Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword
Like this
1Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
Cable 1008: Paramilitary Demobilization and Drug Trafficking in Colombia

Cable 1008: Paramilitary Demobilization and Drug Trafficking in Colombia

Ratings: (0)|Views: 55|Likes:
Published by Andres
This is a 2007 US embassy report describing the expansion of new drug trafficking networks in the aftermath of the demobilization of right wing paramilitary groups in Colombia.
This is a 2007 US embassy report describing the expansion of new drug trafficking networks in the aftermath of the demobilization of right wing paramilitary groups in Colombia.

More info:

Published by: Andres on Jan 19, 2013
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

01/19/2013

pdf

text

original

 
R 131301Z AUG 07FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8073C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 005882SUBJECT: COLOMBIA'S NEW CRIMINAL GROUPS: THE DRUGTRADE'S NEW GENERATION
REF: A. BOGOTA 1033B. BOGOTA 1925C. BOGOTA 3448D. 06 BOGOTA 6262Classified By: Political Counselor John S. CreamerReasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------Summary-------
¶1. (SBU) New criminal groups active in areas offormer paramilitary influence are largely smalldrug mafias that lack the United Self-DefenseForces' (AUC) political pretensions. Most emergedto exploit the narcotrafficking and criminal vacuumleft by the AUC's demobilization; an estimated 20%of their members are former-paras using their oldnarcotics networks. To combat this threat, the GOCis boosting police presence in rural areas,creating interagency task forces targeting thegroups, and hiking outreach to vulnerable sectors.
 
The profits from illegal drugs will continue tofuel these groups, but the ex-paras' loss ofpolitical and social acceptance--and expanded statepresence--should prevent them from recreating theAUC's former national network. End Summary.
-------------------------------------Incipient, with Paramilitary Vestiges-------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Security forces, think tanks, humanrights groups, and multilateral organizations areconcerned by the rise of about 20 new criminalgroups (ref A), with an estimated 3,000 members.The groups are much smaller than former AUC blocs,and lack a unified structure. They are active inareas where paramilitary blocs demobilized (thenorth coast, Antioquia / Choco, the southwest, andeastern plains). The groups include small numbersof former AUC members who did not demobilize,including key mid-level commanders, and exploitsome former AUC drug processing and distributionnetworks. Police estimate that 20 percent of newgroups' members are demobilized ex-paras. OASobserver mission coordinator Juan Carlos Garzonsays the structures are hard to verify since theykeep low profiles.
------------------------------------------------ Apolitical Drug Mafias ("It's the Coca, Stupid")------------------------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) A May 2007 report by the International
 
Crisis Group (ICG) says, "The AUC had enjoyed aquasi-legitimate status in some parts of thecountry.... The new groups have nothing like thisand are seen as a mafia." Groups' leaders areclandestine, have dropped AUC political andcounterinsurgency rhetoric, and lack the social andpolitical acceptance enjoyed by the AUC in manyregions. OAS/MAPP's Garzon said the groups areincreasingly "less paramilitaries and morenarcotraffickers." In many areas, new groups haveforged coca trading alliances with the FARC andELN, the sworn enemies of the ex-AUC (ref C). Inothers, groups fight with the FARC for control ofcoca cultivation and trafficking corridors.4. (SBU) Security analyst Roman Ortiz(Universidad de los Andes) described directlinkages among three narcotrafficking groupsspanning three decades of Colombia's cocaine trade.First, the Medellin and Cali cartels of the 1980's;second, the late 1990's AUC whose bosses weregroomed in the cartels' protection rackets; andthird, today's new criminal groups, many of whoseleaders learned their trade in the AUC. Each timethe security forces defeat a drug empire, he said,it prompts a scramble among smaller groups to takethe incumbent's place. MAPP/OAS analysts said thecurrent mafia violence reflects the struggle amongnew criminal groups, the FARC, and other criminalgangs to fill the vacuum left by the AUCdemobilization.¶5. (C) An exception to the apolitical nature ofmost new criminal groups is Organizacion NuevaGeneracion (ONG) in the department of Narino . The

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->