‘The Network Society, Private-Public Sphere(s) and the Soviets of the Multitude This paper will clatm that changes in ICT have frndamental implications jor the private/ public distinction in contemporary soctal iif, rendering such a distinction increasingly permeable. As a consequence ofsuch permeability it ts contended that the issue traditionally widerstood as that of the ‘Free Rider’, acentral problematic mn collective action theory since Mancur Olson (Olson, 1965) no longer necessitates organisations in expediting contentious collective action mn order to engage with other actors for public goods. Instead this paper clatms that such permeability opens up the possibtltty for something akin to a non-state mediated public sphere, different to that articulated by Habermas which 1s understood as an tnterlocutor between private relations amd the state apparatus (Habermas, 1962). Consequently itis clatmed that the work of Paolo Virno 1m particular (Virno, 1996) offers ameaningfil lens to understand ICT-medtated public space which moves beyond existing categories and engages with new realities observable mm monerous examples of contemporary collective action. Such change in collective action while not inherently ‘emancipatory’, does offer a set of possibilities for political action that transcends traditional theoretical frameworks and methods of practical organisation, while embodying political practices adverse to delegation, representation and the arbitrary imperative of command’. To conclude, the paper will argue that itis tereasingly this new IT-mediated public space understood that 1s the site of political action as understood by Hanah Arendt while the traditionally Habermastan sphere is increasingly rendered one of ‘formation war’ (Arquila and Ronpidt. 1996) and biopolitical control (Foucault, 1979) Jurgen Habermas claims that the public sphere mediates between the private sphere and the sphere of ‘public cuthortty’. Sucha private sphere comprises civil society in it's most narrow sense - that of commodity exchange and social labour (Habermas, 1962), While the sphere of public authority is understood as ‘the state’ and those institutions through which the state's monopoly on legitimate violence is maintained (\Weber, 1919). For Habermas the public sphere is conceptually distinct from the state in so muchas “. it fis] asite for the production and circulation of discourses that can in principle be critical ofthe state”. Furthermore this Habermasian public sphere should be seen as something that striates both the private sphere and the sphere of public authority acting as. conduit and interface between the needs of the former and the means of the latter. As Habermas wnites itis “through the vehicle of public opinion (that) the state (is) 1 touch with the needs of society’ (Habermas, 1962). The primary objectiveof this public sphere is to render the political power of the state ‘a rational power’ that meets the needs of society (ibid ) For social movement scholars, as well as political theorists, such a distinction between private and public characterises the nature of political action. Since antiquity, the relationship between intellect, praxis and poesis has been understood as one of publicness, with political action being a public performance, ora collective conflict of interests with others ina public space. Contentious collective action and social movement mobilization is itself contingent upon shared grievances identifiable within a particular population; the reflection on the shared nature of such grievances and their subsequent collective expression are by nature ‘public’ acts. When Olson (1965) refers to collective action asa transformation of ‘latent’ groups to ‘actual’ participants he is describing the crossing of the boundary between the latency of privacy and the apparency of ‘public’ collective action. Bimber, Flanagin and Stohl (2005) have written of how they believe that traditional understandings of collective action, embodied within the Resource Mobilization School, rather than being simply ‘wrong’, should instead be understood as limited to conditions in which private-public boundaries are firm and relatively impermeable, such that individuals’ efforts to cross them are characterised by discrete calculations of free-riding in the context of high costs.! When itis costly, such boundary-crossing adopts the form off discrete decision: should I bear the costs ofexpressing myselfor acting tn order to enter the public domain in pursuit of a particular public good? Itis under such circumstances that the question of the “free rider’ problem should then be understood asa relevant theoretical construct (Bimber, Flanagin, Stohl, 2005) and an emphasis on formal organisations to broker public forms of participation is entirely sensical. RMT-oriented scholarship, focused as itis on the issue of the free rider and the necessity of formal organisations can thus be seen as an adaptation to conditions ofa firm and impermeable private- public boundary, premising the conditions of collective action upon such a basis. However when boundaries between private and public domains are porous and easily crossed, people's negotiation of the boundary typically involves less intentionality and calculation (Bimber, Flanagin, Stoht, 2005). Moreover, formal structures designed to broker the public-private transition become seemingly less crucial. ICT-mediated sociality permits such conditions with boundaries between the two being increasingly easy to cross, frequently on an unintentional level (McDonald 2002, Bennett and Segerberg, 2011), The result is that boundary crossing in connection with public goods takes on forms ‘ Public transgression has costs of entry such as social stigma and punishment (state-sanctioned or otherwise)not so readily recognizable in the traditional terms of the logic of collective action - as a result the basic ontology of collective action and its relationship to the private/ public distinction is challenged. By way ofa few examples. If someone shared a photo on Facebook of a police officer assaulting a student in the 2010 UK student movement with a critical comment was this participation within the aforementioned movement? If not was ita declaration of public or private support? Does such a definition depend upon intentionality or reception? What of someone making very critical comments on Twitter, arguing against against tuition fees on a hashtag that might be seen by tens of thousands? These may seem like flippant and trivial examples but it is undeniable that the distinction between private and public speech act is becoming increasingly blurred. It was precisely these kinds of action with little private/ public distinction which permitted an impressive episode of collective contention within the UK student ‘movement between November 10th 2010 and December 9th. On November 24th some 100,000 children participated in school walkouts across the country, without any school student union, with the event being set up by a few organisations such as the NCAFC and the EAN with few or no meaningful organisational resources of which to speak A few weeks later on December Sth, a demonstration of some 35,000 FE and HE students, along with education workers and other member of the public, mobilized in Westminster in scenes described by the then Sargent-of-Armsas the ‘most intimidating expertence in her parliamentary career’ Once more the demonstration, simaltaneous with others across the country was not organised by the official national union of students (NUS) but was instead ‘called’ by a network of organisations and individuals with little or no formal organisational resources. While the grievances ofa 300% increase in. fees, the removal of EMA and the parliamentary betrayal of the Liberal Democrats were all particularly large for certain elements of the population (primarily working class students in FE and HE students who had voted Liberal Democrat in the previous election) such a response was entirely unexpected. Least of all by any activists involved, To retum though to the claim that the essential ontology of collective action and its relationship to the private! public distinction is challenged. Such a claim is not made lightly. One might argue that the implications of such change are potentially transformative for our understanding of the mutual relationships between praxis, poesis and intellect as constitutive of political action, Furthermore, such a claim challenges assumptions made by those within the RMT camp, among others about the efficacy and necessity of political organisations and the potentially changed contexts in which such organisations are advantageous or even necessary. Whereas for Olsonian rationality such organisations are a necessity in