of meaning in his life. It is this dimension of his life that would, he believes, beextinguished by medication.Starson’s doctors believe that his condition is deteriorating, and that he will not be able tocontinue to make worthwhile contributions in physics. There is some possibility, though,that he can return to a fruitful research career if he accepts medication. Accordingly, Dr.Posner reacted to the Supreme Court decision by saying a man “who could have made anenormous contribution to society was now lost in a psychotic world.” Echoing thissentiment, Starson’s mother, Stevens, said, “I’m devastated because I’ve lost my son, andmy son has lost his dreams. I think the ruling is insane.”In explaining the Supreme Court ruling, Justice Major does not deny that it may well not be conducive to Starson’s best interests. That is, if we were to act solely on the basis of the duty of beneficence, we may agree with Stevens that her son should be compelled totake his medication. However, adds Major, one’s “conception of the patient’s bestinterests is irrelevant to [the determination of capacity]” (para. 76; cf. para.63,
Starson v.Swayze
). He adds that the respect for, and presumption of, capacity does not derive primarily from concern for another’s best interests. Instead, it derives from the duty torespect another person’s autonomy. Says Major, “The right to refuse unwanted medicaltreatment is fundamental to a person’s dignity and autonomy” (para. 75,
Ibid
.). Also,“Unwarranted findings of incapacity severely infringe upon a person’s right to self-determination” (para. 75,
Ibid
.). One’s right to autonomy must be respected even at thecost of one’s well-being. As Major says,The right knowingly to be foolish is not unimportant; the right voluntarily toassume risks is to be respected. The State has no business meddling with either.The dignity of the individual is at stake. (para. 76,
Ibid
.)Finally, Major says, “The enforced injection of mind-altering drugs against therespondent’s will is highly offensive to his dignity and autonomy, and is to be avoidedunless it is demonstrated that he lacked the capacity to make his own decision” (para. 91,
Ibid
.).Okay, but didn’t Starson clearly lack this capacity? That’s what the Consent and CapacityBoard ruled in 1999. The standard for capacity is set forth in Ontario’s Health CareConsent Act (HCCA). According to it,
A person is ‘capable’ with respect to a treatment, admission to a care facilityor a personal assistance service if the person is
able to understand
theinformation that is relevant to making a decision about the treatment,admission or personal assistance service, as the case may be, and
able toappreciate
the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.
The Consent and Capacity Board held that since Starson was in “almost total” denial of his illness, he could not pass this test. After all, if he does not acknowledge that he is ill,2
Leave a Comment