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The Blessings of Spinoza by Abraham Socher (Review of 5 Spinoza Books), Religious Studies Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 2006)

The Blessings of Spinoza by Abraham Socher (Review of 5 Spinoza Books), Religious Studies Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 2006)

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 Volume 32 Number 1 / January 2006Religious Studies Review / 11
 © 2006 Council of Societies for the Study of Religion
 15REVIEW ESSAYS
 THE BLESSINGS OF SPINOZA
 SPINOZA’S MODERNITY: MENDELSSOHN, LESSINGAND HEINE
 By Willi GoetschelMadison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004Pp. x
+
 351. $29.95, ISBN 0-299-19084-6.
 SPINOZA’S REVELATION: RELIGION, DEMOCRACYAND REASON
 By Nancy LeveneNew York: Cambridge University Press, 2004Pp. xix
+
 256. $75.00, ISBN 0-521-83070-2.
 SPINOZA’S HERESY: IMMORTALITY AND THEJEWISH MIND
 By Steven NadlerNew York: Oxford University Press, 2001Pp. xix
+
 225. $19.95, ISBN 0-19-926887-8.
 SPINOZA AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF BIBLICALAUTHORITY
 By J. Samuel PreusNew York: Cambridge University Press, 2001Pp. xiii
+
 228. $75.00, ISBN 0-521-80013-7.
 SPINOZA’S BOOK OF LIFE: FREEDOM ANDREDEMPTION IN THE ETHICS
 By Steven SmithNew Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003 Pp. 256. $25.00, ISBN 0-300-10019-1.
  Reviewer: Abraham Socher Oberlin CollegeOberlin, OH 44074
 ertrand Russell’s Ciceronian summation of Spinoza’s careeris unsurpassed in its elegant compression:
 Spinoza is the noblest and most lovable of the great philosophers.Intellectually, some others have surpassed him, but ethically heis supreme. As a natural consequence, he was considered, duringhis lifetime and for a century after his death, a man of appallingwickedness. He was born a Jew but the Jews excommunicatedhim. Christians abhorred him equally; although his whole philo-sophy is dominated by God, the orthodox accused him of atheism.(569)
 But here, as elsewhere, Russell glossed over difficult questions,both philosophical and biographical. Spinoza’s metaphysical andpolitical teachings must first be understood before we can deter-mine whether and in what respects they have been surpassed, andthis has never been as easily accomplished as Russell implied.What, most fundamentally, does it mean to speak of 
 Deus sive Nature
 , God or Nature, and, relatedly, of human beings (as wellas everything else) as completely describable under both theattributes of thought and extension? Does this metaphysical doc-trine have any implications for democratic practice, or vice versa?Less subtly but no less importantly, what is the relation betweenthe theological and the political in Spinoza’s
Tractatus
 ? Finally—and this is the biographical question addressed in Steven Nadler’s
B
 ingenious and provocative little book—why, exactly, was Spinozaexcommunicated?Whether Spinoza has been surpassed or not (“Every philoso-pher,” Hegel famously remarked, “has two philosophies, his ownand Spinoza’s”), he is certainly the most widely discussed of thegreat early modern philosophers at the moment. The books underreview, which are only a small sample of the current crop of Spinoza books, address these and related questions from a varietyof disciplinary methodological angles. I
 Spinoza’s Book of Life
 is Steven Smith’s second book aboutSpinoza. His first,
Spinoza, Liberalism, and the Question of Jew-ish Identity
 , focused on Spinoza’s
Theological-Political Treatise
 ,and made a striking and persuasive case for its contemporaryrelevance. The “book of life” is, of course,
The Ethics
 . The titleis meant to surprise. Proverbs describes Wisdom as “a tree of life to them who grasp her” (Prov 3 : 18), and rabbinic liturgyfamously applied this to the Torah. Smith, who notes that
The Ethics
 , like the Pentateuch, is composed of five books, admits thatGilles Deleuze was right to describe the book as a kind of “anti-bible.” Nevertheless, he insists that
The Ethics
 is thoroughlyJewish in its radical monotheism, even if it ultimately underminesJudaism, along with its institutional competitors. Moreover,despite that destructive intent—and Smith follows Strauss in read-ing Spinoza as a thoroughgoing atheist rather than the nondenom-inational “Gott betrunken Mensch” of Romantic dispensation—he interprets Spinoza’s message as ultimately one of hope. Inshort,
The Ethics
 is a still-relevant book of life for an enlightenedpolity. (Smith’s interpretation is Straussian, but without the angst,a partial consequence, perhaps, of the differing fortunes of theWeimar Republic and the United States.)Smith sees Spinoza’s
 Ethics
 as a founding attempt to provide“the psychology and ethics of a democratic soul,” and he cele-brates the enterprise. This is an interesting and fruitful approach,as far as it goes, but God (or Nature) is in the details, and hereSmith’s analysis often flies rather high above the philological andargumentative landscape. Two related examples will have tosuffice. Early on, Smith discusses the central doctrine of Spinoza’s metaphysics. The third definition in the first part of 
The Ethics
 famously states:
 By substance, I understand what is in itself and is conceivedthrough itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the conceptof another thing from which it has been formed.
 Of this definition, Smith writes,
 Spinoza announces his break with the ancient and medieval philo-sophical traditions. For Aristotle with whom the debate aboutsubstance essentially begins, the concept of substance indicatedthe rational form or shape of any species. . . . Accordingly therewere as many substances as there were species in Aristotle’s poly-glot universe. (38)
 This is more or less true, but it obscures Spinoza’s complexrelationship to the Aristotelian tradition and, in particular, to thegreat twelfth-century Aristotelian Moses Maimonides. At the out-set of his
 Book of Knowledge
 , Maimonides defines the sense inwhich his readers ought to believe in a divine being:
 There is a first being, which brings into existence all whichexists . . . and if it were supposed that this being did not exist,
 
 
12 / Religious Studies ReviewVolume 32 Number 1 / January 2006
 nothing else could exist. However if it were supposed that all beingsbut it existed, it alone would still exist. (reviewer’s translation)
 In short, Spinoza’s substance is Maimonides’s God, the Aristote-lian First Being, made immanent. So, far from breaking with themedieval Aristotelian tradition, Spinoza might better be under-stood as carrying the inner logic of this position to its most radicalconclusion. Smith is, of course, familiar with the classic work of Harry Wolfson on Spinoza’s complex indebtedness to the medi-eval tradition as well as the important corrections and furtherfindings of Warren Harvey and others, but they play no role in hisexposition, to its detriment.The main concern of 
Spinoza’s Book of Life
 is not in questionsof being, as such, but rather in the impact of metaphysical argu-ments and doctrines on religion and politics. In this respect,Spinoza’s thoroughgoing determinism with regard to humanagency is a crucial issue, and Smith devotes a chapter to it. In ithe claims that Spinoza’s determinism is not incompatible with achastened sense of human freedom. This certainly keeps withSpinoza’s intentions, but I am not sure that Smith has come toterms with just how modest Spinoza’s freedom may have been.In opposition to Isaiah Berlin’s interpretation, Smith writes,
 It is not because we have a will but because we possessintelligence . . . that we are free agents. It is by virtue of ourpossession of a reflective consciousness capable of conceiving,imagining, wishing and doing that we are free. To say, as Spinozadoes, that freedom and determinism are compatible is not to assertthat human beings follow the same causal patterns as nonhumanobjects. (80)
 Perhaps. But, unfortunately, Smith never moves very far beyondthis assertion to substantive philosophical argument. Yet I am farfrom alone in thinking that it is a central feature of our moralreflection that—precisely at the moment of reflection—our actionis not yet determined. I think practical syllogisms (to return toAristotelian terminology) have causal force, at least sometimes.In this regard, it is striking that Smith chooses not to quoteSpinoza’s famous response to an earnest, worried Tschirnhaus onfreedom:
 Conceive, if you will, that while the stone continues to move, itthinks, and knows that as far as it can it strives to continue to move.Of course since this stone is conscious only of its striving, and notat all indifferent, it will believe itself to be free, and to perseverein motion for no other cause than because it wills to. And this isthat human freedom which everyone brags of having, and whichconsists only in this: that men are conscious of their appetite andignorant of the causes by which they are determined. (Letter 58)
 To think otherwise, Spinoza says again and again, would be toimagine that human beings are “an empire within an empire,”autonomous and apart from the causal network of nature. But thiswould be to suppose that man was a substance, whose conceptis entirely self-sufficient. Nor does Smith’s footnote of DonaldDavidson’s related arguments for his position of “anomalousmonism” help. In the first place, as Smith’s Yale colleagueMichael Della Rocca has shown, Davidson and Spinoza’s posi-tions differ in important respects. In the second, Smith does nottell us in what respect he finds Davidson’s arguments persuasive,and how it tallies with Spinoza’s position.I do not claim that Smith has no reply to such objections.Certainly Stuart Hampshire (who Smith quotes but does not trulyemploy) thought that there was a philosophically and exegeticallysatisfying middle position to be found in Spinoza. My criticismis that too often in this book Smith sketches the outlines of aninteresting position on Spinoza’s behalf, but fails to fill it in ortruly engage and answer potential criticisms. On the other hand,it should be noted that Smith is a graceful and lucid writer andhis emphasis on the “theological-political” context of evenSpinoza’s most difficult metaphysical doctrines is useful andredresses an imbalance in the literature. IIThere could hardly be a greater contrast between Smith’s deter-mination to read Spinoza as an author with something vital toteach us about modernity and the late J. Samuel Preus’s interpre-tive project in
Spinoza and the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority
 .Readers of this journal are likely to know Preus’s work on thehistorical origins of modern biblical criticism and, especially, thecritical study of religion, from his influential
 Explaining Religion from Bodin to Freud 
 . In this book (his last), Preus employed thecontextualist approach of early modern intellectual historianssuch as J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner, whose great meth-odological manifesto, “Meaning and Understanding in the His-tory of Ideas,” was directed, in part, against Straussian readingsof Spinoza, Hobbes, and others. Skinner insisted that the first andprimary task of historical interpretation was to reconstruct theimmediate lexical and rhetorical context of a work, rather thanconstructing a transhistorical dialogue between widely separatedthinkers and ourselves.Preus follows this approach to great effect. In doing so, heuncovers a politically charged debate over the practice of biblicalinterpretation among Spinoza’s contemporaries, and interprets the
 Theological-Political Treatise
 as directed, at least in the firstplace, at moving—or perhaps, better,
mooting
 —this debate. Of particular importance is Preus’s resurrection of the biblical inter-pretation of Spinoza’s erstwhile colleague Ludwig Meyer, whomhe regards as the hidden opponent of the
Treatise
 . Meyer was anidiosyncratic rationalist, who aspired to produce a systematicreinterpretation of the Bible which would bring it into harmonywith the new Cartesian and even more recent Spinozist philoso-phy. Spinoza, who already had thorough experience with such anapproach in his early reading of Maimonides and other medievalrationalists, would have none of it. In opposition, he developed athoroughly historicist approach which alienated the language,text, and doctrine of the biblical documents from the present dayand placed it in a historically interesting but politically irrelevantdistant past. (This approach also has Maimonidean roots, but thatis another story.)In doing so, Spinoza invented modern biblical criticism. AsPreus writes, “His approach to scripture comprehended all thediscoveries and advances that made a new departure necessary.”It is nice irony that Preus gives new precision to our understand-ing of the origins and primary aims of Spinoza’s method of biblical interpretation by employing a direct methodologicaldescendant of precisely the historicism which is at its heart.Nancy Levene is Preus’s successor at Indiana University, andthough she is thoroughly anti-Straussian, her approach to thematerial is constructive rather than contextual. Much as Smith,she presents a Spinoza who still speaks to us about the predica-ments of religion and democracy. In
Spinoza’s Revelation: Reli-gion, Democracy and Reason
 , Levene takes Spinoza’s positive
 
 
 Volume 32 Number 1 / January 2006Religious Studies Review / 13
 claims to be presenting a genuine, if heterodox, religiousapproach to the Bible and the place of religion in a democracyless ironically than either Smith’s Straussian or Preus’s historicistreading will allow. In an important passage, Levene writes,
 Spinoza is not implying that Scripture is the only or even theprimary instance of God’s word in the world. He is suggestingsomething different from both Jewish and Christian readers, anddifferent too from the philosophical and historical-critical readingsof the Bible that would continue to develop after him. Spinoza’sreading of the Bible is intended to establish that the truth of theBible is a universal and eternal truth precisely because it isrevealed, that is available in the text of a particular instance; weonly know its content—its “wages,” as he puts it—from its appear-ance in particular histories directed to particular audiences inparticular conditions. Despite Spinoza’s occasional implicationthat obedience is simply the way to salvation for the ignorantmultitude, it is not that truth abides eternally and is periodicallyalso revealed in certain texts at certain times. Rather, it is thattruths of reason have themselves not always been in the world.(92-93)
 One way to take this is that Spinoza thinks we can attain importanttruths through reflection upon the Bible, just as we can throughany natural, human product of a particular history. But this is notall that Levene means, since that would make the Bible and itsauthority in European society irrelevant, or, at least, no morerelevant than anything else. Rather, she seems to be arguing thatSpinoza developed something like a distinctively modern (or evenpostmodern) version of the doctrine of double truth, which Renanascribed to Averröes. In the next paragraph, Levene writes,
 The integrity of each—divine and human, minds and texts, rea-soning and obeying—depends on their separation. It depends onunderstanding that philosophy and theology no more express thesame truth from different angles than they express different truthsfrom the same angle—that philosophy and theology are eachsovereign (absolutely independent of each other) only if they areconceived in relation to each other. (93)
 Levene’s exegetical argument for this reading is complex and Icannot do justice to it in the compass of this review, but I am alsonot convinced. Here, I am inclined to side with Smith, who iswilling cheerfully to accept the charges of duplicitous atheismthat were hurled at Spinoza. When, at the end of the preface tothe
Theological-Political Treatise
 , Spinoza denies that “Reason isa mere handmaid to Theology,” he is at the beginning of a longand deliberate siege war against the latter. Perhaps Levene, whocan be an extraordinarily subtle reader, can accommodate thiswithin her account of Spinoza’s project, but at the moment I donot see how. This leads us to the biographical question, addressedby Steven Nadler, of the precise nature of Spinoza’s heresy. IIISteven Nadler’s book,
Spinoza’s Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind 
 , is different in form, content, and approach from anyof the books I have discussed so far. It starts with a rhetoricalbang: “It is a splendid mystery,” he writes, full stop, paragraphbreak. The mystery is what Spinoza did in 1656, when he wasonly twenty-three years old, unpublished, and an orphan, to pro-voke the leadership of the Portuguese Synagogue into the mostvituperative
Cherem
 , or writ of excommunication, that it everpromulgated. Among the famous highlights are these:
 But having failed to make him mend his wicked ways, and, on thecontrary, daily receiving more and more serious information aboutthe abominable heresies which he practiced and taught and abouthis monstrous deeds … the said Espinoza should be excommuni-cated and expelled from the people of Israel. By decree of theangels and by the command of the holy men, we excommunicate,expel, curse and damn Baruch de Espinoza … cursing him withthe excommunication with which Joshua banned Jericho and withthe curse which Elisha cursed the boys and with all the castiga-tions which are written in the Book of the Law. Cursed be he byday and cursed be he by night; cursed be he when he lies downand cursed be he when he rises up. Cursed be he when he goesout and cursed be he when he comes in. . . . And the Lord shallblot out his name from under heaven. . . . (Nadler, 2)
 What were Spinoza’s abominable heresies and monstrous deeds?It is striking that the
 parnasim
 of the Sephardic Jewish commu-nity seem to have got it so right, as it were, so early. Althoughthis community, fragile and defensive in its recent emergencefrom the Converso world of Spain and Portugal, pronounced aperhaps unprecedented number of excommunications, they man-aged to recognize Spinoza as their most dangerous heretic beforehe had published a word. On the other hand, Nadler may beoverstating both the mystery and the drama of the occasion. Thisis his description, drawing on the work of Offenberg andSalomon, of the origins of the text of the
Cherem
 :
 [It] had had been brought back to Amsterdam from Venice byRabbi Saul Levi Mortera almost forty years earlier. . . . Morterareceived the appropriate text from Venice’s chief rabbi, his formerteacher, Leon Modena. Modena, in turn had adapted it from thelate thirteenth-century compendium of Jewish law and customs,the
Kol Bo
 (‘All is Within’). Mortera’s Venetian mentor, a manpossessed of both immense learning and a seriously flawed char-acter, was not to be trifled with. He cobbled together a documentfull of curses and imprecations . . . their sheer quantity makes the
 cherem
 actually used for Spinoza decades later mild by compari-son. It was a text that the Amsterdam Jews seem to have kept inreserve. . . . As far as we know, Modena’s elaborate compositionwas brought out in the seventeenth century only for the banningof Spinoza. Therein lies the puzzle. (3)
 This is snappy, suspenseful writing. Nadler has a sense of plotand pacing rare among scholars, let alone historians of philoso-phy. Still, it should be noted that the title
Kol Bo
 is just the Hebrewequivalent of the Latin
Vade Mecum
 . It is a one-volume handbook,and it took no great scholarship on the part of Modena to cribsome language from it, which then was kept around as possibleboilerplate. Moreover, the fact that it was apparently only drawnon in part lessens the sense of a rhetorical WMD, carefully heldby the officials of the community for a situation of extremedoxological danger. Especially since it was originally drafted fora disputatious but garden-variety communal dispute: a synagoguebreakaway (“that,” as the old joke goes, “is the
schule
 I
don’t 
 prayat”). So I am a little skeptical over whether it is, in the end, “asplendid mystery,” or just a historical curiosity that Spinoza’sexcommunication contains rather more heat than one might haveexpected. But even if Nadler may have indulged in a literaryconceit, it is one with heuristic value, for it allows him to explorethe limits and possibilities of seventeenth-century Jewish thoughtto great effect.This is so, despite the fact that I think Nadler’s answer to themystery he poses is fundamentally flawed. Briefly, it is that thecommunity was particularly exercised over Spinoza’s rejection of 

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