

Defendant Jefferson County failed to properly hire, train, supervise, control and/or discipline Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe. 78. Defendant Jefferson County was thus deliberately indifferent to the rights of others

in adopting its hiring and training practices, and in failing to supervise, control and/or discipline Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe, such that those failures

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reflected a deliberate or conscious choice by Defendant Jefferson County8. 79. 80. Those deficiencies caused Plaintiff damages9. In light of the fact that it was Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young

and Defendant Doe who engaged in the constitutional violations, the need to correct deficiencies is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of Defendant Jefferson County can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need10. 81. If Defendant Jefferson County had properly hired, trained, supervised, controlled

and/or disciplined Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe, the constitutional violations committed by Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe would not have occurred. 82. These failures by Defendant Jefferson County to hire, train, supervise, control and/or

discipline Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe subject Defendant Jefferson County to liability for the constitutional violations committed by Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe. 3rd Alternative Basis of Municipal Liability Pattern of Transgressions 83. As the third alternative basis for liability against Defendant Jefferson County, the

acts of Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe were part of a pattern of transgressions, of which Defendant Jefferson County knew or should have known. 84. The failure of Defendant Jefferson County to act proactively to prevent such a

pattern of transgressions, and particularly to prevent the constitutional violations outlined herein, establishes the policy of Defendant Jefferson County to condone or otherwise tolerate such constitutional violations.
8 9

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). Larson By Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1454 (8th Cir. 1996). 10 Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).

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85.

Defendant Jefferson County thus had a policy or custom of failing to act upon

prior similar complaints of unconstitutional conduct, of which they knew or should have known, which caused the constitutional injuries at issue. 86. There was a prior pattern of unconstitutional conduct so persistent and widespread

as to have the effect and force of law11. 87. Defendant Jefferson Countys failure amounted to deliberate indifference to the

rights of persons with whom Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe came in contact, particularly including Plaintiff. 88. Those failures by Defendant Jefferson County to act proactively to prevent these

constitutional violations subject Defendant Jefferson County to liability for the constitutional violations committed by Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant Doe. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 89. Upon information and belief, at the relevant time mentioned herein, Defendant

Jefferson County had purchased and had in effect a policy of insurance to insure itself against claims or causes of action for damages caused by city employees engaged in government functions, including torts as described herein. 90. The purchase of that insurance constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity by

Defendant Jefferson County12. 91. Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages

against Defendant Jefferson County. Attorneys Fees 92. Under 42 U.S.C. 1988, if Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this litigation, then he

will be entitled to receive an award of reasonable attorneys fees, non-taxable expenses and costs.
11

Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1074-75 (8th Cir. 1996), citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 12 RSMo. 71.180 and/or 537.610.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 against Defendant Jefferson County for compensatory damages in a fair and reasonable amount, for reasonable attorneys fees, and non-taxable expenses, for costs and such other relief as may be just under the circumstances and consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. 1983. COUNT IV VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 42 U.S.C. 1983, RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AGAINST DEFENDANT JEFFERSON COUNTY, MISSOURI FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES 93. 94. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. At all relevant times Defendant Davis was serving as an employee of Defendant

Jefferson County as a sheriff. 95. 96. employment. 97. At all relevant times Defendant Godi was serving as an employee of Defendant At all relevant times Defendant Davis was engaging in a government function. At all relevant times Defendant Davis was acting within the course and scope of that

Jefferson County as a sheriff. 98. 99. employment. 100. At all relevant times Defendant Young was serving as an employee of Defendant At all relevant times Defendant Godi was engaging in a government function. At all relevant times Defendant Godi was acting within the course and scope of that

Jefferson County as a sheriff. 101. 102. At all relevant times Defendant Young was engaging in a government function. At all relevant times Defendant Young was acting within the course and scope of

that employment.

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103.

At all relevant times Defendant Doe was serving as an employee of Defendant

Jefferson County as a nurse. 104. 105. At all relevant times Defendant Young was engaging in a government function. At all relevant times Defendant Young was acting within the course and scope of

that employment. 106. 107. Defendant Jefferson County is liable under a theory of respondeat superior13. The actions of Defendant Davis, Defendant Godi, Defendant Young and Defendant

Doe caused Plaintiff to suffer the damages outlined herein. Compensatory Damages 108. Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages

against Defendant Jefferson County. Attorneys Fees 109. Under 42 U.S.C. 1988, if Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this litigation, then he

will be entitled to receive an award of reasonable attorneys fees, non-taxable expenses and costs. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 against Defendant Jefferson County for compensatory damages in a fair and reasonable amount, for reasonable attorneys fees, and non-taxable expenses, for costs and such other relief as may be just under the circumstances and consistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

13

Plaintiff makes this claim based on the dissent of Justice Breyer in Board of County Comrs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 416 (1997).

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SUPPLEMENTAL STATE CLAIMS COUNT V ASSAULT AND BATTERY AGAINST DEFENDANT DAVIS AND DEFENDANT GODI FOR COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND AGAINST DEFENDANT JEFFERSON COUNTY, MISSOURI FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ONLY 110. 111. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. Defendant Davis and Defendant Godis slamming Plaintiff against the wall

constituted an assault and battery14. 112. 113. All actions by Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi were unlawful and unjustified. Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi had the apparent present ability to injure

Plaintiff and to complete the assault. 114. 115. Plaintiff sustained damages as a result of the assault and battery15. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages for assault and battery

against Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi. 116. At the time of the assault and battery of Plaintiff, Defendant Davis and Defendant

Godi were ostensibly acting (even though improperly) to benefit their employers policing function. 117. Defendant Davis and Defendant Godis respective actions were therefore within the

scope of their employment. 118. superior16. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment for assault and battery against Defendant Davis and Defendant Godi in their individual capacity for compensatory damages in a fair and reasonable Defendant Jefferson County is therefore liable under a theory of respondeat

14 15

Geiger v. Bowersox, 974 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Mo. App. 1998). Hall v. Martindale, 166 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. App. 1942). 16 Clark v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 545, 550 (Mo. App. 1986).

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amount, for punitive damages and for costs, and prays for judgment for assault and battery against Defendant Jefferson County under a theory of respondeat superior for compensatory damages in a fair and reasonable amount and Plaintiff prays for such other relief this Court deems just and proper under the circumstances.

Respectfully submitted, SCHOTTEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. BY: s/James W. Schottel, Jr. James W. Schottel, Jr. #51285MO 906 Olive St., PH St. Louis, MO 63101 (314) 421-0350 (314) 421-4060 facsimile jwsj@schotteljustice.com Attorney for Plaintiff Shane Bailey

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