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Congressional Oversight Panel
February OversightReport
February 6, 2009Valuing Treasury Acquisitions* 
*Submitted under Section 125(b)(1) of Title 1 of the Emergency EconomicStabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343 
 
DRAFT1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 2VALUING TARP ACQUISITIONS .............................................................................................. 4TREASURY DEPARTMENT UPDATES SINCE PRIOR REPORT ......................................... 12OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES ......................................................................................................... 15FUTURE OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES ........................................................................................ 16ABOUT THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL ........................................................ 17APPENDIX I: LETTER FROM MR. LAWRENCE SUMMERS TO CONGRESSIONALLEADERSHIP, DATED JANUARY 15, 2009 ............................................................................ 18APPENDIX II: LETTER FROM CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL CHAIRELIZABETH WARREN TO TREASURY SECRETARY MR. TIMOTHY GEITHNER,DATED JANUARY 28, 2008 ...................................................................................................... 22APPENDIX III: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FINANCE ANDVALUATION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL ........................................ 25APPENDIX IV: SUMMARY OF THE LEGAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESSIONALOVERSIGHT PANEL FOR ECONOMIC STABILIZATION CONCERNING THE TARPINVESTMENTS IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ................................................................... 39APPENDIX V: VALUATION REPORT OF DUFF & PHELPS TO THE CONGRESSIONALOVERSIGHT PANEL .................................................................................................................. 51
 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A central question surrounding the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is whether the U.S.Department of the Treasury (Treasury) policy of injecting cash into financial institutions hasresulted in a fair deal for taxpayers. The focus of this report is a financial valuation study of theterms of Treasury's program to invest capital in financial institutions. The study wascommissioned as part of the Congressional Oversight Panel's continuing investigation into theterms of the TARP. The study was conducted for the Panel by its Advisory Committee onFinance and Valuation (Advisory Committee) and by the international valuation firm of Duff &Phelps Corporation; the Advisory Committee's report is attached to this report, and the longercomplete Duff & Phelps valuation study is posted on the Panel's website.
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The valuation study concludes that Treasury paid substantially more for the assets it purchasedunder the TARP than their then-current market value. The use of a one-size-fits-all investmentpolicy,The valuation studywas enhanced by an accompanying legal analysis of the terms of the TARP transactions alsoattached to this report.
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(1)
Bank Accountability.
The Panel pressed Treasury to collect and disclose additionalinformation about how TARP-recipient banks are using taxpayer funds and to establishrather than the use of risk-based pricing more commonly used in market transactions,underlies the magnitude of the discount. A number of reasons for this result have beensuggested. The Panel has not determined whether these reasons are valid or whether they justifythe large subsidy that was created. In addition, the Panel has not made judgments about whetherthe decision-making underlying these investments was sound. The rationale for the Treasury’sapproach and the impact of this disparity will be subjects for the Panel’s continued study andconsideration. It is important, however, for the public to understand that in many cases Treasuryreceived far less value in stocks and warrants than the money it injected into financialinstitutions.The legal analysis concludes that the documentation for the investments was standardized. Theuse of standardized documents probably contributed to Treasury’s ability to obtain speed of execution and wide participation, but it meant Treasury could not address differences in creditquality among various capital infusion recipients through variations in terms or impose specificrequirements on a recipient that might help insure stability and soundness.The February report also provides an update on the Panel’s previous work, as well as a review of the key actions and changes at Treasury since the Panel’s last report. In its initial report, onDecember 10, 2008, the Panel asked ten questions about the TARP and a series of sub-questionson the strategy, goals, methods and operations of the program. In its next report, on January 9,2009, the Panel analyzed Treasury’s response to the Panel’s questions and highlighted fourspecific areas where Treasury most needed to provide additional information:
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Congressional Oversight Panel (online at cop.senate.gov).
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That policy includes creation of a uniform capital infusion program, acceptance of a limit on themarketability of the securities Treasury received, and terms that encourage institutions to replenish their privatecapital.
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