Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword
Like this
2Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
CES Open Forum 13: CORRUPTION, INEQUALITY AND TRUST: the Greek vicious circle from incremental adjustment to "critical juncture" ?

CES Open Forum 13: CORRUPTION, INEQUALITY AND TRUST: the Greek vicious circle from incremental adjustment to "critical juncture" ?

Ratings: (0)|Views: 55|Likes:

Author: Christos J. Paraskevopoulos






Drawing primarily on new institutionalist approaches to Europeanization and the institutional theory of trust, and based on critical evaluation of the post-authoritarian period in terms of institutional and policy evolution, this paper argues that the situation in Greece over the last decade or so characterized by relatively high levels of corruption and inequality and low levels of social and institutional trust has constituted a vicious circle that can be conceptualized as a "multiple/institutional equilibrium". In this respect, the current period of institutional and policy change should be viewed as a "critical juncture", actually a consequence of the external shock facing the country, marked by the serious economic and political crises over the last two to three years. Yet, given that corruption, inequality and lack of trust are characterized as rather "sticky" phenomena, the paper, differentiating - up to a point - from other theories of transition/change, such as cultural, modernization and/or late industrialization theories, provides evidence of the Greek paradox, namely that this vicious circle is a relatively recent phenomenon that can be traced back to the post-authoritarianism, and in particular post-EU accession period, the main feature of which, however, has been incremental institutional and policy change. In other words, the vicious circle can itself be considered as a side-effect or byproduct of inadequacies/failures of the adjustment and/or modernization processes themselves. In accounting for this phenomenon, the paper points to the congruence of cheap credit, on the one hand, as a result of Greece's accession into the Eurozone, and the long-established weakness of the domestic institutional infrastructure, on the other, identified primarily with political clientelism and/or low "quality of government". A key feature of this weakness has been the predominant role of rent-seeking interest groups in Greece's policy-making structure at the expense of (civil) society. This phenomenon, however, is closely linked to the predominance of particularized ("amoral familism"-like) over generalized/social trust, which constitutes a key feature of Greece’s institutional infrastructure. Thus the lack of social trust is identified as a key intervening/ explanatory variable within the research hypotheses of this paper.






Author: Christos J. Paraskevopoulos






Drawing primarily on new institutionalist approaches to Europeanization and the institutional theory of trust, and based on critical evaluation of the post-authoritarian period in terms of institutional and policy evolution, this paper argues that the situation in Greece over the last decade or so characterized by relatively high levels of corruption and inequality and low levels of social and institutional trust has constituted a vicious circle that can be conceptualized as a "multiple/institutional equilibrium". In this respect, the current period of institutional and policy change should be viewed as a "critical juncture", actually a consequence of the external shock facing the country, marked by the serious economic and political crises over the last two to three years. Yet, given that corruption, inequality and lack of trust are characterized as rather "sticky" phenomena, the paper, differentiating - up to a point - from other theories of transition/change, such as cultural, modernization and/or late industrialization theories, provides evidence of the Greek paradox, namely that this vicious circle is a relatively recent phenomenon that can be traced back to the post-authoritarianism, and in particular post-EU accession period, the main feature of which, however, has been incremental institutional and policy change. In other words, the vicious circle can itself be considered as a side-effect or byproduct of inadequacies/failures of the adjustment and/or modernization processes themselves. In accounting for this phenomenon, the paper points to the congruence of cheap credit, on the one hand, as a result of Greece's accession into the Eurozone, and the long-established weakness of the domestic institutional infrastructure, on the other, identified primarily with political clientelism and/or low "quality of government". A key feature of this weakness has been the predominant role of rent-seeking interest groups in Greece's policy-making structure at the expense of (civil) society. This phenomenon, however, is closely linked to the predominance of particularized ("amoral familism"-like) over generalized/social trust, which constitutes a key feature of Greece’s institutional infrastructure. Thus the lack of social trust is identified as a key intervening/ explanatory variable within the research hypotheses of this paper.





More info:

Categories:Types, Research
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

05/31/2014

pdf

 
ces papers - open forum
CORRUPTION, INEQUALITY AND TRUST:
the Greek vicious circle from incremental adjustment to “critical juncture”?
Christos J. Paraskevopoulos
 
C
E
S
-
ces papers - open forum
# 13, 2012
Open Forum CES Paper Series
The Series is designed to present work in progress by current and former Center afliates and
 papers presented at the Center’s seminars and conferences. Any opinions expressed in the pa- pers are those of the authors, and not of CES.
 
Editors:
Grzegorz Ekiert and Andrew Martin
Editorial Board:
Philippe AghionPeter Hall
Roberto Foa
Alison Frank 
Torben IversonMaya Jasanoff 
Jytte KlausenMichele LamontMary LewisMichael Rosen
Vivien Schmidt
Kathleen ThelenDaniel ZiblattKathrin Zippel
 
 ABSTRACT
1
ces papers - open forum # 13, 2012
Drawing primarily on new institutionalist approaches to Europeanization and the institutional theory of trust,and based on critical evaluation of the post-authoritarian period in terms of institutional and policy evolution,this paper argues that the situation in Greece over the last decade or so characterized by relatively high levels of corruption and inequality and low levels of social and institutional trust has constituted a vicious circle that can be conceptualized as a “multiple/institutional equilibrium”. In this respect, the current period of institutional and policy change should be viewed as a “critical juncture”, actually a consequence of the external shock facing thecountry, marked by the serious economic and political crises over the last two to three years. Yet, given that cor 
-
ruption, inequality and lack of trust are characterized as rather “sticky” phenomena, the paper, differentiating -upto a point- from other theories of transition/change, such as cultural, modernization and/or late industrializationtheories, provides evidence of the Greek paradox, namely that this vicious circle is a relatively recent phenom
-
enon that can be traced back to the post-authoritarianism, and in particular post-EU accession period, the mainfeature of which, however, has been incremental institutional and policy change. In other words, the vicious circlecan itself be considered as a side-effect or byproduct of inadequacies/failures of the adjustment and/or moderniza
-
tion processes themselves. In accounting for this phenomenon, the paper points to the congruence of cheap credit,on the one hand, as a result of Greece’s accession into the Eurozone, and the long-established weakness of thedomestic institutional infrastructure, on the other, identied primarily with political clientelism and/or low “qual
-
ity of government”. A key feature of this weakness has been the predominant role of rent-seeking interest groupsin Greece’s policy-making structure at the expense of (civil) society. This phenomenon, however, is closely linkedto the predominance of particularized (“amoral familism”-like) over generalized/social trust, which constitutes akey feature of Greece’s institutional infrastructure. Thus the lack of social trust is identied as a key intervening/explanatory variable within the research hypotheses of this paper.
Christos J. Paraskevopoulos
is
Associate Professor of Political Science & European Public Pol
-
icy at the University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece. He was a Visiting Fellow at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University from January to July 2012. He can be reached via email at: chrp@uom.gr (ofce),or chrp@otenet.gr (home).

Activity (2)

You've already reviewed this. Edit your review.
1 thousand reads
1 hundred reads

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->