There are also arguments that theArab Spring has much potential toweaken Ankara’s role.
have dierent agendas on many important global politicsissues. A typical alliance delineates the red lines o bilateralrelations on various highly critical issues. Moreover, alli-ances are expected to produce high levels o loyalty, whichalso aect the allied partners’ relations with other states.Secondly, Ankara should realize that the present incum-bent o the Oval Oce is not the Obama o 2008, but theObama o 2012. President Obama was more idealistic in2008. Cases like Iraq and Aghanistan “matured” PresidentObama. Obama now has less condence in institutions suchas such as sophisticated procedures between diplomaticsta. Again due to his experiences with the wars in Iraq andAghanistan, Obama is ully aware that institutional changeis dicult, and requires patience o
.President Obama’s brie irtation with PresidentMohamed Morsi o Egypt is proo o this pragmatism. Sois the U.S. approach to the Syrian opposition. Both conrmthat the United States no longer prioritizes long-termagendas o structural changes. Tis does not mean thatthe United States is no longer interested in grand agendas.Rather, the present U.S. priority is ocused on short-termtactics that are seen to secure vital interests. Given thetumultuous pace o the post-Arab Spring Middle East,adding cooperative actors is the U.S. diplomatic priority.Te United States is becoming a tactical actor.
Ankara’s Partner-Leader Role
President Obama is a kind o medievalist in oreign policy.He likes to weave a web o personal linkages, utilizing hismulticultural heritage as his biggest personal asset. Obamadoes not come across as a man o doctrine in oreign policy.One can rarely abstract an Obama doctrine rom what hedoes in oreign policy. Te
Obama at home,with his strict principles on social security or health, has noequivalent in global politics.While updating its position
the United States,Ankara should ollow a selective path: It should be criticalo the medievalism in Obama’s diplomatic style. Te intenseU.S. diplomacy that personal networking engenders is risky or urkey. Ankara should put pressure on Washington orthe deployment o a more sophisticated institutional mecha-nism, at least on some issues. Ankara’s reaction should besimilar on matters o doctrine. Except to demand a moresystematic paradigm, Ankara should not bar any U.S.doctrine. In all likelihood, the U.S. pragmatism is respon-sive to urkish pragmatism.“Direct calls rom the White House” are now more eectivethan sophisticated diplomacy. Te number o phone callsrom President Obama to various leaders indicates a time o crisis. For instance, President Obama made several calls toPresident Morsi during the most recent crisis in Gaza. Tisstrategy takes account o the act that the Middle East is stillin the era o charismatic leaders, and nations still ollow their leaders. Direct dialogue with the leaders is practical,both as a short cut to a quick solution, and as an appeal tolegitimacy. Including Morsi in the negotiations with Israelis certainly a lucrative tactic. Even i the included leaderails to help, the inclusion is intrinsically valuable or havingbeen part o a negotiation.Obama’s medievalism will certainly end urkey’s monopoly on being the premier U.S. partner in the region. Te UnitedStates will naturally be happy to have many other suchpartners, so it could be U.S. strategy to increase the numbero partner-leaders in the Middle East. Partner-leaders arethose who can be reached directly, and would not reuse tobe part o any U.S.-involved diplomatic procedure.Ankara, under Erdoğan’s leadership, had successully monopolized the partner-leader model with the UnitedStates during the last ten years. However, there are alsoarguments that the Arab Spring has much potential toweaken Ankara’s role. Te post-Arab Spring Middle Eastholds many potential partner-leaders in various countriessuch as Egypt, unisia, and Libya. Why? Islamists, the new legitimate actors o the game, are in need o legitimacy conrmation, and United States’ approval is the shortestroute to securing it globally. For example, the many callsrom President Obama have given President Morsi greaterlegitimacy. Tere is region-wide potential or a win-wingame between the United States and the Islamists in theMiddle East. Te reaction to this rom Ankara should bea recognition o new competitors like Egypt. In a recent