Professional Documents
Culture Documents
China
Chinese Banks
Cash Cushions Thinning as Liquidity Erodes and Forbearance Burdens Rise
Special Report
In this Report
Chinese Banks ....................................... 1 Core Drivers of Funding and Liquidity Erosion ................................................... 2 Numerous Indicators Signal the Erosion of Funding and Liquidity ........... 5 Funding and Liquidity Erosion Means Thinner Cash Cushions ......................... 7 Looking Ahead ..................................... 11 Appendix Update on Wealth Management Offerings ............ 13
Financial Sector Challenges Growing: Three years after the onset of the global crisis, China faces a growing list of its own financial sector challenges threatening to undermine economic growth and financial stability. At the heart of these issues is the aggressive counter-cyclical credit policy enacted by authorities in response to the 2008 crisis, which has fuelled a massive build-up of leverage in the formal and informal banking sectors, given rise to large excesses in real estate and infrastructure, eroded financial sector liquidity, and boosted inflation. Recent Stress not Unique: Recent stress in informal lending and among property developers, SMEs, and local governments has not reached systemic levels. Nonetheless, Fitch Ratings believes these are not isolated cases of distress, but rather emblematic of excesses from the credit boom and a policy orientation that overly relies on credit controls and low fixed-interest rates; prioritises the state sector above private companies and savers; and favours forbearance and support over restructuring. In this light, recent problems could be only the beginning. Liquidity Strain Before NPLs: Over the near term, Fitch expects the authorities to continue a selective policy of forbearance and liquidity support for borrowers, including loan rollovers and restructurings, new loans, and bond issuance. As a result, asset quality issues may not fully appear in NPL ratios until well into a deterioration, if at all. Instead, delinquencies will manifest themselves first as liquidity stress, as cash inflows from distressed borrowers slow and more resources are directed to support weak entities. Near-Term Dislocations Unlikely: Banks cash positions are already under strain, and a rising forbearance burden will only add further claims on these resources. For now, the CNY21trn in commercial bank credit capacity plus CNY16trn in deposit reserves is sufficient to prevent any major short-term dislocations. But if current rates of erosion continue, it is conceivable that cash constraints in 2012 could become more binding. Some small banks have a dwindling capacity to extend new credit, and may require substantial relief in reserve requirements. Conditions Today Are Different: Although prolonged forbearance has been successful on numerous occasions this time Chinese banks are entering the credit cycle with significantly weaker liquidity and a much larger stock of financing to carry. Unlike the last run-up of bad loans in the 1990s, there is no force like WTO accession on the horizon to propel the economy out of its difficulties. It is because of this cash constraint that current asset quality stress has the potential to become more destabilising than in previous episodes of loan deterioration. Thinning Cash Causing Stress: Weakening cash cushions explain with what appear to be clean balance sheets and solid earnings, Chinese banks encountered system-wide liquidity crunches in January and June 2011, why banks are paying 300bp above base rates in auctions of Ministry of Finance (MOF) deposits, and why market-driven interest rates continue to climb. Carry Costs Crimp Growth: As forbearance burdens rise and funding and liquidity become more constrained, the less resources Chinese banks will have to continue financing new economic activity while meeting their own obligations and extending forbearance. In this way, the high carry costs of the credit boom could begin to crowd out GDP growth as banks get progressively bogged down by supporting the recent run-up in leverage. Viability Ratings Under Pressure: The rapid erosion of Chinese banks historical funding and liquidity strengths is a concern, and could lead to negative action on some Viability Ratings,with the ratings of smaller banks with thinner liquidity being the most vulnerable.
Analysts
Charlene Chu +8610 8517 2112 charlene.chu@fitchratings.com Chunling Wen +8610 8517 2105 chunling.wen@fitchratings.com Hiddy He +8610 8517 2135 hiddy.he@fitchratings.com
www.fitchratings.com
2 December 2011
Banks
Core Drivers of Funding and Liquidity Erosion
At the core of tightened funding and liquidity conditions are fundamental changes in monetary policy and financial institution regulation since the global crisis, some of which have been intentionally aimed at tightening liquidity and others unintentional. These shifts include: a switch in emphasis from mopping up foreign-currency inflows from open market operations to deposit reserve requirements, which are significantly more constraining for bank liquidity; de facto deposit rate liberalisation, by allowing banks to compete for deposits using wealth management offerings at yields of their own choosing, which has sparked unprecedented competition and made deposits more mobile than ever before; a relatively hands-off approach towards the emergence and growth of the shadow banking system, which has led to increased disintermediation of deposits into other channels; an accelerated push to internationalise the renminbi and open the capital account, which is leading to greater China-related financial activity outside the domestic banking system.
Required reserves
Excess reserves
2004
2005
2006
2007
2007
2008
2009
2010
2010
2011
Excludes bank holdings of restructuring-related PBOC bills Source: PBOC, CEIC, Fitch
Related Criteria
Global Financial Institutions Rating Criteria (August 2011)
Banks
Figure 2
basis). Last year Fitch wrote extensively about a subset of activity focused on the informal securitisation of loans into investment products (see Chinese Banks: Informal Securitisation Increasingly Distorting Credit Data, July 2010). This is only one of many types of offerings, which are outlined in Figure 3. Fitch has long emphasised that the greatest risk associated with Chinese banks wealth management activity is the strain it places on funding and liquidity. This risk was easily controllable when the amount of outstanding products remained small; but with wealth management products (WMPs) issued by domestic banks now approaching 10% of total deposits, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Chinese banks to manage (see Appendix for more information on recent developments in wealth management activity). For banks, the benefits associated with WMP issuance stem from the ability to shift the assets and liabilities underlying WMPs on- and off-balance-sheet, which they typically do through strategically setting product start- and end-dates. This enables banks to lower deposit balances between periods to avoid high reserve requirements, while giving them the flexibility to bring the deposits back on-balance-sheet at period-end to pad loan/deposit ratios.
Figure 3
Single Investor
Other AssetBacked
Credit-Related (CWMPs)
Investor is a Banka
Discounted Bill
Credit-Only
Credit-Mixed
Discussed in 2010 Fitch reports
Bank on-sells the product to investors as a bank wealth management product, for which the bank becomes liable Source: Fitch
Figure 4
Banks
Figure 5
often do not match the timing of WMP payouts. When a mismatch exists and banks are unable to liquidate assets from the pool to pay back investors, they are left with three options: draw on their on-balance-sheet assets, resulting in an erosion of on-balance-sheet liquidity; use money raised from new WMP issuance to pay off old issuance, which is the most popular option, but which is highly dependent on confidence, market conditions, and interest rates; borrow the funds in the interbank market, which covers the immediate product payout but creates a new future liability.
While banks generally prefer the first two options, as liquidity has tightened there has been a growing reliance on interbank borrowing to repay product investors. Because a large share of WMPs are structured to mature at month-end thereby allowing the money to be brought back on-balance-sheet there has been an intensifying month-end scramble for cash to cover product payouts and the additional RRR allocation. This month-end crunch is highlighted in Figure 5, which shows the widened gap between seven-day SHIBOR rates at mid-month and month-end, which exceeded 170bp from August to October 2011. This gap narrowed significantly in November after the authorities began injecting liquidity into the interbank market. However, it is unclear how long this will last given the large stock of WMPs, approximately 40% of which have month-end maturities.
The 2011e forecast for the Fitchadjusted TSF has been revised to CNY17-17.5trn from CNY18trn in July 2011. Most of this change is due to a slowdown in components of the official TSF, while growth of Fitch add-ons remains robust (Figure 7).
Figure 7
(CNYtrn) 5 4 3 2 1 0
H111
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011e
2006 0.71
2007 0.77
2008 0.70
2009 0.18
2010 0.34
2011e 0.44
Source: PBOC, China Trustee Association, HKMA, Wind Information, CEIC, Fitch
Banks
Accelerated Shift of Activity Outside Domestic Banks to Offshore Channels
The push to accelerate the internationalisation of the renminbi and open the capital account has also contributed to erosion of funding and liquidity. The creation of the Dim Sum market for offshore renminbi issuance, the opening of renminbi-denominated trade settlement, Hong Kong banks aggressive expansion of credit to Chinese corporates and banks, and the robust growth of mainland citizens spending and investment abroad have led to an increasing amount of financing and settlements taking place outside the domestic banking system.
Figure 8
Includes exposures booked in mainland subsidiaries of Hong Kong-incorporated institutions Approximately CNY300-400bn of this amount in H111 represents CNY re-deposited at the PBOC Average of end-2010 and Fitchs sovereign teams 2011 forecast of HKD1,944bn Source: HKMA quarterly bulletin, HKMA external liabilities and claims statistics, CEIC
By mid-November 2011, the outstanding amount of Dim Sum issuance stood at roughly CNY215bn. Meanwhile, Hong Kong banks mainland exposure had risen to CNY3.1trn as of end-June 2011 (Figure 8). Because of restrictions on capital inflows, a large portion of the money raised by Chinese companies offshore is not brought onshore, yet repayment of the obligations sometimes comes from onshore resources. In this way, there is an eventual drain of corporate deposits from the mainland banking system to offshore creditors, which may be one factor contributing to the recent increase in capital outflows from China.
(%) 8 6 4 2 0 Dec 06
Feb 08
May 09
Aug 10
Nov 11
Source: CEIC
Thus far, liquidity pressure at state banks has been transitory. Nonetheless, it raises doubts about the conventional wisdom that these entities can provide a reliable first line of defence against an extended system-wide cash crunch. In January 2011 the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC) was forced to inject CNY1.3trn in cash into the banking system nearly twice the amount of any previous month on record in response to systemic stress related to RRR hikes,
Banks
Figure 11
WMP volatility and the Chinese New Year. Similar injections could become more frequent if state banks funding and liquidity continue to weaken.
Figure 12
Source: PBOC
Banks
In H111, the disparity between expected and actual daily average deposits widened almost across the board. Chinas five state banks whose actual average was spot on in H110 were carrying CNY730bn less deposits on a day-to-day basis in H111 than the level implied in their financials (excluding Bank of China (BOC, A/Stable) this figure is CNY979bn). As a share of deposits, the figures are even more stark for Tier 2 banks, whose combined daily average in H111 fell CNY167bn below their January 1 opening balance, or CNY430bn below the expected average. These figures highlight the growing disparity between the funding picture portrayed in Chinese banks financial statements and the day-to-day reality between periods
Figure 14
Viability Rating b+ bb bb bb bb bb b+ bb b+ b+ bb bb b+ bb b bb
Actual minus expected average (CNYbn) -126 -143 -137 -448 -75 -57 -22 -37 -205 -13 -7 -189 -13 +3 +27 +249
Gap as % of actual average (%) -12.0 -8.9 -4.8 -4.0 -3.9 -3.9 -3.9 -2.6 -2.3 -2.2 -2.0 -2.1 -1.2 +0.6 +3.6 +3.7
Domestic operations only where data is available. See Figure 2 for a full list of ratings End-2010 BOC keeps a large share of its WMPs on-balance-sheet between periods, resulting in much lower volatility Source: Bank financial statements
It is difficult to identify how much of this disparity is related to funding that Chinese banks still retain but hold off-balance-sheet in wealth management offerings, as opposed to how much is temporary funding secured for short periods of time at quarter-end. However, even if the money is retained in off-balance-sheet WMPs, the short-term, highly mobile nature of such products means that this money is not a stable source of funding that can be relied upon.
Banks
Figure 15
(CNYbn) 1. Expected Cash Outflows, as identified at prior year-end a. Non-deposit liabilities b. Off-balance-sheet itemsa 2. Cash Inflows/Sources of Cashb a. Cash and excess reserves b. Tradable securitiesc c. Interbank assets 3. Expected Net Cash Position 4. Additional Operating Cash Outflows, current period a. Loans b. Estimated WMP payoutsd 5. Additional Operating Cash Inflows, current period a. Deposits b. Net incomee 6. Final Operating Cash Position 7. Loans less than 1 year 8. Share of loans less than 1 year that must be repaid (%)
a b c
Includes irrevocable loan commitments less than one year, acceptances, letters of credit, and unused credit card lines Average balance over the period Excludes pledged and illiquid securities such as loans and receivables, securities received during NPL carveouts, or investments in other banks WMPs d Assumes only 60% of maturing products must be repaid in cash e Income figures are not available on an unconsolidated basis, so consolidated figures are used instead. 2011e net income is 2x H111 net income Source: Bank financial statements, Fitch
Banks
Figure 16
1. Expected Cash Outflows, as identified at prior year-end 2. Cash Inflows/Sources of Cash 3. Expected Net Cash Position 4. Additional Operating Cash Outflows 5. Additional Operating Cash Inflows 6. Final Operating Cash Position 7. Loans less than 1 year 8. Share of loans less than 1 year that must be repaid (%)
a
Assumes banks receive 80% cash repayment of interbank assets less than one year, corporate fixed-income securities are sold for 80% of their current value, and banks must pay out 80% of WMPs maturing within 1 year Source: Bank financial statements, Fitch
banks with bb category VRs must receive 27% repayments. These are striking changes from just one year ago. It should be noted that these results are conservative as they assume that: all reverse repos will be repaid in full on-time, which is optimistic given that some of these transactions are between banks and their own WMPs, and receipt of cash on this portion of repos is questionable (see Appendix); all non-reverse repo interbank assets less than one year in maturity will be fully repaid in cash on-time, which may not be the case given both declining liquidity among counterparty banks, who may push to roll over obligations, and growing concerns about the health of the nonbank financial sector; banks only have to pay out 60% of maturing WMPs, and experience no deposit outflows aside from these WMP payouts; all corporate fixed-income securities can be sold for cash at no loss when required, which is unlikely to be the case in a stress scenario.
Figure 16 shows the difference in key line items if only 80% of interbank and reverse repo assets are repaid in cash, only 80% of the value of corporate fixed-income securities can be retrieved, and banks must repay 80% of maturing WMPs. In this scenario, Tier 2 banks with VRs of b+/b must receive repayment of 86% of loans less than one year in maturity in order to meet their cash outflow obligations (versus 55% previously), while for banks with bb- VRs this figure rises to 52% from 27%.
Banks
Figure 17
Big Five State Tier 2 Banks with Tier 2 Banks with Banks VRs of bb VRs of b+/b 2012e 2011 2010 2012e 2011 2010 2012e 2011 2010 13.4 11.1 12.8 2.1 2.6 2.6 0.7 1.2 1.2
11.1
9.7
11.9
1.4
2.2
2.4
0.2
0.9
1.0
These figures are in addition to irrevocable credit commitments less than 1 year, which are incorporated in the analysis in Figures 15 and 16 and assumed to be fully met b Assumes that 96% of loans less than 1 year are repaid. At end-H111, NPLs and special mention loans amounted to 4% of gross loans in aggregate for these 16 banks Source: Bank financial statements, Fitch
At first glance, higher-rated Tier 2 banks lending/forbearance capacity would appear to be adequate for the coming year given that annual lending by these six entities has never exceeded CNY1.2trn. However, when considered in the context of the accelerating erosion of liquidity across the sector, it is conceivable that even these banks could begin to experience some crowding out. For example, these banks began 2011 with enough cash to lend CNY2.2trn-2.6trn, but as the year comes to a close these figures have dropped to CNY1.4trn-2.1trn. If this accelerated rate of funding and liquidity erosion persists, it is conceivable that soon only the big five state-owned banks will be in a position to consistently provide the magnitude of intermediation and forbearance required to prop up growth and forestall asset quality deterioration. After more than a decade of steadily declining market share, Chinas state banks may soon be returning to the forefront.
10
Banks
Figure 18
accelerating broad money growth through reducing sterilisation operations and/or printing money, which have obvious negative implications for inflation, or through increasing the money multiplier by pressuring banks to lend, which would worsen leverage; lessening the forbearance burden on the banking system by providing some type of bailout package for the worst loans.
Average of Scenarios 1 and 2 as laid out in Figure 17 b End-2010 Source: Bank financial statements, Wind Information, PBOC, Fitch
Looking Ahead
The analysis above demonstrates why with what appear on the surface to be relatively clean balance sheets and solid earnings the Chinese banking sector encountered system-wide cash crunches in January and June 2011, why banks are paying 300bp above fixed-base deposit rates in auctions of MOF deposits, and why market-driven interest rates continue to trend higher. Loan rollovers/restructurings, transfers of assets off-balance-sheet, and transactions with NBFIs may be preventing current stress from becoming apparent in NPL ratios, but cash positions clearly show that the banking system is under growing strain. Although prolonged forbearance has been successful on numerous occasions in the past, this time Chinese banks are entering the credit cycle with significantly weaker cash cushions and a much larger stock of financing to carry. Unlike the last major run-up of bad loans in the late1990s, this time there is no force like WTO accession on the horizon to propel the economy out of its difficulties.
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Banks
Looking into 2012, Fitch expects funding and liquidity will remain under strain as growth of wealth management offerings adds further WMP payout pressures, and borrower stress drives forbearance burdens higher. In H111, listed banks posted an increase in cash outflow obligations of 30% un-annualised (Figure 15, Line 1), compared to growth of cash inflows/sources of cash of just 12% (Figure 15, Line 2). Add to this decelerating deposit growth and increased pressure to lend, and it is difficult to see how liquidity and funding conditions can ease significantly absent substantial RRR relief. Going into next year, the Chinese banking sector faces four key risks, all of which could lead to a worsening of funding and liquidity erosion and place the system on an accelerated timetable toward future cash constraints: rising forbearance burdens due to growing repayment difficulties among borrowers, in particular local governments, property-related entities, and SMEs; further deceleration in deposit growth, which could result from slowing economic expansion, outflows of capital, or something as benign as a strong rebound in the equity market that would attract away household deposits as occurred in 2007; persistently elevated inflation, which, while falling, could remain high enough to prevent the authorities from aggressively easing liquidity conditions through RRR cuts; a freezing-up of the interbank market due to tightened liquidity at large state banks and/or heightened concern about the health of counterparties.
Given the rising level of stress evident in several aspects of Chinese banks operations including asset quality, capitalisation, funding and liquidity Fitch is becoming increasingly cautious about the medium-term outlook for mainland banks. These concerns could lead to negative action on some Viability Ratings in coming months, with the ratings of smaller banks with thinner cash cushions the most vulnerable (Figure 19).
Figure 19
Support Rating 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Viability Rating NR NR NR bb bb bb b+ bb bb bb b+ bb bb bb bb b+ b+ b+ b
Long-Term Issuer Default Ratinga A+ A+ A+ A A A A A BBB BBB BBB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+
The Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of all 19 Chinese banks are based solely on expectations of state support Source: Fitch
12
Banks
Figure 20
A large portion of these were previously grouped with discounted bill WMPs Source: Wind Information
Some On-, Some OffAs highlighted earlier, the constant movement of WMPs on- and off-balance-sheet is adding significant volatility and distortions in numerous institutional- and system-wide data. However, it is important to note that not all WMPs move back-and-forth. Every WMP begins its life onbalance-sheet during the brief time when money is collected from investors. But following this period, principal-guaranteed products must remain on-balance-sheet, while non-principal-
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Banks
guaranteed products may be moved off until maturity if the bank so chooses. It is through this strategic setting of product start and end dates that banks are able to control the flow of WMP assets and liabilities on- and off-balance-sheet.
Figure 21
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 Source: Wind Inf ormation
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.9
1.2
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
As of end-Q311, roughly 20% of outstanding WMPs were principal-guaranteed products permanently residing on-balance-sheet. Of the remainder, approximately half had yet to mature and were still off-balance-sheet, while the rest were newly launched WMPs still in the phase of collecting money, and therefore temporarily on-balance-sheet but likely to soon move off-. When an off-balance-sheet WMP matures and the money returns on-balance-sheet, the assets underlying the product do not always return with it. In some instances, banks leave the assets off-balance-sheet, and conduct a reverse repo with the WMP (resulting in a rise in deposits on the liability side of their balance sheet and reverse repos on the asset side). This means that some reverse repos are temporary shell transactions not necessarily backed by any real nearterm cash flows. Hence, some Chinese banks liquid assets may be somewhat overstated.
Yield Curves
Loan-Backed Products
(%) 8 6 4 2 0 1-90 day s 91-180 day s 181-365 day s 1-2 y rs H110 H111 H210 Q311
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Banks
Product Disclosure Still Poor
Thin disclosure remains a key source of concern. Rarely do product descriptions identify the precise make-up of assets eg corporate bond number a, issued by Company B on date c for amount d and there is no third-party validation that product descriptions match reality. Meanwhile, no information is provided on the extent of WMPs sold as private placements, no central publicly available catalog exists of WMPs issued and outstanding, and products still do not contain unique identifier codes to trace them. For these reasons, if there were to be widespread problems among WMP offerings, unwinding the products could be extremely difficult, and it is unclear to what extent banks would truly be able to impose losses on investors, who would appear to have a strong argument that critical details were never disclosed and products not fully represented. In this light, it is questionable whether WMPs should be allowed to be shifted off-balance-sheet in the first place.
Rating Implications
Since the Long-Term IDRs of Chinese banks are driven entirely by expectations of state support, they are unlikely to be affected by wealth management developments without a large shock in this activity requiring government assistance. Chinese banks VRs already incorporate the extent of each institutions participation in this activity. That said, given the rapid growth and increasing complexity of products, some VRs could be revised downward if activity were to materially increase current levels of liquidity and credit risk. Figure 24 below highlights upcoming product maturities for the 16 commercial banks under Fitch coverage.
Figure 23
Q411
Q112
Q212
H212
2013+
900 750 600 450 300 150 0 BCOM ICBC BOC CCB CEB MER BOB SPDB SZDB MIN
a
CGBOther(a)
Includes WMPs issued by more than 50 city and rural commercial banks Source: Wind Information
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Banks
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