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The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is often understood as simply
“
nothing iswithout a reason” (Look). Although it may appear simple or obvious, the principle is oftenregarded as the foundation on which the Cosmological Argument is based (
Cosmological  Argument,
9). Rowe argues that all versions of the Cosmological Argument appeal to PSR (
Cosmological Argument,
7) while some philosophers, such as William Craig, believe that it isonly the Leibnizian version (Craig, 283). We will focus primarily on Leibniz, as PSR is generallyaccepted to be the key to his Cosmological Argument. First, we will examine Leibniz’s definitionof PSR and some of his arguments used to defend it. Next, we will see how Leibniz uses PSR inthe Cosmological Argument and why exactly it is the key to the argument. From there we willexamine how many critics target PSR in order to collapse the argument. Finally, we will respondto those arguments and conclude that the Principle of Sufficient Reason can still rationally beheld true.Although it is generally accepted that the Principle of Sufficient Reason has its roots inancient philosophy (Pruss, 3), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) is most often associatedwith it as it was he “who distilled the principle and gave it proper expression” (Craig, 259).Leibniz, writing in the 18
th
century, employs several forms of PSR. These forms range from themost basic of “nothing happens without a reason” to more complex versions such as “nothinghappens without a reason why it should be so rather than otherwise” (Ibid.). Leibniz’s definitionsand how they are meant to be understood is a topic of serious debate, but for the sake of simplicity we will adapt Rowe’s interpretation. Rowe defines PSR as the principle that “theremust be an explanation (a) of the existence of any being and (b) of any positive fact whatever”(
 Philosophy of Religion
, 23).Given this definition we might ask why Leibniz held this principle to be true. AlthoughLeibniz gave no formal defence of PSR, he does indicate “two lines of defence: an
a priori
andan
a posteriori
justification” (Craig, 263). Some might argue that lack of proof is evidenceagainst PSR. However, Leibniz makes it clear that he regards PSR as self-evident; proof of 
 
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which is simply strange to ask for (
 Fifth Paper,
para. 18). The position that PSR is self-evident isnot unique to Leibniz and is, according to Pruss, an explanation of why there are so fewarguments in favour of PSR. He argues that “philosophers who accept PSR typically do so because they take it to be self-evident and hence in need only of refinement and defence fromattempts at disproof, but not in need of proof” (Pruss, 14). Rowe refers to this as a claim that“PSR is (or can be) known
intuitively
to be true” (
 Phil. of Religion
, 31). From this, Leibnizasserts “that all truths…have a proof 
a priori
or some reason why they are rather than not”(Craig, 264).Leibniz also employs an
a posteriori
argument to defend PSR. He argues that a great dealof fields such as metaphysics, physics and moral science rely on PSR to discover truths. If therewere no PSR then we would be unable to know many truths. Surely, asks a critic, there must beother truths discovered in fields other than those mentioned above? Other truths obtained throughfields such as mathematics are proven by Leibniz’s Principle of Contradiction (PC): “that a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time” (Craig, 268). Although PC is important, itis not the subject of this paper. However, we can now realize that PSR is meant to apply toanything outside the realm of mathematics. This argument is “pragmatically justified” (Craig,267) and without it we would not be able to distinguish truth from fantasy. Leibniz argues thatwe need PSR to understand our world, and without it we are lost. But what evidence do we havethat PSR is necessary for our understanding? Leibniz would simply reply that everybody hasmade use of PSR, maybe even thousands of times (
 Fifth Paper,
 para. 127). This is undeniablyevidence from experience. Leibniz seems to hold that PSR is a presupposition in our dealingswith the world. This would mean that “all of our inductive reasoning presupposes the validity of [PSR]” (Craig, 268). In addition to pragmatic justification, Leibniz argues that PSR has never 
 
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 been proven false and that every faulty criticism reaffirms the validity of the principle. Surely, nostronger 
a priori
argument can be demonstrated (Ibid.). Now that we have examined Leibniz’s arguments for PSR we will see how he appliesPSR to the Cosmological Argument. The Cosmological Argument has a goal of proving theexistence of God, and attempts to do so in two parts (
Cosmological Argument,
6). The first partof the argument is to establish that there must be some sort of necessary being or first causewhich explains the existence of all contingent beings. The second part of the argument is to prove that this being or first cause is the God of theism. The Principle of Sufficient Reason, asLeibniz conceives it, is absolutely essential in order to establish the first part. Leibniz admits“that without this great Principle, one cannot prove the existence of God” (
 Fifth Paper,
 para.126). If PSR is granted, “it follows that there is a necessary first cause of the cosmos” (Pruss, 4).PSR is thus required to establish the first part; without it the Cosmological Argument crumbles.Given the key role of PSR, we can now see why critics have made PSR the target of choice for taking down the argument as a whole.David Hume, being a critic of the Leibniz’s
a priori
argument above, argues that PSR isnot necessarily true. Contrary to Leibniz, who argued that PSR can be known intuitively, Humeargues that there is no evidence to make that assumption. It appears that “not everyone who hasreflected on PSR has been persuaded that it is true, and some are persuaded…to think it is false”(
 Phil. of Religion,
31). This “dialectical dead end” (Pruss, 14) leaves work for those whosubscribe to PSR. Leibniz’s argument that PSR is self-evident is not so persuasive when it is notevident for other individuals. It is even less persuasive when individuals—after reflection—  believe PSR to be false. Hume’s objection does raise questions over what Leibniz held to becertain: why should we believe PSR over other explanations? Why do we need to believe that all beings have an explanation if we can imagine other possibilities?
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