"Never Shall I Fail My Comrades" -- The Dark Legacy of Gen. McChrystal’s Memoir "My Share of the Task": His Betrayal of Pat Tillman, Command of JSOC Torture, and Failed Afghan War “Surge” (Dec. 28, 2012; Ver. 2.4, Updated 4-20-14)

NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES
The Dark Legacy of Gen. Stanley McChrystal & His Memoir My Share of the Task: His Betrayal of Pat Tillman, Command of JSOC Torture, and Failed Afghan War Surge
Guy Montag @ feralfirefighter.blogspot.com Dec. 28, 2012 [Ver. 2.4, Updated April 20, 2014]
Gen. McChrystal, after being fired by President Obama following Michael Hastings June 2010 Rolling Stone profile
There will be few markers from this war and much of the history will be inaccurate or incomplete Leaders make mistakes, and they are often costly. The first reflex is normally to deny the failure to themselves; the second is to hide it from others, because most leaders covet a reputation for infallibility. But its a fools dream and is inherently dishonest. -- Gen. McChrystal, My Share of the Task (2013) A great many things went unsaid both during McChrystals [April 2012 Pittsburgh] address and the Q&A There was no mention of his role in the cover up of the friendly-fire slaying of Pat Tillman, including issuing a bogus Silver Star citation for the Ranger. No one asked him about the pattern of detainee abuse in Iraq by [JSOC] units overseen by McChrystals command McChrystal fizzled badly in Afghanistan, and everyone seems to want to dub him a 21st century Sir Gawain -- Carl Prine, McChrystal Clear (Line of Departure blog, June 3, 2012) I am concerned about General McChrystals public [Senate] testimony, which sought to convey that he was uncomfortable with various interrogation [torture] techniques and sought to reduce their use. Given the full history of his approach to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best. -- Senator Russ Feingold, Congressional Record (June 11, 2009) Of the several occasions when he himself attracted critical attention the Pat Tillman affair, for example, or the leaking of his Afghan strategic assessment McChrystal offers explanations [in his memoir My Share of the Task] that fall somewhere between perfunctory and disingenuous. -- Andrew Bacevich, New York Times book review Avoiding Defeat (February 8, 2013) He knows the administrations position on the matter was a cover-up a mistake. But it worked And anyway, his version could never be challenged [it] would become the governments official pronouncement And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts if not the truth. -- [Senator] James Webb, Something to Die For (1991)
[The title of my memoir My Share of the Task] comes from the Ranger creed part of a statement in that creed that says I will always do my share of the task whatever it may be and then some. And I was trying to capture the fact that each of us has a responsibility to do our part but none of us is preeminent. -- Gen. McChrystal, NPR Diane Rhem Show (January 16, 2013) [Rangers] were bound together by a shared history and values, best reflected in the Ranger Creed. The Ranger Creed is a six-stanza summary of Ranger values The third stanza provoked strong emotions. Never shall I fail my comrades. I will shoulder more than my share of the task... Although it had a rhythmic quality, the Ranger Creed was neither a poem nor a mindless mantra chanted by masses. It was a promise, a solemn vow made by each Ranger to every other Ranger. -- Gen. McChrystal, My Share of the Task (2013)
PAT TILLMAN
November 6, 1976 April 22, 2004
L to R: Marie Tillman (widow), Mary Tillman (mother), Richard Tillman (brother), Kevin Tillman (brother), Patrick Tillman, Sr. (father)
in Afghanistan I watched the Rangers deal with the loss of a comrade, and I saw nothing but genuine efforts to take care of a comrade, and I saw nothing but genuine efforts to take care of a fallen Ranger and his family in ways that reflected the deep values of the force. controversy arose and continued over the circumstances of Pat Tillmans death by friendly fire Sadly, truth and trust were lost in the process Concerns were raised over the wording in the Silver Star narrative, which some found misleading Any errors, which I should have caught, were not the result of any intention to misrepresent or mislead To this day, I am saddened by Ranger Tillmans death, as I am for the loss of every service member I served with, and for the pain such losses cause each family. -- Gen. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task (2013)
...
Revealing that Pats death was a fratricide would have been yet another political disaster [e.g. First Battle of Fallujah, April 2004 release of Abu Gharib photos]... So the facts needed to be suppressed. An alternative narrative had to be constructed. Crucial evidence was destroyed including Pats uniform, equipment and notebook. The autopsy was not done according to regulation, and a field hospital report was falsified. An initial investigation completed [by CPT Scott 1st 15-6 investigator] before testimony could be changed [and which hit disturbingly close to the mark] disappeared into thin air and was conveniently replaced by another investigation with more palatable findings. while each investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion To falsify a witness statement in a Silver Star award, fabricating it How come no one is held accountable for this? The whole thing is riddled with nonsense Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep. Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. These are deliberate acts of deceit. -- Kevin Tillman (April 24, 2007 Congressional testimony) The truth may be painful, but its the truth If you feel youre being lied to, you can never put it to rest. -- Mary Tillman (2004)
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES If nothing ever works out all the way, and if all things change, whats left? Your family and your friends and your values, thats whats left. And your duty to them Theyre the only important things in life you must never violate your loyalty if you wished to survive the judgment of the ages. -- James Webb, A Country Such As This (1983)
in Afghanistan I watched the Rangers deal with the loss of a comrade, and I saw nothing but genuine efforts to take care of a comrade, and I saw nothing but genuine efforts to take care of a fallen Ranger and his family in ways that reflected the deep values of the force -- Gen. McChrystal, My Share of the Task (2013) [McChrystal] told people he considered his Ranger vow never to leave a fallen comrade behind more binding even than his marriage vows. -- Dana Priest, Top Secret America (2011)
...
[Gen. McChrystals] command sergeant major [Mike Hall] said, The Rangers are a standards-based organization, and what makes them a little bit different from other organizations is that they enforce their standards. Comparatively, its sort of easy to get into the Rangers, the hard part is staying in and maintaining the standard every day The ideal is to see what is right and to continue to do what is right until it becomes second nature. -- Neil W. McCabe, The Man At McChrystals Side (January 12, 2013) "If you are going to lie and cover up what happened to someone who gave their life ... -- then you deserve to swing. When I started hearing about the false award recommendations, spinning the facts, changing their stories -- I was so pissed. The dishonor the Army is doing to Pat's family ... it's unforgiveable. ... From the moment you first join the Ranger Battalion, its ingrained in you that you will always do the right thing. You will always tell the truth. Then you see something like what theyre doing to Pat what [commanding] officers in the Ranger Regiment are doing and you stop being so nave. The only two times where I personally was in a position to see where the Army had the choice to do the right thing or the wrong thing, both times they chose to do the wrong thing. One of those times was what they did to Pat. It made me realize that the Army does what suits the Army. Thats why I wont put that uniform back on. Im done. -- Pat Tillmans Ranger Team Leader SGT Mel Ward (from Where Men Win Glory)
...
I want to thank anybody involved in the military, especially the Rangers I dont know a lot about what happened but Pat was doing his job. And I dont even know what the Ranger motto is, but Ill bet you a buck that he upheld it. -- Patrick Tillman, Sr. (at his sons Memorial Service, May 4, 2004) You are a General. On paper you subscribe to this [West Point] motto [Duty, Honor, Country] and honor code There is no way a man like you believes the conclusions [of the 3rd Army 15-6 investigation into Pat Tillmans death]. But your signature is on it. I assume, therefore, that you are part of this shameless bullshit. The Rangers stand for something to this day, in my mind, the best. [No one] involved in this deserve to be affiliated with the Rangers. If your uniforms are so decorated, [with the Ranger Tab] you should remove those items. In sum: Fuck you . And yours. -- Patrick Tillman, Sr. (April 2005 letter to BG Gary Jones)
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES A true war story is never moral. It does not instruct, nor encourage virtue If a story seems moral, do not believe it. If at the end of a war story you feel uplifted, or if you feel that some small bit of rectitude has been salvaged from the larger waste, then you have been made the victim of a very old and terrible lie. There is no rectitude whatsoever. There is no virtue. -- Tim OBrian, The Things They Carried (2010)
[Pat Tillman] admittedhe always felt a surge of energy and emotion at the point the National Anthem was played. He chuckled and said, I guess I have a patriotic bone in me. From the time I was very little, I was aware of my fathers pride in being a Marine. When I was three years old I would stand between my parents, feet digging into the soft leather of the big front seat, and sing the entire Marine Corps Hymn at the top of my lungs Military service was prevalent in my family and my husbands family and we were taught to respect it. -- Mary Tillman, Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2008) This war is so fucking illegal -- Pat Tillman to Ranger Russell Baer at Baghdad airport (2003) Pat had joined the Army and yet had not believed in the Iraq War We felt it was illegal and unjust. Ill do my job, Pat told me one night before he left But I dont think our role there is virtuous at all. his feelings on the matter certainly dampened his enthusiasm about service What the fuck kind of marriage involves my absence for months at a time? Its funny because at the time I felt that any absence would be tolerable due to the cause or whatever concept I deluded myself into believing I was standing for. Im a fool. How I managed to find a way out of our perfect existence is incredible. -- Marie Tillman (Pats widow), The Letter (2012) Im Pat Fucking Tillman!! -- Pat Tillmans last words before killed by FF in Afghanistan (2004) I was so certain of life, and of my place in it. I was so sure of my love, and of my future. I now have none of those certainties, but at least I can comprehend pain. I was so ready, so eager to fight and now I pay, richly pay, for having fought. I guess thats what the world does to you. It makes you reali ze that honor and loyalty are traps with no reward. -- James Webb, A Sense of Honor (1981) Pat died for this country, and he believed it was a great country that had a system that worked Congress is supposed to take care of their citizens. It isnt just our family. Every time they betray a soldier, they betray all of us. We had officers that we trusted. We had high regard for them. we knew they [Pat & Kevin] could die or they could come back wounded But we never thought that they would use him the way they did -- Mary Tillman, Congressional testimony (April 24, 2007) For Mary Tillman, what the army did to her son made a mockery of everything he went to war for honesty, integrity, the defence of the truth. 'If you ask me if I trust our system now, the answer is Im pretty disgusted by it. Unfortunately in our culture people survive more effectively through lies and deception and dishonourable behaviour than they do the reverse. And thats very sad. -- Mick Brown, Betrayal of an All-American Hero, UK Guardian (Oct. 7, 2010) Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pats death he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. His statement [P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so That memo is damming as hell. And the fact that he is off the hook is atrocious. -- Mary Tillman, Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2008)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page #:
Foreword (& List of Updates & Revisions) The Dark Side of Gen. Stanley McChrystal & His Memoir:
Gen. McChrystals Biographical Note Guy Montags Pre- Publication Amazon Book Review Guy Montags Post-Publication Amazon Book Review Gen. McChrystals Biographical Note (w/ Annotations) (Dec. 8, 2012) (Jan. 6, 2013) (Jan. 26, 2013) (Dec. 28, 2012)
13 19
20 22 23 29
... Mission Black List #1: The Untold Story of 2003 Capture of Saddam Hussein 35 Thats One Dead SOB: The Untold Story of the 2006 Killing of Abu Zarqawi No Blood, No Foul: McChrystals Command of JSOC Torture 2003-2005
A Few Rotten Apples Standard Operating Procedure Copper Green Grab Whom You Must. Do What You Want No Blood, No Foul Torture & Consequences The Emperors General Obamas Detainee Photo Protection Act of 2009 Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet? This is How We Lose
42 54
55 59 65 67 75 78 82 88
...
My Share of the Blame-- McChrystals Whitewash of JSOC Torture 93 Dirty Wars-- Jeremy Scahills Take On McChrystal & JSOC Torture & Gardez Killings 97 Detainee Treatment Report-- Constitution Projects Whitewash of McChrystal & McRaven 99
McChrystal Clear -- Peddling McChrystal Meth on the Lecture Circuit

McChrystal Clear (Carl Prines June 3, 2012 Line of Departure Blog Post) Got Questions for General McChrystal? "Friendly fire happens...as soon as we found out, that's what we said Alerting family was other chain of command s responsibility"
103
104 111 113 114
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page #
The [Untold] Tillman Story -- McChrystals Betrayal of Pat Tillman

The Official Tillman Story The [Untold] Tillman Story McChrystals [Bullshit] Tillman Story (w/ Guy Montags Commentary)
115
117 118 129
LeAffair Rolling Stan -- Michael Hastings Team America Road Trip

LeAffair Rolling Stan (adapted from Michael Hastings book The Operators) Its a Slap in the Face to Appoint this Man McChrystal Takes Responsibility for Rolling Stone Article The Emperors General
143
144 150 153 159
Something to Die For -- McChrystals Failed Afghan War COIN Surge

The Operators The Wild & Terrifying Inside Story of Americas War in Afghanistan Obamas General Why Hes Losing the War Team America (America Fuck Yeah!) An Unfortunate Deficit of Trust I Was Selling an Unsellable Position A Bleeding Ulcer It Would Be Folly The Sons-of-Bitches with All the Fruit Salad The Costs Would Rise I Was Responsible
162
163 167 168 169 170 171 172 174 176
Remember the Iconoclast, Not the Icon 178 The [Missing] Pat Tillman Legacy The Cause I Deluded Myself Im a Fool 179 Something to Die For 180
... After Pats Birthday - Somehow No One is Accountable for This

After Pats Birthday President Obamas War on the Whistleblowers The One Thing You Can Never Dodge Never Shall I Fail My Comrades Is Military Integrity a Contradiction in Terms? What Had I Learned About Leadership?
183
184 188 191 194 198
About the Author

7
202
APPENDICES
Page #
APPENDIX A: Senate Armed Services Committees November

2008 Report -- Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody
Introductory Note to the Senate Report
203
204
The Command of JSOC Torture from Sept. 2003 to June 2004, by Gen. McChrystal, 207 Admiral William McRaven, and BG Kyle Koenig Timeline of JSOC Task Forces Development of Interrogation SOPs, From December 2002 to June 2004 Removal of Clothing Used by JSOC Task Forces (Although Technique Was Outside Their Interrogation SOPs) with the Knowledge of Commander Legality of JSOC Task Force Interrogation SOPs was Repeatedly Questioned Pro Forma (Or No) Investigation of Reported JSOC Detainee Abuse 209 215 218 220
...
APPENDIX B: McChrystals Testimony Was Incomplete, at Best 221

-- Senator Russ Feingolds Congressional Record Response to General McChrystals June 2, 2009 Senate Testimony ...
APPENDIX C: Notes from Constitution Projects Detainee

Treatment Report (April 16, 2013) on BG Koenig, LTG McChrystal [and Admiral McRavens] Role in JSOC Torture
Constitution Project Found Responsibility For Torture Fell on Certain Military Leaders (But Their Report Didnt Hold Them Accountable) Gen. McChrystal & Admiral McRavens Command of JSOC Torture Non-Coercive Rapport-Based Interrogation Techniques Are Most Effective (But Constitution Project Omits Examples of Maddox & Alexander Using Them to Get Saddam Hussein & Abu al-Zarqawi) Gen. McChrystal, The Army, And President Obamas Whitewash Of JSOC Torture Constitution Project Whitewash of McChrystal & McRavens Command of Torture
8
224
226
228 235
236 239
APPENDIX D: THE FERAL FIREFIGHTER BLOG

TABLE OF CONTENTS -- 2008 to 2012 2014 Feral Firefighter Blog Posts:
Defend Your Integrity -- Robert Gates Leadership of the Failed Afghan War COIN Surge and the Bipartisan Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans 2004 Friendly-Fire Death in Afghanistan & Command of JSOC Torture (April 2, 2014)
240
2013 Feral Firefighter Blog Posts:

More Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not The Truth -- The New York Times Disingenuous Obituary of Michael Hastings & Their Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Role in LeAffair Rolling Stan and The Pat Tillman Story Never Shall I Fail My Comrades -- The Dark Legacy of Gen. Stanley McChrystal & His Memoir My Share of the Task: His Betrayal of Pat Tillman, His Command of JSOC Torture, and His Failed Afghan War Surge (Ver. 2.2) Something to Die For -- The [Untold] Tillman Story Annotations to Michael Hastings book The Operators (Ver. 1.2) (June 23, 2013)
(May 19, 2013)
(Dec. 24, 2013)
2012 Feral Firefighter Blog Posts (continued):

Never Shall I Fail My Comrades -- The Dark Legacy of Gen. Stanley McChrystal: His Betrayal of Pat Tillman, His Command of JSOC Torture, and His Failed Afghan War Surge (Ver. 1.0) The [Missing] Pat Tillman Legacy: The Pat Tillman Foundation & The NFLs Betrayal of Pat Tillman Something to Die For -- The [Untold] Tillman Story Annotations to Michael Hastings book The Operators (Ver. 1.0) (Dec. 28, 2012)
(Dec. 3, 2012)
(Apr. 22, 2012)

TABLE OF CONTENTS -- 2008 to 2012 (Continued) 2011 Feral Firefighter Blog Posts:
"Jon Krakauer's Credibility Problem" (Ver. 2.4.1, Feb. 23, 2012) (and how he took down Greg Mortenson to launch Byliner.com) (Apr. 24, 2011)
"The Tillman Story" DVD Reviews, Comments, Director Interviews (Feb. 15, 2011)
"The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Ver. 1.1 ) -- President Obama & Congresss Bi-Partisan Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Central Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly Fire Death "The Emperor's General" (Ver. 1.1) -- President Barack Obama & the Whitewash of General Stanley McChrystals Role in the Cover Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly Fire Death "He Who Shall Not Be Fact Checked" (Draft) -- CNASS Andrew Exum and the Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly-Fire Death
(Dec. 28, 2010)
(Jan. 29, 2011)
(Jan. 15, 2011)

"Throwing My Shoe at Bob Woodward ... Not" (Draft) Obamas (Dec. 29, 2010) Wars and the Washington Posts Bob Woodwards Whitewash of Gen. McChrystals Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly-Fire Death "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.0) -- President Obama & (Aug. 15, 2010) Congresss Bi-partisan Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Central Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly Fire Death Appendix A1 Mar. 26, 2007 DoD IG Briefing, Tillman Response (July 14, 2010) Appendix B1 Apr. 24, 2007 Congressional Hearing Appendix C1 -- July 31, 2007 Appendix D1 -- July 13, 2007 Gen. Wallace Briefing Gen. McChrystal To Testify
10
(July 8, 2010) (July 6, 2010) (July 13, 2010)
APPENDIX D: THE FERAL FIREFIGHTER BLOG TABLE OF CONTENTS -- 2008 to 2012 (Continued)
Appendix D2 -- August 1, 2007 Congressional Hearing Appendix D3 August 1, 2001 Gen. McChrystal "No-Show" Appendix E1 -- May 2008 Senate Hearings Appendix E2 -- Senator Webb on May 27, 2008 Diane Rhem Show Appendix F1 -- July 17, 2008 Congresss Final Tillman Report Appendix G1 -- May 15, 2009 Diane Rhem Show Appendix H1 -- Gen. McChrystal's June 2, 2009 Senate Hearing Appendix I1 -- McChrystal's Testimony Contradicts Gen. Abizaids Appendix J1 Gen. McChrystal Protection Act of 2009 ... "The Emperor's General" (Ver. 1.0) President Obama and the Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly-Fire Death (June 22, 2010) (July 6, 2010) (July 13, 2010) (July 14, 2010) (July 4, 2010) (July 10, 2010) (July 4, 2010) (July 4, 2010) (July 14, 2010) (July 15. 2010)
"Barely a Footnote" -- Superbowl XLIII and the NFL's Betrayal of Pat (June 20, 2010) Tillman "That's My Hero" -- Pat Tillman, Rachel Corrie, and Yoni Netanyahu Introduction: Feral Firefighter's Tillman Files (Old Version) "Where Men Win Glory" -- Andrew Exum, CNAS and the Whitewash of Gen. McChrystal's Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillman's Friendly Fire Death (He Who Shall Not Be Fact-Checked is a completely revised version of this document) "Where Men Win Glory" -- Appendices (June 20, 2010) (January 2010) (Jan. 27, 2010)
(Jan. 27, 2010)
11

TABLE OF CONTENTS -- 2008 to 2012 (Continued)

Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not the Truth" -- Senator James Webb, (Sept. 11, 2009) Thom Shanker & The New York Times and the Whitewash of General McChrystals Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillmans Death "Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not the Truth" -- Appendices "Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?" -- Senator James Webb, Gen. McChrystal, and their Betrayal of Pat Tillman (Updated 9/09/09) (Sept. 11, 2009) (May 27, 2009)
Appendix A: McChrystal Responsible for Fratricide Investigation & Family Notification Appendix B: McChrystal's Early Knowledge of Confirmation of Tillman Fratricide Appendix C: McChrystal Declines to Appear at Waxman August 1, 2007 Hearing Appendix D: McChrystal's Misleading P4 Memo Appendix E: McChrystal's Fraudulent Silver Star Recommendation Appendix F: McChrystal's Misleading June 2, 2009 Senate Testimony

A Sense of Honor" -- Letters to Mary Tillman & Senator James Webb Remember the Iconoclast, Not the Icon" -- Pat Tillman 1976 2004 Battle for the Truth" -- Iddo Netanyahu, Kevin Tillman and the Cover Up of their Brother's Deaths (Yoni & Pat) (April 3, 2008) (Feb. 15, 2008) (Feb. 4, 2008)
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FOREWORD
Not only is he [McChrystal] lyingabout the circumstances surrounding Pats death he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. His statement [P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so That memo is damming as hell. And the fact that he is off the hook is atrocious. -- Mary Tillman, Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2008)
In 2002, Pat Tillman was the NFL football player who walked away from a $3.6 million contract with the Arizona Cardinals and joined the U.S. Army. Pat Tillman (along with his brother Kevin) enlisted with the Army Rangers, did a tour in Iraq in 2003, and the following year was killed by friendly-fire in Afghanistan on April 22, 2004. However, instead of telling his family the truth about his death, Gen. Stanley McChrystal supervised the Armys cover-up of his friendly-fire death and approved his fraudulent Silver Star recommendation package. Five weeks later, with the Rangers returning home1, the Army finally had to tell the Tillman family his death was fratricide. Over the next three years, a series of investigations were conducted by the Army and Department of Defense. However, these investigations were largely a whitewash of McChrystal and others involved in the cover-up. In February 2008, I was pulled into the Tillman story after Mary Tillman (his mother) called me on the phone. Her call motivated me to write Senator James Webb to ask for his help with her battle for the truth. But, in May 2009 after President Obama nominated Gen. McChrystal to command the Afghan War, I finally realized Senator Webb had instead helped the Democratic Senate whitewash Gen. McChrystals key role in the cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death. I had stumbled upon what Ive called The [Untold] Tillman Story. That is, the Bush administration handed off their whitewash to the Democratic Congress. In 2007, Congressman Henry Waxmans Committee pretended to investigate, while in reality they shielded Gen. McChrystal from public scrutiny and accountability. During McChrystals 2008 and 2009 confirmation hearings, the Senate (particularly Senators McCain, Webb, and Levin) continued McChrystals whitewash. Finally, President Obama nominated him in 2009 to lead the Afghan War (he fired him in 2010), and President Obama appointed him in 2011 , over Mary Tillmans objections, to head the Joining Forces program to support veterans & their families.
1
5-19-13 Update: COL Craig Nixon claimed that he kept the fratricide news close hold (he and McChrystal even hide it from the medical examiner). But, Joseph Kapacziewski wrote in his 2013 book, (p. 193) Back in the Fight, th that it was it was an open secret within the Ranger RGT: The 75 Rangers constituted a small community within two days the news had spread throughout the regiment, both stateside and in the war zone. Rangers knew the real story of how he died by friendly fire long before it became public.
13
Note: For an introduction to the Tillman story, Id suggest reading Gary Smiths 2006 Sports Illustrated profile Remember His Name, Mike Fishs 2006 series at ESPN.com E-Ticket: An Un-American Tragedy, the chapter The [Untold] Tillman Story in this post, or watching Amir Bar-Levs documentary The Tillman Story (original title: Im Pat Fucking Tillman, his last words). For more details, Id suggest reading Mary Tillmans 2008 memoir Boots on the Ground by Dusk (paperback with new Foreword at blurb.com), the revised 2010 paperback edition of Jon Krakauers book Where Men Win Glory (its a flawed book, but it presents the best account of the friendly-fire incident & the Armys cover-up), Michael Hastings 2012 book The Operators, John T. Reeds free articles on military matters about Pat Tillman & McChrystal, and my Feral Firefighter blog posts. ... Since December 2009, Ive documented The [Untold] Tillman Story at http://www .feralfirefighter.blogspot.com. No one else, including Jon Krakauer, has written much about it (even after I handed Krakauer my material in 2009, he failed to tell this story, although he used my research without credit to extensively revise his paperback edition). In my previous posts, Ive also described how General McChrystal played a key role in the Armys cover up Pat Tillmans friendly fire death: McChrystal received confirmation of Tillmans fratricide within two days, he had the responsibility to pass on notification to the family, decided not to forward the fratricide notification to inform the family, he supervised the preparation of a misleading Silver Star recommendation (no mention of fratricide, with two witness statements apparently altered by the Ranger RGT COs, and with inaccurate assertions in the citation & supporting narrative), he approved the fraudulent Silver Star citation, and apparently directed others to conceal friendly fire from the medical examiner & a CID investigator (McChrystals JAG officer congratulated the Ranger RGT JAG for keeping the CID at bay). Last year, in my post, Something to Die For, I added my Tillman story annotations to quotes from Michael Hastings book, The Operators, merging his narrative about McChrystal and the Afghan war with my Tillman story narrative (this post is the best introduction to my Tillman files, with links to more detailed documents and sources). However, more detailed documentation and links to source documents can be found in my earlier posts such as The [Untold] Tillman Story, Lies Borne Out by Truth If Not the Facts, and Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet? (see the list of posts in Appendix C at the end of my Table of Contents). ...
14
Of the several occasions when he himself attracted critical attention the Pat Tillman affair, for example, or the leaking of his Afghan strategic assessment McChrystal offers explanations [in his memoir My Share of the Task] that fall somewhere between perfunctory and disingenuous. -- Andrew Bacevich, New York Times book review Avoiding Defeat (February 8, 2013)
Gen. Stanley McChrystal has said, The one thing you can never, and should never want to dodge, is responsibility. However, despite McChrystals much vaunted candor, his memoir whitewashes or perfunctorily mentions all the controversies of his career. The book jacket promises he will frankly explore the major episodes and controversies of his eventful career. Before reading the book, I had anticipated McChrystal would ignore or only briefly mention-inpassing his controversies (with some prevarication). Instead, it appears hes adopted Goerings big lie propaganda technique and decided to disingenuously whitewash his controversies with a thick layer of bullshit & confabulation. This post, Never Shall I Fail My Comrades, is my rebuttal of McChrystals memoir and my attempt to tell the truth that is missing from his official history & biography. This post portrays McChrystals dark legacy and how he has dodged responsibility for his role in formally importing torture to Abu Gharib, for the use of routine torture by JSOC forces under his command, for his central role in the cover-up of Pat Tillmans 2004 friendly-fire death in Afghanistan, for his strategically flawed Afghan War COIN surge, and for the Rolling Stone profile that got him fired. In addition, McChrystal failed to credit the Tikrit Delta team & interrogator Eric Maddox for their efforts which directly led to Saddam Husseins capture. And his inside story of the interrogations that led to the death of Abu Al-Zarqawi (head of AQ in Iraq) totally contradicts the accounts of Marc Bowden and Matthew Alexander (We found Zarqawi in spite of the way the task force did business). Note: For an executive summary of this post, read the next chapter, Gen. Stanley McChrystals Memoir: My Share of the Task. ...
For Mary Tillman, what the army did to her son made a mockery of everything he went to war for honesty, integrity, the defence of the truth. 'If you ask me if I trust our system now, the answer is Im pretty disgusted by it. Unfortunately in our culture people survive more effectively through lies and deception and dishonourable behaviour than they do the reverse. And thats very sad. -- Mick Brown, Betrayal of an All-American Hero, UK Guardian (Oct. 7, 2010)
In April 2011, just after McChrystal was supposedly cleared by the Pentagons NYT reporter Thom Shanker of all wrongdoing in the Rolling Stone case, President Obama appointed
15
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES McChrystal to head up the Joining Forces program to support military veterans and their families. In response, Mary Tillman (Pats mother) said, Its a slap in the face to appoint this man He deliberately helped cover up Pats death someone who has a heartfelt desire to help families would not have been involved in the cover-up of a soldiers death On Memorial Day 2012, Mary Tillman (Pats mother) called and we talked for about an hour. She said she had spoken briefly with McChrystal in April and mentioned he said something like, I mourn your son every day. Similarly, in his book (p. 134) McChrystal said, To this day I am saddened by Ranger Tillmans death, as I am for the loss of every service member I served with, and for the pain such losses cause each family (Did this guy really just recycle his own talking point clich when he finally spoke with Mary Tillman?!) Mary also said she was considering traveling with Kevin to meet McChrystal in DC. Mary had hoped meeting him face-to-face might bring her some measure of closure. She asked if I would help them prepare questions. But, the next day, they decided not to go. They figured they would probably walk away more frustrated than when we walked in. And, after reading McChrystals memoir, I believe she was right. Despite McChrystals platitudes about leadership, the Ranger Creed, and taking care of a fallen Ranger and his family, it appears this guy is a master of confabulation & bullshit who just wont genuinely admit a mistake, genuinely take responsibility, or be genuinely truthful about the controversies of his career. His hypocrisy is pathetic. During our Memorial Day conversation, Mary said that seeing McChrystal in the news was like rubbing salt in a wound. Unfortunately, this old general just wont fade away. His memoir, My Share of The Task, was released on January 7, 2013 and since then hes been making the rounds of lecture circuit peddling his book. In the past, I used to have a grudging respect for McChrystal when he remained silent and simply refused comment about Pat Tillman. But now, he certainly feels free to break his silence and spin his bullshit story about Tillman, torture, etc. on the talk show circuit (I guess he figures no one in the media will call him on his bullshit, and so far, hes been right). Since McChrystal wont confess the truth about the controversies of his career, I feel he ought to take the advice of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who (according to David Sanders on p. 107 of his book, Confront & Conceal) offered up a barbed assessment of how the White House had spun the Bin Laden raid: I have a new communications approach to recommend Shut the fuck up. ...
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Seven years ago I wrote, Of the many tragic aspects surrounding his [Pat Tillmans] death, one is that he cannot define his own legacy. Now, its up to his family and friends to reclaim the truth and integrity of Pats life and death. By documenting what Ive called the untold Tillman Story, Ive tried to follow my own sense of integrity to do my share of the task to reclaim the truth of Pat Tillmans legacy from the lies of McChrystals bullshit memoir, the governments official pronouncement, and the synchophantic bullshit of the mainstream medias coverage of the story (e.g. the Pentagons NYT reporter Thom Shanker). As [Senator] James Webb wrote in 1991, And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts if not the truth. -- Guy Montag, December 28, 2012 SGT, Co. F (Ranger) 425th Infantry MI ARNG, 1983 1991 Firefighter, 1991 Present
...
P.S. July 21, 2013: Michael Hastings died in a fiery car crash on June 18, 2013. My tribute to him, More Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not The Truth -- The New York Times Disingenuous Obituary of Michael Hastings & Their Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Role in LeAffair Rolling Stan & The Pat Tillman Story, is posted at the Feral Firefighter blog.
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DESCRIPTION OF UPDATES & REVISIONS:

Update Draft 1.1 (January 15, 2013): Now that Ive read much of My Share of the Task, Ive updated portions of No Blood, No Foul sections, especially Thats One Dead SOB about the Sadddam & Zarqarwi manhunt. Ill update the other sections later. Ive added McChrystals Tillman Story and Carl Prines McChrystal Clear post. Update Draft 1.2 (January 26, 2013): Added Amazon.com book reviews of My Share of the Task, updated The [Untold] Tillman Story.
...
Update 2.0 (February 18, 2013): Rearranged TOC. Greatly expanded the Rolling Stone & Afghan War sections. Added Ranger Creed commentary at the front and numerous small edits and updates throughout the document. Added notes for After Pats Birthday section. Update 2.1 (March 31, 2013): Added notes from Maj. Douglas Pryers book The Fight for the High Ground, added new Afghan War & COIN links to The Costs Would Rise I Was Responsible section, made minor updates to Appendix A about the Senate Report and added Douglas Pryer quotes on torture, revised the Foreword and Book Reviews, added quotes from the book Assholes: A Theory and On Bullshit, finished After Pats Birthday section and added quotes from blogger emptywheel [Marcy Wheeler], John T. Reed, and Sibel Edmonds. Update 2.2 (Memorial Day -- May 27, 2013): Added note about heart attack of Dilar Dababa; No Blood, No Foul postscript notes from Jeremy Scahills book Dirty Wars (Andrew Exums swooning about SM4, etc.); No Blood, No Foul notes about the Constitution Projects whitewash of McChrystal & McRavens role in JSOC torture; added Appendix C detailing the Constitution Projects (April 16, 2013) Detainee Treatment report that whitewashed McChrystal (and Admiral Bill McRavens command of JSOC torture; added photo from Pro Football Hall of Fame Pat Tillman exhibit. Update 2.3 (July 12, 2013): Added Shane Clairborne quote, revised cover to the title page, linked to my Michael Hastings tribute post, links to Gian Gentile & Douglas Porchs new books on COIN, added more COL Macgregor notes on McChrystals sucking up to get ahead. ... Update 2.4 (April 20, 2014): Added notes from my April 2014 post, DEFEND YOUR INTEGRITY, to update the The [Untold] Tillman Story & Something to Die For sections with notes on Sec. of Defense Robert Gates leadership of the bipartisan whitewash of Gen. McChrystal;
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THE DARK SIDE OF GEN. MCCHRYSTAL & HIS MEMOIR MY SHARE OF THE TASK
General McChrystal is a legendary warrior with a fine eye for enduring lessons about leadership, courage, and consequence. He took me inside the command bunker, on nighttime raids, and through the fog of war, political and military. This is a brilliant book about leadership wrapped inside a fascinating personal narrative ... Its a deeply inspiring tale. A remarkable memoir by one of the most exceptional and thoughtful leaders of his generation. -- From Amazon.com book blurbs for My Share of the Task Everyone has a dark side, [COL Micheal] Flynn said, seemingly referring to McChrystal Like Tiger Woods, I said. His whole image was built up and torn down overnight. Exactly, like Tiger Woods. -- Michael Hastings, The Operators (2012) The general [Gen. Stanley McChrystal] was a living legend in the Special Operations community, a giant leap above the office-bound dipshits who usually had four stars on their shoulders. McChrystals career should have been over at least two times by now. He is tainted by one of the most controversial scandals of the previous administration: detainee abuse and torture at prisons in Iraq [e.g. Camp Nama], and the cover-up of Pat Tillmans death. -- Michael Hastings, The Operators (2012) A great many things went unsaid both during McChrystals [April 2012 Pittsburgh] address and the Q&A There was no mention of his role in the cover-up of the friendly-fire slaying of Pat Tillman, including issuing a bogus Silver Star citation for the Ranger. No one asked him about the pattern of detainee abuse in Iraq by [JSOC] units overseen by McChrystals command McChrystal fizzled badly in Afghanistan, and everyone seems to want to dub him a 21st century Sir Gawain -- Carl Prine, McChrystal Clear (Line of Departure blog, June 3, 2012)
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Gen. Stanley McChrystals Biographical Note

(December 8, 2012)
[adapted from his biographical note at his speaking bureau Leading Authorities and the Amazon.com book blurb for his memoir My Share of the Task]
Never shall I fail my comrades. . . . I will shoulder more than my share of the task, whatever it may be, one hundred percent and then some. from the Ranger Creed General McChrystal is a legendary warrior with a fine eye for enduring lessons about leadership, courage, and consequence. He took me inside the command bunker, on nighttime raids, and through the fog of war, political and military. This is a brilliant book about leadership wrapped inside a fascinating personal narrative ... Its a deeply inspiring tale. A remarkable memoir by one of the most exceptional and thoughtful leaders of his generation. ... A four-star general, Gen. Stan McChrystal is the former commander of U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan and the former leader of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), which oversees the militarys most sensitive forces. In this illuminating memoir, McChrystal frankly explores the major episodes and controversies of his eventful career career [without rancor or retribution]. [Instead,] He delves candidly into the intersection of history, leadership, and his own experience to produce a book of enduring value. Called one of Americas greatest warriors by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, General Stan McChrystal is a one-of-a-kind commander with a remarkable record of achievement, and is known for his candor, innovative leadership, and going the distance. His entire career has been guided by his sense of duty, from his first day as a West Point plebe in 1972 to his last day as a four-star general. Even as a senior commander, McChrystal stationed himself forward, and frequently went on patrols with his troops to experience their challenges firsthand. The values he has come to be widely admired for were evident: a hunger to know the truth on the ground, the courage to find it, and the humility to listen to those around him. The son and grandson of Army officers, McChrystal graduated from West Point in 1976. He was commissioned as an infantry officer and spent much of his career commanding special operations and airborne infantry units. He served in the 82nd Airborne, the Rangers, the 7th Special Forces Group, the Joint Staff, and JSOC, among other assignments. In 2003, McChrystal was selected to deliver the nationally televised Pentagon briefings about military operations in Iraq.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES From 20032008, he commanded Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and was responsible for leading the nations deployed military counter-terrorism efforts around the globe. He writes of a fight waged in the shadows by JSOC, which he led from 2003 to 2008. McChrystal is widely praised for creating a revolution in warfare that fused intelligence and operations. JSOC became one of our most effective counterterrorism weapons, facing off against Al Qaeda in Iraq. His leadership of JSOC is credited with the 2003 capture of Saddam Hussein. Over time, JSOC gathered staggering amounts of intelligence in order to find and remove the most influential and dangerous terrorists, including the 2006 killing of the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The hunt for Zarqawi drives some of the most gripping scenes in this book, as McChrystals team grappled with tricky interrogations, advanced but scarce technology, weeks of unbroken surveillance, and agonizing decisions. McChrystal brought the same energy to the war in Afghanistan, where the challenges loomed even larger. McChrystal assumed command of all international forces in Afghanistan in June 2009. President Obamas order for an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan was based on McChrystals assessment of the war. He developed and implemented the counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan. McChrystal retired from the military in 2010. He now serves on the board of directors for JetBlue Airways, Navistar, and the Yellow Ribbon Fund. He is also a senior fellow at Yale Universitys Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, where he teaches a popular course on leadership. In April 2011, McChrystal returned to public service after the Obama administration invited him to oversee Joining Forces, a high-profile initiative that supports military families. General McChrystal co-founded the McChrystal Group in January 2011. Its mission is to deliver innovative leadership solutions to organizations. A dynamic, powerful speaker, McChrystal impresses audiences with field-tested leadership lessons. When old systems fall short, he believes true leaders must look for ways to innovate and change. Citing stories from his career, McChrystal reveals a four-star management strategy, concentrating on openness, teamwork, and forward-thinking. Ultimately, My Share of the Task is about much more than war and peace, terrorism and counterinsurgency. As McChrystal writes, More by luck than design, Id been a part of some events, organizations, and efforts that will loom large in history, and more that will not. I saw selfless commitment, petty politics, unspeakable cruelty, and quiet courage in places and quantities that Id never have imagined. But what I will remember most are the leaders.
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Pre-Publication Review of My Share of the Task

(Amazon.com, January 6, 2013) This past Memorial Day, I spoke with Mary Tillman (Pat Tillman's mother) and she said seeing Gen. McChrystal in the news was "like rubbing salt in a wound." Unfortunately, this old general won't just fade away. Now, he's making the rounds of the morning talk shows and the Amazon book blurb for his memoir, "My Share of the Task," promises it will "frankly explore the major episodes and controversies of his eventful career." However, despite McChrystal's much vaunted "candor," it appears his memoir whitewashes or ignores the controversies of his career. For example, he simply repeats his lecture circuit BS that there was no cover-up of Pat Tillman's 2004 friendly-fire death, merely "well-intentioned mistakes." And, McChrystal "still declines to confirm or deny the accuracy of the quotes" of Michael Hasting's "Rolling Stone" profile which got him fired (he spend only a page and a half on it, doesn't even mention Hastings by name, and he doesn't address the substance of Hasting's 2012 book, "The Operators," which details "Le'Affair Rolling Stan" and his failed Afghan war strategy). In April 2011, just after McChrystal was supposedly cleared by the Pentagon's NYT reporter Thom Shanker of "all wrongdoing" in the "Rolling Stone" case, President Obama appointed him to head up the "Joining Forces" program to support military veterans and their families. In response, Mary Tillman said, "It's a slap in the face to appoint this man" ... "He deliberately helped cover up Pat's death"... someone who has a heartfelt desire to help families would not have been involved in the cover-up of a soldier's death..." McChrystal has said, "The one thing you can never, and should never want to dodge, is responsibility." But, it appears that he has "dodged" taking responsibility for his central role in the Tillman cover-up, the use of torture by JSOC forces under his command, how he helped "box in" President Obama into his strategically flawed Afghan War "surge," and for "Le'Affair Rolling Stan (see details at the post, "Never Shall I Fail My Comrades" -- The Dark Legacy of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, at the Feral Firefighter blog). Finally, I'm curious to see how well his story of the capture of Saddam Hussein and the killing of Abu Zarqawi matches previous accounts which describe the "back story"(e.g. interogator Matthew Alexander said, "We found Zarqawi in spite of the way the task force (McChrystal's TF 145) did business"). In the past, I used to have a grudging respect for McChrystal when he simply refused to comment about the Pat Tillman story. But, if McChrystal won't confess the truth about "the major episodes and controversies of his eventful career," I feel he ought to take the advice of SecDef Gates, who offered up a barbed assessment of how the White House had "spun" the Bin Laden raid: "I have a new communications approach to recommend ... Shut ... up."
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Post-Publication Review of My Share of the Task

(Amazon.com, January 26, 2013; last updated March 22, 2013)
There will be few markers from this war and much of the history will be inaccurate or incomplete Leaders make mistakes, and they are often costly. The first reflex is normally to deny the failure to themselves; the second is to hide it from others, because most leaders covet a reputation for infallibility. But its a fools dream and is inherently dishonest. -- Gen. McChrystal, My Share of the Task (2013) Of the several occasions when he himself attracted critical attention the Pat Tillman affair, for example, or the leaking of his Afghan strategic assessment McChrystal offers explanations [in his memoir My Share of the Task] that fall somewhere between perfunctory and disingenuous. -- Andrew Bacevich, New York Times book review Avoiding Defeat (February 8, 2013)
... Gen. Stanley McChrystal begins his memoir, My Share of the Task, by writing he intends to weave together the threads of history and leadership around the story of his life. However, I found his thread of leadership to be rather threadbare. McChrystal scatters anecdotal examples of leadership throughout his book, but only in the last pages does he write about what he had learned about leadership. Similarly, the thread of his life is focused on his Army career, and doesnt dwell much on his personal life, feelings or thoughts. By far, the thread of history is the thickest, and his book has more the feel of a history text than a memoir. Unfortunately, McChrystals history deceitfully whitewashes the controversies of his career. Part I is an extended prologue. McChrystal describes the first 30 years of his Army career, beginning in 1972 when he entered West Point, followed by service in mostly special forces units (Airborne, Special Forces, and Ranger RGT), and ending with his 2002 assignment to the Pentagon Joint Staff. During these years he never commanded units in combat. Part II, the centerpiece of the book, portrays his history of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) under his command from 2003 to 2008. JSOC is comprised of elite operators such as Delta, Seals, DevGru, Rangers, etc. and their support staff. McChrystal tells the story of how JSOC radically transformed itself from a group of shooters into a network interlinked with other agencies that gathered information swiftly and acted accordingly and became one of the U.S.s most effective counterterrorism weapons. McChrystal briefly describes the 2003 capture of Saddam Hussein. However, he failed to credit the Tikrit Delta team & interrogator Eric Maddox (Mission Black List #1) for their efforts
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES which directly led to Saddams capture (perhaps because it could raise questions about the role of torture in the death of a high-value detainee who had a heart attack shortly after arriving at Camp Nama resulting in Maddox facing a dead end). In succeeding chapters, McChrystal writes his history of JSOCs battles against al-Qaeda in Iraq: e.g. 2004s First & Second battles of Fallujah, 2005s operation Snake Eyes to cut off the supply of foreign fighters, 2006s battle for Ramadi, and JSOCs support for the 2007 Iraq Surge and the Sunni awakening movement (for more detail, see Michael Gordons The Endgame). Curiously, McChrystal didnt mention the key role of the Taji trove (see Thom Shankers book Counterstrike) in the 2007 Iraq Surge that was so valuable that one military officer compared it to the allies success in breaking the Nazis Enigma codes during WWII It gave us their whole ball game for Baghdad. And, he only mentioned the Sinjar papers in a footnote (p. 415); Shanker wrote that Gen. Petraeus said the overall Sinjar effort did more to halt the terror networks that flowed foreign fighters and suicide bombers into Iraq than any other operation. Similarly, Marc Bowden wrote (The Finish) that the Sinjar papers played a big part in decapitating al Qaeda in Iraq McChrystal has cited the Sinjar raid as one of his units most important breakthroughs. McChrystals memoir is valuable for providing a strategic big-picture history of JSOCs fight in Iraq (I would also suggest Mark Urbans book, Task Force Black that describes JSOCs fight from the viewpoint of the British SAS). However, if youre interested in an operator level portrayal, I would suggest books such as Mark Owens No Easy Day, Marcus Luttrells Service, or Chris Kyles American Sniper. The heart of McChrystals memoir is his 50-page narrative of the manhunt and 2006 killing of Abu al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. He uses the Zarqawi manhunt to illustrate how JSOC uses a variety of tools including skillful interrogation, drone surveillance, and signals intelligence to find, fix, and finish insurgents. Here, McChrystal claims that TF 145s three best interrogators developed rapport with a detainee to get the intel that led to Zaraqwi. However, McChrystals inside story of these interrogations totally contradicts the accounts of Marc Bowdens article The Ploy (the real story is more complicated and interesting), Mark Urbans book Task Force Black (multiple sources have confirmed to me the accuracy of Bowdens article), and Matthew Alexanders book How to Break A Terrorist (We found Zarqawi in spite of the way the task force did business). In reality, Alexander used rapport to get key intel in a few hours (just before the detainee was due to be shipped out) that JSOCs best interrogators had failed to get in three weeks using their "old-school" attitude!
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Overshadowed by the McChrystal controversy was the story Hastings really wanted to produce: an
indictment of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, which Hastings considers a deadly folly [In his book The Operators] he argues that the Afghanistan war is a debacle and that counterinsurgency is a liberal-sounding sham -- Spencer Ackerman, Michael Hastings: McChrystal Was Complex, Obama Was Naive, Afghanistan Is Hopeless January 5, 2012)
In Part III, McChrystal whitewashes his command of the Afghan War from 2009-2010. He refuses to admit that the military boxed in Obama into making the Afghan war surge (e.g. Bob Woodwards Obamas Wars). And he doesnt address the failure of his strategically flawed COIN strategy (e.g. Fred Kaplans The Insurgents). McChrystals surge didnt work, President Obama fired McChrystal, and Gen. David Petreaus couldnt make COIN work either. But, McChrystal should have known it was folly from the beginning. His best military advice wasnt worth squat. A lot of troops have been killed or wounded because of it. McChrystal ends Part III of his memoir with a brief, disingenuous discussion of the controversial Rolling Stone profile by Michael Hastings which led to his June 2010 firing by President Obama. McChrystal claims he resigned instead of being fired (although he only issued an apology & hadnt submitted his resignation before meeting Obama). McChrystal still declines to confirm or deny the accuracy of the quotes and falsely implies they were off-the record. McChrystal claims he consulted no one (although the general's first action was to call his superiors such as Secretary of Defense Gates and Vice President Biden, etc). Finally, McChrystal claims he took full responsibility for the Rolling Stone piece (although before flying to DC his PR advisor Duncan Boothby offers his resignation McChrystal accepts). For a more critical and honest account of LeAffair Rolling Stan, I would suggest Michael Hastings 2012 book The Operators.
at the very same time the Army was cleaning up Abu Ghraib at an elite secret interrogation facility [JSOCs Camp Nama] nudity and hooding and stress positions were still routine Do you know where the colonel was getting his orders from? I believe it was a two-star general. I believe his name was General McChrystal. I saw him there a couple of times. -- John Richardson, Esquire (2006)
McChrystal wrote (p.136): for many [foreign jihadists], burning anger over images of degradation at Abu Gharib had provoked them to come to Iraq and would fuel the fire for years to come. (p.172): In my experience, we found that nearly every first-time jihadist claimed Abu Gharib had first jolted him to action. The 2008 Senate Armed Services Committee report, Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, described how torture contributed to combat deaths of American soldiers: the first and second identifiable causes of U. S. combat deaths in Iraq - as judged by their effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighters into combat - are, respectively the symbols of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo."
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES But, McChrystal claims that Abu Gharib was the work of a few bad apples and that he never condoned mistreatment of detainees But the SASC report said: The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply the result of a few bad apples acting on their own. Interrogation policies endorsed by senior military and civilian officials authorizing the use of harsh interrogation techniques were a major cause of the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody. SMU TF [JSOC task force] policies [authorized by McChrystal] were a direct cause of detainee abuse and influenced interrogation policies at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq. In addition, as Joint Staff VDJ3 it appears McChrystal was involved in the process of formally importing torture to Iraq in 2003 by sending Gen. Geoffrey Miller to Gitmotize Abu Gharib and by sending SERE instructors to teach torture techniques to TF 121. After McChrystal did his share of the task of lighting the fire of Abu Gharib (contributing to the deaths of US soldiers), he then commanded the JSOC night raids which killed thousands of jihadis who came to Iraq because of Abu Gharib. McChrystals like an arsonist firefighter who sets the fire and then later brags about putting it out! After he took command of JSOC in 2003, instead of reducing torture, McChrystal (along with then TF 121 CO Admiral Bill McRaven) approved more techniques until he was ordered to stop most of them after the Abu Gharib scandal; although it appears JSOC didnt fully clean up its act until the end of 2005. Maj. Douglas Preyer wrote in his book, The Fight for the High Ground: Incredibly, even after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, the facility run by the elite Special Mission Unit in Iraq [TF121] continued to permit more of these techniques than had been previously allowed at Abu Ghraib Finally, after McChrystals 2009 Senate testimony, Senator Russ Feingold wrote: I am concerned about General McChrystals public testimony, which sought to convey that he was uncomfortable with various interrogation techniques and sought to reduce their use. Given the full history of his approach to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best. Overall, it appears McChrystals memoir attempts to re-write history and whitewash his role in the use of torture as commander of JSOC.
in Afghanistan I watched the Rangers deal with the loss of a comrade, and I saw nothing but genuine efforts to take care of a comrade, and I saw nothing but genuine efforts to take care of a fallen Ranger and his family in ways that reflected the deep values of the force. -- Gen. McChrystal, My Share of the Task (2013)
Gen. McChrystal claims its a misperception that there was a cover-up of Pat Tillmans 2004 friendly fire death in Afghanistan. However, his account is disingenuous and simply doesnt withstand informed scrutiny. In reality, General McChrystal played a central role in the Armys cover up. Although McChrystal was told of confirmed fratricide within two days, he
26
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES intentionally failed in his duty to pass on notification to the family, he supervised and approved a fraudulent Silver Star recommendation (with two forged witness statements), and he apparently directed others to conceal evidence of friendly fire from the medical examiner. Since then, McChrystals central role has been repeatedly whitewashed by the Democratic Congress and President Obama. In April 2011, just after McChrystal was supposedly cleared (the DoD IGs investigation report is a joke!) of all wrongdoing in the Rolling Stone case, President Obama appointed him to head up the Joining Forces program to support military veterans and their families. In response, Mary Tillman (Pat Tillmans mother) said, Its a slap in the face to appoint this man He deliberately helped cover up Pats death someone who has a heartfelt desire to help families would not have been involved in the cover-up of a soldiers death
A great many things went unsaid both during McChrystals [April 2012 Pittsburgh] address and the Q&A There was no mention of his role in the cover up of the friendly-fire slaying of Pat Tillman, including issuing a bogus Silver Star citation for the Ranger. No one asked him about the pattern of detainee abuse in Iraq by [JSOC] units overseen by McChrystals command McChrystal fizzled badly in Afghanistan, and everyone seems to want to dub him a 21st century Sir Gawain -- Carl Prine, McChrystal Clear (Line of Departure blog, June 3, 2012)
The book jacket for My Share of the Task promises to frankly explore the major episodes and controversies of his eventful career. Before reading the book, I had anticipated McChrystal would ignore or only briefly mention-in-passing his controversies (with a bit of prevarication). Instead, it appears hes adopted Goerings big lie propaganda technique and decided to disingenuously whitewash his controversies with a thick layer of bullshit and confabulation. McChrystal has said, The one thing you can never, and should never want to dodge, is responsibility. However, McChrystal has dodged responsibility for his role in formally importing torture to Abu Gharib, for the use of routine torture by JSOC forces under his command, and for his central role in the cover-up of Pat Tillmans 2004 friendly-fire death in Afghanistan. This past Memorial Day, Mary Tillman called me and we spoke for about an hour. After speaking briefly with McChrystal in April, she said she had considered meeting face-to-face with him in DC, but she figured they would probably walk away more frustrated than when we walked in. After reading McChrystals memoir, I believe she was right. Despite McChrystals platitudes about the Ranger Creed and taking care of a fallen Ranger and his family, it appears this guy is a master of confabulation who just wont genuinely admit a mistake, genuinely take responsibility for his actions, or be genuinely truthful about the controversies of his career. His hypocrisy is pathetic.
27
Mary also told me that seeing McChrystal on the news was like rubbing salt in a wound. Unfortunately, this old general just wont fade away; hes been making the rounds of the talk show circuit peddling his book (I guess he figures no one will call him on his bullshit, and so far, hes been right). In the past, I used to have a grudging respect for McChrystal when he remained silent and simply refused comment about Pat Tillman. But, since McChrystal wont come clean about his mistakes, I feel he ought to take the advice of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who (according to David Sanders on p. 107 of Confront & Conceal) offered up a barbed assessment of how the White House had spun the Bin Laden raid: I have a new communications approach to recommend Shut the fuck up.
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Gen. McChrystals Biographical Note (With Annotations)

(December 28, 2012; have since added additional footnotes)
[Adapted from his biographical note at his speaking bureau Leading Authorities and the Amazon.com book blurb for his memoir My Share of the Task]
Never shall I fail my comrades. . . . I will shoulder more than my share of the task, whatever it may be, one hundred percent and then some. from the Ranger Creed In this illuminating memoir, Gen. Stan McChrystal frankly explores the major episodes and controversies of his eventful career [without rancor or retribution]2. [Instead,] He delves candidly into the intersection of history, leadership, and his own experience to produce a book of enduring value. Called one of Americas greatest warriors3 by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, General Stan McChrystal is a one-of-a-kind commander with a remarkable record of achievement, and is known for his candor4, innovative leadership, and going the distance. His entire career has been
Although it appears he has a couple of subtle slams in his book on Michael Hastings (p. 109, McChrystal) and President Obama (p. ***; see quote in The Sons-of-Bitches With all the Fruit Salad).
3
Michael Hastings wrote in The Operators: The general [Gen. Stanley McChrystal] was a living legend in the Special Operations community, a giant leap above the office-bound dipshits who usually had four stars on their shoulders [e.g. McChrystals predecessor Air Force MG Dell Dailey whose incompetence (and his deputy BG Greg Trebon) during Operation Anaconda & the invasion of Iraq got several JSOC guys KIA/WIA. He was described as a 6000 mile screwdriver by Delta Squadron CO Pete Blaber (see his book The Men, the Mission, and Me, Sean Naylors book Not a Good Day to Die, and Michael Gordons book Cobra II) determined to shove a marshmallow into a piggy bank.] Though personally a Democrat, McChrystal felt great loyalty to Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Bush. he was Dick Cheneys and Donald Rumsfelds golden boy. a number of times throughout the Bush administration McChrystal got orders directly from Cheney. Rumsfeld and Cheney embrace McChrystals willingness to get things done, even if it includes bending the rules or skipping the chain of command.
4
Candor? Personally, Id substitute the word bullshit instead. Ive argued that his public comments about his role in the cover-up of Pat Tillmans 2004 friendly fire death, his command of routine torture by JSOC forces, and the Rolling Stone profile which helped get him fired have hardly been candid. But, like the other celebrity general David Petreaus, McChrystal has had luck with getting hagiographic treatments from the sycophantic press corps. Im not anticipating much candor about the controversies of his eventful career in his memoir. 29
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES guided by his sense of duty, from his first day as a West Point plebe in 1972 to his last day as a four-star general. Even as a senior commander, McChrystal stationed himself forward, and frequently went on patrols with his troops to experience their challenges firsthand. The values he has come to be widely admired for were evident: a hunger to know the truth on the ground5, the courage to find it, and the humility to listen to those around him. The son and grandson of Army officers, McChrystal graduated from West Point in 1976. He was commissioned as an infantry officer and spent much of his career commanding special operations and airborne infantry units. He served in the 82nd Airborne, the Rangers, the 7th Special Forces Group, the Joint Staff, and JSOC, among other assignments.6 In 2003, McChrystal was selected7 to deliver the nationally televised Pentagon briefings about military operations in Iraq.8 From 20032008, he commanded Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and was responsible for leading the nations deployed military counter-terrorism efforts around the globe. He writes of a fight waged in the shadows9 by JSOC, which he led from 2003 to 2008.
5
However, McChrystal didnt display this hunger to know the truth or courage when he supervised the 2004 cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death on the ground in Afghanistan.
6
Update 5-01-13: p. 103, Scahill Dirty Wars: In 1998 Dick Cheney, who then chaired the Military Fellowship Selection Board at the Council on Foreign Relations, recommended McChrystal for the fellowship.
7
He was also selected to briefed the SASC six days each week and found this relationship helpful later (especially when Senator Levin, Webb, and McCain let him slide on torture and the Tillman cover-up). And, if you look at his footnotes (p. 405), he stuck in a bit of subtle humor about his role: Carl Huse & Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Strokes Lawmakers Every Morning and They Seem to Like it, NYT March 29, 2003
8
(p. 82 McChrystal): As Joint Staff VDJ3 he periodically performed the role of Pentagon military spokesman for briefings to the Pentagon Press corps. there was every opportunity to misspeak or to appear a buffoon on national television. Michael Hastings wrote, The stint [Pentagon spokesman in 2003] is memorable for quotes that would have acted as albatrosses to most others, like backing up Donald Rumsfelds infamous remark about looting in Baghdad Stuff happens. He also, unfortunately, mentions that major combat operations in Iraq are over, a week before Bushs Mission Accomplished speech.
9
at the very same time the Army was cleaning up Abu Ghraib at an elite secret interrogation facility [JSOCs Camp Nama] nudity and hooding and stress positions were still routine Do you know where the colonel was getting his orders from? I believe it was a two-star general. I believe his name was General McChrystal. I saw him there a couple of times. -- John Richardson, Esquire (2006) 30
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES McChrystal is widely praised for creating a revolution in warfare that fused intelligence and operations.10 JSOC became one of our most effective counterterrorism weapons, facing off against Al Qaeda in Iraq.11 His leadership of JSOC is credited with the 2003 capture of Saddam Hussein.12
The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply the result of a few bad apples acting on their own. Interrogation policies endorsed by senior military and civilian officials authorizing the use of harsh interrogation techniques were a major cause of the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody. SMU TF [JSOC task force interrogation] policies were a direct cause of detainee abuse and influenced interrogation policies at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq. SASC 2008 Report, Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody
10
Shanker & Schmitt wrote in Counterstrike: Gen. McChrystal was praised for changing the culture of handling intelligence: Across the military and intelligence community, General McChrystal was credited with commanding missions that captured and killed more of Americas adversaries than any other living officer. But his legacy in shifting the culture of handling intelligence is just as important. They described two of the secret intelligence coups that largely contributed to the success of the Iraq surge: What was pulled out of the Taji trove was so valuable that one military officer compared it to the allies success in breaking the Nazis Enigma codes during WWII and General Petreaus said the overall Sinjar effort did more to halt the terror networks that flowed foreign fighters and suicide bombers into Iraq than any other operation. But, the authors didnt describe the role of torture (harsh interrogation in Washingtonese) in the secret campaign. They only briefly allude to its use at Camp Nama by JSOC forces under Gen. McChrystals command. But, apparently, the authors didnt believe that torture contributed much to success against Al Qaeda: The process of massing intelligence on an individual has proven to be a more valuable tool than harsh interrogation techniques
11
The authors of Top Secret America praised Gen. McChrystals leadership of JSOC: In the fall of 2003, JSOC got a new commander [Gen. Stanley McChrystal] who would turn the organization into arguably the most effective weapon in the U.S. counterterrorism arsenal. However, Spencer Ackerman wrote, Theres a debate in military circles about whether McChrystal or his friend and successor, Adm. William McRaven deserve credit for JSOCs resurgence; but [Marc] Ambinders reporting suggests Flynn is the real father of the modern JSOC.
12
It doesnt appear McChrystal deserves any credit for the capture of Saddam Hussein. First, he had only been in command of JSOC for a couple of months (and spent much of that time ramping up JSOC operations in Afghanistan; it doesnt appear he established any new policies that contributed to the capture. Second, the intelligence that directly led to Husseins capture was gathered by the Tikrit TF121 team (and its interrogator Eric Maddox) working independently of the TF121 Baghdad HQ. Third, Hussein was captured in spite of the routine use of torture by TF121 (a high-value detainee died shortly after he was taken to Camp Nama; Maddox said, I was facing a dead end). 31
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Over time, JSOC gathered staggering amounts of intelligence in order to find and remove the most influential and dangerous terrorists, including the 2006 killing of the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The hunt for Zarqawi drives some of the most gripping scenes in this book, as McChrystals team grappled with tricky interrogations,13 advanced but scarce technology, weeks of unbroken surveillance, and agonizing decisions14. McChrystal brought the same energy to the war in Afghanistan, where the challenges loomed even larger. McChrystal assumed command of all international forces in Afghanistan in June 2009.15 President Obamas order for an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan was based on McChrystals assessment of the war.16 He developed and implemented the counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan.17
13
In 2006 an interrogator named Matthew Alexander found the lingering coercive interrogation mindset hurt the hunt for Zarqawi. Alexander said, I dont know Gen. McChrystals involvement in that [coercive interrogation mindset] But I do know that mentality was extremely counter-productive and almost cost us our chance at finding Zarqawi. We found Zarqawi in spite of the way the task force did business.
13
Instead, Matthew Alexander used non-coercive interrogation methods to get the intelligence that directly led to Zarqawi (although McChrystal failed to give Alexander credit, unlike Admiral McRaven who ensured Eric Maddox received official recognition for his role in the capture of Saddam).
14
Apparently referring to McChrystals decision to bomb Zarqawi knowing that several women and children were in the house (although McChrystal has expressed no remorse in his book or in interviews. Its also worth noting that Army spokesman denied any children were killed! More candor!
15
Michael Hastings wrote, [Secretary of Defense Robert] Gates says hell fire him [Gen. McKiernan] if he doesnt resign. He doesnt, and Gate fires him [May 11, 2009]. Privately, McKiernan will tell friends that it was Petraeus who was behind getting rid of him a dirty move to get a public relations bump that comes from the strong move of switching generals to win the war.
16
Hastings wrote, "McChrystal tells them [Gates, Mullen, Petreaus] his stark assessment, the serious next step is asking for more troops. The serious next step is what the assessment concludes: Were losing. [On September 21, 2009] Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward publishes McChrystals confidential assessment of the war. [Obama felt boxed in] In the end, Obama attempts to split the difference he gives the military the troops they want, but tells them they need to leave sooner than theyd like. warning him over a VTC: Do not occupy what you cannot transfer.
17
A losing COIN strategy. Hastings wrote, Obama chooses West Point to deliver his [Dec. 1, 2009] speech on his new strategy. Or, more accurately, McChrystal and Petraeuss strategy. He tells all the reasons why fighting in Afghanistan is a bad idea. He tells them that were going to do it anyway. The escalation in Afghanistan is on an entirely different scale from the escalation in Iraq, however it creates a new war. The surge in Afghanistan triples the number of forces and more than quadruples the 32
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES McChrystal retired from the military in 2010.18 He now serves on the board of directors for JetBlue Airways, Navistar, and the Yellow Ribbon Fund. He is also a senior fellow at Yale Universitys Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, where he teaches a popular course on leadership.19 General McChrystal co-founded the McChrystal Group in January 2011. Its mission is to deliver innovative leadership solutions to organizations. A dynamic, powerful speaker, McChrystal impresses audiences with field-tested leadership lessons20. Citing stories from his career, McChrystal reveals a four-star management strategy, concentrating on openness, teamwork, and forward-thinking.
cost of the conflict. Its chances of success are low, almost nonexistent. No matter how professional or competent or dynamic McChrystal and his team were, the task they had set out for themselves was so obviously doomed. [SAS commander Sir Graeme Lamb] describing the situation [in Afghanistan] as like Apollo 13, heading out to the moon, with a bloody great hole in the side, bleeding oxygen. What was happening in Marjah [April 22, 2009; offensive started on February 12, 2009] didnt bode well for the next major offensive planned for Kandahar. Marja was supposed to be a proof of concept and the concept looked like a failure. McChrystal will describe it [Marja] as a bleeding ulcer. The White House will view it as a failure. What McChrystal is doing in Kandahar doesnt seem to be what hed promised the White House earlier. He doesnt impress them and it will be held against him a few weeks later. They were still pissed about the leak of the strategic assessment and the failure to explain the rationale of the Kanadahar offensive to the president and his staff.
18
Retired? He was fired by President Obama after Hastings Rolling Stone controversial profile came out in June 2010! McChrystal claims he resigned instead of being fired (although he had only issued an
apology and hadnt submitted his resignation before meeting Obama). McChrystal still declines to confirm or deny the accuracy of the quotes and falsely implies they w ere off-the record. McChrystal claims he consulted no one (although The general's first action was to call his superiors such as Secretary of Defense Gates and Vice President Biden, etc.). Finally, McChrystal claims he took full responsibility for the Rolling Stone piece (although that day PR advisor Duncan Boothby offers his resignation McChrystal accepts). For a more critical and honest account of LeAffair Rolling Stan, I would suggest Michael Hastings 2012 book The Operators.
19
Spencer Ackerman in his piece, Professor McChrystals Lectures: Navigating Politics, Media, Irony, wrote: some of his [Yale] classes have the potential to be awkward. Navigating Politics. . Loyalty, Trust and Relationships. Communicating the Story the Media Environment. Um. Then theres the reading list. . While one of McChrystals classes deals with notoriety, Michael Hastings piece somehow goes unassigned. But McChrystal isnt going to overcome his public fallfrom-grace by structuring his seminar as an ode to his awesomeness.
20
His TED talk didnt impress me: Never shall I fail my comrades. ..." (N from the Ranger Creed). Really? Coming from the guy who was at the center of the Army's cover-up of Pat Tillman's friendly-fire death? Where's my barf bag? This is rich, "The Pope" talking about the "promise" of the Ranger Creed and taking care of your men. He certainly failed the Tillman family. However, I did like his description of Army parachuting. Took me back 25 years, to when I "waddled" to the door and fell out with a heavyass ruck ("new guy" carrying the AM PRC-70 radio, batteries, DMDG, etc). 33
In April 2011, McChrystal returned to public service after the Obama administration invited him to oversee Joining Forces,21 a high-profile initiative that supports military families. Ultimately, My Share of the Task is about much more than war and peace, terrorism and counterinsurgency. As McChrystal writes, More by luck than design, Id been a part of some events, organizations, and efforts that will loom large in history, and more that will not. I saw selfless commitment, petty politics, unspeakable cruelty, and quiet courage in places and quantities that Id never have imagined. But what I will remember most are the leaders. ... Despite the blandishments of the book blurb for My Share of the Task, it doesnt appear that McChrystals memoir frankly explores the major episodes and controversies of his eventful career. I doubt if McChrystal will candidly discusses his dark legacy of his central role in the 2004 cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death, the routine torture by JSOC task forces under his command, how he helped box in President Obama into his failed Afghanistan War surge with its flawed COIN strategy. It will also be interesting to see how his account of LeAffair Rolling Stan compares to Michael Hastings well-documented (did that guy ever turn off his tape recorder?) version in his book The Operators. And, Im curious to see how well his account of the capture of Saddam Hussein and the killing of Abu Zarqawi compares to my own research into those manhunts. But, Im not holding my breath waiting for McChrystals vaunted candor in his memoir. Based on his remarks on the lecture circuit and his Senate testimony, Im expecting more bullshit.
21
Just two days after the DoD IG & the Pentagons NYT reporter Thom Shanker supposedly cleared McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the Rolling Stone case, on April 10th, Gen. McChrystals reputation was further restored by President Obamas appointing him to head up the new Joining Forces program to support military veterans and their families. In response, Mary Tillman said, Its a slap in the face to appoint this man He deliberately helped cover up Pats death someone who has a heartfelt desire to help families would not have been involved in the cover-up of a soldiers death And Narda Zacchino said, It is bewildering and tasteless, after McChrystals callous disregard for the Tillman family throughout this entire episode, that Barack Obama should appoint him to a high-profile position having anything to do with helping military families. When asked about Marys remarks, Michelle Obama said were proud to have him [McChrystal] on board and White House Press Secretary Carney said that [President] Obama is very aware of the generals rsum. Later he added, We have enormous respect for the service and sacrifice of Pat Tillman and his family. The circumstances surrounding Pat Tillman's death have been thoroughly investigated, and General McChrystal was found to have acted honorably despite the fact that this tragedy was mishandled. 34
MISSION BLACK LIST #1

The [Untold] Story of the 2003 Capture of Saddam Hussein
From 20032008, he [Gen. McChrystal] commanded Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) His leadership of JSOC is credited with the 2003 capture of Saddam Hussein. -- Leading Authorities Biographical Note for Gen. Stanley McChrystal ... [Radman was flown to Baghdad instead of driven back to Tikrit. After Maddox was told,] he said, Thats a huge mistakeThey [Baghdad TF 121] dont even know who he is. He can lay out the entire insurgency here in Tikrit. He might even lead us to Saddam. [Even worse, the next day Maddox learned that Radman dropped dead of a coronary shortly after arriving in Baghdad (possibly from the stress of torture at Camp Nama?). Eric Maddox wrote, ] The obstacles I was facinggot a lot higher when news came from BIAP that Radman Ibrahim had died of a massive heart attack while in custody. This was a major setback. I was facing a dead end. -- Eric Maddox, Mission: Black List #1 You were teamed with the best in TikritYou were accepted because you proved your worth from the very beginning. In the big scheme of things, your individual efforts were more valuable than dozens of operators. Great work Eric!
-- Dalton Fury (former Delta CO), Amazon Book Review of Mission: Black List#1
35
MISSION BLACK LIST #1

From 20032008, he commanded Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) His leadership of JSOC is credited with the 2003 capture of Saddam Hussein.
In October 2003 Gen. Stanley McChrystal took command of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). One of the units under his command was Task Force 121 (composed of operators from Delta, SEAL teams, etc.) whose primary task was to kill or capture high-value targets in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the time, the Iraq TF 121 commander was Admiral William McRaven (who later succeeded McChrystal as commander of JSOC in 2008 and who supervised the 2011 raid in Pakistan which killed Osama Bin Ladin). McChrystals leadership of JSOC has often been credited with having supervised some highly successful commando special operations in Iraq including the capture of Saddam Hussein in 200322. However, its not clear how much credit, if any, McChrystal deserves for the capture of Saddam Hussein.*1 First, he had only been in command of JSOC for a couple of months; I dont know if he established any new policies that contributed to the capture.*2 Second, the intelligence that directly led to Husseins capture was gathered by the Tikrit TF121 team (and its interrogator Eric Maddox) working independently23 of the TF121 Baghdad HQ. Third, Hussein was captured in spite of the routine use of torture by TF121 at BIAP (a key detainee died of a heart attack shortly after he was taken to Camp Nama at BIAP; Maddox said, I was facing a dead end). Postscript Note*1: To his credit, in his memoir McChrystal doesnt claim credit for the capture of Saddam. On his first trip out of the States, he only spent a couple of days in Iraq and then left to ramp up Operation Winterstrike in Afghanistan on October 27, 2003, and implemented it there during November. (see pp. 107-108). Postscript Note*2: Obviously, McChrystal didnt change much in a few days in Iraq, although he did sketch out the hourglass diagram before he left (p. 106) ... Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13, 2003 on a farm south of Tikrit. The earliest accounts gave the credit to the Fourth Infantry Division (4th ID) whose intelligence officers had created a Link Analysis Diagram the Mongo Link that detailed the relationships between
22
e.g p.434, The Outpost (2012) Jake Tapper p. 200 Maddox
23
36
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES more than 250 Baathists and tribal ties to Hussein in the Tikrit area.24 However, much of the credit belongs to the Tikrit TF121 team (that worked with LTC Steve Russells 4th ID battalion) and to an Army interrogator named Eric Maddox who conducted the key interrogations that directly led to the capture of Saddam Hussein25. Maddox arrived in Iraq in at the end of July 2003. Shortly afterwards, he was temporarily attached to the Tikrit TF121 team and conducted their interrogations (without using torture) during the next five months. For the most part, Maddox worked independently*3 of both the 4th ID intelligence officers and the TF121 HQ intelligence officers. Instead of using the 4th IDs Mongo link, Maddox relied on his own diagram and a much smaller list of former Saddam bodyguards to focus his efforts. Postscript Note*3: McChrystal wrote (p. 105) that the Tikrit team largely toiled away on its own without much assistance from TF 121 HQ. In his Amazon book review, The value of intuition and instinct, the former Delta officer Dalton Fury praised Eric Maddoxs efforts: Eric, thanks for taking the time to share the extraordinary behind the scenes efforts of nabbing Saddam. You were teamed with the best in TikritYou were accepted because you proved your worth from the very beginning. In the big scheme of things, your individual efforts were more valuable than dozens of operators. I highly recommend this fascinating book for anyone interested in just how Saddam was finally located in his spider hole. Great work Eric! The Tikrit TF121 team operated largely independently of its HQ in Baghdad. However, the Tikrit team called on another team from Baghdad to help capture Radman Ibrahim on November 8, 2003. Unfortunately, against the Tikrit teams wishes, Radman was flown to Baghdad instead of being driven back to Tikrit. After Maddox was told, he said, Thats a huge mistakeThey [Baghdad TF 121] dont even know who he is. He can lay out the entire insurgency here in Tikrit. He might even lead us to Saddam.26
24
p.242, Hunting Down Saddam (2004) Robin Moore;
p.187, Wanted Dead or Alive Benjamin Runkle;

25
Mission Black List #1 (2008) Eric Maddox; The value of intuition and instinct October 20, 2009 Amazon Comment by Dalton Fury (former Delta CO); p.287, 308 We Got Him (2010); Steve Russell; Searching for Saddam: The Social Network that Caught a Dictator by Chris Wilson at slate.com
26
p.113, 117-118 Maddox
37
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Even worse, the next day Maddox learned that Radman dropped dead of a heart attack shortly after arriving in Baghdad (from the stress of torture at Camp Nama?). Eric Maddox wrote, The obstacles I was facinggot a lot higher when news came from BIAP that Radman Ibrahim had died of a massive heart attack while in custody. This was a major setback. I was facing a dead end.27 Similarly, LTC Steve Russell wrote, When I learned that Johns SOF team had scored Radman, I was ecstatic. We had been pursuing this man since May as we were convinced he would surely know Saddams location....There was a little problem, John said After we nabbed him, I guess he couldnt take the stress. He keeled over with a heart attack. It wasnt anything we did. I guess his ticker just couldnt take it It was a devastating blow to the good news of Rudmans capture28. Note: My suspicion that Ibrahim died from torture on November 8th is consistent with the death of Manadel al-Jamadi, a detainee captured by SEALs and interrogated by OGA at Abu Gharib, on November 4, 2003.29 Postscript Note 4-27-13: The Constitution Projects Detainee Treatment report found (p. 392) The Special Mission Unit task forces are connected to several detainees deaths in detention, including Dilar Dababa, Manadel al-Jamadi, Abed Hamed Mowhoush, and Abdul Jameel. Like Radman Ibrahim, Dababa supposedly died of a heart attack (p.94): Dababa died [June 13, 2003] of an apparent heart attack, but his autopsy contradicted this, finding instead that his death was a homicide caused by traumatic brain injury and hemorrhage. The autopsy also describes dozens of abrasions and bruises, concentrated but not limited to the head and neck, and injuries from handcuffs around the wrists and ankles. Many of these injuries were not present at the time of his capture. ... Despite Radmans death, Maddox managed to conduct a series of interrogations that directly led to the capture of Hussein. Just hours before he was due to depart from Iraq, he managed to quickly get the location of Hussein from his skillful interrogations of Muhammad Khudair & Muhammad Ibrahim.30 ...
27
p.113, 117-118 Maddox p. 262-263 Russell pp.137-138; Tony Lagouranis, Fear Up Harsh 9 p. 208 - 213 Maddox
28
29
30
38
A few days before those interrogations, Maddox was introduced to TF 121 S-2 COL Walker. Maddox noted, theoretically [he] would have known about every information gathering operation But it didnt work that way intelligence gathered in Tikrit pretty much stayed in Tikrit. They tried to keep the oversight from TF HQ to a minimum to avoid unnecessary interference. It was for that reason I was not required to write lengthy reports of my work.*4 Postscript Note*4: McChrystal wrote (p. 105) that the outlying teams and the Baghdad HQ didnt have a shared picture nor a common fight inspiring territoriality and distrust. Note: Gen. McChrystal deserves credit for later creating the policies and procedures to ensure widespread sharing of intelligence within TF 121 and with other agencies*5 Postscript Note*5: See McChrystal, p. 106-107, 117,169 for his hourglass diagram, discussion of JIATF, etc. COL Walker asked Maddox to brief the TF121 CO Admiral William McRaven31 (AKA McCraven32 by Maddox, and Bill by COL Russell33) about his work in Tikrit. Afterwards, McRaven said, I want to thank you for your hard work. Its sergeants like you who win wars and make officers like COL Walker and me look good. After Saddams capture, McRaven made sure Maddox got full credit for his work. After his return to the States, Maddox was awarded The Legion of Merit and the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement for actionable intelligence thatdirectly resulted in the capture of Saddam. However, in 2006, Gen. McChrystal failed to ensure the interrogator Matthew Alexander got credit for his work directly resulted in the 2006 kill of Zarqawi.
...
31
As previously noted, Admiral McRaven succeeded McChrystal as JSOC CO in 2008 and supervised the 2011 raid in Pakistan which killed Osama Bin Ladin. McRaven was the author of the 1995 book Spec Ops which presented case studies of Special Operations including the 1976 Raid on Entebbe during which Yoni Netanyahu was killed. Its worth noting that McRavens account follows Iddo Netanyahus manuscript Yonis Last Battle which contradicts the official IDF/Israeli story. Ive previously discussed how the cover-up of Yonis death was similar to that of Pat Tillmans 2004 friendly-fire death in my 2008 feral firefighter post Battle for the Truth. I find it ironic that McRaven was giving the author of No Easy Day grief for telling the truth about the Bin Laden raid when his book did the same for the Entebbe raid!
32
p. 213, 216-219 Maddox
33
Johns men would be under the overall command of Bill, the higher -level special operations commander who had recently arrived for the raid.
39
POSTSCRIPT: My Share of the Task & the Capture of Saddam

On December 13, 2003, McChrystal was at Ft. Bragg when he got the call (p. 110-111) from Admiral McRaven that they were about to move on Saddam. . In his memoir, McChrystal only spends a short paragraph (p.111) to describe the hunt and capture of Saddam Hussein by TF121, writing how a combination of intelligence (including detainees) and efforts by conventional units worked up the insurgent network to get to Saddam and pointed out the process was slower and less precise than it would become during 2004-2008: a detainee who had been flipped through the smart manipulation of the task forces interrogation team [actually by Eric Maddox]. Although less refined than many that would follow, the operations that led to the capture of Saddam gave us a glimpse of how TF 714 operations would evolve in the coming years. Using a complex combination of intelligence collected from a variety of sources, including detainees, we slowly laid bare the network around Saddam. While the process was slower and less precise than it would ultimately become, our efforts with conventional partners, painstaking exploitation of information, and rapid reaction to emerging leads proved an effective combination. Thats it!34 And McChrystal wrote (p. 112) of his petty disappointment that TF 121 members gave President Bush Saddams pistol (Eric has a picture in his book of a framed cigar from Saddams stash that the Tikrit team sent to thank him for his efforts). As previously mentioned, Admiral McRaven made sure Maddox was properly recognized and decorated for the capture. And, former Delta commander Dalton Fury praised him: You were accepted because you proved your worth from the very beginning. Great work Eric! So then, in his memoir, why doesnt McChrystal give any credit to the Tikrit Delta team and Eric Maddox who worked independently of TF 121 HQ to get Saddam? Or at least mention them? Obviously, he must know the full story. First, perhaps he failed to describe this backstory because Maddox later spoke out publicly against using torture in interrogations? Second, as previously mentioned its embarrassing that a key detainee died of a heart attack shortly after being sent to the TF 121 HQ; it would certainly raise questions about the role the use of torture played in his death. With that context, its worth noting that in 2006, Gen. McChrystal also failed to credit interrogator Matthew Alexander for his work that resulted in locating the man who would lead TF 121 to Zarqawi. In his memoirs account of the Zarqawi man hunt, McChrystal makes only a reference to one of the other interrogators not normally assigned to Mubassir got him to admit a piece he had been holding out on. Perhaps he failed to describe Alexanders key role because Alexander has also taken a strong public stance against using torture to interrogate detainees?
34
Pp. 38-39; Gordon & Trainor, Endgame (2012): A series of raids during the fall led JSOCs teams to a site in Baghdad where they captured Muhammad Ibrahim Omar al-Musslit In an interrogation Musslit described
40
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES And his story didnt paint TF 121 in a good light: I dont know Gen. McChrystals involvement in that [coercive interrogation mentality] But I do know that mentality was extremely counterproductive and almost cost us our chance at finding Zarqawi. We found Zarqawi in spite of the way the [JSOC] task force [145] did business. Postscript Note 3-17-13: Maj. Douglas A. Preyer (author of The Fight for the High Ground: The U.S. Army and Interrogation During Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003 - April 2004) includes Mission: Black List #1 on his Top 10 books U.S. interrogation (Tom Ricks Best Defense blog Feb. 28, 2013)
41
THATS ONE DEAD SON OF A BITCH

The [Untold] Story of the 2006 Killing of Al-Zarqawi
largely thanks to Matt Alexander Musab Abu Zarqawi is dead. Alexander requests to leave the main detention facility of General Stanley McChrystal's Special Mission Unit [TF 145] and head north as part of a mobile interrogation team... It should also be on the required reading list of any military unit or school with a good commander who cares about keeping troops on the moral high ground. -- from Maj. Douglas A. Preyers Amazon book review of Kill or Capture In Iraq, many of the facilities employing so-called "enhanced" interrogation techniques were special operations facilities. Incredibly, even after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, the facility run by the elite Special Mission Unit in Iraq [TF121] continued to permit more of these techniques than had been previously allowed at Abu Ghraib Although torture-lite techniques were no longer a matter of official policy for this unit [in early 2006], many of its interrogators had faith in these techniques, causing them to routinely employ the harshest possible variants of doctrinal approaches. -- from Maj. Douglas A. Preyers Amazon book review of How to Break a Terrorist When I would go up to my boss and say theres a better way to interrogate detainees his answer would be Im sorry because theres something above me controlling the interrogators and those interrogators have carte blanche to interrogate how they want, [Matthew] Alexander said. I dont know Gen. McChrystals involvement in that [JSOCs coercive interrogation mindset] But I do know that mentality was extremely counter-productive and almost cost us our chance at finding Zarqawi. We found Zarqawi in spite of the way the task force [145] did business. -- Matthew Alexander interview, Former Interrogator Presses for McChrystals Stance on Abuse
42
THATS ONE DEAD SON OF A BITCH

JSOC became one of our most effective counterterrorism weapons to find and remove the most influential and dangerous terrorists, including the 2006 killing of the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The hunt for Zarqawi drives some of the most gripping scenes in this book, as McChrystals team grappled with tricky interrogations, advanced but scarce technology, weeks of unbroken surveillance, and agonizing decisions. -- From Amazon .com blurb for My Share of the Task
Gen. McChrystals leadership of JSOC has been credited with having supervised some highly successful commando special operations in Iraq including the capture of Saddam Hussein and the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.35 But, as previously discussed, it doesnt appear that McChrystals leadership contributed much to the 2003 capture of Hussein. On the contrary, JSOC torture policies may have led to the death of a key detainee (heart attack) which led to interrogator Eric Maddox thinking he was facing a dead end. In July 2004, Gen. McChrystal moved his Iraq HQ from Baghdad to Balad Air Force base. After the move, Task Force 121 was renamed Task Force 145 and their main focus became the hunt for Abu Musab al-Zarqwai, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Two years later, the manhunt for Zarqwai finally ended on June 7, 2006. JSOC tracked his religious advisor Shaykh Abd alRahman to a house where he was meeting Zarqawi. They were killed (along with two children) after Air Force F-16s dropped two bombs. Gen. McChrystal (and his S2, COL Michael Flynn) deserve credit for building the JSOCs capacities to fix and finish Zarqawi (after the initial find phase). During the two years preceding Zarqawis death, their leadership vastly improved the intelligence gathering abilities of JSOC (e.g. creating shared databases, coordination of intelligence between agencies, exploiting pocket litter, use of drone surveillance, gathering intel from cell phones, etc). But, Benjamin Runkle pointed out, Even in cases such as the Saddam and Zarqawi manhunts these technologies played only a peripheral role. David Isby noted, The critical element [in the Saddam manhunt] had been the all-important HUMINT. And Amatzia Baram noted, the successful targeting of Zarqawi was a feather in the cap of American intelligence. It has very little to do with drones. This is HUMINT.36 Afterward the killing of Zarqawi, several accounts gave primary credit for the killing of Zaqawi to Jordanian intelligence or high-tech surveillance. Bruce Riedel wrote, In the end, Jordans
35
p. 434, The Outpost (2012) Jake Tapper 6 pp. 208215, Benjamin Runkle, Wanted Dead or Alive (***)
36
43
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES GID played a central role in uncovering the clues that led to his death.37 Aki Pretiz & Eric Rosenbach wrote, Acting on information provided by [Jordanian] intelligence JSOC discovered a new name ... Rahman.38 Michael Smith wrote, the Jordanians infiltrated the AQIZ group with a spy, and credited JSOCs signal intelligence that track[ed] the locations of both Zarqai and Abd al-Rahman using their satellite phone and by using a Shadow UAV [drone] to keep eyeball on them.39 And Dana Priest claimed, using the expanded bandwidth and constant surveillance by unmanned aircraft, JSOC executed a series of raids, known as Operation Arcadia [collected video, documents, discs etc.] which led to the death of Zarqawi.40 However, it doesnt appear that Jordanian intelligence had much (if anything) to do with finding Zarqawi. As with the capture of Saddam, it appears that skilled interrogation was the key needed to find Zarqawi. Military historian Mark Bowden was at Balad when Zaraqwis body was brought back to the base and interviewed the TF 145 interrogators. A year later, Bowden wrote, In the official version of how it happened, which is classified, they [three old-school interrogators] received primary credit for the breakthrough. All three were duly decorated. But,the real story is more complicated and interesting.41*1 Postscript Note*1: Bowden continued by saying, The truth is known to those interrogators involved, to their immediate chain of command, to a military historian [Marc Bowden?] who interviewed the principals, and to a small circle of officials [perhaps including McChrystal?] who have been briefed about it. There are detailed accounts of the interrogation sessions that describe the tactics and motivations of the gators. So there are those who know the story well who were not directly involved in it. However, McChrystals memoir appear to present the official version of the interrogation which totally contradicts the accounts told by Bowden, Alexander, and Urban; it appears somebody fabricated their accounts (McChrystals endnotes (p.421) say significant details regarding the interrogation of these [Zaraqwi] detainees came from extensive interviews with multiple task force members). I would guess some were M.S. (the female Major who was the TF 145 J2), C.M. (CPT Roger interrogation unit CO), and old-school gators. Note: Bowdens version described in his piece The Ploy (May 2007 Atlantic Monthly) was fleshed out in more detail by Matthew Alexander in his 2008 book How to Break a Terrorist. In addition, Mark Urban in his book, Task Force Black, about the British SAS in Iraq wrote, There are other versions of how the Coalition found Sheikh Rahman But multiple sources have confirmed to me the accuracy of Bowdens article on the interrogation.42 And Benjamin Runkle in his book about manhunts drew heavily upon Bowden & Alexanders accounts.43
37 38
p.106, Bruce Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda (**) p. 130, Aki Peritz & Eric Rosenbach Find, Fix, Finish (2012) 39 pp. 269-270, Michael Smith, Killer Elite (***) 40 14 Dana Priest article, 41 Mark Bowden, The Ploy (Atlantic Monthly -- May 2007) 42 pp.148- 151, 159-161 Mark Urban, Task Force Black (2010) 43 pp. 200203, Benjamin Runkle, Wanted Dead or Alive (***)
44
British SAS Captured Video of Zarqawi Video, Not Key Detainees

Postscript Note: McChrystal writes (p. 203) that an interrogator (Mike in Bowdens account) learned in January (Bowden says February) of a group of buildings in Yusufiyah that were used for meetings and they were placed under surveillance by ISR. He then describes how two targets were hit on April 8, 2006, the second of which yielded twelve detainees who were sent to Balad. Four of the detainees appeared important. However, Mark Urban describes a different portrayal of the capture of the key detainees which eventually led to Zarqawi. (pp. 137 145). Mark Urban wrote in his book about the British SAS in Iraq, Task Force Black, that there had been a series of Larchwood raids (Arcadia raids? Or separate SAS raids?) in April. He mentions the April 8th raid, but then describes an April 16th raid (Larchwood 4) in which five insurgents were killed and five men were captured, four of whom were the important detainees mentioned in McChrystals version (Naylor in Closing in on Zarqawi also mentions this April 16th raid). Obviously, McChrystal and Urbans accounts are contradictory. Besides the different dates, Larchwood 4 was hit by the British SAS who suffered five wounded in heavy fighting. I dont understand why they arent given credit in McChrystals account? [they got the video, not the detainees] The SAS are only briefly mentioned in McChrystals book. For a full account of their accomplishments in Iraq, see Mark Urbans book which is a good complement to McChrystals book for a history of JSOC operations in Iraq. CORRECTION: Urban wants to credit the SAS with that raid that got the key detainees, but apparently Urban confused two different raids; the one (Larchwood 4) that yielded the last video of Zarqawi and the one that netted the group of five detainees.44 By the end of 2005, JSOC torture had ceased in Iraq and the TSF was squeaky clean. However, after arriving in March 2006 TF 121 interrogator named Matthew Alexander (one of about a half dozen Air Force reserve interrogators who offered a new approach) found the lingering coercive interrogation mindset hurt the hunt for Zarqawi. Alexander said, I dont know Gen. McChrystals involvement in that [coercive interrogation mindset] But I do know that mentality was extremely counter-productive and almost cost us our chance at finding Zarqawi. We found Zarqawi in spite of the way the task force did business.45 Instead, Matthew Alexander used non-coercive interrogation methods to get the intelligence that directly led to Zarqawi (although McChrystal failed to give Alexander credit, in contrast to Admiral McRaven who ensured Eric Maddox received official recognition for his role in the capture of Saddam).
44
p. 206; Gordon & Trainor, Endgame (2012): Among the documents [from Larchwood 4] was an unedited version of a propaganda video that featured Zaraqwi.
45
Spencer Ackerman Former Interrogator Presses for McChrystals Stance on Abuse(6-01-09)
45
We Found ZQ in Spite of the Way the Task Force Did Business

Alexander recalled, that several of his colleagues attempted to use coercive interrogation techniques in the Zarqawi hunt, despite Alexanders concerns over their dubious efficacy: When I would go up to my boss [C.M./Roger interrogation CO] and say theres a better way to interrogate detainees his answer would be Im sorry because theres somebody above me controlling the interrogators and those interrogators have carte blanche*2 to interrogate how they want was extremely counterproductive and almost cost us our chance at finding Zarqawi. He continued, We found Zarqawi in spite of the way the task force did business.46 Postscript Note#2: McChrystal writes (p.209) TF 145 assigned their best three interrogators to work on four of the Yusufiyah detainees Amy was given top priority. Note that McChrystal uses different pseudonyms than Bowden & Alexander do in their accounts: Amy = Mary; Jack = Tom; Paul = Lenny; Jack = Tom; Abu Haydr = Mubassir Assuming Bowden/Alexander/Urban are correct, then McChrystals memoir portrays a fabricated account of Mubbassirs interrogation. Supposedly Amy, Jack and Paul developed rapport and trust with him over the course of several weeks. Eventually, Paul supposedly got Mubbassir to admit the man in a picture was Karim his brother and a courier. Paul rewarded him with breakfast. Later, they listened to the radio together and ate ice cream! (p. 210-211). However, Alexander wrote how all three interrogators were the old guard, who were at Guantanamo and did previous tours in Afghanistan and Iraq[(e.g. Amy had worked 4 years with the TF]. They believe in fear-and-control methods but now theyre being forced to play by the rules Theyve never built rapport with these guys, gotten to know them as people or earned their trust. Why do they think any of their strategies are going to work? Apart from Tom [Jack] nobody here has any interest in the new techniques. This generation of interrogators was deeply steeped in the force-on-force mentality back home, in their previous tours here in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo. And, Alexander wrote (p. 185, How to Break a Terrorist) about Paul [Lenny] saying, Fucking muj. Just show him who is boss.Sympathy wont work. Control 101 is the first lesson in interrogationTear down his self-respect. Yourre Totally Screwed routine. And McChrystal would have his readers believe that this is the same guy who hung out with Mussabir eating ice cream and listening to the radio! The TFs three best interrogators used their old-school methods and got nothing. Mark Bowden wrote, for three weeks, from mid-April to early May, Abu Haydr [Mussibar] was questioned twice daily, and gave up nothing. The others are ignorant .. I have never felt comfortable talking with them. Mary [Amy] was forceful Lennys [Paul] approach was to hammer at the man relentlessly Mary [Amy] and Lenny [Paul] were stymied, and the team had all but given up on getting information [he] was just hours away from being shipped out
46
Spencer Ackerman Former Interrogator Presses for McChrystals Stance on Abuse(6-01-12)
46
Alexander Pulls an End-Run around JSOC to Get Breakthrough

In his second book, Kill or Capture, Alexander mentioned how he pulled an end around on everyone by striking a secret deal with the detainee [Abu Haydr] who gave us the path to Zarqawi actions that I felt were necessary to circumvent the micromanagement of my interrogation team.47 Likewise, Bowden wrote, Concerned that his breakthrough [getting al-Masris name from Haydr] would be squandered, Doc [Alexander] decided to go behind his commanders back. He paid the first of many unauthorized visits to Abu Haydrs [he got al-Masris name from him in a few hours and he took him off the transport list;] Shit, hes leaving right now! No, hes not. I already took care of that].* Alexander got his breakthrough in a few hours that the TFs best interrogators had failed to get in three weeks! Postscript Note*: McChrystal wrote a contradictory version (p.212), in which supposedly M.S. (TF 121 J2) vetoed the transfer recommendation that night because she wanted the interrogators to keep trying. McChrystal only made an unnamed reference to Alexander as an interrogator not usually assigned who got al-Masris name from Mubbassir (the other Air Force interrogators arent even mentioned at all). But, even after Alexanders breakthrough, Bowden wrote, Despite Abu Haydrs insistence that he speak only to Dr. Matthew, his interrogation resumed with the regular team of gators. Concerned that his breakthrough would be squandered, Doc decided to go behind his commanders back. He paid the first of many unauthorized visits So Doc, unable to deliver the captives information himself, had to persuade Abu Haydr to talk, not to him but to Mary [Amy] and Lenny [Paul].*3 Postscript Note*: Instead, McChrystal claims (p. 214) that Mubbassier had supposedly finally given up Rahmans name after his Amy and Paul threatened to be done with him and to him away (the long weeks of rapport and meaningful interactions tugged at him!). TF 145 then tracked Rahman with ISR and a few weeks later he led them to Zaraqwi. Afterwards, the three amigos, as they had supposedly previously agreed (p.233), told Mussabir about the death of his close friend Rahman and stayed with him to comfort him. Yeah, right.
47
p 18, Matthew Alexander, Kill or Capture (2011)
47
Army Lied About Zarqawi Killing Collateral Damage

Bowden wrote how McChrystal himself came by. He and his top commander stared down at Zarqawi with evident satisfaction. Everyone leaned in to listen. Yep, said one of the colonels, thats one dead son of a bitch. McChrystal wrote (p. 232) that he walked over to the SAR with Steve [new TF 145 CO] and Mike Flynn. I assume one of those COLs made the preceding comment. Besides Zarqawui, Rahman, two women, and two children were killed by the bombs. However, Bowden wrote, GEN Caldwell initially said that a child was killed in the bombing, but altered his statement the next day to say that no children had been killed. However, his account contradicts both Bowden and Alexander. Bowden wrote, In the Compound, pictures from the blast site showed two dead children, both under age 5. And Alexander wrote (p.282), [Mary] held a photo of a dead childa girl. Her crushed head lay amid the rubble of the house Two children had died in the bombing. Postscript Note: McChrystal writes (p.211) that the bombs killed Zarqawi, Rahman, another man, two women, and a young girl. His account has only one dead child vs. two in the other accounts (perhaps matching GEN Caldwells initial report of one child; which changed to none the next day!). Love that military candor! Im sure it was just a well-intentioned mistake which created the misperception that the Army was spouting BS. Just like with Pat Tillman. During his CBS Morning Show interview (January 6, 2013, Gen. Stanley McChrystal on the tasks behind him, spoke about his decision to order the air strike: As he relates both in the interview and in his new book, McChrystal ordered an air strike on the house where Zarqawi was hiding knowing that his wife and children were there as well. Asked if getting Zarqawi was worth killing innocent people, McChrystal says, "I think it was necessary to stop him, so I didn't hesitate I had every expectation that his wife and children were there with him," he said. "This was a man who had not only personally been involved in killing, but had literally precipitated thousands and thousands of deaths in Iraq. His cruelty, en masse, was stunning It was so necessary to stop him, I didn't hesitate." Maybe I missed it, but I dont think McChrystal wrote in his book that he knew women and children were in the house and that he made the decision regardless and he claimed that Delta had to land 400 meters away. But Gordon & Trainor (p. 207, Endgame) said McChrystal called GEN Casey to get permission to make the hit knowing of the collateral damage and that Delta had planned to land on the road in front of the house and run down the driveway.
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Theres Somebody Above Me Controlling the Interrogators

So, who was responsible for the micromanagement of keeping the old-school interrogators on the job that almost cost the chance at finding Zarqawi? Well, it appears that McChrystals S2 COL Mike Flynn (and his Deputy (J2X?), a female Major)* were responsible. Shortly after viewing Zarqawis body, Alexander described a briefing from by the JSOC S248: a senior colonel [?] and his deputy, a major. They were high-level [JSOC] intelligence officers for the command The colonel addressed us with a backhanded compliment, You all did great work here, he told us, even though this came down to just a few interrogators. I wasnt sure what he meant, until I learned that Mary, Lenny, Tom, and Cliff [an analyst] were subsequently called into the commanding generals [McChrystals] office and awarded medals. Finally, a lightbulb went on in my head. I finally knew who tied Randys hands and why Roger wouldnt discipline Lenny [for trying to sabotage Alexanders breakthrough]. Most likely, this colonel and major called those shots. Similarly, Mark Bowden wrote about the S2 briefing and the awards given to the interrogators whose old-school had hurt the hunt for Zarqawi: The units [TF 145] female J2, or chief intelligence officer, [must actually be the deputy S2 in Alexanders account] embraced a young woman [Mary] in a T-shirt and khaki cargo pants who was part of the two-person gator team [Mary & Tom] that had produced what is known in the trade as lethal information. I am so glad I chose you for this, she said. And, in his Line of Departure blog (Carl Prine June 4th, 2012 at 11:18 am) Carl commented, OPSEC prevents me from discussing it, but Ill just let everyone mull this over: A female officer deserves the most credit for getting Zarqawi. Carl, if you read this, let me know if that female officer to which you referred was the JSOC deputy S2. Postscript Note*: After reading McChrystals book, it now appears the female officer responsible for the micromanagement which almost cost the chance to get Zarqawi was M.S. She was a major and the TF 121 J2 top intel officer (p.207) and gave the priority of the detainees to Amy/Mary (After Zaraqwi was killed, Bowden wrote that M.S. hugged Amy/Mary and said, I am so glad I chose you for this). The senior colonel was probably Mike Flynn. Its not clear what role, if any, he or McChrystal played in the micromanagement. Yet, despite her micromanagement of keeping the old-school interrogators on the job that almost cost the chance at finding Zarqawi, McChrystal gives high praise to her in his book (p.247): M.S. whose relentlessness and poise had been fundamental to the final stages of the Zarqawi hunt six months earlier
48
pp. 281-282, Matthew Alexander, How to Break a Terrorist (2008)
49
Old-School Gators Decorated, Alexander Gets Shipped Out

After the killing of Zaraqwui, Marc Bowden wrote that the three old-school interrogators got credit for the breakthrough and were decorated by McChrystal for their interrogation efforts: In the official version of how it happened, which is classified, the woman [Amy/Mary] embraced by McChrystals [Deputy] J2, and her two male interrogation partners [Tom & Lenny], received primary credit for the breakthrough. All three were duly decorated. Four of the gators involved were decorated for their service. Mary, Lenny, Tom and Doc [?] were called to the generals office. Doc [?] and Lenny, the Navy reservist, were awarded Bronze Stars; Mary and Tom received civilian medals. Two other civilian analysts [Cliff & ?] were also recognized. And, Matthew Alexander similarly wrote, I learned [later] that Mary, Lenny, Tom, and Cliff were subsequently called into the commanding generals [McChrystals] office and awarded medals. Postscript Note*: McChrystal wrote (p. 234) that the new TF 145 CO gave out awards to five members Amy, Jack, Paul and to two analysts (notice no mention of Alexander). Bowden thought that the credit to the successful interrogation was misplaced. Only the oldschool gators were decorated. None of the new Air Force interrogators received credit, despite their breakthroughs: Several of those who had worked on the case for months felt the recognition was appropriate but somewhat misallocated. Mike, after all, had developed the information that had led to the arrests of Abu Raja and Abu Haydr; Matt and Nathan had broken Abu Raja; and Doc [Alexander] had invented the ploy that ultimately enabled the killing blow. Note: Bowden slightly contradicts Alexanders version of events. Alexander says he only heard later about the others called to McChrystals office. But, if Alexander received no recognition, why did Bowden say he was called into McChrystals office for a Bronze Star? (it looks like he made a mistake there). Its worth noting that the interrogators that werent recognized were mostly the new guys, while the old school veterans got all the credit. A day or two after Zaraqawis death (perhaps to get him out of the way) Matthew Alexander was shipped out to Kirkuk to do field interrogations until near the end of his tour in August 2006. After returning to the States, Alexander did receive a Bronze Star on October 11, 2006 by Gen. McChrystal for exceptionally meritorious achievement as an interrogator pivotal to planning and execution of numerous combat operations of national significance) but it didnt specifically credit him for his crucial interrogations that directly led to the killing of Zarqawi. McChrystals failure to ensure Alexander received credit for his work stands in stark contrast with Admiral McRavens treatment of Eric Maddox. After Saddams capture, McRaven made
50
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES sure Maddox got full credit for his work.49 After his return to the States, Maddox was awarded The Legion of Merit and the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement for actionable intelligence thatdirectly resulted in the capture of Saddam. ...
POSTSCRIPT: My Share of the Task & The Killing of Zarqawi

A couple of years later, in a Washington Post opinion piece, Im Still Tortured by What I Saw in Iraq, Matthew Alexander reflected on his time with JSOC TF 145: The Army was still conducting interrogations according to the Guantanamo Bay model: Interrogators were nominally using the methods outlined in the U.S. Army Field Manual, the interrogators' bible, but they were pushing in every way possible to bend the rules -and often break them.50 Our [Air Force reservists] new interrogation methods led to one of the war's biggest breakthroughs: We convinced one of Zarqawi's associates to give up the al-Qaeda in Iraq leader's location But Zarqawi's death wasn't enough to convince the joint Special Operations task force for which I worked to change its attitude toward interrogations. The old methods continued. Marc Bowden wrote the truth of the Zarqawi manhunt is more interesting than the official story: In the official version of how it happened, which is classified, they [three old-school interrogators] received primary credit for the breakthrough. All three were duly decorated. But the real story is more complicated and interesting. The truth is known to those interrogators involved, to their immediate chain of command, to a military historian [Marc Bowden?] who interviewed the principals, and to a small circle of officials [perhaps including McChrystal] who have been briefed about it. There are detailed accounts of the interrogation sessions that describe the tactics and motivations of the gators. So there are those who know the story well who were not directly involved in it. Instead, in his memoir Gen. McChrystal writes the official version of the interrogation which totally contradicts the accounts told by Bowden, Alexander, and Urban; it appears some of the
49
John Weisman wrote (p. 36, KBL Kill Bin Laden) that McRaven was one of the few flag officers who regularly displayed loyalty down his chain of command
50
Update 5-01-13: p. 159, Scahill Dirty Wars: An air force interrogator [Matthew Alexander?] who worked with the JSOC task force hunting Zarqawi told me that he did not see any form of oversight for the kill or capture campaign. He said he witnessed and stopped several cases of abuse, which he communicated up the chain of command. With the cases in which I reported abuses, there was no accountability. In one case, an interrogato r was merely recalled from a remote location and then put right back to work at the main prison [described in his book?] my impression was that occasional law-breaking would be tolerated as long it never got out to the press.
51
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES interviewed TF145 members who were interviewed fabricated their accounts of the interrogation sessions (and the SAS role in capturing the key detainees was completely ignored). Matthew Alexander said, We found Zarqawi in spite of the way the task force did business. He pulled a series of end runs around his commanders to get the interrogation breakthrough and then ensure that it wasnt squandered by handing Mubassier back to same three interrogators who had already failed with their old-school methods. It appears that the TF 145 J2 M.S. was responsible for the micromanagement which almost lost the chance to get Zarqawi. Afterwards, it appears that Gen. Caldwell whitewashed the collateral damage reports, and the old-school gators were rewarded for the successful interrogation effort, while the new guys (especially Alexander who got the breakthrough) who used rapport building techniques did not receive due credit by Gen. McChrystal and the task force commanders. Postscript Note: On January 31, 2013, Gen. McChrystal discussed his memoir, "My Share of the Task," with author and journalist Mark Bowden at the Free Library of Philadelphia (recorded on CSPAN). During his talk, McChrystal gave his usual BS about how JSOC didnt really torture (just some EIT techniques) and instead used rapport to get the info that led to Zaraqawi; heres my notes: No one at TF 145 had run interrogation facility. Brought in specialists (SERE?); really none. Looked at history books and manuals, but for conventional war. Learned way through it (different period, Twin Towers, losing people). EIT (not dramatic; sleep deprivation, stress position) No beatings. The best way was conversation and respect. Got Zaraqwi with close relationship, watched movie (Exorcist). The way we did it was to convince them they want to communicate. Problem with torture is not if it works (we havent done it) but you hurt yourself, a corrosive force. Abu Gharib pictures were aberration (but taken as proof of policy [ how about your SOPs?]) but led to 1000s of jihadis (we killed). Torture policy mobilizes fire; information is not worth the cost. Remarkably, Mark Bowden just sat there listening to McChrystals BS which contradicted his own 2007 account The Ploy. It would have been interesting if someone would have asked Bowden and McChrystal to try to explain whose account was false, and why. You would think Bowden might have brought up the question, but like the typical hagiographer, he probably wants to retain his access. Postscript Note: Gordon & Trainor briefly describe the Zaraqwi manhunt in their book Endgame (pp. 206-208). Doesnt go into nearly as much detail as McChrystals account (appears to be some small differences between their accounts). Doesnt say much about the interrogation process: By mid-May another detainee [from Objective Mayer] hadfingered someone called Abd al52
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Rahman as Zaraqwis religious advisor. By early June, a detainee had provided interrogators with new details the long-awaited breakthrough had finally occurred Postscript Note 3-17-13: Maj. Douglas A. Preyer (author of The Fight for the High Ground: The U.S. Army and Interrogation During Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003 - April 2004) includes How to Break a Terrorist on his Top 10 books U.S. interrogation (Tom Ricks Best Defense blog Feb. 28, 2013).
53
NO BLOOD, NO FOUL
Torture of Detainees by JSOC Forces Under Gen. McChrystals Command
the tragedy, the crime of Abu Gharib a fairly limited number of people I asked JSOC forces to treat detainees, everyone in a way so that we had the moral high ground. -- Gen McChrystal, Aspen Ideas Festival (June 2012) The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply the result of a few bad apples acting on their own. Interrogation policies endorsed by senior military and civilian officials authorizing the use of harsh interrogation techniques were a major cause of the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody. SMU TF [JSOC task force interrogation] policies were a direct cause of detainee abuse and influenced interrogation policies at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq. -- Senate Armed Service Committee, Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody (2008) at the very same time the Army was cleaning up Abu Ghraib at an elite secret interrogation facility [JSOCs Camp Nama] nudity and hooding and stress positions were still routine Do you know where the colonel was getting his orders from? I believe it was a two-star general. I believe his name was General McChrystal. I saw him there a couple of times. -- John Richardson, Esquire (2006) I would say JSOC was moderately complicit [in torture]. one of the big questions that still hangs o ver the head of Gen. McChrystal Theres a legitimate and still open question of how much he knew, and what he did about it. if you look at the time line, and look at whats public the [11/20/08 ] torture report from the Senate intelligence committee blacked out all the references to JSOC [and GEN McChrystal & Admiral McRaven] [its] Quite clear that even on a senior level, task force commanders in Iraq [Bg Koenig, Admiral McRaven & Gen. McChrystal] knew what was going on. -- Marc Ambinder, How The Pentagons Top Killers Became (Unaccountable) Spies (2012) I am concerned about General McChrystals public [Senate] testimony, which sought to convey that he was uncomfortable with various interrogation techniques and sought to reduce their use. Given the full history of his approach to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best. -- Senator Russ Feingold, Congressional Record (June 11, 2009) 54
A FEW ROTTEN APPLES

the tragedy, the crime of Abu Gharib a fairly limited number of people I asked JSOC forces to treat detainees, everyone in a way so that we had the moral high ground. -- Gen McChrystal, Aspen Ideas Festival (June 2012)
On April 28, 2004, the images of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were first broadcast by 60 Minutes. The Army and Bush administration spun these shocking images as an aberration, the actions of the hill-billy, night-shift, National Guard Military Police unit gone wild. In his 2012 public appearances51, Gen. McChrystal also claimed that detainee abuses at Abu Gharib were the acts of a few rotten apples: Abu Ghraib was extremely damaging to the U.S. mission and gave a misconception. Pictures filled the airways and Internet and sent the wrong message about the U.S. the tragedy, the crime of Abu Gharib. Fairly limited number of people I asked JSOC forces to treat detainees, everyone in a way so that we had the moral high ground52.
Postscript Note: Here are links to more recent McChrystal interviews in which he discussed his (or not) his role in torture. These remarks are similar to those made prior to the release of his book: General Stanley A. McChrystal (Charlie Rose Show -- January 8, 2013): at 39:50 Gen. Stanley McChrystal on 'Task' of Afghanistan, Responsibility and Resignation (PBS News Hour -- January 16, 2013: see transcript) PRESS Pass: Gen. Stanley McChrystal (Ret.) (w/ David Gregory) (NBC Meet the Press -- January 17, 2013): Torture at 10:14; Tillman at 12:10 Gen. McChrystal (Ret.) Discusses Al Qaeda in Iraq (CSPAN Brookings Lecture -- January 28, 2013): Torture at 41:05)
51
Stanley McChrystal on Leadership Bob Schieffer interview Aspen Ideas Festival, June 30, 2012 and Retired U.S. general pays visit to Widener, March 26, 2012
52
Maj. Douglas A. Preyer wrote, leaders chose to fight to keep soldiers on the moral high ground, in his 2009 book, The Fight for the High Ground: The U.S. Army and Interrogation During Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003 - April 2004). Or you can read his masters thesis.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES During his interviews, McChrystal claimed that he and JSOC was not involved in torture: He also spoke about enhanced interrogation techniques, noting he did not know if they work or not, but that what hes noticed is that the best way to get information from suspects is through long periods of conversation. The information that came from detainees, which is a component of human intelligence, was critical to us. But it wasn't gained through mistreatment. The best information always comes from building a relationship with the detainee. McChrystal rejected the argument some have made that using torture is an acceptable practice and dismissed the notion that the end result justifies the means. The effect of torture, is really on the torturer, McChrystal said. It corrodes the moral fiber of the force. In a December 2012 interview (Generation Kill) with Foreign Policy magazine (March/April 2013 issue), McChrystal spoke at length about his take on the role of torture: I teach a seminar at Yale on leadership, and in one of the classes, I decided to bring up the issue of torture to rouse their indignation at the idea. And more than half the class said, "Well, if you need to do it, it's OK." And I was shocked. I think torture is an absolute mistake, and I made that clear within our organization. Whether or not torture works is an academic argument I don't even want to be a part of, because at the end of the day, I think the torturers are weakened. They're weakened internally individually, and they're weakened strategically as a cause. The thing that hurt us more than anything else in the war in Iraq was Abu Ghraib. When the pictures came out in the spring of 2004, many Americans felt our government was being honest -- that we had a problem with a platoon operating in the prison mistreating prisoners. The Iraqi people viewed it very differently. Many of them felt it was proof positive that the Americans were doing exactly what Saddam Hussein had done -- that it was proof [that] everything they thought bad about the Americans was true They thought that was the broader reality. And there were hundreds of foreign fighters that came in [to Iraq] because they were responding to Abu Ghraib. Using torture is ultimately self-defeating. It's morally wrong, and it's a strategic mistake. When I took over [the Special Operations] Command, we were still very new to running operations, holding detainees, and so forth. We weren't manned with the right interrogators; we didn't have the right facilities. People were doing their best, but we were doing what I'd consider an unsatisfactory job. We weren't actively torturing people, but we weren't treating people the way that we should have been. We started cleaning that up right away, correcting that. My biggest regret is that it took us about nine months before we got it to the point where it should have been from the beginning. That's slower than it should have been.
56
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES However, Human Rights Watch 2006 report, No Blood, No Foul, claimed JSOC forces under McChrystals command committed detainee abuse in Iraq. In response to such allegations, McChrystal claimed that when he took command of JSOC he was shocked by detention conditions, cracked down on abuse, and set out to professionalize JSOC interrogations53: Shortly after McChrystal took command in September 2003, he visited the JSOC detention facility in Iraq McChrystals first tour of the Baghdad detention facility shocked him. Several detainees were being kept naked, and dogs were being used to guard their cells. This is how we lose. This is our Achilles heel, he told associates In response, McChrystal set out to professionalize the interrogation system by training interrogators how to best question prisoners and by teaching others how to collect information about a detainee McChrystal ordered his intelligence chief, Michael Flynn, to professionalize the interrogation system. Following McChrystals crackdown, JSOC still had to use the rules laid out in the Army Field manual to interrogate detainees. Similarly, during McChrystals June 2, 2009 Senate confirmation hearing, Senator Carl Levin asked him to comment on allegations of detainee mistreatment by units under your command during your tenure as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command from 2003 to 2008. In reply, McChrystal claimed he never condoned mistreatment of detainees and immediately reduced the use of harsh interrogation techniques: I do not, and never have, condoned mistreatment of detainees, and never will. We must at all times adhere to our obligation to treat detainees humanely. When we found cases where we thought there was an allegation of mistreatment, we investigated every one And that was from the beginning. When I took command in 2003, I found our treatment of detainees followed existing guidance but needed improvement. Our facilities were limited, our expertise in specialties like interrogation was insignificant We did not use all the things that were outlined there [12/02/02 SecDef memo] some of them were used when I took over -we immediately began to reduce that. In the months and years that followed, we improved continuously. [p.15, SASC 6-02-09] ... However, it appears that McChrystals public statements are an attempt to re-write history and whitewash his role in the use of torture as commander of JSOC. It appears McChrystal was disingenuous to claim that the Abu Gharib abuse was limited to the actions of a few rotten apples. He was certainly aware that the torture exposed at Abut Gharib was the tip of the iceberg of an organized torture system in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay that was based on guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense.
53
pp. 246-249, Dana Priest & William M. Arkin Top Secret America (2011) 57
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES During August 2003, as Vice Director of Operations (VDJ3) of the Joint Staff, it appears McChrystal was involved with the process of importing torture techniques to Abu Gharib from Guantanamo Bay. And, after taking command of JSOC in October 2003, he approved torture policies and oversaw its conduct by task forces in both Iraq & Afghanistan until he was ordered to stop in May 2004 (he got approval in June 2004 to resume some techniques). However, it doesnt appear JSOC fully cleaned up its detainee operations in Iraq until late 2005. Despite his claim, McChrystal did not immediately began to reduce the use of JSOC torture techniques. Just after his Senate confirmation hearing, Senator Russ Feingold wrote [Congressional Record, 6-11-09 (S6537 S6538)] he oppose[d] the nomination of LTG Stanley McChrystal to become commander of the Afghan War because of a classified matter and because McChrystals Senate testimony concerning interrogation appears incomplete, at best.
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STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply the result of a few bad apples acting on their own. Interrogation policies endorsed by senior military and civilian officials authorizing the use of harsh interrogation techniques were a major cause of the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody. SMU TF [JSOC] policies were a direct cause of detainee abuse and influenced interrogation policies at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq. -- Senate Armed Service Committee, Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody
In his public statements Gen. McChrystal claimed that the Abu Ghraib abuse was conducted by a fairly limited number of people. However, in reality, Abu Gharib was merely the tip of the iceberg of widespread torture by the Defense Department; torture was already standard operating procedure at secret CIA prisons, by the Copper Green SAP, at Guantanamo Bay, and by JSOC task forces in Iraq & Afghanistan.
In 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) investigated the history of torture policy by the Defense Department. Their report, Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, was published on November 20, 2008 (and released to public on April 22, 2009):
The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply the result of a few bad apples acting on their own. The fact is that senior officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees. Those efforts damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that could save lives, strengthened the hand of our enemies, and compromised our moral authority. Interrogation techniques such as stripping detainees of their clothes, placing them in stress positions, and using military working dogs appeared in Iraq only after they had been approved for use in Afghanistan and at GTMO. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's December 2, 2002 authorization of aggressive interrogation techniques conveyed the message that physical pressures and degradation were appropriate treatment for detainees in U.S. military custody the gloves are coming off we want these detainees broken. Interrogation policies endorsed by senior military and civilian officials authorizing the use of harsh interrogation techniques were a major cause of the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody. Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) [e.g. JSOC TF 121] interrogation policies in Iraq included the use of aggressive interrogation techniques such as military working dogs and stress positions. SMU TF policies were a direct cause of detainee abuse and influenced interrogation policies at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Members of the reserve 372nd Military Police company and the (demoted) commander of all MPs in Iraq, COL Janis Karpinski became the Army scapegoats of the Abu Gharib scandal. Karpinski wrote to Kelly Vahlos: Gen. McChrystal, like most of the officers, contractors, and high-level civilians who knew about the secret interrogation facilities and torture at numerous locations in Iraq, was never held accountable. He was questioned during his [June 2009 Senate] confirmation hearing, but it was generally glossed over. Karpinski maintains she was a scapegoat for senior officers who knew, allowed it, and directed the abusive interrogation techniques system-wide including McChrystal. ... In July 2002, Rumsfeld appointed Gen. McChrystal to be the Vice director of Operations (VD J3) of the Joint Staff.54 Seymour Hersh wrote in his book (p.249), Chain of Command, how Rumsfeld had handpicked the members of the Joint Staff: Rumsfeld repeatedly overruled the senior planners on the Joint Staff, the operating arm of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he chafed about generals having the slowsGradually Rumsfeld succeeded in replacing those officers in senior Joint Staff positions who challenged his views. All the Joint Staff people now are handpicked, and churn out products to make the Secretary of Defense happy55
54
p. 78; McChrystal: In that role [VDJ3] , first under Marine LTG Greg Newbold and later for an old friend AF LTG Norty Schwartz, I assisted the J3 with management of the large operations staff directorate.
55
pp. 109; Scahill, Dirty Wars: But nearly invisible in the breathless media narrative of the warrior-leaders ascent is another McChrystal a man who in reality had seen very little action before ascending to the post of JSOC commander after the Iraq invasion. This McChrystal was a climber who had cozied up to the right people politically, whether Democrats or Republicans, as well as key figures within the military bureaucracy. In essence, he was one of the chosen few. According to career military officers who knew McChrystal going back to Wes t Point, he had been groomed for years to rise through the army ranks. I like Stan very much, as a person, said Colonel Macgregor, who was McChrystals roommate at West Point. But MacGregor charged that after 9/11, McChrystal had ingratiated himself with the neoconservatives, particularly Rumsfeld and Cheney. He was someone that had made his reputation, in the Pentagon with Rumsfeld. He was someone who saw this global Caliphate as a tremendous enemy, and kept beating the drum for that. And that e ndeared him to all of the key people. The military, Macgregor said, is run under a system that rests ultimately on a foundation that is cronyism. In other words, are you one of the boys? Its kind of a brotherhood selection: Is this man going to stay the course with us? Is he going to say whatever we tell him to say, do whatever we tell him to do? McChrystal, he told me, realized early on that if he is going to advance, hes going to have to ingratiate himself. And he does this in the Pentagon.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES In August 2003, Rumsfeld decided to send Gen. Geoffrey Miller to Gitmotize Iraq 56. In her book, The Dark Side,57 Jane Mayer described his decision: Rumsfeld was described as pounding on the tables, demanding to know why the military had not yet found Saddam Hussein Rumsfeld loudly disparaged the quality of information coming from U.S.-held prisoners in Iraq. he liked the results they [new extreme interrogation rules at Guantanamo] were producing. He wanted MG Geoffrey Miller to Gitmotize Iraq As VDJ3, it appears McChrystal was involved in this process58 of sending Miller to Iraq59; Generals Fays report [j. (1) (a)] stated that MG G. Millers visit was in response to a [August 18, 2003] J3 JCS request to SOUTHCOM for a team to assist CENTCOM and ISG in theater.60 In addition, Jane Mayer also described how the Joint Staff J3 in August 2003 decided to send SERE instructors to Iraq to instruct the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) that was looking for WMD and the JSOC Iraq Task Force that was looking for Saddam, how to inflict torture61: the [SERE] officials had not come to help captured U.S. soldiers resist abuse. They had come to them how to inflict it. Just as SERE training had seeped into Guantanomo and the CIAs black sites, it was formally imported during this period into Iraq. the decision to send SERE instructors to Iraq originated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose operations [J3] commander [Gen. Norty Schwartz, McChrystals boss] was frustrated at the lack of progress [by the ISG]62
56
p.101; Scahill: He [COL Douglas MacGregor] said he was disturbed by what he was witnessing inside the DoD as Cheney and Rumsfeld began building up the SSB and JSOC [in 2001 and 2002]. I stayed away from it. I didnt want to be involved in it because I had this fear we were ultimately breaking laws. One would have expected someone to stand up and say, Im sorry, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Cambone, General Boykin, you dont have the authority to suspend the Geneva Convention.
57
p.241, Jane Mayer, The Dark Side
58
p.80, McChrystal: The VDJ3 position offered me a good vantage point to see how the Pentagon worked. Senior enough to be included in many key meetings I developed a feel for the general mood and in the place.
59
p. 80, McChrystal: Law required the secretary of defense to authorize the overseas deployment of any forces, and his written approval was called a deployment order (DEPORD). at the table were also the Chairman JCS, a couple members of Rumsfelds staff, and the J3 or VDJ3, the position I then held In several cases I watched him [Rumsfeld] dig into more detail on a two or three-person detachement than he did on a fifteen-thousand soldier combat division.
60
p. 57 , Mark Danner, Torture and Truth
61
pp.245-247, Jane Mayer, The Dark Side
62
See pp. 27-29; Young, Shelton R. Review of Dod -Directed Investigation of Detainee Abuse Unclassified at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/abuse.pdf
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES But while the ISG rejected Washingtons pressure to use SERE techniques, another task force based in Iraq was excited at the prospect [JSOC TF 20/121] in September 2003 SERE advisers were sent to aid [TF 121] The task forces commander [BG Koneig] did not call on SERE to help protect his soldiers, but rather asked the SERE officials to provide advice and assistance to the task force interrogation mission. Within months of the JPRA delegations visit, TF-20 [121] developed a reputation for uncontrolled brutality. For bucking these direct orders from the top rungs of the Pentagon to inflict illegal levels of cruelty on the prisoners, [COL Steve] Kleinman said he soon found himself the least popular officer in the country They wanted to do these things. They were itching to. It was about revenge, not interrogation. And they thought I was coddling terrorists. Postscript Note: Gen. Lyle Koenig was then the commander of TF 121 (Admiral Bill McRaven succeeded him on October 16, 2003) who requested the SERE instructors. For more details, see Appendix B and the SASC report. However, even before JPRA formally imported SERE techniques into interrogations in Iraq, some of these techniques had already been used in Afghanistan by Military Intelligence and members of JSOC Task Force 2063: before coming to Iraq she [CPT Wood] had spent six months at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. At Abu Gharib, in the first week of August, she was appointed officer in charge of interrogation operations. she got hold of the Interrogation Rules of Engagement used by Task Force 20 and essentially plagiarized it before submitting it for approval as the rules of engagement for MI at Abu Gharib. In her book64 Jane Mayer described the consequences of Rumsfelds decision to send MG Geoffrey Miller to Gitmotize Iraq. Many of Millers recommended changes that were implemented by CENTCOM CO GEN Sanchez contributed to the abuses at Abu Gharib: Millers concept placed military intelligence officers in charge of prison operations in Iraq . [Miller] Recommended that interrogations be centralized at Abu Gharib advocated using ordinary military police who worked as guards in the prison to participate in the interrogation process must be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of the internees. By September 14, Sanchez [CO of Iraq War] had put in place a new policy, modeled on Guantanamo Bay Low ranking military personnel such as Sergeant Javal David would recall that they had been told by intelligence interrogators to do things like loosen this guy up and make sure this guy gets the treatment
63
pp. 38-40, Philip Gourevitch & Errol Morris, Standard Operating Procedure
64
p.241, Jane Mayer, The Dark Side 62
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Ironically, Seymour Hersh described how, after the Abu Gharib story broke, GEN Miller was presented as the general who would clean up Abu Gharib!65: In late March [2004], before the Abu Gharib scandal became publicly known, GEN Miller was transferred from Guantanomo and named head of prison operations in Iraq. After the story broke on CBS ... GEN Sanchez presented him to the media as the general would clean up the Iraqi prison system and instill respect for the Geneva Convention. ... Shortly after Millers trip to Iraq, Rumsfeld handpicked66 Gen. McChrystal to become the new commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). McChrystal took command of JSOC in October 200367 and intensified Rumsfelds strategy of manhunts. Seymour Hersh wrote (p. 272-276): We need to find some more fighting generals.68Rumsfeld called for restructuring Special Operations as a specific agency under the personal command of the defense secretary.had struggled for two years to get the military leadership to accept the strategy of what he called manhunts69 Cambone was deeply involved in developing the new Special Forces approach [GEN] Boykin became an important piece of the planned escalation.70 ...
65
p. 32, Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command
66
P. 95, McChrystal: several months earlier [than Oct 6, 2003] Doug [Brown] called me, not long after he was selected to command SOCOM. He asked if I would take TF 714 [JSOC] that October. I believe that Rumsfeld actually pushed for McChrystals promotion, even if Brown officially selected him.
67
p. 93, McChrystal: took over the special forces command [JSOC] October 6, 2003.
68
Postscript Note July 21, 2013: p. 109, Scahill Dirty Wars: But [COL Douglas] Macgregor charged that after 9/11, McChrystal had ingratiated himself with the neoconservatives, part icularly Rumsfeld and Cheney. He was someone that had made his reputation, in the Pentagon with Rumsfeld. He was someone who saw this global Caliphate as a tremendous enemy [military] rests ultimately on a foundation that is cronyism. In other words, are you one of the boys?
69
p. 110, Scahill Dirty Wars: Despite his stated concern about the way US military policy was alienating Muslims, McChrystal shared the political view that the US was indeed in a war against Islam the officer said, They ran what was for all practical purposes an assassination program.
70
p. 110, Scahill Dirty Wars: Boykin and Cambone and McChrystal were fellow travelers in the great crusade against Islam. [COL] Macgregor also said that when McChrystal was named JSOC commander, he was given a mission under Mr. Cambone, who is Rumfelds intelligence director, and General Boykin, who was Cambones right-hand man, to essentially go after the terrorists. McChrystal, he said, presided over this black world where any actions were justified against Muslims because you were fighting against the Caliphate.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES After the images of Abu Gharib abuse hit the airways in April 2004, the Army and Defense Department conducted a series of investigations. The resulting reports were, predictably, whitewashes. Seymour Hersh wrote (pp. 68-71): the investigation into Abu Gharib would be pro forma. ... Rumsfeld has completely rigged the investigations. My friends say we should expect something much akin to the Army IG report just a few rotten apples. . the sexual abuses at Abu Gharib have become a diversion for the prisoner abuse and the violation of the Geneva conventions that is authorized. And, Jane Mayer wrote that COL Kleinman disagreed71 with the official story of a few rotten apples: Rejecting Rumsfelds argument that the only problem was a handful of wayward soldiers, he said, It was not a few rotten apples. It was the Zimbardo [1971 Stanford Prison] experiment writ large. ... In light of the dark legacy of Abu Gharib, it appears that McChrystals public statements (Abu Ghraib gave a misconception the crime of Abu Gharib. Fairly limited number of people ) are an attempt to re-write and whitewash his history of involvement with torture. McChrystal was disingenuous to claim the Abu Gharib abuse was limited to the actions of a few rotten apples. He was certainly aware that the torture exposed at Abu Gharib was only the tip of the iceberg of a wider system in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Gitmo that was authorized at the highest levels of the Dept. of Defense and that he helped formally import to Abu Gharib & Iraq.
71
p.246, Jane Mayer, The Dark Side
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COPPER GREEN
Rumsfeld then authorized the establishment of the highly secret program [Copper Green], which was given blanket advance approval to kill or capture and, if possible, interrogate high-value targets. Fewer than 200 hundred operative and officials were completely read into the program The rules are Grab whom you must. Do what you want. -- Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command
The harshest torture at Abu Gharib appears to have been conducted by a highly secret special access program (SAP) known as Copper Green that was expanded into Abu Gharib (and presumably into JSOC facilities) in August 2003. Seymour Hersh wrote72: Rumsfeld then authorized the establishment of the highly secret program, which was given blanket advance approval to kill or capture and, if possible, interrogate high-value targets. Fewer than 200 hundred operative and officials were completely read into the program The rules are Grab whom you must. Do what you want. Rumsfeld and Cambone went a step beyond Gitmotizing, they expanded the scope of the SAP, bringing its unconventional methods to Abu Gharib. [Cambone] would bring some of the Army military intelligence officers working inside the Iraqi prisons under the SAPs auspices. There was a fear that the situation at Abu Gharib would lead to the exposure of the secret SAP As long as its benign and contained, the Pentagon can deal with the photo crisis without jeopardizing the secret program In mid-June [2004] the Pentagon briefly disbanded the special-access team and, in a few days, reconstituted it, with new code words and new designators. The same rules of engagement were to be applied ... In the book, Standard Operating Procedure (p.211), it appears Philip Gourevitch referred to the process Hersh wrote about bringing some of the Army military intelligence officers working inside the Iraqi prisons under that SATs auspices: A week after Herringtons visit to Abu Gharib, Saddam Hussein was capturedand the next night (December 14, 2003), [COL] Pappas explained that hed just got off a conference call with GEN Sanchez and the secretary of defense. He said, Were starting a special projects team, and were going to break the back of the resistance. if you volunteer, you cant talk about this to anybody, [Tim] Dugan said. he said all approach techniques were authorized the people in an unlawful insurgency have no protection under the Geneva Convention. ...
72
p. 46,50,59-63, 68-71Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES In Afghanistan, in late October 2003, Gen. McChrystal ramped up TF 121 for Operation Winterstrike operations, driven by a new Washington emphasis on getting the big HVTs (Osama Bin Ladin and Saddam Hussein). As part of this effort, he established a new enhanced interrogation facility at Bagram that was involved with the Copper Green program. In his book, Operation Darkheart, LTC Anthony Schaffer described his February 2004 tour of TF 121s new enhanced interrogation facility: The U.S. military was involved in some bad stuff. We all knew that harsher-thannormal interrogation techniques had been approved I had known there was a special system for handling HVT prisoners that the Pentagon leadership didnt want going to the BCP the interrogation program, [REDACTED; Copper Green in unredacted edition] was authorized, but a lot of us felt it wasnt appropriate and wasnt right. We also all knew that the CIA had a separate secret prison at Bagram. The [newly converted] 1099 [TF121] facility was an enhanced interrogation program Id been led into the top-secret interrogation system authorized by my boss at the time, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ... Finally, in his May 14, 2010 Atlantic Monthly piece, Inside the Secret Interrogation Facility at Bagram, Marc Ambinder also wrote about the Copper Green program: Although the CIA's enhanced interrogation program was investigated the Defense Department's parallel activities have been given little scrutiny. To this day, the Department denies the existence of a "special access program," codenamed "Copper Green," which allegedly authorized military interrogators to use extremely harsh methods, including the infliction of sexual humiliation, on high-value terrorists. Only about 200 military and civilian personnel were aware of Copper Green's existence before it was disclosed by the New Yorker's Seymour Hersh. The CIA's program, known internally by the acronym "GST," has been discontinued. Although "Copper Green" was disbanded, the Defense Department's detainee affairs section has set up a new special access program under which the rules for battlefield interrogations are established. It is classified Top Secret.
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NO BLOOD, NO FOUL
at the very same time the Army was cleaning up Abu Ghraib at an elite secret interrogation facility [JSOCs Camp Nama] nudity and hooding and stress positions were still routine "Do you know where the colonel was getting his orders from?" "I believe it was a two-star general. I believe his name was General McChrystal. I saw him there a couple of times." -- John Richardson, Esquire (2006)
General McChrystal was the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) from October 2003 to August 2008. McChrystal has claimed that he never condoned mistreatment of detainees, after taking command he immediately reduced the use of harsh interrogation techniques, and ordered his J2 COL Micheal Flynn to professionalize the interrogation system. However, it certainly appears that after McChrystal took command he approved more torture techniques (used until GEN Abizaid suspended them after the Abu Gharib scandal broke in April 2004). And it appears that JSOC task forces in Iraq & Afghanistan were still using some nonFM 34-52 techniques until the end of 2005. ... In their 2011 book, "Top Secret America" (and in their Washington Post article Top Secret America: A look at the militarys Joint Special Operations Command, Dana Priest and William M. Arkin wrote [p.222]: [JSOC] have captured and interrogated ten times as many [detainees as the CIA]. They hold them in prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan that they alone control and, for at least three years after 911, they sometimes ignored US military rules for interrogation and used almost whatever means they thought might be most effective. Even before the Armys Abu Ghraib prison photos began circulating in 2004, a confidential report warned that some JSOC interrogators were assaulting prisoners and hiding them in secret facilities. And, in March 2006, NYT reporter Eric Schmitt wrote a March 19, 2006 piece, In Secret Unit's 'Black Room,' a Grim Portrait of U.S. Abuse: The new account reveals the extent to which the unit members mistreated prisoners months before and after the photographs of abuse from Abu Ghraib were made public in April 2004, and it helps belie the original Pentagon assertions that abuse was confined to a small number of rogue reservists at Abu Ghraib. The Black Room was part of a temporary detention site at Camp Nama, the secret headquarters of a shadowy military unit known as Task Force 6-26 [20, 121, 145, etc] Placards posted by soldiers at the detention area advised, "NO BLOOD, NO FOUL."
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES [midlevel civilian and military Defense Department personnel who worked with Task Force 6-26] agreed to speak out of what they said was anger and disgust over the unit's treatment of detainees and the failure of task force commanders to punish misconduct more aggressively. The critics said the harsh interrogations yielded little information to help capture insurgents or save American lives.
In addition, John Richardson, in his August 2006 Esquire piece, Acts of Conscience, described the experience of an interrogator, Jeff, who worked at Camp Nama in Spring 2004: But at the very same time the Army was cleaning up Abu Ghraib [at Camp Nama] nudity and hooding and stress positions were still routine, where ranking officers knew exactly what was going on and promised to protect the interrogators at all costs. Garlasco had briefed Stanley McChrystal once. He was head of the Joint Special Operations Command, the logical person to oversee Task Force 121. Within the unit, the interrogators got the feeling they were reporting to the highest levels. The colonel would tell an interrogator that his report is on Rumsfeld's desk this morning or that it was read by SecDef. Do you know where the colonel was getting his orders from? he asks. Jeff answers quickly, perhaps a little defiantly. I believe it was a two-star general. I believe his name was General McChrystal. I saw him there a couple of times. It was a point of pride that the Red Cross would never be allowed in the door 'Will they ever be allowed in here?' And he said absolutely not. He had this directly from General McChrystal This facility was completely closed off to anybody investigating, even Army investigators." In July 2006, Human Rights Watch released a major report, "No Blood, No Foul," based on dozens of interviews with soldiers who had witnessed the interrogation of prisoners in Iraq. This report revealed that the elite forces conducting the interrogations at Camp Nama (Nasty Ass Military Area) and two other locations, known (amon g other names) as Task Force 121, committed systematic abuse of prisoners at other facilities across Iraq, leading to at least three deaths. Whether or not he was present during the actual abuse as commander of JSOC, Stanley McChrystal oversaw them.
And torture also continued to be used in Afghanistan after McChrystal took command of JSOC. In late October 2003, he ramped up TF 121s operations in Afghanistan driven by a new Washington emphasis on getting the big HVTs (Osama Bin Ladin and Saddam Hussein). As part of this effort, he established a new enhanced interrogation facility at Bagram. LTC Anthony Schaffer served as a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) officer in Afghanistan from July 2003 until January 2004. During the first part of his tour, Schaffer led the HUMINT Support Detachment (HID) of TF 121 during Operation Winterstrike and worked with McChrystal and his J2 Brian Keller. He described it quickly became clear that 1099[121] was under enormous pressure to produce quick results and how McChrystal and TF 121 began
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES arriving in Afghanistan with a vengeance during the last week of October 2003. In his book, Operation Darkheart, he described his February 2004 tour of TF 121s new enhanced interrogation facility: The U.S. military was involved in some bad stuff. I had been avoiding the place [BCP- Bagram Collection Point prison]. There were problems over how prisoners were being interrogated. Suspicious deaths had been reported We also all knew that the CIA had a separate secret prison at Bagram. We all knew that harsher-than-normal interrogation techniques had been approved but I didnt - and still dont -- believe such methods work. Later in my deployment to Afghanistan, I came face-to-face with the program of enhanced methods of interrogation. The [newly converted] 1099 [TF121] facility was an enhanced interrogation program, Jack [Schaffers replacement as TF 121s HID] told me I was blown away and not in a good wayby what I saw. These interrogation areas, it was clear, had holding points for a prisoners hands and legs. They were designed for prisoners to be shackled and held in stress positions to maximize discomfort and pain. The intent here by DoD was to regularize enhanced interrogation. It was only later, after all the publicity [of the Abu Gharib photos], that I realized the full scope of what had been going on. Id been led into the top-secret interrogation system authorized by my boss at the time, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Finally, in his February 13, 2012 piece, How The Pentagons Top Killers Became (Unaccountable) Spies, Spencer Ackerman interviewed Marc Ambinder about his justpublished eBook about JSOC & McChrystal, The Command, and asked about JSOCs role in torture: As the insurgency in Iraq became too much for commanders to bear, there was a scramble to figure out how to get tactical intelligence out of anyone they captured. And it seemed like the militarys first response was well rough them up. I would say JSOC was moderately complicit [in torture]. The number of actual interrogators and tier-one operators who actually participated in torture was very small. But the number of people who knew about it had to be much larger. And one of the big questions that still hangs over the head of Gen. McChrystal, whos otherwise widely admired is that it took him seemingly a long time when he took over the command to get his arms around how the commands interrogation practices were actually working. Theres a legitimate and still open question of how much he knew, and what he did about it. if you look at the time line, and look at whats public the [11/20/08 SASC] torture report from the Senate intelligence committee blacked out all the references to JSOC [and to McChrystal and McRaven] [its] Quite clear that even on a senior level, task force commanders [Admiral McRaven & Gen. McChrystal] in Iraq knew what was going on.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Note: See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the Senate Armed Service Committee November 20, 2008 report, Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody. This appendix discusses Admiral McRaven, Gen. McChrystal, and BG Lyle Koenigs involvement in torture while in command of TF 121 and/or JSOC. Also see the discussion below about McChrystals June 2, 2009 Senate testimony, and my discussion of Senator Russ Feingolds response in Appendix B, given the full history of his [McChrystals] approach to interrogations, [his] testimony appears incomplete, at best. ... Postscript Note 3-17-13: Maj. Douglas A. Preyer also relied heavily on this Senate report, writing it was The best unclassified source of information regarding the influence of national policy on harsh interrogation techniques in Iraq. Preyer is the author of the 2009 book, The Fight for the High Ground: The U.S. Army and Interrogation During Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003 - April 2004). Or you can read his masters thesis of the same title (missing a couple of chapters and the Foreword by COL Herrington). Heres some of my notes from Preyers thesis about the systemic use of SERE techniques by an SMU Task Force [TF 121 under McChrystals command] (mostly from Chapter 3): Interrogation techniques that had been designed to train U.S. military personnel on how to resist and survive interrogations by an enemy unconstrained by the Geneva Conventions made their way, via formal and informal means, from U.S. military SERE schools to GTMO and Afghanistan, and from these two theaters, to Iraq harsh interrogation techniques were used systemically at Abu Ghraib and special operations facilities (and probably briefly at Camp Cropper as well). At Abu Ghraib, these harsh techniques rapidly descended into sadistic, sexualized violence that shamed a nation. Leaders and interrogators who, during their previous deployments to GTMO or Afghanistan had gained knowledge of the SERE techniques sanctioned in these two other theaters, often employed these techniques in Iraq Special operations units were also a significant conduit for the migration of SERE techniques to Iraq Interrogation policy for this SMU task force directly influenced the drafting of the first interrogation policy for conventional forces in Iraq. the use of harsh techniques was approved on a case-by-case basis at Camp Nama, the SMU Task Forces detention facility on the Baghdad Airport While SMU Task Force policy never included "Forced Nudity," this technique was nonetheless employed at Camp Nama. the use of this technique was reinforced by the assistance visit of a three-man JPRA team to the facility from September 5-23, 2003 This JPRA team also reported observing an interrogation in which an SMU Task Force interrogator repeatedly slapped a detainee across the face, which was apparently a common practice at the facility despite its not yet being formally approved. special operations soldiers at a location close to Camp Cropper (probably Camp Nama) were beating detainees before transporting them to Camp Cropper. The SMU Task Force in Iraq adopted its most aggressive policy on March 26, 2004, a policy that would be in effect only until May 6, 2004, at which time General Abizaid suspended the use
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES of all non-doctrinal techniques in the U.S. Central Command AOR [true, but McChrystal then requested permission to resume using five techniques (including control positions) and got permission to resume the use of four non-FM techniques in June 2004]
For decades if not centuries to come, the twin symbols of GTMO and Abu Ghraib and all that these symbols have done to fuel the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and to incur international 56 condemnation of the U.S., should serve as a cautionary tale for any other senior U.S. leader who might someday consider a similarly unwise course of action. Since OIF I and the Abu Ghraib scandal, a myriad of inspectors and investigators have amassed an extremely lengthy list of reasons for detainee abuse. These reasons have ranged from a shortage of a certain resource to confusion over some item of doctrine or policy to soldiers being improperly trained for performing a specific task. Certainly, these various issues are important and need to be corrected. However, the U.S. Army is in real danger of missing the forest for the trees, for most essentially, what was at the heart of any instance of interrogation abuse during OIF I was a leader (or leaders) making unethical decisions. In other words, leaders with flawed ethical decision making skills were the sine qua non (or root) cause of interrogation abuse in Iraq.
... On April 28, 2004, the images of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were first broadcast by 60 Minutes. As the result of blowback from the Abu Gharib scandal, on May 6, 2004, CENTCOM CO GEN Abizaid suspended the use of all non-FM 34-52 techniques. In response, several weeks later, McChrystal asked Abizaid for the authority to employ at least five additional techniques73 outside the Army manual. It appears that these techniques (and perhaps others) continued in use by JSOC until the end of 2005. It appears a principal reason the use of torture was ended was to comply with Senator McCains Detainee Treatment Act that was signed into law on December 30, 2005 that prohibited techniques beyond the Army Field manual 34-52. In addition, another reason was McChrystal needed a squeaky clean interrogation system to get British approval for the SAS to once again work as full partners with JSOC in Iraq. Mark Urban, in his book Task Force Black, described how concerns about torture had blocked the British SAS from working with JSOC after May 200474: [In December 2003 COL] Herrington found his access to Camp Nama blocked, but still managed to find out what was going on. [he was] shocked by the fact that many of the JSOC officers he spoke to seemed to regard the abuse of prisoners as normal. A number of these incidents happened after McChrystal had taken over command of JSOC. By March 2004 British officers knew that a raft of complaints about US detainee operations was percolating through the Pentagon.
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pp. 222-224; SASC 11/20/08 Report pp. 54-55, 67, 116-117, 131; Mark Urban, Task Force Black (2010)
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Shortly before the attack on Fallujah [April 2004], MI6 visited Balad Following the MI6 visit, concerns were raised about the detention conditions there [at the Temporary Screening Facility] were the violent practices COL Herrington uncovered at Camp Nama being continued?... from now on, Britains special forces would only turn its prisoners over to the Americans if there was an undertaking not to send them to Balad. Conditions in the Temporary Screening facility, the special ops jail at Balad, had been cleared up by the end of 2005. . In mid-January 2006the SAS deployedto Balad, where it could be joined at the hip with the American effort. JSOCs prison was by this point squeaky clean, with CCTV surveillance and many other checks. Postscript Note: (Urban, p. 86) As casualties limited TF 145s capacities, in June 2005 McChrystal asked if the SAS could assist with Operation Snake Eyes in al-Qaim. The British declined citing ongoing British concerns about the Baled detention facilities the Americans flew in a second squadron of Delta Force and pressed on. (p.91): Britain was worried about the JSOC prison at Balad (the TSF). Work had been done to rebuild the cells so they met British-approved standards but it would take time and several visits by British officials for this to be confirmed. Note that McChrystals account of Operation Snake Eyes (pp. 180-187) doesnt mention he had asked the SAS for their help: I became convinced we needed more TF 714 forces in Iraq. . I decided to deploy a second squadron of Green to Iraq for a number of months [Summer 2005] as we surged, our pace would become an unsustainable sprint Operation Snake Eyes. Surge forces began to arrive en masse in July 2005. we put them outside Al Qaim. Postscript Note 4-01-13: Ian Cobain wrote in his piece, Camp Nama: British personnel reveal horrors of secret US base in Baghdad (Guardian, 4-01-13) about British concerns about torture by JSOC forces at Camp Nama: One person who has been widely reported to have been seen there frequently was General Stanley McChrystal, then commander of US Joint Special Operations forces in Iraq. ... Finally, another factor in ending torture was the development under McChrystals command (and by his S2 intelligence officer COL Micheal Flynn75 from June 2004 until 2008) of more effective means of gathering JSOC intelligence (e.g. drone surveillance, site exploitation, electronic surveillance, etc.): [So they torture people until [COL Micheal] Flynn figures out theres a better way to get intelligence?] I know that sounds like a neat narrative, and this is a complicated story.
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McChrystal wrote (p. 156) how Flynn turned many of their concepts into reality and directed his intelligence operation for three years using ISR aircraft (p.157) , software to reveal relationships from captured electronic equipment, etc.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES But in essence, that is what happened. While you have to say the command was complicit in the rough, bad stuff early on but this command deserves credit for figuring out what to do about it, and how to meet the need for intelligence without roughing people up, and how to get inside the decision loops of the insurgents. most people give credit to the J2 [intelligence chief] at the time, Gen. Mike Flynn. (Theres a debate in military circles about whether McChrystal or his friend and successor, Adm. William McRaven76 deserve credit for JSOCs resurgence; but Ambinders reporting suggests Flynn is the real father of the modern JSOC.) ... JSOC Task Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan77 starting using torture by at least October 2002. Gen. McChrystal claimed in his Senate testimony that he immediately began reducing the use of torture by JSOC after taking command in October 2003. However, it appears that approved torture techniques were not reduced until after he was ordered to do so after the Abu Gharib scandal, and continued78 in some form until the end of 2005.79 Its worth noting the Red Cross is still not allowed access to the JSOC facilities and their operations are still shrouded in secrecy. NYT reporter Eric Schmitt in his piece, U.S. Shifts, Giving Detainee Names to the Red Cross (August 22, 2009), wrote: Unlike the secret prisons run by the C.I.A. that President Obama ordered closed in January [2009], the military continues to operate temporary screening sites the Special Operations camps have been excluded [from Red Cross access]. Military officials say conditions at the camps have improved significantly since then, but virtually all details of the sites remain shrouded in secrecy. . This spring, based on a request by General Petraeus, Mr. Gates ordered a review of the Special Operations camps [after a court-ordered release of torture photos was blocked by President Obama and the Senate unanimously passing a new FOIA law]. In July, Admiral Mullen sent a confidential
76
McChrystal wrote (p. 117) about McRavens recommendation to form a joint interagency task force.
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Update 5-01-13: Scahill claims (pp. 104, 147 Dirty Wars that McChrystal was involved in settin up detention th facilities in 2002: When the 9/11 attacks occurred, McChrystal was the chief of staff of the 18 Airborne. He was soon deployed to Afghanistan to help establish CJTF-180. In the early days of CJTF-180, McChrystal ran a hybrid organization the task force would take the lead in detention operations and interrogating prisoners and the SMUs that made up the HVT Task Force worked from a copy of the interrogati on SOP that was developed while McChrystal was running the detention and interrogation operations in Afghanistan as part of CJTF-180.
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Update 50-01-13: Some abuse may have continued past 2005. Schaill wrote (p. 159, Dirty Wars): An air force interrogator [Matthew Alexander?] who worked with the JSOC task force hunting Zarqawi [Spring 2006] told me that he did not see any form of oversight for the kill or capture campaign. He said he witnessed and stopped several cases of abuse, which he communicated up the chain of command. With the cases in which I reported abuses, there was no accountability. In one case, an interrogator was merely recalled from a remote location and then put right back to work at the main prison [described in his book?] my impression was that occasional lawbreaking would be tolerated as long it never got out to the press.
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McChrystal (p. 198): It had taken eighteen months [from June 2004 to Jan. 2006?] to make it [TSF] so [a truly professional operation]. But, in an interview he said nine months [Oct 03 to July 04?].
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES message to all of the military service chiefs and senior field commanders asking them to redouble their efforts to alert troops to the importance of treating detainees properly. Admiral Mullen felt compelled to issue his message after viewing photographs documenting abuse of prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan by American military personnel in the early years of the wars, a senior military official said. Mr. Obama decided in May not to make the photographs public, warning that the images could ignite attacks against American troops. Note: McChrystal discussed this Afghan detainee facility in his memoir (pp. 347-348). For more details on this facility, see Andy Worthingtons September 4, 2011 piece, Bagram and Beyond: New Revelations About Secret US Torture Prisons in Afghanistan.
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TORTURE AND CONSEQUENCES

only 29 percent of people around the world said the United States is a generally positive influence in the world. Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo have a lot to do with that perception. Treating detainees harshlyincreases resistance to cooperation, and creates new enemies. damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that could save lives, strengthened the hand of our enemies, and compromised our moral authority. the first and second identifiable causes of U. S. combat deaths in Iraq - as judged by their effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighters into combat - are, respectively the symbols of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo." -- General Kimmons, press conference on revised FM 32-54
On April 28, 2004, 60 Minutes broadcast the images of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. In his 2012 public appearances, Gen. McChrystal claimed the abuse were the acts of a few rotten apples, Abu Ghraib was extremely damaging to the U.S. mission and gave a misconception. Pictures filled the airways and Internet and sent the wrong message about the U.S. Like McChrystal, the Army & Busha dministration spun these shocking images as an aberration, the actions of the hill-billy, night-shift, National Guard Military Police unit gone wild. However, in reality, Abu Gharib was merely the tip of the iceberg of widespread torture; it was standard operating procedure at secret CIA prisons, by the Copper Green SAP, at Guantanamo Bay, and by JSOC task forces in Iraq & Afghanistan. The 2008 SASC Report stated, The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to the actions of a few bad apples acting on their own. The fact is that senior officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees. From 2003 to 2008 General McChrystal was the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). McChrystal has claimed that he never condoned mistreatment of detainees. However, it appears his Senate testimony about detainee abuse was rather disingenuous. Now, as a celebrity general, he continues to spin his so-called crackdown to credulous journalists and audiences on the lecture circuit. In their 2010 book, Counterstrike: The Untold Story of Americas Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda, Pentagon NYT reporters Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt praised Gen. McChrystals counterterrorism legacy: Across the military and intelligence community, General McChrystal was credited with commanding missions that captured and killed more of Americas adversaries than any other living officer.
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Postscript Note: During his January 31, 2013 CSPAN BookTV interview with Mark Bowden, McChrystal also spoke about having to kill thousands of jihadis: After Abu Ghraib [photos were released], many more insurgents began coming into Iraq and Afghanistan from surrounding counties, McChrystal said, excited to fight the invading Americans. We had to kill most of them, he said. But, I would argue that McChrystal played a role in lighting the fire which led to Abu Gharib: he helped Gitmotize Iraq, he commanded JSOC torture, and commanded the JSOC night raids also created more adversaries than any other living officer and led to the deaths of American soldiers (McChrystals like an arsonist firefighter who sets fires and then brags about putting them out!). The SASC Report described how torture created new enemies and contributed to combat deaths of American soldiers: the first and second identifiable causes of U. S. combat deaths in Iraq as judged by their effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighters into combat - are, respectively the symbols of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo." Postscript Note: Similarly, McChrystal wrote (p.136): for many [foreign jihadists], burning anger over the recent stories and images of degradation at Abu Gharib had provoked them to come to Iraq and would fuel the fire for years to come. (p.172): In my experience, we found that nearly every first-time jihadist claimed Abu Gharib had first jolted him to action. And McChrystal was was correct to say that Abu Ghraib was extremely damaging to the U.S. mission. In his memoir (p. 200-201) McChrystal wrote, Abu Gharib represented a devastating setback for Americas effort in Iraq creating or reinforcing negative perceptions worldwide of American values, it fueled violence that would soon worsen dramatically.
The 2008 SASC report, Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, described how the use of torture damaged our countrys reputation and created new enemies: only 29 percent of people around the world said the United States is a generally positive influence in the world. Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo have a lot to do with that perception. Those efforts [torture] damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that could save lives, strengthened the hand of our enemies, and compromised our moral authority. Treating detainees harshly only reinforces that distorted view, increases resistance to cooperation, and creates new enemies. And, some have argued that torture wasnt even a very effective tool to gather intelligence. Even the sycophantic authors of Counterstrike didnt dwell on the role of torture in the secret campaign against Al Qaeda. They only briefly alluded to its use (e.g. Camp Nama) by JSOC forces under Gen. McChrystals command. Apparently, the authors didnt believe torture had
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES contributed much to the success against Al Qaeda; in that March 2006 piece about Camp Nama, Schmitt wrote, [midlevel civilian and military Defense Department personnel who worked with Task Force 6-26] agreed to speak out of what they said was anger and disgust over the unit's treatment of detainees and the failure of task force commanders to punish misconduct more aggressively. The critics said the harsh interrogations yielded little information to help capture insurgents or save American lives. ... In his press conference on the revision of the Armys field manual on interrogations, General Kimmons said (p. 187, American Torture) nothing good would come from the use of torture: No good intelligence is going to come from abusive practices. I think the empirical evidence of the last five years tells us that. any piece of intelligence [obtained from abusive practices] would be of questionable credibility and would do more harm than good when it inevitably became known nothing good will come from them. Some of our most significant successes have accrued from expert interrogators using [authorized and humane practices] in clever ways Perhaps Kimmons in saying, Some of our most significant successes, referred to the successful manhunts of both Saddam Hussein and al-Zarqawi that resulted from skilled interrogations (conducted without torture) conducted by Eric Maddox and Matthew Alexander. In fact, it appears that their efforts were successful in spite of the routine use of torture (or coercive interrogations) by task forces during McChrystals command of JSOC. However, inexplicably, McChrystal doesnt mention by name either Maddox or Alexander80 in his book! Perhaps because they have both publicly opposed the use of torture, and because Alexanders account of the killing of Zarqawi is embarrassing to JSOC and contradicts their (and McChrystals) official history.
80
A very implicit reference to Alexander appears on McChrystal p. 212: one of the other interrogators not normally assigned to Mubassir got him to admit [he had met with Masri].
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THE EMPERORS GENERAL
President Obama meets with Gen. Stanley McChrystal at the White House (May 19, 2009)
Obama had a wide-open opportunity [at May 13, 2009 ASU commencement] to remind us that Tillman could be the best example in our lifetimes of someone who eschewed popularity and personal advancement to devote himself to a bigger purpose. For some reason, the president passed. Maybe it simply was an oversight that Obama forgot Tillman, although he walked right up and out of Tillman Tunnel to reach the stage. Perhaps Obama was sensitive to the fact that the speech came shortly after the announcement that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal would become the top American commander in Afghanistan. -- Bob Young, Obamas Big-Time Fumble at ASU (Arizona Republic, May 17, 2009) President Barack Obama declared Wednesday [May 12, 2009] he would try to block the court-ordered release of photos that show U.S. troops abusing prisoners. The White House had said last month it would not oppose an appeals court ruling The effort to keep the photos from becoming public represented a sharp reversal from Obama's repeated pledges for open government -- In Reversal, Obama seeks to Block Abuse Photos (Associated Press, May 13, 2009) President Obama did the right thing because he knows that the release of these [torture] photos will achieve no good and will do great harm. That's why Senator Graham and I introduced the Detainee Photographic Records Protection Act, to back up President Obama's commander in chief decision not to release these photos. we certainly drafted the amendment together with people in the White House. because the president does not want these photos to see the light of day. Senator Lieberman, Weekly Standard, 6-09-09 78
THE EMPERORS GENERAL

[Note: Adapted from my blog posts "The Emperor's General" and "The [Untold] Tillman Story"] President Obama did the right thing because he knows that the release of these [torture] photos will achieve no good and will do great harm. That's why Senator Graham and I introduced the Detainee Photographic Records Protection Act, to back up President Obama's commander in chief decision not to release these photos. we certainly drafted the amendment together with people in the White House. because the president does not want these photos to see the light of day. Senator Lieberman, Weekly Standard, 6-09-09)
On April 23rd 2009, the Obama administration announced the Pentagon would give the ACLU photographs showing detainee abuse of prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq. The following month, on May 11, 2009 (despite McChrystals key role in the Tillman cover-up and torture by JSOC forces) President Obama nominated McChrystal to be his new commander of the Afghan War. The following day, on May 12th 2009, President Obama decided to block the court-ordered release of photos. President Obamas effort to keep the photos from becoming public represented a sharp reversal from his repeated pledges for open government. The President announced on May 13th that release of the photos would pose an unacceptable risk of danger to U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq after meeting with Gen Petreaus and other military leaders on May 12th. Obama said the photos had already served their purpose in investigations of a small number of individuals and the individuals who were involved have been identified, and appropriate actions have been taken. On Wednesday, May 13th 2009, President Obama delivered his commencement speech to Arizona State University's graduating class inside Sun Devil Stadium. But, in his speech that focused heavily on serving a larger good and placing character over celebrity and substance over appearance, Obama did not mention Pat Tillman. Why not? As Bob Young speculated in his May 17th column, Obamas Big-time Fumble: Maybe it simply was an oversight that Obama forgot Tillman, although we were told Sunday that Obama was staged inside the Arizona State football locker room before his speech - where there is a photo of Tillman. And he walked right up and out of Tillman Tunnel to reach the stage. Perhaps Obama was sensitive to the fact that the speech came shortly after the announcement that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal would become the top American commander in Afghanistan. McChrystal was deemed by a Pentagon investigation to be responsible for inaccurate information from the Army about Tillman's death, and the Tillman family has been critical of what it believes was his role in a coverup of the real events that took place.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Its worth noting the dates of McChrystal's nomination and President Obama's decision not to release photos of prisoner abuse in Iraq; May 11th and 12th, respectively. Presumably, some of the photos showed abuse by JSOC forces under his command? NYT reporter Eric Schmitt in his piece, U.S. Shifts, Giving Detainee Names to the Red Cross (August 22, 2009), mentioned these photos showed abuse in both Iraq & Afghanistan in the early years of the war: Unlike the secret prisons run by the C.I.A. that President Obama ordered closed in January [2009], the military continues to operate temporary screening sites the Special Operations camps have been excluded [from Red Cross access]. Military officials say conditions at the camps have improved significantly since then, but virtually all details of the sites remain shrouded in secrecy. This spring, based on a request by General Petraeus, Mr. Gates ordered a review of the Special Operations camps. In July, Admiral Mullen sent a confidential message to all of the military service chiefs and senior field commanders asking them to redouble their efforts to alert troops to the importance of treating detainees properly. Admiral Mullen felt compelled to issue his message after viewing photographs documenting abuse of prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan by American military personnel in the early years of the wars, a senior military official said. Mr. Obama decided in May not to make the photographs public, warning that the images could ignite attacks against American troops. Note: McChrystal discussed this Afghan detainee facility in his memoir (pp. 347-348). For more details on this facility, see Andy Worthingtons September 4, 2011 piece, Bagram and Beyond: New Revelations About Secret US Torture Prisons in Afghanistan. ... On May 13th, obviously anticipating that the Government was likely to lose its court appeal, Obama asked Congress to change FOIA by retroactively narrowing its disclosure requirements to prevent a legal ruling by the courts. Senator Graham said the White House helped them draft the bill. On May 20th, U.S. Senators Lindsey Graham, Joe Lieberman and Senator John McCain introduced the Detainee Photographic Records Protection Act to block the release of the detainee photos. The very next day, on May 21st, the act was offered as an amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations bill and the U.S. Senate unanimously passed it. On June 1st 2009, Glenn Greenwald posted his entry, Obama's support for the new GrahamLieberman secrecy law, at salon.com where he wrote: To argue that the photos will harm how we are perceived is, necessarily, to acknowledge that they reveal new information that is not already widely known [McChrystals role in torture at Camp Nama?]. Apparently, the proper reaction to heinous acts by our political leaders is not to hold them accountable but, instead, to hide evidence of what they did. What makes all of this even worse is that it is part of a broader trend whereby
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES the Government simply retroactively changes the law whenever it decides it does not want to abide by it. ... The act was stripped out of the supplemental appropriations bill. However, it was later added as an amendment to a Homeland Security Appropriations Bill HR 2892. On October 20, 2009, Senator McCain praised the passage of the bill, I am also pleased this conference report does contain a provision that will allow the Secretary of Defense to prohibit the disclosure of detainee photographs under the Freedom of Information Act if he certifies that release of the photos would endanger U.S. citizens, members of the Armed Forces, or U.S. Government employees deployed outside the United States. ... On October 28, 2009, President Obama finally signed the bill into law.
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DID THEY TEACH YOU HOW TO LIE YET?
Senator James Webb, D-VA
General Stanley McChrystal
nothing is ever going to heal the wounds inflicted on the Tillman Family while I have nothing but respect for the Tillman Family their personal grief should not be a veto on the nomination of the man [General McChrystal] the President, the Secretary of Defense [Gates], and General Petraeus all feel gives the United States the best chance of victory in Afghanistan These are serious questions and are more important than either the death of Pat Tillman or the alleged abuse of detainees. -- CNAS Fellow Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama blog, Confirm Him (June 2, 2009) Ron Holcomb [Secretary of Defense] never told a lie, at least not in the way he could be caught in it. As a consequence, his remarks were a mix of bald truth, diplomatic half-truths, and what Holcomb had privately called necessary, unconfirmable distortions. Nonetheless, they would become the governments official pronouncement on the days action. And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts if not the truth. --- James Webb, Something to Die For (1991) They ought to make a movie about this. Mr. Smith comes to Washington. Yeah, I called my pa last night and he says, Judd boy [newly-elected Senator], you been up there with them muck-a-mucks two days, now. Did they teach you how to lie yet? -- James Webb A Country Such As This (1981) If nothing ever works out all the way, and if all things change, whats left? Your family and your friends and your values, thats whats left. And your duty to them Theyre the only important things in life. And that the rest of it might change a million times, be called wrong or right or anything else, but you must never violate your loyalty if you wished to survive the judgment of the ages. -- James Webb A Country Such As This (1983) 82
DID THEY TEACH YOU HOW TO LIE YET?

[Note: First section adapted from my posts Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet? Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth, and The [Untold] Tillman Story I am concerned about General McChrystals public testimony, which sought to convey that he was uncomfortable with various interrogation techniques and sought to reduce their use. Given the full history of his approach to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best. -- Senator Russ Feingold, Congressional Record (June 11, 2009)
Conveniently, on May 25, 2009, shortly before McChrystals Senate confirmation hearing, The New York Times Pentagon reporter Thom Shanker exonerated McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the Tillman case. However, Shanker ignored clear evidence given him of McChrystals central hands-on role. CNASs Andrew Exum (a former Army Ranger officer) failed to show genuine concern for the Tillman family in his Abu Mugawama blog Confirm Him" (June 2, 2009): The bottom line is, nothing is ever going to heal the wounds inflicted on the Tillman Family And while I have nothing but respect for the Tillman Family, their personal grief should not be a veto on the nomination of the man [Gen. Stanley McChrystal] more important than either the death of Pat Tillman or the alleged abuse of detainees [at Camp Nama]. Aside: Later that year, in September 2009, Exum whitewashed McChrystals role in the Tillman cover-up with his horribly biased Washington Post book review of Jon Krakauers book Where Men Win Glory The Odyssey of Pat Tillman. In October 2009 the Washington Post ombudsman chastised him for neglecting to reveal his numerous personal and professional conflicts of interest with Gen. McChrystal)81 On June 2nd 2009, The Senate Armed Services Committee held General McChrystals confirmation hearing for his promotion to four-star general and Afghan war commander. The hearing was strictly pro-forma. Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb tossed McChrystal a few softball questions about JSOC torture and Pat Tillman. The real hearing had been conducted the previous year in a secret executive session, behind closed doors, on May 15, 2008. General McChrystal denied the phony narrative of a raging firefight was anything more sinister than "mistakes" made to honor Tillman. "I didn't see any activity by anyone to deceive," he said. "We failed the family. And I was a part of that." He expressed his "deepest condolences" to Tillman's family. Mary Tillman said she neither accepted nor believed McChrystal's [nonapology] apology. "McChrystal was lying," she said. In the Foreword to her revised paperback (at blurb.com) of Boots on the Ground by Dusk, Mary Tillman commented on McChrystals Senate confirmation:
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES I had sent the President an email and a letter reminding him of McChrystals involvement in the cover-up of Pats death. I also contacted the staffs of Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator James Webb but it was clear that neither senator wanted to get involved. McCain was already publicly endorsing the McChrystal appointment before the hearing even began. Sadly, McChrystals promotion had been sanctioned long before the hearing. None of the congressmen pressed McChrysal about Pats case or detainee abuse and torture at Camp Nama On June 10th, General McChrystals was confirmed by the Senate after Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid made an impassioned plea on the Senate floor. Shortly afterward, the Senate approved President Barack Obama's nomination of McChrystal by unanimous consent (that evening, Gen. McChrystal gave NYT reporter Thom Shanker a personal tour of his new Pentagon headquarters that night. Isnt access grand!). The next day, Senator Russ Feingold wrote that he oppose[d] the nomination of LTG Stanley McChrystal because of a classified matter But where was his opposition when it would have mattered? ... During Gen. McChrystals June 2, 2009 Senate confirmation hearing, Senator Carl Levin asked him to comment on allegations of detainee mistreatment by units under your command during your tenure as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command from 2003 to 2008. In reply, McChrystal claimed his treatment of detainees was acceptable and legal and continuously improved: I do not, and never have, condoned mistreatment of detainees, and never will. We must at all times adhere to our obligation to treat detainees humanely. We stayed within all of the existing and authorized guidelines, we did a legal review and stayed within those all the time as I outlined last year [secret May 2008 hearing] when we discussed it When we found cases where we thought there was an allegation of mistreatment, we investigated every one, and we punished, if it was substantiated. And that was from the beginning. When I took command in 2003, I found our treatment of detainees needed improvement. ... When I took over, I was [uncomfortable with some of the techniques I saw] We did not use all the things [interrogation techniques outside Army Field Manual] that were outlined there [12/02/02 SecDef memo] some of them were used when I took over -- we immediately began to reduce that [number of techniques that were utilized]. When I took command, I found the detention facilities really insufficient for need our expertise in specialties like interrogation was insignificant In the months and years that followed, we improved continuously. took us from what I think was acceptable and legal to something I became much more proud of over time [p.15, SASC 6-02-09]
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES On June 11, 2009, the day after McChrystals unanimous Senate confirmation, Senator Russ Feingold inserted a statement into the Congressional Record voicing his concerns with the veracity of General McChrystal testimony. Senator Feingold concluded his response to Gen. McChrystals June 2, 2009 Senate testimony about his treatment of detainees by writing [see Appendix B]: I am concerned about General McChrystals public testimony, which sought to convey that he was uncomfortable with various interrogation techniques and sought to reduce their use. Given the full history of his approach to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best. ...
Ive also found much of McChrystals Senate testimony about detainee abuse to be bullshit. Much of his testimony was disingenuous or, at best, put a lot of spin on the treatment of detainees by JSOC task forces under his command from 2003 to 2005 [see Appendix A and B for more detail]:
1.) I do not, and never have, condoned mistreatment of detainees, and never will. We must at all times adhere to our obligation to treat detainees humanely: Standard operating procedures approved by McChrystal from October 2003 until May 2004 described interrogation techniques used by JSOC task forces that included use of dogs, safety positions [stress positions; put in painful position enforced by handcuffs], sleep adjustment/sleep management, sensory deprivation, sensory overload [painful music, etc.], change of environment/ environmental manipulation [e.g. put in cold mud all night until near hypothermic], diet manipulation [starve], isolation, mild physical contact [no blood, no foul?]. How exactly how are these techniques examples of that humane treatment?
2.) We stayed within all of the existing and authorized guidelines, we did a legal review, and stayed within those all the time as I outlined last year [closed May 2008 hearing] when we discussed it: Stayed within guidelines? Nudity nor beatings were permitted under the TF 121 interrogation SOPs.The quality of that JSOC legal review appears dubious. Other military lawyers pointed out that not all the techniques in Rumfelds working group had been approved for use and the Geneva Convention applied to combatants in Iraq. Both Task Force 121 CO Koenigs legal advisor and SERE instructor COL Kleinman told Koenig in September 2003 (probably before McChrystals arrival) that the use of SERE techniques was unlawful, outside TF 121 interrogation SOPs, and against the Geneva Convention. On May 15, 2008 the SASC held a secret executive session hearing for the confirmation of McChrystals promotion to head the Joint Staff and McRavens promotion to take over command of JSOC. The real hearing took place then, behind closed doors, about McChrystals role in the Pat Tillman cover-up and his command of JSOC torture.
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3.) When we found cases where we thought there was an allegation of mistreatment, we investigated every one, and we punished, if it was substantiated. And that was from the beginning: Total bullshit. However, I would guess that most of those investigations were as "extremely brief and cursory" with "obvious gaps in the investigation methodology as that of the investigation of the issues raised by COL Herrington [see Appendix A] after his December 2003 inspection of interrogation facilities in Iraq (he was not allowed access to the TF 121 facilities). Tony Lagouranis, in his book Fear Up Harsh, wrote how his reports of detainee abuse by Task Force 121 members given to CID investigators simply disappeared. Michael Otterman, in American Torture (p. 176), wrote how investigations were stymied on several fronts. unable to thoroughly investigate due to the suspects and witnesses involvement in Special Access Programs (SAP) and/or the security classification of the unit impossible to investigate people known only by pseudonyms. had a major computer malfunction which resulted them in losing 70 percent of their files 4.) We did not use all the things [interrogation techniques outside Army Field Manual] that were outlined there [12/02/02 SecDef memo] some of them were used when I took over -we immediately began to reduce that [number of techniques that were utilized]: Senator Feingold was concerned with McChrystals testimony that he sought to reduce the use of some techniques he was uncomfortable with when he took over. Really? It doesnt appear that the number of techniques approved for use decreased under his command. Shortly after he took command of JSOC, McChrystal approved an October 25, 2003 SOP that included 10 techniques outside FM 34-52. Just a few months later, on March 26, 2004 he authorized four additional techniques; this later JSOC SOP included a larger number of interrogation techniques outside of FM 34-52 than the SOPs of any other military organization at the time. The use of non-FM 34-52 techniques by JSOC temporarily ended in May 2004 only after the Abu Gharib scandal, not because of discomfort on McChrystals part. And, even after GEN Abizaid suspended those techniques, McChrystal was comfortable with requesting to continue to use five techniques outside FM 34-52 (he was denied the use of control positions); the other four continued in use past June 2004. When Senator Levin asked McChrystal to square his public testimony that he reduced the number of techniques which were utilized with this SASC report, General McChrystal responded, in March 2004, [he] reduc[ed] the frequency of use of several of the techniques by requiring high-level approval (as previously noted, McChrystals new SOP didnt reduce the number of techniques which were utilized; it increased the number from 10 to 14!) And, as far as reduced frequency of use by requiring high-level approval, a TF 121 interrogator named Jeff (see Human Rights Watch report (No Blood, No Foul HRW Report) said that such approval was pro forma:
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES There was an authorization template on a computer And it was a checklist. I never saw a sheet that wasn't signed. Some interrogators would go and use these techniques without typing up one of those things knew it was going to be approved anyway 5.) When I took command in 2003, I found our treatment of detainees needed improvement. ... When I took over, I was [uncomfortable with some of the techniques I saw: Senator Feingold was also concerned with McChrystals testimony that he was uncomfortable with some of the techniques when he took over. Given that McChrystal didnt actually reduce (until forced to do so) the number of approved techniques, what technique(s) was he uncomfortable with? His March 2004 SOP increased the number from 10 to 14! It appears Admiral McRaven was the [redacted] commander who said after arriving in October he was ''uncomfortable with TF 121 interrogators stripping detainees. Nudity was being used even though his approved SOP didnt permit it. Regardless, McRaven and McChrystal didnt immediately reduce the use of nudity; McRaven claimed he only ended the practice two or three months later in December 2003 or January 2004 (however this claim was contradicted by his legal advisor who testified that after their discussion the commander said he would continue to use nudity). 4.) When I took command, I found the detention facilities really insufficient for need In the months and years that followed, we improved continuously Even after TF 121 moved to their new facilities in Balad in July 2004, Mark Urban wrote (p.67, Task Force Black) of the concerns the British MI6 had with the new Temporary Screening Facility: concerns were raised about the detention conditions there. the cells were like dog kennels tiny82 from now on Britains special forces would only turn over its prisoners to the Americans if there was an undertaking not to send them to Balad. Mark wrote how the British werent satisfied with conditions at Balad until the end of 2005.
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p.201, McChrystal: Not long after we had begun using the Balad Screening facility, Senator Carl Levin . saw the facility in its first weeks of use [July 2004], when the cells had been built smaller than some other in Iraq and were painted black.
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THIS IS HOW WE LOSE

Shortly after McChrystal took command he visited the JSOC detention facility in Iraq, McChrystals first tour of the Baghdad detention facility shocked him. Several detainees were being kept naked, and dogs were being used to guard their cells. This is how we lose. This is our Achilles heel In response, McChrystal set out to professionalize the interrogation system
-- Dana Priest & William Arkin, Top Secret America Three years after his Senate confirmation hearing, during his 2012 public appearances83, Gen. McChrystal has claimed detainee abuses at Abu Gharib were merely the acts of a few rotten apples: Abu Ghraib was extremely damaging to the U.S. mission and gave a misconception. Pictures filled the airways and Internet and sent the wrong message about the U.S. the tragedy, the crime of Abu Gharib. Fairly limited number of people I asked JSOC forces to treat detainees, everyone in a way so that we had the moral high ground. And, in interviews with Dana Priest & William M. Arkin (for their 2011 book & Washington Post piece, "Top Secret America") McChrystal claimed that after he took command of JSOC in September (October?) 2003, he was shocked by the TF 121 detention facilities and conducted a crackdown to professionalize JSOC interrogations [pp. 246-249]: Shortly after McChrystal took command in September 2003, he visited the JSOC detention facility in Iraq McChrystals first tour of the Baghdad detention facility shocked him. Several detainees were being kept naked, and dogs were being used to guard their cells. This is how we lose. This is our Achilles heel, he told associates In response, McChrystal set out to professionalize the interrogation system by training interrogators how to best question prisoners and by teaching others how to collect information about a detainee McChrystal ordered his intelligence chief, Michael Flynn, to professionalize the interrogation system. Following McChrystals crackdown, JSOC still had to use the rules laid out in the Army Field manual to interrogate detainees. ...
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Stanley McChrystal on Leadership Bob Schieffer interview Aspen Ideas Festival, June 30, 2012 and Retired U.S. general pays visit to Widener, March 26, 2012 88
However, McChrystals assertions about his role in torture on the lecture circuit and in interviews appear to be as disingenuous as his 2009 Senate testimony:
1.) the tragedy, the crime of Abu Gharib. Fairly limited number of people I asked JSOC forces to treat detainees, everyone in a way so that we had the moral high ground. Fairly limited? Fairly widespread would be more accurate. As discussed previously, torture was standard operating procedure, authorized by the highest levels of the Department of Defense, from 2002 to 2005 in Gitmo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Moral high ground. Really? JSOC use of non-FM 34-52 techniques from 2002 to 2005 was hardly moral and certainly violated the Geneva Conventions for treatment of detainees.
2.) Shortly after McChrystal took command in September [no, Oct. 6th] 2003, he visited the JSOC detention facility in Iraq, McChrystals first tour of the Baghdad detention facility shocked him. Several detainees were being kept naked, and dogs were being used to guard their cells. This is how we lose. This is our Achilles heel, he told associates. First, McChrystal took command of JSOC on October 6, 2003. But, his memoir has contradictory accounts of his first visit to the screening facility. First, he said (p. 199-200) TF 121 CO BG Lyle Koenig called him the day he took command (Oct 6th) supposedly telling him we need to close the [BIAP] screening facility we dont have the expertise or experience to do this correctly, and McChrystal wrote he visited the facility about a week later (around Oct 13th). However, McChrystal also wrote (p. 100) that his first stop on my first trip as JSOC CO to the theater we drove from BIAP was October 24th. Thats a two week difference. And by that time, Admiral Bill McRaven had taken command from Koenig on October 16th. Doesnt make sense. It appears he may have visited the facility on October 25th, just before he left for Afghanistan (p106): When I inspected our intelligence gathering facility at BIAP later that month [after Tikrit visit on 25th?] Is he talking about October, or even later? Second, Im very skeptical of Koenigs alleged concern with detainee treatment. As previously discussed, Jane Mayer wrote how the Joint Staff J3 [McChrystal was then the VDJ3] in August 2003 decided to send SERE instructors to Iraq to instruct the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) that was looking for WMD and the JSOC Iraq Task Force that was looking for Saddam, how to inflict torture84: the [SERE] officials had not come to help captured U.S. soldiers resist abuse. They had come to them how to inflict it. Just as SERE training had seeped into Guantanomo and the CIAs black sites, it was formally imported during this period into Iraq. the decision to send SERE instructors to Iraq originated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose
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pp.245-247, Jane Mayer, The Dark Side 89
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES operations [J3] commander [Gen. Norty Schwartz, McChrystals boss] was frustrated at the lack of progress [by the ISG]85 But while the ISG rejected Washingtons pressure to use SERE techniques, another task force based in Iraq was excited at the prospect [JSOC TF 20/121] in September 2003 SERE advisers were sent to aid [TF 121] The task forces commander [BG Koneig] did not call on SERE to help protect his soldiers, but rather asked the SERE officials to provide advice and assistance to the task force interrogation mission. Within months of the JPRA delegations visit, TF-20 [121] developed a reputation for uncontrolled brutality. I would speculate that where McChrystal claimed that Koenig told him in early October 2003, we dont have the expertise or experience to do this correctly, he was actually referring an earlier conversation in August 2003 where Koenig asked for advice and assistance to the task force interrogation mission. BG Koenig supported the use of harsh techniques over the objections of both his legal advisor and SERE instructor COL Kleinman (see Appendix A and page 170+ of the Senate torture report). Third, This is how we lose Didnt he recycle this quote from somewhere else?* I believe I remember seeing him use previously use that phrase in reference to JSOC night raids or collateral damage. Note*: Yes. See McChrystal, p. 240: As I watched, I thought, not for the first time: It would be easy for us to lose. Shocked.? Its notable that McChrystal doesnt mention nudity or the use of dogs in his book (p.100). Admiral McRavens testimony refers to stripping detainees. Although this technique was outside the TF 121 SOP, it nevertheless continued until at least December 2003 or January 2004, long after he took command (See Appendix A & p. 161, SASC). Dogs. But use of military dogs was still approved by McChrystal long after he took command! His March 26, 2004 SOP still includes that technique! (p. 222, SASC).
3.) In response, McChrystal set out to professionalize the interrogation system by training interrogators how to best question prisoners and by teaching others how to collect information about a detainee McChrystal ordered his intelligence chief, Michael Flynn, to professionalize the interrogation system. By the summer of 2005, JSOCs interrogation booths at Balad sat around the corner from the large warren of rooms where specialists mined thumb drives, computers, cellphones, and documents to use during interrogations
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See pp. 27-29; Young, Shelton R. Review of Dod-Directed Investigation of Detainee Abuse Unclassified at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/abuse.pdf
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES McChrystal claims in his memoir (p. 200) that changes began almost immediately after he took command in October. What changes?! During his first visit to Iraq, McChrystal approved an October 25, 2003 SOP that included 10 techniques outside FM 34-52. Just a few months later, on March 26, 2004 he authorized four additional techniques; this later JSOC SOP included a larger number of interrogation techniques outside of FM 34-52 than the SOPs of any other military organization at the time. Nudity was permitted until at least Dec 2003 although it was not in the SOP. The use of non-FM 34-52 techniques by JSOC in Iraq temporarily ended seven months after McChrystal took command, in May 2004, only after the Abu Gharib scandal, not because of discomfort on McChrystals part. And, even after GEN Abizaid suspended those techniques, McChrystal still wanted to continue to use five techniques outside FM 34-52 (he was denied the use of control positions like handcuffing someone in a painful position), and at least four techniques continued in use past June 2004. And JSOC interrogations werent immediately professionalized by COL Michael Flynn. He didnt become McChrystals S2 until July 2004, nine months after McChrystal took command. Some have argued that Flynn is the real father of the modern JSOC. One factor in ending JSOC torture was the development by Flynn from 2004 2008 of more effective means of gathering JSOC intelligence (e.g. drone surveillance, site exploitation, electronic surveillance, etc). As Marc Ambinder said, [So they torture people until Flynn figures out theres a better way to get intelligence?] I know that sounds like a neat narrative, and this is a complicated story. But in essence, that is what happened. this command deserves credit for figuring out how to meet the need for intelligence without roughing people up most people give credit to the J2 at the time, Gen. Mike Flynn. (Theres a debate in military circles about whether McChrystal or his friend and successor, Adm. William McRaven86 deserve credit for JSOCs resurgence; but Ambinders reporting suggests Flynn is the real father of the modern JSOC.) 4.) Following McChrystals crackdown, JSOC still had to use the rules laid out in the Army Field manual to interrogate detainees: It would be more accurate to say CENTCOM GEN Abizaids crackdown. After the April 2004 Abu Gharib scandal the use of non-FM 34-52 techniques by JSOC was suspended by GEN Abizaid in May 2004 (not because of action on McChrystals part). But, even after GEN Abizaid suspended those techniques, McChrystal requested to continue the use of five techniques outside FM 34-52 (he was denied the use of control positions). It appears that these techniques (and perhaps others) continued until the end of 2005. This contradicts McChrystals claim in his memoir (p.202) that by the summer of 2004 we got rid of them completely, and all handling followed the field manual used by the army.
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McChrystal p. 117: I had earlier accepted Bill McRavens recommendation that w e seek to form a true joint interagency task force (JIATF).
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES It appears only by the end of 2005 were the detainee facilities totally cleaned up to the approval of outside observers. Torture was totally ended to comply with Senator McCains Detainee Treatment Act that was signed into law on December 30, 2005 that prohibited techniques beyond the Army Field manual 34-52. Finally, another reason was McChrystal needed a squeaky clean interrogation system to get British approval for the SAS to once again work as full partners with JSOC in Iraq. ...
Now, three years after his disingenuous Senate testimony, McChrystal continues to spin his role in torture to credulous journalists and audiences on the lecture circuit. It appears that many are still under the spell of this celebrity general. And his memoir will probably just add to the pile of bullshit.
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MY SHARE OF THE BLAME
Jan. 7, 2013
April 16, 2013
April 23, 2013
And there were hundreds of foreign fighters that came in [to Iraq] because they were responding to Abu Ghraib. . The thing that hurt us more than anything else in the war in Iraq was Abu Ghraib. our government was being honest we had a problem with a [MP] platoon operating in the prison mistreating prisoners. I think torture is an absolute mistake. When I took over Command [of JSOC] We weren't actively torturing people, but we weren't treating people the way that we should have been. We started cleaning that up right away, correcting that. -- Stanley McChrystal, (Generation Kill Foreign Policy, Apr/May 2013) The abuse and torture at [JSOCs] Camp NAMA was not an anomaly, but rather a model. the investigation [of Abu Gharib] revealed that those running the prison had looked to the example set at Camp NAMA, Guantanomo and at Bagram in Afghanistan. [they] simply took the [JSOC] task forces standard operating procedures changed the letterhead and implemented them. -- Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars (2013) The Uniform Code of Military Justice also retains its clear prohibitions on mistreating prisoners, but the track record of prosecutions in the military is mixed at best the lack of successful prosecutions demonstrate major gaps in enforcement of the laws against torture and war crimes, which likely reduces their deterrent effect. Even without the risk of prosecution, the risk of public disclosure and disapproval might deter a future administration from authorizing torture. [Gen.] Taguba said he thought the MPs [at Abu Gharib] had been exploited, and that there had been a failure both within the military and in Congress to hold those at the top responsible. Instead, Taguba said, there were several officers complicit or involved in abuse who got away, or got their fourth star. McChrystal wrote in his memoir that [t]here were lapses of discipline, but they were never tolerated. Never a wink and a nod. [But] McChrystal declined several invitations from the [Constitution Projects] Task Force to be interviewed about Afghanistan and Iraq. -- The Constitution Projects Detainee Treatment Report (April 16, 2013) 93
MY SHARE OF THE BLAME

Postscript Commentary on McChrystals Whitewash of JSOC Torture
In his memoir, My Share of the Task, General McChrystal briefly describes the use of torture (he uses the term enhanced interrogation techniques) by JSOC forces at Temporary Screening Facilities (TSF) on pages 198 203; 124 124; 347-348. After reading McChrystals book, in the immediately preceding sections (Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet? & This is How We Lose) I have added new comments about McChryustals account of JSOC detainee treatment. In his memoir McChrystal only basically adds detail to his same basic (bullshit) assertions as in his Senate testimony and his interviews with Dana Priest. Here, Ill make a few more comments on his memoirs whitewash of JSOC torture:
1.) It began the day I assumed command of TF 714 [JSOC]. Lyle Koenig [TF 121 CO] called me from Baghdad to welcome me to the command. Sir, we need to close the screening facility were operating at our base at BIAP [airport]. We dont have the expertise or experience to do this correctly. When I visited about a week later, I was unimpressed This is our Achilles heel. Changes began almost immediately. McChrystals memoir is contradictory on the timing of his first visit to the screening facility. He wrote (p. 199-200) Koenig called him on Oct 6, 2003, about a week later would be October 13th. However, elsewhere he wrote (p. 100) that his first stop [Green Zone] on my first trip as JSOC CO to the theater was October 24th. Thats a two week difference. And by that time, Koenig was gone, Admiral Bill McRaven had taken command on October 16th. Doesnt make sense. It appears he may have visited the facility on October 25th, just before he left for Afghanistan (p106): When I inspected our intelligence gathering facility at BIAP later that month [after Tikrit visit on 25th] Is he talking about October, or even later? As noted in the preceding section, Im very skeptical of Koenigs alleged concern about detainee treatment. As previously discussed, Jane Mayer wrote how the Joint Staff J3 [McChrystal was then the VDJ3] in August 2003 decided to send SERE instructors to Koenigs TF 121 to teach them how to inflict torture87: The task forces commander [BG Koneig] did not call on SERE to help protect his soldiers, but rather asked the SERE officials to provide advice and assistance to the task force interrogation mission. Within months of the JPRA delegations visit, TF-20 [121] developed a reputation for uncontrolled brutality. I would speculate that where McChrystal claimed that Koenig told him in early October 2003, we dont have the expertise or experience to do this correctly, McChrystal was actually
87
pp.245-247, Jane Mayer, The Dark Side 94
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES referring an earlier conversation in August 2003 where Koenig asked for advice and assistance to the task force interrogation mission. And shortly before McChrystal took command, Koenig had supported the use of harsh techniques during the SERE teams stay (from September 4th until September 23rd) despite the objections of both his legal advisor and SERE instructor COL Kleinman (see Appendix A and page 170+ of the Senate torture report). The Legal Advisor had concerns about punching, choking, and beating detainees and had raised these issues with the Commander [Koenig] who was not receptive to his concerns. Notably, McChrystals memoir doesnt mention the nudity and use of dogs that shocked him on his first visit. Changes began immediately? The day after his first visit, on October 25, 2003 the TF 121 SOP was approved with 10 torture techniques, which was increased by McChrystal to 14 techniques (including dogs) on March 26, 2004. As previously mentioned, nudity continued for at least two or three more months despite being outside the SOP. 2.) I also made mistakes. As late as the spring of 2004, six months into my command, I believed our force needed the option of employing select, carefully controlled enhanced interrogation techniques, including sleep management. I was wrong. Although these techniques were rarely requested or used, by the summer of that year we got rid of them completely, and all handling inside our centers followed the field manual used by the army. (p. 202) He almost apologized here. Six months into his command would be April 7 (the Bagram conference!) But only just a little more than a week before, on March 26th, he had approved the new interrogation SOP which had increased the number of carefully controlled techniques from 10 to 14! And on May 27th he still believed JSOC needed the option (when he requested to continue the use of 5 techniques) which is well past six months into my command. Besides sleep management, these techniques included use of dogs, safety positions [stress positions; put in painful position enforced by handcuffs], sleep adjustment/sleep management, sensory deprivation, sensory overload [painful music, etc.], change of environment/ environmental manipulation [e.g. put in cold mud all night until near hypothermic], diet manipulation [starve], isolation, mild physical contact. rarely requested or used? A TF 121 interrogator working at BIAP in 2004 named Jeff (see Human Rights Watch report (No Blood, No Foul HRW Report) said that such approval was pro forma: There was an authorization template on a computer And it was a checklist. I never saw a sheet that wasn't signed. Some interrogators would go and use these techniques without typing up one of those things knew it was going to be approved anyway We got rid of them completely followed the field manual Bullshit. We? He was ordered in May by Abizaid to suspend them after the shit hit the fan after Abu Gharib and he continued the use of four non FM 34-52 techniques after June 4, 2004!
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES 3.) Wed focused our commanders conference [April 7, 2004] in Bagram on the complexities and sensitivity of counterinsurgency operations, particularly detainees I had the commanders read Modern Warfare we disagreed with the hard-edged solutions Trinquier endorsed we also brought Douglas Porch88 foremost scholar of French Military counterinsurgency campaigns I decided to show The Battle of Algiers. (p.123, 200) Really? Is that like watching a porn film to become more sensitive to the dangers of pornography? The French Paras were brutal in using torture to break the insurgency. Heres an excerpt from the Wiki for Trinquier: These tactics included the use of small and mobile commando teams, torture The French army applied Trinquier's tactics during the Algerian War. In the short run these tactics resulted in a decisive victory Or Google Modern Warfare. I dont see how learning this hard-edged stuff (fighting fire with fire) would make JSOC more sensitive about detainee treatment. McChrystal appears to be really laying it on thick with this claim. Its worth mentioning Gen. Petraeuss comments on the Algiers example (see Fred Kaplan, p. 160, The Insurgents: [Richard] Swain was upset that one draft chapter [in the 2006 Army COIN FM] had cited Algeria as a COIN case study. This was a colonial war to impose foreign authority We have got to get over The Centurions. Petraeus agreed this section of the field manual is wrong and will be fixed. The Algiers example is not appropriate. You cant sacrifice your principles as an American service person. ... Overall, it appears that McChrystals memoir My Share of the Task is his attempt to re-write history to whitewash his role in the use of torture in Iraq. During August 2003, as Vice Director of Operations (VDJ3) of the Joint Staff, it appears McChrystal helped send Gen. Miller to Gitmotize Abu Gharib prison. And, as commander of JSOC, McChrystal did not immediately begin to reduce the use of JSOC torture techniques. Instead, he approved torture SOPs and oversaw its conduct in Iraq until he was ordered to stop in May 2004 (he got approval in June 2004 to resume some techniques). However, it JSOC didnt fully cleaned up its detainee operations in Iraq until late 2005 (to comply with McCains new law and to get the British SAS into action). Finally, Senator Russ Feingolds comments about McChrystals Senate testimony also apply to his memoir: I am concerned about General McChrystals public testimony, which sought to convey that he was uncomfortable with various interrogation techniques and sought to reduce their use. Given the full history of his approach to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best.
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Postscript Note July 21, 2013: Published book Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War
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DIRTY WARS
Postscript: Jeremy Scahills Depiction of McChrystal & JSOC Torture
Jeremy Scahills book, Dirty Wars, was released on April 23, 2013. His book is a history of the past decades CIA & JSOC covert war in the shadows in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yeman, Somalia, Pakistan, etc. The world is a battlefield. Well worth reading.89 In his book, Scahill describes the development of torture policy and practice by JSOC task forces under the command of Gen. McChrystal & Admiral McRaven. See CH 8: Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape, CH 9: The Troublemaker: Stanley McChrystal, CH 13: You Dont Have to Prove to Anyone That You Did Right, and CH 14: No Blood, No Foul. Scahills depiction of Gen. McChrystals role in JSOC torture generally agrees with my own research in my preceding chapter (also) entitled No Blood, No Foul (we drew upon much of the same source material). However, my account also includes material that is missing from Scahills book, and his account missed some important details about McChrystal & McRaven: As the J3 JCS McChrystal was involved in the process to send Gen. Miller to Gitmotize Abu Gharib and sending the SERE instructors to teach TF 121 torture techniques. On pp. 151 & 154, Scahill refers to the CO of the SMU TF. This commanders name, Gen. Koenig, was revealed during 2008 Senate testimony by Col Moulton. Furthermore, a close examination of the 2008 Senate torture report & Senator Feingolds 2009 Congressional Record letter shows that the names of other SMU TF COs that were also redacted in the Senate report were Gen. McChrystal & Admiral McRaven (see Appendix A & B). And the redactors missed a reference to TF 121 in the footnotes. His depiction of the capture of Hussein is brief, only drawing on Michael Smiths incomplete account, and only mentions in passing that a former bodyguard captured and interrogated by the task force had given up the location. My preceding chapter, Black List #1 describes the key role of Eric Maddox in that interrogation and how torture hurt his efforts to get Hussein by (perhaps) killing a high-value detainee. His depiction of the killing of Zarqawi is based only on the account spoon-fed to the NYT by the Army. It fails to mention the key role of interrogator Matthew Alexander in working behind the backs of JSOCs intel officers to get the job done despite their coercive interrogation mindset that hurt his efforts.
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Postscript Note July 21, 2013: I just watched the film of the same name. Well worth watching to put a human face on the victims of the Dirty Wars and is a good complement/introduction to the book. The film doesnt mention McChrystal, but does show his successor Admiral McRaven.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES A couple of minor corrections: 1.) p. 106, McChrystal was the JCS J-3 (not J-2). 2.) p. 102, McChrystal became the 3rd Ranger Batt CO in 85 (not RGT CO) But, according to Scahill, it appears I missed that during 2002 McChrystal ran (pp. 104, 147) the detention and interrogation operations in Afghanistan as part of CJTF-180. I havent confirmed this info. ... At the end of his Chapter 14 No Blood, No Foul, Scahill only notes that McChrystal wrote in his memoir (p. 161) that allegations of systemized torture at NAMA were false. However, Scahill didnt discuss further McChrystals BS torture claims (although Scahills preceding discussion certainly would make a reader highly skeptical of McChrystals denials). Note: If youre interested in a detailed rebuttal of McChrystals claims, I did so in the preceding sections, Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet, This is How We Lose, and My Share of the Blame. ... Scahill interviewed CNAS fellow Andrew Exum (and former Ranger officer) and quoted him as gushing about McChrystal (p. 107): you are seeing everything you want to be in life: just a remarkable individual, a fantastic soldier the Pope Hes the man above whom is no one else. I still bear a grudge toward Exum for his role in whitewashing McChrystals command of the cover-up of Pat Tillmans 2004 friendly-fire death in Afghanistan. Back in 2009, Exum wrote an extremely biased Washington Post book review that whitewashed McChrystal and the other Ranger officers involved. If youre interested in more details, see the appendices in my post Something to Die For or the post He Who Shall Not Be Fact-Checked. Finally, I found Scahills quotes from his interviews with COL Douglas MacGregor to be insightful about McChrystals ingratiating character (see pp. 101, 109, and 110). MacGregor seems quite the iconoclastic character whose ideas influenced the planning for the invasion of Iraq (see his book Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting).
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DETAINEE TREATMENT REPORT

Postscript: The Constitution Projects Whitewash of Gen. McChrystal & Admiral McRavens Role in JSOC Torture
The Constititution Project describes itself as a national watchdog group that advances bipartisan, consensus-based solutions to some of most difficult constitutional challenges of our time. Their blue-ribbon Task Force on Detainee Treatment was made up of former highranking officials with distinguished careers and includes conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats and was charged with providing the American people with a broad understanding of what is known and what may still be unknown about the past and current treatment of suspected terrorists detained by the U.S. government during the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations. On April 16, 2013, the Constitution Project released their Detainee Treatment Report report which was the product of more than two years of research, analysis and deliberation. This report described the evolution of torture policies and practice by the military & CIA at Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Although it received front-page coverage in the New York Times, it was largely overshadowed by the Boston bombings that occurred that same day. Their report brings together much valuable information (and is a valuable complement to the Senate Armed Services Committees 2008 report Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody that only focused on policies). However, Marcy Wheeler wrote a critical post on the report at her Emptywheel blog post (Even Bipartisan Conventional Wisdom Report Says It Was Torture): The report is important and comprehensive, but not without flaws. It took me a matter of minutes to find a number of errors, repetition of dangerous misinformation, and incomplete reporting. and at times it appears completely unaware of what primary sources say.* As such, the report represents a cautious, bipartisan, institutionalist view. And in her footnote, Mary wrote: *I am admittedly biased on this front. I was within a day of being contracted to collect documents for this effort, but someone involved in the process deemed me at a time when I was already loudly criticizing the Obama Administration for things theyve done too partisan for the project. Some of the documents I had already identified at that time are utterly absent from this report; in their place the report claims ignorance. I also found the report to be flawed. After a quick read of CH 3, I found the report whitewashed Gen. Stanley McChrystals command of torture from 2003 to 2005 by JSOC forces. And the report doesnt even mention Admiral Bill McRaven by name (the report is written to scapegoat his predecessor BG Kyle Koenig) although he commanded JSOC TF 121 during its worst use of torture in late fall 2003 and spring 2004. Why? Probably because he isnt yet retired and is now commander of US SOCOM. So much for accountability! (See AppendixCfor more details).
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The Constitution Project Found Responsibility For Torture Falls On Certain Military Leaders, But Doesnt Hold Them Accountable:
The reports Finding #2 was: The nations most senior officials bear ultimate responsibility [for torture]. Responsibility also falls on other government officials and certain military leaders. Gen. Taguba said, there were several officers complicit or involved in abuse who got away, or got their fourth star. He doesnt name names; however, he may have been referring to Gen. McChrystal. The report noted, the lack of successful prosecutions demonstrate major gaps in enforcement of the laws against torture and war crimes, which likely reduces their deterrent effect. ... Even without the risk of prosecution, the risk of public disclosure and disapproval might deter a future administration from authorizing torture. What risk of public disclosure and disapproval? Even this report whitewashes McChrystals role in torture and doesnt even mention Admiral McRavens name! Some public disclosure! These guys are hardly shaking in their boots when this report whitewashes their actions!
Gen. McChrystal & Admiral McRaven Commanded JSOC/Task Force 121 Torture:
This report describes how torture was spread to Iraq by JSOC forces from Afganistan, how Gen. Miller and SERE instructors were sent to Gitmotize Iraq (although it fails to note McChrystals involvement), it describes how torture was not limited to a few bad apples at Abu Gharib but was SOP at Camp Nama and other JSOC detention facilities (with several suspicious deaths), and how this torture continued into at least mid-2004 and possibly beyond. However, the report failed to explicitly note that JSOC torture was conducted under the direct command of Gen. McChrystal & Admiral McRaven (McRavens name isnt even mentioned). It fails to memtion that both officers approved several torture SOPs after taking command. Instead the report is written in a manner that places blame on BG Kyle Koenig and argues that McChrystal came in and cleaned things up (using extensive quotes from his disingenuous memoir, even though McChrystal declined several invitations from the Task Force to be interviewed about Afghanistan and Iraq). I find it rather amazing they would use his BS quotes despite his refusal to answer their questions! The report found that torture contributed to rising insurgencies. I would argue that McChrystal played a role in lighting the fire which led to Abu Gharib: he helped Gitmotize Iraq, he
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES commanded JSOC torture, and commanded the JSOC night raids also created more adversaries than any other living officer and led to the deaths of American soldiers. McChrystals like an arsonist firefighter who sets fires and then brags about putting them out!
Non-Coercive Interrogation Techniques Are Most Effective (But Constitution Project Omitted Examples Of Maddox & Alexander Using Them To Get Hussein & Zarqawi):
The report found that the most effective way to obtain timely, credible intelligence from suspected terrorists and others who threaten the United States was to use noncoercive, traditional, rapport-based interviewing approaches with detainees. However, Im surprised the report didnt mention interrogators Eric Maddox and Matthew Alexander who have written books about how they used non-coercive methods to get Saddam Hussein and Al-Zarawi? Why arent these examples of high-profile interrogation success included in the report? Perhaps because discussion of the interrogations that led to Hussein would mention the death of a detainee who supposedly had a heart attack during questioning by TF 121 under McRavens command? And, Alexanders book contradicts McChrystals bullshit account in his memoir of how Zaraqwi was fixed and killed.
Gen. McChrystal & And President Obamas Whitewash Of JSOC Torture Investigations:
The report quoted McChrystals memoir: [t]here were lapses of discipline, but they were never tolerated. Never a wink and a nod. However, the report noted that neither the CID or Red Cross had access to JSOCs Camp Nama, many obstacles were placed in the way of CID investigators, and that reports of torture up the TF 121 chain of command went into a black hole. The report mentions how President Obama back-pedaled & blocked the April 2009 release of JSOC torture photos. Its worth noting the dates of McChrystal's nomination and President Obama's decision not to release photos of prisoner abuse in Iraq; May 11th and 12th, respectively. Presumably, some of the photos showed abuse by JSOC forces under his command? (Note: See my following chapter The Emperors General or my previous posts, such as The Emperors General or The [Untold] Tillman Story for details on the McChrystal Photo Protection Act of 2009.)
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The Constitution Projects Whitewash of Gen. McChrystal & Admiral McRavens Command of JSOC Torture:
The report noted that, McChrystal declined several invitations from the Task Force to be interviewed about Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead, for JSOCs response to allegations of abuse the report uncritically used extensive quotes from McChrystals recent disingenuous memoir that paint him in a favorable light as the guy who supposedly cleaned up JSOC torture. The Constitution Project report appears to have been written to make BG Koenig the scapegoat for TF121s torture. The report only explicitly mentions the July 2003 TF 121 torture SOP before McRaven/McChrystal took command (it doesnt mention the Oct 2003 and March 2004 SOPs authorized by them and doesnt explicitly note they were in command of the JSOC torture described during that period). On page 88, the report mentions the JSOC task forces commander; at that time, in October 2003, Admiral McRaven had just taken command of TF 121. This is the only implicit reference to his command of torture in the report (obviously, he was not interviewed). In the report, his name is not even mentioned in connection with torture by TF 121; p. 88 is disingenuous since most readers would assume the report refers to BG Koenig in that passage. Note: Both McChrystal & McRavens names were also redacted from the Senate report; but their identities can also be determined using other primary sources (e.g. Feingolds congressional record statement, McChrystals memoir). Probably the most egregious whitewash was a passage (p. 91) by an interrogator at Camp Nama who said, We called the colonel by his first name, called the sergeant major by his first name. I couldnt tell you the sergeant majors last name if I tried. Same with the colonel The interrogator also said that neither the Red Cross nor the Armys Criminal Investigative Division had access to Camp Nama. However, the report somehow omitted further damming quotes from the same interrogator!: Do you know where the colonel was getting his orders from? he asks. I believe it was a two-star general. I believe his name was General McChrystal. I saw him there a couple of times. It was a point of pride that the Red Cross would never be allowed in the door 'Will they ever be allowed in here?' And he [colonel] said absolutely not. He had this directly from General McChrystal This facility was completely closed off to anybody investigating, even Army investigators." ... (As mentioned previously, see AppendixC for more details and quotes from the report).
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MCCHRYSTAL CLEAR
Specialist Carl Prine, another Pyro soldier A former Marine NCO grunt turned war correspondent, he had lived with and studied guerrillas in the brutal West African wars of the 1990s. Called by a recruiter looking for prior service volunteers, Prine had joined the Pennsylvania Army NG in the summer of 2005 and was shipped to Habbaniyah as an individual augmentee in December. Pyro was a motley crew, but Prine, a 39-year-old enlistee, was strange by any measure some brave men, some strange men, and Prine, who was both brave and strange. Falah asked his company and platoon commanders to vote on bravery. They didnt choose an officer at all. They chose lowly Specialist Carl Prine. Faleh presented the medal to Prine in the Panther command post. A picture was taken I n the background, one of Prines senior soldiers looks stunned. -- Owen West The Snake Eaters (2012) ... A great many things went unsaid both during McChrystals address and the Q&A with the audience that followed. There was no mention of his role in the cover up of the friendly-fire slaying of Pat Tillman, including issuing a bogus Silver Star citation for the Ranger. No one asked him about the pattern of detainee abuse in Iraq by units overseen by McChrystals command including beatings, psychological torture and other forms of mistreatment. At Camp Nama, for instance, prisoners were routinely stripped naked, subjected to sleep deprivation and extreme cold, placed in painful stress positions, and assaulted. McChrystal fizzled badly in Afghanistan, and everyone seems to want to dub him a 21st century Sir Gawain Its almost as if were addicted to this man. No matter how bad his insubordination is for our democracy, how much the Tillman family and our Army suffered during his leadership in Iraq and Afghanistan, or what a lamentable example he sets for todays officers, we not only keep coming back for Stan the Man but make him out to be something of a prophet and a guide for our children. Its almost as if America is hooked on some really powerful McChrystal meth. -- Carl Prine, McChrystal Clear (Line of Departure blog, June 3, 2012)
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McChrystal Clear
[From Carl Prines Line of Departure blog post -- McChrystal Clear (June 3, 2012)] Note: In July 2012, because of recurrent migraines from his TBIs from IEDs in Iraq, Carl had to stop posting at the Line of Departure blog. The site has since been taken down.
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After stumbling a long time over impossible trails/ you are up on top. / Hardship didnt crush you, you trod it down, climbed higher. Thats how you see it. After life has tossed you / away, and you ended up on top / like a one-legged wooden horse on a dump. Up on Top, Olav H. Hauge
Hes a thin man and, like many of the business stiffs coming from their downtown grind into the auditorium, stands tall in his tailored suit. Bleached silver by stage lights, the ex-general keeps his hair cropped like a soldier. But Stanley McChrystal, 57, no longer serves in the U.S. Army. Thats because he was forced to retire nearly two years earlier following remarks dismissive of civilian leaders he and his staff seemed to make in a Rolling Stone article a salient fact never mentioned in the gushing introduction to him as he struts across Heinz Hall on March 28th like a rock star or celebrity chef. He smiles, two slightly upturned parentheses on an otherwise unreadable face. But youd grin too if pimped in Pittsburgh as one-of-a-kind commander with a remarkable record of achievement, the man responsible for creating a revolution in warfare that fused intelligence and operations to kill terrorists in Iraq and who became as the leader of the fight in Afghanistan one of Americas greatest warriors best known for his candor. Over the next 1 hours, from the hagiographic introduction to the last self-serving fib, McChrystal provides a string of Wikipedia-deep musings on American foreign policy, international security threats, the meaning of public service for our military families, a few secrets about leadership and some anecdotes about teaching at Yale his students apparently are barred from repeating in the best traditions of academic freedom. Hell receive a standing ovation before his address even begins and hell apparently merit another at the end, probably because hes the only former soldier anyone in Pittsburgh or
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES audiences elsewhere will encounter on a stage in 2012 and they want to clap avidly at some symbol of sacrifice. In this regard McChrysal is the bony dream catcher dangling from our societys windshield, snagging the good vibes intended for front line soldiers, not letting a single clap escape his falcon ears, beaming and basking.
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Cloaking himself in the mantle of the troops like this, McChrystal becomes a master dramatist. This is evident from how he begins his speech, poking fun at himself. But its the sort of gentle self-ribbing really intended to lionize his favorite subject, which is Stanley McChrsytal, of course. He peppers his lecture with several moments of this aw shucks hokum because its designed to delude you into thinking that hes at once saturnine and deeply moral, neither of which is probably true but, on stage, seems to enchant audiences. When he turns serious at the flick of a projector slide ever the champion of PowerPoint, our generals it all sounds like a half-boiled Tom Friedman column. Heres some of that precious wisdom apparently Yale needs or the terrorists win: Because the world has changed. And what happens in St Petersburg now makes a difference in St Louis. Theres nowhere thats that far away. What happens in Baghdad is going to make a difference in Baltimore. And, of course, what happens in Pakistan youre going to feel it in Pennsylvania. Theres no place that doesnt matter to us anymore. So weve got to try to understand. Friedman proved that you can bait a rhetorical hook like that to capture whole schools of middlebrow fish. Maybe thats why McChrtystal on the tour casts equally vapid spinners about the Arab Spring, Iranian history, an internet where no one is very far away and a war in Iraq that was justified because Saddam Hussein is gone, even if we didnt do enough due diligence while planning the invasion. Along the way the Pittsburgh audience learned that McChrystals son, an intelligence analyst somewhere in the vast military-industrial complex bloated beyond recognition since 9/11, once had blue hair an anecdote uttered, it seems, only to name-check former UN boss Kofi Annan. He apparently was boggled by it. Or whatever. How unchallenging was McChrystals speech? Well, one of his more profound moments came when he declared, Cities dont have politics. People do.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Thats supposed to mean something, I suppose, but anyone with the IQ higher than a Tonka trucks isnt going to spend much time lingering over Stans koan.
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I should concede that while tedious McChrystals speech finally settled a bet. For years a gaggle of us listened to the generals most egregiously callow pronouncements about his populationcentric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. I held to the belief that he was more like the uber-clever David Petraeus, a soul I never thought bought into half of what he said aloud. Instead, I argued, his COINtastic sloganeering really was just a means to kick the can down the road in Iraq and Afghanistan, time being a very valuable commodity for any occupier trying to pacify restive people. I mean, who wouldve taken seriously McChrsytals mumbo jumbo about the government-in-abox for Marjah or how our forces were turning the people of Kandahar into democracy-loving friends of America, one heart and one mind at a time? Surely that had to be mere sophistry designed to win time for other measures to take effect, right? Well, Im now convinced that he actually believes his own idiocy. From his very lips, two years after getting booted from OEF: The problem is in the population. The people are what matters. Theyre how you win and how you lose. Going outside the people to get the enemy misses the entire point. You wont solve the problem, no matter how many Taliban you go out and kill. In many cases, the more you do and the better youre at it, you make the problem worse. After long descriptions of how buying villages the right way wins hearts and minds and blah blah blah, he maintained that the point of it all was forging relationships with the people, the same sort of partnership he struck during long hours of listening to Hamid Karzai. That apparently paid off several times when bad things happened in Afghanistan and they could move forward. While I grumbled about losing my bet, McChrystal saw fit to double down on his acute case of myopia by fluffering accused congenital liar and alleged do-gooding grifter Greg Three Cups of Tea Mortenson: Hes a friend of mine. In fact, hes a close friend of mine so I have a huge regard for him. When I was in Afghanistan, what he would do for me is he would go to areas where he had great credibility with the elders. And he would bring the elders to me. Or Id travel and wed have a gathering and hed talk and Id listen. It gave me an ability to connect with him and learn. And thats what we have to do. He has a unique credibility in Afghanistan from doing that. I dont know whether the charges about the book are true, or not. I wasnt there. So I dont know. I like the book. To me, the story inspired me. The concept inspired me. And I think the
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES concept is whats important. So I cant judge him for that stuff. I cant judge the man but I have high regard for the book. McChrystal is the best kind of mark because he never admits that he got rooked and, indeed, shamelessly shills for the conman long after everyone else figured out the hustle. This is the man our Congress awarded four stars and set loose in the Hindu Kush to toy with the lives of American service members and Afghan peoples, a bona fide convert to the quack cult of Mortensenism? Get a bellyful of Stan the Man, Yale. In their increasing irrelevancy academia and our failed celebrity generals deserve each other.
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Im probably alone in this, but Ive been struggling to figure out exactly why McChrystal is teaching a course on leadership at the once-serious Ivy League institution. Sure, I dont doubt that a great many former soldiers, especially Rangers, believe that McChrystal was an inspiring military figure. But Im just not sold on any lessons he can impart to anyone who believes in a meritocracy. A third generation soldier, he missed the end of Vietnam while attending West Point. Graduating in 1976, he entered an Army hollowed out after the unpopular conflict in Southeast Asia. With few wars to fight for nearly two decades, he advanced in a largely uncompetitive world, it all made perhaps even easier for him because his father retired Major General Herbert McChrystal had been the Pentagons Director of Planning before his son took a commission. Yale students, the first thing you should do to become a leader is to have the good sense to be sired by a high-ranking parent before going into the very same line of work. It worked for Donald Trump and McChrystal, so mull that over. Although constantly described as a warrior in introductions and the program guide, someone probably should mention that McChrystal served in Desert Storm as the action officer of the J-3, a staff position, and did much of the same sort of work, albeit at higher positions, in Iraq and Afghanistan. This explains why the former Ranger wore at the time of his retirement an EIB and not the CIB. This is no knock on the general. I detest whenever soldiers are denigrated because they dont have combat service or a valor award. Dwight Eisenhower never saw a lick of fighting before World War II and he was one of the greatest generals our nation ever produced. Abraham Lincoln killed no Indians during his brief few months in uniform and yet proved during the Civil War to be strategically a genius unlike nearly all of his generals.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES I guess my beef is that Lincoln and Ike won their wars and no one lauded them as a warrior during the bloodletting, a title Ike wouldve quietly shrugged off as undeserved. McChrystal fizzled badly in Afghanistan, and everyone seems to want to dub him a 21st century Sir Gawain, his mace dripping with the blood of the beheaded Green Knight, or his Taliban equivalents. He isnt. And I cant figure out why he doesnt just grab the microphone after those sorts of introductions and say something like, Thats very kind of you, Sir, but I wasnt a warrior. Id like to think that I served a nation at war proudly and honorably as a staff planner because that was my gift and its what I was asked to do. The man orchestrated the assassination of Abu Musad al-Zarqawi through brainpower and relentless toil, so who would say that hes wrong in that? I wouldnt. Hell, Id give him a standing ovation for the 2006 assassination of the Jordanian terror mastermind and pay good money to hear him yap about how he did it.
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A great many things went unsaid both during McChrystals address and the Q&A with the audience that followed. There was no mention of his role in the cover up of the friendly-fire slaying of Pat Tillman, including issuing a bogus Silver Start citation for the Ranger. No one asked him about the pattern of detainee abuse in Iraq by units overseen by McChrystals command, including beatings, psychological torture and other forms of mistreatment. At Camp Nama, for instance, prisoners were routinely stripped naked, subjected to sleep deprivation and extreme cold, placed in painful stress positions, and assaulted. Dozens of soldiers were disciplined and five Rangers convicted of abusing Iraqis, but not McChrystal, the man who during his Pittsburgh speech breathlessly assured the crowd that most of leadership is discipline. This, again, from the man who got canned for either putting down civilian overseers in front of a reporter or letting his staff do the dirty deed. That insubordination included describing National Security Advisor Jim Jones as a clown, characterizing his commander in chief as someone who didnt seem engaged and belittling the vice president as Joe Bite Me Biden. My favorite was McChrystals condemnation of Richard Holbrooke a diplomat who really saw extensive combat in Vietnam as a man so tedious and annoying in his role as the direct emissary of the president that he didnt deserve to have his emails read by the precious four star.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES So, how does a failed general who cultivated a command climate so toxic that even Admiral Mike Mullen called him out on it own up to this legacy in Pittsburgh? What I regret, I think, is that the depiction in that story of the people I served with, he said. Im not worried about me. The people I served with, I think its not accurate. I think it gives them less respect and credit. Mark those words because theyre proof of McChrystals true genius. Rather than discipline, one might say that leadership in the long career of Stanley McChrystal boils down to 1) knowing how the son of a general might exploit the bureaucracy for lofty advancement, 2) ensuring that failed policies and criminal underlings never stick to ones oily hide and 3) relentlessly denying any personal responsibility for bungling ones job, to the point that 4) one hides behind his staff when dogged by culpability. Say what you want about McChrystals four-point leadership system, but it obviously works long after hes no longer even a leader. In fact, theres probably no one who has proven to be better at monetizing failure than Stan the Man! You can chart the money and stock options flowing in as he sits on the board of directors of Jet Blue and MRAP super-manufacturer Navistar . Dont forget his gig with Siemens Government, a firm perhaps best known for a bribery scandal one wonders if McChrystals cachet now shall scrub clean. Theres also his McChrystal Group, now a client of AOL. And the fact that hes in the top tier of gets on the national speakers tour, perhaps netting tens of thousands of dollars for each engagement. With that heady record of failing ever upward, one might someday ask President McChrystal how shooting a man in Reno just to watch him die and burning Bibles outside the Vatican propelled him above his peers at the Iowa caucus, just as letting his secretary, chauffeur and maid take the rap won him New Hampshire and, eventually, the nation. Of course, thats just a joke, and probably not a good one. But it highlights an uncomfortable truth about us: Its almost as if were addicted to this man. No matter how bad his insubordination is for our democracy, how much the Tillman family and our Army suffered during his leadership in Iraq and Afghanistan, or what a lamentable example he sets for todays officers, we not only keep coming back for Stan the Man but make him out to be something of a prophet and a guide for our children. Its almost as if America is hooked on some really powerful McChrystal meth. Well, let me be the first to go cold turkey. When youre ready to quit you can join me.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Ill be the one standing by the coffee and doughnuts. Hello, America, my name is Carl, and Im now 66 days sober. Hello, Carl.
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Note: Carl Prines Line of Departure blog was great. Unfortunately, Carl had to quit blogging after his disabling migraines returned; he took several IED hits during his tour of Iraq (he makes a brief, but memorable appearance as the brave, but strange soldier in Owen Wests book, The Snake Eaters). Unfortunately, his blogs archives have been disappeared from military.com. One of Carls last columns, McChrystal Clear (June 3, 2012) was a caustic review of McChrystals road show. The following month, columnist Kelly Vahlos wrote a touching tribute to him, Carl Prines Line of Departure (7-11-12): he is one of the good guys, a veteran who obviously loves the military for what it could be and loathes it for what it has been used for Hes not been right about absolutely everything and sometimes I think he could go easier on other writers, especially when they have their hearts and heads in the right place [a reference to Michael Hastings]. But hes always consistent when it counts in his loyalty to the rank and file and exposing the corruption of power. And that makes him tops with me because there arent a lot of veteran-journalist-critics with his talent willing to write the things he does.
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Postscript Note: Here are links to some other McChrystal road-show lectures: Stanley McChrystal: Listen, learn ... then lead (TED 2011, March 2011) On January 31, 2013, Gen. McChrystal discussed his memoir, "My Share of the Task," with author and journalist Mark Bowden at the Free Library of Philadelphia (recorded on CSPAN) On January 28, 2013, he gave a lecture at the Brookings Institute, Gen. McChrystal (Ret.) Discusses Al Qaeda in Iraq (also recorded by CSPAN).
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GOT QUESTIONS FOR GEN. MCCHRYSTAL?

On March 19, 2012, newsworks.org posted Got questions for the former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan? Give us your questions below for the general, and we'll try to get a couple of them in during the Q&A session following his remarks. Sure, I could come up with some questions for McChrystal ... but, why bother? I figured sending questions would be a waste of time. Based on my personal experience, I no longer have much faith in the press to ask tough questions of the powers-that-be. However, Mary Tillman emailed me the link to that post. So, for her sake, I figured I would give it a try, and sent in two questions (Mary Tillman emailed me that my questions are very sound). Heres one of my questions: Question #2: A 2007 Department of Defense Inspector Generals investigation found you were accountable for the inaccurate [Silver Star] award recommendation for Pat Tillman. For example, the report found the two witness statements were altered somewhere in the [Silver Star] approval chain (apparently by the Ranger RGT commanding officers). PFC [ONeal] stated that he did not sign the valorous award witness statement and also pointed out parts he knows he did not write and parts that were not accurate. SGT [Ward] pointed out parts that were inaccurate, in that he was unable to see CPL Tillmans actions from his location Kevin Tillman (his brother who served with him as a Ranger in Iraq & Afghanistan) testified before Congress: These are deliberate acts of deceit. To falsify a witness statement in a Silver Star award, fabricating it with these kids names on it And, Jon Krakauer (in his book, Where Men Win Glory, pp. 334 347 of his paperback edition) described how you personally "administered the medal recommendation process" and directly supervised the Ranger Regiment commanders who altered the two Silver Star witness statements. He wrote that a false narrative "was painstakingly written to create the impression Pat Tillman was killed by enemy fire and that The Silver Star recommendation was "fraudulent" by "any objective measure." During your 2009 Senate confirmation hearing, you testified your recommendation was not well written with mistakes that were well intentioned. Could you please explain how well-intentioned mistakes could possibly account for the two forged witness statements for Pat Tillmans Silver Star medal? Note: The Department of Defense Inspector Generals March 2007 report found that Gen. Stanley McChrystal was accountable for the inaccurate [Silver Star] award recommendation [see Appendix A1, DoD IG Tillman Investigation and pp. 46 56, Misleading Information from the Battlefield inThe [Untold] Tillman Story"] In 2007, Congressman Henry Waxmans House Oversight Committee held two Tillman hearings. At the April 24, 2007 Congressional hearing, Kevin Tillman said, while each
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion These are deliberate acts of deceit. To falsify a witness statement in a Silver Star award, fabricating it with these kids names on it How come no one is held accountable for this? The whole thing is riddled with nonsense, sir [see pp. 46 56 in The [Untold] Tillman Story"]. However, on July 31, 2007, Gen. William Wallace overruled the IGs findings, and cleared McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the Tillman cover-up (several other officers involved were given slaps on the wrist and have since been promoted to General. Retired Gen. Kensinger was made the official scapegoat; he lost a star and a little pension money). [see pp. 57 - 66" The [Untold] Tillman Story"]. The following day, August 1, 2007, Congressman Henry Waxmans House Oversight Committee held the second hearing of their Tillman investigation. However, Waxman allowed Gen. McChrystal to decline to appear (he was never later interviewed), and never tried to determine if he was responsible for the altered Silver Star witness statements and pp. 67 86, The Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew in "The [Untold] Tillman Story"]. ... Unfortunately, neither of my questions were asked. After McChrystals Widener University presentation on March 26, 2012, McChrystal was tossed a soft-ball question: "What about Pat Tillman?" McChrystal replied (Newswerk's Twitter feed): Friendly fire happens As soon as we found out, thats what we said ..."I know there's no conspiracy" Alerting family was other chain of command[s responsibility] ." What bullshit. I expect this is the same crap hes put in his book about the Tillman story. First, the Tillmans come from a military family, they know friendly fire happens. Thats not what bothered them so much. They understand that. They just got pissed off that the Army kept from truth from them so long and then the Generals still kept lying to their face about what happened for the next three years! Second, McChrystals response echoed the B.S. of General Wallaces July 31, 2007 review that supposedly cleared McChrystal of all wrong doing (its worth noting that, despite his FOIA, the Army refused to give a copy to Jon Krakauer, ultimately saying it was privileged information). In reality, McChrystal was told of confirmed friendly-fire just two days afterwards; but it took the Army five weeks to tell his family. And according to a DoD IG report appendix, McChrystal was in the operational chain of command that was responsible to tell the family [See pp. 56-66, "The [Untold] Tillman Story" at http://www.feralfirefighter.blogspot.com]. I think its worth fisking Gen. McChrystals response in more detail on his response. The next couple of pages do this (they are adapted from the posts Did They Teach You to Lie Yet? and The [Untold] Tillman Story.
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FRIENDLY FIRE HAPPENS AS SOON AS WE FOUND OUT, THATS WHAT WE SAID

On June 2, 2009 Gen.McChrystal testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing for his nomination to become the new commander of the Afghan war. First, McChrystal said there was speculation early on that Tillman was killed by friendly fire, but that he and others were waiting for the outcome of an "initial review" [Scotts 4/29 15-6] before coming forward with that information [sending P4]: And so, we initially were waiting for the outcome of that initial review [CPT Scotts 156] before we went forward with any conclusions. So, it was a well-intended intent to get some level of truth before we went up. (p. 18 transcript) But, there was never anything speculative or potential or "suspected" about Tillmans friendly fire death. The Rangers on the ground being shot at knew immediately what had happened. On the 23rd word was passed up 70% sure by the CSM to LTC Bailey and on to COL Nixon. And on the 24th, the initial investigating officer CPT Scott passed on verbal confirmation (Im certain, Im sure) to LTC Bailey, who then called COL Nixon (McChrystal was next in the chain of command). McChrystal knew of confirmed FF just two days after Tillmans death! (If this isnt some level of proof, what is?) Second, McChrystal said he sent his P4 message to inform his chain of command that he believed friendly fire was a possibility before the memorial service which in retrospect looks contradictory. (After the Wallace report came out, McChrystal was praised by the Secretary of the Army for acting "reasonably and quickly" by sending his timely P4 memo to alert his superiors on the 29th): I also sent a message informing my chain of command that we believed it was fratricide, and we did that when we were told there were going to be fairly high-profile memorial services. And when I sent the message, the intent entirely was to inform everyone up my chain of command so that nobody would be surprised. (p. 18 transcript). McChrystal said he was told of suspected fratricide on the 23rd. Yet he didnt send out his P4 until the 29th? How is waiting six days considered timely? And notice that McChrystal wasnt concerned about Tillmans family being surprised. He wrote in his P4, I felt it was essential that you received this information as soon as we detected it in order to preclude any unknowing statements by our countrys leaders which might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillmans death become public. Note the if not when it becomes public. And how is sending the P4 on the 29th as soon as we detected it when McChrystal said he was told on the 23rd? Further, McChrystal wasnt concerned with correcting the Silver Citation he had just forwarded to the Secretary of the Army the previous day and that had already been approved.
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ALERTING FAMILY WAS OTHER [GEN. KENSINGER] CHAIN OF COMMANDS RESPONSIBILITY]

On July 31, 2007 Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and General Richard Cody held a press briefing to announce the findings of General William Wallaces review. Gen. McChrystal was cleared of all wrongdoing, while Gen. Kensinger was singled out as the scapegoat. When asked by a reporter why McChrystal couldnt have just called Tillmans family about potential fratricide, General Cody replied that in the casualty reporting business we do not encumber the JSOC commander [McChrystal] with all of that thats done by the regiment and done by the Army through SOCOM. Secretary Geren added, So it was General Kensingers responsibility. However, if you look at Appendix D: Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin Notification Process (p.80, DoD IG report), youll see that McChrystals Chief of Staff was responsible for sending a supplemental casualty report to USAOC after learning of friendly fire. Its also noted on the flowchart that both McChrystal and his Chief of Staff knew about the fratricide by April 25th [actually on 23rd and he received verbal confirmation Im certain, Im sure on the 24th ] and yet they and everyone else in the chain of command (including JAG officers) did not send the required report as required by regulations (this finding not in the IG Report Conclusions). Furthermore, McChrystal himself told General Jones that there was a conscious decision on who we told about that potential [fratricide] because we did not know all the facts. I believe that we did not tell the family of the possibility because we did not want to give them some halfbaked finding. Shortly afterwards, he contradicted himself, saying, I did not know there was a decision not to tell the family. They had another [son] in the firefight. So which is it? Mary Tillman responded to McChrystals testimony during her April 24, 2007 testimony, I believe that we did not tell the family of the possibility because we did not want to give them some half-baked finding. But the irony is that is exactly what they did. They made up a story. you are supposed to tell the family right away if you suspect fratricide, period. It is not nebulous as Colonel Nixon said. It is not nebulous at all. You simply tell the family you suspect it. Then you can investigate. Then you can give the family your conclusions. So the idea that they were trying to protect us by not telling us until the investigation took place is ridiculous. In his Senate testimony, IG Gimble laid the blame for the failure to notify the Tillman family upon COL Nixon for keeping the fratricide information close hold. But how is that possible? Since, Nixon told Gen. McChrystal, logically the IG should have held McChrystal responsible as well for his failure to tell the family. Gen. McChrystal had early knowledge of fratricide, had the responsibility to tell the Tillman family about fratricide, and failed to do so (and he also had his JAG officer withhold that information from the medical examiner and CID investigator).
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THE [UNTOLD] TILLMAN STORY

Gen. Stanley McChrystals Betrayal of Pat Tillman
controversy arose and continued over the circumstances of Pat Tillmans death by friendly fire Sadly, truth and trust were lost in the process Concerns were raised over the wording in the Silver Star narrative, which some found misleading Any errors, which I should have caught, were not the result of any intention to misrepresent or mislead To this day, I am saddened by Ranger Tillmans death, as I am for the loss of every service member I served with, and for the pain such losses cause each family. -- Gen. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task
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Pat [Tillman] died for this country, and he believed it was a great country that had a system that worked. But we never thought that they would use him the way they did -- Mary Tillman, Congressional testimony (April 24, 2007) It [word of Pat Tillmans friendly fire death] went up to the two-star level and the two-star took it right up to the four-star level. Here is the steak dinner, but were giving it to you on this garbage can cover. You know, you got it, you work it. -- Brigadier General Howard Yellen (May 2004) Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pats death he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. His statement [P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so That memo is damming as hell. And the fact that he is off the hook is atrocious. -- Mary Tillman, Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2008)
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PAT TILLMAN
November 6, 1976 April 22, 2004
L to R: Tillman Family: Marie (widow), Mary (mother), Richard (brother), Kevin (brother), Patrick Sr.(father)
Patrick Tillman, Sr. -- Memorial Service (May 4, 2004)
in Afghanistan I watched the Rangers deal with the loss of a comrade, and I saw nothing but genuine efforts to take care of a comrade, and I saw nothing but genuine efforts to take care of a fallen Ranger and his family in ways that reflected the deep values of the force -- Gen. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task
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Sometimes I [Grandmother Hodges] wish I had never told you those stories I just wanted you to remember your daddy [killed in WWII]. Now, you be careful. Hodges never had a lick of luck at this. Ghosts and glory. It stunned him to hear her say it. -- James Webb, Fields of Fire (1978) Discussions about the military had been part of the boys childhood. My sons were influenced by these stories [my father] and I had been at odds over Vietnam. The senseless destruction, loss of life, and government deception clashed with his belief that ours is a righteous country. Would he have encouraged Pat and Kevin? Or would he have feared, as I did now, that our family had glamorized the honor of military service? -- Mary Tillman, Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2008) You are a General There is no way a man like you believes the conclusions [of the 3rd Army 15-6 investigation into Pat Tillmans death]. But your signature is on it. I assume, therefore, that you are pa rt of this shameless bullshit In sum: Fuck you . And yours. -- Patrick Tillman, Sr. (April 2005 letter to BG Gary Jones) The truth may be painful, but its the truth If you feel youre being lied to, you can never put it to rest. -- Mary Tillman (2004) 116
THE OFFICIAL TILLMAN STORY

In 2002, Pat Tillman was the NFL football player who walked away from a $3.6 million contract with the Arizona Cardinals to join the U.S. Army. Pat Tillman (with his brother Kevin) served with the Army Rangers in Iraq during 2003. The following year he deployed to Afghanistan, and was killed in action during an intense enemy ambush in Afghanistan on April 22, 2004. He was awarded the Silver Star medal and was praised for his heroism during his May 4, 2004 nationally-televised memorial service. Five weeks later, on Memorial Day weekend, the Tillman family was informed that Pat had actually been killed by friendly fire. During a press conference, Gen. Kensinger said the Army investigation had concluded, Tillman probably died as the result of friendly fire. He didnt take questions and the Army did not release any details. During the next four years, four more investigations were completed by the Army and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG). Unsatisfied with the DoD IG report, Congress (with a newly elected Democratic majority) held two hearings in April & August 2007. Gen. William Wallace reviewed the previous investigations and on August 31, 2007 recommended discipline for several officers, particularly Gen. Kensinger, but cleared Gen. Stanley McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the matter. Secretary of the Army Pete Geren apologized for a perfect storm of mistakes that created in the mind of many a perception that the Army intended to deceive the public and the Tillman family. In July 2008, the House Oversight Committees final report blamed stonewalling by the Bush administration for no one being held accountable. In May 2009, President Obama nominated Gen. McChrystal to be his new Afghan war commander. In response to accusations by the Tillman family that McChrystal had been involved in a cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said: "this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal." The Senate confirmed McChrystal by unanimous consent on June 10, 2009. Only a year later, on June 23, 2010, McChrystal offered his resignation to President Obama after members of his staff supposedly made inappropriate remarks to a Rolling Stone reporter. Shortly afterwards, McChrystal retired from the Army. In April 2011, The New York Times reporter Thom Shanker wrote that a DoD IG investigation had cleared McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the Rolling Stone case. Within days, President Obama appointed McChrystal to head the new Joining Forces program to help military veterans and their families. Now, he heads the McChrystal Group, teaches at Yale, sits on several boards, and speaks on the lecture circuit.
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THE [UNTOLD] TILLMAN STORY

[Adapted from the version found in the post Something to Die For; see the annotations to The Operators in that post for more detailed comments and links to other documentation]
It appears Gen. McChrystal supervised much of the Armys cover-up of Pat Tillmans 2004 friendly-fire death. Why? Well, the Army (almost) always lies about bad news. In 2004, the Bush Administration used Tillmans heroic death to distract attention from the Abu Gharib images that were broadcast shortly afterwards. Then, the Defense Dept. (led by Rumsfeld and then Robert Gates) dragged out their so-called investigations over the course of the next three years until it was no longer a PR threat to the Army or the Bush administration. In 2007, it appears the Democratic Congress whitewashed McChrystal because he was the hero of the dark side of the Iraq Surge. In 2008, the Senate whitewashed McChrystal so he could continue his rise as one of the stars in the Army and be promoted as the Director of the Joint Staff, the right-hand to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff90. In 2009, McChrystal actions (Camp Nama & Tillman) were whitewashed by President Obama and the Senate so he could be the savior to lead the Afghan Surge. In 2010, Obama fired McChrystal for failing to make the progress he had promised (and to show the Army brass he was the Boss). In 2011, in part to mend fences with the military, President Obama continued the McChrystal whitewash by appointing him head up the Joining Forces program. The Pat Tillman story is not over yet. Our government and the media have continued the whitewash of Gen. McChrystals (among others) key role in the cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death and detainee abuse at Camp Nama up to the present day. On the lecture circuit, Stanley McChrystal keeps trotting out his line of bullshit, and no one in the press has called him out on it. And shortly, on January 7th, his memoir is coming out. More of the same?
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Update 4-20-14: And because President Bush & Secretary Gates fought for McChrystal to override the initial Senate opposition to his promotion. 118
May 2004 -- Tillman Probably Died as the Result of Friendly Fire

In 2002, Pat Tillman was the NFL football player who walked away from a $3.6 million contract with the Arizona Cardinals to join the U.S. Army. Pat Tillman (with his brother Kevin) enlisted with the Army Rangers, did a tour in Iraq in 2003, and was killed by friendly-fire in Afghanistan on April 22, 2004. He was awarded the Silver Star medal and was praised for his supposed heroism during a May 4, 2004 nationally-televised memorial service. Within just two days of his death, on April 24th, the first investigating officer confirmed Tillman was killed by friendly-fire and passed that information up his chain of command to Gen. McChrystal. However, a decision was made (presumably by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and/or Vice President Cheney who had an extremely cozy relationship with Gen. McChrystal) to cover up Tillmans friendly-fire death and award him a fraudulent Silver Star medal (probably to avoid yet more bad PR, as they knew the Abu Gharib images were about to be released to the public). From the citation (the narrative has even more BS): Caught between the crossfire of an enemy near ambush, Corporal Tillman put himself in the line of devastating enemy fire as he maneuvered his fire team to a covered position from which they could effectively employ their weapons on known enemy positions. His audacious leadership and courageous example under fire inspired his men to fight at great risk to their own personal safety, resulting in the enemy's withdrawal, his platoon's safe passage from the ambush kill zone, and his mortal wound In making the ultimate sacrifice for his team and platoon, Corporal Patrick D. Tillman reflected great credit upon himself, the Joint Task Force, and the United States Army. Note: maneuvered! In his book, McChrystal claims that Tillman was awarded a Silver Star for merely running up a hill to a covered position (not under fire) along with the rest of his Ranger squad. How come they didnt get decorated when they all did the same thing? Five weeks later, just before Memorial Day weekend, the Tillman family was finally told Pat had actually been killed by friendly fire. During the press conference, Gen. Kensinger said the Army 15-6 investigation had concluded Tillman probably died as the result of friendly fire. But, Kensinger didnt take any questions and the Army didnt release any further details.
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April 2005 -- "Shameless Bullshit Fuck you and Yours.

Five weeks after Pats death, the Tillman family received an informal briefing from LTC Bailey on his friendly-fire death. [adapted from Mary Tillmans account pp. 41-45 Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2008)] that contradicted the portrayal in the Silver Star citation: The commander wanted boots on the ground in Manah before dark. The only way to accomplish this was to split the platoon into two sections, Serial One which would move directly to Manah, and Serial Two which would take a different route to drop off the disabled Humvee. Serial One moved through the canyon safely. Serial Two had to backtrack, and unexpectedly ended up going through the same canyon. Serial Two came under attack in the canyon (ineffective fire from a few men from several hundred meters away; none of the vehicles was even hit). Serial One dismounted and maneuvered through Manah up a hill (not under enemy fire) to covered positions on a ridgeline. Pat went over the ridge behind some boulders with an AMF soldier and PFC ONeal. When SGT Bakers Humvee came through the canyon, they saw the AMF soldier and shot him from 200 meters away and shot up Pats position and the ridgeline. Pat took cover and threw smoke. The firing stopped. Thinking it was safe, Pat and ONeal stood up, and the Humvee fired again from only 35 meters away, hitting Pat in the legs (His last words, Cease Fire! Friendlies! Im Pat Fucking Tillman!), and then he was killed by a SAW burst to his head. Bakers vehicle continued shooting up the ridgeline at the rest of Serial One and into the village of Manah, hitting LT Uthlaut and RO Lane. However, just two weeks later COL Nixon presented the official briefing in which major details of the story had been changed. The family pressed for answers, and the Secretary of the Army ordered yet another Army 15-6 investigation by Gen. Jones. Pat Tillmans fathers response to the results of that third 15-6 investigation is memorable: "You are a General. There is no way a man like you, with your intelligence, education and rank ... believes the conclusions reached. But your signature is on it. I assume, therefore, that you are part of this shameless bullshit. In sum -- Fuck you and yours.
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April 2007 -- The Whole Thing Is Riddled with Nonsense

Pat Tillman, Sr.s response apparently prompted yet another set of investigations. Two years later, in March 2007, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) and the Armys Criminal Investigation Division (CID) finally completed their investigations. However, the Tillman family was furious with being presented with yet another deceitful briefing. Shortly afterwards, Congress (with a newly elected Democratic majority) held their first Tillman hearing on April 24, 2007. Kevin Tillman said, while each investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion To falsify a witness statement in a Silver Star award, fabricating it How come no one is held accountable for this? The whole thing is riddled with nonsense. And Mary Tillman said, we shouldnt be allowed to have smokescreens thrown in our face. in every way, they [Army investigators] dodged. They are dodging us, and the [Department of Defense] IG [March 31, 2007 report] condoned that and your job is to find out what happened to Pat.
July 2007 -- A Perfect Storm of Mistakes

On July 31, 2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren91 briefed the press on Gen. Wallaces review of the Army & DoD IG investigations. Geren apologized for a perfect storm of
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Postscript Note 3-31-13: Fred Kaplan wrote (pp. 279 282, The Insurgents): Back in the fall of 2004 [Pete] Geren was one of Rumsfelds special assistants Geren was confirmed as Secretary of the Army on July 16, 2007. Not long after, he received [the memo] listing the generals whod be nominated to sit on the upcoming promotion board. he sent it back with a rejection note and said hed pick them himself. Geren spent the next week assembling a list of the Armys most dynamic generals. He whittled that list down to fifteen and asked them all to serve on his promotion board. They included. Stanley McChrystal I assume Geren asked Congressman Waxman to drop McChrystal from August 1, 2007 witness list and held his August 31st press briefing to officially clear McChrystal and make Gen. Kensinger the official scapegoat. Its worth noting that in 2002, Geren was working for Rumsfelt and received a snowflake asking him to keep his eye on Tillman. Update 3-06-14: Its worth noting that after Gates became Defense Secretary in 2006, he kept most of Rumsfelds staff. Gates wrote about his admiration of McChrystal. Did Gate hire Geren as part of the process to protect McChrystal? I would speculate that Gates had some influence over Geren. And it appears that Gates Dept. of Defense stonewalled the Congressional investigators .
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES mistakes that created in the mind of many a perception that the Army intended to deceive the public and the Tillman family. Despite much of its nonsense the DoD IGs report admitted that Gen. McChrystal was accountable for the inaccurate [Silver Star] award recommendation. IG Gimble testified before Congress that the Silver Star witness statements were altered somewhere in the approval chain (COL Nixon, LTC Kauzlarich, and/or LTG McChrystal were in that chain). The citation itself was carefully written to falsely imply that Tillman was killed by devastating enemy fire. However, Wallace & Gren cleared McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the Tillman cover-up. The other officers involved were given slaps on the wrist (several have since been promoted to General rank). Retired Gen. Kensinger was made the official scapegoat (he was the worst liar); he lost a star and a little pension money. But, in reality, McChrystal had orchestrated the Tillman cover-up. Although he had early knowledge of the friendly-fire death & was responsible to notify the family, he failed to inform the Tillman family of the friendly-fire, he supervised the writing of the fraudulent Silver Star recommendation, Tillmans uniform and equipment were destroyed, and his own legal officer concealed the fratricide from the medical examiner and a CID investigator). Note: see the posts The [Untold] Tillman Story and Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet? for more detailed discussion of McChrystals role in the Armys cover-up. In her 2008 book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk, Mary responded to the Wallaces review: Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pats death, he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. His statement [P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so. And shortly after General Wallaces findings were released in July 2007, Mary said: "That memo [P4] is damming as hell. And yet, nothing happens to [McChrystal]. He is writing fraudulent language in that memo. He is giving examples of how they can script the Silver Star award, even though Pat was killed by fratricide. And he is saying we need to keep our leadership abreast of things so they don't embarrass themselves, IF the circumstances of Pat's death should become public He should be saying 'We're going to have to put a hold to the Silver Star and we're going to have to notify the family [of suspected friendly fire].' That is what he would say if he was innocent, but he is not. He is trying to find a way that they can continue this false, elaborate story of theirs. And the fact that he is off the hook is atrocious. In his July 2010 revised paperback edition of Where Men Win Glory, Jon Krakauer described how McChrystal had "orchestrate[d] what can only be described as a broad conspiracy to conceal Tillman's fratricide ..." He wrote how Gen. McChrystal personally "administered the medal recommendation process" with a false narrative that "was painstakingly written to create the impression Pat Tillman was killed by enemy fire" and directly supervised the Ranger RGT
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES commanding officers in Afghanistan who appear to have altered the two Silver Star witness statements to remove any mention of friendly fire (and which contained false statements). The Silver Star recommendation was "fraudulent" by "any objective measure."
August 2007 -- " Another Man Who Will Not Be in the Room
The next day, August 1, 2007, Congressman Henry Waxmans House Oversight Committee held their second Tillman hearing.92 Mary Tillman wrote, They [Rumsfeld & generals] have collective amnesia. Rumsfeld was asked several times in various ways when he learned of Pats death, but he couldnt recall. Mary continued, we were not happy with the hearing at all. The Republicans on the committee were at best indifferent Most of the Democrats disappointed us as well. They were not prepared . We expected more from Congress. However, unnoted (except for a slip by CNNs Barbara Starr) Waxman had allowed Gen. McChrystal to decline to appear at his hearing. Chairman Waxman closed his hearing by saying, We are obviously trying to find out what went on and who had responsibility. But, its not obvious that he and his Committee made a good faith effort to uncover the truth. They failed to question Gen. McChrystal about his key role in writing the fraudulent Silver Star, altered witness statements, early knowledge of fratricide, failure to inform the family, and his deceptive P4 memo. Most importantly, they chose not to have Gen. McChrystal testify. Waxman has never explained why McChrystal was dropped from the hearing witness list (and never interviewed). If the Committee was obviously trying to find out what went on they would have looked into McChrystals key role in the cover-up. Instead, it appears the Committee chose to shield McChrystal from public scrutiny. Why? Well, during the summer of 2007 the Iraq surge was at its peak. McChrystal was a rising star in the Army who led the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) forces to whom many attributed much of the success of the Iraq Surge. It appears leaders of the Democratic Congress made a decision to shield Gen. McChrystal from accountable for his central role in the Tillman cover-up because of his key role in the Iraq war and his friends in high places.93
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Update 3-21-14: In his memoir, Gates doesnt explicitly mention either the April or the August Congressional hearings into the Tillman case
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3-06-14 Update: Ive noted previously that McChrystal was Vice President Cheney and Secretary Rumsfelds golden boy. Gates wrote (p.55, Duty) that he and President Bush fought to get McChrystal promoted in 2008. Perhaps they also put pressure on Congressional leaders in 2007 to shield McChrystal with a pro forma investigation? 123
May 2008 -- Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?

McChrystal wrote (McChrystal, pp.278-279): On Friday, June 13, 2003 I passed command of TF 714 (JSOC) to my friend and former deputy, then Vice Admiral Bill McRaven. A few weeks earlier [May 22nd], I had been confirmed by the Senate to become director of the Joint Staff, essentially chief of staff to the chairman of the joint chiefs. DJS was a prestigious post, one John Abizaid and then George Casey had held Id been told that the chairman, Admiral Mike Mullen, had sought me for the position. The Senate confirmation process had been unexpectantly jarring. my experience prior to that point in my career had been as a name of a long promotion lists that the White House recommended and the Senate confirmed.. had not involved individual testimony or significant issues. This time the experience was much different. . In the end the process took until the first week of June. I reported for duty to the Joint Staff on August 13, 2008. Questions surrounding the death of Pat Tillman were raised [May 2008] and I addressed them. The major issue regarded TF 714s [JSOCs] detention operations. Legitimate questions and concerns were intertwined with an ongoing inquiry [SASC 11/08 Torture Report] into the Bush administrations overall detention policies led by Senator Levin. Id been happy for the opportunity to address any questions about TF 714 head-on, but it felt as though the delay was the product of a larger political issue.
...
During the Spring of 2008 (after receiving my April 3rd letter asking him to help Mary Tillman), Senator James Webb conducted a secret review of McChrystals role. On May 15th 2008, just after Mary Tillman was in Washington, D.C. on her book tour, the Senate Armed Services Committee (headed by Levin and McCain)94 held a secret executive session where McChrystal testified in detail about his actions in executive session behind closed doors. Shortly afterwards, the Senate promoted him to Director of the Joint Staff.95 Exactly how did Webbs secret review, followed by a closed hearing, and a vote without discussion wipe away McChrystals role in the Tillman cover-up? There was no public testimony or public discussion by the Senate. What was said during that closed hearing?
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p. 82, McChrystal: [as VDJ3 JCS] conduct[ed] briefings to Congress six time each week . part of an effort to maintain better relations with Congress Senator Carl Levin I found the relationship helpful later when commanding later both in special operations and the war in Afghanistan. And, if you look at his footnotes (p. 405), he stuck in a bit of subtle humor about his role: Carl Huse & Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Strokes Lawmakers Every Morning and They Seem to Like it, NYT March 29, 2003
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Update 3-21-14: Gates wrote in his memoir (p. 55) that he and President Bush stood and fought for McChrystal. Id speculate that pressure by Bush & Gates was placed on Senators Levin, Webb, and McCain to get them to cave-in and reverse their opposition. With Senator Webb, it was probably so he could get his GI Bill passed. 124
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Senator Webb and SASC Counsel Gary Leeling refused to answer any of my questions about the hearing, only saying it was in executive session. Senator Jamess Webb betrayal of the Tillman family cuts the deepest. Ive trusted his sense of honor for thirty years. If anyone in Congress should have cared, it would have been him. Webb, as a young Marine veteran, spent 8 years to clear the name of a dead Marine for his mothers sake! Im hard on Webb not because I dislike the man, but that Im disillusioned by him. As an old man and politician, hes turned into exactly what he once reviled as a young veteran!
July 2008 Why is It So Hard to Find Out Who Did It?

A year later, in July 2008, the Oversight Committee finally released their report. They blamed stonewalling by the Bush Administration for their failure to hold anyone accountable. At the end of his April 2007 hearing, Congressman Waxman96 had stated in frustration, What we have is a very clear, deliberate abuse intentionally done. Why is it so hard to find out who did it? Well, his report said that lack of recollection made it impossible to assign responsibility and the intense interest that initially characterized the White Houses and Defense Departments reaction to Corporal Tillmans death was followed by a stunning lack of curiosity about emerging reports of fratricide (suggesting Gates was less than forthcoming with DoD documents requested by Congress). ESPN reporter Mike Fish wrote the the White House and Gates Department of Defense had effectively stonewalled the investigation.
96
In her 2012 book, Classified Women, Sibel Edmonds wrote (pp. 306, 315-316) how Congressman Waxman had dropped support for the whistleblowers after the Democrats won the 2006 mid-term elections: We ended up gathering a handful of supporters in the House. The most ambitious and outspoken was Congressman Henry Waxman what we asked for was to have public hearings on our cases Our handful of minority supporters seemed to wholeheartedly agree, and promised to back out initiatives. In the end we got absolutely nothing. We were told repeatedly that as long as the Republican majority remained in Congress we had no chance whatsoever. the Democrats won [2006 midterms], and became the majority in both House and Senate. We thought we had won I called [in February 2007] and emailed our formerly fiery and supportive staff members from Henry Waxmans office many times. I received no response The new majority Democrats, including o ur handful of backers, didnt even want to hear about the hearings they had promised us except for that capital D, would continue to a tee the practice of their predecessors. 125
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES But, I would argue the biggest reason was that Waxmans so-called investigation was not an honest attempt to get at the truth. In reality, the Democratic Congress (and later, President Obama) had merely continued the Bush administration whitewash of Gen. McChrystal.
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May 2009 -- The Emperors General

McChrystal wrote (McChrystal, pp.288-289): Senate confirmation [for President Obamas May 11, 2009 nomination to command the Afghan War] was required and it was easier than it had been coming out of TF 714 [JSOC] the year before, although I again addressed questions surrounding Corporeal Tillmans death [and treatment of detainees]. I appreciated concerns raised by the Tillman family and others, but after multiple investigations and testimony the year prior, I knew that I had already provided full and forthright insights on my role and all I had observed. On June 2, 2009, I testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
...
On May 11, 2009 despite McChrystals key role in the Tillman cover-up. President Obama nominated McChrystal to be his new commander of the Afghan War. In response to accusations by the Tillman family that McChrystal had been involved in a cover-up of Pat Tillmans death, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell97 said: "this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal." A few days later, on May 13th, Obama gave the Arizona State University commencement address at Sun Devil Stadium (where Pat had played college ball) without once mentioning his name (presumably to avoid embarrassing questions about his nomination of McChrystal). That same day, Obama back-pedaled on his previous decision to allow the court-ordered release of torture photos, presumably because they showed detainee abuse by JSOC forces under McChrystals command. On May 20th, Senators Lieberman, Graham, and McCain (working with the White House) introduced a bill to change the FOIA law to block the photo release. The Senate unanimously passed it the next day Conveniently, on May 25, 2009, shortly before McChrystals Senate confirmation hearing, The New York Times Pentagon reporter Thom Shanker exonerated McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the Tillman case. However, Shanker ignored clear evidence of McChrystals central hands-on role. During the week before the confirmation hearing, I corresponded with Shanker and sent him material which described how the Democratic Congress had whitewashed McChrystals role. However, Shanker's post-hearing piece continued to parrot the government's
97
In response to Mary Tillmans objection to McChrystals May 2009 nomination to head the Afghan War, Geoff Morrell (Gates Press Secretary) wrote: "this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal." What BS! What outside experts? No wrong doing? Even the DoD IG report said McChrystal was accountable for the inaccurate [Silver Star] award recommendation! Apparently Gates agrees with Morrells BS since he wrote, I trust this guy to do and say what I want (p. 275, Duty) 127
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES official line (interestingly, the NYT's editors disappeared his original June 2nd article from their website within a few hours after it was published). CNASs Andrew Exum (a former Army Ranger officer) failed to show genuine concern for the Tillman family in his Abu Mugawama blog Confirm Him" (June 2, 2009): The bottom line is, nothing is ever going to heal the wounds inflicted on the Tillman Family And while I have nothing but respect for the Tillman Family, their personal grief should not be a veto on the nomination of the man [Gen. Stanley McChrystal] more important than either the death of Pat Tillman or the alleged abuse of detainees [at Camp Nama]. Aside: Later that year, in September 2009, CNASs Andrew Exum whitewashed McChrystals role in the Tillman cover-up with his horribly biased Washington Post book review of Jon Krakauers book Where Men Win Glory The Odyssey of Pat Tillman (the WP ombudsman later chastised him for neglecting to reveal his numerous personal and professional conflicts of interest with Gen. McChrystal).98 ... On June 2nd 2009, The Senate Armed Services Committee held General McChrystals confirmation hearing for his promotion to four-star general and Afghan war commander. The hearing was strictly pro-forma. Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb tossed McChrystal a few softball questions. The real hearing had been conducted the previous year, behind closed doors. General McChrystal denied the phony narrative of a raging firefight was anything more sinister than "mistakes" made to honor Tillman. "I didn't see any activity by anyone to deceive," he said. "We failed the family. And I was a part of that." He expressed his "deepest condolences" to Tillman's family. Mary Tillman said she neither accepted nor believed McChrystal's [nonapology] apology. "McChrystal was lying," she said. In the Forward to her August 2010 revised paperback (at blurb.com) of her 2008 book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk, Mary Tillman commented on McChrystals Senate confirmation: I had sent the President an email and a letter reminding him of McChrystals involvement in the coverup of Pats death. I also contacted the staffs of Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator James Webb but it was clear that neither senator wanted to get involved. McCain was already publicly endorsing the McChrystal appointment before the hearing even began. Sadly, McChrystals promotion had been sanctioned long before the hearing. None of the congressmen pressed McChrysal about Pats case or detainee abuse and torture at Camp Nama
98
Postscript 5-01-13: Exum practically swoons when talking up SM4 with Jeremy Scahill (p. 107, Scahill Dirty Wars: you are seeing everything you want to be in life: just a remarkable individual, a fantastic soldier the Pope Hes the man above whom is no one else. 128
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES On June 10th, General McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate after Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid made an impassioned plea on the Senate floor. Shortly afterward, the Senate approved President Barack Obama's nomination of McChrystal by unanimous consent (that evening, Gen. McChrystal gave NYT reporter Thom Shanker a personal tour of his new Pentagon headquarters that night. Isnt access grand!). The next day, Senator Russ Feingold wrote that he oppose[d] the nomination of LTG Stanley McChrystal because of a classified matter. But where was his opposition when it would have mattered the previous day?
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July 2010 The Tillman Story

On July 24, 2010, Gen. McChrystal retired (after being fired by Obama in June 2010 for badmouthing him in a controversial Rolling Stone profile) from the Army. Since then, he consults, speaks on the lecture circuit, is on board of directors, and teaches leadership at Yale. A few days after McChrystals retirement, on July 27, 2010, Jon Krakauer published his revised paperback edition of his 2009 book Where Men Win Glory The Odyssey of Pat Tillman. The previous year, his September 2009 hardcover edition described his friendly-fire death & the Armys cover-up. Krakauers book has great epigrams, does a good job of reconstructing the actual friendly-fire incident (and the events leading up to it) and some aspects of the Armys cover-up of Tillmans friendly-fire death (but McChrystal was barely a footnote). However, in his updated edition, Krakauer described McChrystal as playing the central role in the scandal and included much more detail of the cover-up by McChrystal. But, Jon Krakauer wrote a deceitful Preface where he claimed I discovered new information. In reality, just two days after the release of his first edition, my Aunt Candy literally placed two binders of my research (about 200 pages) into Krakauers hands at his Boulder book signing (my detailed analysis shows my material was the source of Krakauers additional evidence of deceit). ... A few days after Krakauers revised paperback was released, in early August 2010 shortly before the theatrical release of Amir Bar-Levs documentary The Tillman Story, Mary Tillman published the revised paperback edition of her 2008 book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk. In her new Foreword, she alluded to this untold story: McChrystals actions should have been grounds for firing. That is why it was so disturbing to us when President Obama instead promoted McChrystal to the position of top commander in Afghanistan. I had sent the President an email and a letter reminding him of McChrystals involvement in the cover-up of Pats death. I also contacted the staffs of Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator James Webb and expressed my concerns but it was clear that neither senator wanted to get involved. [Senator] McCain was already publicly endorsing the McChrystal appointment before the hearing even began. Sadly, McChrystals promotion had been sanctioned long before the [June 2009 Senate hearing]. None of the congressmen pressed McChrystal about Pats case or detainee abuse and torture at Camp Nama Over the last five years, the Pentagon and Congress have had numerous opportunities to hold accountable those responsible for the cover-up of Pats death. Each time theyve failed. The Tillman Story [documentary] illustrates the corruption, deception, and indifference that is systemic in our government. The cover-up of Pats death was orchestrated at the very highest levels of the Pentagon, and elsewhere in our government the government didnt just lie to us; it lied to a nation.
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April 2011 -- With Three Cups of Luck?

In April 2011, Jon Krakauer accused Greg Mortenson of deceit [see the chapter With Three Cups of Luck? in "Jon Krakauer's Credibility Problem]. However, it appears that Krakauers e-book, Three Cups of Deceit, was largely a publicity stunt timed with the 60 Minutes April 2011 broadcast to raise the buzz (and investment capital) for his friend Mark Bryants new online publishing startup Byliner.com] . However, Krakauer himself certainly displayed deceit by embellishing his story of how he discovered McCrystals central role. Was Krakauer embarrassed to admit that he had failed to uncover this new material by himself? And missed it the first time around? Like Mortenson, it appears that Jon Krakauer embellished his story to boost his esteem and protect his ego. I dont care (much) about Krakauer stealing my credit. But, his greater act of deceit was one of omission. After reading his book, youd believe the Democratic Congress was stonewalled by President Bush. But, even after being handed my untold story, Krakauer still failed to describe in his updated edition how President Obama and the Democratic Congress continued the Bush administrations whitewash of McChrystals central role in the cover-up of Tillmans friendlyfire death. Furthermore, Where Men Win Glory is a flawed biography since (after losing their trust) Krakauer lost access to the Tillman family (except for his widow Marie).
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GEN. MCCHRYSTALS TILLMAN STORY

Of the several occasions when he himself attracted critical attention the Pat Tillman affair, for example McChrystal offers explanations [in his memoir My Share of the Task] that fall somewhere between perfunctory and disingenuous. -- Andrew Bacevich, New York Times book review Avoiding Defeat (February 8, 2013)
In his memoir, My Share of the Task (pp. 132-134, 278-279, & 288-289), Gen. Stanley McChrystal has written the official story of his actions in the controversial aftermath of Pat Tillmans 2004 friendly fire death in Afghanistan. He bemoans that truth and trust were lost in the process and claims that he saw nothing but genuine efforts to take care of a comrade a fallen Ranger and his family. Similarly, McChrystals response to a question about Pat Tillman on the January 16, 2013 Diane Rhem Show (at 40:00 General Stanley McChrystal: "My Share of the Task") generally followed the account in his book: there was not an attempt to hide the fact that Pat Tillman was killed by friendly fire. I found out about 24 hours after his death that, in fact, the suspected cause of death was fratricide So about 24 hours after he was killed, I went up the chain of command and said preliminary investigations tells us it was fratricide. So there was no attempt to hide it because the first thing we did was report it. And we reported it up the chain. There are two chains of command for a unit in combat. There was the operational chain which I was responsible for in the fight. And then there's an administrative chain which handles all of the things around the disposal of the remains, handling of the family and what not, notification, whatnot. I was not part of the latter you have to do a full investigation on fratricide. As it was going along, I assume that the family was being kept informed, because, in fact, Corp. Tillman's brother was in the platoon when the fire fight occurred. And I suspect he had pretty good knowledge of what had happened. There subsequently grew the perception that there was a -- that there was a cover up or an attempt to deny the fact that he was killed by friendly fire. I didn't ever see that personally. I didn't ever know anybody that did anything that I thought reflected that. I didn't see everything. I can't speak with full knowledge, but everything I saw was not that. And I can say that unequivocally. He was awarded a Silver Star because he was maneuvering in a situation which he thought he was maneuvering against one situation. It took courage to do that maneuver. When I signed the Silver Star recommendation, I did that knowing that he was likely killed by friendly fire. But the fact he was killed by friendly fire doesn't in any way take away from his courage in my view it did not make him any less of a hero in my mind And so it was important to me that we not take away from Pat Tillman, what he had earned and done, because there was a mistake made. Again, a mistake -- a grievous mistake, but an honest one by fellow rangers.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES In addition, David Gregory referenced his Nov. 2009 interview with Jon Krakauer who had said that McChrystal had supervised the writing of the fraudulent Silver Star etc. on the January 16, 2013 Meet the Press (12:10 PRESS Pass: Gen. Stanley McChrystal (Ret.) (although this video only appeared online). ... However, the Tillman family and others (e.g. see Mary Tillmans Boots on the Ground by Dusk, Amir Bar-Levs documentary The Tillman Story or Jon Krakauers paperback edition of Where Men Win Glory (paperback edition) believe he covered up Pats friendly fire death. In April 2007, Kevin Tillman testified before Congress, saying: Revealing that Pats death was a fratricide would have been yet another political disaster ... So the facts needed to be suppressed. An alternative narrative had to be constructed. Crucial evidence was destroyed including Pats uniform, equipment and notebook. The autopsy was not done according to regulation, and a field hospital report was falsified. An initial investigation completed [by CPT Scott 1st 15-6 investigator] before testimony could be changed [and which hit disturbingly close to the mark] disappeared into thin air and was conveniently replaced by another investigation with more palatable findings. It appears that General McChrystal played a key role in the Armys cover up: McChrystal received confirmation of Tillmans fratricide within two days, he had the responsibility to pass on notification to the family, made a decision not to tell the family, he supervised the preparation of a misleading Silver Star recommendation (no mention of fratricide, with two witness statements apparently altered by the Ranger RGT COs, and with inaccurate assertions in the citation & supporting narrative), approved the misleading Silver Star citation, and apparently directed others to conceal friendly fire from the medical examiner and a CID investigator (McChrystals JAG officer congratulated the Ranger RGT JAG for keeping the CID at bay). Mary Tillman testified that the investigations were largely a whitewash, saying: They [Army investigators] are dodging us, and the (Department of Defense) IG condoned that [with their investigation) even though they make the public believe they did such a grand job because they pointed the finger at four generals and five other officers. That is a smokescreen. These officers [e.g. Gen. Kensinger] are scapegoats Following this introductory section, Ive presented McChrystals account (slightly edited) of his actions during the Tillman story, followed by my commentary. Note that, here, I am not making an attempt to exhaustively document my assertions or address every point. If youre interested in more detail and supporting arguments & evidence, see my previous Feral Firefighter posts which have extensive appendices with links to source material such as The [Untold] Tillman Story, Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not the Truth," or Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?
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The Five Investigations Largely Whitewashed the Armys Handling of Pat Tillmans Controversial Friendly Fire Death
controversy arose and continued over the circumstances of Pat Tillmans death by friendly fire and his familys notification. Genuine concerns over slow and incomplete communication with the family increasingly became mixed with suspicions of intentional misconduct accusations of intentional deception, cover-up, and exploitation of Corporal Tillmans death for political purposes were propagated. Sadly, truth and trust were lost in the process. Five investigations were conducted. Questions surrounding the death of Pat Tillman were raised [during my May 2008 SASC confirmation] and I addressed them. . [My June 2009] Senate confirmation was easier than it had been the year before, although I again addressed questions surrounding Corporal Tillmans death. I appreciated concerns raised by the Tillman family and others [SASC June 2009], but after multiple investigations and testimony [SASC May 2008] the year prior, I knew that I had already provided full and forthright insights on my role and all I had observed. But in Afghanistan I watched the Rangers deal with the loss of a comrade, and I saw nothing but genuine efforts to take care of a comrade, and I saw nothing but genuine efforts to take care of a fallen Ranger and his family in ways that reflected the deep values of the force. To this day, I am saddened by Ranger Tillmans death, as I am for the loss of every service member I served with, and for the pain such losses cause each family. ... Slow and incomplete: although the family was immediately told of his death, his family wasnt told until the Army had to tell them five weeks later when his Ranger BN returned to the U.S. COL Craig Nixon claimed that he kept the fratricide news close hold. But, Joseph Kapacziewski wrote in his 2013 book, (p. 193) Back in the Fight, that it was it was an open secret within the Ranger RGT: The 75th Rangers constituted a small community within two days the news had spread throughout the regiment, both stateside and in the war zone. Rangers knew the real story of how he died by friendly fire long before it became public. And long before his family was told. Kevin Tillman said, Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep. Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. These are deliberate acts of deceit. In April 2007, Kevin Tillman testified before Congress that while each investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion. McChrystal never mentioned the result of the DoD IG investigation which found him accountable for the inaccurate Silver Star recommendation package. Of course McChrystals 2009 confirmation was easier. It was strictly a pro forma affair where he was tossed a few softballs about Tillman and Camp Nama. The real confirmation had been held a year earlier, behind closed doors in a secret executive session.
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McChrystal Was Told of Confirmed Friendly Fire Just Two Days After Tillmans Friendly Fire Death (while it officially took Five weeks!)
On April 23 [2004] I flew from Baghdad down to Qatar, where I met with John Abizaid [CENTCOM CO] at his forward HQ. We discussed the situation in Iraq. While I was there, Craig Nixon [Ranger RGT CO] called me from Bagram with news that a Ranger had been killed in a firefight I passed the sad news to John as we talked. Later that day Craig called again with an update: The Ranger lost was Pat Tillman. He also informed me that the chain of command would be recommending Tillman for a Silver Star. The next day [April 24th] I flew to Bagram. In addition to operational activities, Craig briefed me on the circumstances of Corporal Tillmans death. Although further investigation was required, he had concluded that Tillman was likely killed by friendly fire from fellow Rangers.
...
Pat Tillman was killed on April 22nd and the KIA report was sent by McChrystals Chief of Staff along with a casualty report to the next of kin. On the 23rd, Nixons first call was to inform McChrystal that Pat Tillman had been killed. Nixons second call was to inform McChrystal that Tillman was killed by friendly fire (Ranger 2nd BN CO LTC Bailey had called Nixon and told him I was certain that we had killed him and we needed to do a 15-6 [investigation]. Bailey verbally assigned CPT Scott to conduct the investigation). Its worth noting that McChrystal and Abizaids different testimonies are contradictory. For example, here McChrystal contradicts his previous testimony (in the Jones 15-6) that he was in Qatar when he was told about friendly fire. Or, Abizaid says told nor details or heroic. ... Likely killed by friendly fire! On April 24th, Tillmans platoon returned to the FOB. After CPT Scott did his first five interviews, he told LTC Bailey Im certain, Im sure; Bailey then called Nixon, who passed the news on to McChrystal. Nixon and McChrystal knew of confirmed friendly fire on the 24th, just two days after Tillman was killed. Knowing this, the rest of McChrystals claims concerning his handling of Tillmans death are nonsensical. Its important to realize that all of McChrystals other talk about potential friendly fire (likely killed, possibility, suspected, tentative conclusion, etc.) when he discusses family notification, the Silver Star, etc. are weasel words. Although the Army maintains it officially took five weeks to confirm fratricide, within just two days of Tillmans death, verbal confirmation of Tillmans fratricide had already moved up the chain of command. Further investigation! Sure, the interviews needed to be completed, the interviews typed up, and the report written, etc. But the purpose of the 15-6 investigation wasnt to determine IF there was friendly fire, but to document just how it occurred.
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McChrystal Sent a Misleading P4 Message to His Chain of Command to Warn POTUS Against Embarrassing Remarks (But Mostly to Cover His Ass)
[On April 24th McChrystal was told of confirmed friendly fire] A short time later [April 28th] [I] approved a [Silver Star] Citation that had originated with the Ranger Regiment. A few days later [April 28th] I was told that a high-profile memorial service in San Jose was planned [on May 4, 2004]. I had already passed the assessment of the potential that he had been killed by friendly fire [had called VA Olsen on April 24th] to SOCOM, and advised them that an investigation of that possibility was underway. I decided to send a direct [P4] message [on 29th] to emphasize to Generals Abizaid and Brown [and Kesninger] that friendly fire was the likely cause of death. ... A short time later & A few days later are misleading. Without providing dates in his narrative, a reader would believe that McChrystal immediately approved the Silver Star (perhaps with limited information) and then a few days later sent his P4 message. In reality, he approved the Silver Star four days after he learned of confirmed friendly fire and then sent the P4 just one day after he had approved the Silver Star (intentionally written with no mention of friendly fire). Once again, note the friendly fire weasel words potential, likely, and possibility. ... Emphasize? But if you read the P4, McChrystals stated intent was actually his concern the President might make embarrassing remarks based on the Silver Star citation he had just approved the day before! (looks contradictory): POTUS [President] and the Secretary of the Army might include comments about Corporal Tillmans heroism and his approved Silver Star medal in speeches not knowing the specifics about his death preclude any unknowing statements which might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances [i.e. friendly fire] of Corporal Tillmans death becomes public. Notice the if. Mary Tillman wrote, His statement [P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so. And John R. Reed wrote, McChrystal is absolutely certain about Tillman deserving the Silver Star However, he has to await the outcome of an investigation to determine whether Tillman was killed by friendly fire, which was a no brainer in this case. Apparently, public-relations efforts like awarding dubious medals require virtually no investigation or thought, but revealing unattractive truth, well, we gotta do a whole formal 15-16 investigation before such an unnatural act. I believe McChrystal only sent his P4 memo to provide a paper trail he could use later (which he did in his Jones 15-6 testimony) to cover his butt. The P4 provides a paper trail that he had informed his superiors about friendly fire, it allows him to argue that he thought Tillman deserved a Silver Star even if it was from friendly fire, and he could argue that he had approved the Silver Star before he got confirmation of suspected friendly fire.
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McChrystal Was Responsible to Send Friendly Fire Notification to Kensingers Command Which Would Notify his Family
On April 23 [2004 while in Qatar] Craig [Nixon]informed [called again] me this [Pat Tillman KIA] was standard notification and other administrative processes were under way. On April 24th, in addition to operational activities, Craig briefed me on the circumstances of Corporal Tillmans death. The initial phone call [April 23th to SOCOM Olsen/Brown] I made, and the [P4] message [to Gen. Abizaid/Brown/Kensinger] I transmitted on April 29th], only days after Pat Tillmans loss, reflected my intent to fully inform the multiple commands and commanders who would be involved in administrative matters associated with Corporal Tillmans death. LTG Phil Kensinger at U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the administrative HQ responsible for handling actions surrounding the death of members of . the Rangers. As the TF 714 [JSOC] CO in operational control of the Rangers, but not tasked with administrative communication with the family, I had an incomplete view of all that transpired.
...
The DoD IG report only blamed Nixon for the failure to notify the Tillman family,and other multiple commands and commanders who would be involved in administrative matters, CENTCOM {Abizaid). They faulted Nixons decision to keep the friendly fire knowledge on close hold and for not following standard notification procedures to pass news of friendly fire to McChrystal and his staff. But, despite his stated intent to fully inform his chain of command, McChrystal supposedly failed to inform CENTCOM CO Abizaid of anything except Tillman KIA. The DoD IG report faulted Nixon for his failure to inform CENTCOM and other agencies of the friendly fire death. However, inexplicably the IG report failed to point out that Nixon reported to McChrystal who would then be responsible for the CENTCOM notification once he was informed of friendly fire (this finding was probably scrubbed from the report). . ... Nixon was blamed for not notifying CENTCOM/Gen Abizaid. But Abizaid was McChrystals boss. Obviously, on April 23th, after getting the friendly fire update from Nixon, McChrystal then told Abiziad (ditto with confirmed friendly fire on April 24th). But they deny this. If McChrystal truly had the intent to fully inform the multiple commands and commanders then why didnt his Chief of Staff pass on the friendly fire notification paperwork per regulations? (regardless of his intent, he failed to send on friendly fire notification). And McChrystal would have personally told Abizaid. Its not believable that McChrystal didntpass on the news in person at Qatar, or never later called him: (McChrystal, p. 95): I would be Johns [Abizaid]s single point of contact and of responsibility. As my boss in the 82nd John had liked to communicate with me personally, not through our staffs. So my proposal for direct interaction suited his style. But if I call, Ive got to be able to reach you.; (McChrystal, p. 55): My brigade CO [82nd], COL John Abizaidwas my boss, he was
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES also a friend.; (McChrystal, p.180): I sent Gen. Abizaid a message Abizaid called me when he got the message. We skipped the usual joking back and forth that started most of our conversations. John thanked me for the forewarning. Its worth noting that Abizaid claimed (besides no phone calls) he never even received McChrystals April 29th P4 message until sometime after May 6th (it supposedly somehow got misplaced by his staff). But McChrystal wrote (p.180), Termed a Personal For, or P4, it was designed for point-to-point communications between senior officers, avoiding the normal route through staffs. I used these communiques sparingly but did so when I felt it was important my message not be lost or delayed. ... On July 31, 2007 (conveniently just the day before the Congressional hearing which McChrystal declined to attend, although Kensinger was sent a subpoena) Secretary of the Army Geren & General Cody held a press briefing to announce General Wallaces findings. Gen. McChrystal was cleared of all wrongdoing, while Gen. Kensinger was singled out as the scapegoat. When asked by a reporter why McChrystal couldnt have just called Tillmans family about potential fratricide, General Cody replied that in the casualty reporting business we do not encumber the JSOC commander [McChrystal] with all of that thats done by the regiment and done by the Army through SOCOM. Secretary Geren added, So it was General Kensingers responsibility. However, if you look at Appendix D: Casualty Reporting & Next of Kin Notification Process (p.80, DoD IG report), youll see that McChrystals Chief of Staff was responsible for sending a supplemental casualty report to USAOC (Kensinger) after learning of friendly fire. Its also noted on the flowchart that both McChrystal and his Chief of Staff knew about the fratricide by April 25th [actually on the 23rd ] and yet they and everyone else in the chain of command (including JAG officers) did not send the required report as required by regulations (this finding is not in the IG Report Conclusions). They claimed ignorance of the pertinent regulations. Its true that Kensingers command was tasked with the actual administrative communication with the family. But if you look at the flowchart, McChrystal (or his staff) were first supposed to send the friendly fire update to Kensinger. But, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren said, General Kensinger failed in his duty to his soldiers, and the results were a calamity for the Army He failed in his duty to inform the family about the friendly fire incident in a timely manner , failed to inform the acting Secretary of the Army of the fratricide investigation and made false official statements. Secretary Geren and General Cody defended General McChrystals handling of the Tillman fratricide. However, their defense of McChrystal doesnt hold up under examination. In fact, although Kensinger was culpable, I believe General McChrystal was guilty of exactly those same charges for which Kensinger was scapegoated by the Army! General McChrystal was guilty of failing to inform the family about friendly fire in a timely manner, failing to inform the acting Secretary of the Army [his chain of command] of the fratricide investigation, and he appears to have made false official statements in his testimony in and his Silver Star package. Incomplete view. Really? He was at the Bagram JOC with the Ranger RGT officers after he heard about the friendly fire, was briefed by them and presumably had access to the interviews and the results of the April 25th AAR.
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McChrystal Failed to Send Friendly Fire Notification and Concealed Friendly Fire from the Medical Examiner & CID Investigator
[Pat Tillman was killed in Afghanistan on April 22, 2004] controversy arose over genuine concerns over slow and incomplete communication with the family increasingly became mixed with suspicions of intentional misconduct. On April 23 [while in Qatar] Craig [Nixon called and] informed me this was standard notification and other administrative processes were under way. I learned later that the family was not immediately notified of the possibility of friendly fire. From the beginning, I assumed they [Tillman family] would be notified of the ongoing investigation into the possibility of fratricide, but I believed final determination would not be publicly announced beyond the family until the investigations conclusions were final. likely after the planned memorial service [on May 4th]. After the discussion [with Nixon about the friendly fire incident on April 24th], I called SOCOM HQ to relay a tentative conclusion of friendly fire [and advised them that an investigation of that possibility was underway]. Gen. Brown was out, so I passed the information to his deputy, thenVice Admiral Eric Olsen. The initial phone call I made [on April 23rd], and the [P4] message I transmitted [on April 29th], only days after Pat Tillmans loss, reflected my intent to fully inform the multiple commands and commanders who would be involved in administrative matters associated with Corporal Tillmans death.
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slow and incomplete communication: Although McCrystal was told of confirmed friendly fire just two days (April 24th) after Tillmans death, the Army didnt tell the Tillman family until five weeks later (Abizaid said, fratricide was called as early as the 29th of April [P4 message], and that on the 28th of May] we conclusively stated it was fratricide thats not a slow investigation. Thats a fast investigation). ... It appears McChrystal is blaming Nixon for his own failure to pass the friendly fire update up through the administrative processes. But Nixon told McChrystal on April 23rd, and Mchrystal told his own chief of staff (who was responsible for handling that update as he did the initial KIA report) who did not send the update to Kensingers command. From the beginning, I assumedthe Tillman family would be notified! But McChrystal testified there was a conscious decision on who we told I believe that we did not tell the family of the possibility because we did not want to give them some half-baked finding. But, in the same testimony, McChrystal contradicted himself, saying, I did not know there was a decision not to tell the family. They had another [son, Kevin,] in the firefight [but the Ranger RGT officers knew he didnt know and told the other Rangers to keep their mouths shut]. Mary Tillman replied, the irony is that is exactly what they did [gave the family a halfbaked story] you are supposed to tell the family right away if you suspect fratricide, period. It is not nebulous as Colonel Nixon said. It is not nebulous at all. You simply tell the family you
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES suspect it. Then you can investigate. Then you can give the family your conclusions. So the idea that they were trying to protect us by not telling us until the investigation took place is ridiculous. not be publicly announced beyond the family: McChrystal said (Jones 15-6) that he had no reluctance to disclose this was a fratricide and that he did not direct anyone not to say anything about the incident. But, Jon Krakauer wrote (pp. 339-340 Where Men Win Glory PB): Taking their cues from McChrystal and Nixon, officers in the Ranger RGT deliberately withheld from Mallak [Army medical examiner] that Pat had been killed by friendly fire and he described how McChrystals legal advisor, LTC Allen congratulated [Major] Kirchmaier [Nixons JAG] for keeping the CID [investigator] at bay. (When asked under oath about this, McChrystal repeatedly invoked phrases such as not that I can recall). ... my intent to fully inform: Given McChrystals failure to forward the friendly fire update through administrative channels to notify the family and withholding that information from the medical examiner (who was incredulous that Tillmans clothing and body armor had been burned), it appears McChrystals intent was to conceal friendly fire from other agencies. And, as previously noted, regardless of his intent McChrystal didnt actually do it. He failed to formally notify CENCOM (although he probably picked up the phone and told Abizaid). It appears that Nixon and Kensingers wrongdoing was emphasized, and McChrystals role omitted by the IG, even though McChrystal was the man in the middle of the reporting chain! (the IG report Conclusions sometimes contradict their own findings in the reports body & appendices). So, instead of McChrystal taking responsibility, he let Kensinger take the fall.
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McChrystal Supervised the Writing of A Fraudulent Silver Star Package (with Inaccurate Citation and Altered Witness Statements)
On April 23 [2004 while in Qatar] Craig [Nixon] called again and informed me that the chain of command would be recommending Tillman for a Silver Star for valor, based on his actions while maneuvering against enemy forces. At that time, most soldiers KIA were recommended for an award, typically the Bronze Star. We followed what was then standard practice to process the award as quickly as possible. The next day [April 24th] I flew to Bagram. drew out the engagement on an easel and we discussed how it likely occurred. I asked about the Silver Star. LTC Jeff Bailey [CO 2nd RGR BN] said he felt that although friendly fire was suspected, Tillmans actions maneuvering against what the Rangers at the moment believed were enemy forces ambushing the column of Tillmans fellow Rangers warranted the recognition. I agreed, and a short time later approved a citation that had originated within the Ranger RGT. In the years that followed, controversy arose Concerns were raised over the wording in the Silver Star narrative, which some found misleading as to the reason for Tillmans death. In the citation, we sought to document what I believe was his heroism, without drawing official conclusions about friendly-fire that were still premature. Any errors, which I should have caught, were not the result of any intention to misrepresent or mislead. I believed that the fact that Pat Tillman was killed by friendly fire, a sad reality in every war, did not diminish either his service or his sacrifice.
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McChrystals claim that the Silver Star (instead of the usual Bronze Star for KIA) was recommended by the chain of command on April 23rd is false. The recommendation started as a Bronze Star on April 22nd, and was only upgraded by Bailey on April 27th. Sure, the Silver Star paperwork originated from the Ranger BN, but Id assume that word came down from on high (perhaps Rumsfeld?) to make Tillmans death heroic and to give him a bigger medal. ... McChrystals narrative implies the Silver Star was processed as quickly as possible and approved within just one day on April 24th, just a couple of days after Tillmans death. In reality, the Silver Star recommendation wasnt approved until April 28th (four days later!). McChrystals narrative also implies the Silver Star was approved on April 24th with only limited, preliminary information about the firefight and friendly fire. However, McChrystal had already received details from the investigating officer who was interviewing the Rangers who had returned to base (confirmed friendly fire, etc). More information was gathered during Tillmans platoon AAR (After Action Review) on April 25th and as the investigation continued. Note the usual friendly fire weasel words: suspected and still premature. McChrystal wrote that Nixon said the Silver Star was based on his [Tillmans] actions while maneuvering against enemy forces. However the IG report found none of the heroic actions
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES described in the citation actually occurred; all of Tillmans heroic actions were during the friendly fire (which was intentionally left out). No friendly fire, no heroism! Faced with their BS, the officers finally claimed Tillman was decorated for running up a hill (like everyone else he was with) and intending to fight the enemy. Its also worth noting that McChrystal describes Baileys Silver Star rationale as maneuvering. That it, Tillman got a Silver Star for simply running up a hill (not under fire) to firing positions, along with the rest of his squad (how come the other dozen Rangers didnt get a medal?). ... some found [the citation] misleading: Some? The citation reads, for gallantry in action . against an armed enemy enemy fire Cpl. Tillman put himself in the line of devastating enemy fire known enemy positions enemy's withdrawal and his platoon's safe passage from the ambush kill zone (note that the citation didnt mention friendly fire; it was carefully written to avoid saying Tillman was actually killed by enemy fire). Only, there was no enemy fire, no enemy withdrawal and no ambush kill zone! (the serial did pass through safely, but they killed Tillman and an Afghan, shot the LT in the face, and the RO in the knee!). Anyone reading the citation would think Tillman was KIA. McChrystal said the Silver Star had errors and was not well written. He never noticed that friendly fire wasnt mentioned? Or that the citation bore no resemblance to the AAR or interviews? OK, lets grant that he somehow made those mistakes. But how about the fraudulent witness statements? The IG report found that the two Silver Star witness statements were altered: PFC [ONeal] stated that he did not sign the valorous award witness statement and also pointed out parts he knows he did not write and parts that were not accurate. Sgt [Ward?] pointed out parts that were inaccurate, in that he was unable to see CPL Tillmans actions from his location. How can McChrystal possibly explain how the two Silver Star witness statements resulted from errors without any intention to misrepresent or mislead? Hes never tried to do so. The IG said the witness statements were altered somewhere in the [Silver Star] approval chain and in the operational chain of command (not Gen. Kensingers): That is, Ranger RGT XO LTC Kauzlarich, Ranger RGT commander Nixon, and/or McChrystal. Friendly fire is a sad reality of war. The Tillman family have a long tradition of military service and are well-read on military history. They understand that friendly fire happens. They werent angered by that, but that the Army kept lying to them about what had happened! I agree with McChrystal that friendly fire didnt diminish Pat Tillmans service or sacrifice. But, it does diminish the heroism for which he was supposedly awarded the Silver Star! ... In 2007, Gen. Wallace and Army Secretary Geren disregarded the DoD IG report findings that McChrystal was accountable for inaccurate and misleading assertions contained in the award recommendation package. Unsurprisingly McChrystal never mentions this finding.
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LEAFFAIR ROLLING STAN
Michael Hastings
OBAMAS GENERAL -- Why Hes Losing the War
In the summer of 2010, Stanley McChrystal, U.S. Army general and Afghan war commander, reportedly trashed the U.S. civilian military leadership the display of disrespect was striking, but more telling were the details about McChrystals handling of smaller matters. -- Aaron James, Assholes: A Theory (2012) ... Over the past year, journalists had regularly been given intimate access to McChrystal and his staff. A reporter for the NYT a profile that found McChrystals only fault was that he worked so hard Time magazine had put him as runner-up for Person of the Year all told the same story: McChrystal as a modern combination of saint and ninja, a Jedi Knight Special Forces operators had a healthy disrespect for authority; Rolling Stone fit this self-styled image perfectly. They were building Brand McChrystal ballsy, envelope-pushing, risk-taking. It was the natural evolution of a very aggressive media strategy to establish McChrystal as a contender for the greatest general of his generation, on a par with Petraeus. I dont care about the article, McChrystal said, Just put me on the cover. I paused. He was joking, sort of Its between you and Lady Gaga, sir. McChrystal looked at me and smiled. Put me in the heart-shaped bathtub with Lady Gaga, he said. Maybe some rose petals. I just want to get on the cover so I can finally gain my sons respect. (His son was in a band.) I was starting to like them, and they seem to like me. They were cool. They had a reckless, who-givesa-fuck attitude. I was getting inside the bubble This is beginning to sound like fucking Almost Famous. . The movie his one-day story turned into a lengthy road trip on tour with the band. there wasnt always a happy ending if you wrote about people with brutal honestly. -- Michael Hastings, The Operators (2012) 143
LeAffair Rolling Stan

[Adapted from Michael Hastings book The Operators. See my post Something to Die For, for the full annotated version with page references and links to more detailed documentation]
[Rear Admiral Gregory Smith had] just gotten involved into a nasty exchange with a popular freelance journalist named Michael Yon [Yon] had just gotten kicked off an embed. Next time military generals talk about poor press performance in Afghanistan, Yon wrote that April, please remember that McChrystal and crew lacked the dexterity to handle a single, unarmed writer How can McChrystal handle the Taliban? Over the past year, journalists had regularly been given intimate access to McChrystal and his staff. A reporter for the NYT a profile that found McChrystals only fault was that he worked so hard A writer from The Atlantic asked if McChrystal was Afghanistans only hope Time magazine had put him as runner-up for Person of the Year all told the same story: McChrystal as a modern combination of saint and ninja, a Jedi Knight ... Special Forces operators had a healthy disrespect for authority; Rolling Stone fit this self-styled image perfectly. They were building Brand McChrystal ballsy, envelope-pushing, risk-taking. It was the natural evolution of a very aggressive media strategy to establish McChrystal as a contender for the greatest general of his generation, on a par with Petraeus. I dont care about the article, McChrystal said, Just put me on the cover. I paused. He was joking, sort of. I didnt have a clue who was going to be on the cover though. The name Bono flashed through my mind. I reached for something a little more current Its between you and Lady Gaga, sir. McChrystal looked at me and smiled. Put me in the heart-shaped bathtub with Lady Gaga, he said. Maybe some rose petals. I just want to get on the cove so I can finally gain my sons respect. (His son was in a band.) Id spent many weeks around the countrys most senior military officials, and Id never heard them talk like this before. It was the kind of banter Id heard on the front lines, but not inside headquarters, where blandness and discretion often trumped colorful language and obscene hand gestures, at least in front of reporters. I was starting to like them, and they seem to like me. They were cool. They had a reckless, who-gives-a-fuck attitude. I was getting inside the bubble ...This is beginning to sound like fucking Almost Famous. . The movie his one-day story turned into a lengthy road trip on tour with the band. there wasnt always a happy ending if you wrote about people with brutal honestly.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES McChrystals command style represented an unprecedented departure from previous US military history a command made up of elite Special Forces soldiers Generally, theyd been in charge of a few thousand of the most brilliant people in the service, and they were now running an army that numbered in the hundreds of thousands. A drawback: McChrystal and Lamb were used to dealing with the best of the best, high IQs, not the dumbness of the Big Army. The loyalty [of his staff] to McChrystal often ended up with the general getting an inaccurate picture of what was actually taking place. Over the past few weeks, hed been comfortable with allowing almost everything to be out there, transparent and open. Hed never tried to take anything back or personally spin me. Even if his staff thought hed nailed it, McChrystal knew what I had seen That was a raw wound back there. The talk [to soldiers in Afghanistan] had been an outright disaster. Israel Arroyo, the soldier whod invited McChrystal down, had been evacuated with another soldier for post-traumatic stress. Mikie Ingram, the soldier hed gone on his well-publicized patrol with, had been killed. The platoon was borderline mutinous. Yet McChrystal and Duncan were worried that I was going to write that the soldiers didnt understand the war. Why are we here? Spending over a week [April 2010] with McChrystal and his team in Western Europe had caused me, briefly, to rethink my answers. The excitement and the feeling of being on the inside made me give them the benefit of the doubt. Sure, the war had become morally dubious, ridiculously expensive, and would likely fuel anti-American terrorism for years to come but they were such cool guys, and they were nice to me Why not just give them a chance, like a number of my colleagues always did? Their confidence and expertise were persuasive. If they believed in the mission, then why couldnt I? The more time I spent outside the bubble I couldnt shake my own skepticism. No matter how professional or competent or dynamic McChrystal and his team were, the task they had set out for themselves was so obviously doomed. What Tom Hanks said to Private Ryan. He saved his life. He [Dave Silverman] said, Earn it. With your story. Earn it. The vision: McChrystal on the cover of Rolling Stone. How could you not write a 110 percent blowjob profile that just plainly fucking rocked? Earn it. On a personal level, part of me didnt want to disappoint McChrystal and Dave and Casey and Flynn and Duncan The month I spent with them was exciting, and Id gotten a privileged view from the inside of a top military command. If I wrote the story I wanted to write, it would be years before I ever had that view again. The access Id gotten was unprecedented. But what do you do with it? Bury the story? Write a puff piece to ensure further access? Or write what
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES actually happened? I knew, too, that McChrystal and his team could play rough with reporters and hadnt hesitated in the past to launch personal smear campaigns against them.99 The draft [of The Runaway General] expressed my conflicting feelings Id liked hanging out with McChrystal and his team, yet I hated the war. Everything Id seen and heard and knew about the war would not reflect well on them they were an unchecked force, steamrolling the civilian leadership, flipping them the giant bird along the way. Not that I didnt think all of their complaints unjustified --- Id probably be pissed if I thought that the civilians who gave the orders didnt actually appear to be committed to the war. On the other hand, McChrystal and other military officials had pushed Obama to get the mission they wanted. The military leadership pushed hard and played dirty to get the war in Afghanistan they wanted. Men like [SAS Commander Graeme] Lamb and McChrystal told themselves they operated within a strict code of honor ... And this is where I saw the flaw. How could they, at the same time, be involved in cover-ups with Tillman, with torture, with endless allegations of reckless civilian killings? The answer, I believe, was that they considered the loyalty that they felt for one another as the highest measure of integrity. any action to complete the mission and protect their pack whether it was leaking to the press or forcing a president down a path he didnt want to take they saw as acceptable. Id seen another side of his personality. Maybe the side Id been shown had been there all along, and no one else had decided to write about it? Wed grown accustomed to seeing the general as a superman and the press rarely challenged this narrative in their coverage. Wed been bombarded with hagiographic profiles and heroic narratives When there were criticisms of generals, it usually came too late Here, I realized, was a chance to tell a different story, to capture what the men running the war actually said and did. Duncan was worried about what the story would say either be fun, or end my career. Rolling Stone closed the story. It was set for publication next week [June 22, 2010]. Lady Gaga, not Stan McChrystal, was going to be on the cover. ... I assumed the [Runaway General] story would get some attention in Washington, maybe get in the news for a few hours. But I didnt expect much else. Id been writing about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for the past five years. Usually, most news stories and the wars themselves were ignored The real problem wasnt just the content of the story it was who read it. High-ranking figures in Washington, mainly, proving that both shit and publicity rolls downhill.
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Referring to Admiral Smiths briefing against the journalist Jerome Starkey w ho uncovered the cover-up of JSOCs botched night-raid at Gardez. For more details, see The Operators, Jeremy Scahills Dirty Wars (both book and film), and my June 2012 post More Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Note: Just a year after McChrystals Senate confirmation, on June 23, 2010, President Obama fired McChrystal supposedly for inappropriate remarks made by his staff to a Rolling Stone reporter. However, it appears other factors were: to show the generals he was the Boss, because McChrystal was losing the war (subtitle of the cover of Rolling Stone) by failing to show progress in Marja, etc. and to punish Gen. McChrystal & Petraeus for promising what they couldnt deliver with his COIN strategy. The story had terrified them [the Washington crowd], striking deep-seated fears in the Washington psyche. It demonstrated just how tenuous ones own position could be careers could flame out overnight. And the political and media class saw the story as a threat to their schmoozy relationship100 The unwritten rule Id broken was a simple one: You really werent supposed to write honestly about people in power. Especially those the media deemed untouchable. Trash Sarah Palin all you want, but tread carefully when writing about the sacred cows like McChrystal and Petraeus. Youre supposed to keep the myths going. Id fucked up I wasnt to be trusted because I had told the truth. A few of my colleagues in the media eventually got around to attacking Rolling Stone. It was the beginning of a whispering campaign that would continue throughout the next year... I could understand why the government officials would be pissed. I was telling them their whole strategy was a waste of time. But the reaction from a number of journalists on the national security beat seemed twisted They seemed to take my criticism of the military-industrial complex personally. It might as well be called, I thought, the media-military-industrial complex The press had been complicit enablers before the Iraq invasion, failing in their watchdog role, focusing less on truth and accuracy and more on whether the campaign [to sell the war] was succeeding. The Armys investigation [of the Rolling Stone article] concluded that no one in the Army was at fault. In September, the Pentagon decided to launch a second investigation. They would spend eight months looking for answers, when all they really had to do was reread the story. To me, both the investigations seemed absurd. My story had never claimed McChrystal and his staff had violated any laws, yet the press coverage of the investigation made it appear as if the
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Reporter Carl Prine wrote in his column (Greenwald Is Wrong!, Line of Departure - January 7th, 2012): The confluence of celebrity generals and sycophantic DC reporters has served poorly our democracy and contributed to some of the worst journalism on battle in a half century. Too many reporters in and out of DC are stenographers, and they play to their sources instead of working hard on behalf of their readers. This is true not only of many reporters covering defense issues, but also those on every beat at every news outlet in the country. Thats one reason why ESPN did better reporting on the death of Pat Tillman than everyone in DC Mike Fish and the sports guys were outsiders not only to defense reporting but also the failed Beltway nexus of journos and generals, so they had no sacred cows to spare or VIPs to curry. They cared only about the truth. 147
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES men were all being exonerated.101 Exonerated from what? From looking like jerks? For being illegally, rather than casually, insubordinate? Pentagon officials would privately tell journalists that the intent of the investigation wasnt even to find wrongdoing; it was to damage my credibility. On April 8, 2011 the Defense Department investigation into McChrystal and his staff is completed. The investigation reads comically102 It [Rolling Stone exoneration] is the last whitewash of McChrystals military career.103 Two days after the [Dept. of Defense] report is finished, the White House announces that President Obama appointed McChrystal as an unpaid advisor to military families. They [White House] help to rehabilitate Stanley McChrystals image, appointing him [April 2011] to lead a high-profile initiative [Joining Forces] supporting military families no need to have a potential voice criticizing the administration in the upcoming election. Mary Tillman, Pat Tillmans mother, is outraged. Its a slap in the face to all soldiers, she says of the choice. He deliberately helped cover up Pats death. And he has never adequately apologized to us. ...
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Once again, the NYT reporter Thom Shanker carried water for the powers-that-be: An inquiry by the Defense Department inspector general into a magazine profile has cleared the general of all wrongdoing. [Pentagon Inquiry Into Article Clears McChrystal and Aides , NYT Apr. 18, 2011]. A reprise of Shankers previous exoneration(NYT May 26, 2009), just before his June 2009 Senate confirmation hearing, where his analysis found McChrystal was cleared of wrongdoing in the Pat Tillman case. Michael Hastings said, [Thom Shanker] literally just published the Pentagon spokesperson's anonymous quotes when he was reporting on my stories. And he didn't bother to call Rolling Stone for a comment, of course, because, well, he's got the official line from the Pentagon. [Robert Greenwald and Reporter Michael Hastings Take on the Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America's War Machine, Alternet 1/27/12)]
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In an interview with Scott Horton (The Operators; Six Questions for Michael Hastings, Jan. 20, 2012), Michael Hastings said: The multiple Pentagon investigations into the Rolling Stone story were particularly absurd. Of course, the results of these investigations were invariably reported with pro Pentagon spin. Thom Shanker [no surprise!] the New York Timess Pentagon correspondent, didnt even bother calling us for comment before he ran with the Pentagon spokespersons story clearing McChrystal, whatever that meant. (I refer you to the statement Obama made when he fired McChrystalthats why he got fired, not because he explicitly broke any laws. The Pentagons attempt at rewriting this history has been disturbing to observe.) I suggest reading the report of the investigations in full, if you want some comic relief.
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Michael Hastings said, Is whitewash one or two words? In my experience, when the DoD investigates itselfespecially when powerful people are involvedthey find they did nothing wrong. Or, they find some low-level asshole to hang out to dry [Scott Hortons, The Operators; Six Questions for Michael Hastings, Jan. 20, 2012]. 148
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES ... Postscript Note July 21, 2013: For more details about the last whitewash of McChrystals military career see my post, More Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not The Truth -- The New York Times Disingenuous Obituary of Michael Hastings & Their Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Role in LeAffair Rolling Stan and The Pat Tillman Story
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ITS A SLAP IN THE FACE TO APPOINT THIS MAN
Mary Tillman testifying before Congress (April 24, 2007)
McChrystal at White House Joining Forces (Apr. 12, 2011)
Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal has been invited back to public service by the Obama administration. [He]will lead the three-member advisory board for Joining Forces [McChrystal] said It sends a strong, positive message that this is about taking care of people. -- Thom Shanker, McChrystal to Lead Program for Military Families (NYT, April 10, 2011) I am proud that the Center for a New American Security [CNAS], has stepped forward to help coordinate Joining Forces. Its going to be guided by General Stan McChrystal. well come closer to our vision of a nation that truly recognizes and honors our military families. an America where every soldiercan deploy knowing that their family will be taken care of back at home. where our veterans and their families, especially our Gold Star families who have sacrificed so much, are honored throughout the entirety of their lives. -- First Lady Michelle Obama (Joining Forces Launch at White House, April 12, 2011) It is bewildering and tasteless, after McChrystals callous disregard for the Tillman family throughout this entire episode, that Barack Obama should appoint him to a high-profile position having anything to do with helping military families. -- Narda Zacchino, What Stanley McChrystal Did to Pat Tillmans Family (Truthdig.com, April 13, 2011) Is the president aware of the role that Gen. McChrystal played in the cover-up when Pat Tillman died? [WH Press Secretary] Carney answered that Obama is very aware of the generals rsum. [We have enormous respect for the service and sacrifice of Pat Tillman and his family. The circumstances surrounding Pat Tillman's death have been thoroughly investigated, and General McChrystal was found to have acted honorably despite the fact that this tragedy was mishandled.] -- Jake Tapper (ABC News, April 14, 2011) 150
Its a Slap in the Face to Appoint this Man

Maybe more important I would accept First Lady Michelle Obamas request to serve my country again, this time on the board of advisors for Joining Forces, a White House initiative for service members and their families. -- from Gen. McChrystals My Share of the Task ... Just two days after Thom Shanker supposedly cleared McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the Rolling Stone case, on April 10, 2011, Gen. McChrystals reputation was further restored by President Obamas appointing him to head up the new Joining Forces program to support military veterans and their families. In response, Mary Tillman said, Its a slap in the face to appoint this man He deliberately helped cover up Pats death someone who has a heartfelt desire to help families would not have been involved in the cover-up of a soldiers death Michael Hastings wrote, They [White House] help to rehabilitate Stanley McChrystals image, appointing him [April 2011] to lead a high-profile initiative [Joining Forces] supporting military families no need to have a potential voice criticizing the administration in the upcoming election. When asked about Marys remarks, Michelle Obama said were proud to have him [McChrystal] on board and White House Press Secretary Carney said that [President] Obama is very aware of the generals rsum. Later he added, We have enormous respect for the service and sacrifice of Pat Tillman and his family. The circumstances surrounding Pat Tillman's death have been thoroughly investigated, and General McChrystal was found to have acted honorably despite the fact that this tragedy was mishandled. April 22, 2011 was the seventh anniversary of Pat Tillmans death. Ironically, that year, it happened to fall on Good Friday. On Easter Sunday morning, the smiling faces of Michelle Obama & Jill Biden appeared on the cover of "Parade Magazine (a puff piece interview about the Joining Forces program, without, of course, any mention of Mary Tillmans objections). That Easter, while taking Communion at my Episcopal church, a somewhat sacrilegious Eucharistic liturgy came to mind: Pat Tillman has died. General Stanley McChrystal has risen (from his Rolling Stone crucifixion), but . . . Pat Tillman will not come again. As his brother Richard said at his brothers memorial service in 2004, . thanks for your thoughts, but hes fucking dead. ... Joining Forces is administered out of the influential Washington think tank, Center for a New American Security (CNAS). CNAS has close ties with Gen. McChrystal and led the push in Washington for the Afghan War surge.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES After writing his May 2009 piece that exonerated McChrystal, New York Times Pentagon Reporter Thom Shanker spent 90 days as a writer in residence at CNAS to work on his book Counterstrike. It appears Shankers sabbatical was yet another perk for exonerating McChrystal and for being a loyal stenographer for the Pentagon and the Obama administration. (And guess who hosted his September 2011 book release party? CNAS, of course!) In September 2009, CNASs Andrew Exum (a former Army Ranger officer) whitewashed McChrystals role in the Tillman cover-up with his horribly biased Washington Post book review of Jon Krakauers book Where Men Win Glory The Odyssey of Pat Tillman (the WP ombudsman later chastised him for neglecting to reveal his numerous personal and professional conflicts of interest). Andrew failed to show genuine concern for the Tillman family in his blog post Confirm Him" (June 2, 2009): The bottom line is, nothing is ever going to heal the wounds inflicted on the Tillman Family And while I have nothing but respect for the Tillman Family, their personal grief should not be a veto on the nomination of the man [Gen. Stanley McChrystal] more important than either the death of Pat Tillman or the alleged abuse of detainees [at Camp Nama]. In other words, the Tillman family can go to hell. And CNAS runs this program to "support" military families! Considering their past betrayal of the Tillman family, Gen. McChrystal and CNAS was a shameful choice by President Obama to run the Joining Forces program. As Narda Zacchino said, It is bewildering and tasteless, after McChrystals callous disregard for the Tillman family throughout this entire episode, that Barack Obama should appoint him to a high-profile position having anything to do with helping military families.
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McChrystal Takes Responsibility for Rolling Stone Article

1.) The Rolling Stone article is out [June 22, 2010], and its really bad. The article was the work of a reporter writing for Rolling Stone magazine who had interacted with my command team several times over the previous several months, including parts of our April trip to Europe. By nature I tended to trust people and was typically open and transparent But such transparency could go astray when others saw us out of context or when I gave trust to those few who were unworthy of it. (McChrystal, pp. 387, 109). I despise authors who slam others without even bothering to mention their name; in this case Michael Hastings. Perhaps McChrystal didnt want people to google him to check him out for themselves (or check out his book The Operators which discusses LeAffair Rolling Stan in detail). Hastings was young (only 30 years old at the time), but he had been an Iraq War Newsweek correspondent for 5 years. Perhaps McChrystals team underestimated this kid (like in the movie Almost Famous). It appears those few who were unworthy of it [trust] was McChrystals subtle slam of Hastings. I guess after all the blow job puff-piece hagiographies he was used to getting from the Establishment press corps, an honest profile by an independent reporter with integrity was a bit off-putting to his ego. 2.) But, beginning with the provocative title, The Runaway General, the article described a hard-charging general, a struggling US policy, and attributed a number of unacceptable comments to my command team. I was surprised at the tone and direction of the article (McChrystal, p. 387) Dont slam the reporter for the title! Editors decide that (and much of the article). Besides, I found the title on the cover to be even more provocative Obamas General: Why Hes Losing the War. Attributed? Even when pressed, by multiple journalists, McChrystal has consistently refused to confirm or deny the accuracy of the quotes and would not discuss the Rolling Stone article in detail. Why not? Probably because he knows Hastings has much of it recorded or written down. Unacceptable was from President Obamas press conference announcing McChrystals firing. In the Rolling Stone article the quotes were anonymous (editors decision); but in Hastings book they are all attributed by name to members of his staff (obviously tape-recorded or from detailed notes) and to McChrystal himself. McChrystal doesnt want anyone focusing on the substance of the story; did he and his staff make those unacceptable comments? Thats a battle he knows he cant win.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Surprised? Hastings spoke with McChrystals PR guru Duncan Boothby about The Rolling Stone article before it came out. Boothby knew (or suspected) it wasnt going to be good (maybe he didnt share that info with McChrystal). McChrystal was probably surprised that Hastings didnt write a blow-job piece despite the fact Hastings personally got along well with him and this staff. 3.) On April 14, 2010, we flew to Europe on Friday, April 16, when I took Annie for dinner at a small French restaurant to celebrate our 33rd wedding anniversary Annie felt the brotherhood among the soldiers was evident and was something the reporter needed to see and understand. The printed story cast it [dinner in Paris] is a very different light Regardless of how I judged the story for fairness or accuracy, responsibility was mine (McChrystal, pp. 384, 387). Fairness? McChrystal and his team have implied that Hastings used off-the-record quotes. However, Hastings had been a reporter for years, knew the rules, and claims he respected the two off-the-record conversations he had with McChrystal. And if the tape is rolling and the reporter is writing in his notebook, I would imagine things are on the record! And many reporters believe that all the damaging quotes were unfairly made at a bar. In reality, most of the damaging quotes were made the first day of Hastings reporting, in the office! Accuracy. As mentioned before, McChrystal has consistently refused to confirm or deny the accuracy of the quotes or whether or not they were insubordinate. Probably because he knows most of them were recorded or noted.104 Responsibility was mine? BS. McChrystal has evaded responsibility for the Rolling Stone profile that got him fired. Instead of resigning, McChrystal issued an apology and then threw his PR advisor Duncan Boothby over the side of the boat (Boothby offers his resignation McChrystal accepts). He probably thought he could ride out the media storm, again. Instead of taking responsibility, McChrystals portrayed Hastings as the bad guy, the scapegoat for his own sins. McChrystal blames the unnamed reporter (obviously liberal pinko left-wing if hes writing for Rolling Stone magazine!) for an unfair (implies that he was unethically using off-the-record material) inaccurate (anonymous quotes attributed). But, McChrystal refuses to discuss the substance of the story with the media. Thats a battle he knows he cant win. If McChrystal was genuinely taking responsibility for the Rolling Stone story, he would say something like, I fucked up by allowing myself and my staff to be too transparent, letting it all hang out, and trash-talking my civilian bosses in front of a reporter (the enemy). He seemed like such a harmless kid and he got along well with me and my staff. But, he was just doing his job and we said everything that appeared in his story. The closest he came to saying something like that was in a 2011 Tom Brokaw interview, where he discussed dealing with the press: the press is like -- it's not good or bad, it's like air. It's there. And unless you want to stop breathing, the press is going to be there, and you can't control
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Update 4-20-14: Gates memoir: McChrystal offered no explanation, didnt say he or his staff had been misquoted or that the article was distorted in any way. 154
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES it. I also tell them -- and I hope no one takes offense -- the press is what the press is. If you pick up a snake and hold it and it eventually bites you, don't get upset. (Laughter.) You know? That's what the press does. (Laughter.) I mean, they do their job.
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4.) In April 2011, the DoD IGs office would release a summary of its review into the allegations outlined in the Rolling Stone article. The investigation could not substantiate any violations of DoD standards and found that not all of the events occurred as portrayed in the Rolling Stone article. These conclusions came out quietly, almost a year after the tornado of controversy the article created (McChrystal, p. 390). The DoD Report was a joke. As previously mentioned (two pages back), The multiple Pentagon investigations into the Rolling Stone story were particularly absurd. Read it yourself. Its just six pages. Of course, the Pentagon wont release the full report or any of the interviews so the public can check it for themselves.
5.) And its [the storys] ultimate effect was immediately clear to me That evening, I was directed to fly back to D.C. From the moment Id seen the article, I knew only one decision was right for the moment and the mission I called no one for advice. we put on dress green uniforms before going to the Pentagon I left the White House after a short, professional meeting with President Obama and drove to Fort McNair to tell Annie that the President had accepted my resignation (McChrystal, p. 387-388).
**** ADD I consulted no one! Talked to Gates, issued apology, fired his PR guy!
[the storys] ultimate effect was immediately clear to me. Really? McChrystal staff told WP reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran: After McChrystal read it, "he knew instantly, this was going to be very large," the source said. "But I don't think any of us realized it was going to be as large as it was." I called no one for advice: Really! The general's first action was to call his superiors [eg. Mullen & Gates105]. Then he began reaching out to members of the Obama administration mentioned in the article [e.g. Biden, Holbrooke, etc. (from Gen. McChrystal allies, Rolling Stone disagree over article's ground rules, WP 6-26-10). I knew only one decision was right McChrystal wrote that he made the one decision to resign on the flight back to D.C. In interviews, hes said that when he met with Obama at the White House he had the resignation in his pocket (really?) and cheerfully offered his resignation although he would have stayed on if Obama thought it best: I wanted to stay in the job but I wanted to do what was best for the mission. Whatever the president felt was best for the mission was what I needed to do And he told CBS News that, "I told the president that I would support any decision he made -- if he wanted
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Update 4-20-14: From Gatess memoir: About 5 pm, Stan called me to apologize for the article. What the fuck were you thinking? McChrystal offered no explanation, didnt say he or his staff had been misquoted or that the article was distorted in any way.
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES me to go back or if he wanted to accept my resignation, which I carried with me." McChrystal said, "I accepted responsibility, I ended my career over that, and I've moved on with my life." What BS! McChrystal did not release his resignation before he was called back to DC. Instead, he issued a public apology and let his PR advisor Duncan Boothby take the fall: Spin it as a PR fuckup, thats all. He offers his resignation McChrystal accepts (Hastings, p. 316). Unless you quit by publically announcing your resignation before you meet with your Boss, youve been fired! (you can call that resigned if it helps your ego, but thats not candid). I ended my career? No, Obama did106. going to the Pentagon. McChrystal implies he made his decision to resign on the flight back to D.C. But, McChrystal hadnt submitted his resignation before he met with the President. From Mike Allens The Tick-Tock: How President Obama Took Command of the McChrystal Situation (6/24/10 Politico): NBC News Chief Pentagon Correspondent Jim Miklaszewski happened to be on the steps of the Pentagon when McChrystal arrived yesterday morning for his meeting with Secretary Gates107, before heading to the White House. Mik says McChrystal bounded up the steps: "My question was, 'Have you already submitted your resignation?' [McChrystal said] 'Come on, you know better than that. No!' 'When I asked "Will you?" he was already rushing through the door and up the stairs to his meeting with Gates and never responded."
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4-20-14 Update: From Gates memoir: I went in to see the president on the 22nd. The first words out of his mouth were Im leaning toward relieving McChrystal. I said McChrystal would offer a letter of
resignation I urged the president to turn down the resignation, and tell Stan he had one last chance. I was pretty sure the president would not do as I had suggested. Just after 10 a.m., the president called to tell me he had relieved McChrystal
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4-20-14 Update: From Gates memoir: I went in to see the president on the 22nd. The first words out of his mouth were Im leaning toward relieving McChrystal. I said I was going to see Stan the next morning I believe if we lose McChrystal, we lose the war. The president told me my concerns were valid, but I dont have the sense its going well in Afghanistan. He doesnt seem to be making progress. Maybe his strategy is not working. These feelings did not spring from a magazine article but had been there all along. What if Petreaus took command? I still urged the president to hear out McChrystal. I said McChrystal would offer a letter of resignation I urged the president to turn down the resignation, and tell Stan he had one last chance. I was pretty sure the president would not do as I had suggested. At 8:30 the next morning, Mullen and I met with McChrystal. I told him the president was leaning toward relieving him and that the proper thing to do was to offer to resign. Stan only said, Ill do whats best for the mission. He then left to see Obama. Just after 10 a.m., the president called to tell me he had relieved McChrystal the president came in and told the assembled senior team that Petraeus was the new commander. 157
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES And its worth noting that CSM Mike Hall was with McChrystal during his meeting with Obama. Although Hall wouldnt discuss the meeting, he did say that, nobody knew what was going to happen, nobody knew what General McChrystal was going to say, or what the president was going to say. Hmm. It sure sounds as though McChrystal hadnt decided to resign after his Pentagon meeting before he went to the White House. McChrystal would not disclose what Obama said to him during their meeting after the article ran, saying what is said between the president and I in the Oval Office really needs to be between us. He wants the powers-that-be to know that he can now be trusted to keep his mouth shut about his bosses. One reason he got fired was because his negative impressions of Obama he had shared with his staff and Michael Hastings appeared in Rolling Stone. Apparently, McChrystals at least learned the lesson to not bad-mouth his Boss in front of others. ... McChrystal ends his memoir with a brief, disingenuous discussion of the controversial Rolling Stone profile by Michael Hastings which led to his June 2010 firing by President Obama. But McChrystal claims he resigned (although he had only issued an apology and hadnt submitted his resignation before meeting Obama). McChrystal still declines to confirm or deny the accuracy of the quotes and falsely implies they were off-the record. McChrystal claims he consulted no one (although his first action was to call his superiors such as Secretary of Defense Gates and Vice President Biden, etc.). Finally, McChrystal claims he took full responsibility for the Rolling Stone piece (although PR advisor Duncan Boothby took the hit for him) but mostly blames the reporter for his (and his staffs) trash talk. For a more critical and honest account of LeAffair Rolling Stan, I would suggest Michael Hastings 2012 book The Operators.
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The Emperors General

Michael Hastings Rolling Stone piece, The Runaway General, came out on June 22, 2010. Coincidentally, that morning I was just finishing up my new post, The Emperors General about President Obamas whitewash of McChrystals role in the Tillman cover up. In all the hoopla about McChrystal being called back and fired by Obama, the small title on the cover of Rolling Stone (Lady Gaga beat out Stan; he didnt get to share a heart-shaped tub with her either) went unnoticed: Obamas General: Why Hes Losing the War. In his post, Michael Hastings: McChrystal Was Complex, Obama Was Naive, Afghanistan Is Hopeless (January 5, 2012), Spencer Ackerman wrote: Overshadowed by the McChrystal controversy was the story Hastings really wanted to produce: an indictment of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, which Hastings considers a deadly folly [In his book The Operators] he argues that the Afghanistan war is a debacle and that counterinsurgency is a liberal-sounding sham that conceals a bloodthirsty agenda. At the time, I didnt know shit about the Afghanistan War or the policy deliberations that had led up to the Afghan Surge. I was puzzled that McChrystal was supposedly fired just for a bit of trash talking banter by his staff. As I dug into it, it appeared part of the back story was that McChrystal was losing the war. The day after McChrystal was fired, Ron Paul said, That McChrystal thing is just a symptom of what we wont face up to, which is that its a totally failed policy If we were on the verge of a great success, do you think wed fire the general?). And Mike Allen wrote, that McChrystal already had two strikes: He had previous transgressions (including the London speech in which he dismissed out of hand an approach to Afghanistan that could have wound up being the strategy). Those had a cumulative effect and had taken their toll, as various aides put it. And we arent exactly rolling through Kandahar, so he wasnt walking on water in the field, which was also in the back of some folks minds. ... In Fall 2010, I read Bob Woodwards book Obamas Wars which discussed the run-up to the Afghan surge. On NPRs Talk of the Nation (12-13-10) I asked him about the back story to McChrystals firing (see my post "Throwing My Shoe at Bob Woodward ... Not"):
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES However, he either dodged or misunderstood my question about the two high-level meetings that McChrystal held with the President on May 6, 2010 and May 11, 2010108 . Curiously, Woodward said nothing in his book about what was discussed in those two meetings, other than McChrystal got a strike one and strike two. Either his sources held out on him, or Woodward was holding back in his book. Probably, it was a combination of the Afghan war not going so well and [at least] the perception that McChrystal was once again boxing in Obama that got him fired. If McChrystal was clearly winning the war, I think he would still be there. Politically it worked. Obama showed that he was in charge, punished McChrystal for once again boxing him in (if he believed that was the case), and punished Gen. Petreaus for boxing him in by demoting him from CENTCOM and handing him the tar-baby of the Afghan War (COINs the trick, well be drawing down in a year? OK, now its your baby). Since June 2010, Ive read quite a bit on the Afghan War and the decision-making story of the Afghan Surge. I found Woodwards account to be the most valuable (as have others) and I think Michael Hastings account in his book The Operators is a solid introduction to that story (along with my post Something to Die For, that goes over the same ground in less detail). ... Overall, McChrystals account of LeAffair Rolling Stan is disingenuous. He claims to have taken responsibility for the Rolling Stone story (although he blames Michael Hastings, without mentioning his name, for his supposed lack of fairness and accuracy). However, McChrystal has refused dodged discussing the substance of the story and has repeatingly refused to confirm or deny the accuracy of Hastings quotes and story. Hilariously, McChrystal claims he made the decision to resign on the flight back to D.C. (although he hadnt yet submitted his resignation two hours before seeing the President). He said he would have stayed on the job if Obama had thought it best; obviously, McChrystal was actually fired by President Obama after being called back to DC from Afghanistan.
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McChrystal doesnt mention these May meetings in his book. He only mentions (p. 385) President Karzais th arrival on May 12 .
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SOMETHING TO DIE FOR

The Failure of Gen. McChrystals Afghan War Surge
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Listen, this really hurts [death of Bob Horrrigan & other operators in 2005]. But let me tell you what would make it hurt even more; if it is all in vain. Victory would not offset the terrible price already paid a price that would increase as the fight expanded. But losing would make the pain unbearable. -- Gen. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task What did Mr. Tillman's sacrifice mean? It didn't mean anything. It speaks to the mythology of war ... There is nothing glamorous or romantic about war. It's mostly about random pointless death and misery the good aren't rewarded, there's no such thing as karma. -- Jeffery A. Trachtenberg , Jon Krakauers Inside Story of Pat Tillman (WSJ, Sept. 11, 2009) I wanted Barack Obama to win the presidency in 2008. Among my reasons was his outspoken opposition to Bushs disastrous, unnecessary and probably illegal war in Iraq. So what does Obama do? He sends 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. Having interviewed Patrick Tillman, Sr. (father of Pat Jr.) I called him for a quote. My condolences to the families in advance, he said. -- Jack Neworth, Careful What You Wish For, Santa Monica Daily Press, (Jan. 29, 2011) Since Obama became president, a thousand soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, more than double the total in the years under Bush. lets declare victory and go home. It only took an additional 711 American lives for the White House to arrive at this conclusion. Wed been fighting the wrong war, in the wrong way, in the wrong country. -- Michael Hastings, The Operators (January 2012)
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Pat Tillman was awarded this Silver Star medal. McChrystal supervised the writing of this award with falsified witness statements and a narrative that bears no resemblance to reality .
The Operators
[Adapted from Michael Hastings book The Operators. See my post Something to Die For, for the full annotated version with page references and links to more detailed documentation]
For five years [2003 2008], McChrystal was Americas top hunter/killer. [JSOC & Gen.] Petraeus and counterinsurgency is able to take credit for creating the conditions for a facesaving withdrawal [from Iraq]. The surge becomes a modern military myth Petraeus and the COINdinistas, with a new leading figure in the guise of General Stanley McChrystal, would soon push their theories on Afghanistan in full force. [Secretary of Defense Robert] Gates says hell fire him [Gen. McKiernan] if he doesnt resign. He doesnt, and Gate fires him [May 11, 2009]. Privately, McKiernan will tell friends that it was Petraeus who was behind getting rid of him a dirty move to get a public relations bump that comes from the strong move of switching generals to win the war. In May 2009 President Obama nominated Gen. Stanley McChrystal to assume command of the Afghan War. McChrystal gets unanimous confirmation from the Senate. On June 9, 2009, he gets his fourth star. On June 26 [2009], Gates asks McChrystal to write a strategic assessment of the war. By early August, the assessment is close to being complete. McChrystal flies for a secret meeting with Gates, Mullen, and Petraeus. He tells them his stark assessment, tells them the situation is deteriorating, the serious next step is asking for more troops. The serious next step is what the assessment concludes: Were losing. [On September 21, 2009] Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward publishes McChrystals confidential assessment of the war. On September 27, six days after the leak, a McChrystal interview airs on 60 Minutes. The White House doesnt like what happened in London, either. McChrystals allies in the media rally to push his plan inviting influential thinkers to the assessment team pays dividends. In the end, Obama attempts to split the difference he gives the military the troops they want, but tells them they need to leave sooner than theyd like. Obama gives McChrystal what he wants, warning him over a VTC: Do not occupy what you cannot transfer. Obama chooses West Point to deliver his [Dec. 1, 2009] speech on his new strategy. Or, more accurately, McChrystal and Petraeuss strategy. He tells the audience of cadets all the reasons why fighting in Afghanistan is a bad idea. He tells them that were going to do it anyway. The escalation in Afghanistan is on an entirely different scale from the escalation in Iraq, however it creates a new war. The surge in
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Afghanistan triples the number of forces and more than quadruples the cost of the conflict. Its chances of success are low, almost nonexistent. ... By the fall of 2008 Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda were barely footnotes to what we were doing there. If it wasnt about Bin Laden, then what the fuck was it about? When I traveled with McChrystal, I was shocked when General Michael Flynn had told me that he didnt think wed ever get Bin Laden. Why are we here? Spending over a week [April 2010] with McChrystal and his team in Western Europe had caused me, briefly, to rethink my answers. The more time I spent outside the bubble I couldnt shake my own skepticism. No matter how professional or competent or dynamic McChrystal and his team were, the task they had set out for themselves was so obviously doomed. [SAS commander Sir Graeme Lamb] describing the situation [in Afghanistan] as like Apollo 13, heading out to the moon, with a bloody great hole in the side, bleeding oxygen. The simple and terrifying reality, forbidden from discussion in America, was that they were getting their asses kicked by illiterate peasants who made bombs out of manure and wood. The arena [p.279, from Teddy Roosevelts speech] acted as a barrier, protecting their sacrifices from the uncomfortable realities of the current war that it might be a total waste of time and resources that historians would look back on cringing What was happening in Marja [April 22, 2009; offensive started on February 12, 2009] didnt bode well for the next major offensive planned for Kandahar. Marja was supposed to be a proof of concept and the concept looked like a failure. McChrystal will describe it [Marja] as a bleeding ulcer. The White House will view it as a failure. A joke goes around: Yes, Afghanistan does have a government in a box. That box is Kabul. What McChrystal is doing in Kandahar doesnt seem to be what hed promised the White House earlier. He doesnt impress them and it will be held against him a few weeks later. They were still pissed about the leak of the strategic assessment and the failure to explain the rationale of the Kanadahar offensive to the president and his staff. ... The draft [of the June 22, 2010 Rolling Stone profile The Runaway General] expressed my conflicting feelings Id liked hanging out with McChrystal and his team, yet I hated the war. Everything Id seen and heard and knew about the war would not reflect well on them.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES The real problem wasnt just the content of the story it was who read it. High-ranking figures in Washington, mainly, proving that both shit and publicity rolls downhill. All that is bad [stupid things they said] its bad too, that they think were wimps, a White House insider will tell me. Petraeuss name comes up that solves a bunch of problems. The White House knows that if they are going to sack McChrystal, they cant put some no-name in his place. If Petraeus cant do it, no one can, or so the thinking goes. The president said it: This is Petraeuss plan too. He helped design and lead our new strategy. Obama doesnt mention he had worked along with Gates and Mullen to box in the president in the decision to escalate the war. The McChrystal thing that burns Gates up. [But] He tosses [Gen.] McKiernan without a word of remorse. at McChrystals retirement ceremony in July [2010], Gates will bemoan the fact that Americans have lost a hero, someone whose record of service is unmatched. (Forget Tillman, forget Camp Nama, forget the negative command climate) Petraeus didnt seem to want to get publicly attached to the war in Afghanistan. Hes had his triumph in Iraq, and military officials speculated that he knew there was no way the Afghanistan war was going to turn out well. That it was a loser, and he was happy enough to let McChrystal be left holding the bag. [Petraeus] needs to change the headlines Petraeus steps up the violence. He drastically ups the number of airstrikes triples the number of night raids by Special Forces keeps claiming progress, despite the fact that violence keeps going up. The metrics used to judge progress in Afghanistan are classified The general [Petraeus] set out to remake the NIE to his liking.
Note: One whistleblower, LTC Daniel Davis, published an article called "Truth, Lies and Afghanistan" where he wrote, "Senior ranking US military leaders have so distorted the truth when communicating with the US Congress and American people in regards to conditions on the ground in Afghanistan that the truth has become unrecognizable." In an interview, Active-Duty Army Whistleblower Lt. Col. Daniel Davis: U.S. Deceiving Public on Afghan War (Democracy Now, Apr. 11, 2012), LTC Davis said: I dont know why theyre dead. I dont know what benefit my country derived from the loss of their life. And if you cant tell me that theyre going to gain some benefit for my country, I just morally cannot keep quiet. I mean, the Army is built on whats called the Army Seven Values if you see something thats wrong, youve got to have the moral courage to do something about it. loyalty is one of those values, and I believe my loyalty to the soldiers I just owed it to them to do whatever I could to try to bring light to this
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES White House officials start to make the case [Spring 2011]: The [Afghan] surge worked, lets declare victory and go home.110 In April, President Obama announces Petraeus will become his next CIA chief. In June, he returns home, his tour in Afghanistan complete. In August, a retirement ceremony is held for him. No top White House officials attend. Petraeus has exited gracefully. The plan Biden had called for a year earlier is the plan the Pentagon is going to be forced to adopt. It only took an additional 711 American lives and 2,777 Afghan lives for the White House to arrive at this conclusion. Since Obama became president, a thousand soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, more than double the total in the years under Bush.111 Strangely, Bin Ladens death [May 1, 2011] would have little impact on the actual war the war in Afghanistan hadnt been about capturing Bid Laden for years... But it would give Obama the political cover he needed to give his speech in June [2011] where he declared the war in Afghanistan was coming to an end, or at least the beginning of the beginning of the end. Right from the start, the idea of the War on Terror was a fuzzy one at best. Bin Ladens death revealed the biggest lie of the war, the safe haven myth, Afghanistans version of WMDs Wed been fighting the wrong war, in the wrong way, in the wrong country. War had been exposed as the Giant Lying Machine112, in Halberstams words. It was all, it seemed, a scam.
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The latest Gen. Petraeus biography, All In, had been sitting in a stack by my bed for over a month. I had glanced at it, but it looked like such a boring suckfest that I put off reading it. My instincts were collaborated by Micheal Hastings Rolling Stone review, The Legend of David Petraeus (Jan. 31, 2012). Heres Michael Hastings on the book: The genius of David Petraeus has always been his masterful manipulation of the media. But after reading the new biography about him Ive started to wonder if hes losing his touch. the Petraeus-approved All In is such blatant, unabashed propaganda, its as if the general has given up pretending theres a difference between the press and his own public relations team. Instead, for a more honest take on Petraeuss war, I would recommend Intel Wars (2012) by Matthew M. Aid or, of course, Michael Hastings book.
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And, heres Michael Hastings on the Giant Lying Machine [Robert Greenwald and Reporter Michael Hastings Take on the Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America's War Machine (Alternet ,1-27-12): ... I called it the media military industrial complex, and one of the sort of insights that I have had is that they call it the Pentagon Press Corps, right? And you sort of think, oh, well it means the people who kind of watch over the Pentagon and perform the media's watchdog function, but no, it's an extension of the Pentagon. For the most part. I mean, when was the last time anyone at the Pentagon broke a story that wasn't pre-approved? It's very, very rare. And I noticed this first in Iraq when things were going horribly when I was there. And the spokespeople in the military public relations apparatus would just lie to your face. Every day they would lie. And God forbid you point this out. Yeah, we all know they're lying but you're not supposed to say it, you know? We know we're getting bullshit every day, but come on, man, don't point it out -- that's not classy. 166
Obamas General: Why Hes Losing the War.

Michael Hastings Rolling Stone piece, The Runaway General, came out on June 22, 2010. Coincidentally, that morning I was just finishing up my new post, The Emperors General about President Obamas whitewash of McChrystals role in the Tillman cover up. In all the hoopla about McChrystal being called back and fired by Obama, the small title on the cover of Rolling Stone went unnoticed: Obamas General: Why Hes Losing the War (Lady Gaga beat out Stan for the cover picture; he didnt share a heart-shaped tub with her). At the time, I didnt know shit about the Afghanistan War or the policy deliberations that had led up to the Afghan Surge. I was puzzled that McChrystal was supposedly fired just for a bit of trash talking banter by his staff. Later, as I dug into the story and read about the Afghan War, it appeared much of the back story was that he was losing the war (As Ron Paul said, If we were on the verge of a great success, do you think wed fire the general?). Since then, Ive read quite a bit on the Afghan War and the decision-making story of the Afghan Surge. I found Woodwards account to be the most valuable (as have others) and I think Michael Hastings The Operators is a solid introduction to that story (along with my post Something to Die For, that goes over the same ground (in less detail). If I had the time, Id lay out the argument that McChrystal (along with Petraeus, Gates, and Mullen) boxed in Obama into a strategically flawed COIN Afghan surge. Gen. McKiernan wouldnt ask for more troops, so they fired him in May 2009 and put in McChrystal who (after his assessment with some think-tank gurus) asked for the troops needed according to their best military advice. In September 2009, once they realized that Obama didnt want to win but instead wanted to head for the exit, the Pentagon leaked the report to box-in Obama. Eventually, Obama compromised probably out of political calculation (if the surge works, great we can draw down troops. Doesnt work? Say it did, so we can draw down). Obama gave the Pentagon most of the troops they wanted, but set a deadline. But the Pentagon figured they could use the loophole that troop draw-downs would be based on conditions on the ground to keep a lot of troops in the Afghan War for a long time. The Surge didnt work. McChrystal got fired, and Petreaus couldnt make it work. But, McChrystal should have known it was folly from the beginning. His best military advice wasnt worth shit. A lot of troops have been killed or wounded because of it. In the following pages Ive pasted quotes from McChrystals book followed by quotes from books or articles that present a more critical account than that found in Gates or McChrystals memoirs of their command of the failed Afghan War COIN surge.
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Team America (Fuck Yeah!)

I knew I had to build a team of talented, experienced, and deeply committed professionals A joke circulated that the bands getting back together. I knew the key to success was getting people to believe more than anything else, this was a war of perception and confidence I felt strongly we could succeed, and committed myself completely.
...
Despite all of the bad news, a small but determined group of officers at ISAF HQ in Kabul, snidely referred to by their colleagues as Team Victory, continued to resolutely believe in eventual victory in Afghanistan (Matthew M. Aid, p. 96Intel Wars). Team America the name McChrystals staff called themselves, referring to the comedic film113 about U.S. cluelessness (Michael Hastings, p. 110 The Operators) Gates said the war needed some fresh thinking. By fresh thinking, Gates meant a working knowledge of COIN. Several officers whod worked with McChrystal were puzzled by his appointment. As far as they knew, he had no skill set in counterinsurgency McChrystals experience in this die of insurgency warfare had been, literally, academic, derived strictly from reading books The consequences would soon show. (Fred Kaplan, p. 302; The Insurgents) McChrystals staff formed a tight clique. They were all Rangers and they all tried to act just like the boss: a groupthink seems to have taken hold, a shared conviction they were right about everything and that everyone else was wrong, nave or stupid The insularity of McChrystals staff suppressed the normal tendency to reassess the situation or modify a decision. His staff officers dismissed the pessimism out of hand. They were Rangers, flush with a can-do confidence, emboldened by their recent tours in Iraq. (Fred Kaplan, p. 328-329; The Insurgents) McChrystals command style represented an unprecedented departure from previous US military history a command made up of elite Special Forces soldiers Generally, theyd been in charge of a few thousand of the most brilliant people in the service, and they were now running an army that numbered in the hundreds of thousands. A drawback: McChrystal [was] used to dealing with the best of the best, high IQs, not the dumbness of the Big Army. The loyalty [of his staff] to McChrystal often ended up with the general getting an inaccurate picture of what was actually taking place Why are we here? Spending over a week [April 2010] with McChrystal and his team in Western Europe had caused me, briefly, to rethink my answers Their confidence and expertise were persuasive. If they believed in the mission, then why couldnt I? The more time I spent outside the bubble I couldnt shake my own skepticism. No matter how professional or competent or dynamic McChrystal and his team were, the task they had set out for themselves was so obviously doomed. (Michael Hastings, p. ** The Operators)
113
Team America (2004); see soundtack for theme song America (Fuck Yeah)
168
Unfortunate Deficit of Trust

the emergence of an unfortunate deficit of trust between the White House and the Department of Defense as I deployed to Afghanistan my gut feeling was that we needed a new approach, not additional forces Some in the White House felt as though the military had limited the presidents options before he had a chance to weigh our professional advice. This was never my intent, nor that of my staff. To me it appeared unintentional on both sides I knew that any perceptions of military incompetence or manipulation were unfounded I had to provide accurate, honest inputs. I viewed the troop calculation [40,000 needed] not as a request, but as providing what is termed best military advice I should have understood better that the presidents review process was reevaluating the mission itself ... [Mullen and Gates] were starting to wonder whether McKiernan really knew how many troops were needed. If McKiernan was serious about counterinsurgency, how could he not want more forces?... Mullen and Gates had settled on a replacement they felt confident he [McChrystal] would ask for the resources necessary to win. ( Chandrasekaran, pp. 52-53, Little America) Before McChrystal had departed Washington, Robert Gates had told him to take stock of the war effort within 60 days convinced that David McKiernan had underestimated the need for more U.S. troops, there was now an opening to campaign for more. All it required was for McChrystal to make a convincing case. (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, p. 59, Little America) Obamas uncertainly about the mission was evident in the questions he posed in the first meeting with the NSC on September 13, 2009 It was only then that some in the military began to discover this was not a review to bless the current strategy; it was a review meant to find a way to the exit [escalate and exit]. The jamming of the President began right away. Just after the first meeting, Gen. McChrystals secret reportwas leaked (David Sanders, p. 29 Confront & Conceal). McChrystal gave a speech in London made it clear [Vice President Bidens counterterrorism option] would lead to failure McChrystal had by then already participated in two meetings with Obamas war cabinet in which considerable skepticism had been voiced about the need for a large-scale counterinsurgency campaign the military now seemed to be staking out a hard position ahead of the conclusion of the formal Afghanistan review by Obama. (Peter Bergen, p.523; The Longest War) at every turn that fall, according to [Bob] Woodward, the military had sought to limit Obamas options. In turn, Petraeus, McChrystal and Mullen felt they were simply urging enough troops to defeat al-Queda and the Taliban. Does the President want to win or lose? they reportedly asked each other, believing they were forthrightly laying out what was required stood by the request for 40,000 more troops as the only way to make progress in Afghanistan We truly didnt try to box them in, [said Petraeus] Yeah, we were in all in league; we supported what we thought was the militarily sensible option we said that below 40,000 you cant accomplish the mission. (Paula Broadwell, p. 114; 118; 119 All In)
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I Was Selling an Unsellable Position

If Id felt like the decision to set a withdrawal date would have been fatal to the success of the mission, Id have said so often glacial speed of counterinsurgency unrealistic expectations Congressmen had told me repeatedly that I had, at most, a year to show convincing progress
...
Obama ultimately agreed to 30,000 additional troops But he also then insisted that Mullen, Petreaus, McChrystal and Gates agree to a secret terms sheet that stated; This approach is not fully resourced counterinsurgency or nation building, but a narrower approach what Obama personally added at the last minute was the provision that a drawdown of forces would begin in July 2011. (Paula Broadwell, p. 119-120 All In) With these additional forces, he [Obama] asked them [Mullen, Gates, Petraeus] will you be able to clear, hold, and transfer to the point wherewithin eighteen monthsthe Afghan security forces can take the lead in the fight?... If they said they could do this, and it turned out they couldnt, he wasnt going to double down. No serious scholar or practitioner in the field would promise that a campaign of this sort could succeed so rapidly. Counterinsurgency wars were by nature protracted wars; they usually took years, sometimes decades, to resolve. (Fred Kaplan, p. 317; The Insurgents) I asked one of Petreauss aides how he reconciled the generals plan with the presidents goal. We didnt pay much attention to that memo, he said. (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, pp. 319-321, Little America) Both sides could take from the July 2011 date that they had won the battle; for the Pentagon the important point about the timing of the withdrawal was that it would be conditions based. (Peter Bergen, p.328; The Longest War) Petraeuss assumptionwas that as in Iraq, the surge would yield some significant benefits significant enough that the president would not want to tinker with success. But Afghanistan wasnt Iraq, and change wasnt coming as quickly as the deadlines Washington had setthe Pentagon saying they could do it [18-month surge] in order to get the troopsThey all signed up to it They thought if we can establish this is working, we would not end up withdrawing. The way you do counterinsurgency is to do as much as it takes, for as long as it takes. (David Sanders, pp. 51-52 Confront & Conceal). The inability to hand off the [Garmser] district to the Afghans after two years raised fundamental questions about Americas war strategy The Marines werent ready to hand over Nawa Had the commanders made a false promise to the president?... If the Afghan government lacked the capacity and political will to provide security and civil administration in the districts, counterinsurgency seemed to be the wrong strategy. (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, pp. 319-321, Little America)
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A Bleeding Ulcer
Why are we here, Sir? Whats the Point?... ground truth I was asking soldiers to believe in something their ground-level perspective denied them. I was asking them to believe in a strategy impossible to guarantee, and in progress that was difficult to see, much less prove the fight for Marjah, never in doubt militarily, became a litmus test for the validity of our strategy in Afghanistan. ... [Richard Holbrooke said] there has always been a disconnect between what was being reported internally and the talking points You would never know we were talking about the same war. Truth is the first casualty of war. (Matthew M. Aid, pp. 13Intel Wars) With each trip, the war became less recognizable as the one being described from podiums in Kabul, Washington, and London. A positive spin could be expected but there was often such a gulf between what we were told was happening and what I was seeing with my own eyes that I sometimes questioned my recollections... This is a simple book an honest account of what the war looks like on the ground. (Ben Anderson, xvi No Worse Enemy; see also Andersons documentary, Battle for Marjah). If the Obama administration and Gen. McChrystal had seriously hoped that they could turn the tide in Afghanistan in 2009, they were sorely disappointed had failed to arrest the Taliban momentum Going into 2010 [McChrystal] promised Washington a quick, decisive victory that would publicly demonstrate that the tide was indeed turning The place chosenwas Marjah. (Matthew M. Aid, pp. 92-93 Intel Wars) The warMcChrystals warwasnt going so well. The clearest and most disturbing sign was the battle for Marja The ISAF troops could clear but not hold, and the build phase of the plan lay in the incalculably distant future there was no government in a box (Fred Kaplan, p. 331; The Insurgents) Panic over Marjah set in at ISAF HQ Gen. McChrystal flew down to Marjah He wanted results and he wanted them soon. This is a bleeding ulcer right now in June 2010, Gen. McChrystal admitted that only 5 of the 121 districts in Afghanistan that he deemed essential if the war in Afghanistan was to be won were rated as secure (Aid, pp. 95-97Intel Wars) The problem with Marjah, he [Carl Weston] said was not just McChrystals unattainable expectations. It was the surge itself the Afghan government lacked the willingness and capacity to seize the opportunity provided by American troops. We set ourselves up for an impossible model in the ninth year of the war We created our own strategic failure. (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, p. 147, Little America) [McChrystal;] That the military part of counterinsurgency works in Afghanistan. I dont think its proven yet that the government of Afghanistan could rise to meet what they have to do. Because if they cant do it, another pillar of counterinsurgency is missing, and you have to have it. (Gordon, Q. and A. With Former U.S. Commander in Afghanistan NYT, Jan. 8, 2013)
171
It Would Be Folly
As a student of history, I was sensitive to the Vietnam analogy I re-read Stanley Karnows Vietnam: A History During a memorable night in Kabul. I spoke on the phone with Karnow114 When I arrived to take command of the war in June 2009, I found a creeping, fatalistic pessimism, as though the fight were over, the effort failed Indeed, in those early days, as I assessed the war, I wasnt sure it could be done. Although Id known it would be difficult, the situation was even worse than Id anticipated I wasnt sure a successful outcome was achievable, no matter what we did gauging our chances at fifty-fifty, and only then if we made serious changes. The obstacles were numerous, but the accrued problems were not insoluble, just incredibly difficult.. I understood the tendency of military leaders to be optimistic, often dangerously so. But both our analysis and my intuition told me our effort could succeed I thought that if we did smart analysis, got the strategy right, worked to exhaustion, and came into a bit of luck, the mission could be accomplished. I never would have sought additional forces to fight an effort I felt was doomed If Id felt like the decision to set a withdrawal date would have been fatal to the success of the mission, Id have said so ... the new [COIN] doctrine would harden into dogma. And its enthusiasts, emboldened in their confidence, wouldoften with good intentionslure the nation more deeply into another war that it lacked the ability or appetite to win. (Fred Kaplan, p. 4; The Insurgents) Even Fred Kagan, the most enthusiastic [McChrystal assessment] team member, put the chances of success at less than fifty-fifty. (Fred Kaplan, p. 306; The Insurgents) Wass de Czege worried that the COIN field manual was under representing the difficulty of doing this you need to know how difficult it is ahead of time, because if what you bring to the conflict isnt enough to win the battles, then its better to stay out. (Fred Kaplan, p. 162; The Insurgents) [David Kilcullen thought] that it was generally best not to undertake COIN campaigns in the first place. They took a long time, cost a lot of money, got a lot of people killed, and often didnt work The theme throughout his fifty-page guide was basically, dont do this! A glance at a map, a few villages, or some key passages from Galula would have revealed that Afghanistan and COIN made an unlikely match (Fred Kaplan, p. 347; The Insurgents) According to Galula, these prerequisites [for a successful insurgency] included a weak government, a neighboring country that offers safe havens, and a predominately rural, illiterate
Stanley Karnow, more than a mentor: Column: I asked Stanley [Karnow] what he told the U.S. commander [McChrystal] in Afghanistan. "Well, that we never should have been in Vietnam in the first place," he answered.
114
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES populationprecisely the traits marking Karzais Afghanistan. an insurgents ideal situation was the topography and demography of Afghanistan. (Fred Kaplan, p. 342; The Insurgents) werent able to hold or build much not even after a year and a half of a COIN-driven surge. There was no reason to believe that another year and a half and thirty thousand troops would make much difference. Nor, probably, would another ten years and one hundred thousand troops. (Fred Kaplan, p. 354; The Insurgents) I argued against having the surge then, because I said that its not even close to being enough. There was a paper it was called "Go Big or Go Deep." the "Go Big" plan, which is what General McChrystal was recommending Forty thousand was never enough. Maybe 100,000 additional troops might have given you the ability to militarily pacify the insurgency. Im not advocating that was the answer; in fact, I was advocating the opposite: dont put those troops in there. (Active-Duty Army Whistleblower Lt. Col. Daniel Davis: U.S. Deceiving Public on Afghan War) the modern age itself has reduced much of the whole COIN concept to folly. The most oftencited models of successful counterinsurgenciesMalaya, Kenya, the Philippines, Algeria, and Northern Ireland-- were colonial wars. The successful COIN campaigns of lore were also wars of stunning brutality in Algeria, the routine use of torture in pacification campaigns. This was the dark side of counterinsurgency, but it had also been seen by its practitioners as an essential side. (Fred Kaplan, p. 364; The Insurgents) David Kilcullen wrote in his interagency guide on COIN that it would be folly to engage in counterinsurgency abroad unless there is a reasonable likelihood that the affected government will introduce necessary reforms and will demonstrate adequate willpower and capacity to defeat insurgents It is often the case that the less intrusive and more indirect the approach selected, the more likely it is to succeed a small footprint is often best (Fred Kaplan, p. 289-291; The Insurgents) If you send troops overseas to bolster a regime whose leaders lack legitimacy or the will to reform, the most brilliant strategyand strategistwill have little chance of prevailing In assessing the prospects of a COIN campaign, if the insurgents are out of reach, or if the government being challenged is too corrupt to reform, or if the war is likely to take longer and cost more than a president or a nation is willing to commit its the commanders responsibility to say so. David Petreaus [& McChrystal?] knew all these things were true of the war in Afghanistan, but he stopped short of saying so; he thought he could overcome the odds (Fred Kaplan, p. 363; The Insurgents) Overshadowed by the McChrystal controversy was the story Hastings really wanted to produce: an indictment of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, which Hastings considers a deadly folly [In his book The Operators] he argues that the Afghanistan war is a debacle and that counterinsurgency is a liberal-sounding sham that conceals a bloodthirsty agenda (Spencer Ackerman, Michael Hastings: McChrystal Was Complex, Obama Was Naive, Afghanistan Is Hopeless January 5, 2012)
173
The Sons-of-Bitches With all the Fruit Salad

Gen. McKiernans request for new forcesa new president found himself facing a timesensitive decision. It reminded me of President Kennedys experience with the Bay of Pigs [My father] talked about how hard it was to take responsibility for mistakes. He used President Kennedys leadership and courage after the Bay of Pigs fiasco as an example. [Daniel Ellsbergs] outrage stemmed from his conclusion that many of the failures in Vietnam owed not to flawed analysis but to politically driven decisions to ignore the difficult conclusions the analysis offered. The Pentagon Papers convinced him that decision makers had not been misled into disaster by ignorance or bad advice. Rather, faced with two politically toxic but militarily sound options -- withdrawal or full escalation -- they [slam at Obama?] chose to pursue other policies for political reasons, even though analysis told them these policies were likely to fail. [McChrystal;] I go back and think of President Kennedy, who had a military service background, but he comes into the presidency and hes faced with a decision on the Bay of Pigs, with the C.I.A. and the military giving him data, and it turns out very badly. It really set back their ability to build trust over time (Michael Gordon, Q. and A. With Former U.S. Commander in Afghanistan NYT, Jan. 8, 2013) ... The sons-of-bitches with all the fruit salad just sat there nodding, saying it would work -President Kennedy, on the bad advice he received from his generals, remarking on the colorful ribbons on their chests (from first page of Michael Hastings book The Operators). [Michael Hastings:] After he [JFK] got burned at the Bay of Pigs, he said, never again am I going to blindly trust these guys. He had learned in the Pacific that a lot of these admirals and generals running around were clowns. What did I learn in Iraq, seeing Iraqi police execute people on the streets and then having a two, three star general tell me how great the Iraqi police are? You realize these guys are clowns! But its really tough for people who havent served to stand up to all the shiny brass. And its tough for journalists as well just because someone has a uniform on doesnt mean you need to genuflect. You can be respectful and thank them. But one has to be able to be as critical of fourstar general as of Newt Gingrich. You have to treat these people like theyre flawed human beings like you (Spencer Ackerman, Michael Hastings: McChrystal Was Complex, Obama Was Naive, Afghanistan Is Hopeless January 5, 2012) Petraeus did not accept the new presidents desire to head for the nearest exit ramp on Afghanistan in 2009. The general began lobbying for a surge and undercutting the president Petraeus rolled the younger commander in chief into going ahead with a bound-to-fail surge in Afghanistan, just as, half a century earlier, the C.I.A. had rolled Jack Kennedy into going ahead with the bound-to-fail Bay of Pigs scheme. Both missions defied logic, but the untested
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES presidents put aside their own doubts and instincts, caving to experience So many more American kids and Afghanistan civilians were killed and maimed in a war that went on too long. Thats the real scandal. (Maureen Dowd, Reputation, Reputation, Reputation Nov. 13, 2012) Obama should have gone long, not big But taking that path would have required a first-term Democratic president with no military experience to stand up to his troop-hungry generals. Surging was the easy thing to do, [Kael] Weston said. Its much harder to say no. (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, pp. 331, Little America) ... In Holbrookes opinion, the Pentagon had failed to candidly tell President Obama just how bad the situation was in Afghanistan and how poor the short term prospects were for turning the situation around if due consideration had been given to all the facts on hand, it might have been more statesmanlike to go back on the promises he made on the campaign trail and just walk away from the problem. (Matthew M. Aid, pp. 70-71 Intel Wars) Obama had to do this 18-month surge just to demonstrate, in effect, that it couldnt be done . Obama would have given the monolithic military its day in court and the United States would not be seen as having been driven off the battlefield. (Bob Woodward, p. 338; Obamas War) Does Obama really believe in the war? McChrystal and his team have their doubts. One of the reasons he agreed to the escalation in Afghanistan was because he felt he would be politically vulnerable if he didnt he might look weak on national security, he couldnt overrule his generals. Did he really go along with a war he didnt believe we could win so he wouldnt get criticized for losing it? (Michael Hastings, pp. 287-288; The Operators) ... I find it rather ironic that McChrystal chose to compare Obamas rubber-stamping of McKiernans request with the Bay of Pigs. I think it would have been more apt to compare the Bay of Pigs with McChrystals request for 40,000 troops. And, is it my imagination, or was McChrystal making a dig on Obama, blaming him for not choosing withdrawal or full escalation? On the contrary, I agree with Maureen Dowd that Gates, Petraeus, Mullen, and McChrystal115 succeeded in boxing in Obama into giving them the troops to try out their COIN folly in Afghanistan. McChrystals bad advice (bad assessment) has led to the death of a lot of American soldiers.
115
Postscript 5-01-13: It also appears Admiral McRaven pushed for the surge (pp. 329 -330, Scahill Dirty Wars: McChrystal and McRaven had pressed Obama to surge US forces in Afghanistan Obama and McRaven actually have a fairly good relationship, and McRaven worked hand in glove with McChrystal, designing the counter AQ strategies. McRaven played a significant hidden role in developing the McChrystal plan that Obama eventually signed off on. And McRaven and Robert Harward were brought into the WH Afghan strategy meetings in the fall of 2009. Like McChrystal, McChrystal and Harward pressed for a heavy, heavy COIN presence in major populations centers, while using CT teams to stalk targets throughout the country.
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The Costs Would Rise I Was Responsible

I felt strongly we could succeed, and committed myself completely nothing was certain the costs would rise And I was responsible. ... The plan Biden had called for a year earlier is the plan the Pentagon is going to be forced to adopt. It only took an additional 711 American lives and 2,777 Afghan lives for the White House to arrive at this conclusion Since Obama became president, a thousand soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, more than double the total in the years under Bush. (Michael Hastings, The Operators) McChrystal was responsible? BS! Hes retired and earning the big bucks peddling his BS book on the lecture circuit. Those soldiers who have been killed or wounded in his war are the ones paying the price for his folly of a war. Hows war been going since McChrystal made his graceful landing? Not so well: The Battle for Marjah hasnt turned out so well: Taliban popular where US fought biggest battle For the number of Americans killed and wounded and the cost see The 13-Year War.
How about the results of McChrystals COIN surge? Take a look at the following articles:
Militarys Own Report Card Gives Afghan Surge an F Spencer Ackerman, Sept. 27, 2012 The Afghan war: Do the numbers add up to success? Matthew Schofield, Oct. 9, 2012 General David Petraeus's fatal flaw: not the affair, but his Afghanistan surge Nov. 13, 2012 Petraeuss COIN Gets Flipped Kelly Vlahos, American Conservative, Nov. 19, 2012
Top US General in Afghanistan Sees Uncertain Future -- John Glaser, Jan. 31, 2013
Face reality in Afghanistan -- Daniel L. Davis, February 13, 2013
The COIN of the RealmIs a Wooden Nickel C. Christine Fair, TIME March 13, 2013 The REAL reason the U.S. failed in Afghanistan - Stephen M. Walt, March 15, 2013 Trying to Do the Impossible Rory Stewart, Foreign Policy March/April 2013
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Postscript Note (July 21, 2013): Two books critical of COIN & the Afghan surge will be published at the end of the month: COL Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War
... Finally, the Army has quietly closed down the Afghan based named in memory of Pat Tillman: An ending in Afghanistan: U.S. closes Forward Operating Base Tillman. The war was a waste of his life and all the other Americans who have died there.
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REMEMBER THE ICONOCLAST, NOT THE ICON
Richard Tillman -- Memorial Service (May 4, 2004)
Pat Tillman statue at University of Phoenix Stadium
Its what always happens to the saints and prophets who are dangerous: we bronze them, we drain them of their passion and life and traps them in stained-glass windows and icons, confining them safely in memories of the past. St. Francis becomes a birdbath, Malcom X is put on a stamp -- Shane Clairborne, The Irresistable Revolution (2008) ... I didnt write shit because Im not a writer. Im not just going to sit here and break down on you. But thanks for coming. Pats a fucking champion and always will be. Just make no mistake, hed want me to say this, Hes not with God; Hes fucking dead. Hes not religious. So, thanks for your thoughts, but hes fucking dead. -- Richard Tillman (May 4, 2004) Through his little brothers cameo appearance, Pat Tillman appeared in full view, complete with the candor, the nonconformity and the love of dropping cuss words at the most inopportune time. Especially when they can soil an elaborate broadcast [networks cut away from live broadcast after his F-bombs]. -- Mary Tillman, Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2008) ... "The Iliad is ever mindful that war is about men killing or men killed. In the entire epic, no warrior, whether hero or obscure man of the ranks, dies happily or well. No reward awaits the soldier's valor; no heaven will receive him. The Iliad's words and phrases for the process of death make clear that this is something baneful: dark night covers the dying warrior, hateful darkness claims him; he is robbed of sweet life, his soul goes down to Hades bewailing its fate." -- Caroline Alexander, The War That Killed Achilles: The True Story of Homer's Iliad and the Trojan War 178
The [Missing] Pat Tillman Legacy

[Adapted from Marie Tillmans book The Letter; see The [Missing] Pat Tillman Legacy. Marie was Pats wife. Shes now remarried and heads the Pat Tillman Foundation]
The need to protect and defend was embedded in his [Pat Tillman] DNA, evident in the way hed rush to defend his brothers or his friends There are people who dont respond strongly to words like honor, but Pat did. Those five small letters strung together meant the world to him. The decision to join the Army was about Pats hearing that voice inside, his internal compass that part of his character that compelled him to dedicate his life to something more meaningful. Pat had joined the Army [in May 2002] and yet had not believed in the Iraq War. neither Pat nor I agreed with the Iraq War. We felt it was illegal and unjust. Ill do my job, Pat told me one night before he left But I dont think our role there is virtuous at all. Pat understood and accepted that basic principle [when you sign up, you obey orders; see Kevin Tillmans 2006 letter After Pats Birthday] going in. But that didnt mean that training for a war he didnt believe in was easy or that silencing his thoughts on the issue was a small matter. his feelings on the matter certainly dampened his enthusiasm about service He wondered if he could have contributed to the cause in another way [from a letter written in Iraq to his wife Marie]: What the fuck kind of marriage involves my absence for months at a time? Its funny because at the time I felt that any absence would be tolerable due to the cause or whatever concept I deluded myself into believing I was standing for. Im a fool. How I managed to find a way out of our perfect existence is incredible. Postscript Note: What a contrast with McChrystals 2006 X-mas email to his wife from Iraq!: I still believe we are doing what is our dutyYou know the frustration I feel when I see the packed malls and overfed greed of so many Americans. But when I meet. with young Americans who believe in their cause and their dutyand who desperately want to see leaders who reflect the values and dedication they want in the people they followit is pretty easy to stand the separations with the quiet confidence we are living up to all the values we were raised to uphold. Pat saw the world the way he thought it should be. That it wasnt always that way, well, that was beside the point. He chose to see it the way he wanted it to be. When things didnt play out the way he expected them to like his early time in the military it hurt me all the more, because his intentions were pure. I wanted badly for the world to meet him at this level.
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Something to Die For

[Adapted from my letter to Marie Tillman in The [Missing] Pat Tillman Legacy] If there were a worthy mission an idea they could come to believe in they [Delta] committed to it unlike anything I had yet seen in my military career. Listen, this [the Summer 2005 Delta deaths of Bob Horrigan etc.] really hurts. But let me tell you what would make it hurt even more; if it is all in vain Victory would not offset the terrible price already paid a price that would increase as the fight expanded. But losing would make the pain unbearable. -- Gen. McChrystal, My Share of the Task
In Marie Tillmans (Pat Tillmans widow) book, The Letter, she extolled the value of military service (something that people should value and take pride in its great purpose and potential sense of values and character in the men and woman who volunteered to serve I had been proud of him, and I was now proud of them reminded me of what had been at the core of Pats decision to serve). During her USO trip to Afghanistan, she sat by a soldier for breakfast. She wrote that you wanted to instill in this soldier the same confidence that as hard as it was, he was doing a great thing. doing a great thing. Really? Instead, I believe the lives of the 9/11 generation have been wasted in the Iraq & Afghan wars of the past decade. Thousands of young soldiers have been killed, wounded, and or suffer from TBIs & PSTD. For nothing. As Michael Hastings wrote in his book, The Operators, Wed been fighting the wrong war, in the wrong way, in the wrong country (my post Something to Die For adds my annotations to his book about the Afghan War and his road trip with Gen. McChrystal). Seven years ago, the Afghan War was just an abstraction to me. Now, my step-brother, an Army Colonel, just returned from his hopeless task of trying to train the Afghan police. His boy (a new-born baby when I crashed at his place at Ft. Benning after graduating from Ranger School in 85) is young and dumb (as I was then) and joined the Infantry. Hes now deployed with a Stryker unit from Fort McChord in Kandahar province (I talked to him after he returned from patrol on Thanksgiving Day). I pray he doesnt become another statistic. The wrong war, in the wrong way, in the wrong country has now become personal to me. I believe the Pat Tillman story can be viewed as a metaphor for the 9/11 generation. Like others, after 9/11 he answered the call to service. However, the reality of his service didnt match his ideals (felt it was illegal and unjust I dont think our role there is virtuous at all). Tillman didnt die heroically sacrificing himself to save his comrades (after senseless orders to split his platoon and get boots on the ground he was killed by his mates in a FUBAR minor ambush in a strategically botched war). Afterwards, the Army and our government betrayed him and his family (just as many returning veterans and their families havent gotten the proper support to help them rebuild their lives).
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Both Marie and Kevin Tillman (Pats brother who did a tour with him in both Iraq & Afghanistan) [in his 2006 Truthdig essay After Pats Birthday] wrote that Pat understood that soldiers lose their public voice after they sign up for the military. Marie wrote, I read up on what was going on politically, now these decisions were personally affecting me. But everybody was really apathetic and not engaged. far from feeling I needed to be loyal, I felt I needed to remind removed decision makers that there were flesh-and-blood individuals lives at stake. I agree with Marie that we ought to be more engaged with the decisions our government makes about war; blind patriotic support, slapping a ribbon on your car isnt enough. Marie wrote how she even considered joining an antiwar protest in 2003, Once, after Pat and Kevin had left, I was driving home and I passed an antiwar protest outside Fort Lewis. I was struck by a protester who identified herself as the mother of a soldier. Could I stand with her? I wanted to I fully felt you could support the troops and yet not the military actions. But at this point in time, the antiwar platform was raw, shaky ground to stand on. Pat was already treated differently I didnt want to make it worse for him. I drove past and went home. In my 2008 letter to Mary Tillman I wrote: When I was young and dumb I joined an Airborne Ranger Long-Range Recon (LRRP) unit. I was 17 years old when I enlisted. I grew up in the Army, enjoyed the challenges, and being with the guys. But, the lies of the first Gulf War were the last straw for me. I no longer wanted to be in what Donald Duncan [Special Forces LRRP, one of the first veterans to protest Vietnam] called The New Legions]. A slave who would be told who to kill for oil or other national interests. I didnt re-enlist for the third time, instead I chose to spend my life doing something more worthwhile [being a firefighter has worked for me]. Marie wrote that Pat Tillman also had second-thoughts about his decision to enlist in the Army (He wondered if he could have contributed to the cause in another way). If he had the chance to do it again, do you believe Pat Tillman would have enlisted? Or encourage others to seek the honor of military service? She quoted his letter from Iraq, the cause I deluded myself into believing I was standing for. Im a fool. How I managed to find a way out of our perfect existence is incredible. During her Harvard speech she said, When you sign up and decide to serve, you give your lives up to the American people and politicians. What we needed was for them to not needlessly put their lives in harms way. ...
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES I agree with you. And with [Senator] James Webb who wrote (in his 1991 novel Something to Die For: Having spent three years watching the Wizards of Oz in Washington, he stayed up nights wondering about the uses to which they would be put its going to cost us. And Id like to be able to tell my men that the price theyre going to pay is worth it. That its important to the country. Vital. Something to die for.
...
The NFL & the Pat Tillman Foundation have turned him into a lifeless patriotic icon; for details see the post The [Missing] Pat Tillman Legacy.
Pat Tillman Exhibit (Pro Football Hall of Fame)
In April 2004 Pat Tillman tragically [no mention of friendly fire or its cover-up] lost his life in Afghanistan while taking part in Operation Enduring Freedom. Tillman, a member of the U.S. Army Rangers, put his lucrative NFL career on hold in the Spring of 2002 to serve his country. A seventhround draft pick of the Arizona Cardinals in 1998, Tillman soon became the starting safety and broke the team's franchise record for tackles in 2000 with 224. Visitors to the Hall of Fame can learn more about Tillman and see his U.S. Army Ranger jacket as well as a jersey worn by him that is on display in the Hall's traveling exhibit, Pro Football and the American Spirit: The NFL and the U.S. Armed Forces. The maquette seen in the display is a replica of the statue displayed at the University of Phoenix Stadium in Glendale, AZ and was donated to the Hall by the Bidwill family. 182
AFTER PATS BIRTHDAY
Pat and Kevin Tillman in Saudi Arabia just before Iraq Invasion (March 2003
At the end of the day the commander is responsible. The one thing you can never, and should never want to dodge, is responsibility. -- Stanley McChrystal, Aspen Ideas Festival (June 30, 2012)
...
Somehow that overt policy of torture became the fault of a few bad apples in the military Somehow torture is tolerated. Somehow lying is tolerated. Somehow faking character, virtue and strength is tolerated. Somehow a narrative is more important than reality Somehow this is tolerated. Somehow nobody is accountable for this. -- Kevin Tillman, After Pats Birthday (November 6, 2006) For Mary Tillman, what the army did to her son made a mockery of everything he went to war for honesty, integrity, the defence of the truth. 'If you ask me if I trust our system now, the answer is Im pretty disgusted by it. Unfortunately in our culture people survive more effectively through lies and deception and dishonourable behaviour than they do the reverse. And thats very sad. -- Mick Brown, Betrayal of an All-American Hero, UK Guardian (Oct. 7, 2010) You are a General. On paper you subscribe to this [West Point] motto [Duty, Honor, Country] and honor code There is no way a man like you believes the conclusions [of the 3rd Army 15-6 investigation into Pat Tillmans death]. But your signature is on it. I assume, therefore, that you are part of this shameless bullshit. The Rangers stand for something to this day, in my mind, the best. [No one] involved in this deserve to be affiliated with the Rangers. If your uniforms are so decorated, [with the Ranger Tab] you should remove those items. In sum: Fuck you . And yours. -- Patrick Tillman, Sr. (April 2005 letter to BG Gary Jones) 183
After Pats Birthday

Obamas War on the Whistleblowers
Just before the 2006 mid-term elections and what would have been his brother Pats 30th birthday, on November 6, 2006, Kevin Tillman published his eloquent letter, After Pats Birthday at truthdig.com: Somehow our elected leaders were subverting international law and humanity by setting up secret prisons around the world, secretly kidnapping people, secretly holding them indefinitely, secretly not charging them with anything, secretly torturing them. Somehow that overt policy of torture became the fault of a few bad apples in the military. Somehow back at home, support for the soldiers meant slapping stickers on cars. Its interesting that a soldier on his third or fourth tour should care about a faded sticker on a car as his friends die around him Somehow subversion of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution is tolerated. Somehow suspension of Habeas Corpus is supposed to keep this country safe. Somehow torture is tolerated. Somehow lying is tolerated. Somehow faking character, virtue and strength is tolerated. Somehow a narrative is more important than reality. Somehow American leadership, whose only credit is lying to its people and illegally invading a nation, has been allowed to steal the courage, virtue and honor of its soldiers on the ground. Somehow the same incompetent, narcissistic, virtueless, vacuous, malicious criminals are still in charge of this country. Somehow this is tolerated. Somehow nobody is accountable for this. Gen. McChrystal claim that Abu Gharib was the work of a few bad apples and that he never condoned mistreatment of detainees. But the 2008 Senate Report, Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, found: The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply the result of a few bad apples acting on their own. Interrogation policies endorsed by senior military and civilian officials authorizing the use of harsh interrogation techniques were a major cause of the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody. SMU TF [special mission unit task force e.g. JSOC] policies were a direct cause of detainee abuse and influenced interrogation policies at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq. In addition, as Joint Staff VDJ3 it appears McChrystal was involved in formally importing torture to Iraq in 2003 by sending Gen. Geoffrey Miller to Gitmotize Abu Gharib and by sending SERE instructors to teach torture techniques to TF 121. And, after he took command of JSOC in 2003, instead of reducing torture, McChrystal approved more techniques until he was ordered to stop most of them after the Abu Gharib scandal (although it appears JSOC didnt fully clean up its act until the end of 2005).
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES In 2006, Kevin had hoped the election of a majority Democratic Congress would bring back accountability to our country.116 But, just as with the cover-up of his brothers friendly-fire death, those responsible for ordering CIA and Army torture have never been held accountable for their actions (as the Obama administration is fond of saying, Theyre moving forward, not looking backward). Instead, as Glenn Greenwald wrote in Zero Dark Thirty: new torture-glorifying film wins raves (The Guardian, Dec. 10. 2012): Those who ordered and implemented torture were never prosecuted. They were actively shielded from all forms of legal accountability by the current president. They thus went on to write books, get even richer, and live the lives of honored American statesmen. Torture was thus transformed from what it had been - a universally recognized war crime - into just another pedestrian, partisan political debate that Americans have. For example, Glenn Greenwald wrote, in Crime Boasting for Profit (Salon.com, April 25, 2012), that shielded from all forms of accountability, a CIA official is able to publish a book glorifying his illegal acts: the decision to destroy the [waterboarding] tapes was made by Jose A. Rodriguez Jr., Protected by the DOJ from any and all accountability for what he did, the CIA official who ordered the videotapes destruction is now enjoying the fruits of his crimes. He just published a new book in which he aggressively defends his decision to destroy those tapes joins a long line of Bush officials who not only paid no price for the crimes they committed, but are free to run around boasting of those crimes for profit. And, the movie Zero Dark Thirty will soon be shown in the theaters. This film is propaganda, a CIA hagiography that glorifies the use of torture and falsely implies that it led to getting Bin Laden. And the red-headed CIA agent (mentioned in the Jane Mayer book as having tortured an innocent man and then refused to release him for months) was one of the models for the heroine! In addition, it appears she was one of the CIA agents who intentionally withheld from the FBI knowledge before 9/11 that two of the 911 hijackers were in the U.S.! (see the book Disconnecting the Dots). ... But worse yet than just letting torture go unpunished, in a parody of justice, the Obama administration has been far worse than the Bush administration in going after government whistleblowers who made public the same illegal acts that Kevin Tillman decried in his letter!
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Postscript Note 4-01-13: Sibel Edmonds wrote (pp. 306, 315-316) in her 2012 book, Classified Women: The most ambitious and outspoken [supporter] was Congressman Henry Waxman the Democrats won [2006 midterms], and became the majority in both House and Senate. We thought we had won The new majority Democrats, including our handful of backers, didnt even want to hear about the hearing s they had promised us except for that capital D, would continue to a tee the practice of their predecessors.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Heres an excerpt from Peter Van Buren and Tom Engelhardts Joining the Whistleblowers Club (April 9, 2012): the strange, embattled world of Obama-era governmental whistleblowers. just about the only people inside the National Security Complex who ever get in trouble for their acts. In our era, the illegal surveillers, the torturers, the kidnappers, those who launch and pursue undeclared and aggressive wars, and those who squander taxpayer dollars all run free. Later, if they were important enough, they write their memoirs for millions of dollars, peddle their speeches for hundreds of thousands more, and live the good life. The only figures in the Complex regularly pursued as troublemakers and possible criminals turn out to be guilty of a single all-American crime: telling the citizenry what they should know about the operations of, and often enough the crimes of, the government they elected. For example, Jesselyn Radack, in Obama targets journalists (Apr. 9, 2012), wrote about the fate of a CIA officer who blew the whistle on torture: CIA officer John Kiriakou was the first CIA officer to call waterboarding torture and that he revealed that the CIAs torture program was policy rather than aberrant playtime. his book, The Reluctant Spy: My Secret Life in the CIAs War on Terror, sharply criticizes the CIAs torture program. The [DOJ] indictment of John Kiriakou, like that of Tom Drake, is meant to chill whistleblowers and the journalists who report their stories. Kiriakou himself has also spent tens of thousands in attorneys fees and is struggling to raise the million dollars his defense is expected to cost. Intelligence community employees with mortgages and mouths to feed no doubt get the message. [Update: Kiriakou has now pled guilty to some charges and will do several years in prison] But members of the CIA are not alone in escaping accountability for their role in torture (or in profiting from the publication of their memoirs). In Glenn Greenwalds 2011 book, With Liberty and Justice for Some, he mentioned Gen. McChrystals rehabilitation: the rehabilitation of the last decades war criminals is so complete that their war crimes havent even damaged their careers they are thriving, with their platforms undiminished and their reputations as honorable public servants fully intact General Stanley McChrystal became Obamas top military commander in Afghanistan despite ample evidence that detainee abuse was rampant under his command (he was later dismissed in the aftermath of a controversial Rolling Stone interview). In sharp contrast to the fates of the whistleblowers, Gen. McChrystal is doing just fine in retirement. Hes the head of the McChrystal Group (with former Ranger RGT CO BG James Craig Nixon), sits on several boards of directors, heads the advisory board of the Joining Forces program, and has been a celebrated (and well-compensated) speaker on the lecture circuit. peddling his memoir, My Share of the Task released on January 7, 2013.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES ... Finally, McChrystals war has been coming home, to the homeland. Jesselyn Radack wrote: Oscar- and Emmy-nominated documentarian Laura Poitras has filmed three of my NSA clients for the third installment of her War on Terror trilogy. Not surprisingly, her latest film will be about the governments ever-expanding secret domestic surveillance, NSA treating our nation like a foreign country for spying purposes, and the war on whistleblowers. Washington Post report Dana Priest, in her 2012 book Top Secret America, also wrote about the governments ever-expanding secret domestic surveillance: The Defense Department has given JSOC a bigger role in nonmilitary assignments the organization is busy with its new 30,000-square-foot office building turned command center [Joint Special Operations Task Force-National Capital Region]. It sits across the highway from the Pentagon in pristine suburban splendor, just a five-minute drive from McChrystals civilian office and the former generals favorite beer-call restaurant... It is creating targeting packages for U.S. domestic agencies Many of the intelligence innovations (including the use of drones) pioneered by Gen. Stanley McChrystal & Gen. Michael Flynn to target insurgents overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan are now being turned inward on the United States. Isnt it great to live in the land of the free, home of the brave?117
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In his piece, The National Security State Continues to Militarize the Homeland (8-03-13), Peter Van Buren wrote, More and more, weapons, tactics, techniques and procedures that have be en used abroad in war are coming home, this time employed against American Citizens. Much of the technology and methodology the NSA and others have been shown to be using against American Citizens was developed on and for the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular the advanced use of cell phones to track peoples movements. Also refined in Iraq, Afghanistan and the greater archipelago of the war of terror was the use of metadata and data-mining.
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The One Thing You Can Never Dodge

[My father] talked about how hard it was to take responsibility for mistakes I tended not to personalize mistakes, as there were plenty to go around. I certainly had made my share Leaders make mistakes, and they are often costly. The first reflex is normally to deny the failure to themselves; the second is to hide it from others, because most leaders covet a reputation for infallibility. But its a fools dream and is inherently dishonest. -- Gen. McChrystal, My Share of the Task The one thing you can never, and should never want to dodge, is responsibility. -- Stanley McChrystal, Aspen Ideas Festival (June 30, 2012)
... Although Gen. McChrystal was at the center of the Armys cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendlyfire death and commanded JSOC forces that tortured detainees, he has never taken responsibility or been held accountable for his actions.118 Instead, his actions have been whitewashed by himself, the Army, President Obama, and the Democratic Congress (assisted by the NYTs Thom Shanker & CNASs Andrew Exum). Gen. William Wallaces 2007 review of the militarys investigations cleared McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the Tillman cover-up. Retired Gen. Kensinger was made the official scapegoat (he lost a star and a little pension money) and took the fall for McChrystal. The other officers were given slaps on the wrist (not even a permanent letter in their files!) for their perfect storm of mistakes (several were later promoted to general rank). Shortly afterwards, Congressman Waxman and his so-called Oversight Committee shielded McChrystal from scrutiny during the Tillman hearings. The following year, in 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee (especially Senators James Webb, Carl Levin, & John McCain) gave McChrystal a pass after investigating his role in torture and the Tillman cover-up. In 2009, faced with the court-ordered release of photos that showed torture that extended beyond Abu Gharib, President Obama and the Senate changed the FOIA law to protect McChrystal (among others). Then, after a pro-forma hearing, the Senate unanimously confirmed in June
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p. 101; Scahill Dirty Wars: He [COL Douglas MacGregor] said he was disturbed by what he was witnessing inside the DoD as Cheney and Rumsfeld began building up the SSB and JSOC [in 2001 and 2002]. I stayed away from it. I didnt want to be involved in it because I had this fear we were ultimately breaking laws. One would have expected someone to stand up and say, Im sorry, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Cambone, General Boykin, you dont have the authority to suspend the Geneva Convention. But we have another problem. We have no interest in the Senate, in holding anyone accountable and enforcing the laws, he asserted. So if you have no one in any branchwhether its judicial, legislative or executivewhos interested in upholding the law, then you can do pretty much what you want. And I think thats ultimately whats happened.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES 2009 (even Sentaor Feingold who supposedly opposed it!) McChrystals nomination by President Obama to head the Afghan War. However, McChrystal was fired by Obama in June 2010 after he and his staff were quoted in Rolling Stone bad-mouthing President Obama and others in the civilian leadership (of course, McChrystal blamed reporter Michael Hastings instead of himself). Later that year, Jim Gourley wrote a comment in Tom Ricks Foreign Policy column (12/17/10): "we hold McChrystal up as a pyrrhic hero against Obama and a victim of a rock mag hatchet job [yet] Lindy England, Bradley Manning, Steven Green and everyone else below the rank of E-9 get roasted as fast as we can get them to a court martial. But the officers who fudged the Pat Tillman investigation ... What happens to them? Somehow, the military finds an explanation for their actions." In contrast, Pat Tillmans platoon leader, LT Uthlaut (no slouch, at West Point he was the First Captain, at the top of his class) was by his Ranger commanders to split his platoon, over his vehement protests. He was shot in the face by the same friendly fire that killed Pat Tillman. Yet, he was offered up by the Ranger commanders as a low-ranking scapegoat and kicked out of the Ranger Battalion for his failure to control his platoon during the friendly fire incident. Ranger Jude Lane said, Everybody thinks Uthlaut got the shaft If the Army has to decide whether to punish a lieutenant colonel at headquarters or a lieutenant in the field, you better believe the lieutenants going to take the hit every time. Shit rolls downhill. [p. 364, paperback Jon Krakauers Where Men Win Glory]. Since then, what happened to these Army officers who orchestrated the "hands-on" cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death? Ranger Regiment Commander COL Nixon got his star [hes since retired and now works for the McChrystal Group]. Regiment Executive Officer LTC Kauzlarich (The Lost Kauz in The Good Soldiers) who led the 2nd 15-6 investigation (and bad-mouthed the Tillmans for their agnostic/atheistic views) was promoted to full-bird Colonel in 2010. Shortly after Tillmans death, LTC Bailey was promoted to full-bird Colonel (a few years later he got his star). Finally, Gen. McChrystal was promoted three times ending up as a four-star general. Despite McChrystals platitudes about the Ranger Creed and taking care of a fallen Ranger and his family, it appears this guy just wont genuinely admit a mistake, genuinely take responsibility for his actions, or be genuinely truthful about the controversies of his career. His hypocrisy is pathetic. Now, hes making the rounds of the lecture circuit peddling his book (I guess he figures no one in the mainstream media will call him on his bullshit, and so far, hes been right). ... In a 2008 Democracy Now interview, Mary Tillman said, the bottom line is, no one has been held accountable for anything. some slaps on the wrist and some people have just been scapegoated. I would like someone to be held accountable. Id like for them to discover
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES who was involved with this cover-up. Its a horrible thing that they did. And I think that if people dont see that, its very sad, because it means that we have been numbed to all the lies and deceptions that weve been faced with during these last eight years. And, Patrick Tillman, Sr. wrote in his 2005 (Fuck you and yours) letter, No one has been confronted with their conduct. The issue of importance is the integrity of the military from the lieutenant colonel on the ground all the way up and past General Jones [3rd investigator].
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Never Shall I Fail My Comrades

I was so certain of life, and of my place in it. I was so sure of my love, and of my future. I now have none of those certainties, but at least I can comprehend pain. I was so ready, so eager to fight and now I pay, richly pay, for having fought. I guess thats what the world does to you. It makes you realize that honor and loyalty are traps with no reward. -- James Webb, A Sense of Honor (1981)
I believe that for Pat Tillman, his sense of integrity, honor, courage, and loyalty were traps with no reward. I would count him among the beautiful souls that Eyal Press wrote about in his 2012 book, Beautiful Souls Saying No, Breaking Ranks, and Heeding the Voice of Conscience in Dark Times (2012): [he] was not a rebel but a true believer, a conservative, a patriotic man who subscribed wholeheartedly to the tenets of a belief system that his subsequent downfall indeed revealed to be a myth. believed in those ideals too much They were nave to believe these things, a cynic with a more jaded outlook might aver. But had they been more cynical or jaded, they would not have felt so committed to the principles they assumed should be guiding them [Yet] he had managed to avoid betraying the one person whose judgment he knew he would not be able to evade: his own. Postscript Note 3-31-13: Another beautiful soul is Sibel Edmonds (she blogs at boilingfrogspost.com). Her 2012 book is Classified Woman Ive just started reading. ...
[McChrystal] told people he considered his Ranger vow never to leave a fallen comrade behind more binding even than his marriage vows. -- Dana Priest, Top Secret America (2011)
In a January 12, 2012 interview (Neil W. McCabe, The Man At McChrystals Side), Gen. McChrystals command sergeant major Mike Hall claimed: The Rangers are a standards-based organization, and what makes them a little bit different from other organizations is that they enforce their standards. Comparatively, its sort of easy to get into the Rangers, the hard part is staying in and maintaining the standard every day The ideal is to see what is right and to continue to do what is right until it becomes second nature. What utter bullshit about the Ranger Creed! I fully agree with the sentiments of Pat Tillmans Ranger team leader SGT Mel Ward on the actions of McChrystal and the Ranger commanders [p. 384, paperback edition of Jon Krakauers Where Men Win Glory] in the aftermath of Pats death:
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES "If you are going to lie and cover up what happened to someone who gave their life ... -then you deserve to swing. When I started hearing about the false award recommendations, spinning the facts, changing their stories -- I was so pissed. The dishonor the Army is doing to Pat's family ... it's unforgiveable. From the moment you first join the Ranger Battalion, its ingrained in you that you will always do the right thing. You will always tell the truth. ... Then you see something like what theyre doing to Pat what officers in the Ranger Regiment are doing and you stop being so nave. The only two times where I personally was in a position to see where the Army had the choice to do the right thing or the wrong thing, both times they chose to do the wrong thing. One of those times was what they did to Pat. It made me realize that the Army does what suits the Army. Thats why I wont put that uniform back on. Im done. ...
If nothing ever works out all the way, and if all things change, whats left? Your family and your friends and your values, thats whats left. And your duty to them Theyre the only important things in life. you must never violate your loyalty if you wished to survive the judgment of the ages. -- [Senator] James Webb, A Country Such As This (1983)
West Point 68 graduate John T. Reed (see John T. Reeds free articles on military matters) has written several posts about McChrystal and his role in the Tillman affair. He argued in his piece, Is military integrity a contradiction in terms?, that such dishonesty is not merely the work of a few bad apples but is systemic among Army officers: I love the ideals of West Point and the Army. West Point lived up to them in my experience. The Army did not even try. To them, honor is just so much public relations eyewash. General Stanley A. McChrystal gives lie to the Armys claims to be an honorable organization Basically, McChrystal was the main liar in the Pat Tillman case [That alone was enough for me to dismiss him as a piece of shit] [But,] the problem is the whole Army. The Army simply does not tolerate honest officers In the Tillman case, officers were expected to cover up and put a positive spin on Tillmans death officially, what McChrystal did in the Tillman case is prohibited. But I say that its really mandatory. To any who say I unfairly tar the whole U.S. Army because of the dishonesty of a few bad apples, I have two words: McChrystals promotion [to lead the Afghan War]:
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES McChrystal is what the Army wants you to be119... [McChrystal, after being promoted in spite of lying, was fired for telling the truth about his feelings about his superiors.] ... Thirty years ago, [Senator] James Webb argued (in his 1983 novel, A Country Such As This): And no, the military isnt just fine. The point is, it isnt corrupt. Its a system with human failures. But when human failures systematically extend up every single link in the chain-of-command (to include the Chair of the Joint Chiefs, Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense) up to the President, how is the military not a corrupt system? Furthermore, our country is corrupt and rotten at its core. Every single institution in this country has failed the Tillman family, including the leadership of the Army, both houses of Congress, the White House, and the socalled watchdog Press. Perhaps Senator James Webb, in his 1991 novel, Something to Die For, hit the nail on the head: How lofty it must have been to have burnt with the purity of the Revolution! Before the days of multi-million dollar election campaigns that brought politicians to their knees before the monied temple of the contributors. Before the time of computerized politics that cause them to await the wisdom of those oracles known as pollsters before they spoke. Or maybe it had been trash from the get-go, myths to feed the public. ... In his 2010 piece, Betrayal of an All-American Hero, Mick Brown wrote, For Mary Tillman, what the army did to her son made a mockery of everything he went to war for honesty, integrity, the defence of the truth. 'If you ask me if I trust our system now, the answer is Im pretty disgusted by it. Unfortunately in our culture people survive more effectively through lies and deception and dishonourable behaviour than they do the reverse. And thats very sad. McChrystal certainly has survived and prospered because of his dishonourable behavior.
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In 2007 Secretary of the Army Pete Geren appointed McCrystal to the promotion board that picked the Armys new generals (see pp. 279 282, Robert Kaplan, The Insurgents. I assume Geren asked Congressman Waxma n st to drop McChrystal from August 1, 2007 witness list and held his August 31 press briefing to officially clear McChrystal and make Gen. Kensinger the official scapegoat.
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Is Military Integrity a Contradiction in Terms?

Thats the one thing that nobody can take away from you, McChrystal said. Thats your understanding of what you believe is right and wrong. -- J.R. Reed, Yale Daily News, McChrystal Talks Leadership (January 24, 2013) When I arrived, [the West Point honor] code had been distilled to a simple directive: A cadet will not lie, cheat, or steal, nor tolerate those who do so to use a West Point phrase, choosing the easy wrong, not the hard right ... honor was sacrosanct to me there was a clear, bright line dividing shenanigans from transgressions against integrity Lying to anyone was a violation of your honor and meant explusion The code existed to ensure that the words of cadets and officers alike could always, in all situations, be taken as truth. Lies, even small ones, threatened that system of trust. -- Gen. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task ... "Pat was all about integrity There is absolutely no integrity in any of this [pointing to large plastic tub filled with binders of Pentagon investigation documents]. The American public needs to be aware of what's going on, and they can't take their politicians or figures of authority at face value" -- Mary Tillman, After Mother Mary Tillman's Loss Came 'No Integrity' (USA Today, May 5, 2008)
In his memoir, Gen. McChrystal mentioned the 1976 Raid on Entebbe [McChrystal, p.25]: Id been impressed in July 1976 when Israeli commandos had reached deep into Africa to rescue passengers in Entebbe. The commander of the IDF The Unit (equivalent to the U.S. Army Delta), Yoni (Jonathan) Netanayahu was killed leading the assault. Yoni was cast from the same mold as Pat Tillman. When I first learned of Pat the iconoclast in 2005 (vs. the media icon), I was immediately reminded of Yoni. Although they were separated by 27 years, both were charismatic individuals driven who lived and died with intensity and integrity. Both Achilles-like and slain in the high places. The similarities, despite the obvious differences, between their stories is eerie. Ironically, Yoni truly died heroically, killed while saving hostages at Entebbe. But it would have been embarrassing to mention the friendly fire deaths of hostages and that Yoni died because the mission went FUBAR, so the IDF instead told the story he was shot in the back by a stray burst of fire. Like Kevin Tillman, Iddo Netanyahus oldest brother Yoni died in battle, became a national icon, and had the truth of the nature of his death covered up by his government. Iddo has also been engaged in a long battle for the truth about his brothers death [see my 2008 post, Battle for the Truth"]. And, like Pat Tillman, Yoni Netanyahu was also a remarkable man. The reality of both Pat and Yoni was much deeper than their iconic images. Both possessed a core of honesty and integrity, led by personal example, and lived their lives intensely. Neither cared much about money or
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES personal comfort. Both were mavericks, intellectuals and avid readers. For example, from the foreword to book The Letters of Jonathan Netanyahu: Of all the aspects of his character one predominates integrity. By this we do not mean only honesty toward ones fellow man, but, above all, honesty toward oneself. An inner wholeness marked Yonis entire behavior, inspired his way of life and determined his objectives. That wholeness resulted from a great need for absolute harmony between his thoughts and deeds. For Yoni, unlike many of us, could not hold beliefs without living them to the full. Once convinced of the rightness of an idea, whether in the personal or national sphere, he had to do what he could to actualize it, regardless of the hardships or risks involved. Again and again he asked himself whether he was working toward the realization of his lifes aims. Similarly, Pat Tillmans widow, Marie, wrote (in her book The Letter) There are people who dont respond strongly to words like honor, but Pat did. Those five small letters strung together meant the world to him. ... Postscript Note 3-29-13: I recently discovered the blogger emptywheel aka Marcy Wheeler [emptywheel.net] and her post Pat Tillman's Super Bowl (January 31, 2009) [see my June 2010 post on the 2009 Superbowl "Barely a Footnote"]. In her post, Wheelers associate bmaz wrote a comment about Tillmans sense of honor: Earlier this morning, Marcy posted this serious and wonderful piece on Pat Tillman I would like to return for a moment to the subject of her post, namely who Pat was The contract he walked away from with the Cardinals was for about 3.6 million; he had turned down previously a 9 million dollar multi-year contract with the St. Louis Rams, right in the middle of their Super Bowl years, in order to stay with and build the Cardinals in what he considered to be his home at the time. That is the kind of man that Pat was. Pat didnt give a damn about money and the trappings of celebrity Pat was an avid reader. Of everything. there was nothing he he loved more than spirited discussion And he could discuss all intelligently, deeply and passionately. Pat was an iconoclast. He was his own man and would back down from nothing, and no one, if he thought he was right. This is what made him an odd fit for the military. He had every ounce of the heroism, valor, trust and honesty that the military has always purported to stand for, and then some. But he was not a yes man ... I had the privilege of knowing Pat Tillman a little. ... well enough to get the measure of the man he was. had a few long lunch conversations with him. He was everything he has been made out to be and more. He was twenty years younger than I, but you would never know it. He was such a deep and diverse thinker that he was almost the antithesis to the world as we currently know it. The nation, and the world, lost a lot with Pat Tillmans death. Honor and fight what he stood for, and what he wanted the country to stand for, that is what he would want.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES And, as you watch the Super Bowl tomorrow, remember Pat and his beliefs; for he, of all, should have been around to see the day. Note: For more about Pat Tillmans character, see my 2012 post The [Missing] Pat Tillman Legacy, the 2008 post Battle for the Truth"and the 2008 post Remember the Iconoclast, Not the Icon." Unfortunately, McChrystals lack of integrty is not an aberration among the officer corp. John T. Reed wrote about the lack of honor and the hypocricy of Army officers in his piece, Is military integrity a contradiction in terms?: I love the ideals of West Point and the Army. West Point lived up to them in my experience. The Army did not even try. To them, honor is just so much public relations eyewash. military officers put on such a big show of self-righteous indignation when the subject of their honor comes up set themselves up for far more extreme embarrassment when they are revealed to be hypocrites as well as liars. Hypocrisy: Although the politicians at the top are the cause of the lack of integrity in the military, they at least sort of admit their own lack of integrity. That sort of twofaced nonsense is part and parcel of being a politician. It is also part and parcel of working for politiciansas military officers do. military officers affect an indignant, holier-than-thou demeanor when the mere suggestion of dishonesty comes up. In other words, politicians are hypocrites. But career military officers are much bigger hypocrites. In contrast to Pat Tillman and other beautiful souls, Gen. McChrystal hasnt shown himself to be a man of integrity, honesty, or moral courage. Despite McChrystals platitudes about leadership, the Ranger Creed, and taking care of a fallen Ranger and his family, it appears this guy is a master of confabulation and bullshit who just wont genuinely admit a mistake, genuinely take responsibility, or be genuinely truthful about the controversies of his career. His hypocrisy120 is pathetic.
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4-20-14 Update: As is Secretary Robert Gates (for details, see my April 2014 post Defend Your Integrity):
Gates admonished the [West Point] cadets to, Defend your integrity as you would your life. Thats Secretary of Defense talk for, You guys need to end this U.S. military officer habit of lying routinely in official business. But then Gates expressed complete confidence in General McChrystal [the main liar in the Pat Tillman cover -up] indicating that Gates words at West Point were just the usual do as I say not as I do hypocrisy. If Gates would defend his integrity as he would his career, then we would have something. -- John T. Reeds post Secretary Of Defense Gates Comments on Military Integrity and Careerism
Who is responsible for this continuing outrage with regard to the treatment of Pat Tillmans death and the never-ending cover-up of it? Defense Secretary Robert Gates who said we need fresh eyes in Afghanistan. After five official inquiries into the Tillman incident, we could not find any honest eyes in 196
the whole U.S. military. Perhaps the lack of integrity in the military is a higher priority than the freshness of the four-star general in charge of Afghanistan. As far as the wonderfulness of the military and congressional investigations, Senator John McCain said, [the Armys actions were] inexcusable and unconscionable. Nevertheless, McCain [and Webb & Levin] supports the promotion McChrystals promotion turns out to be an integrity litmus test. Those opposed to the promotion (the Tillman family) have integrity; those in favor of promoting McChrystal, do not. -- John T. Reed, The General Who Lied About Pat Tillman Gets Promoted to the Highest Rank
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What Had I Learned About Leadership?

So, after a lifetime, what had I learned about leadership? The best leaders are genuine. I found soldiers would not forgive me being less than I claimed to be. Simple honesty matters. I encountered some figures who had learned to leverage superficial gifts so effectively that they appeared to be better leaders than they were. Modern media exacerbate the challenge of sorting reality from orchestrated perception. .. . Appearances were deceiving. I was first impressed, then often disappointed, by some of the flashiest or most macho leaders Speeches on leadership and values from such commanders often fell on deaf ears. -- Gen. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task I teach leadership at Yale because it's what I'm passionate about I wanted to write a book that would stand the test of time to have a book that would be taught 20 years from now at West Point... -- Gen. McChrystal, NPR Diane Rhem Show (January 16, 2013)
...
The best leaders are genuine. In July 2008, I discovered that Gen. McChrystal played the key role in the cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death. However, at the time, I reserved most of my anger for the hypocritical Democratic Congress (and later President Obama, the NYTs Thom Shanker, and CNASs Andrew Exum): Its not surprising that after the initial fratricide cover-up fell apart, that Army officers and the Bush administration lied to protect their careers. Reprehensible, but understandable. But the Democratic Congress, after they took control of both Houses in 2006, could have gone after those responsible. Or at least not promoted them! Their hands are dirty as well with the betrayal of Pat Tillman. My writing has centered upon Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Not because he was the biggest culprit in the Tillman affair (he was just following orders from Rumsfeld & Cheney), but because he was at the center of the Tillman cover-ups chain-of-command, left the most fingerprints (e.g. fraudulent Silver Star citation, not informing Tillman family, stonewalling the medical examiner) and was the primary beneficiary of the Army/Congressional/White House whitewash of those responsible for the cover-up. But, since then (and especially over the past year) Ive become disgusted by McChrystals hypocrisy and dishonesty. Before reading his book, I had anticipated McChrystal would ignore or only briefly mention-in-passing his controversies. I could understand if he had simply refused to comment about the controversies of his career (eg. Tillman, Camp Nama torture, LeAffair Rolling Stan, his failed Afghan COIN surge), or quickly passed over them, or simply prevaricated a bit. Instead, it appears McChrystal has adopted Goerings big lie propaganda technique and decided to disingenuously whitewash his controversies with a thick layer of bullshit and confabulation (like his supposed good friend Greg Mortenson). I guess he figures no one will call him on his bullshit, and so far, hes been right.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Appearances were deceiving. On the lecture, McChrystal certainly delivers his stump speeches with the appearance of candor and sincerity without coming across as a just smooth politician. But, in reality, thats what he was during the last decade of his career. A politician in a green suit. He was a Pentagon spokesman. Spent a couple of years on the Joint Staff. As commander of JSOC his position was largely political; his task force COs largely ran the war while he ran interference (to his credit he let the D boys do their thing without micromanaging them like that idiot MG Dell Dailey or BG Greg Trebon121). In Afghanistan, he was the front man dealing with the political side of things, while Gen. Rodriquez ran the war. And, like any good politician, its worth noting that McChrystal was an ass-kissing suck-up to the powers above him. Jeremy Scahill wrote (p. 109, Dirty Wars): But nearly invisible in the breathless media narrative of the warrior-leaders ascent is another McChrystal a man who in reality had seen very little action before ascending to the post of JSOC commander after the Iraq invasion. This McChrystal was a climber who had cozied up to the right people politically, whether Democrats or Republicans, as well as key figures within the military bureaucracy. In essence, he was one of the chosen few. According to career military officers who knew McChrystal going back to West Point, he had been groomed for years to rise through the army ranks. I like Stan very much, as a person, said Colonel [Douglas] Macgregor, who was McChrystals roommate at West Point. But MacGregor charged that after 9/11, McChrystal had ingratiated himself with the neoconservatives, particularly Rumsfeld and Cheney. He was someone that had made his reputation, in the Pentagon with Rumsfeld. He was someone who saw this global Caliphate as a tremendous enemy, and kept beating the drum for that. And that endeared him to all of the key people. The military, MacGregor said, is run under a system that rests ultimately on a foundation that is cronyism. In other words, are you one of the boys? Its kind of a brotherhood selection: Is this man going to stay the course with us? Is he going to say whatever we tell him to say, do whatever we tell him to do? McChrystal, he told me, realized early on that if he is going to advance, hes going to have to ingratiate himself. And he does this in the Pentagon.
Speeches on leadership and values from such commanders often fell on deaf ears. Yeah, its hard for me to take seriously hearing him preach about honesty and taking responsibility when hes dodged responsibility for his role in formally importing torture to Abu Gharib, for the use of routine torture by JSOC forces under his command, and for his central role in the cover-up of Pat Tillmans 2004 friendly-fire death in Afghanistan.
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: pp. 312-313, Brandon Webbs 2012 book The Red Circle: Do I think it was a bad call [by Trebon]? Yes I do. We all felt the guys had died for what appeared to us to be no good reason.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES I wanted to write a book that would stand the test of time. I dont think so (I hope it is a fools dream that he can hide his mistakes). Memoir-wise, his book is a bit of a bore. Historywise, its full of bullshit on his controversies (although it does present a nice overview of JSOC operations in Iraq). Instead, I believe that Jon Krakauers book about Pat Tillman, Where Men Win Glory, will stand the test of time (although its a flawed bio and despite Krakauer being an egotistical ass). People will read Into Thin Air and then read Krakauers other books. And, hopefully, Michael Hastings book on McChrystal & the Afghan War, The Operators, will also outlast McChrystals BS memoir.
...
On Memorial Day 2012, Mary Tillman called me and we spoke for about an hour. She said she had spoken briefly with McChrystal in April 2012 and he said something like, I mourn your son every day. Similarly, in his book (p. 134) McChrystal said, To this day I am saddened by Ranger Tillmans death, as I am for the loss of every service member I served with, and for the pain such losses cause each family (Did this guy really just recycle his own talking point clich when he finally spoke with Mary Tillman?!) After speaking briefly with McChrystal in April, Mary said she considered meeting face-to-face with him in DC, but she figured they would probably walk away more frustrated than when we walked in. After reading McChrystals memoir, I believe she was right. Despite McChrystals platitudes about the Ranger Creed and taking care of a fallen Ranger and his family, it appears this guy is a master of confabulation who just wont genuinely admit a mistake, genuinely take responsibility for his actions, or be genuinely truthful about the controversies of his career. His hypocrisy is pathetic. Mary also told me that seeing McChrystal on the news was like rubbing salt in a wound. Unfortunately, this old general just wont fade away; hes been making the rounds of the talk show circuit peddling his book. In the past, I used to have a grudging respect for McChrystal when he remained silent and simply refused comment about Pat Tillman. But, since McChrystal wont come clean about his mistakes, I feel he ought to take the advice of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who (according to David Sanders on p. 107 of Confront & Conceal) offered up a barbed assessment of how the White House had spun the Bin Laden raid: I have a new communications approach to recommend Shut the fuck up.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES ...
On a lighter note:
I liked McChrystals description of his eating binge after completing Ranger School (p.27): I followed graduation with the inelegant eating binge most new Rangers undertake. I remember Annie staring in amazement as I washed down Hershey bars dipped in peanut butter with beer until I vomited, only to repeat the process. I remember eating seven hot dogs, two Snickers bars and a can of Classic Coke (being scalped by the RIs wifes) after finishing Florida phase of Ranger School two hours later, I tried to finish dinner. I couldnt quite finish dessert (usually Id lick my plate clean). I spent the next hour on my back with my knees up to take the pressure off my bloated stomach (in formation waiting to move some parachutes) to avoid vomiting. I gained 43 pounds over the next two weeks. McChrystal and I overlapped briefly at Ft. Benning. He mentioned (p. 45) taking command of the 3rd Ranger BN in October 85, just when I graduated Ranger School. And McChrystal mentioned (p.19) spending the summer (1976?) at Ft. Hood, Texas with a Ranger unit. I suspect that was a LRRP unit like mine (perhaps it later morphed into the 143rd (?) Texas NG LRRP company?). Finally, I liked McChrystals description (p.30) of getting ready to jump out of a C-130. Brought back to mind my own paratrooper jump memories of a quarter century ago.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Patience, Montag. Our civilization is flinging itself to pieces. Stand back from the centrifuge. Remember the firemen are rarely necessary. The public itself stopped reading of its own accord. You firemen provide a circus now and then at which buildings are set off and crowds gather for the pretty blaze, but its a small sideshow indeed, and hardly necessary to keep things in line. So few want to be rebels anymore. -- Ray Bradbury, Fahrenheit 451
Guy Montag, M.F.L.F. Local #451
Fire gear with Tillman NFL #40 Helmet Sticker
After three years of JROTC, when he was a young & dumb seventeen year-old boy, Guy Montag enlisted with Co. F (Ranger) 425th Infantry. He spent eight years with Co. F from 1983 to 1991, completed Airborne and Ranger School, and left as a SGT leading a LRRP patrol. He earned two engineering degrees and was a yuppie for a couple of years with Andersen Consulting (now Accenture). He abandoned the life of a cubicle rat, and for the past twenty-one years hes been a professional firefighter (only 7 - 11 more years to go til retirement!). Since October 2005, Montag has closely followed the Pat Tillman story. Since 2009, hes been an amateur feral scholar (hat tip to Stan Goff) of the untold Pat Tillman story. His extensive Tillman files are at http://www.feralfirefighter.blogspot.com When hes not wasting spending time on the Tillman story, Guy Montag is an eclectic reader, works on his homestead, is a soccer mom for his son, helps (when she permits it) his bookworm daughter find new sci-fi to read, and generally neglects his long-suffering wife who is appalled at the amount of time her husband has spent on his blog over the past four years. Hes doing his part to try to avert the worst of global warming (but saving the world is only his hobby).
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APPENDIX A:
Senate Armed Services Committees November 2008 Report, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody
[from Senate Armed Services Committee report, November 20, 2008]
I would say JSOC was moderately complicit [in torture]. one of the big questions that still hangs over the head of Gen. McChrystal Theres a legitimate and still open question of how much he knew, and what he did about it. if you look at the time line, and look at whats public the [November 2008 ] torture report from the Senate intelligence [actually SASC] committee blacked out all the references to JSOC [and GEN McChrystal & Admiral McRaven] [its] Quite clear that even on a senior level, task force commanders in Iraq [McRaven & McChrystal] knew what was going on. -- Marc Ambinder, How The Pentagons Top Killers Became (Unaccountable) Spies
... Introductory Note to the Senate Report The Command of JSOC Torture from Sept. 2003 to June 2004, by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, Admiral William McRaven, and BG Kyle Koenig Timeline of JSOC Task Forces Development of Interrogation SOPs, From December 2002 to June 2004 Removal of Clothing Used by JSOC Task Forces (Although Technique Was Outside Their Interrogation SOPs) with the Knowledge of Commander Legality of JSOC Task Force Interrogation SOPs was Repeatedly Questioned Pro Forma (Or No) Investigation of Reported JSOC Detainee Abuse
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Introductory Note to the Senate Report:

Following this introduction are excerpts from the 263 page Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) report, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody (November 20, 2008). Ive selected passages [report page number indicated by (###)] which show the development of JSOCs interrogation Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) from October 2002 to June 2004. Much of the content of this Senate report collaborates the earlier reporting by writers such as Jane Mayer and Seymour Hersh. Although Ive spelled out some of the abbreviations, you can find a complete list at the front of the report. Its worth noting that JSOC appears in the list, but not the body of the report (it was probably redacted in a reference to McChrystal). Although their names are redacted, this report includes statements (or comments about) from BG Lyle Koenig, General Stanley McChrystal, Admiral William McRaven, and JSOC J2 COL Brian Keller; his name escaped redaction on p. 181; Keller was McChrystals J2 for several months (McChrystal, p. 99) and see Tony Schaffers book Operation Dark Heart). Air Force BG Koenig was commander of TF 121 from (?) until October 16, 2003 [see McChrystals book and COL Moultons Senate testimony on p. 25 of the SASC 9-25-08 hearing]. McRaven commanded TF 121 from October 16, 2003 until April 2006 [see McChrystals book]. McChrystal was the commander of JSOC, supervising TF 121, from October 6, 2003 to *** 2008. McRaven then succeeded McChrystal, and commanded JSOC from 2008 to 2011 (he supervised the May 2011 operation which killed UBL). It appears McRaven took command of TF 121 on October 16, 2003 and was the officer who said he was ''uncomfortable with stripping detainees. According to his Senate testimony, Gen. McChrystal took command of JSOC sometime in October 2003 [his book says October 6, 2003] (which contradicts several sources who say he took command in September 2003, and McChrystals official bio. which says Sept 03). It appears most of the [redacted] references to McChrystal, McRaven, and Task Force 121 [SMU Special Mission Unit] are from the Special Focus Team classified annex from the Church Report (p. 148, SASC 11/20/08 Report, Note 1150): 1150: Department of Defense, Interrogation Special Focus Team Report on Special Mission Unit Interrogation Practices in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (October 28, 2004) at 3 (hereinafter "Church Special Focus Team Report"). As part of his investigation of detention operations and detainee interrogation
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES techniques, Vice Admiral Albert Church examined interrogation techniques used by SMU in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. VADM Church's main report, released in March 2005 [Executive Summary released, main report was classified], did not discuss the SMUs. Rather an Interrogation Special Focus Team, under the auspices of VADM Church's review, issued a separate, classified annex that discussed SMU interrogation practices in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Though completed in October, 2004, the SMU annex was not provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee until July 26, 2006. However, you can find references to TF 121 in the classified version of the Fay Report (see appendices of Mark Danners book Torture and Truth) and one reference escaped redaction in the Senate Report (p. 223, Note 1738).
...
Postscript Note 3-17-13: For his Masters thesis, Maj. Douglas A. Preyer also relied heavily on this Senate report, writing it was, The best unclassified source of information regarding the influence of national policy on harsh interrogation techniques in Iraq. Preyer is the author of the 2009 book, The Fight for the High Ground: The U.S. Army and Interrogation During Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003 - April 2004). Or you can read his masters thesis of the same title (missing a couple of chapters and the Foreword by COL Herrington). Chapter 3 of Preyers book briefly discusses the the systemic use of SERE techniques by an SMU Task Force [TF 121 under McChrystals command]. Here are some of my notes from Preyers thesis: Interrogation techniques that had been designed to train U.S. military personnel on how to resist and survive interrogations by an enemy unconstrained by the Geneva Conventions made their way, via formal and informal means, from U.S. military SERE schools to GTMO and Afghanistan, and from these two theaters, to Iraq harsh interrogation techniques were used systemically at Abu Ghraib and special operations facilities (and probably briefly at Camp Cropper as well). At Abu Ghraib, these harsh techniques rapidly descended into sadistic, sexualized violence that shamed a nation. Leaders and interrogators who, during their previous deployments to GTMO or Afghanistan had gained knowledge of the SERE techniques sanctioned in these two other theaters, often employed these techniques in Iraq Special operations units were also a significant conduit for the migration of SERE techniques to Iraq Interrogation policy for this SMU task force directly influenced the drafting of the first interrogation policy for conventional forces in Iraq.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES the use of harsh techniques was approved on a case-by-case basis at Camp Nama, the SMU Task Forces detention facility on the Baghdad Airport While SMU Task Force policy never included "Forced Nudity," this technique was nonetheless employed at Camp Nama. the use of this technique was reinforced by the assistance visit of a three-man JPRA team to the facility from September 5-23, 2003 This JPRA team also reported observing an interrogation in which an SMU Task Force interrogator repeatedly slapped a detainee across the face, which was apparently a common practice at the facility despite its not yet being formally approved. special operations soldiers at a location close to Camp Cropper (probably Camp Nama) were beating detainees before transporting them to Camp Cropper. The SMU Task Force in Iraq adopted its most aggressive policy on March 26, 2004, a policy that would be in effect only until May 6, 2004, at which time General Abizaid suspended the use of all non-doctrinal techniques in the U.S. Central Command AOR [True, but Preyer failed to point out that McChrystal then requested permission to resume using five techniques (including control positions) and got permission to resume the use of four non-FM techniques in June 2004]
For decades if not centuries to come, the twin symbols of GTMO and Abu Ghraib and all that these symbols have done to fuel the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and to incur international 56 condemnation of the U.S., should serve as a cautionary tale for any other senior U.S. leader who might someday consider a similarly unwise course of action. Since OIF I and the Abu Ghraib scandal, a myriad of inspectors and investigators have amassed an extremely lengthy list of reasons for detainee abuse. These reasons have ranged from a shortage of a certain resource to confusion over some item of doctrine or policy to soldiers being improperly trained for performing a specific task. Certainly, these various issues are important and need to be corrected. However, the U.S. Army is in real danger of missing the forest for the trees, for most essentially, what was at the heart of any instance of interrogation abuse during OIF I was a leader (or leaders) making unethical decisions. In other words, leaders with flawed ethical decision making skills were the sine qua non (or root) cause of interrogation abuse in Iraq.
[Note that Preyer failed to discover (or note) that BG Koenig, Adm McRaven and Gen. McChrystal were the three leaders with flawed ethical decision making whose names were redacted in the Senate Report who commanded JSOC and TF 121 torture.] And he didnt mention that some EIT techniques were approved to continue in use by JSOC beyond May 2004.
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The Command of JSOC Torture 2003 -- 2004: MG Stanley McChrystal, Admiral Bill McRaven, and BG Kyle Koenig
BG Kyle Koenig was the TF 121 CO preceding McRavens arrival in October 2003. From the Senate report its clear that Koenig requested training in SERE techniques in August 2003 (it appears McChrystal was involved in this process as Vice Director J3 of the Joint Staff) and aggressively applied them despite the strong protest of both his legal advisor and SERE instructor COL Kleinman that their use of these techniques was unlawful, outside TF 121 interrogation SOPs, and against the Geneva Convention. However, Koenig did not act on their concerns. Admiral McRaven was the new commander of TF 121 who was uncomfortable with stripping detainees upon his arrival on October 16, 2003. However, he allowed this practice to continue until at least December 2003 or January 2004 (his claim that he ended the practice contradicts his legal advisors testimony), although the practice was not in the interrogation SOP he approved in October. And he appears to have made a false statement to investigators that dogs and "environmental manipulation" were not used, though both were techniques approved by him. General McChrystal took command of JSOC on October 6, 2003 [see McChrystal, p. **]. He testified before the Senate that upon taking command he was uncomfortable with some techniques and immediately reduced the number of techniques which were utilized. However, the record doesnt support his assertion. The number of approved non-FM 32-54 techniques increased from 10 to 14 between October 2003 and March 2004 (his claim that he instead reduced the frequency of use by requiring high-level approval is contradicted by an TF 121 interrogator who said he never saw a sheet that wasnt signed. The use of non-FM 34-52 techniques by by McChrystals JSOC only decreased after GEN Sanchez suspended their use in Iraq after the Abu Gharib scandal, not because of discomfort on McChrystals part. And, shortly afterwards McChrystal was comfortable with requesting to continue to use techniques outside FM 34-52. And it appears that JSOC continued to use some of those techniques until the end of 2005. McChrystal also testified that JSOC stayed within authorized guidelines (contradicted by testimony that stripping occurred under his watch) and did a legal review. However, the quality of that legal review appears dubious. Military lawyers pointed out that not all the techniques in Rumfelds working group had been approved for use and the Geneva Convention applied to combatants in Iraq. As pointed out previously, both TF 121 CO Koenigs legal advisor and SERE instructor COL Kleinman told Koenig in September 2003 (probably before
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES McChrystals arrival) that the use of SERE techniques was unlawful, outside TF 121 interrogation SOPs, and against the Geneva Convention. Gen. McChrystal testified before the Senate that we investigated every [alleged mistreatment of detainees] and punished those responsible if it was substantiated. However, I would guess that most of those investigations were as "extremely brief and cursory" with "obvious gaps in the investigation methodology as that of the investigation of the issues raised by COL Herrington after his December 2003 inspection of interrogation facilities in Iraq (he was not allowed access to the TF 121 facilities).
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Timeline of JSOC Task Forces Development of Interrogation SOPs From December 2003 to June 2004
December 2, 2002: SEC DEF Approves Non-FM34-52 Interrogation Techniques for Gitmo (xxvii) Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) interrogation policies were influenced by the Secretary of Defense's [Rumsfelds] December 2, 2002 approval of aggressive interrogation techniques for use at GTMO. SMU TF interrogation policies in Iraq included the use of aggressive interrogation techniques such as military working dogs and stress positions. SMU TF policies were a direct cause of detainee abuse and influenced interrogation policies at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq. (148) While SMU TF operators conducted a limited amount of direct questioning, or, "screening" of detainees while on the battlefield [p.255, 287, 379-381, 401;The Interrogators by Chris Mackey & Greg Miller], it appears that they did not conduct interrogations until at least October 2002. Prior to that point, SMU personnel had observed interrogations conducted by Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CITF-180) which had assumed control of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan at the end of May 2002. (193) the SMU TF Commander told him [GEN Miller during his September 2003 visit] the SMU TF was using operators as interrogators. January 10, 2003: Afghanistan JSOC Task Force CO Approves 1st Interrogation SOP (153) On January 10, 2003 the SMU Task Force Commander in Afghanistan approved the first interrogation standard operating procedure (SOP) for the SMU Task Force. (158) the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) in Iraq had an interrogation policy in place before the beginning of OIF. This policy was identical to the February 2002[3?] policy in use at the SMU Task Force in Afghanistan and reflected the influence of techniques authorized for use at GTMO. obtained a copy of the interrogation SOP in use by the SMU personnel in Afghanistan, changed the letterhead, and adopted the SOP verbatim. July 15, 2003: Iraq JSOC Task Force 20 Issues 1st Interrogation SOP (159) A July 15, 2003 SMU interrogation SOP appears to have been the first interrogation policy drafted specifically by the SMU TF in Iraq. The list of interrogation techniques in that SOP included "vary comfort positions" (sitting, standing, kneeling, prone); presence of military working dogs; 20-hour interrogations; isolation; and yelling, loud music, and light control (160) The SMU Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence officer (J2X) who served at the SMU facility told the Committee that a list of authorized interrogations approaches was posted
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES on a wall at the SMU TF facility. He specifically recalled stress positions, loud music, light control, isolation, allowing a minimum amount of time for sleep, and military working dogs as techniques authorized for use in interrogation.
September 2003: JPRA Instructs Iraq JSOC TF 121 on Use of SERE Techniques (179) Lt Col Kleinman testified before the Committee that he told Col Moulton that the JPRA team [September 2003] was "being asked to use the full range of SERE methods in the interrogation of detainees. (223) Several interrogation techniques authorized for use by the SMU Task Force were similar to techniques used in the resistance phase of SERE training. In fact, undated SMU TF SOPs from this period [Spring 2004] suggest a connection between SMU TF interrogation techniques and SERE. The SOPs state, under interrogation "Standards," that "[i]nterrogations will be done [in accordance with] all applicable rules and regulations to include... Survival/Evasion/Resistance/and Escape regulations. 207 [REDACTED; McRaven] stated that when he took command in October 2003, he "discovered that some of the detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique. He said that he did not know where the technique came from. Weeks prior to his October 2003 arrival, however, JPRA instructors had stripped a detainee during their assistance visit to the SMU TF facility as part of an interrogation October 25, 2003: New JSOC Task Force 121 Commander Issues 2nd Interrogation SOP Including 10 Techniques Outside FM 34-52 (206) On October 16, 2003 a new Commander, [REDACTED; McRaven] took command of the SMU TF [121]. [REDACTED; McRaven] stated that he "used his subject matter experts to build the [interrogation] SOP consistent with existing rules and regulations. This SOP went into effect on October 25, 2003. Note 1242: [REDACTED; McRaven; probably reference to classified Church report annex] Questionnaire (June 29, 2(04) at 3. NOTE: Admiral William McRaven was probably the [redacted] new commander of TF 121 on October 16, 2003 referred to in this passage. But, Seymour Hersh wrote (p.283, Chain of Command): that the task force [121] was then [Nov 2003] commanded by Air Force Brigadier General Lyle Koenig, an experienced Special Forces helicopter pilot who was replaced in spring 2004 by Rear Admiral William McRaven, who had recently been on the National Security Council staff. However, Hersh is incorrect that McRaven took over in spring 2004 (was he given misinformation?) Although Koenig was the TF 121 commander in September 2003, it
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES McRaven took command no later than December 2003; McRaven was the CO of TF 121 when Saddam was captured in December 2003 (see section on the capture of Saddam Hussein). According to his June 2, 2009 Senate testimony, McChrystal took command of JSOC sometime in October 2003; I think both McRaven and McChrystal took command of their respective units in October 2003 [Postscript: McRaven 10/16/03 and McChrystal 10/06/03]. However, its possible this passage instead referred to Gen. McChrystal taking command of JSOC on October 16th. If so, then McChrystal would be the officer who said (p.161) after arriving he was ''uncomfortable with TF 121 interrogators stripping detainees and claimed he ordered the practice stopped in December 2003 or January 2004 (however that testimony contradicted the TF 121 Legal Advisor testimony, that [McRaven or McChrystal] said in a meeting at that time that TF 121 would continue to use nudity. (206) According to the Church Special Focus Team Report the October 25, 2003 SMU TF policy included ten interrogation techniques not listed in the Army Field Manual. Those techniques included controlled fear (muzzled dogs), stress positions, sleep deprivation/ adjustment, environmental manipulation, yelling, loud music, and light control, removal of comfort items, isolation, false documents/report, multiple interrogator, and repeat and control. (207) Despite having been included in the October 25, 2003 SMU TF policy, which he approved [REDACTED; McRaven] indicated to DoD investigators in June 2004 that he had not approved "environmental manipulation" or "presence of military working dogs There is evidence that at least one technique that was not in the SOP - removal of clothing - was in use at the SMU TF in late 2003. NOTE: It appears [McRaven] made a false statement to investigators about what techniques had been approved by him on October 25, 2003. And its worth noting that allowed the use of nudity, even though it was not an approved technique.
October 2003: Iraq War CO Rescinded Most Aggressive Techniques from CITF-7s SOP, JSOC Task Forces Continued to Use Them Well Into 2004 (219) While CENTCOM legal concerns had led to CITF-7s removal of most of the aggressive interrogation techniques from its interrogation policy in October 2003, interrogation policies issued by Task Forces under CENTCOM Command, including the the Special Mission Units in Iraq and Afghanistan continued to include aggressive interrogation techniques well into 2004. (222) According to the Church Special Focus Team Report, the March 26, 2004 SMU TF SOP included a larger number of interrogation techniques outside of FM 34-52 than the SOPs of any other military organization at the time.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES March 26, 2004: Gen. McChrystal Approves New JSOC Task Force Interrogation SOP Including 14 Techniques (previously 10) Outside FM 34-52 (222) [REDACTED] Prior to March 2004, however, each [JSOC Task Force] operated under a distinct interrogation SOP. On March 26, 2004 the SMU TF [McChrystal] implemented a single interrogation policy that covered SMU TF operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The March 26, 2004 SMU SOP authorized 14 [vs. 10 IN 10/25/03 SOP] "interrogation techniques" not explicitly listed in FM 34-52, including use of muzzled dogs, "safety positions (during interrogations)," sleep adjustment/management, mild physical contact, isolation, sensory overload, sensory deprivation, and dietary manipulation. Note 1732: The 14 techniques were the use of military working dogs, safety positions(during interrogations), use of blackened goggles/ear muffs during interrogation, sleep adjustment/sleep management, use of female interrogators, sensory deprivation, sensory overload, change of environment/ environmental manipulation, diet manipulation, use of falsified documents or reports and deception, use of individual fears, use of isolation, fear of long-term incarceration, and mild physical contact. (223) Note 1738: See Department of Defense Headquarters, Joint Task Force 121 (ITF-121), Baghdad Air Base, Iraq CITF-121 Battlefield Interrogation facility/team Standard Operating Procedures. [The redactors missed this reference to TF 121]
May 6, 2004: CENTCOM Commander Suspends Use of All Non-FM 34-52 Techniques As a Result of Detainee Abuse at Abu Gharib (222) Although the authority in the March SOP to use "muzzled dogs" was rescinded on April 22, 2004, the remainder of the techniques remained authorized until May 6, 2004, when GEN John Abizaid, the CENTCOM Commander, suspended use of all non-FM 34-52 techniques. The Church Special Focus Team report said the techniques were suspended as a result of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib.
May 23, 2004: After Suspension, Gen. McChrystal Tells Gen. Abizaid He Plans to Request Additional Techniques for Use By JSOC Task Forces (223) On May 23, 2004 [REDACTED; McChrystal] SMU TF [JSOC] Commander sent a message to [REDACTED; CENTCOM CO GEN Abizaid] stating that the May 6, 2044 [REDACTED] wrote that detainees held by his TF were "hardened" and "trained to resist interrogation" and added: FOR THIS LIMITED GROUP OF DETAINEES [REDACTED] SLEEP MANAGEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL MANIPULATION (LIGHT AND NOISE), EXTENDED INTERROGATIONS, VARYING COMFORT POSITIONS AND THE USE OF HOODS TO INDUCE A PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE OF ISOLATION AND DEPENDENCE ON THE INTERROGATORS ARE PARTICULARLY USEFUL.1740
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES [REDACTED; McChrystal] told [REDACTED; Abizaid] that he planned to request "authority to employ" additional Techniques 1741 Note 1739/1740/1741: Message from Commander [JSOC McChrystal] to Commander [CENTCOM Abizaid] DTG 231006Z MAY 04 (May 23, 2004) at 1; Ibid (emphasis in original); Ibid. at 1.
May 27, 2003: Gen. McChrystal Formally Requests to Continue Use by JSOC Task Forces of 5 Interrogation Techniques Outside of FM 34-52 (223) On May 27, 2004, [REDACTED; McChrystal] formally requested that CENTCOM grant authority to the SMU TF to use five interrogation techniques: sleep management, control positions, environmental manipulation, separation, and change of scenery. 1742 The request stated that control positions - defined as "requiring the detainee to stand, sit, kneel, squat, maintain sitting position with back against the wall, bend over chair, lean with head against wall, lie prone across chairs, stand with arms above head or raised to shoulders, or other normal physical training positions" - could also "be used in order to implement sleep management" and that "in the most exceptional circumstances, and on approval from [the SMU TF Commander]," interrogators could ''use handcuffs to enforce the detainee's position. An interrogator could require a detainee to remain in a control position for "no more than 45 minutes in one hour and for no more than six hours in a 24 hour period. Note 1742: [LONG REDACTION]
June 4, 2004: Gen. Abizaid Approves Use of 4 Non-FM 34-52 Interrogation Techniques by JSOC Task Forces, But Denies Use of Control Positions (224) Notwithstanding the May 6, 2004 suspension of all non-FM 34-52 techniques, on June 4, 2004, GEN Abizaid approved the use of sleep management, environmental manipulation, separation, and change of scenery for the SMU TF. [denied use of control positions.]1745 He delegated the approval authority for the use of those techniques to the "first general officer in the chain of command," and specified that none of the techniques could be used beyond a 72 hour period "without a review by [the SMU TF Commander] or the first general officer in the chain of command. 1746 Note 1745/1746: Church Special Focus Team Report at 16. Although the request defined "separation" to include the use of goggles, earmuffs, and hooding, the CENTCOM Cornmander approved 'use of hooding." Memorandum from General John Abizaid [to Commander [REDACTED; McChrystal], Request/or Use a/Interrogation Techniques, Dated 27May 2004 (June 4, 2004). NOTE: Both Gen. Abizaid and Gen. McChrystals names are [redacted] in the SASC report. (although the redactor missed Abizaids name in Note 1745). However, Senator
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Russ Feingold uses both names in his discussion of these SASC report passages from March 26, 2004 through June 4, 2004 (Congressional Record, June 11, 2009 S6537S6538). Therefore, Ive identified McChrystal and Abizaid in the above passages. ... On June 11, 2009, the day after McChrystals unanimous Senate confirmation, Senator Russ Feingold inserted a statement into the Congressional Record that referred to this report. He voiced his concerns with the veracity of General McChrystal Senate testimony: I am concerned about General McChrystals public testimony, which sought to convey that he was uncomfortable with various interrogation techniques and sought to reduce their use. Given the full history of his approach to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best. First, Feingold was concerned with McChrystals testimony that he sought to reduce the use of some techniques he was uncomfortable with when he took over. Really? It doesnt appear that the number of techniques approved for use decreased under his command. Shortly after he took command of JSOC, McChrystal approved an October 25, 2003 SOP that included 10 techniques outside FM 34-52. Just a few months later, on March 26, 2004 he authorized four additional techniques; this later JSOC SOP included a larger number of interrogation techniqu es outside of FM 34-52 than the SOPs of any other military organization at the time. The use of non-FM 34-52 techniques by JSOC only decreased after the Abu Gharib scandal, not by discomfort on McChrystals part. And, even after GEN Abizaid suspended non-FM 34-52 techniques, McChrystal was comfortable with requesting to continue to use five techniques outside FM 34-52 (he was denied the use of control positions). When Senator Levin asked McChrystal to square his public testimony that he reduced the number of techniques which were utilized with this SASC report, General McChrystal responded, in March 2004, [he] reduc[ed] the frequency of use of several of the techniques by requiring high-level approval (as previously noted, McChrystals new SOP didnt reduce the number of techniques which were utilized; it increased the number from 10 to 14!) And, as far as reduced frequency of use by requiring high-level approval, a TF 121 interrogator named Jeff (see Human Rights Watch report (No Blood, No Foul HRW Report) said that such approval was pro forma: There was an authorization template on a computer And it was a checklist. I never saw a sheet that wasn't signed. Some interrogators would go and use these techniques without typing up one of those things knew it was going to be approved anyway
214
Removal of Clothing Used by JSOC Task Forces (Although Technique Was Outside Their Interrogation SOPs) With the Knowledge of Commander
(161) While neither the January 10, 2003 nor the July 10, 2003 SMU policies included "removal of clothing" there is evidence that it was used as an interrogation technique at the SMU TF. After Taking Command in October 2003, Admiral McRaven Permitted Stripping of Detainees Until at Least December 2003, Despite Being Outside of His Approved SOP (206) On October 16, 2003 a new Commander, [REDACTED; McRaven] took command of the SMU TF. [REDACTED; McRaven] stated that he "used his subject matter experts to build the [interrogation] SOP consistent with existing rules and regulations. This SOP went into effect on October 25, 2003. 207 [REDACTED; McRaven] stated that when he took command in October 2003, he "discovered that some of the detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique. He said that he did not know where the technique came from. Weeks prior to his October 2003 arrival, however, JPRA instructors had stripped a detainee during their assistance visit to the SMU TF facility as part of an interrogation (211) The Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) in Iraq also used "removal of clothing" as an interrogation technique in the fall of 2003, just as the Abu Ghraib abuses were taking place. While not included in the SMU TF interrogation SOP, the SMU TF Commander stated that when he took command in October 2003 he "discovered that some of the detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique. [REDACTED; McRaven] said he terminated the practice in December 2003 or January 2004. (161) [REDACTED; McRaven] who took command at the SMU TF in October 2003 stated that when he arrived on site he "discovered that some of the detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique ''to gain control over the detainee. [REDACTED McRaven] stated that he did not know where the technique came from and that he was uncomfortable with stripping detainees even though "arguably, it was an effective technique. [REDACTED McRaven] said he terminated the practice in December 2003 or January 2004. 207 [REDACTED; McRaven] stated that when he took command in October 2003, he "discovered that some of the detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique. He said that he did not know where the technique came from. Weeks prior to his October 2003 arrival, however, JPRA instructors had stripped a detainee during their assistance visit to the SMU TF facility as part of an interrogation. [REDACTED; McRaven] stated that he was ''uncomfortable'' with stripping detainees and that "stripping a detainee just didn't seem right to [him] even though arguably, it was an effective technique. He said he terminated the practice in December 2003 or January 2004.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Admiral McRavens Testimony About Terminating Practice in Dec. 2003/Jan. 2004 Contradicts His Legal Advisors Account (161) However, the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served at the SMU TF facility from December 2003 until February 2004 stated that he attended a meeting called by [REDACTED; McRaven] in December 2003 or January 2004 to discuss the use of stripping prisoners as part of interrogations. The Legal Advisor stated that stripping detainees gave him pause but said that the technique was 'widespread" at that time The Legal Advisor stated that the Commander nevertheless decided at the meeting that the SMU TF would continue to use nudity as an interrogation technique though the Legal Advisor stated that he thought [REDACTED; McRaven?] may have said that he [REDACTED; McChrystal?] would have to approve its use. ... NOTE: It appears that McRaven was the [redacted] commander who said after arriving in October he was ''uncomfortable with TF 121 interrogators stripping detainees (although its possible it was actually McChrystal; the word uncomfortable was used during his Senate testimony). Although McRaven [or McChrystal; see October 25, 2003 note in Development of JSOC Task Force Interrogation SOPs From January 2003 to June 2004] claimed he ordered the practice stopped in December 2003 or January 2004, his testimony contradicts that of the TF 121 Legal Advisor who testified that McRaven said in a meeting at that time that TF 121 would continue to use nudity. NOTE: On page 207, it appears that Admiral McRaven [or McChrystal] Despite having been included in the October 25, 2003 SMU TF policy, which he approved indicated to DoD investigators in June 2004 that he had not approved "environmental manipulation" or "presence of military working dogs It appears [McRaven or McChrystal] made a false statement to investigators about what techniques had been approved by him on October 25, 2003. ... On June 11, 2009, the day after McChrystals unanimous Senate confirmation, Senator Russ Feingold inserted a statement into the Congressional Record that referred to this report. He voiced his concerns with the veracity of General McChrystal Senate testimony: I am concerned about General McChrystals public testimony, which sought to convey that he was uncomfortable with various interrogation techniques and sought to reduce their use. Given the full history of his approach to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best. Senator Feingold was concerned with McChrystals testimony that he was uncomfortable with some of the techniques when he took over. But, given that McChrystal didnt actually reduce
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES the use (on his own) of the number of approved techniques during 2004, what technique(s) is he talking about? It appears that Admiral McRaven was the [redacted] commander who said after arriving in October he was ''uncomfortable with TF 121 interrogators stripping detainees (its possible McChrystal was the commander uncomfortable with the use of nudity after his arrival; its not clear whether he or Admiral McRaven was the commander referred to in the Senate report). Regardless, the commander knew nudity was being used even though his approved SOP didnt permit it. And, McRaven/McChrystal didnt immediately reduce the use of nudity; he claimed he only ended the practice two or three months later in December 2003 or January 2004 (however this claim was contradicted by his legal advisor who testified that the commander said he would continue to use nudity).
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Legality of JSOC Task Force Interrogation SOPs Was Repeatedly Questioned

(154) an investigation completed by the Department of Defense Inspector General in 2006 concluded that the [January10, 2003] SMU SOP "was influenced by the counter-resistance memorandum that the Secretary of Defense approved on December 2, 2002.
Techniques Approved By Secretary of Defense for Gitmo Not Applicable to Iraq War: (154) The SMU TF Legal Advisor concluded that the [January10, 2003] interrogation SOP proposed for use by the SMU was in accordance with their "guidance and constraints," and therefore, "legally sufficient [for Afghanistan]. In addition, the Legal Advisor recommended that the SMU "continue to approach CENTCOM for clarifying guidance on whether the techniques apparently approved for use at GITMO by SECDEF ... are applicable or can become applicable for use in the CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility]. (187) In his email, CAPT Donovan [JFCOM SJA] stated that JPRA should not rely on the March 6, 2003 Working Group report as "authoritative DoD guidance." He wrote that, although the Secretary had approved certain counter-resistance techniques during interrogations of unlawful combatants at GTMO, not all of the techniques listed in the Working Group report had been approved for use. CAPT Donovan also raised serious concerns about the legality of the interrogation techniques in the CONOP emphasizing that, unlike in Afghanistan and at GTMO, the Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq.
TF 121 CO BG Koenig Told by Legal Advisor & COL Kleinman that SERE Techniques Were Unlawful, Violated Geneva Conventions, and Fell Outside Task Force SOP: 223) Several interrogation techniques authorized for use by the SMU Task Force were similar to techniques used in the resistance phase of SERE training. In fact, undated SMU TF SOPs from this period [Spring 2004] suggest a connection between SMU TF interrogation techniques and SERE. The SOPs state, under interrogation "Standards," that "[i]nterrogations will be done [in accordance with] all applicable rules and regulations to include... Survival/ Evasion/Resistance/and Escape regulations. (170) On August 25, 2003, the SMU Task Force in Iraq formally requested a JPRA "interrogation team." On August 27, 2003, [REDACTED; J3 Joint Staff; McChrystal was Vice Director] request for support, forwarded it to JFCOM, and asked that JFCOM task JPRA to support the request. That same day, the JFCOM Operations Directorate (J-3) authorized JPRA to provide the requested support to the SMU TF. Note: See the Senate report pp. 170+ for more details about Col Kleinmans SERE visit to TF 121 from Sept. 5, 2003 until Sept. 23, 2003.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES NOTE: Gen. McChrystal was vice director of Operations (S3) of the Joint Staff from July 2002 until he took command of JSOC in Sept/Oct. 2003. It appears McChrystal was involved in this process: the decision to send SERE instructors to Iraq originated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose operations [J3] commander was frustrated at the lack of progress [by the ISG] But while the ISG rejected Washingtons pressure to use SERE techniques, another task force based in Iraq was excited at the prospect [JSOC TF 20/121] Within months of the JPRA delegations visit, TF-20 [121] developed a reputation for uncontrolled brutality. [p. 245, Jane Mayers The Dark Side].
(181) Around the time that Lt Col Kleinman met with the SMU TF Legal Advisor, Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller met separately with the SMU TF Director of Intelligence (J2), COL Brian Keller, and his J-2X and participated in interrogations with J-2X staff. Note: COL Brian Keller was McChrystals JSOC J2 for several months (McChrystal, p. 99). (193) According to LTC Beaver [former ITF-GTM SJA], the SMU TF Legal Advisor raised concerns with her [during September 2003 visit] about physical violence being used by SMU TF personnel during interrogations, including punching, choking, and beating detainees. He told her that he was "risking his life" by talking to her about these issues. LTC Beaver told the Committee that the SMU Legal Advisor had also raised these issues with the Commander of the SMU TF [121], but that [REDACTED; TF 121 CO Air Force BG Lyle Koenig] was not receptive to his concerns.
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Pro Forma (Or No) Investigation of Reported JSOC Detainee Abuse:

TF 121 Legal Advisor Reported Abuse to Gen. Millers SJA & to BG Koenig: (193) According to LTC Beaver [former ITF-GTMO SJA], the SMU TF Legal Advisor raised concerns with her [during September 2003 visit] about physical violence being used by SMU TF personnel during interrogations, including punching, choking, and beating detainees. He told her that he was "risking his life" by talking to her about these issues. LTC Beaver told the Committee that the SMU Legal Advisor had also raised these issues with the Commander of the SMU TF [121], but that [REDACTED; TF 121 CO Air Force BG Lyle Koenig] was not receptive to his concerns. COL Herrington Not Allowed into TF 121 Facility & Reported Need to Be Reined In: (216) In November 2003, BG Barbara Fast, the CITF-7 Director for Intelligence, commissioned retired Army Colonel Stuart Herrington to assess U.S. intelligence operations in Iraq. (217) Shortly before leaving for Iraq, COL Herrington received a call [REDACTED; ISG] told COL Herrington of his concern that detainees had been ''tortured and beaten by agency guys and SMU TF personnel in Iraq. (217) COL Herrington wrote in his report that an OGA representative told him that OGA [CIA?] personnel had been instructed not to have any involvement with interrogation operations at the SMU TF as the "practices there were in contravention to his Agency's guidance on what was and what was not permissible in interrogating detainees. He added that he had been told by his CITF-7 escort that it would be "difficult, if not impossible" to visit the SMU TF facilities. His written report stated it seems clear that [the SMU TF] needs to be reined in with respect to its treatment of detainees. CITF-7 Investigating Officers Report Cursory With Obvious Gaps: (219) COL Herrington told the DoD IG that he expected that CITF-7 and the Army G2 would investigate the issues he raised. However, he said they never contacted him. In what VADM Church described as an "extremely brief, three-page report," the CITF-7 investigating officer found no proof to substantiate the allegations against the SMU TF. VADM Church criticized the CITF-7 report as "extremely brief and cursory" with "obvious gaps in the investigation methodology. ... Gen. McChrystal testified that we investigated every [alleged mistreatment of detainees] and punished those responsible if it was substantiated. However, I would guess that most of those investigations were as "extremely brief and cursory" with "obvious gaps in the investigation methodology as that of the investigation of the issues raised by COL Herrington.
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APPENDIX B:
Senator Feingolds Congressional Record Response to Gen. McChrystals June 2009 Senate Testimony
I am concerned about General McChrystals public testimony, which sought to convey that he was uncomfortable with various interrogation techniques and sought to reduce their use. Given the full history of his approach to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best. -- Senator Russ Feingold, Congressional Record (June 11, 2009)
On June 11, 2009, the day after McChrystals unanimous Senate confirmation, Senator Russ Feingold inserted a statement into the Congressional Record voicing his concerns with the veracity of General McChrystal June 2, 2009 Senate testimony about his treatment of detainees. Senator Feingold concluded: I am concerned about General McChrystals public testimony, which sought to convey that he was uncomfortable with various interrogation techniques and sought to reduce their use. Given the full history of his approach to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best. First, Feingold was concerned with McChrystals testimony that he sought to reduce the use of some techniques he was uncomfortable with when he took over. Really? It doesnt appear that the number of techniques approved for use decreased under his command. Shortly after he took command of JSOC, McRaven/McChrystal approved an October 25, 2003 SOP that included 10 techniques outside FM 34-52. Just a few months later, on March 26, 2004 he authorized four additional techniques; this later JSOC SOP included a larger number (14) of interrogation techniques outside of FM 34-52 than the SOPs of any other military organization at the time. The use of non-FM 34-52 techniques by JSOC only decreased after the Abu Gharib scandal, after GEN Abizaid suspended non-FM 34-52 techniques in Iraq (but not due to action on McChrystals part). Shortly afterwards, McChrystal requested to continue the use of five techniques outside FM 34-52 (he was denied the use of control positions). When Senator Levin asked McChrystal to square his public testimony with this record, General McChrystal responded, in March 2004, [he] reduc[ed] the frequency of use of several of the techniques by requiring high-level approval. But, as previously noted, in March 2004, McChrystals new SOP didnt reduce the number of techniques which were utilized; it
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES increased the number from 10 to 14! And, as far as reduced frequency of use by requiring high-level approval, an TF 121 named Jeff said that such approval was pro forma: There was an authorization template on a computer And it was a checklist. I never saw a sheet that wasn't signed. Some interrogators would go and use these techniques without typing up one of those things knew it was going to be approved anyway Second, Senator Feingold was concerned with McChrystals testimony that he was uncomfortable with some of the techniques when he took over. But, given that McChrystal didnt actually reduce the (on his own) number of approved techniques during 2004, what techniques is he talking about? Its possible McChrystal was the commander who said he was uncomfortable with the use of nudity after his arrival (its not clear whether he or Admiral McRaven is the commander referred to in the Senate report).122 Regardless, the commander knew nudity was being used even though his approved SOP didnt permit it. And, McRaven (or McChrystal?) didnt immediately reduce the use of nudity; he claimed he only ended the practice two or three months later in December 2003 or January 2004 (however his claim was contradicted by his legal advisor who testified that the commander said he would continue to use nudity). Especially after reading the Senate Armed Services Committees November 2008 report, INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY (see Appendix A), I agree with Senator Feingold that McChrystals Senate testimony appears to be incomplete, at best. It certainly didnt display much so-called candor. ... Following are annotated excerpts from Senator Russ Feingold Congressional Record statement voicing his concerns with the veracity of General McChrystal testimony , which given the full history of his approach to interrogations, [his] testimony appears incomplete, at best: At his public [Senate] confirmation hearing [on June 2, 2009], General McChrystal responded to a question from Chairman LEVIN regarding interrogation policies that included stress positions, the use of dogs and nudity by stating that [s]ome of them were in use when I took over, sir, and then, as we immediately began to reduce that.123
122
According to McChrystals book he took command of JSOC on October 6, 2003. Therefore, the new CO of the SMU [TF 121] on October 16, 2003 must be McRaven.
123
On October 16, 2003, either McRaven took command of TF 121 or McChrystal took command of JSOC (McRaven took command no later than December 2003; McChrystal took command in October or September. Its not clear which is being referred to here and in the references to nudity. 222
NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES When asked whether he was uncomfortable with some of the techniques in use, he replied [w]hen I took over, I was.124 However, following the hearing, Chairman LEVIN sent General McChrystal a question describing many of the 14 interrogation techniques125 not listed in the Army Field Manual ]34-52] that were authorized under Gen. McChrystals command, up until May 6, 2004 when CENTCOM CO Gen. Abizaid suspended the use of all such techniques.126 [Senator Levins] question then described a request from Gen McChrystal submitted 3 weeks [May 27, 2003] after the suspension, to continue using a number of these techniques.127 Asked to square his public testimony with this record, General McChrystal responded that, when he took command in 2003 [October 2003?], he reviewed the interrogation program and, in March 2004128, reduc[ed] the frequency of use of several of the techniques by requiring high-level approval.129
The new commander approved an interrogation SOP on October 25, 2003 that included 10 techniques outside FM 34-52: controlled fear (muzzled dogs), stress positions, sleep deprivation/ adjustment, environmental manipulation, yelling, loud music, and light control, removal of comfort items, isolation, false documents/report, multiple interrogator, and repeat and control (p. 206, SASC). It doesnt appear the number of techniques had decreased Although not listed, the commander knew that nudity was also being used. Also, other SERE techniques were being used in September 2003 (and perhaps later). (pp. 179, 207 , 223 SASC)
124
If McChrystal took command on October 16, 2003, then this could be a reference to stripping detainees (p. 161 SASC)
125
The 14 techniques were: use of military working dogs, safety [stress] positions(during interrogations), use of blackened goggles/ear muffs during interrogation, sleep adjustment/sleep management, use of female interrogators, sensory deprivation, sensory overload, change of environment/ environmental manipulation, diet manipulation, use of falsified documents or reports and deception, use of individual fears, use of isolation, fear of long-term incarceration, and mild physical contact (p. 222, Note 1732 SASC)
126
The Church Special Focus Team report said the techniques were suspended [by GEN Abizaid] as a result of detainee abuse at Abu Gharib; not by McChrystal (p.222, SASC).
127
On May 27, 2004, [McChrystal] formally requested that CENTCOM grant authority to the SMU TF to use five interrogation techniques: sleep management, control positions, environmental manipulation, separation, and change of scenery (p.223 SASC)
128
On March 26, 2004 the SMU [JSOC] TF implemented a single interrogation policy that covered SMU TF operations in both Iraq & Afghanistan. [McChrystal] authorized 14 interrogation techniques not explicitly listed in FM 34-5 (see Note #14 above) included a larger number of interrogation techniques outside of FM 34-52 than the SOPs of any other military organization at the time (p.222 SASC) 223
General McChrystal then acknowledged that he personally requested approval from General Abizaid to continue using several of the techniques that had just been suspended, including control positions. [On June 4, 2004] General Abizaid rejected the use of control positions, and according to the Senate Armed Services Committee [11/20/08] report, the use of hooding.130 I have numerous concerns, both about this history and about General McChrystals public testimony I have long opposed any interrogation techniques that are not authorized by the Army Field Manual [34-52]. I am thus dismayed by General McChrystals personal support for the use of some of these techniques, particularly the so-called control positions, and by his efforts to continue the techniques after they had been suspended. And, while I have no reason to believe that General McChrystal would not adhere to current law and policy, I am troubled by his failure to express any regret for his previous positions. Finally, I am concerned about General McChrystals public testimony, which sought to convey that he was uncomfortable131 with various interrogation techniques and sought to reduce their use.132 Given the full history of his approach to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best.
129
What? McChrystals March SOP didnt reduce the number of techniques which were utilized ! His March SOP increased the number from 10 in October 2003 to 14 in March! As far as reduced frequency of use by requiring approval, an TF 121 named Jeff said that in Spring 2004, There was an authorization template on a computer And it was a checklist. And it was already typed out for you I never saw a sheet that wasn't signed. Some interrogators would go and use these techniques without typing up one of those things knew it was going to be approved anyway (No Blood, No Foul HRW Report)
130
On June 4, 2004 GEN Abizaid approved the use of four of the five techniques; he denied use of control positions (p.224, SASC)
131
If McChrystal took command on October 16, 2003, then this could be a reference to stripping detainees (p. 161 SASC). Or it may have been Admiral McRaven who was uncomfortable.
132
See note #18 above 224
APPENDIX C
The Constitution Projects Detainee Treatment Report (April 16, 2013) on BG Koenig, LTG McChrystal [and Admiral McRavens] Role in JSOC Torture
The nations most senior officials bear ultimate responsibility for allowing and contributing to the spread of illegal and improper interrogation techniques used by some U.S. personnel on detainees in several theaters. Responsibility also falls on other government officials and certain military leaders. [Gen.] Taguba said he thought the MPs [at Abu Gharib] had been exploited, and that there had been a failure both within the military and in Congress to hold those at the top responsible. Instead, Taguba said, there were several officers complicit or involved in abuse who got away, or got their fourth star. the track record of prosecutions in the military is mixed at best the lack of successful prosecutions demonstrate major gaps in enforcement of the laws against torture and war crimes, which likely reduces their deterrent effect. Even without the risk of prosecution, the risk of public disclosure and disapproval might deter a future administration from authorizing torture. McChrystal wrote in his memoir that [t]here were lapses of discipline, but they were never tolerated. Never a wink and a nod. [But] McChrystal declined several invitations from the [Constitution Projects] Task Force to be interviewed about Afghanistan and Iraq. -- The Constitution Projects Detainee Treatment Report (April 16, 2013)
...
Constitution Project Found Responsibility For Torture Falls on Certain Military Leaders, But They Havent Been Held Accountable Gen. McChrystal & Admiral McRavens Command of JSOC Torture Non-Coercive Rapport-Based Interrogation Techniques Are Most Effective (But Constitution Project Omits Examples of Maddox & Alexander Using Them to Get Saddam Hussein & Abu al-Zarqawi) Gen. McChrystal, The Army, And President Obamas Whitewash Of Torture Investigations: Constitution Project Whitewashed McChrystal & McRavens Command of JSOC Torture
Note: see Detainee Treatment Report section in the No Blood, No Foul for a summary
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THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT FOUND RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTURE FALLS ON CERTAIN MILITARY LEADERS, BUT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN HELD ACCOUNTABLE:
360 various Bush officials and military officials have publicly stated that certain detainees in U.S. treatment were tortured, though many others maintain that the enhanced interrogation techniques did not rise to the level of torture. Note: This is McChrystals claim. He wrote [a]s late as the spring of 2004, six months into my command, I believed our force needed the option of employing select, carefully controlled enhanced interrogation techniques,.. Also, in his Generation Kill Foreign Policy interview he said, We weren't actively torturing people, but we weren't treating people the way that we should have been. ... Finding #2: The nations most senior officials bear ultimate responsibility for allowing and contributing to the spread of illegal and improper interrogation techniques used by some U.S. personnel on detainees in several theaters. Responsibility also falls on other government officials and certain military leaders. ... 106 Taguba said he thought the MPs had been exploited, and that there had been a failure both within the military and in Congress to hold those at the top responsible. It has to be the generals, Taguba said. In the Navy if that ship runs aground, who gets relieved? The captain. 173 Instead, Taguba said, there were several officers complicit or involved in abuse who got away, or got their fourth star. He did not want to name specific individuals, however.174 Note: Is fourth star a reference to McChrystal? ... 336 Since 2009, there have been no trials, civil or criminal, and no official commission of inquiry. 335 The Uniform Code of Military Justice also retains its clear prohibitions on mistreating prisoners, but the track record of prosecutions in the military is mixed at best, with many serious cases leading to no jail time or no conviction at all. the lack of successful prosecutions demonstrate major gaps in enforcement of the laws against torture and war crimes, which likely reduces their deterrent effect. 335 Even without the risk of prosecution, the risk of public disclosure and disapproval might deter a future administration from authorizing torture. But public opposition to torturing terrorism suspects under any circumstances has fallen since President Obama took office.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Note: What risk of public disclosure and disapproval? No one in the press has called McChrystal on his BS about torture, etc.! As mentioned later in these notes, this Constitution Project report whitewashes McChrystals role in torture and doesnt even mention McRavens name! Some public disclosure! 336 Retired Colonel Steven Kleinman was less confident than the others. He said it was quite plausible that soldiers were using cruel techniques on detainees in a field site somewhere right now in Afghanistan. So yes it is a danger to come back. 169
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GEN. MCCHRYSTAL & ADMIRAL MCRAVEN COMMANDED JSOC/TASK FORCE 121 TORTURE:
Afghanistan Torture Was Spread to Iraq By MI & JSOC Forces:
63 Of the early detention operations at Bagram, retired General Stanley McChrystal later wrote in his memoir I had been deeply unimpressed with the interrogation facilities at Bagram when I first deployed to Afghanistan in 2002. 45 Note: According to Schaills book, McChrystal was involved with setting up interrogation operations in Afghanistan.
63 The behavior [at Bagram prison] included yelling, nakedness, body cavity searches, alleged beatings, sleep deprivation and barking military dogs. The behavior toward detainees was exhibited across both military police and military interrogation units. Many of these same techniques would later be found in Iraq and indeed several members of the 519th deployed to Iraq in the summer of 2003 to initiate interrogation operations there. Just as at Bagram, the 519ths assistant operations officer, Captain Carolyn Wood, assumed duties as the interrogation officer in charge in Iraq.49 104 During the summer of 2003, 10 or 12 members of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, the same unit linked to two detainee deaths in Afghanistan, traveled to Abu Ghraib to set up interrogation operations there. Captain Carolyn Wood became the officer in charge. On July 26, 2003, Wood sent a proposed interrogation policy that included sleep management, comfort positions, the presence of military dogs, 20-hour interrogations, isolation and light control.160 Note: CPT Woods torture SOP was copied from JSOCs torture SOPs. Many have argued that Sanchezs second memo demonstrates that any subsequent abuses in Iraq were a function of undisciplined, sadistic soldiers, not policy. This is particularly true of the notorious Abu Ghraib photographs. 105 Note: McChrystal makes this claim on the lecture circuit and in his book. 106 But other photographs depict abuses that began before Graners unit arrived at the prison, and were widely condoned if not actually authorized. The Fay Report, an investigation by Major General George Fay into military intelligence personnels role in the Abu Ghraib abuses Major General Antonio Taguba (in the Taguba Report investigating MP abuses) also found a link between MI and the MP guards abuses 109 detainee abuse in Iraq was widespread but that doesnt mean its all the same. Theres been spontaneous abuse at the troops level; theres been more authorized abuse; theres
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES been overlap a sort of combination of authorized and unauthorized. And you have abuse that passed around like a virus; abuse that started because one unit was approved to use it, and then another unit which wasnt started copying them.211 109 The abuses by both OGA and the 3rd Armored Cavalry at the Blacksmith Hotel and Al Asad Air Base are one example of abuse being passed around like a virus. Two nearby detention facilities in Mosul were another. One was a detention site for Navy SEAL Team 7, one of the units affiliated with the JSOC task forces. One detainee dropped off by the SEALs in March 2004 Fashad Mohammed died at the SEAL compound in Mosul on April 5, 2004.
Gen. McChrystal Helped Gitmotize Abu Gharib & Involved in Sending SERE Instructors to Teach Torture to JSOC TF 121 in Iraq:
105 In early September, Major General Geoffrey Miller visited Iraq to advise personnel there about improving interrogations. 88 In the summer of 2003, General Koenig then the head of the JSOC task force, asked Colonel Randy Moulton, the commander of the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), for help with interrogation. JPRA sent a team of three people: Lieutenant Colonel Steven Kleinman Kleinman said the team arrived in Iraq at the end of August and departed in early October.21 Note: As Joint Staff VDJ3, IN August 2003, McChrystal was involved in the order to JPRA to send Gen. Miller & SERE instructors to Gitmotize Iraq
Torture Was Not Limited to a Few Bad Apples at Abu Ghraib. It was SOP at Camp Nama & Other JSOC Detention Facilities Under the Command of McChrystal & McRaven:
389 Many high-value detainees in Iraq were interrogated by a JSOC task force, which over time was known as Task Force 20, Task Force 121, Task Force 6-26, and Task Force 145. The task force was originally based at a facility outside the Baghdad International Airport, known as Camp Nama. 388 many prisoners in Iraq were interrogated by the CIA or by Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) troops, who did not answer to the same chain of command as the regular military and did not consider themselves bound by Geneva. 389 [TF 121] It was not under the authority of General Ricardo Sanchez, the overall commander of U.S. troops in Iraq; Sanchez later said he did not even know what techniques the task force was authorized to use.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Note: McChrystal commanded JSOC and reported to CENTCOM Gen. Abizaid (and reportedly directly to Rumsfeld/Cheney. TF 121 was part of JSOC and commanded by McRaven after October 2003. He approved several torture SOPs during 2003/2004 that are described in the SASC 2008 report (see Appendix A). 392, The Special Mission Unit task forces and the CIA did not confine their activities to Camp Nama. They also operated at different locations around Iraq, and are connected to several detainees deaths in detention, including Dilar Dababa, Manadel al-Jamadi, Abed Hamed Mowhoush, and Abdul Jameel. 94 There are at least five suspicious detainee deaths in Iraq that appear to be linked to the CIAs operations or the JSOC task forces. 94 Early entries in the investigative file also state that Dababa died [June 13, 2003] of an apparent heart attack, 62 but his autopsy contradicted this, finding instead that his death was a homicide caused by traumatic brain injury and hemorrhage. The autopsy also describes dozens of abrasions and bruises, concentrated but not limited to the head and neck, and injuries from handcuffs around the wrists and ankles. Many of these injuries were not present at the time of his capture.63 Note: Interrogator Eric Maddox (who got Saddam Hussein) was told a high-value detainee he wanted to question died of a Heart Attack on December 8, 2003 at Camp Nama.
Even After McRaven & McChrystal Took Command of TF 121 / JSOC in October 2003, JSOC Torture Continued Until At Least Spring 2004:
91 But the reports of abuse kept coming. On June 25, 2004, an FBI agent emailed his superiors and alleged that a detainee captured by the JSOC task force had suspicious burn marks. 102 Other reports seem to confirm the ongoing use of enhanced techniques that included close confinement as well as sleep deprivation into the spring of 2004. An investigation into Special Forces task forces treatment of detainees by Brigadier General Richard Formica documented one incident in April or May 2004, 397 The use of stress positions and close confinement by Special Forces and the CIA continued into mid-2004, and possibly beyond. Note: Compare p. 102 to p. 397: The use of stress positions and close confinement by Special Forces and the CIA continued into mid-2004, and possibly beyond. An investigation into Special Forces task forces treatment of detainees by General Richard Formica documented one incident in April or May 2004 91 An interrogator based at the Battlefield Interrogation Facility in Camp Nama in the first half of 2004 later spoke to Human Rights Watch about ongoing abuses there
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McRaven & McChrystal Authorized Several Torture SOPs after Taking Command of TF 121/ JSOC:
88 Some of JSOC task forces harsh treatment was explicitly authorized. According to the DOD inspector general and the Senate Armed Services Committee, the JSOC task forces written standard operating procedures (SOP), dated July 15, 2003, authorized sleep deprivation, loud music, stress positions, light control, and the use of military dogs.13 Although not in the written SOP, nudity was also commonly used, reportedly with the knowledge of the JSOC task forces commander and legal advisor.14 Note: The JSOC task forces commander refers to Admiral Bill McRaven who took command of TF 121 in October 2003. However, in the report, his name is not mentioned in connection with torture by TF 121 389 According to the DOD inspector general and the Senate Armed Services Committee, the task forces written standard operating procedures (SOPs) authorized sleep deprivation, loud music, stress positions, light control, and the use of military dogs. Although not in the written SOPs, nudity was also commonly used, with the knowledge of the task forces commander and legal advisor.106 Note: p. 88 is disingenuous since most readers would assume they are referring to Koenig in that passage. And p.88 only mentions the July 2003 SOP under Koenigs command. However, other SOPs were approved by McRaven & McChrystal in October 2003 & March 2004. 103 an interrogation policy for Special Forces troops disseminated in February [March 24,] 2004 permitted interrogation techniques that had been rescinded for ordinary troops, including sleep deprivation, stress positions and environmental manipulation.146 Note: correction, not February, but March 26, 2003 102 McChrystal acknowledged that: [a]s late as the spring of 2004, six months into my command, I believed our force needed the option of employing select, carefully controlled enhanced interrogation techniques, including sleep management. I was wrong. Although these techniques were rarely requested or used, by the summer of that year we got rid of them completely, and all handling inside our centers followed the field manual used by the Army.143 Note: Bullshit! Six months into his command would be April 7. 2003. But only just a little more than a week before, on March 26th, he had approved the new interrogation SOP which had increased the number of carefully controlled techniques from 10 to 14! And on May 27th he still believed JSOC needed the option (when he requested to continue the use of 5 techniques) which is well past six months into my command. Besides sleep management, these techniques included use of dogs, safety positions [stress positions; put in painful position enforced by handcuffs], sleep adjustment/sleep management, sensory deprivation, sensory overload [painful music, etc.], change of environment/ environmental manipulation [e.g. put in cold mud all night until near hypothermic], diet manipulation [starve], isolation, mild physical contact.
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES rarely requested or used? A TF 121 interrogator working at BIAP in 2004 named Jeff (see Human Rights Watch report (No Blood, No Foul HRW Report) said that such approval was pro forma: There was an authorization template on a computer And it was a checklist. I never saw a sheet that wasn't signed. Some interrogators would go and use these techniques without typing up one of those things knew it was going to be approved anyway We got rid of them completely followed the field manual Bullshit. We? He was ordered in May by Abizaid to suspend them after the shit hit the fan after Abu Gharib and he continued the use of four non FM 34-52 techniques after June 4, 2004!
JSOC Torture Appear to Have Continued in Iraq After Spring 2004 (Probably to the End of 2005, Possibly Beyond):
102 In summer 2004, the JSOC task force moved its headquarters to Balad and built a new screening facility 397 The use of stress positions and close confinement by Special Forces and the CIA continued into mid-2004, and possibly beyond. 103 Formica stated, consistent with McChrystals memoirs, that this [use of EIT/torture] had been corrected in May 2004. However, in interviews conducted by attorneys in July 2007, two former detainees gave detailed descriptions of being imprisoned in tiny cells that detainees called black coffins in January 2006.147 397 Formica stated that this had been corrected in May 2004. However, in interviews conducted by attorneys in July 2007, two former detainees gave detailed descriptions of being imprisoned in tiny cells that detainees called black coffins in January 2006.181 Note: consistent with McChrystals memoirs! And, Matthew Alexander wrote that JSOC stopped torture shortly before his arrival in Feb. 2006 102 According to Urban, one British official who visited the Balad detention facility said that the cells there were like dog kennels tiny. 140 Britain eventually told JSOC that its Special Forces could not transfer prisoners to the Americans unless the U.S. agreed not to send them to Balad.141 Urban states that one visit by British intelligence occurred shortly before a November 2004 operation in Falluja142 which implies that the cramped cells remained in use despite Levins objections.102 Note: One reason was McChrystal needed a squeaky clean interrogation system was to get British approval for the SAS to once again work as full partners with JSOC in Iraq. Mark Urban, in his book Task Force Black, described how concerns about torture had blocked the British SAS from working with JSOC after May 2004. The British werent satisfied with Balad until the end of 2005.
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In Afghanistan, JSOC Torture Continued Beyond 2004 in Black Jail:

328 The New York Times reported in August 2009 that according to three military officials, the military for the first time is notifying the International Committee of the Red Cross of the identities of militants who were being held in secret at a camp in Iraq and another in Afghanistan run by United States Special Operations forces. 117 328 Despite these safeguards, a number of former detainees have alleged mistreatment at a facility they called the Black Jail or Tor Jail, located at Bagram Air Base but separate from the main prison there. 329 The Atlantic reported in May 2010 that the facility was operated by the DIAs Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC), which was performing interrogations for a sub-unit of Task Force 714, an elite counter-terrorism brigade. 122 Other reports have stated that Task Force 714 was commanded by Admiral William McRaven, the head of Joint Special Operations Command from 2008 to 2011 and now the commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command.123 Note: this is only mention of McRaven in the report. It doesnt mention his command of TF 121 and authorization/supervison of torture.
The Use of Torture at Abu Gharib & JSOC Led to Rising Insurgency (Report Omits Mention Contributed to Deaths of Soldiers in Iraq):
265 As detailed in this report [see Chapters 2 and 3], the use of harsh techniques that sometimes amounted to torture had widespread consequences. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, detention operations, including use of torture by U.S. forces, were changed dramatically after they contributed to rising insurgencies and breakdowns in command authority. 276 Although Abu Ghraib was the most visible example of soldiers abusing detainees, there were many similar situations in Bagram Detention Facility in Afghanistan, Camp Bucca in Iraq, National Directorate of Security detention facilities throughout Afghanistan, and detainee deaths at the point of capture in the field.53 Note: Why is Camp Nama missing from the above list?
276 The culture of abuse, in turn, spawned further insurgency movements. In 2003, after the release of the Abu Ghraib photos, a reporter asked a young Iraqi man about the reasons for the rise in violence against U.S. soldiers. His response emphasized the imperative for revenge Note: The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply the result of a few bad apples acting on their own. SMU TF [JSOC] policies were a direct cause of detainee abuse and influenced interrogation policies at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq. (SASC, Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody)
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Note: the first and second identifiable causes of U. S. combat deaths in Iraq - as judged by their effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighters into combat - are, respectively the symbols of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo." (General Kimmons). The report didnt mention combat deaths as a consequence of torture. Note: Similarly, McChrystal wrote (p.136): for many [foreign jihadists], burning anger over the recent stories and images of degradation at Abu Gharib had provoked them to come to Iraq and would fuel the fire for years to come. (p.172): In my experience, we found that nearly every first-time jihadist claimed Abu Gharib had first jolted him to action. But, I would argue that McChrystal played a role in lighting the fire which led to Abu Gharib: he helped Gitmotize Iraq, he commanded JSOC torture, and commanded the JSOC night raids also created more adversaries than any other living officer and led to the deaths of American soldiers (McChrystals like an arsonist firefighter who sets fires and then brags about putting them out!).
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NON-COERCIVE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES ARE MOST EFFECTIVE (BUT CONSTITUTION PROJECT OMITTED EXAMPLES OF MADDOX & ALEXANDER USING THEM TO GET HUSSEIN & ZARQAWI):
113 To give one example [of ethical treatment], Colonel Herrington and Major Douglas Pryer have cited the First Armored Division, commanded by Major General Martin Dempsey, for its professional and ethical treatment of captives.238 Note: Maj. Pryer includes Maddox and Alexanders books in his top ten interrogation books. Im surprised his own book on army torture in Iraq is only briefly mentioned in passing only once in the report. Maj. Douglas A. Preyer (author of The Fight for the High Ground: The U.S. Army and Interrogation During Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003 - April 2004) includes Mission: Black List #1 on his Top 10 books U.S. interrogation (Tom Ricks Best Defense blog Feb. 28, 2013)
264 In June 2008, 15 senior interrogators, interviewers and intelligence officials from the U.S. military, the FBI and the CIA amongst them Kleinman, Herrington, Navarro and Cloonan all met, developed and released principles upon which they agreed. All agreed that the most effective way to obtain timely, credible intelligence from suspected terrorists and others who threaten the United States was to use noncoercive, traditional, rapport-based interviewing approaches with detainees.102 Moreover they found the use of torture and other inhumane and abusive treatment resulted in false and misleading intelligence, loss of critical intelligence, was unlawful, ineffective, counterproductive, and caused serious damage to the reputation and standing of the United States.103 ... Note: Why didnt the report mention the books by interrogators Eric Maddox and Matthew Alexander who used non-coercive methods to get Saddam Hussein and Al-Zarawi? Why arent these examples of high-profile interrogation success included in the report? Perhaps because they contradict McChrystals bullshit account in his memoir. And, because discussion of the interrogations that led to Hussein involve the death of a detainee who supposedly had a heart attack during McRavens command?
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GEN. MCCHRYSTAL, THE ARMY, AND PRESIDENT OBAMAS WHITEWASH OF TORTURE INVESTIGATIONS:
In His Memoir McChrystal Whitewashed JSOC Torture Investigations:
103 McChrystal wrote in his memoirs that even after special operations troops were restricted to interrogation methods in the Army Field Manual, [t]here were lapses of discipline, but they were never tolerated. Never a wink and a nod. 151
McChrystal Blocked Red Cross/CID From Investigating JSOC Torture:

86 But attempts to prosecute abuses in other Iraqi were even less successful, due to a lack of resources for investigators and widespread confusion about the rules for prisoner treatment. [??] This was particularly true in cases of ghost detainees held by the CIA or by a secretive Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) task force, known over time as Task Force 20, Task Force 121, Task Force 6-26, and Task Force 143. The JSOC task force was part of a highly classified Special Access Program, 91 The interrogator [Spring 2004] said that neither the Red Cross nor the Armys Criminal Investigative Division had access to Camp Nama. Theoretically, he could have gone to his normal units chain of command and reported to CID, but he had been told on his first day at the camp that he was not allowed to disclose anything that happened at the Special Forces facility to his normal command.47 Note: As previously mentioned, the report omitted other damming quotes from a Tf 121 interrogator: It was a point of pride that the Red Cross would never be allowed in the door 'Will they ever be allowed in here?' And he [colonel] said absolutely not. He had this directly from General McChrystal This facility was completely closed off to anybody investigating, even Army investigators."
91 According to Army CID investigator Angela Birt, if he had reported to Army CID there was little they could have done: [A]ny investigations that came out of [JSOC facilities] were referred to a couple of agents embedded with the folks at Fort Bragg. And they operate and work directly for them. And as soon as we saw something visible to us that belonged to them we had to hand it over. You dont see it again. Wed hear about it from other detainees but as soon as we referred something it went into a black hole and we never saw it again.48 93 In April 2005, a regular Army CID investigation team wrote to the commander of Criminal Investigation Command that it had been unable to thoroughly investigate over 20 cases of
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES alleged detainee abuse, Another memo, written on February 11, 2005, describes in more detail the obstacles that CID agents faced in trying to investigate the JSOC task force 113 Another member of the [Detainee Abuse] task force, former Sergeant Cooper Tieaskie, said that sometimes the task force would receive reports of abuse from military intelligence units that were heavily redacted for operational security reasons: Sometimes, it was just like, Heres what were going to give you one sentence. 243 This problem was especially acute for Special Forces units, but not limited to them. None of the members of the task force could recall a single one of their cases proceeding to a courtmartial even in cases where there was clear physical evidence that a detainee had been beaten. Renaud said he viewed the task forces work as a whitewash.
The Army Cover-Ups of JSOC Torture (Classified Findings Contradict Public Unclassified Findings:
335 The Uniform Code of Military Justice also retains its clear prohibitions on mistreating prisoners, but the track record of prosecutions in the military is mixed at best, with many serious cases leading to no jail time or no conviction at all. the lack of successful prosecutions demonstrate major gaps in enforcement of the laws against torture and war crimes, which likely reduces their deterrent effect. 390 In March or April 2004, the CJTF-7 legal advisors office wrote to Herrington that they had investigated his sources allegations and found no evidence of mistreatment. Herrington said he expressed blunt dismay and incredulity at this conclusion, and said his source could be excused for thinking this is a cover-up. 119 336 As discussed above, much of the evidence that might definitively contradict these sanitized portrayals of torture remains classified. Since 2009, there have been no trials, civil or criminal, and no official commission of inquiry. The unclassified evidence is scattered across hundreds of unofficial media and NGO reports, and hundreds of thousands of pages of government documents. 104 According to journalist Marc Ambinder, at some point McChrystal ordered deputy commanding general Eric Fiel to quietly review the practices at Camp Nama. The review, which remains classified and locked in a vault at Pope Army Airfield, resulted in disciplinary action against more than forty JSOC personnel. Several promising careers including that of the colonel responsible for Nama at the time of the abuses were ended. 157 75 In March 2005, the Church Report was completed and released. Its focus was to investigate whether DOD had promulgated interrogation policies that had directed, sanctioned or encouraged the abuse of detainees. At least in the public unclassified summary, the report found DOD had not done so; it found no link between approved
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES interrogation techniques and detainee abuse. 143 Significantly, nothing in our investigation of interrogation and detention operations in Afghanistan or Iraq suggested that the chaotic and abusive environment that existed at the Abu Ghraib prison in the fall of 2003 was repeated elsewhere.144 75 As discussed above, the complete [Church] report remains classified; however, references to the classified report appear in other publicly available documents and it appears the classified report may, if not contradict, at least undermine, some of the findings in the unclassified executive summary.
President Obama Back-Pedaled & Blocked 2009 Release of JSOC Torture Photos (Just After Nominated McChrystal to Lead Afghan War)
316 the Obama administration similarly reversed its position on public disclosure of evidence of detainee abuse. On April 16, 2009, President Obama ordered the disclosure of several Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memoranda that described the CIAs enhanced interrogation techniques in detail. In the same lawsuit, the ACLU also sought disclosure of previously unreleased photographs of detainee abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan, and won a court order calling for the photos release. 316 On April 23, 2009, DOJ notified the court that it would release the images by May 28.23 But on May 13, the administration reversed its position and informed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that upon further reflection at the highest levels of government, it would instead appeal to the Supreme Court to prevent release of the photos.24 Multiple press reports said that Obama had changed his mind after receiving personal pleas from General Ray Odierno and General David McKiernan, the top military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, that releasing the photos would endanger U.S. troops.25 Note: Its worth noting the dates of McChrystal's nomination and President Obama's decision not to release photos of prisoner abuse in Iraq; May 11th and 12th, respectively. Presumably, some of the photos showed abuse by JSOC forces under his command? 316 But in October 2009, Congress passed and Obama signed legislation to override FOIA and permit the Defense Secretary to withhold photographs if he determined that their disclosure would endanger U.S. citizens or members of the Armed Forces. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts ruling ordering release of the photos, 28 and they have never been disclosed.
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THE CONSTITUTION PROJECTS WHITEWASH OF GEN. MCCHRYSTAL & ADMIRAL MCRAVENS COMMAND OF JSOC TORTURE:
The Constitution Project Found Responsibility for Torture Falls on Certain Military Leaders, But Does Not Name Admiral McRaven & Whitewashes McChrystal:
Finding #2: The nations most senior officials bear ultimate responsibility for allowing and contributing to the spread of illegal and improper interrogation techniques used by some U.S. personnel on detainees in several theaters. Responsibility also falls on other government officials and certain military leaders. ... 360 various Bush officials and military officials have publicly stated that certain detainees in U.S. treatment were tortured, though many others maintain that the enhanced interrogation techniques did not rise to the level of torture. Note: This is McChrystals claim. He wrote, [a]s late as the spring of 2004, six months into my command, I believed our force needed the option of employing select, carefully controlled enhanced interrogation techniques,.. Also, in his Generation Kill Foreign Policy interview he said, We weren't actively torturing people, but we weren't treating people the way that we should have been. 106 Taguba said he thought the MPs had been exploited, and that there had been a failure both within the military and in Congress to hold those at the top responsible. It has to be the generals, Taguba said. In the Navy if that ship runs aground, who gets relieved? The captain. 173 Instead, Taguba said, there were several officers complicit or involved in abuse who got away, or got their fourth star. He did not want to name specific individuals, however.174 Note: Is fourth star a reference to McChrystal?
Despite McChrystals Refusal to Interview and Go On the Record, The Constitution Project Uncritically Used Quotes from McChrystals Memoirs to Whitewash his Role in Torture
93 Cambone and Rumsfeld declined interview requests from Task Force staff.
p. 78, McChrystal declined several invitations from the Task Force to be interviewed about Afghanistan and Iraq.
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The Constitution Project Report Makes BG Koenig the Scapegoat for TF 121s Torture (Omits Mention of McRavens TF 121 Command and Doesnt Connect the Dots of McChrystals Command of Torture):
88 Some of JSOC task forces harsh treatment was explicitly authorized. According to the DOD inspector general and the Senate Armed Services Committee, the JSOC task forces written standard operating procedures (SOP), dated July 15, 2003, authorized sleep deprivation, loud music, stress positions, light control, and the use of military dogs.13 Although not in the written SOP, nudity was also commonly used, reportedly with the knowledge of the JSOC task forces commander and legal advisor.14 Note: The JSOC task forces commander refers to Admiral McRaven; this is the only implicit reference to his command of torture in the report (obviously, he was not interviewed). He took command of TF 121 in October 2003. However, in the report, his name is not even mentioned in connection with torture by TF 121; p. 88 is disingenuous since most readers would assume the report refers to Koenig in that passage. Note: Report whitewashes by only explicitly mentioning the July 2003 SOP before McRaven/McChrystal took command (omits mention of Oct 2003 and March 2004 SOPs authorized by them). 389 According to the DOD inspector general and the Senate Armed Services Committee, the task forces written standard operating procedures (SOPs) authorized sleep deprivation, loud music, stress positions, light control, and the use of military dogs. Although not in the written SOPs, nudity was also commonly used, with the knowledge of the task forces commander and legal advisor.106 Note: p.88 only mentions the July 2003 SOP under Koenigs command. However, other SOPs were approved by McRaven & McChrystal in October 2003 & March 2004. 88 The July 15, 2003, interrogation policy was unsigned, although the task force commanders name was on the signature block. The commander, Brigadier General Lyle Koenig,15 told Senate committee staff that he did not recall approving or even seeing an interrogation policy, though he did acknowledge that he knew about some of the harsh techniques in use.16 #16 Levin Report, supra note 2, at 160. Koenigs name is redacted from the report but he was later identified in congressional testimony by Col. Randy Moulton, supra note 15. Note: Both McChrystal & McRavens names are also redacted from the Senate report; but their identities can also be determined using other primary sources (e.g. Feingolds congressional record statement, McChrystals memoir). 101 General Stanley McChrystal has written that in September [actually October 6,] 2003, the first day he assumed control of the JSOC task forces, Lyle Koenig, the air force brigadier general then commanding our task force in Iraq, called me from Baghdad he stated flatly,
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES Sir, we need to close the screening facility were operating at our base at [Baghdad International Airport]. We dont have the expertise or experience to do this correctly. 78 In his 2013 memoir, General McChrystal recalled his frustration and the steep learning curve that existed in managing detainee operations from the previous decade. Of his own inexperience in detainee operations, McChrystal recalled:, I was one of the leaders who lacked experience in detainee custody and exploitation. I had studied history and understood the theory but had never done anything remotely like running a prison. My peers and subordinates were similarly positioned. 101 McChrystal visited the facility about a week later, and was unimpressed with both the facility and our ability to staff it. 132 He wrote that he told JSOC staff regarding detainee treatment that [t]his is our Achilles heel. If we dont do this right well be taken off the battlefield. 133 Note: McChrystal took command of JSOC on October, not September. His account here of his discussion with Koenig and his first visit to Camp Nama is disingenuous (dates dont make sense). 102 His memoirs do not specify what he saw, but reporters Dana Priest and William Arkin have reported that during McChrystals visit, several detainees were being kept naked and their cells were guarded by dogs.134 102 In January 2004, the Army Times reported that Koenig was retiring under a cloud of secrecy. After several weeks of inquiries about rumors that Koenig had been relieved of command, an Air Force spokesman told the newspaper that he was on terminal leave pending retirement. The spokesman said there were no ongoing investigations at this time regarding Koenig, and refused to elaborate further.135 Note: Dead link #135. Internet search found nothing except speculation that Koenig was forced to retire to avoid a sexual harassment scandal. However, the reports passage here seems to imply that he was fired as part of McChrystals supposed clean-up of torture.
In Quotes by TF 121 Interrogator, Constitution Project Omits Mention of McChrystals Presence at Camp Nama & His Closing It Off to the Red Cross & CID:
91 We called the colonel by his first name, called the sergeant major by his first name. I couldnt tell you the sergeant majors last name if I tried. Same with the colonel. 91 The interrogator said that neither the Red Cross nor the Armys Criminal Investigative Division had access to Camp Nama. Theoretically, he could have gone to his normal units chain of command and reported to CID, but he had been told on his first day at the camp that he was
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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES not allowed to disclose anything that happened at the Special Forces facility to his normal command.47 Note: The report omitted other damming quotes from the same interrogator: Do you know where the colonel was getting his orders from? he asks. I believe it was a two-star general. I believe his name was General McChrystal. I saw him there a couple of times. It was a point of pride that the Red Cross would never be allowed in the door 'Will they ever be allowed in here?' And he [colonel] said absolutely not. He had this directly from General McChrystal This facility was completely closed off to anybody investigating, even Army investigators."
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APPENDIX D
THE FERAL FIREFIGHTER BLOG
(February 2008 to April 2012) (http://www.feralfirefighter.blogspot.com)
Note: A detailed Table of Contents for the Feral Firefighter blog can be found at the end of the TOC at the beginning of this post Never Shall I Fail My Comrades.
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&quot;Never Shall I Fail My Comrades&quot; -- The Dark Legacy of Gen. McChrystal’s Memoir &quot;My Share of the Task&quot;: His Betrayal of Pat Tillman, Command of JSOC Torture, and Failed Afghan War “Surge” (Dec. 28, 2012; Ver. 2.4, Updated 4-20-14)

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&quot;Never Shall I Fail My Comrades&quot; -- The Dark Legacy of Gen. McChrystal’s Memoir &quot;My Share of the Task&quot;: His Betrayal of Pat Tillman, Command of JSOC Torture, and Failed Afghan War “Surge” (Dec. 28, 2012; Ver. 2.4, Updated 4-20-14)

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NEVER SHALL I FAIL MY COMRADES