Interpreting Anaphoric Expressions A Cognitive Versus A Pragmatic Approach

Interpreting Anaphoric Expressions: A Cognitive versus a Pragmatic Approach Author(s): Mira Ariel Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Linguistics,
Vol. 30, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 3-42 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4176255 . Accessed: 16/01/2013 14:36
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J. Linguistics 30 (I994),
3-42.
CopyrightC) 1994 Cambridge UniversityPress
Interpreting anaphoric expressions: a cognitive versus a pragmatic approach

MIRA ARIEL Tel Aviv University
(Received6 August 1992; revised I7 March 1994)

Levinson (I985,
i987a &
b, I99I) and Ariel (i985a & b, I987,
i988a
&
b,
i990oa,
99i)
have each proposed to anchor discourseand sententialanaphorawithin a more general theory of communication. Levinson chose a general, extra-linguistic of pragmatic theory.He uses Grice'sQuantitymaximto accountfor the distribution zeros, reflexives,pronounsand lexical NPs, claimingthat coreferentreadingsare preferred, unlessa disjointreadingis implicated(by the revisedGriceanmaximshe offers).I have proposeda specifically linguistic,cognitivetheory,wherebyspeakers retrievalsof mental representations to guide addressees' corresponding all definite NPs (coreferent well as disjoint)by signallingto them the degreeof Accessibility as associated with the intended mentalentityin theirmemory.An examination actual of data reveals that Levinson'spredictionsregardingdefiniteNP interpretations are often not borne out. In addition,his proposalscannot accountfor many anaphoric patternsactuallyfound in naturaldiscourse.Accessibilitytheory,it is argued,can data. accountfor both types of problematic
I. INTRODUCTION
Levinson (I985, published as i987a, i987b, I99I) and Ariel (I985a&b, I987, sharean interestin the mechanisms i988a, i988b, publishedas i99i, IggOa)
responsiblefor anaphoricinterpretations performedby addressees, both in discourseand within the sentence.We also sharea theoreticalframework: the view that extra-linguistic factorscan sometimessupplybetteraccounts than the grammar that accountsfor a can, and that when it is the grammar linguisticphenomenonit is quite feasible,indeeddesirablethat a cognitive
motivation lie behind it. The 'Avoid Pronoun' principle, claimed to be grammatical by Chomsky (I98I), is one case in point (Ariel I985b, I988a&b, iggoa; Levinson I987a&b).Along with Horn (I985), we have proposed to reduce its status to that of an extra-grammatical principle. Control phenomena (Ariel I987, iggoa; Levinsoni985, i987b) and reflexives (Ariel
I987; LevinsonI99I) are two otherlinguistic phenomena have soughtto we explainin termsof (but not necessarily reduceto) pragmaticaccounts. Moreover,neitherof us believesthat it is the pragmaticist's primarygoal
to conquer more and more territory from the grammarian. We see grammar mostly as a grammaticalized functional system of communication, which during the freezing process may have developed quite a few arbitrary and 3
1-2
MIRA ARIEL
formal distinctions. These, we believe, should be left to the formal grammarians deal with. We have thereforeproceededalong similarlines to in recentyears, each attemptingto providea non-grammatical account for anaphoric interpretations.In particular,we have also argued that the Bindingprinciples both syntacticand semantic (Chomsky,I98I), regulating fromthe principles properties NPs arenot so different of discourse governing anaphora (Ariel I985a&b, 1987, iggoa, I99I; Levinson 1987b, i99i). Hence,they can be eitherreduced(the strongerclaim,takenby Levinson)to pragmatic considerations motivated(the weakerversion,adoptedby me) or by cognitiveconsiderations. It is not surprising we havechosento call our respective that endeavorsto accountfor the nonlinguistic considerations anaphoricinterpretations in by
different names. Levinson attempts to account for anaphora interpretation
via a (revised) Gricean procedureof implicatures,a classical pragmatic approach.I have arguedthat the appropriate of referringexpressions use dependson a properevaluationby the speakerof the Accessibilityof the intendedreferents the addressee. to Influenced numerous by psycholinguistic experiments,which have shown beyond doubt that different anaphoric expressions triggerdifferent processing procedures especiallySanford& (see
Garrod
I98I),
I proposed (Ariel 1985a&b and onwards) that referring
expressions(anaphoricexpressionsamong them) signal specific (relative) degreesof Accessibilityof mentalrepresentations. I would like to arguein this paperthat Levinson'spragmatic proposalis
insufficient as is, especially when a greater variety of anaphoric expressions are taken into account. While I agree with the spirit of the approach, as well
as with many of its insightfulconclusions,I think that a completetheoryof how referringexpressionsare interpretedcannot make do with general instructionsgeneratingcertain implicatures,although these are certainly needed.We need Accessibility theoryas a mediatorbetweenlinguisticforms and pragmatic inferencing for anaphoric interpretations(generated by Relevanceconsiderations). We will proceed as follows. Section 2 will introduceLevinson'stheory. Section3 will presentmy arguments againstit. Section4 will be dedicatedto my own proposalsconcerningdiscourseand sententialanaphora.
2. THE PRAGMATIC APPROACHTO ANAPHORA:LEVINSON'S NEO-GRICEAN ANALYSIS Presenting some puzzling data from Guugu Yimidhirr, which abounds with zero anaphora, Levinson (1987b) first draws our attention to the fact that anaphoric interpretations are not usually marked as such unambiguously. Rather, it is a pragmatic matter for the addressee to determine that coreference was intended by the speaker (as well as what the antecedent is), based on common sense knowledge about probabilities of events and other 4
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
suchconsiderations also Ariel iggoa; PartIII). Thisis certainlyfarfrom (see controversial,although it is not clear how one is to deal with it under Levinson'stheory(morebelow).Levinson'smoresubstantial claimsare also more linguisticin nature.In line with Levinson(I987a), whichconcentrated more on discourseanaphora,Levinson (I987b: 384) attemptsto partially reduce grammaticalanaphora to pragmatics.He claims that 'the more "minimal"the form,the strongerthe preference a coreferential for reading'. He thereforesets up the followingscale: (i) LexicalNP > Pronoun> o (his (5)) This scale predicts that while the forms to the left favor disjoint interpretationswith potential antecedents,the forms to the right favor coreference readings. Pronoun/zero alternationsare familiarfrom Chomsky's(I98I) 'Avoid PronounPrinciple',which states that wheneverthe languageallows a zero form, one is to preferit - a minimization principlein effect.Indeed,where alternationsbetween zero anaphora(PRO, pro or zero topic) and overt pronounsoccur,linguistshavejudgedthat nativespeakerspreferthe empty forms.Out of context,this seemsto be the case, and (2) belowlists two such examples: (2) (a) Maya1 wants ?for her/herself/PROito win these elections. (b) birkotai al she+ ?at/o nicaxt ba my-congratulations that you won (in) the on bxirot. (Hebrew) elections to 'My congratulations you for havingwon the elections.' Levinsonattemptsto motivate such preferences, well as those favoring as overtpronounsoverzeroseven thoughzerosare allowedgrammatically. He claims that such pronouns will normally be interpretedas disjoint in reference fromtheirpotentiallinguistic antecedents. Thus,the pronounin (a) above is unacceptableonly under the coreferencereading. It is perfectly grammatical, however,on a disjointreading. Similarlyto Reinhart(I983) with respectto bound anaphoraversusfree pronouns,Levinsonproposesthat we need not adopt specialprinciplesto account for preferredanaphoric and disjoint readings of reduced NPs (pronouns and zeros). Rather, wheneverpossible, he rightly argues, one shoulduse generalprocedures neededin interpretation anyway.Specifically, he refersto Grice'smaxim of Quantity(and possibly Manneras well), as motivationsfor the scalein (I). The maximof Quantitydictatesto speakers to provideas muchinformation is required the current as for purposesof the conversation (Levinson's Q-principle),but not to volunteer too much information(Levinson'sI-principle). For each principleLevinsonsuggestsboth a speakerand an addresseebasedinstruction. Q-principle The instructsthe speakerto offerthe strongest 5
MIRA ARIEL
possiblestatementshe can commitherselfto. The addressee,on his part, is to take it that the speaker has indeed conformed to the Q-principle. Therefore,if thereis a strongerclaim, which the speakercould have made, since it entails the one she actuallymade (and it uses expressionsof equal lengthand complexity), then the addressee deducethat the speakermust can know that the strongerclaimis false. Thus, sincethe speakerin (3) chose to assert(a) and not (b), which entailsit and is more informative, speaker the must be committedalso to the truth of (c), which negates(b):1 (3) (a) Some of my best friendsare men. (b) All of my best friendsare men. (c) Not all of my best friendsare men. Since 'all' entails 'some' and the two expressionsare equally long and complex, they form a Horn scale. The Q-principle, then, blocks utterance enrichment, negatingthe stronger by potentialclaim,withwhichthe original statementis compatible.With respect to the interpretation potentially of anaphoric expressions, Levinson argues, this means blocking the more informativecoreferencereading, which the speaker could have achieved using the more specificform, e.g. a reflexiveas opposed to a pronoun.The latterinducesa disjointreference reading,since the two form a Horn scale. The I-principle urgesspeakersto act in the oppositedirection,namely,to produceas little informationas necessary.The addressee's corollary,then, instructs him to enrich the speaker's statement by producing licensed inferences. He is to generate a more informative, i.e., more specific interpretation from the speaker'sutterance,providedhe judges the speaker to have intended it. The mechanismhe is intended to use instructshim, among other things, to prefer coreferencereadings, for one is to avoid interpretations multiplythe entitiesreferred This preference, that to. argues Levinson,is in line with his I-principle, sincereducingthe numberof entities referred in discourse to causesthe speaker's statements be compatible to with fewer states in the world, hence to be more informative.Noting that very often the quantity of semanticinformationcorrelateswith linguisticsize, Levinsonsuggeststhat the scale in (I) above be subsumedunder the same minimization principle the I-principle. will laterarguethat thisconflation of I of content quantitywith form size is problematic.2 A last set of implicatures (dubbedQ/M-implicatures Levinson I987b, in in M-implicatures LevinsonI99i) is proposedto ensurethat markedforms yield marked interpretations,i.e. non-stereotypicalones. Thus, while
[i]
[2]
Examples such as these were presumably first discussed by Horn (1972). They were analyzed in the spirit as above by Gazdar (I979). Levinson actually admits that he is here using Grice's maxim of Manner rather than quantity, specifically, the instruction to be as (linguistically) brief as possible.
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
unmarkedforms urge addresseesto generate1-implicatures (enrichingthe utterance by adding stereotypicaldetails omitted by the speaker), M implicatures encouragethe opposite readings.This would account for the of disjointinterpretations lexicalNPs.3Sincethesethreetypesof implicatures contradict each other in that one calls for the generation of a more informativereadingthan the speaker'sliteral message (the 1-implicature), while the othersblock such enrichments and M-implicatures), Levinson (Qsuggestswe ordertheir applicationas follows:' (4) (a) Q-implicatures(blocking a stronger interpretationwhen the relevantexpressionformspart of a Horn scalecontrastset) take precedence over 1-implicatures. (b) M implicatures markedinterpretations (generating when long/ markedforms are used) take precedence over 1-implicatures. (c) 1-implicatures (producing stereotypicaland specific interpretations) are generated,if a and b are not applicable.5 Thus, when a pronounis used wherea reflexive could have been used, a Qimplicatureof disjoint referenceis generated.Since the pronoun and the reflexive form a contrastset, and sincethe speakerchose the weaker(i.e. less informative)form of the two, the addresseeis to infer that the stronger readingdoes not hold. Hence, the following,usuallythoughtof as a purely grammatical judgment,turns out to be pragmatically motivated: (5) Ginatilikes her*i,j/herself. However,whena pronounis usedwherea reflexive couldnot havebeenused, blocks 1-implicature and coreference preferred: is nothing generation, (6) Ginati said shei/*herselfwould come. The use of a pronounwherezero could have occurred(a below), or the use of a lexical NP where a pronoun could have occurred(b) is considereda marked use. They thereforeinduce an M implicature,and the preferred readingis of noncoreference: to (7) (a) Iddoi would like him11i//o win these elections. (b) Mayaicame early and the child,i,/she began to play.
[3] Lexical NPs and even pronouns count as marked where pronouns and zeros could have been used respectively. Markedness is therefore sensitive to the context. [4] But see Horn (I985) for an attempt to draw a division of labour between them, Ienrichments occurring only with regard to stereotypic inferences. [5] Levinson presents the order somewhat differently in his I987b paper (statement 46), claiming that the I-principle applies if the Q-principle fails to apply, unless the Q/Mprinciple is applicable. I find the formulation in (4) above clearer. He does not say anything definite about the relation between Q-implicatures and M-implicatures (see his I99I paper, note 8), but it seems to me they are unordered. Thus, a marked form can perhaps generate a Q-implicature in addition to its generating an M-implicature.
MIRA ARIEL
Note that this explanationcan only work if one knows 'ahead' where is to reflexives occur,for pronouns'distribution complementary that of can reflexives. Indeed,Levinsonproposesto adopt ConditionA of Bindingas is, namely: (8) Anaphorsmust be bound in their GoverningCategory. Presumably, pronouns occur everywhere else. However, in addition, LevinsonadoptsReinhart's (I983) optionalCo-indexing rule,whichpermits a grammatical of Co-indexing two NPs when a pronounis c-commanded by an NP outside its minimal Governing Category (in addition to the Coindexing of anaphors).Levinsonhas to have this additionalgrammatical rule, for, as Reinhart(I983) has shown, where bound anaphora(as in (a) nonbelow)couldhavebeenusedbut was not (as in (b)), addressees interpret coreference: (9) (a) Bound Anaphora: Near heri Maya1saw Iddo. (b) Free Pronoun: Near Maya1she*i,/ saw Iddo. Note that had Levinsonnot added Reinhart'scomparisonbetweenbound he anaphoraand free pronouns'coreference, would not have been able to in account for the non-coreference (9b). Considerthe pronounshe. When of comparedwith a reflexive(for the possiblegenerationof a Q-implicature disjointreference), resultis that since a reflexiveis inappropriate this the in context, a pronouncan be used to inducea coreference reading(according to the I-principle). Thisis obviouslya wrongprediction, since(9b)necessarily implies a disjoint readingof the NPs. However, once the addresseeis to compare (b) with (a), its potential semantic equivalent,noting that the speakermust have avoidedthe bound anaphorain (a), he infersthat noncoreferenceis intended. Note that the fact that the proper name is ccommandedby the pronounwithinthe S domain,a violationof Condition C, cannotexplainthe ban on coreference the (b) case, for Reinhart(I983), in and Levinsonfollowingher, arguesfor the eliminationof ConditionC from the grammar. Thisadoptionof Reinhart's Co-indexing actuallymeansthat Levinson rule includesConditionB effectswithin the grammar,and I cannot see how he claimsto haveeliminated ConditionB (in English,at least).6Reinhart herself (p.c.), on whom Levinson relies here, does not claim to have eliminated Condition B from the grammar.Note also that once one is requiredto comparebetweena potentiallyboundpronounand a freepronounin order to generateQ-implicatures disjointreferences, of Horn'sscalelooks a bit less
[6] But I have no reason to doubt his analysis of Guugu Yimidhirr, which does not seem to require Condition B.
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
familiar.Bound pronounsare not formallydistinctfrom free pronouns(in most languages).Insteadof listingin orderof informativeness itemsequally lexicalized,it must now contain the syntacticstructures neededin orderto recognizec-commandrelationsand minimalGoverningCategories.Note, moreover,that the constrainton equal complexityof the forms compared must also be lifted,sincebackwards anaphora(the favoredformin (9)) is by all psycholinguistic criteria morecomplexthanforwards anaphora(seeAriel
i985b).
Whilein his I987b paperLevinsonattemptsto deriveconditionB and C patterns (of pronouns and lexical NPs respectively)from a grammatical ConditionA (on reflexives), Levinson(I99I) demonstrates that at least for some languages,a differentdivision of labour exists betweenthe grammar and pragmatics. often noted in the literature, As many languageseitherdo not have special reflexiveforms (i.e., used as bound pronouns within a minimalGoverningcategory),or else, theirreflexives pronounsare not and in complementary distribution,as BindingConditionsdictate.Hence, they seem to lack ConditionA. Since one conditionat least is to be specifiedby the grammar,Levinson suggeststhat some languagesare B-first,ratherthan A-first.That is, their grammar specifies ConditionB of Binding,ratherthanConditionA. In order to generatecoreference readingswith reflexives, reflexives now (rightly) are consideredmarked forms. Following Faltz (I977, I985) and Farmer & Harnish(I987), Levinsonclaims that in the unmarkedcase, argumentsof one predicateare assumedto be disjoint.Hence,once coreference sought, is it has to be markedby a markedform (Ariel (I987) offeredquite a similar analysis). Indeed, most reflexivesare longer and more complex forms as withregular compared pronouns.Manycontinueto fulfilemphatic functions in additionto reflexivity. Condition A patternsare thereforenow generatedvia M implicatures, whichurgeaddressees choose a nonstereotypic to interpretation, coreference in this case. Also, once a lexicalNP is used, wherea pronouncould be used (i.e. in the same S, but not as an argumentof the same predicateas the the antecedent), addressee againinstructed generatean M implicature, is to this time of non-coreference,since a pronoun would have I-implicated coreference(see (7b) again). Levinsonthen suggeststhat it is highly likely that many A-firstlanguagesemergedout of historicallyB-firstlanguages.I find this quite convincing. Once we assume that coreferencebetween co-argumentsof the same predicate is marked, we no longer need the Q-implicaturein A-first languages.It is not clearto me why Levinsonwantsto retainthe Horn scale of reflexives pronouns after he himself has argued that reflexivesare > marked forms, generating M implicatures.He does need it for B-first languageswith long distanceanaphors(reflexives whoseantecedents not are foundwithinthe clause).For there,arguesLevinson,the contrastbetweena 9
MIRA ARIEL
regularpronoun and a reflexiveis not necessarilyin the markednessof but a havingcoreferent clause-mates, rather,of presenting markedpoint of view (so-calledlogophoricity).Since the differencebetweenpronounsand reflexivesneed not be referentiality, two forms are not semantically the equivalent,and hence, the use of a reflexive may be justifiedon the basis of the markedpoint of view. A pronounin the sameenvironment may indicate an unmarkedpoint of view while pointingto the same antecedent. This changefrom an A-firstto a B-firstanalysisof the Bindingconditions does not affect my criticismof Levinson'spragmatictheory of anaphora. Both analyses assume a complementarydistribution between referring expressions.Both assume that the main question to be resolved by the addresseewith respectto potentiallyanaphoricexpressionsis whetherthe speaker intendeda coreference disjointreading.Both analysesassumethat or the only crucialcontextualfactorsare those capturedby the grammarians, and that addressees triviallyidentifywhat the intendedantecedent In can is. the next section I will argueagainstthese assumptions.I will have nothing furtherto say about Levinson'sfailureto replaceConditionB, for I myself am not endorsing such a step. I will suggest that the three Binding Conditions, although grammaticalin the sense that they are formally of defined,are the reflection the cognitiveAccessibility theoryto be outlined in section 4. The main bulk of this paper will be dedicatedto discourse anaphora. 3.
ARGUING AGAINST THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH
I will first try to show that Levinson'sassumptionson how potentially anaphoricexpressionsare actually interpretedin discoursemiss a whole range of facts actuallymanifestedin naturallanguage(section 3.I). I will thendiscussa fewweaknesses inconsistencies the theoryhe has offered and in
(3.2).
3. I The interpretationof potentially anaphoric expressions
It is certainlytruethat givenany pairof NPs, one potentiallyconstituting an antecedent, otherpotentiallyanaphorically the relatedto it, an unequivocal decisioncan and shouldbe madeby the addressee whetherthe two are to on be read coreferentiallyor disjointly. However, I claim that many more considerations involvedin such decisionsthan Levinsonadmits,even if are we limit ourselvesto linguisticantecedents, which is what I will do for the most part.First,it is not triviallyestablished whichpotentialreferent be will checkedas to coreference/disjointness.claim that one must assesscertain I relevant featuresaboutit (in additionto grammatical ones),beforea decision can be made whetherthis is the intendedantecedent.Second,one needs to weigh subtle contextualfactors which determinethe relation betweenthe
10
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
potential antecedent(or the unit in which it occurs in) and the potential anaphoricexpression(or the unit it is in). Third, one should take into account the specificpotentiallyanaphoricexpressionschosen, for these do not all triggeridenticalpreferential patternsof coreference/disjoint readings. Levinsonhas ignoredthe natureof the antecedent(the firstissue),he has not fully appreciated importanceof the varietyof contexts (the second the issue), nor the great varietyin anaphoricdevicesroutinelymanipulated by the speakers (the third issue). The relevant contexts for him are the ccommand domain and the S domain (assuming he has not eliminated ConditionB). The expressions analyzesare full NPs, pronouns,reflexives he andzeros.In whatfollowsI will showthatinterpreting potentiallyanaphoric expressionsrequiresthe addresseeto take into consideration natureof the the potential antecedent (3.1.I ), other contexts than the ones Levinson discusses(3. I.2), and additionaltypesof anaphoric thanthosehe expressions lists (3.I.3). Hence, if I am correct,the Levinsonaddresseewill not be able to makethe correctinterpretation all cases,for his theorydoes not require in him to weigh enough relevantfactors.
3.I.I
The nature of the antecedent
It seemsthat Levinson'saddressees required know aheadof timewhat are to the one and only one potentiallinguistic antecedent and then,all theyhave is, to do is establishwhetherthe potentiallyanaphoricexpressionat hand is coreferentor disjointfrom it. Consider,however,the following(originally from Broadbent(1973)): (io) Thefeedpipelubricates chain,and it shouldbe adjustedto leave the a gap half an inch betweenitself and the sprocket. In discourse, I argue, many, if not most interpretationsof anaphoric expressions occurin contextssuch as (io), i.e., wherethereis more than one antecedentcompatiblewith the grammatical specifications the anaphoric of expression.Levinson'stheorycannot explainto us how one decidesamong variouspotentialantecedents.Note, however,that this decisionaffectsthe laterdecisionabout the anaphoric expression beingcoreferent disjoint.In or the examples he quotes, Levinson seems to pick the most accessible antecedent(by my criteria,see below), thefeedpipein this case, and then he can argue that pronouns such as in (io) generate an 1-implicature of coreference.7 whathappenswhenwe pickchainas a potentialantecedent? But The same it is then disjointin reference. However,I do not see how eithera
[7] Note that Levinsondoes not actuallydiscuss the above example.See his 1985 article
(p. 40), wherehe actually usesthefollowing premise, correct itself,in orderto ensurethat in we pick the right antecedent:'We'vejust been talkingabout Douglas'. Shouldn'tthis consideration formpart of the theoryof reference interpretation? believeit should(see I section4 below). II
MIRA ARIEL
of could be generated, Q- or an M-implicature disjointness sinceneitherzero nor a reflexivecould have occurredinstead. Levinsonwould then need to supply a principle by which choices are made among equally possible coreference readings.He has offerednone so far. Anotherrelevantexampleis stressedpronouns.Stressed pronounsshould be classified markedon Levinson's as markedness scale.As such,they should of This is indeedtruewhenthe most generatean M implicature disjointness. accessibleantecedentis considered(in most cases, the topic).8 However, stressedpronounsare used anaphorically quite often, althoughthey pick a less obvious candidateas antecedent:
(II)
Maya1kissed Ginatj,and then SHE*i/i went home.
Thus, Levinson'signoringthe question of choosing the antecedentmakes him assumethat by somechancethe rightantecedent his theoryis chosen for (in (io) for coreferenceand in (II) for disjointness),but he ignores other possiblechoices,whichin (io) would give a wrongpredictionof coreference (with chain)and in (I I), a correctcoreference prediction, despitethe marked form, which is supposedto generatea disjointreadingaccordingto him.
3.I.2 The nature of the relation between the antecedent (unit) and the anaphor (unit)
The only relationsbetweenantecedentsand potentialanaphorsrecognized by Levinson are a c-command relation within the minimal Governing Category(reflexives demanding pronounsand lexicalNPs forbidding it, it), and a c-commandrelationoutsidethe minimalGoverningCategory(which enablesthe coindexingof pronouns).However,as we shall see below, many moreaspectsof the relationbetweenthe antecedent clauseand the anaphoric expressionclauseplay an importantrole in decisionsregarding coreference/ disjointness potentialanaphoricexpressions.Indeed,some, if not many, Qf of Levinson's would-be disjoint readings are coreferent after all. This discrepancyresults from his failure to consider the potential variety of relationswhich may hold betweenantecedentsand anaphoricexpressions,
[8] An anonymous referee rightlyarguedagainstmy assumption topicality the only has that is relevant factoris assigning stressed pronouns theirantecedents, presenting following by the whereunlikemy claimabove,it is the stressed examples, pronounwhichrefersto the topic (Maya,in (i)) whilethe unstressed pronounrefersto the nontopic(Ginat,in (ii)): (i) MayaikissedGinat1 then Iddo kissedHERj/*;J and (ii) MayaikissedGinat;and then Iddo kissedher*i/i. Thereader of course,right.The truegeneralization is, aboutwhatantecedent chosenby is stressedpronounsis not topicality,but rather,salience.High salience,in its turn,can be established virtueof quite a few factors.One of them is topicality,another(as in the in exampleshere) is expectationsdue to the preference parallelreadingsin conjoined of whereone candidate moreplausiblethan anotherin a certainrole (moreon sentences, is this in Ariel (iggoa: I83-4)).
I2
INTERPRETING
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EXPRESSIONS
above those specifiedby the grammar. Roughly,when the relationbetween the two clausesis not highlycohesive,what Levinsonpredictsto be a disjoint anaphoricexpressionturns out to be interpreted coreferent. as Considerthe followingminimalpair, offeredby Haegeman(I984: (ia) &
(2a)):
(I2)
(a) Johni did all the houseworkwhile John's,iwife was ill. while John'siij (b) Johniwill study Linguistics, fatherused to teach literature.
Note that while Levinson can account for the ungrammaticality the of in coreference (a), sincea pronounis appropriate here,he cannotaccountfor in the possiblecoreference (b), whereagain, a pronounis allowed. Another pair of contexts which are indistinguishableeither by the grammaror by Levinson'stheory are presentedbelow. Li & Thompson (1979) quote the followingexamplefrom Chinese:
(I 3) (a) This Wang-Mian was gifted. (b) o (= he) was not more than twentyyears of age. (c) o(= he) had already mastered everything in astronomy,
geography,and classics. (d) However,he had a differentpersonality. (e) Not only did o (= he) not seek officialdom... Note thatin Chinese,references highlyaccessible to entities,as 'Wang-Mian' above must be, are preferably made by zeros. This happensin three of the four non-initialreferences above, and a pronounin any of themwould have indeedfavoureda disjointreading.9 Still, this effectis not felt in clause (d). The pronoun is interpretedas coreferent.Now, syntactically,there is no difference betweenthe antecedent-anaphor in relationship (d) as opposedto (b, c, e): the antecedentoccurs in an independentprecedingclause. Li & Thompson,however,suggest that clause (in)dependency not a syntactic is matteronly. It is also pragmaticin nature,and pragmatic cohesionplays a role in anaphoricinterpretations. Accordingto Li & Thompson,the degree of conjoinability betweenclausesprefacedby a semanticconnectivesuch as however,is lower. Hence the preferencefor a pronoun in such contexts. Levinsonhas no way of accountingfor such differences. Hebrewis also a pro droplanguageto a largeextent.It therefore poses the same and other problemsfor Levinson'sanalysis.As in Chinese,a Hebrew speakershouldhave no reasonto use an overtpronounwhencoreference is intended,for zero is usually allowed. However,overt coreferentpronouns occurquiteoften, theirpopularitydependingon the genre(muchmore so in spokenthan in writtendiscourse).The followingpair of sentences,differing only with respectto the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the semantic (b) (a)
[9] See Henry (I986) too for discussion of such judgments in Chinese.
'3
MIRA ARIEL
connective laxen 'therefore' was presentedin Ariel (iggoa) (along with others): (I4) (a) ??Noga dibra im shimonyafe, ve + o yaazor Noga spoke with Simon nicely, and will-help la li + sxov et ha + mizvada. her to carryACC the suitcase (b) Noga dibra im shimonyafe, ve + laxen Noga spoke with Simon nicely, and therefore o yaazor la li + sxov et ha + mizvada. will-helpher to carryACC the suitcase In the samespiritas the Li & Thompson'sproposal,I have accountedfor to such preferences reference the natureof the relationship betweenthe by antecedentand the anaphor.While in both (a) and (b) above, the clauses containingthe antecedentand the anaphorrespectively conjoined,only are in (b) is therea semanticconnectivewhichdrawsour attentionto a semantic relationbetweenthem. Hence the abilityto use zero. Hebrewpresenttense does not usuallypermitzero options (whichcan be explainedby Accessibilitytheory- see Ariel (i99oa, I99I) - though not by Levinson).However,the informalspoken registerthen has anothertype of minimalpair: full pronounsas opposed to cliticizedpronouns.Note that whereas Levinson'stheory would predict that cliticized forms should be preferred when coreference sought by the speaker,the followinghas two is full pronouns(in c and d), both interpreted coreferent, as althoughcliticized forms are of courseacceptable,and indeedoccur (in b and c). The example
was first quoted in Ariel (i99oa: (6I)-(62), where sources are listed):
(I5)
Established discourse topic:10 the press, referred to by the full pronoun they or its stressed version, for a number of clauses preceding (b) below. (b) h + mociim [-hem mociim] et ze kaxa...
(a)
they publish
(c)
ACC
this like-this a-few
aval hem madgishim . .. h + notnim [= hem notnim] kama ...
but they emphasize they give ... (d) od davar she+ hem asu... anotherthing that they did
Note that again,wherethe speakerchose to switchto the full pronounis not arbitrary.(c) introducesa contrast,i.e. a shift from the previousunit, (d)
[io] An anonymous referee has commented on my nonchalant identification of topics. Since the definition of topic is not at issue in this paper, I think we can make do with my intuitive identification of topics. Discourse topics were counted as such if they could have been so classified by Reinhart's (I98I) criterion, and provided they were repeatedly used as sentence topics. Readers can verify this for themselves in (I 5). Where I do not specify a long enough stretch of discourse (as in the Alice Walker story examples in (i 6)), readers will have to trust me, or else consult the original text. I4
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
introducesan aside.1'Levinsoncan offerno explanationfor this patternof distribution. He would wrongly predict a disjoint reading for the full pronouns. A similar problem arises with respect to first person pronouns. Since Hebrewverbs mark firstperson in theirinflection,there should neverbe a of contextwhichcalls for the employment an overtpronoun.Afterall, when following another first person reference,there is no possible 'disjoint' the reference here(assuming samespeaker). AlthoughLevinsoncan correctly predict that coreferencewill be deduceddespite the overt pronoun which could be substitutedby zero, he cannot motivate speakers'preference(in certaincontextsbut not others)to use full pronounsanyway(becauseof the speaker's The Q-principle). followingis a minimalpairfromliterary Hebrew, a style notorious for its preferencefor zeros (see Ariel Iggoa for precise statistics):
(i 6) (a) ze haya davar shel ma bexax bishvilyalda o
it was nothing for (a) girl or isha le+heanes. ani acmi neenasti, kshe- o I (a) woman to-get-raped. myselfwas-raped,when [I] hayiti bat-shtem-esre. ima af paam lo yadaa, uwas twelve-years-old. Mama never (not) knew, and o meolamlo sipartile+ ish. [I] never (not) told to- anybody (WalkerI985: 30) himshixle + nasot le + alec oti la + cet (b) hu pashut he just kept trying to make me to- go ito, ve+ lifamim, mi-tox hergel,ani xoshevet, with-him,and sometimes,out or habit, I guess, o halaxtiito. gufi asa ma she+ [I] went with-him.my-bodydid what (that) [it] shulamshe+ yaase. ve- ima meta. ve- ani was-being-paid do. and Motherdied. and I to haragtiet buba. killed ACC Bubba. (WalkerI985: 3') Note thatwhileboth finalclausesunambiguously referto the narrator (recall that Hebrewmorphology makesthatclear),only the (b) examplecontainsan overt pronoun.I have suggestedthat the choice is dictatedby the natureof the shift back to the discoursetopic (the narrator). Althoughthe motheris the previoussentencetopic in both examples,the breakfrom the story line is far more drasticin (b) (the mother'sdeath). Hence the use of the fuller form, which has no connectionto coreferentiality disjointness. or
[i i]
Similarly, (I987) distinguishes Fox betweensequences closeddown,thatis fullyprocessed, callingfor a full NP as an anaphoric device,andsequences yet closeddown,callingfor not the use of a pronouninstead.
'5
MIRA ARIEL
We thus see that any theory which attemptsa simple predictionabout withouttakinginto accountsubtledifferences coreference disjointness, or in the nature of the relation between the antecedent and the potentially will anaphoricexpression, not do. We have seen above that withinthe same contexts(as theyaredefinedby Levinson)the verysameexpressions (Chinese and Hebrewpronouns)triggercoreferencesometimes,but disjointnesson other occasions. Also, minimal anaphoric expressionswill not be used sometimes(e.g. o in (I4a) and (i6b)), althoughthe context,as it is definedby for Levinson,is appropriate their use.
3.1.3 The type of anaphoric expression
While Levinson can draw an infinite number of distinctions among potentiallyanaphoricexpressions,dependingon both relativebrevityand degreeof informativity, cannot actuallyuse these distinctionsto predict he the different distributional patternsof theseexpressions. Sinceonly reflexives and grammatically coindexedpronounshave distinctcontexts,all the others are necessarilydefinedas occurringin the same contexts. In other words, sincefreepronouns,definitedescriptions, propernamesand otherexpression types to be mentioned below, can all occur in environmentswhere the antecedent does not c-command anaphoric the Levinsonpredicts expression, that: a. all expressions other than pronouns, which are more informative/marked (e.g. definite descriptions,proper names) should trigger disjointreadings, that b. thereis no expectation finddifferences the and to in and interpretation actualdistribution suchexpressions. of Afterall, the only decision is whether a given potentially anaphoric expression triggers a coreferenceor a disjointreading.Once it is decidedthat they all triggera disjointreading,Levinson'saddressee no furtherinstructions what to has on do in order to interpretthat expression.In what follows, I will show that these two expectationsare not borne out by the data: Many, if not most definite descriptionsand proper names are interpretedby referenceto linguistic antecedentson the one hand, and on the other, their textual distributions significantly are differentfrom each other. Findings from naturally occurringtexts show that depending on the discoursegenre,(Hebrew)definitedescriptions interpreted coreferent are as with some previouslymentionedlinguisticantecedentbetween56.25% and 8I.4% of the time (see Ariel Iggoa). Taken together,the various sources employcoreferent definitedescriptions 66.2% of the cases.They are used in to retrievenonlinguisticantecedents(as 'disjoint') only in 33.8% of the time.12 Moreover,a division of definitedescriptions into short ones (up to
[12]
See Ariel (iggoa: 35) for exact breakdown and list of references cited. Actually, it is not so much that the discourse genre dictates the nature of the use of definite descriptions. Rather, it is the nature of the genre which guides the speaker on what can be assumed by her without first introducing it into the discourse. Hence, in news items anaphoric uses are
i6
INTERPRETING
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two contentwords)as opposedto long ones (threecontentwordsand above) outsidethe text only in 2I.8 % revealsthat the shortones referthe addressee of the cases. It is quite conceivablethat once we count the nonlinguistic antecedentsof those definitedescriptions mentionedby Levinson,i.e. ones containing only one content words, results would have been even more drastic.Thavenius(I982), who checkeda naturallyoccurring conversation, found that only 10.7 % of the references (no matter what referring in wereexophoric.Thismarginality exophoricreferences expressions) applies even to deictics,presumably prototypical the for expressions extra-linguistic references. Halliday& Hasan(1976),who examinedtwo chaptersof Alice in Wonderland, found that only 20% of the deicticsreferredthe readerto the physicalsurroundings. Evenfull propernames(first+ last name),the primeexamplesfor referring outsidethe discourse,co-referwith antecedents mentionedin the previously text 36.2% of the time.13Note, however,that when we examinefirstnames (the type of name used by Levinson),the picturechangesdramatically, and in the wrongdirectionfor Levinson.In the textsI examined, firstretrieval no (necessarilydisjoint in interpretation)was performedby a first name, althoughI believethat othergenres,oral discoursefor example,would show themas capableof retrieving antecedents nonlinguistic quiteeasily.Themost common contexts for first names in the texts I examinedwere when the antecedentsoccurredin the previous S (42.9 %), or further in the same paragraph(40.8%). These are all, of course, contextswherepronounsare allowed to occur. Still, the implicatureto disjointnesswith a linguistic antecedentfails to be generated.The statisticsfor last namesare somewhat but different, they too are coreferent with an antecedent the previousS in in a substantialnumberof the cases (39.2 %). The second problemwhich resultsfrom Levinson'sfailureto sufficiently distinguishamong referring expressionsis his inabilityto predictwherehis variousso-calleddisjoint-reference markers occur.And they do occurin will highlypredictable environment. full Thus, definitedescriptions, names,last names, first names, demonstratives etc., are not randomlydistributedin texts,whenthey have a coreferent antecedent. Neitherare theirdistributions identical.The variousstudiesin Givon (I983), Clancy(I980) and othersto be quoted below have all shown that subsequentmentions of the same referents madeusing specificreferring are expressions dictatedby various as contextualfactors. Table i (= Table i.6 in Ariel (iggoa)), shows that the
more common for definite descriptions than in editorials, where the writer assumes the facts and comments on them, thus using definite descriptions more often to retrieve nonlinguistic antecedents from long-term memory. [I3] Levinson (I985: (63)) thus comments that the reference to the discourse topic 'Buli Buli' as Buli Buli he is strange. However, if one takes into consideration that Buli Buli was not mentioned in the few previous clauses, which had a different local topic (Douglas), one is perhaps less surprised that the full name is used coreferentially. See more below.
17
MIRA ARIEL FURTHER IN FORM SAME S 2 (3.4)a LAST S 12 (20.7) SAME PARAG. 15 (25.9) 24 (30.4) 20 ACROSS PARAG. 29 TOTAL
Full names
Last names
(50)
58 (ioo)
79 (I00)
First names
3 (6.I)
31 (39.2) 21 (42.9)
24 (30.4)
(40.8)
5 (I0.2)
49 (Ioo)
Table I.
The distributionof variousname types in context

a
Percentages parentheses. in
various names, for example,each occur in slightlydifferentenvironments, these beingmeasured the distancefromtheirlinguisticantecedent. the In by table, the prototypicalcontextsof each expressiontype are in bold."4 Thus, full names(first+last name)tend to occurin the two most distantcontexts (over75 % of them).Lastnamesare almostequallydividedbetweenthreeof the four contexts,none occurring the most minimalcontext,whereasfirst in namesmostly occur in the two intermediate contexts(over 83 %). Similar comparativedata were found for personal pronouns, demonstrativepronounsand definitedescriptions (Ariel iggoa: Table 0.3), as can be seen in Table 2. Again, emboldenedtypeface representsprototypical
FURTHER IN SAME PARAG. 75 (I4.2) ACROSS PARAG. 24 (4.5) I3 (I5.5) TOTAL 529 (Iao)
FORM
SAME S
LAST S
Pronouns Demonstrative pronouns Definite descriptions
II0 (20.8)a 320
4 (48) 4 (2.8)
(60.5) 50 (59.5)
20 (I4.1)
17 (20.2)
84 (I00)
142 (I00)
65 (45.8)
53 (37.3)
Table2. The distribution of pronouns, demonstrative pronouns and definite in descriptions discourse
a
in Percentages parentheses.
environments the occurrence eachexpression: for of pronounsfavorthe two minimaldistances(over8I %),demonstrative pronounsthe two intermediate distances (almost 8o %), and definite descriptions favor the maximal distances(over 83 %). Such findingshave to be accountedfor, and I claim
[I4]
Distance,however, not takenas number syllables was of separating two, but rather, the as outlinedin the tableheadings above.Thisis so becauseclausesandparagraphs highly are relevantunitsin termsof processing, more so than numberof syllables.
INTERPRETING
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they can be accountedfor by the very same mechanismwhich ensuresthe preferenceof coreferenceover disjoint readings, as they are called by Levinson. Thus, contra to Levinson'sclaims,most definitedescriptions and proper names are interpreted and in coreferentially, their occurrence the text is far from arbitrary. this point, Levinsonmay retortthat he neverdeniedthat At other pragmaticfactors may play a role in anaphoricinterpretations, and that is correct. However, Accessibility theory can incorporate these 'additional'factorsas an integralpart of the core theoryof reference, we as shall later see. In fact, Accessibilitytheory need not make a dichotomous distinctionbetweencoreferenceand disjointness.It accounts for both the interpretationof so-called referringexpressions as well as for that of anaphoricexpressions.As will be argued later, naturallanguagesdo not draw a sharp line between expressions specialized for direct reference ('disjoint' interpretation accordingto Levinson)as opposed to anaphora. Hence, Levinson'sattemptto insist on a distinctionbetweena coreference and a disjointreadingis mistaken.
3.2
3.2. I
Problems and inconsistencies in Levinson'sprinciples and scales The I-principle
Levinsonassumesthat when faced with a choice betweena coreference and a disjointreading,addressees for the coreference opt reading.Whilethismay be true (at least in many cases), I do not believethat Levinsonconvincingly motivatesthis allegedpreference. Levinsonarguesthat a coreference reading is preferred sinceinformativity requires to try and minimizethe number one of entitiesmentionedin discourse.Coreference, arguesLevinson,does not requirethe addresseeto introducean additionaldiscourseentity. Indeed,a preference minimize numberof textualreferents to the does seemto manifest itself in actualdiscourse.New entities,i.e. ones not previously mentionedin the discourse (marked are indefinite), a minorityamongreferring expressions. Most NPs in actualdiscourseare GIVEN (hence,markeddefinite)ratherthan BRAND-NEW, to use Prince'sI98I terminology(see Ariel I985b). However, Levinsonand I do not at all deal with Brand-New referents. only discuss We potentiallyanaphoricexpressions, which necessarily referto Given entities, althoughsome of theirantecedents may havenot yet appeared the specific in discourse. It is not clearto me how Givenentities(sayfromthe physicalsurroundings or from long termmemory)can be said to detractfrom the informativity of the proposition. If informativityis indeed measured by the number of possible worlds reduced,there is no a priori reason to assume that the numberof eliminated optionsis largerwhenthe referent beenmentioned has in the specific discourse. In other words, disjointnesswith a previous linguisticantecedentis no obstacleto informativity, coreference not and is
I9
MIRA ARIEL
guaranteedto increaseinformativity. Thus, I see no necessaryconnection Levinsonthen betweeninformativityand the preferencefor coreference.'5 does not properlymotivatehis 1-implicatures calling for coreference. Similarly, Levinson's effortto changethe prediction I-enrichments of from coreferenceto disjointnessin his I99I articleis not convincing.Levinson arguesthat Informativity enrichments based on stereotypes. are Thus, since one normallyperformsactionson othersratherthan on oneself(e.g. kissing, hitting are performedon others), a reflexive,which is a marked form, is required for marking the coreferencebetween arguments of the same predicate(such as washingor loving oneself).WhileI myselfhave endorsed such a view, I do not see how Levinsoncan viewthe stereotypic implicatures (of coreference)as creatingmore informativereadings.If anything,then nonstereotypic interpretations moreinformative are thanstereotypic ones,in that they eliminatefrom considerationa more deeply engrainedbelief. In other words, the I-principle cannot both be informativity and stereotypy. Levinsonmay then defendhis I-enrichment whichsupposedly procedures, cause preferencesfor coreferenceover disjoint readings,by arguing that processingentitiesstoredin long-termmemorytakes more time, and that is of coursetrueon the whole.It is only common-sensical assumethat highly to accessiblememoryitems, as currently mentioneddiscourseentitiesmust be, are less costly to process than highly inaccessibleones. Indeed, it is these processing procedures, and not informativity, that account for the overwhelminglyanaphoric uses of referringexpressions. But then, the argumentfor the preferencefor coreferenceshould be based on ease of processing,ratherthan on informativity. With this I agree,of course,and I too do not viewthispreference belongingin a specifically as reference-related theory.It follows from Sperber& Wilson's(I986) Relevancetheory,which instructsthe speakerto take into accountthe addressee's processingcosts. However, I shall argue that processing procedures are more crucially involvedin the characterization referring of expressions.Specifically, since speakersmay wish to refernot to the most salientpotentialreferent,they should overtlyinstructthe addresseeto searchfor a less salientantecedent.
3.2.2
The minimizationprinciples
One problemwith the minimizationscales offeredby Levinsonis actually acknowledged Levinson(I987a & b) himself.Levinsonconflates(at least) by two concepts of minimization,the principlewhich lies at the heart of his theory. One minimizationis semantic. Thus, a pronoun is semantically emptier,i.e. less specificthan a full NP, and is to be preferred the speaker by whenshejudgesthat the addressee generate I-enrichment can an implicature.
[i5]
In fact, Giora(I988) arguesthat informativity increased is whenprobabilities decrease. In otherwords,the less accessible interpretation is (disjointness) actuallymore informative ratherthan less informative. 20
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
A second minimization principlealso calls the speakerto prefera pronoun over a full NP, but this time becausepronounsare shorterlinguisticforms. In otherwords,minimization interchangeably is used as formalbrevityand as semanticnon-specificity. Now, this conflationis not baseless.In the unmarked case, shorterforms are also poorersemantically. Thus, Levinson'sscalebetween:LexicalNP > Pronoun> Zero Anaphorseemsto fulfillboth the formaland the semantic
conditions. As argued in Ariel (i985b, Iggoa), many referring expressions
can be distinguished to the amount of informationthey contain (Ariel's as criterion of Informativity).In addition to the expressionscompared on Levinson's scale above, I have discussed differencesbetween zero and pronounsversusfull demonstratives (e.g. that book), a bare demonstrative (that)versusa full demonstrative, and last name versusfull name, and first in general,any formwith as opposedto withouta modifier,as well as richer versus poorer modifiers (recall the differencebetween short versus long definitedescriptions). Many of these are, of course,irrelevant Levinson's to researchprogram since he simply classifiesthem as generating'disjoint' readings,but we have alreadyseen that this classification missesthe general pictureof references naturaldiscourse. in However,theseoppositions,whichmeetboth the formaland the semantic criteria,are only the unmarked cases.Naturallanguages,unfortunately, are known to not always grammaticalize an 'unmarked'manner.So-called in marked occurrences,which are properly and unproblematically comprehendedby addressees,must be taken into account too. And I will later suggest that they can be incorporated togetherwith the 'unmarked'cases under the same (Accessibility)theory. Considerthe proper name Bea, as opposed to she, and U.S. as opposed to The UnitedStates. The first pair consists of equally long members,whose semantic richness differs considerably.The expressions the secondpair are of different in sizes but equal semantic content. Hence, semantic minimization does not necessarily translateinto formalminimization. Consider now semantic minimizationas a sole criterion.There are a number of differencesamong potentially anaphoric expressions, which Levinson's semantic concept of minimization (= Ariel's informativity criterion)fails to generate.Again recall that although for Levinsonthese expressionswould seem irrelevant,since he dubs them all as generating disjointreferences, are here takinghis notion of 'disjoint' as potentially we coreferent with a less salientantecedent. Thus, the semanticcriterionfails to predicta differentreferential patternfor the followingpairsof expressions: a definite descriptionversus a full demonstrative,proximal versus distal demonstratives, verbalagreement in Hebrew)versuscliticizedpronouns (as and versusfull pronouns.In each pair, we cannot diagnoseone item which is semantically richer.They are equallyinformative.However,as we have seen above (section3.1), theirdistributional patternsin naturaldiscourseare
21
MIRA ARIEL
different.Moreover,the semantic/informativity criterionpredictsdifferent for in patternsof distribution pronounsand demonstratives languagessuch are as Chinese,Hebrewand English.WhereasChinesedemonstratives more informative thanpronouns,sincetheycombinewithnounclassifiers, Hebrew pronouns and demonstrativesare equally informative (distinct forms distinguish for gender and number in both expression types). English pronouns, on the other hand, are actually more informative than demonstrative pronouns,for only they have distinctformsfor the two sexes and another for inanimates.Levinsoncompletelyignores the question of demonstrative coreferwith more pronouns,but invariably,demonstratives distantantecedentsthan pronouns. Anotherdifficulty with the semanticcriterioncan be seen in the following reflexive> pronoun/lexical scale,whichservesas a basisfor Q-implicatures: NP. If it is specificitywhich is at the basis of Q-implicatures, how come a proper name (a type of lexical NP) is not positioned to the left of the reflexive? it Surelythe information conveysis more specificthan a reflexive. And how come there is no scale betweenfree pronouns and lexical NPs, positioninglexicalNPs in general,to the left of freepronouns,sincethey are more specificin theircontent?Just as reflexives point to an antecedent more than a pronoundoes, so do lexicalNPs in general,and proper unequivocally namesin particular. Next, considerthe formal minimization criterion.First, if minimalityof form and not of informationis crucial to the scale, i.e. to the options it compared, is not clearhow Levinsoncan haveaddressees comparebetween bound and free pronouns,which are formallyindistinctin termsof formal minimality(recall that he has added that comparison to Q-implicature generation). Moreover,if Levinsoninsistson a contrastbetweenboundand freepronouns,he mustthenallowfor comparisons betweenwholestructures. Thiscreatesotherproblems. Thus,I see no reasonfor a Levinson's addressee not to compare(a) and (b) in the followingpair,reaching conclusionthat the (b) generatesa disjointreading,althoughit does not: (I7) (a) JaneipromisedPROi to leave. (b) Janeipromised(that) she*i/j would leave.'6 Unlike the examplein (I 7), (i 8) shows that when the constructionsare identical,PRO/pronounchoicesdo generatedisjointreadings,as shown by Levinson(I987a) himself: (i8) Janeiwants PROi/herj to leave. Note that LevinsonconsidersVP conjunctions sententialconjunctions, as with zero anaphorfor subject(even in English,see his 1987b:example(i)).
[i6] Levinson may retort that (b) here is longer, which is true, but recall that Levinson's condition for comparison includes equal complexity as well. And at least some of the bound pronouns compared with free pronouns involve backwards anaphora as opposed to forwards anaphora. The former, of course, is considered much more difficult to process. 22
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
In that case, (b) in the followingpair should also be interpreted disjoint as in reference,becausethe zero option is available:
(i9) (a) Ginat woke up for a minuteand o went back to sleep.
(b) Ginat woke up for a minuteand she went back to sleep. This, of course,is not true.Coreference far from beingdispreferred (b). is in We thus see that Levinson'sattemptto captureReinhart'sintuitionabout bound versusfree pronounswithinhis theorywould go againsthis 'equally complex'constraint, wellas introduce as of problems interpretation 7b and (I
igb).
Secondly,Levinsonconflatestwo distinctconceptsin his markedness scale (zero > pronoun> lexical NP), which is used to generateM-implicatures: Markednessand length. Although it is again generallytrue that popular forms (unmarked termsof theirdistribution) tend to shorten(the, for in do example,is a derivativeof the longer that), this is not always true. Thus, althoughzero anaphorsare acceptable Hebrew,they are by no meansfelt in to be the unmarked forms(unlikeChineseor Japanese). sameappliesto The Hebrew cliticized pronouns. Moreover, even English sometimes shows omissionsof (at least) first person pronouns.But these zero anaphorsare certainlymarked,althoughthey are of course shorterthan pronouns. A third problemis Levinson'spredictionthat markedforms (exceptfor reflexives)triggerdisjoint readings,or, as we see it, they are potentially coreferent with less accessibleantecedents. Englishthis... versusthe..., then pose a problem.Thisbeingthe phonologically lengthier form(and,moreover, the intuitivelymore markedform), shouldpoint to less salientantecedents than the... The exact oppositeis, however,true (see again Table i above). The sameappliesto thisversusthat,the formerbeingthe markedmemberof the pair,whileit is the latterwhichrefersto lessobvious/closeby antecedents (see Ariel (iggoa: 51-5) for examplesand references such distinctionsin for English,French,German,Latin, Spanishand Turkish). In fact, I think markednessshould not form part of the core theory of at (co)reference all. It should be kept for the explanationof truly marked cases, e.g. where languagesdiffer from each other in unpredictable ways. Note that Levinsonneedstwo scalesof referring expressions two sets of and implicatures and M), both implicating (Q disjointness, probablybecausehe wants to keep the Horn scale (for Q-implicatures) its constrainton the with itemsbeingequallylexicalized. itemson themarkedness The scale(generating M-implicatures) cannot meet this criterionfor obvious reasons.I will later show that if one relaxes this constraint, one Accessibilityscale can be formulated, whichaccountsfor both coreference readings well as for what as Levinson calls 'disjoint' references.In fact, the forms on Levinson's markedness scalearenot particularly marked(exceptfor reflexives). have We seen the popularityof many of them in coreference readingsin the findings above. And even the truly marked forms (stressedpronouns, reflexives)
23
MIRA ARIEL
behavein an unmarked I way with respectto reference, would argue.So the markedness scale is unnecessary.
3.2.3 Levinson's view on speakers' performance aspects of referential use
Levinson(I985: 45) proposesthat speakers naturaldiscourseoperatewith in the followingprinciplein mind: 'Try letting the I-principle in the firste win instance,i.e. go for minimalforms;if that doesn'tworkescalatestep by step towards a Q-principlesolution'. Levinson quotes one piece of telephone conversationwhich seems to operate according to this mechanism(his
example (40)):
(20)
A: Hello B: 'lo Is Shortythere, A: Ooo jest- who? B: Eddy? Wood//ward? A: Oo jesta minute
But the natural conversationdata I have (not to mention the written materials)are far from reflecting such trialand errorprocedures. Errors,of course,do occur.But they arenot uni-directional, Levinsonpredictsthem as to be.'7 In other words, over-specifications occur, exceptthat they are also harderto detect, becauseconversationalists not bother to commenton do them for they do not cause misunderstandings. In sum, I mainly argued that Levinson'sclaims regardingthe 'facts' concerning coreference disjointinterpretations and (section3.I) are far from precise.Briefly,in orderto decideon a coreference versusa disjointreading correctly,the addressee needsto be able to choose the intendedantecedent: He has to distinguishbetween potential antecedentssomehow (3.I.I). In order to do that, the addresseemust rely on the natureof the potentially anaphoricexpression(e.g. informativity, brevity),a step allowedfor under Levinson'sview only insufficiently First, Levinsonis unawareof many so. more distinctions existingamonganaphoricexpressions (3.I.3), and second, he does not appreciate roleof the relationbetweenthe antecedent the (clause) and the anaphoricexpression(clause)(3. I.2). However,both considerations are relevantin determining anaphoricrelations,and in predicting actual the distributionof potentiallyanaphoricexpressionsin discourse. I thenarguedthat Levinson's M andI principles, Q, generating coreference or disjoint readings, suffer from various weaknesses. Specifically,the I principle cannotpredictthe preference coreference for overdisjointness. The
[17]
Note that accordingto this proposal,the speakershould have even tried a pronoun initially,ratherthan a nickname.
24
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
slogan adopted by Levinsonthat minimalforms generatethe most highly is informative interpretations notjustified.Levinson's proposalsalso conflate semanticand formal minimization,although linguisticexpressionsdo not always meet both criteria simultaneously. The Q principle generates implicatures based on a scale, simultaneously defined over semantic informativity and formal equality, which are not always adhered to. Moreover,the scale offered seems to contradictthe criterionof semantic specificity it purports to represent. Finally, the M principle generates implicatures relyingon a scale simultaneously based on formalbrevityand in markedness use, althoughthesetwo criteriasometimes conflicteachother. These problems with Levinson's scales stem from the fact that gensuch as 'formalminimality necessarily eralizations, is semanticminimality', 'formal lengthiness always correlates with disjointness (better called coreferencewith less accessibleantecedents)or with markedness',do not always hold, despite the clearly functional motivation behind them. Unfortunately,these discrepancies cannot be incorporated into Levinson's theory,for he has offeredus too generala theory,which is not specifically designedto handlereference cases. Sinceit is a (central) pragmatic proposal, i.e. an extra-linguistic theory, it relies on rationalconventions,and has no place for ad-hoc, arbitrary rulesor relations."8 generalityseemedto be This Levinson's great advantage, for Levinson seemed to require no special mechanismfor the resolutionof anaphora,but it turns out to also be his great disadvantage. I suggestthatthe basictheoretical problems withtheprinciples, aggravated by Levinson'sfailureto takeinto consideration manymoreintricate the facts about the distributionand interpretation potentiallyanaphoricexpresof sions, can all be resolvedby Accessibilitytheory,which is actuallya more sophisticated versionof Levinson'stheory.AlthoughAccessibility theoryis more specific in that it is linguistic rather than pragmatic,dedicated to reference interpretations ratherthan to implicature generation general,it in also addresses a question Levinson simply ignores, namely, how the interpretation so-calleddisjointreadingsis performed. of Afterall, referring expressionspointing to extra-textualreferentsmust get an interpretation too.19In the followingsectionI will brieflyoutlineAccessibility theory,my suggestion for a cognitive linguistic theory, specialized for reference
[I8] A note on terminology. I distinguish between two types of pragmatic rules. The first are
general rules, such as Grice's and Levinson's maxims, Kasher's Rationality principle and Sperber & Wilson's principle of Relevance, which do not refer to specific linguistic forms. These I consider extra-linguistic (central system) pragmatic rules. The second type are (pragmatic) linguistic (module) rules, where specific reference to actual linguistic units has to be made. These are considered grammatical rules, and may be quite arbitrary, although they may very well have a functional motivation. See Ariel (iggob) on the grammarpragmatics borderline.
[I9]
For discussion the similarity of betweenanaphoric referential and interpretations NPs of see Ariel (to appear). 25
MIRAARIEL
as interpretation (coreferent, well as 'disjoint')insteadof Levinson'scentral pragmaticaccount.20

APPROACHTO ANAPHORA:AN ACCESSIBILITY 4. THE COGNITIVE ANALYSIS
While Levinson assumes that the addressee'stask upon encounteringa potentiallyanaphoricexpression(o, pronoun,reflexive, propernameetc.) is to determinewhether that expressioncarries a coreferenceor a disjoint
reading, Accessibility theory (Ariel I985a & b, I987, i988a, i990a, I99I)
posits another task: All potentially anaphoric expressions are to be i.e. deciphered, identifiedwith some mentalentity.Hence, so-calleddisjoint fromanaphoric uses areno different uses.In otherwords,once the addressee has determinedthat the pronounsin (a) and (b) below have no sentential antecedents,and are thus 'disjoint', he has not at all finishedinterpreting
them:
(21) (a)
She will come home.
(b) Maryihas now come home, so shejwill have to leave. I claim that the reason that all potentially anaphoric expressions are processedin a similarway is that they are all contextretrievers, they are for all markedGiven,i.e., non-Brand-New the addressee. to Note thatit will not do to interpretas a Brand-Newentity every 'disjoint' NP, namesincluded. Openingup a newfile (a la Heim I982) for Chomsky, as for a student and just a new theorywould not count as a properprocedure:
(22)
A student presenteda new theory, and Chomsky has changed his mind about Binding theory.
Thus, while 'Chomsky'is 'disjoint' and New in the discourseof (22) in the sensethat it is beingmentionedfor the firsttime, it is not 'Brand-New'(see PrinceI98I). 'Used' items,suchas 'Chomsky'above,arethosepermanently storedin our long-termmemory,althoughthey have not beenmentionedin
the current discourse. And whoever fails to identify Chomskywith the mental
representationof the famous linguist has not interpretedthe sentence correctly. This much may be acceptable to Levinson, who, following common
practice, distinguishes between referential and anaphoric uses of NPs. I have argued against this position (see especially Ariel I988a). Note that first, conceptually it is somewhat odd, for the distinctly referential use assumes a direct tie between linguistic (referring) expressions and world entities. I
[20] Actually,I havearguedthat the samemechanism operative any contextretrievals is in of
Giveninformation presuppositional (e.g. constructions), it is not aimedto be as general but a mechanism Levinson's M and I-principles. as Q, 26
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
believe it is more plausibleto hypothesizea connectionbetweenlinguistic expressionsand mentalentities.Once we do that for referring expressions, the artificialdifferencebetween linguisticantecedents(for anaphora)and world object-antecedents reference)disappears.In other words, both (for 'anaphoric' and 'disjoint' NPs need to be identified with mental representations. Indeed,this leads naturallyto my second argumentagainst the artificial distinctionbetweenreferringand coreferring expressions/uses.I maintain that referringexpressionsundergo similarprocessingproceduresfor their In interpretation. other words,the factorsinvolvedin the searchfor mental antecedentsdo not distinguishbetween referenceand anaphoraas such. Hence, whereas the distinction is relevant for the sentence-grammarian because s/he is only committed to providing linguistic accounts for distributional facts within the S domain,the (linguistic)pragmaticist not is thus constrained.The pragmaticist, who has taken upon herselfto provide extra-grammatical accounts need not necessarilyadopt the grammarian's division of phenomenainto sententialversusnonsentential,and anaphora versusdisjointness. Indeed,once we examineGivennessexpressions potentiallyanaphoric (i.e. expressions),we immediatelysee that natural languagesdo not find the reference/coreference distinctiona significantone. If they had, we would expectto find the coding systemmore sensitiveto the distinction.We would have had expressions specialized for direct reference as opposed to expressionsspecializedfor anaphoricuses. This is not the case, however. Names, and even deicticexpressions, presumably prototypicalreferring the expressions 'disjoint'in reference) usedfor reference linguistically (i.e. are to mentionedantecedents,i.e. coreferentially (see (23) below). Pronounsand zeros, supposedlythe prototypicalanaphoricexpressions,can be used to retrieveentitiesnot yet mentionedin the discourse,i.e. 'disjoint' (24): (23) (b) Only Felixi voted for Felixi. (b) Arafat diber im xuseini ve+ zei hivtiax... Arafat talkedwith Husseinand this (one) promised (a) The butlerdid it. (the murder) (b) Shakeo beforeusing.(on a medicinebottle,from Sadock 1974: 608) I have therefore suggested that natural languages code degrees of Accessibilityin memoryin their Givennessexpressions(see again note 20). Thus,whenthe speaker wishesto referto someGivenentity,shemustchoose a linguisticexpressionwhich signalsthat degreeof Accessibility with which shejudgesthe addressee entertainit in his memory,regardless whether to of the form is used anaphorically 'disjointly'. or A varietyof factorscontributeto the degreeof Accessibilitywith which entitiesareentertained one'smemory.Relyingon relevant in psycholinguistic
(24) 27
MIRA ARIEL
findingspertainingmainly to linguisticantecedents(Clark& Sengul I979; Garnham& Oakhill I985; Garrod& Sanford I982; Garveyet al. 1974-5; Marslen-Wilson Komisarjevsky & TylerI982; Sanford& GarrodI98I), and
linguistic findings (Bates et al. I980; Bentivoglio I983; Brown I983; Clancy 1980; Cooreman I983; Du Bois 1980; Eid I983; Fox I983, I987; Gasser 1983; Givon i983a-d; Grosz 1981; Gundel ig80; Hinds i983; Hobbs 1976; Jaggar I983; Levinsohn 1978; Li & Thompson 1979; Linde 1979; Rochester & Martin 1977; Schiffman 1984; Yule 198i), I have isolated two main factors
(in addition to other, idiosyncraticones, not to be discussed here): the prominenceof the antecedentand the nature of the relation between the antecedentand the Givennessmarker,now dubbed Accessibilitymarker. of Thus, the mentalrepresentations discourseparticipants (the speaker,the and addressee) certainspecialdiscourseentities(humans,entitiesencodedas topics or subjects)are relativelymore salientas potentialantecedents than the representations entitiesnot present,non-topics,non-subjects nonof and humans. Competing antecedents,on the other hand, lower each other's Accessibility (see Clancy I980 and Ariel 9ggoa). is this prominence the It of antecedent which dictates the preference of subjects in choosing one antecedent('the feedpipe')over another('the chain'), as exemplified the in Broadbent (1973) experiment reported above.Suchclaimsaboutpreferred on antecedents havealso beenindependently offeredby proponents Centering of theory (e.g. Brennanet al. I987; Grosz et al. I987), who set out from the question of local coherence rather than from that of reference.Their proposals, however, are very much compatiblewith Accessibilitytheory. Similar findings have been reportedin Sanford & Garrod (I98I), where reactiontime in interpreting anaphoricpronounsand definitedescriptions was shorterwhen the antecedentwas the discoursetopic. The relationshipbetween the potential antecedentand the Accessibility markermay also vary.A shortdistancebetweenthe mentionof the one and the mentionof the otherusuallyimplieshigh Accessibility the antecedent of to the Accessibility marker.Indeed,Tables I and 2 above show that various anaphoricexpressions not randomlyoccurin the text. Rather,full names do take the most distant antecedents,pronouns occur with the closest by antecedents. In between we find definite descriptions, last names, demonstrativepronouns and first names (in this order). The same pattern emergeswhenwe compareanaphoricreferences antecedent a recently (the is mentioned discourseentity, hence highly accessible,most probably)with directreferences ('disjoint'references, wherethe entityreferred has not yet to been mentioned in the current discourse, and hence is of relativelylow Accessibility). Again,it is full nameswhichlead in markinglow Accessibility entities:They are used for 'direct' referencesalmost twice as much as the definitedescriptions. Whenwe checkwhichnametypesareused for 'direct', disjointreferences, againthe samescaleemerges, withfull namesconstituting over 85 percentof the cases, last names,close to 15 percentand firstnames
28
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
are none whatsoever(percentages based on data presentedin Ariel (iggoa: of 45)). Although, as mentionedabove, this nonoccurrence first names is probablyaccidental, relativepopularityof the variousnamesremainsthe the same in all texts, I claim. But a closer tie can also be the result of higher cohesion between the clausescontainingthe antecedentand the potentiallyanaphoricexpression. Thus, embeddingcreates a more cohesive link between the clauses than conjoiningdoes, and the same applies, for instance,to restrictiverelative clauses (more cohesive with their matrices)versus nonrestrictiverelative clauses(see Ariel iggoa, i99I). Thus Hebrewoptionalresumptive pronouns are significantly acceptablein restrictive less relativeclauses (RCs) than in non-restrictive RCs. The tightlink betweenthe antecedent head)and the (the anaphoric expression (the resumptivepronoun) in restrictiveRCs discouragesthe use of a resumptive pronoun,and zero is preferred:
(25)
(a) ha + gvarimha + yisreelimshe+ ha+ cava sholeax the men the Israelis that the- army sends o/?otamle+ hilaxemhem geza shuvenistibi + myuxad. them to fight are race chauvinistespecially 'The Israelimen that the army sends to fight are an especially chauvinistic lot.' (b) ha + gvarimha + yisreelim,she+ ha + cava sholeax the men the Israelis that the army sends o/otam le+ hilaxem,hem geza shuvenistibi + myuxad. them to fight are race chauvinistespecially 'The Israeli men, whom the army sends to fight, are an especiallychauvinistic lot.'
However, when the relation between the antecedentand the resumptive pronounin a restrictive is less tight, as when the distancebetweenthem RC is relatively large,resumptive pronounsare quiteacceptable. (26) showsthat while a resumptivepronoun is not favoredwhen the distancebetweenthe antecedentand the resumptivepronoun is short (a), it is quite acceptable otherwise(b):
(26)
(a) shoshana hi ha+ isha she+ nili ohevet o/?ota. Shoshanais the woman that Nilly loves her (b) shoshana hi ha + isha she+ dani sipershe+ moshe Shoshanais the woman that Danny said that Moses rixel she+ nili ohevet ?o/ota. gossipedthat Nilly loves her
Hence, I have proposedthat the speakermust take into accountthe factors related to the antecedent'ssaliency, as well as the nature of the relation between the antecedent(clause) and the potentiallyanaphoricexpression (clause).Once she has consideredthese factorsshe is in a good position to
29
MIRA ARIEL
assess the overallAccessibilityof the specificantecedentat the point when another referenceis to be made to it. She then chooses her potentially anaphoricexpressionaccordingly.Referringexpressionsare arrangedon a scale of Accessibilitymarking,forms to the left signallingrelativelyhigher Accessibility,forms to the right signallingrelativelylower Accessibility:2
(27)
The Accessibility Marking Scale:
< zero < reflexives agreement markers< cliticizedpronouns< unstressed pronouns< stressed pronouns< stressed pronouns + gesture< proximaldemonstrative + NP) < distaldemonstrative ( (+ NP) < proximal demonstrative (+ NP) + modifier< distal demonstrative + NP) + modifier< firstname < last name < short ( definitedescription< long definitedescription22 full name < full < name+ modifier.23 Note that the very same scale is used by speakersin manipulating the all factorsmentionedabove. Thus, I claim that it is not accidentalthat distant antecedents, non topic ones, ones in competition with other potential antecedents,ones in a less cohesive relationwith the anaphoricexpression etc. all favor the use of a relativelylow Accessibility marker,and vice versa for near, topical antecedentsetc. What all these environmentshave in common is the degree of Accessibilitywith which the mental entity is associated in the addressee'smemory at the point when the potential anaphoricexpressionis encountered. Two exampleswill show that indeed,
I thank an anonymousreferee for drawing my attention to the careless title (The Accessibility Scale)I haveused for the scalein (27). It is, of course,a marking scale,and not a scale gradingAccessibilityrates. As for the reader's justifiedrequestfor a true Accessibility scale,I doubtwe will everbe ableto supplyone for discourse for references, the weightingof variousAccessibility factorsseemsto evadea clear-cut formulation (but see Toole (I992) for suggestions suchweightings). have,however,attempted I concerning to providesucha scalefor grammaticalized devices(Reflexives, anaphoric PROs,etc.) in Ariel (I987). referee herecommented whilethereis an approximate has that correlation [221 An anonymous betweenlengthand relative it Accessibility, all dependson the contentof the NP and how it relatesto the discourse question.Now of course,somedefinitedescriptions much in are moreunequivocal, rigid,to anticipate term,regardless theirlength(e.g. thesun). or of my Othersarebetterretrievers becausethe addressee associates characterization 'the one (e.g. withthe referent betterthananother(e.g. 'my neighbor fromthe 5thfloor').But teacher') all in all,thecorrelation lengthis quitesignificant, witnessed thenumbers with as by quoted above regardingdisjoint versus anaphoricuses. 'Disjoint' readingsare much more commonforlongdefinite and descriptions, anaphoric readings muchmorecommonfor are short definitedescriptions. findsit strangethat full name +modifierendsthe list, followingdefinite [23] The samereferee descriptions.S/he claims that many definitedescriptions, especiallyones modifiedby relativeclauses,actuallyintroduce New, unfamiliar referents. propernamescan also But be usedto introduce unfamiliar referents, especially whenadjacent an RC! In anyevent, to the Accessibility Marking Scaleis onlymeantto givethe reader roughideaaboutthe sort a of choicesspeakers make.Actualchoicestake into accountthe specificdiscourse, can the contentconveyed,etc. See the codingprinciples particular below (informativity, rigidity and attenuation), which guide addressees' choices, especiallywhen variationson basic formsare concerned.
[2I]
30
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
different factorsinteractin the decisionaboutwhat referring these seemingly expressionto use. Table 2 showed 24 pronominalreferences antecedents the previous to in paragraph,the most distant context I examined. Although in terms of this percentages, is ratherlow (4.5 percent),we shouldstill try to accountfor this use of highAccessibility markers suchdistantreferences. turnsout for It that these pronounsarejustifiedin light of the prominentantecedents they referto. An overwhelmingly majorityare the discoursetopic. Indeed,once we removethose references madeto the recurring discoursetopic,we are left with 2 suchpronominal references percentof pronouns).In otherwords, (0.4 the combination of great distance and nontopicalitycontributesto the avoidance of high Accessibilitymarkers (a pronoun in this case) more than each of the factorsalone. significantly Topicalized relativeclausesprovidea similarexample.We haveseenabove that directobjectresumptive pronounsare optionalin Hebrew.(28a) below shows that subject resumptive pronouns are, however, ungrammatical (usually),and zero must be used. I claim that this is so due to the fact that subjects normally occur sentence-initiallyin Hebrew. They are thus positioned almost adjacent to the head, their antecedent.That this ban againstthe occurrence topmostS subjects relativeclauses(as resumptive of in pronouns) derives from Accessibilityconsiderationsand not from some arbitrary grammatical constraint be seenfrom(b) and (c), whichcontain can topicalized RCs with subject resumptivepronouns. Doron (I982) has claimedthat subjectresumptive pronounsare allowedin suchconstructions. But why is that so? And if so, why is (c) only marginally acceptable while(b) and (d) are fully acceptable?:
(28)
(a) ha + talmidashe+ * hilo meaxeret... the student that she is-late 'The studentwho is late...' (b) ha+ talmidaishe+ et tali hii ohevet... the student that ACC Tal she likes
'The student who likes Tal...'
(c) ?ha+ talmidashe+ tamid hi meaxeret... the student that always she is-late
'The student who is always late...'
(d) ha+ talmidashe+ le + xol exad min ha+ sheurim the student that to each one of the classes hi meaxeret... she is-late I have suggested(see Ariel iggoa) that topicalizations minimally increasethe distancebetweenthe head(antecedent) the RC subject(pronounor gap). and This is the reasonwhy (b-d) improveon (a). The size of the distanceaffects the acceptabilityof the resumptivepronoun, as we see in the contrast 3'
MIRA ARIEL
between(c) and (d). However,the distanceis not dramatically different (b) in and (c), but still (c) is significantly acceptable.This, I suggest,is due to less the fact that (b) introduces a competing antecedent ('Tal'), which reducesthe highAccessibility the Head.Thus,in the case of automatically of RCs we can see the intricateworkingof Accessibility theory.The apparent facts are that direct object resumptivepronouns are optional, occurring especially when relatively distant from their heads, subject resumptive pronounsare on the wholeungrammatical, exceptthat they areallowedwith topicalizations, providedthe topicalizedphraseis eitherlong or else it is an NP. Accessibilitytheory, however, can capture this complex pattern by sayingthat resumptive pronounsare usedwhenever antecedent judged the is to be relativelyless accessible.I claim this is the only denominator these all environments have in common. Now, the scalein (27) is by no meansarbitrary. fact, I haveclaimedthat In it is essentiallyuniversal.The reason for its universalityis that natural languagestend to code degreesof Accessibilityaccordingto three coding principles: rigidityand attenuation, factorsconsidered Informativity, all also by Levinson.The more(lexically)informative formis, chancesare it will the code relatively lowerAccessibility. morerigidly(unambiguously) form The a refers(propernamesin particular) lowerthe Accessibility marks.Last, the it the less attenuated the form (i.e. longer or louder, but with no added information)the lower the Accessibilityit marks. Thus, full names are highly informative,highly rigid (easily referring uniquelyin our culture)and relativelylong phonologically.Zeros, on the other hand, are neither informative,nor rigid and they are maximally attenuated.First names are relativelyinformative, are not so rigid (the but numberof first names is by far smallerthan the numberof last names). Pronounsare even less rigid,but they encode numberand gender(in many languages).Cliticizedpronounsare virtuallythe same as pronounsin terms of informativityand rigidity, but they are more attenuated.Hence, they should mark higher Accessibility.Agreementmarkers(in highly inflected languagessuch as Hebrew)are again as informativeand rigid as pronouns and cliticized pronouns, but are even more attenuated than cliticized pronouns,and indeed,I have arguedthat they markhigherAccessibility (for details see Ariel I99oa, I99I). Note, however,that althoughthe threeprinciplesoffereddo accountfor most of the hierarchical arrangement (27), they cannot account for the in relative Accessibility associated with all the forms. For example, full demonstratives(e.g. that table) signal higher Accessibilitythan definite descriptions(the table), although informativityand rigidity cannot distinguishbetweenthem, and attenuationwould have wronglypredictedthat the definitedescriptionbe associatedwith a higherdegreeof Accessibility. The reasonis that attenuationis also commonfor unmarked forms,and the definitearticle,beingas popularas it is, tendsto shorten,cliticizeor destress
32
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
in many languages without any connection to the (relativelyvery low) Accessibilityit marks. This is why I claim that a specificallylinguistic principle is at work here. Although most of the scale in (27) can be motivated(by the threeprinciples functionally above),some of its orderings have to be stipulated. Let us now briefly review the distributionalfacts about Accessibility markerscited both in supportof Levinson'stheoryand as counterexamples to it. I suggestthat theycan all be accountedfor by one and the sametheory: Accessibilitytheory. Examples(I2)-(I6), which were presentedas counterexamples to Levinson'sproposal, can be accounted for by Accessibility to theoryby reference cohesion.In all theseexamplesthe degreeof cohesion betweenthe antecedent clauseand the anaphorclausedetermines whethera fuller(lowerAccessibility) formor a leaner(higherAccessibility) formwould be preferred. Examples(I 3) from Chineseand (I 5) from Hebrewshow that a potentialchange of topic (markedby the connectivebut, or by an aside) causesthe changefromzero to pronounin Chinese,fromcliticizedpronoun to full pronounin Hebrew.The examplesin (I2) show the dependence the of coreference a firstnamewithinan S on whetherthe relevant of clauseis more or less cohesiveto the antecedent clause.Wherethe nameis unacceptable the whileclausedoes not follow a break,and is morecohesiveto the antecedent clause,meaning'at the sametime'. It is acceptable whenit follows a break, and is interpreted a contrastivemarker.24 as Example(i6) shows that even the Accessibility the mentalrepresentation the speaker bejudgedto of of can be lower afterthe dramatic changeof topic in the previousclause(the death of the mother). Example I i (from English) points to the importanceof the degree of prominenceof the potential antecedent.The stressed pronoun, a lower Accessibilitymarkerthan a non-stressed pronoun,refersto the less salient candidate,the non-topic,or the less expectedreferent the specificrole.The in same goes for (io) and (23b), where the higher Accessibility marker (pronoun) corefers with the more prominent antecedent,and the lower Accessibility marker (a demonstrativepronoun) corefers with the less prominentantecedent. The various consistent distributionalpatterns of Accessibilitymarkers mentionedin section3.1, whichare unpredictable Levinson,follow from by Accessibility theoryquitestraightforwardly. Whileshortdefinite descriptions are discourse anaphoric close to 8o percent of the time, long definite are descriptions discourseanaphoric only in 35 percentof the cases(seeAriel 44). More importantly, distancefrom theirantecedents, the because iggoa: of the relativelowerAccessibility they signalto the addressee, predictably is largerthan in the case of pronounsand demonstrative pronouns(Table2).
[24]
Haegeman (I984) solves this problem by suggesting that some whiles are S-adverbials, other are E-adverbials.
33
2 LIN 30
MIRA ARIEL
in Evenfull nameshavediscourseantecedents morethana thirdof the cases. have not been recently However,these mostly occurwhen theirantecedents mentioned.On the other hand, over 40 percentof the antecedentsof first names (the highest Accessibilitymarkersamong name types) coreferwith entitiesin the previousS (withadditional6 percentreferring an antecedent to within the same S). The above is only a very brief summaryof linguisticfindingson both the distributionand interpretation anaphoricexpressionsin discourse,all of supporting Accessibility theoryin that they show that those markers argued to be lower Accessibility markersoccur in contextswherethe antecedentis relativelyless accessibleto the addressee.HigherAccessibility markers,on the other hand, tend to occur in contextswhich assumea higherdegreeof of Accessibility the antecedentto the addresseeat the point when he has to interpretthe Accessibilitymarker.But see Ariel (I985b, iggoa) for a more extensiveexpositionof the theory and how it incorporates many facts the about potentially anaphoric expressions discussed by the numerous researchers mentionedabove. As for sententialanaphora,the obligatoryintra-sentential examplesseem to be by and largesubjectto the Bindingrules.25 These,however,shouldbe viewedas a partialgrammaticalization Accessibilityconstraints.26 of Thus, anaphorsare extremely highAccessibility markers, shouldhavea highly and accessibleantecedent(a binderin some locally defineddomain).Pronouns are relatively lower Accessibility markers than anaphors. No wonder ConditionB specifies that if they arebound,it is only in a largerdomain(the S), where the antecedent is less accessible. Alternatively,they can be coreferentwith antecedentsoutside the S domain ('free'), where again antecedents are less accessible. Condition C can also be motivated in accordancewith Accessibilitytheory: LexicalNPs, the lowest Accessibility markers, cannot be grammaticallybound at all, for the grammatically defineddomainis too small,so that the Accessibility the antecedent of must be too high at that point for the use of low Accessibilitymarkersto be appropriate.In other words, I claim that the Binding conditions are
[25]
[26]
Butsee Reinhart Reuland & of A (I993) for a reformulation Conditions andB as syntactic and semantic conditions on (respectively) reflexivity predicate reflexive two of its cois (a if argumentsare coindexed).Togetherwith the chain condition, they account for local reflexives(e.g. herself, Dutch zichzelf) includingtheir logophoric uses, for so-called pronominal anaphors (e.g. Dutchzich)andfor pronouns. effect,the scalecreated(from In higherto lowerAccessibility marking) localreflexives, is: pronominal anaphors, pronouns. Zribi-Hertz (I989) arguesthat Condition shouldbe reformulated sucha way that the A in grammatical requirement a c-commanding for antecedent withina givendomainfall out of a discoursegrammarrule. I should like to leave open the muddy questionof the interaction betweendistinctly formalrulesand functional rules.Whileit is my conviction that a historical and/or typological account of the grammaticalization process of Accessibility theoryinto (someversionof) the Bindingrulesis feasible,I fully admitthat it is a challengetoo greatfor me at this stageto decidehow to represent factsin any the one synchronic grammar. leave that to furtherresearch. I
34
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
as formulated theyare becausethereis a non-arbitrary, functionalreasonfor this formulation. lie Accessibility markingconsiderations behindthe specific distributionof each of the markers(anaphor,pronoun, lexical NP), since each of the Binding conditions targets a differentdegree of antecedentrelatedness. the otherhand,manycounter-examples On anaphoric expression to the Bindingrulesseemmorenaturalin an Accessibility framework.27will I below on the effectof the natureof the antecedent, concentrate arguingthat anaphorscan be used despitethe violationof conditionA, providedthey are extremelysalient. Logophoric reflexivescan find their antecedentsin non-local domains becausethey referto the entityfrom whose point of view the information is reported (see Zribi-Hertz I989). Such an entity is bound to be highly accessible.The prominence the antecedentthereforecompensatesfor the of largerdistance.In fact, such reflexivesdo not even requireintra-sentential antecedents:
(29)
Now Kittyi could see Mauricej,his red pulloverthe only colour in the gloom. Therewas no one but themselvesi+j the huge building. in (BrooknerI983: 124)
Now althoughBindingconditionsonly referto 3rd personreflexives,Ist and 2nd reflexivesare just as obligatory when c-commandedby a local antecedent.However,it is not surprising just these two, whichreferto that the prominententities,the speakerand the addressee,can occur without a linguisticantecedent,as in 30 :28 (30) (a) This masterpiece writtenby Maya and myself/*himself. was (b) So who's advising Govorshin apart from ourselves/ *themselves? (The Fourth Protocol: a I987 film). Similarly,colloquial(Philadelphian?) Englishreferences firstand second to personscan be made using reflexives, not thirdpersonreferences. but The same appliesto each other, anotheranaphorsubjectto ConditionA. In the following example (from Sportiche I983, who attributes it to Chomsky),each otherdoes not have a linguisticantecedent:
(3I)
Lies about each other triggered the fight.
However,I claimthat for (3I) to be acceptable, settingmustbe suchthat the two people are actuallyfightingin front of the speakers.Hence, each other
[27] However,not all counter-examples be explained Accessibility can via theory.Others, such
[281
as epitheticallexical anaphors,need to refer to some pragmatictheory in order to be accounted for. See Ariel (iggoa), where I motivate various counter-examples to Accessibility theoryusing Relevancetheory(Sperber Wilson I986). Otherinteresting & examplesare discussedby Bolinger(I979) and Toole (1992). But see Reinhartand Reuland(I993) for additionalconstraints such 'free' reflexive on
forms.
35
2-2
MIRA ARIEL
is occasionallyallowedto take a discourseantecedent('disjoint'),when the antecedentis extremelysalient. That the prominenceof the antecedentis crucial for 'grammatically' controlledformscan also be seen in the many languageswheresubjectsare preferredas anaphors' antecedents.Faltz (I985) actually claims that a preferencefor subjects as antecedentsfor reflexivescan be seen in all but are languages, for somelanguages, subjects the onlypotentialantecedents for reflexives (e.g. Turkish,Finnish,Malayalamand others).Icelandicsig (a long-distancereflexiveform) only takes subjectantecedents(Maling I984), and when in an adverbialclause, it must be bound by the matrix subject, the subject.Englishanaphorsare presumably most prominentgrammatical
not necessarily bound by subjects, but as Chomsky (1985: io8) notes, 'in
some structures,anaphorsare "subject-oriented" the sense that only a in subjectcan be the antecedent...': (a) Theyi told me that picturesof each otheriwould be on sale. (b) *1 told themi that picturesof each otheriwould be on sale. Chomsky(I 98I: 289-290) also notes the followingminimalpair,whereagain the pronounand the reflexiveform part of the PP: (33) (a) Johni turnedthe argumentagainst*him/himselfi. (b) Johni turnedhis friendsagainsthim/himselfi. Note that when the interveningreferentis less of a competitionsince it is inanimate('the argument')the higher Accessibilitymarkermust be used. When the interveningreferentis human ('his friends'), a pronoun can be used as well. I suggestthat the latterpotentialantecedent moreprominent, is and therefore constitutesmoreof a competitionto Johnas antecedent, hence loweringits relativeAccessibilityand allowingthe use of the slightlylower marker a pronoun.This competitionis more clearlybrought Accessibility out in the following example,suggestedto me by an anonymousreferee, wherethe competingantecedentis both animateand singular :29
(32)
(34) Johni turnedhis friend3 againsthimi/himself. Recall that Levinson has accountedfor the contrastivedistributionof pronounsand reflexives pointingto the logophoricnatureof references by by
[29]
Thesamereferee not convinced hisfriendsreallyconstitutes competing is that a antecedent morethantheargument, just as the latteris inappropriate since becauseit is inanimate, the formeris inappropriate becauseit is plural(wherethe anaphoric expression singular). is However, Clancy (I980), who examined referentialforms in discourse,counted all intervening NPs as potentialcompetition,and her resultsshowedthat this was indeeda contributing factor. The only additionI am makingis a distinctionbetweenhuman/ animate vs. inanimate antecedents,claiming the former are preferred(due to our egocentric preference humans,no doubt).Kuno (I987) has madea similarpoint, but for I admitthat this claimneedsto be substantiated empirical by data otherthanthe example above.
36
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
reflexives.We have here seen cases where such contrastivedistributionis unrelatedto long-distance/logophoric uses. In addition,althoughI will not argue it here, I also believe that the Accessibilityaccount is superiorto Levinson'saccountbecause:(a) it does not treatlong-distance anaphorsas a different with a different as phenomenon explanation, Levinsondoes (since distanceis counterbalanced a prominentantecedent), (b) it does not and by assumethat long-distance are reflexives necessarily marked.It remainsto be seen whether all long-distancereflexivesindeed signal a markedpoint of view. It is certainlythe case that many languageswhich have two sets of reflexiveforms use their short, unmarkedones for long distancesand their contextsof bindingwithin a derived,markedforms for the more restricted minimalGoverningCategory(e.g. Dutch and Norwegian,Faltz I977, inter alia). Up until now I have tried to argue that Accessibilitytheory is a better theory than Levinson'sfor both discourseand sententialanaphora,for it betteraccountsfor actualdata, and it does so in a moreunifiedmanner,not relyingon markedness accountfor supposedly to exceptional behaviors. The last advantage of Accessibility theory over the Neo-Gricean pragmatic proposalby Levinson(and recentlyalso by Huang i99i) to be mentionedis actually on the face of it a theoreticalweakness.Note that in Levinson's theory a potentially anaphoric expression in a given sentence is either coreferentor disjoint.This is a clearprediction.Accessibility theory,on the other hand, does not always make such sharp judgments. It merely determines speaker's the assessment the degreeof Accessibility of associated with the entity in the addressee's memory.Hence, within the same context, two relatively similar Accessibility markers (e.g. full versus cliticized pronouns,cliticizedpronounsversusagreement markers) may not alwaysbe in complementary distribution.Although one always aspires to a theory which shows all forms to be in complementary distribution, is not the this casein the use naturallanguagemakesof its referring expressions. therefore I maintain that Accessibility,a graded psychologicalnotion, is indeed the suitable explanation for these linguistic facts (Gundel et al. (I993) also believethat a rangeof referring expressions may be appropriate any given in context).Any elegantaccount,whichforcesan eitheror decisionon the use and interpretation what I term Accessibilitymarkerswill not be able to of account for the rich data found in naturallanguage.30 I will mentionjust one example.Ariel (I985b: 29) quotes the patternof initial referencesto the (very same, continuing)discoursetopic in all the of paragraphs threearticles.Out of 53 relevantparagraphs whichmentioned the discoursetopic in the first sentenceof the new paragraph75.5 percent
[30] But note that when Levinson judges a pair of NPs to be coreferent rather than disjoint, he
himself claims that it is only so 'all things being equal'. Since circumstances are not always unmarked, Levinson too admits (a different type of) noncomplementarity of forms.
37
MIRA ARIEL
low useda relatively Accessibility This tendencyis wellmotivatedby marker. Accessibilitytheory, since a paragraphbreak signals a potentialchange in discourse topic, hence the lowering of the Accessibilityof the previous discoursetopic. However,the 24.5 percentcases, wherethe reference the to topic was madeusing a high Accessibility markerare equallyexplainable by the fact that continuing discourse topics are extremelysalient. In other words, although Accessibility theory can explain why shifts to lower Accessibility markers reference discourse for to within topicsarediscouraged the paragraph, while they are more popularoutside the paragraph scope, I believe it cannot predict each time such cross-paragraph lowering of will markers occurfor discourse Accessibility topics.And this,I claim,is how speakers operate. In other words, there is some free variation among referring expressions, over and above individual, ad-hoc Accessibility which obviouslyplay some role in determining considerations, Accessibility degrees,thoughwe madeno mentionof themhere.Any theorywhichprefers to eliminate this messy fact in order to achieve a more elegant theory the misrepresents use of Accessibilitymarkersin naturaldiscourse. In sum,I believethatAccessibility theoryis the theorycloserto accounting for actual uses and interpretations anaphora.It explainsreal decisions of taken by speakersand addressees,namely, how to appropriately choose a referringexpression(the speaker'stask) and how to identify the intended mental representation to corresponding it (the addressee's task). Levinson, instead,developsa whole apparatuswhichis to decidebetweencoreference and disjoint readingsof potentiallyanaphoricexpressions,a distinctionI have arguedto be a mereepiphenomenon the coding systemof Givenness in expressions.In addition, althoughLevinson'stheory has the advantageof simplicity,sinceit dictatesthat formsbe in complementary distribution, and of generality,since it employs generalpragmaticprocedures,presumably neededin any case, these turn out to be shortcomings after all. First, naturallanguagesdo not distinguishfor each of theirAccessibility markers(= potentiallyanaphoricexpressions) uniquecontext. They only a manifest obvious preferential tendencies,which do not manifest a perfect complementary distributionbetweenforms. These, I have argued,point to the crucialrole that assessments degreeof Accessibility memoryplay in of in the interpretation context-retrieving of expressions.Since it is obvious that speakerscannot accurately assessthe degreeof Accessibility associatedwith each mental representation their addressee's in memory,all they can do is guess it approximately. Hence, some free variationremainsin the use and interpretation Accessibilitymarkers.The difference of betweencoreference and disjointness,on the other hand, is clear-cut(once the antecedentis and established), hence,thereis no place for any greyareausagein a theory that believesthis to be the primaryquestion. Second,the generalprinciples offeredby Levinson(followingGrice I975; Horn 1985) do not alwaysyield the requiredlinguisticconventionused by 38
INTERPRETING
ANAPHORIC
EXPRESSIONS
speakers and addressees in the employment of anaphoric expressions. Although natural languages tend to grammaticalize accordingto extralinguisticforces (be they cognitive or pragmatic),other factors invariably intervene the conventionis not completelytransparent its motivation. and to Thus, relativelyshort (or attenuated)forms do generallycomply with the pragmatic/common-sensical thattheyexpressless semantic principle content and henceare less specificin reference. markers However,Accessibility come in such a greatvarietythat many are equallyinformative/specific, although their distributional patternsdiffer (pronouns,cliticizedpronouns and rich agreement markers), while others are equally long yet their preferred contexts are different(e.g. definite descriptionsand full demonstratives). SinceAccessibility a theoryis specifically linguistictheory,it can moreeasily accommodatead-hoc grammaticalizations. scale in (27) is thus only The partially motivated by the three coding principles proposed above rigidityand attenuation). Gricean-pragmatic A (informativity, theory,on the other hand, leaves all decisionsto the inferencingpower of the addressee, thus assigningno role to use conventionsless than perfectlytransparent to the functional principleslying behind them. Under such a theory, each speaker'suse/addressee'sinterpretation must be directlymotivatedby the generalprinciples,leaving no place for distinctionsone is unable to draw from them (e.g. definitedescriptions versusfull demonstratives). Scale (27), however,is allowedto do just that. It does draw distinctionswhich cannot be directlyderivedfrom the functionalconsiderations behindreference use and interpretation. Last,althoughAccessibility theoryis less generala theory,it is nonetheless much more comprehensive,in that it accounts for both referentialand anaphoricuses, and more crucially,it encompasses muchlargervarietyof a linguisticexpressions(Levinsondiscussesonly zeros, reflexives,pronouns and lexicalNPs, not distinguishing betweenthe many sub-typesthat appear in most world'slanguages see the list in (27), whichis not completeitself). Accessibility theorypurportsto accountfor all Accessibility markers.Thus, accordingto Accessibilitytheory, only purely inferentialprocesseswhich have not been frozen into linguistic use conventions are performedvia pragmatic implicatures. Indeed,all counter-examples Accessibility to theory mustbejustifiedby special,intendedimplicatures generated the addressee by specificallybecause Accessibilityconventions have been violated.3'Ariel
(iggoa: chapter 9) is dedicated to such special uses.
[3i]
However,I believethat no linguistic interpretation, reference anaphora and included,has beencompleted beforeit has beenchecked, disambiguated and/or completed inferences by generated our centralsystempragmatics. by
39
MIRA ARIEL SOURCES Brookner, A. (I983). Providence. London: Thiad.
Walker,A. (I97i). How did I get awaywith killingone of the biggestlawyersin the state?It was easy. In Youcan'tkeepa good woman down.San Diego: HarcourtBraceJovanovich. Walker,A. (I985). The Hebrewtranslation Walker197I. Noga II. 30-31. of REFERENCES Ariel, M. (I985a). How, when and where to refer? Paper deliveredat the International Pragmatics Conference, Viareggio. Ariel,M. (I985b). Givenness PhD dissertation, Tel-AvivUniversity. marking. Ariel, M. (I987). The grammaticalization accessibility. of Ms., Tel-AvivUniversity. much (A abridged versionof it appearsas Part II of Ariel (iggoa).)
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Heim, I. (I982). The semantics of definite and indefinitenoun phrases. Sonder Forschungberech
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Interpreting Anaphoric Expressions A Cognitive Versus A Pragmatic Approach

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Interpreting Anaphoric Expressions A Cognitive Versus A Pragmatic Approach

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Interpreting Anaphoric Expressions: A Cognitive versus a Pragmatic Approach Author(s): Mira Ariel Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Linguistics,

CopyrightC) 1994 Cambridge UniversityPress

Interpreting anaphoric expressions: a cognitive versus a pragmatic approach

(Received6 August 1992; revised I7 March 1994)

b, I99I) and Ariel (i985a & b, I987,

I proposed (Ariel 1985a&b and onwards) that referring

3. I The interpretationof potentially anaphoric expressions

The nature of the antecedent

Maya1kissed Ginatj,and then SHE*i/i went home.

this like-this a-few

aval hem madgishim . .. h + notnim [= hem notnim] kama ...

The distributionof variousname types in context

Pronouns Demonstrative pronouns Definite descriptions

II0 (20.8)a 320

Problems and inconsistencies in Levinson'sprinciples and scales The I-principle

as interpretation (coreferent, well as 'disjoint')insteadof Levinson'scentral pragmaticaccount.20

She will come home.

The Accessibility Marking Scale:

Lies about each other triggered the fight.

MIRA ARIEL SOURCES Brookner, A. (I983). Providence. London: Thiad.

Ariel, M. (to appear). Referring expressions and the + /-coreference distinction. In

Halliday,M. A. K. & Hasan,R. (1976). Cohesion in English. London:Longman.

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