Much less frequently – although by no means never – we dospeak about normativity in the context of the formal sciences, suchas logic and mathematics. This essay is about the problem of the nor-mativity of the latter disciplines, with particular emphasis on mathe-matics. One of the theses which I intend to defend is the statementthat, despite the fact that in many domains such as language, mora-lity and mathematics the term takes different semantic nuances, thereis a common base for them, which I will call a proto-normativity or proto-rules. The main instrument which I intend to use is the embo-died-embedded mind, one of the interpretative paradigms
of cogni-tive neuroscience.
After an approximation of the problem in the rst “negative” part
of this paper, I will review the normativity in the context of the clas-sical views in the philosophy of mathematics, such as Platonism andformalism. I will try to show, that Platonism and formalism do not
provide an adequate solution to the problem of normativity. In the sec-
ond “positive” part of the paper I will review the problem of norma-tivity through the prism of the embodied-embedded mind paradigm.In this part I will give arguments supporting the thesis according to
which, although we are just taking our rst steps in the neurocogni
-tive approach to mathematics, our hopes for a solution to the riddle of normativity should be associated with this approach.
What exactly is the normativity of mathematics? I will try to
approximate this problem in two steps – rstly referring to the fa
mous “Wittgenstein paradox” and, secondly, by showing, after Robert
Hanna, three features of the intrinsic normativity of formal sciences.
The famous part of paragraph 201 of the “Philosophical Investiga-
tions” reads as follows:
Cf. S. Kripke,
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge 1982; K. Glüer, P. Pagin,
Rules of Meaning and Practical Reason
, “Synthese” 1999, no. 117, pp. 207–227; K. Glüer, Å. Wikforss,
, “Mind” 2009, no. 118, pp. 31–70; B. Brożek,
The Normativity of Lan-
, this volume; A. Shaw,
The Perspectivist Account of the Normativity of Meaning
, this volume.