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PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW
 
Monday, October 20, 2008 04:32 PM GMT+06:00
Published On: 2008-01-30
Front Page
Nuclear proliferationcannot be controlled now
Former CIA agent says
 
Hamid Mir, from IslamabadA former American CIA agent and nuclear expert David Dastych has claimed that main nucleararsenals of Pakistan, India, Britain, France, the USA, Russia and China are safe but nuclearproliferation could not be controlled now because it has completely slipped out of control.He said some corrupt officials of the US defence and state departments were involved in the theftof US nuclear secrets which were sold to many countries including Israel and Pakistan.In an exclusive interview with Hamid Mir, he said questioning Pakistani scientist Dr A Q Khan isnot of any high value now. He said Russian-made small neutron bombs are a real threat to worldpeace. David Dastych (65) was recruited to Polish intelligence in 1961. He joined CIA in 1973 andbecame a double agent. He served in the USA, Europe, Vietnam, and China and in othercountries. He was arrested by Polish counterintelligence in 1987 on charges of espionage forAmerican and Japanese secret services. He was released from prison in 1990, after the fall of communist regime in Poland.In the following years he worked for several western intelligence services for the monitoring of illegal nuclear trade. He survived two assassination attempts. His son died mysteriously in the UKin 1996. He is living in Poland these days and writing for some local and international magazines.This interview was done via email.
Q:
For how long you worked with the CIA and in which countries you performed your duties?(Also mention about your arrest and then release from prison)
A:
I had first informal contacts with the CIA in North Vietnam, when working for the InternationalSupervision and Control Commission (ICSC) and the Polish Intelligence in 1967. Canadian officersenabled them. But I was blocked from going to South Vietnam and I was expulsed from thatCommunist country (and was) declared "persona non grata."I went to China then. A formal CIA recruitment was my own initiative and it happened in summerof 1973 in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam. Then, in August 1973, I passed lie-detector tests andinterrogation by CIA teams in Paris. In Poland I reported my CIA recruitment and I became acovert agent, in loose contact with the Agency and targeted against the Soviet Union, from 1973until my arrest in March 1987.In fact, I became sort of a double agent for the CIA in the Polish Intelligence andCounterintelligence and that lasted fourteen years. I worked in Poland, USSR, Hungary, EastGermany and other countries of Eastern and Central Europe - in the countries of the Warsaw Pact.In result of a "sting operation" I was arrested under false accusations of spying for the JapaneseIntelligence. Following a secret military trial I got a sentence of 8 years in 1988, but theCommunist regime in Poland collapsed in 1989 and I was released by general amnesty inFebruary 1990.
Q:
Is it correct that you tried to break up a Soviet Nuclear spy ring in Europe in the 70's?
A:
Yes, my information to the CIA about Soviet spies in Western Europe helped the Nato to breakup a multinational organisation of Soviet agents (planted in Germany, France, Italy and other
 
 
countries). This organisation consisted of nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians, working insensitive places. Most of the members of that intelligence network were arrested in a sweepingoperation but some escaped. It happened in the second half of the 1970s.
Q:
Did you monitor the illegal trade in nuclear materials, weapons parts and technology in 1990'sand which particular countries were involved in illegal proliferation?
A:
Yes, I did. For me it was a voluntary mission and I worked under many covers in Europe andAsia. Since the beginning of 1992, following a meeting in Jerusalem's "King David Hotel" with aprominent Israeli and international nuclear expert, the late Shalheveth Freier, I performed manyspecial tasks. The purpose of my mission was to penetrate organised crime and intelligencegroups trading in nuclear materials, weapons parts and technology. Most of these productsoriginated in Russia and in other states of the former USSR, some also from China.In my work, I had contacts with several intelligence agencies but I was not employed by any of them. My work lasted until December 16, 1994. At this stage, the countries (or rather theirintelligence services and various criminal groups) involved in the nuclear proliferation were mainlyRussia, Belarus, Ukraine, Baltic states (Latvia and Lithuania), and Kazakhstan. Chinese andMongolian private groups traded in post-Soviet nuclear materials via Hong Kong.The countries searching for nuclear materials, weapons and technology were (among other) SaudiArabia, Brunei, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, Iraq, North Korea and some terrorist groups like al-Qaeda.Palestinians from several political-military organisations (al Fatah, Abu Nidal Organisation) oftenserved as intermediaries for Arab and other states. Chechen rebels, fighting against Russia andcooperating with the Russian and other mafias, were an important source of materials andweapons for al-Qaeda.Several countries, including Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, as wellas Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Israel were "transit" places forshipments of nuclear materials and products from Russia or other post-Soviet states to "endusers" in other countries. Specialised laboratories in Switzerland, Germany, Austria, France andother states tested illegally imported nuclear products.American, Australian, Canadian, and also Mexican businessmen or intelligence "front companies"participated in the illegal nuclear trade and in the proliferation of nuclear technology.
Q:
How safe are the Russian and American nuclear weapons.
A:
I have no direct access to the Russian and American nuclear secrets but I know from manysources that the main nuclear arsenals of these big nuclear powers, as well as other nuclearstates like Britain, France, China, India and Pakistan, are safe and under strict control. In theearly 1990s, tactical nuclear weapons from Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine were offered oninternational nuclear black markets.Most of these weapons were offered and sometimes sold by military-business groups, some viaorganised crime groups. A few transactions of very expensive nuclear materials and productswere organised by specialised Russian military enterprises. Technical descriptions of thesematerials and products were available from Russian military laboratories.
Q:
Do you know anything about the nuclear purchases made by Pakistan in the past?
A:
Yes, I think I could trace some purchases of nuclear materials and products by Pakistan fromRussia on black market. In fact, there was no other way to get them. Saudi Arabia and Bruneifinanced some of these transactions. I remember a shipment of special nuclear products fromRussia to Austria in late 1992, which went to Pakistan then. It was perfectly organised from bothsides -- the seller and the buyer.The products were shipped by Russian military plane, delivered to a Russian diplomatic mission,inspected by experts and sold and shipped to the buyer. The end user was Pakistan but theproducts went there through a third party. No Pakistani officials or other people took part in thetransaction carried out in Austria, near Vienna. Money was paid through banks, not in cash. Butthere were also cash-goods exchanges in Germany, Switzerland, Luxemburg and Liechtenstein.
 
 
Q:
Do you know anything about some US officials selling nuclear secrets to others?
A:
I do, but only through my American contacts in the Intelligence and the FBI. Some corrupt USofficials of the Department of Defence and State Department facilitated the theft of US nuclearsecrets (technology) from American national laboratories -- Los Alamos and Sandia -- tocustomers in several countries, including Pakistan. This procedure involved Israeli and Turkishintelligence and also Pakistan's ISI.Dr A Q Khan's laboratories were brokers for nuclear proliferation to other countries, includingAlgeria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Myanmar and other states looking for nuclear technology. Thisinformation first surfaced five years ago through reports of a Turkish-American FBI translator, MsSibel Edmonds. She was gagged by US court decision and only recently she disclosed moreinformation, which is still being blocked by the Bush Administration. It was revealed in part bythree articles, published by "The Sunday Times" in London on the 6th, 20th and 26th of January2008 (with my contribution).
Q:
Is it correct that US officials sold nuclear secrets not only to Pakistan but also to Israel andsome Arab countries?
A:
Of course, they did. The main recipient of the most of the US nuclear information was alwaysIsrael, specifically after the capture, sentencing and jailing of their main spy in the USA. JonathanPollard, whose handler was a former top Israeli intelligence officer Rafi Eitan (now member of theIsraeli government and chairman of the Pensioners Party).An informal group in the Mossad composed of right-wing operatives and working hand-in-handwith the Turkish and Pakistani Intelligence was offering US nuclear technology to some Arabcountries and to other countries. They did this for profit and, in some cases also for politicalmotives, for example, to get direct proof of some foreign states illegally purchasing nuclearmaterials or technology. At present, this might be used as a justification to prove that Iran isdeveloping nuclear weapons.
Q:
How Israeli intelligence helped China to break into American nuclear laboratories. Why Israel isstill a trusted friend of USA?
A:
It's a long story, going back to the 1980s, when the Mossad sold PROMIS software to theChinese Military Intelligence (PLA-2) via its top agent and business operative, the late Britishpublisher and billionaire Robert Maxwell. Since then Chinese intelligence developed highlyeffective "hackers teams" which use modernised versions of PROMIS to break into Americannuclear labs. But this is only one of many methods of spying by the Chinese, who are extremelynumerous and active in the United States. Israel, as a state, was and still is a trusted friend andpolitical and military ally of the United States.But in Israel itself, there are several political groups, which have divergent goals. The presentalliance of the Bush II Administration and their "neocon" advisers in particular, is with the Israeliright wing Likud coalition, which is in conflict with the Palestinians and with Arab and Muslimstates. Israel is a nuclear power, the biggest in the Middle East, though it officially does not admitto the possession of the nuclear weapons.
Q:
Dr A Q Khan is under a lot of restrictions from many years in Pakistan but why he is still veryimportant for the Western media and Western governments?
A:
It is important to the West and to the USA in particular to question Dr AQ Khan about hisnuclear proliferation activities, which did a lot of harm to the world's efforts to stop the spread of the nuclear weaponry and technology. Dr Khan is not a nuclear scientist himself and hiscontribution to the development of the nuclear arsenal by Pakistan was by theft of the blueprintsof uranium enrichment technology from Holland's Urenco and by his organisational skills todevelop the massive centrifuge uranium enrichment systems in Pakistan.But Dr Khan and his collaborators have also organised a profit-based, semi-official system to sellPakistan's nuclear technology to other countries. Western media are simply looking for a "scoop",trying to approach Dr AQ Khan and to interview him. Western governments would like to knowmore about the ways of spreading nuclear technology to the countries, like Iran, Syria andseveral other to stop that procedure.
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