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-\:iidemy
of Management Review
1981.
Vol. 6. No. 3. 363-374
The Ethics of Organizational
GERALD F. CAVANAGH
University of Detroit
DENNIS J. MOBERGMANUEL VELASQUEZ
University of Santa Clara
Political uses
of power demand explicit
consideration
of
ethical
restraints,in part because current management theory focuses on the value of out-comes rather than on the value of the meanschosen.We have developed
a
normative model of
ethical analysis
that
can be
helpful
in determining
whatthese restraints are. The model integrates three kinds of ethical theories:utilitarianism, theories of moral rights, and theories of justice.
Power is the cornerstone of both managementtheory and management practice. Few concepts aremore fundamental to the study of organizations,and power is a vital and ubiquitous reality inorganizational life [Dahl, 1957; Zald, 1970;Zalesnik, 1970]. Our primary purpose here is todevelop a framework for evaluating the ethicalquality of certain uses of power within organiza-tions. We will first distinguish political from non-political uses of power and then canvass the litera-ture of normative ethics in order to construct amodel of ethical analysis that can be applied topolitical uses of power in organizations.
Organizational Politics
The
contemporary view of power in organizations
is
that it is the ability to mobilize resources, energy,and information on behalf of a preferred goal orstrategy [Tushman, 1977]. T^hus, power is assumedto exist only when there is conflict over means orends [Drake, 1979; Pfeffer, 1977]. More
'Portions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting ofthe Academy of Management, Detroit, 1980.
'We
wish to thank David Caidweli, Andre Delbecq, Peter Mills,James Morris, and Barry Posner for their thoughtful review ofvarious drafts of this paper.
©
!9SI
by the Academy of Management 0363-7425
specifically, this view of power is based on two fun-damental propositions:amental propositions:
1.
Organizations are composed of individuals andcoalitions that compete over resources, energy,information, and influence [Hickson, Hinings,
Lee,
Schneck, & Pennings, 1971; Thompson,
1967].
2.
Individuals and coalitions seek to protect theirinterests through means that are unobtrusivewhen compared to existing controls, norms, andsanctions [Allen, Madison, Porter, Renwick, &Mayes, 1979; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974].
This perspective has led some authors todistinguish between political and nonpolitical usesof power [Gandz & Murray, 1980]. For example,Mayes and Allen [1977] draw the distinction in termsof organizational sanctions: nonpolitical uses ofpower are those that involve sanctioned means forsanctioned ends, and political uses involve unsanc-tioned means, or sanctioned means for unsanction-ed ends. That is, when individuals and coalitionschoose to move outside of their formal authority,established policies and procedures, or job descrip-tions in their use of power, that use is political.When they use power within these sanctions for endsthat are not formally sanctioned through goalstatements, this too is a political use of power, ac-cording to the Mayes and Allen definition.Unlike more encompassing conceptualizations
363
 
that equate politics with
any
use of power [e.g.,Martin & Sims, 1956], the Mayes and Allen defini-tion underlines the discretionary nature of organiza-tional politics. In spite of formal systems designed tocontrol the use of power, organizational memberscan and do exercise political power to influence theirsubordinates, peers, superiors, and others [Schein,
1977].
And coalitions may employ politics in theirreaction to policy changes that threaten their owninterests [Crozier, 1964; Pettigrew, 1973].When individuals and coalitions move outsideformal sanctions, the traditional authority/respon-sibility linkage is broken, and important ethicalissues emerge. However, current treatments oforganizational politics either beg the ethical issuesentirely [e.g., Kotter, 1977] or offer simplisticethical criteria. For example. Miles asserts that "it is. . . important to recognize that politics need not bebad, though common parlance uses the term in a pe-jorative sense. The survival of an organization maydepend on the success of a unit or coalition in over-turning a traditional but outdated formal organiza-tion objective or policy" [1980, p. 155]. However,there are a host of political actions that may bejustified in the name of organizational survival thatmany would find morally repugnant. Among theseare such Machiavellian techniques as "situationalmanipulation," "dirty tricks," and "backstabbing."There
is,
then, a clear need for a normative theoryof organizational politics that addresses ethicalissues directly and from the standpoint of the exer-cise of discretion. Unfortunately, the business andsociety literature, where one might expect to findsuch issues discussed, offers little guidance in thisregard. The emphasis in this literature is on institu-tional interactions (e.g., government regulations)and on broad human resource policy issues (e.g.,affirmative action), and not on the day-to-day poli-tical decisions made in the organization.Discussions of political tactics in the managementliterature also offer little guidance. The literature is,of course, rich with political guidelines: there areleadership theories, lateral relations prescriptions,notions about how to design and implement rewardand control systems, conflict resolution strategies,and the like, all of which provide fodder for thedevelopment of political behavior alternatives(hereinafterPBA).However, the form of these theo-retical notions tends to reduce decisions to
cal-culations
based
on effect
that is, they provide themanager with an understanding and prediction ofwhat PBAs are likely to evoke in terms of an out-come or set of outcomes. Armed with contemporaryleadership theories, for example, managers canpresumably determine the type of face-to-face direc-tion that will result in the desired level of perform-ance and satisfaction. This calculative emphasisdefines theoretical debate over ethics in terms of
the
desirability of outcomes and tends to ignore thevalue of the activities, processes, and behaviors in-volved, independent of the outcomes achieved.What a manager
should do
is thus determined by
the
desirability of the outcomes and not by the qualityof the behaviors themselves. Such an emphasis in-evitably leads to a kind of ends-justify-the-meanslogic that fails to provide guidance for managersbeyond linking alternatives to outcomes. Considerthe following case.Lorna is the production manager of a noncohesivework group responsible for meeting a deadline thatwill require coordinated effort among her subor-dinates. Believing that the members of the workgroup will pull together and meet the deadline if
they
have a little competition, Lorna decides in favor of aPBA. She tries to create the impression among hersubordinates that members of the sales departmentwant her group to fail to meet the deadline so thatsales can gain an edge over production in upcomingbudgetary negotiations.How might we evaluate this PBA? Managementtheory tends to focus our attention on consequences.One might argue that if it works arid Loma's grouppulls together and meets the deadline, it's okay.
Or,
a
more critical observer might argue that even if
the
ob-
jective
is
accomplished, an important side effect
could
be the loss of a cooperative relationship between thesales and production departments. What we tend tolose sight of, though, is that "creating an impression"is a euphemism for lying, and lying may not beethically acceptable in this situation.This example illustrates what may be termed theteleological or goal-oriented form of managementtheory [Keeley, 1979; Krupp, 1961; Pfeffer, 1978].This leads managers and management scholars
alike
to restrict normative judgments about organiza-tional behavior to outcomes (e.g., performance,satisfaction, system effectiveness) rather than con-sider the ethical quality of the means employed.In contrast, the field of normative ethics providesfertile ground on which to develop a normative
364
 
theory of organizational politics. We will thereforeturn to the literature of this field in order to draw outa set of principles that can provide the basis for anormative analysis of organizational politics thatmay reduce the ethical uncertainty surrounding thepolitical use of power.
Ethical Criteria Relevant toPolitical Behavior Decisions
Work in the field of normative ethics during thiscentury has evolved from three basic kinds of moraltheories: utilitarian theories (which evaluate beha-vior in terms of its social consequences), theories ofrights (which emphasize the entitlements of indi-viduals), and theories of justice (which focus on thedistributional effects of actions or policies). Each ofthese has a venerable heritage. Utilitarian theorywas precisely formulated in the eighteenth century[Bentham, 1789; Mill, 1863; Sidgwick, 1874]. For-mulations of rights theories appeared in the seven-teenth century [Hobbes, 1651; Locke, 1690; Kant,
1785].
Aristotle and Plato first formulated theoriesof justice in the fifth century B.C. This past decadehas seen a continuing discussion of a subtle andpowerful variant of utilitarianism called "ruleutilitarianism" [Brandt, 1979; Sobel, 1970], anelaboration of several rights theories [Dworkin,1978; Nozick, 1974], and the publication ofsophisticated treatments of justice [Bowie, 1971;Rawls, 1971].Utilitarian TheoryUtilitarianism holds that actions and plans shouldbe judged by their consequences [Sidgwick, 1874;Smart, 1973]. In its classical formulation,utilitarianism claims that behaviors that are moralproduce the greatest good for the greatest number[Mill, 1863]. Decision makers are required toestimate the effect of each alternative on all the par-ties concerned and to select the one that optimizesthe satisfactions of the greatest number.What can be said about the ethical quality ofPBAs from a utilitarian standpoint? In its presentform, utilitarianism requires a decision maker toselect the PBA that will result in the greatest goodfor the greatest number. This implies not only con-sidering the interests of all the individuals andgroups that are affected by each PBA, but alsoselecting the PBA that optimizes the satisfactions ofthese constituencies. Obviously, this can amount toa calculative nightmare.Accordingly, there are several shortcuts that maybe used to reduce the complexity of utilitariancalculations. Each of these involves a sacrifice ofelegance for calculative ease.
First,
a decision makercan adopt some ideological system that reduceselaborate calculations of interests to a series ofutilitarian rules. For example, some religious ide-ologies specify rules of behavior that, if followed,are supposed to result in an improved human condi-tion (e.g., the Golden Rule). Certain organizationalideologies, like professionalism, allow complexutilitarian calculations to be reduced to a focus oncritical constituencies [Schein, 1966].
Second,
a
decision maker can adopt a simplified frame ofreference in evaluating the interests of affected par-ties.For example, an economic frame of referencepresupposes that alternatives are best evaluated interms of dollar costs and dollar benefits. In this way,utilitarian calculations can be quantified. And
third,
a
decision maker can place boundaries on utilitariancalculations. For example, a decision maker can con-sider only the interests of those directly affected by adecision and thus exclude from analysis all indirect orsecondary effects. Similarly, a decision maker canassume that by giving allegiance to a particularorganizational coalition or set of goals (e.g., "officialgoals"), everyone's utilities will be optimized.Calculative shortcuts like these do not auto-matically free decision makers from moral respon-sibility for their actions. Normative ethicianstypically suggest that decision makers shouldperiodically assess these simplifying strategies toassure themselves that certain interests are not beingignored or that decision rules do not lead to subop-timal outcomes [e.g., Bok, 1980].Whatever form of utilitarianism
is
employed, twotypes of PBAs are typically judged unethical: (1)those that are consistent with the attainment of somegoals (e.g., personal goals) at the expense of thosethat encompass broader constituencies (e.g.,societal goals), and (2) those that constitute com-paratively inefficient means to desired ends. Takethe case of an employee of a company who uses per-sonal power to persuade policy makers to grantunusually high levels of organizational resources toa project by systematically excluding important in-
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