"The law has long been settled in Oklahoma that in case of doubt or ambiguity ajudgment may be construed in the light of the entire judgment roll or record."Keel v. MFA Mutual Ins. Co., 1976 OK 87, 6, 553 P.2d 160, 161. Examination of theentire record is particularly important in construing an uncertain workers'compensation judgment, because the issues to be resolved in a workers'compensation case are formed by the evidence, as well as by the required writtenmaterials. Hammons v. Oklahoma Fixture Co., 2003 OK 7, 4, 64 P.3d 1108, 1109-10.\par\par"In construing the judgment, it is necessary to take into consideration thesituation to which it was to be applied and the purpose sought to beaccomplished." Gade v. Loffler, 1935 OK 351, 11, 42 P.2d 815, 815 (per curiam)."In construing the judgment of a court, effect should be given to every word andpart thereof, including such effects and consequences that follow the necessarylegal implications of its terms, although not expressed." Id., at 0, 42 P.2d at815 (syllabus 1).\par\parIn the case at hand, the trial judge stated he "reviewed the file and the exhibitssubmitted at the latest trial." This review of the entire record was clearlyproper to determine the intent of the continuing medical maintenance provision inthe 1994 order. In doing so, the court found that deterioration of the prostheticknee was "predictable and expected to occur gradually over time when this case wastried in 1994." That is, deterioration of the prosthetic implants was an issueformed by the evidence at the time of the adjudication in 1994, and was thesituation to which continuing medical maintenance was to be applied. Consideringthe fact that the prosthetic implants are necessary to maintain maximum medicalimprovement in claimant's left knee, monitoring their deterioration was clearlythe purpose of the continuing medical maintenance provision, while their eventualreplacement was a necessary legal implication of the continuing medicalmaintenance, although not expressed.\par\parThe trial court's construction of the medical maintenance provision was fullysupported by the law and the entire record. As such, it was neither contrary tolaw nor against the clear weight of the evidence as the three-judge paneldetermined. We hold the three-judge panel erred as a matter of law in vacating thetrial court's order. The three-judge panel's order is reversed and this cause isremanded to the three-judge panel with directions to reinstate the trial court'sorder finding treatment to replace the implants to be within the intent of themedical maintenance provision.1\par\parVACATED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.\par\parGABBARD, P.J., and GOODMAN, J., concur.\par\par(FOOTNOTES):\par\par1 Claimant alternatively sought benefits on the ground that the deterioration ofthe implants was a change of condition for the worse. Both the trial court andthree judge panel ruled that a claim for benefits on this ground was barred by thestatute of limitations in 85 O.S. 43(C) (2006). In upholding the denial ofbenefits by the trial court and three judge panel on the ground of change ofcondition, this court does not reach the statute of limitations question.\par\parWe conclude the deterioration in the implants is not a "change of condition"because it does not involve a physical or anatomical change in claimant's body.The deterioration of the implants represents the diminished effect of a mode oftreatment. That is, the implants wear out much like the effects of medication wearoff. The implants require replacement in the same way maintenance medication must
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