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International Experts’ Meeting onProtection against Extreme Earthquakes and Tsunamis in the Light of theAccident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
Organized in connection with the implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety
IAEA HeadquartersVienna, Austria4 –7 September 2012
Chairperson’s Summary
1.
Background
As part of the implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) ActionPlan on Nuclear Safety, that was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Board’sdecision that was unanimously endorsed by the IAEA General Conference in 2011, the IAEASecretariat held a four-day
International Experts’ Meeting
(
IEM3) on Protection against Extreme Earthquakes and Tsunamis in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant”,
from
4 to 7 September 2012, at IAEA headquarters in Vienna,Austria.During the last years, an increasing international concern has been raised about theoccurrence of extreme natural hazards (earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, meteorologicaland hydrological hazards) and their possible impact on the safety of nuclear installations.Although in the past three decades, a few nuclear power plants have experienced earthquakeground motions, recent strong earthquakes have occurred that surpassed the original seismicdesign or evaluation levels and seriously affected operating nuclear power plants, mainly inJapan. This experience shows that operating plants were shut down immediately followingthe event and that remained shut down for extended periods while comprehensive studies,investigations and evaluations were conducted to assess their safety. In most cases, nosignificant damage was identified in these nuclear power plant (NPP) units. In a limitednumber of cases, upgrades were implemented to meet new definitions of the design basis orrequirements for beyond design basis earthquakes. The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, affectedby the July 2007 NCOE Earthquake is a significant example of such cases.However, it was the combined effects of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan on 11 March2011 that produced the most serious consequences with the subsequent nuclear accident atthe Fukushima Daiichi NPP. This is the first time that external hazards have significantlycontributed to a nuclear accident, thus confirming that such events may challenge all layersof defence in depth. The overarching lesson to be learned is that an integrated approach isneeded to protect nuclear installations against external hazards of similar magnitude. Theoccurrence of this severe earthquake and subsequent tsunami has opened the gates not only
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for a critical re-examination of the margins of safety in the design and operation of criticalfacilities, but also of the equally complex process of decision making. The dialogue betweenthe scientific community and the decision makers must ensure that policies are alwaysguided by risk-informed processes. This way, the management of risk will becomeconsistent.Valuable experience and many lessons have been and are being learned by Member Statesand operators in managing the safety of NPPs under adverse extreme conditions created byexternal events, as well as the need to take a number of urgent actions by the nuclearcommunity worldwide in all aspects involved with the Fukushima accident.
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The IEM3 Meeting: Objectives and Conduct
The objectives of this International Experts’ Meeting (IEM3) were as follows:
•
To share lessons learned from recent extreme earthquakes and tsunamis, including theGreat East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of 11 March 2011;
•
To exchange information on the development of recent technologies and the results of on-going research programmes relating to site evaluation and NPP safety that aim toprovide protection against earthquakes and tsunamis; and
•
To identify issues that should be further investigated.The following two thematic areas and topics were selected for organizing the sessions:
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Technical session 1: Seismic and Tsunami Hazards
o
Databases
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Hazard Assessment
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Characterization of Effects of External Events
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Technical session 2: Seismic and Tsunami Safety
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Safety Assessment
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Protective Measures
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Lessons Learned
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Event Warning SystemsThe four-day IEM3 featured 42 expert presentations from keynote and invited speakers andcontributors. Two Panel sessions were held at the end of the sessions, providing a forum foropen discussion and exchange of views and opinions between panelists and the audience. Thetopics discussed by the Panels were as follows:
•
Panel Session 1:
o
Assessment of hazards, with scarce or non-existence data and treatment of uncertainties, for both earthquakes and tsunamis.
o
Tsunami modeling, including associated phenomena
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Combination of extreme events
•
Panel Session 2:
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Selection of beyond design basis scenarios:
How much beyond?
How to model the scenario affecting structures, systems andcomponents, plant, site, region?
o
Incorporation of nonlinear behavior of structures and components in margincalculation
o
Challenges of probabilistic safety/risk assessments:
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Loss of on-site and off-site infrastructures
Breach of the defence in depth
Time effect
Risk communicationThe IEM3 revealed a high level of interest of numerous experts from all scientific andengineering disciplines involved in the assessment of earthquake and tsunami hazards andrelated design safety aspects, from operating organizations, regulatory authorities, vendorsand consultancy. A total of 120 participants participated in the meeting from 35 countries and1 international organization.A press interview was held after the closing session on 7 September, 2012.The present Summary was produced by the Chairperson and the Co-Chairpersons of the IEMon the basis of the proceedings and discussions of the IEM3.
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Main Issues and Lessons from the Fukushima Accident in relation to Earthquakes and Tsunamis
GeneralIn general, it was confirmed during the discussions and presentations that there is a need toensure that in considering external natural hazards:
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The selection and evaluation of the sites and the design of nuclear plants shouldinclude sufficient protection against infrequent and complex combinations of externalevents and these should be considered in the plant safety analysis – specifically thosethat can cause site flooding and which may have longer term impacts;
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Plant layout should be based on maintaining a ‘dry site concept’, where practicable, asa defence in depth measure against site flooding as well as physical separation anddiversity of critical safety systems;
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Common cause failure should be particularly considered for multiple unit sites andmultiple sites, and for independent unit recovery options, utilizing all on-siteresources;
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Any changes in external hazards or understanding of them should be periodicallyreviewed for their impact on the current plant configuration; and
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An active tsunami warning system should be established with the provision forimmediate operator action.Topics and IssuesThe topics discussed and the issues related to hazard assessments can be grouped into thefollowing broad categories:
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Recent advances in methods
related to hazard assessment, including deterministicand probabilistic approaches, modelling, data gathering, data analysis, fieldinvestigations and other activities;
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Development of design basis
related to the consideration of criteria to define adesign basis, various practices in the Member States, how to account for unknowns,including the need to consider minimum values;
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Beyond design basis considerations
related to how to define events beyond thoseadopted for design basis, what are the deterministic and probabilistic considerations,how to account for unknowns;
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