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Case study Merowe / Hamdab Dam Project

By Amgad Moussa Falko Bethmann

Seminar The Science and Politics of Large Dam Projects Professors Thomas Bernauer, Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Bernhard Wehrli, Department of Surface Waters - Research and Management, EAWAG Alfred West, Department of Surface Waters - Research and Management, EAWAG Department of Applied Aquatic Ecology, EAWAG
Submitted July 16th, 2007

We need large Dams and we are not going to apologize for it. Those in the developed countries who already have everything put stumbling blocks in our way from the comfort of their electrically lit and air conditioned homes. The third world is not ready to give up the construction of large dams, as much for water supply and flood control as for powerHydropower is the cheapest and cleanest source of energy, but environmentalists do not appreciate that. Certainly large dam projects create local resettlement problems, but this should be a matter of local, not international concern.

Former president Theo van Robbroek of the International Commission on Large Dams ICOLD

To persuade Third World governments to abandon plans to build water development schemes, to which they are often totally committed, is very difficult. Nevertheless, every effort must be made by local environmental groups to do so. If necessary they should resort to non-violent direct actions at the dam site. We in the west can best prevent the construction of further dams by systematically lobbying donor governments, development banks and international agencies, without whose financial help such scheme could not be built. Indeed we call on those organizations herewith to cut off funds from all large-scale water development schemes. Edward Goldsmith and Nicholas Hildyard, editors of The Ecologist.

Source: Dams and development: transnational struggles for water and power. Sanjeev Khagram, 2004, Ithaca, Cornell University Press[2].

Table of contents:
Introducing statements Preface A The project A.1 Introduction to Merowe dam A.2 Merowe Dam- technical details A.3 Geography, Geology and Geophysics A.4 Hydrology A.5 Socioeconomic context A.6 Political context B The challenges B.1 International relations B.2 Resettlement B.3 Environmental impact B.3.1 Ecology B.3.2 Water loss B.3.3 Downstream effects B.3.4 Greenhouse gas emissions B.3.5 Increased salt content and sedimentation B.4 Health B.5 Archaeological heritage C Evaluation of performance C.1 PER analysis C.1.1 Introduction C.1.2 PER scores C.1.2.1 Hydropower production C.1.2.2 International tensions and relations C.1.2.3 Resident people and cultural heritage C.1.2.4 Environmental Consequences C.1.3 Summary of PER analysis C.2 The 1959 agreement as a framework to manage Merowe-dam-related international conflicts. C.3 Assessment of Merowe dam as an electricity production option C.3.1 Weighted score assessment of electricity production alternatives C.3.1.1 Alternatives C.3.1.1.1 Thermal power plant C.3.1.1.2 Distributed photovoltaic panels C.3.1.1.3 Wind farms C.3.1.1.4 Solar-thermal power plant C.3.1.2 Assessment criteria C.3.1.3 Results of Weighed score assessment for the most promising alternatives C.3.2 Economic assessment of the dam C.3.2.1 Cash flow and Net Present Worth (NPW) C.3.2.2 Merowe dam from sustainability perspective C.3.2.2.1 Weak sustainability and external cost D Conclusion E Epilogue References 2 4

5 5 6 6 8 8

10 12 14 15 15 15 16 16 16 17

19 19 19 19 20 21 22 23 24 24 25 26 26 26 27 27 28 28 29 29 30 31 33 35 36

Preface: Construction of large dams raises controversy as to which extent their negative impacts should be accepted compared to their positive outcomes. Moreover, the geopolitics of many river basins is such that international disputes are created and/or exacerbated by the construction of large dams. Evaluation studies therefore are vital in the decision making process if a specific large dam should be built or not and how the various side effects should be handled during construction and operation. Ahead of construction, the economic, social and environmental changes, both positive and negative, must be determined and contrasted. History of dam construction especially in Africa has shown that the performance and net effect of the dam could hardly be described as satisfactory [3]. In some cases societies ended up worse off after the construction of a dam. It is therefore necessary to combine the technical and economic feasibility studies with the environmental and social impact assessments. In addition, the effectiveness of the international river management regimes in resolving conflicts and satisfying the needs of the riparian countries must be assessed. Still the situation can be far from optimal even with river management regimes in place, due to modest cooperation levels of the complying riparian countries [4]. Against this background we conducted an evaluation of the Merowe dam project. We reviewed its positive and negative impacts. We also examined whether the 1959 treaty between Egypt and Sudan was effective in enabling the construction of the dam without causing tension, and to what extent this treaty will be effective in solving probable conflicts in the future due to dam-related changes. The study is organized as follows: the first chapter reviews basic information about the dam. The second chapter will look at problems that might be caused by the dams construction and operation, followed by the discussion of political, social and environmental problems. Evaluation of (future-) performance is presented in chapter three, as well as alternative scenarios that could have been realized instead of the construction of Merowe Dam.

A
A.1

The Project
Introduction to Merowe dam

The 'Merowe Multi-Purpose Hydro Project' or Merowe High Dam is currently under construction near the Nile Rivers 4th cataract close to the small village Hamdab. The Dams main purpose is electricity generation; although it is also designed for irrigation purposes. Its dimensions make it the largest contemporary hydropower project in Africa. The retained lake will submerge the 4th cataract and will inundate irrigated land as well as farmland used for flood recession agriculture [5]. 55.000 to 70.000 people are currently resettled into new areas. Several international contractors are involved in the project. A Chinese engineering consortium is executing the civil works, while Lahmeyer International (Germany) manages the construction of the project. Alstom (France) is supplying hydro turbines. ABB (Switzerland) is building transmission substations. River diversion and work on the concrete dam began on the 8th of December 2003. The idea of constructing a large storage dam at Merowe site already dates back to colonial times [6]. The original purpose of Merowe Dam was to protect Egypt from floods and droughts. After gaining independence, the Egyptian government chose to construct Aswan High Dam (AHD) in Egyptian territory instead, putting a preliminary end to Merowe construction plans. The idea of Merowe Dam was revived in 1979 but the resumption of the civil war as well as insufficient funding and lack of investors interest delayed the project. By a change in political relations by the end of the last century, funding for the project could be secured from China and Arab countries. The dam is planned to be fully operational, by mid-2008. A.2 Merowe Dam technical details

The dam will be in total 9.2 km long, consisting of a 311 m long homogeneous earth dyke and a 4.4 km long major concrete face rock-fill dam on the right bank. A 154 m long spillway and a 370 m long power intake dam will sit in the right river channel and on Marawa Island, followed by an 841 m long major earth core rock-fill dam in the left river channel. On the left bank a 1.4 km concrete face rock fill dam and a 1.7 km long earth dyke are under construction. The power plant will be equipped with ten Francis-turbines totaling in a peak capacity of 1,250 MW. Each turbine has a flow rate of 300 m/s and a head of 43 m. With an estimated efficiency of 50% this totals to a yearly electric power production of 5.5 TWh, almost doubling the Sudanese power production. Further technical details are shown on the data sheet to the right [7]. 5

Major concrete face rockfill dam Maximum height Crest lengths Upstream slope Downstream slope Volume Major earth core rock-fill dam Maximum height Crest lengths Upstream slope Downstream slope Volume

52 m 1,437 m +4,364 m 1 V:1.3 H 1 V:1.6 H 6.1x106 m

67 m 841 m 1 V:2 H 1 V:1.8 H 10x106 m

Spillway capacity 19,900 m/s Penstock diameter 8.5 m Table 1: Merowe Dam technical details

A.3

Geography, Geology & Geophysics

Merowe dam (official name) is located at 18.40 N and 32.03 E. It is situated 350 km northwards the Sudanese capital Khartoum or 800 km downstream along the Nile. The dam is constructed near the Nile Rivers 4th cataract close to the small village Hamdab, the reason why it is also referred to as Hamdab dam. The planned reservoir will be an estimated 170 to 200 km long and will reach up to the island Mograt close to Abu Hamad. The lake will have a surface of 800 km and an average depth of 26m. The resulting impoundment volume is 12.5 km, which equals to 20% of the Niles annual flow [8]. The course of the Nile along the fourth cataract follows a Precambrian basement rock zone, marking-off the south end of the so called Nubian swell, a tectonic uplift zone mainly active during Cenozoic times [9] (Fig.1). SIR-C/X-SAR Imagery Fig. 1: Geological and structural map of the Cataract region of studies have shown that the course of the Nile (after the 1988 Geological Research Authority the Nile has recently (in geologic terms) of the Sudan and Robertson Research) shifted south due to the relative uplift. It is inferred that fracturing has followed after or accompanied the tectonic uplift [10] The embankment dams will mostly be funded on migmatites and granite-gneiss. Parts of the rock-fill dam in the left river channel will be founded on some 30 m deep alluvial deposits. The EIAR of 2002 carried out by Lahmeyer International assumes the Merowe area to be tectonically stable and without significant implications for the project. It states that the faults of the tectonic rift system do not extend to the area of the project. The triggering of earthquakes due to changes of the stress regime by the new mass of the reservoir was observed during the construction of the Aswan dam, however earthquakes going beyond the maximum credible earthquake design of Ml 6 on the Richter scale are assumed to be unlikely. A.4 Hydrology

The Nile River actually consists of two different hydraulic regimes at Merowe site, the White Nile and the Blue Nile/Atabara system. The latter regime corresponds to the wet and dry season in the Ethiopian highlands. During winter, when little rain falls in the highlands, the Atabara and Blue Nile dry up. The peak flow is reached in summer, when the monsoon winds from the Indian Ocean bring torrential rains to the highlands. On the other hand, there is the White Nile regime, which rises from Lake Victoria, flowing through Uganda, Lake Kyoga and Lake Albert. It maintains a constant flow over the year. The flow is buffered due to the storage capacities of the two big lakes and by evaporative losses in the Sudd, the worlds largest freshwater swamp. The steady stream of the White Nile keeps the Nile at Merowe flowing during the winter months, when the blue Nile/Atabara system has dried up. Fig 2 & 3 [11] give a detailed overview, how the Nile flow behaves during the year.

Damming the river at Merowe will eliminate the downstream annual flooding of the 900 km down to Aswan Dam, which flushed and cleaned the river once a year. For the Merowe Reservoir, the EIAR of 2002 predicts an annual inflow of 84 km per year, corresponding to an average flow rate of 2,660 ms-1. These values agree roughly with later studies of Failer 2004 [12] presenting an annual flow of 65km per year and an average value of 2,055 ms-1.

Fig. 3: Seasonal flow patterns of the Nile.

Fig.2: Flow patterns and seasonal contributions to the Nile flow.

Table2: Calculated hydrologic parameters after the EAWAG independent review of Merowe Dam project

Water balance Average annual inflow Average runoff flood(4 months) Average runoff dry season (8 months) Max. runoff flood Max. runoff dry season Average daily release Max. release flow (4 h per day) Min. release flow (20 h per day) Average irrigation Max. irrigation flow (8 months) Min. irrigation flow (4 months) Max. theoretical turbine flow Average evaporation Regime at low flow Average runoff dry season (8 months) Minimum turbinate Reservoir filling rate Max. time to fill reservoir Regime at high flow Average runoff flood (4 months) Peak capacity Reservoir filling rate Min. time to fill reservoir

[ms-1] [ms-1] [ms-1] [ms-1] [ms-1] [ms-1] [ms-1] [ms-1] [ms-1] [ms-1] [ms-1] [ms-1] [mm/d] [ms-1] [ms-1] [ms-1] [d] [ms-1] [ms-1] [ms-1] [d]

[km/yr] 2664 6400 800 7400 900 1000 3000 600 233 300 100 2498 6 800 600 200 480 6400 3000 3400 28 84.0 67.2 16.8 77.8 18.9 31.5 15.8 15.8 7.3 6.3 1.0 31.5 1.75

More hydrological parameters according to the EIAR 2002 are presented in Table 1. Recalculations in the EAWAG independent review conclude that the reservoir can be safely filled within 4 weeks during the wet season and the reservoir can be operated as designed with a discharge of 3000 m3s-1 during peak hours and 600 ms-1 during the rest of the day. Critical issues regarding performance are the frequency of occurrence for dry years in the future and the corresponding probability of the reservoir not procuring the 4hours of peak power. According to Roskar (2000) [13], who analyzed the flow for the past 135 years, future flow will slightly increase by 10% in the year 2125. A.5 Socioeconomic context

Sudan had a population of 40 million people in the year 2005 [14]. The country has been classified as a presidential republic with low human development in many annual UN human development reports. Only in the year 2006 was Sudan considered as a country with medium human development having a human development index rank (HDI) of 141 [15]. The GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) was $1949 in 2004 compared to $4211 in neighboring Egypt and $39,676 in the USA[15]. Around 40% of the population is estimated to be below poverty line. Energy consumption per capita was 4.1 million Btus, almost 1/8 of that in Egypt, 32.3 million Btu, 42 times smaller than that of Germany, 172.7 million Btus, and 63 time smaller than that of Australia, 260.4 million Btus, [14, 16-18]. Electricity consumption was 2.9 billion kWh which, in per capita basis, is 13 times less than that in Egypt and 180 times less than that in Germany. Sudan has an installed electric power generation capacity of 760 MW. For comparison, that is less than half of the capacity of Albania, where the population is less than 1/10 of the population in Sudan [19]. The countrys electricity grid is still plagued with blackouts and reaches a meager fraction of the population. Electrification is vital for any human development since education, sanitation and health services are dependent on electrification levels. To reach some of the development standards of today, Sudan has to undergo major changes in energy production. Main Sudanese exports are cotton, sesame, livestock, groundnuts, Arabic gum, and sugar [20] Expansion in producing these goods is hindered by the lack of modern irrigation systems, agricultural processing and food producing industries. Textiles, edible oils, leather and tanning industry are Sudans main industrial sectors, though they are limited in size. The value of all Sudanese exports was $ 6.989 billion in the year 2005 [20]. The country is believed to have considerable mineral resources but the civil war prevented the assessment of resources and their exploitation. Development of these economic sectors to an extent that enables Sudan to benefit from its advantages and profit from the global trade will require stable and substantial electricity supply. The inadequate electric power generation capacity of Sudan implies that its economic potentials remain untapped, which makes human and economic development almost impossible. A.6 Political context

In this section we give a quick overview of the political climate in Sudan. Though the topics discussed below might seem of little consequences for a dam project involving one country, they are in reality very influential as they shape Sudans relations with 8

the outside world, thus, determine the available technological and economical support to development projects in Sudan. The current Sudanese president, Gen. Omar Al Bashir, seized power after leading a coup d'tat in 1989 to overthrow the democratically elected government of El Sadiq Al-Mahdi. This coup was carried out by Islamists officers from the National Islamic Front, an offshoot from the Muslim Brotherhood. The National Islamic Front and its members in the military strongly opposed the concessions that the civilian government of El Sadiq El Mahdi was going to give to the southern rebels as well as its plans to abolish Sharia. They considered the policies of El Mahdi as intents to weaken the Islamic character of Sudan and secularize the Sudanese state. Al-Bashir ruled as a leader of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, a military junta, till late 1993 when he became president of the Republic of Sudan. During the first decade of his rule, he and Dr Hassan al-Turabi, the founder of the National Islamic Front and an influential ideologue for the Islamist political movements on the global level, were very strong alleys. El Turabi dominated, at least, the steering of Sudanese foreign policy agenda. In 1990-1991 Sudan was among a handful of nations to oppose the USA-led war on Iraq. This stance alienated Sudan within the Arab formal political sphere and damaged its relation with other Arab regimes. El Turabi orchestrated an alliance between all the Islamist opposition movements and invited them for a conference in Sudan in 1993. This move proved costly for Sudan as it was declared a state sponsor of Terror by the USA. In 1995 Hosny Mubarak, president of Egypt for the last quarter of a century, survived an assassination attempt while attending an African Union summit in Addis Abbaba. Islamist armed groups claimed responsibility. Sudan was accused of harboring and supporting these groups, a plausible accusation given el Turabis ideological stances and his major influence on Sudanese politics and decision making. This led to deterioration in the relations between Sudan and Egypt. In 1997, a trade embargo and a total asset freeze were enacted by the U.S. government against Sudan. The deterioration in Sudans foreign relations culminated in August 1998, when USA air forces bombarded Sudanese pharmaceutical installations, allegedly manufacturing chemical weapons. This was a reprisal for the bombing of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salam earlier the same year, two terrorist acts whose perpetrators were allegedly harbored and supported by Sudan, as well. In 1999 a power struggle between El Turabi and El Bashir erupted as El Turabi opposed El Bashirs re-election. It concluded with the house imprisonment of El Turabi in 2001 and his marginalization in the Sudanese politics. El Bashir, after wining the presidential election of 2001, started transition from the revolutionary legality to the constitutional legality. This meant that his policies will be judged by what they achieve to the Sudanese people in terms of security and prosperity and not according to the extent of advancement of an ideological agenda. The boost given to major development projects, e.g., Merowe dam, and achieving the peace agreement can be understood in light of this policy change. Marginalization of el Turabi, moderation of the regimes Islamist rhetoric, the move away from a revolutionary ideologically motivated state toward more pragmatic approaches, peace agreement with the southern rebels, and the finding of considerable oil reserves improved to some extent Sudans situation as aid and credit 9

receiving country. However, the fact that the same president and many of the high ranking officials who were in charge during the turbulent decade of the 90s are still in powerful positions, along with their refusal to allow international intervention to stop the catastrophe in Darfur, hinder cooperation and loans from western states. This has direct implications on the funding and construction of Merowe dam, as for Sudan it was more viable to obtain financial and technical assistance from Arab development funds and the Chinese government (Table 3). An important note is that the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), a joint fund of all the states member of the Arab league, suspended its operations in Sudan from 1988 to 2000. Merowe dam was given the first priority upon resumption of activities in accordance with the Sudanese government request.
Table 3 Funding sources of Merowe dam project [21]

Investor

Fund (in million $US)

1 2 3 4. 5. 6. 7 8.

Government of Sudan Government of China Arab Fund for Economical and Social Development. Saudi Fund for Development Abu Dhabi Fund for Development Kuwaiti Fund for Economical Development Sultanate of Oman State of Qatar Total, including electricity transmission lines

575 520 250 200 150 150 106 15 1966

The composition of the funding sources meant that the guidelines advanced by international NGOs, as well as their leverage on project planning, were of little significance. Moreover, the scantiness of the democratic means and the participatory platforms available to the Sudanese citizens diminishes greatly the ability of grassroot pressure groups to alter the course of the project through peaceful means. Most of the western partners are engineering companies. They focus on the technical aspects of the project as per their contracts, with negligible interference, or interest, in the policies, the planning, or the wide-scale consequences of the project. Operating in relative comfort from pressure and rules advanced by western NGOs does not necessarily mean that the dam project is advancing despite having negative impacts that outweighs its positive outcomes. It only means that the dynamics of decision making are different than that dominating other projects such as the Narmada [2]. Decisions made are mostly in favor of achieving national targets and technical effectiveness rather than preserving local ecological and social fabric. This is exhibited, for example, on the official website of the dam. The section entitled environmental issues discusses wild life, flora, fauna, water quality, and health in 660 words. Affirmation of positive impacts without explaining the mechanisms bringing them about is obvious in statements like Due to the construction work, the breeding places and habitat for insects, particularly mosquitoes (anopheles, simulium, culex) and snails, which are known to be vector of malaria, filariasis, onchocerciasis and bilharzias will be destroyed, while new habitat will most likely not be created or will be unsuitable for establishment of breeding grounds (italics added). On the other hand, the dams body alone is detailed in around 1200 words. The deficiencies in the official environmental impact assessment prepared by Lahmeyer International, are illustrated in the review by EAWAG [5]. Again, such circumstances do not mean that Merowe Dam project will necessarily have negative impacts that outweigh its positive outcome. Assessment of both is presented in the following chapters. 10

B
B.1

Challenges
International relations

Stark contrast exists in the Eastern Nile Basin (Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt) between the share of riparian countries in the runoff and their consumption of the Nile water [22]. Ethiopia uses only 3% of the runoff, while rains falling in its territory contribute 85 % of the Nile water reaching Aswan. Beside this asymmetry, another thorny issue in the interstate relations is that of Egypts historically acquired rights to the Nile water entering Egyptian territory versus Ethiopias right to use the water falling in its sovereign territory. Ethiopias position is that all the treaties agreed upon during colonial times and those that did not include Ethiopia are invalid, a fresh system-wide agreement is needed, and the concept of historically acquired rights must be abandoned. While Egypt insists that its share of 55.5 km3 yr-1 acquired in the 1959 agreement is, as we will detail later, the minimum to accept therefore is not open to negotiations. The essence of this problem can be explained in the following. The inhabited parts in Egypt are basically the shores of the Nile, irrigated land in a vast desert. Population of this land by humans was concomitant to the formation of the Nile in its contemporary form around 10,000 years ago. The Egyptians can assert, without exaggeration that they have been surviving on the Nile waters since Egypt, the Egyptians and the Nile itself came to existence, while the upstream nations survived on the riches of their environments with inconsequential consumption of Nile water. However, this does not change the fact that most this water falls in Ethiopian territory and that the Ethiopians are facing acute food shortage problems due to their dependence on rain for irrigation. Moreover, population growth forces Ethiopia to use all resources at its reach to save Ethiopians form starving to death. Sudan is in the middle between these two countries, therefore, its success in using the Nile water depends on the relation between Egypt and Ethiopia [23] as well as its own relations to both countries. Ethiopian efforts to assert its rights to the Nile runoff and to exploit water resources of the Nile River were unsuccessful, but catalyzed international tension in many occasions. Sudan and Egypt are not sympathetic to these efforts, stating that the rainfall in Ethiopia dwarfs the runoff entering their territories and their national water resources are scarce. Almost the totality of their populations water needs is, and has always been, satisfied by the Nile water. They usually suggest that Ethiopias chronic food security problems should be solved by local water management projects that do not influence the quantity of water flowing into their territories, which is considered to be an acquired right. However, the rigidity of their positions gave way recently to negotiation and cooperation in joint projects such as Baro-Akobo project [22]. This was mainly due to a paradigm shift from single focus to multi-focus interaction. Currently the countries in the basin are involved in discussing overarching management schemes and fundamental concepts, as well as planning and executing individual projects. Egypt and Sudan were under British tutelage during the first half of the 20th century. Between 1882 and 1914 Egypt was under British military occupation. It was declared a British protectorate in 1914. Independence was unilaterally granted in February

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1922 after a period of riots and civil unrest between 1919 and 1921. British troops however did not leave Suez Canal till 1956. The Sudan was ruled by a British-Egyptian condominium from 1899 to 1953. Starting from 1924 Egyptian influence in Sudan was dramatically reduced after Britain forced the Egyptian army out of Sudan. In 1955, the Sudanese Parliament decided Sudan to be a fully independent sovereign state. Consequently British troops and officials, and the little remaining Egyptian troops and officials, left the country by the year 1956. During these years the British high commissioner exercised significant power in the governance of both Egypt and Sudan. Under these circumstances, Britain and Egypt made the 1929 agreement. The agreement was far from being a comprehensive plan to manage Nile water. The idea of the British was to build Jabal Auliya dam in Sudan to store water for irrigation of the Gezira project and to withdraw more water from Sennar dam to irrigate the same project. Egypt was staunchly opposing these projects, fearing that irrigating this project and storing water in the new dam in Sudan will cause droughts in Egypt in the low flood years. Acknowledging Egypts historically acquired right of 48 km3 water per year, an ample amount compared to Egypt needs back then, was in the end sufficient to make the Egyptians agree. Plans to construct a large dam with a huge reservoir that can store the whole annual flow of the Nile was revived and advanced by the new regime in Egypt after 1952. However, construction of this dam required the negotiation of a new agreement between the independent republics of Egypt and Sudan. In 1959 the two countries finally reached an agreement. In this agreement The two Republics agree that the Republic of Sudan shall construct the Rosseires Dam on the Blue Nile and any other work which the Republic of Sudan considers essential for the utilization of its share [24]. Until now Sudan has not been using its full share of 18.5 km3 annually [23], therefore Sudan is entitled to Egypts agreement and cooperation through the Permanent Joint Technical Commission for Nile Waters, created by the 1959 agreement. In summary, Egypt has not objected to Merowe dam project because it is bound to the 1959 agreement. Moreover, Egypt supported the project by backing Sudans effort to secure funding from Arab funds and states. Showing goodwill and strengthening friendship with Sudan are vital to Egypts interests, especially in Nile related issues. Ethiopia also did not object to the project since it has no direct impact on water issues in Ethiopia, while objecting to the project may antagonize Sudan and hinder the development of further projects and water management schemes. B.2 Resettlement

All the resettlement issues such as entitlement to compensation, estimation of compensation, construction of new communities to receive the evacuees, and reaching agreements with the affected people were left to the ministry of irrigation and subsequently to the Dams Implementation Unit (DIU). This unit was formed by a presidential decree and is supervised by a Higher Political Committee headed by the president of the republic himself [25]. These issues were not included in the studies presented to the funding bodies. Financing of these issues is entirely the responsibility of the Sudanese government. The consequences of this arrangement are highlighted in the following paragraphs. Three communities will be affected by the Merowe dam: The Hamdab, by 8%, the Amri by 28%, and the Manasir tribe by 64% of the population. Each of these 12

communities underwent different circumstances in the evacuations, compensation and resettlement process. Therefore, in the following we discuss the experiences of each of these communities separately. The Hamdab people were the first to be evacuated since their villages are located on the island where the dam body is located. The evacuation started on the 15th of June 2003. It was carried out in four stages; the last of them in April 2005. The assessment of compensations and the evacuation went smoothly in general, with insignificant quarrels and very little litigation. The first stage was particularly taken care of. The DIU went to the extent of filling the new homes with enough supplies for weeks and contracting a catering service to provide hot meals free of charge for the evacuees during the first three days in their new homes [26]. The following stages did not receive such warm reception but the new situation was generally accepted. The troubles appeared afterwards. Concerned Sudanese citizens [26-28] and international NGOs [29] report field studies that reveal the problems facing the evacuees in their new homes. Unfortunately, a systematic and comprehensive study of the situation of the evacuees in their new communities was not done, or at least not published, by the Sudanese government. Therefore, we rely on the efforts of concerned individuals who visited the new communities and interviewed the evacuees in the assessment of the resettlement effort. In general, disappointment, dissatisfaction and economic hardship are prevailing among the Hamdab community in their new homes [26-32]. This state of affairs is due to shortcomings of the DIU in many aspects such as: 1- Specification of the homes, especially the reduced area and the compact layout of buildings. 2- Specification of the agriculture land, many of the places are of poor fertility or even barren. No substitute for the areas that were commonly used is provided. 3- Cost of sand removal and land reclamation has to be borne by the farmers. 4- Period of time during which subsidized fertilizers will be made available, this time period is too short compared to the necessary time to reclaim the land due to its low organic content. 5- Cost of energy for irrigation, this represents a new cost item that, among many others, did not exist for the old land. 6- Dependence of the agricultural production of the whole community on a central agency with constant overheads that will be reflected as a cost in the water price. 7- Payment of compensation in installments without taking inflation into consideration. 8- Overlooking the loss of livestock and poultry and the unsuitability of the new places to accommodate them. This loss will deprive the diet from protein sources and marginalize the women from the production process. 9- Excluding the unmarried men from receiving homes even if they had homes in the old villages. 10- Compensation based on residence not on ownership. 11- Incessant efforts to bypass and surmount elected committees, while encouraging some friendly representatives of the affected communities. 12- A psychological trauma when the old villages were razed to ground once the Hamdab people left them, long before the dam completion. The people were denied a readjustment period in which they are still in contact with their old habitat, while adapting and understanding the new one. 13

Amri people, having witnessed the disappointments and the hardship of Hamdab people, opposed staunchly to let the DIU survey their region before agreeing to all the details of entitlement, relocation site and compensation, and having guarantees that the DIU will rigorously fulfill its part of the agreement. Their protests against the census of their properties by the DIU and the attempt of the DIU to proceed with this step aided by the Sudanese police, turned into violent clashes that resulted in the death of three civilians in April 2006 [33]. These serious events called for intervention of the state. Consequently, a committee from the ministry of justice replaced the DIU in carrying out the census and estimating the compensation that the DIU will have to pay [34]. The stance of the DIU was reflected in the comments of Mr. Osama Abdullah, the Minister of State at the Ministry of Irrigation and the Executive Director of DIU, it is not in our interest or in the countrys interest to pay more reparations and compensations since this money comes from the national treasure and not from the funds financing the dam [35]. This stance that views the compensation as an incurred cost that must be minimized using all possible means had very detrimental effects for Hamdab and Amri people. However, the root causes to the problem, in our opinion, are the omission of detailed and consented resettlement planning from the most preliminary plans of the project and the assignment of all resettlement issues to the same body that handles the construction of the dam with the same budget. The proposed new location of the Manasir community is essentially a desert. Consequently, the Manasir had a nonnegotiable request to stay close to the Nile around the new lake and not to be relocated to a barren place. The request was refused categorically by the DIU, which also did not recognize a committee elected by Manasir to represent them. The DIU bypassed this committee and encouraged another one friendly to the DIU. The frustrations of some of Manasir people that their goals cannot be achieved peacefully lead some of them to join armed opposition movements. Alarmed by the incidence involving Amri people the Sudanese president intervened before another violent struggle could erupt. He issued a decree relieving the DIU from the resettlement issues and assigned the competencies to be handled by local government representatives with a special budget. The vital request of Manasir people to stay on the river or the lake banks was consented [36]. However, tension and discord accompanying the resettlement of Manasir people have not yet been dissipated. The resentment of the treatment they received initially has not been reconciled yet. Moreover, the continuation of construction work by the DIU at the rejected site is spreading fear and distrust that eventually they will be forced to move. B.3 Environmental impact

B.3.1 Ecology The construction of Merowe dam will have some impacts on wildlife population. The dam and its lake will not block any migration route. Nile crocodiles, monitor lizards and aquatic birds will loose their nesting grounds, as the reservoir will flood the natural moist river banks and will be surrounded by bare rock in the future. Waders and other birds depending on shallow water for support of food will loose their source for nutrition. Nesting trees were chopped down during the digging process of the reservoir, inhibiting birds from breeding. 14

Severe change will be on the aquatic ecology. It is expected that the alteration of fish population will resemble that observed after the construction of the Aswan High dam. Fishes that can not adapt to the new environment will disappear while easily adaptable species may have a benefit. For migratory fishes it is likely to find new spawning areas further upstream, while fish populations below the dam will be locked. A ladder construction will not be built as it would be too high and too long for migratory fish. Changes in water level will have positive and negative consequences. On the one hand when the water level is high during spawning season, fishes can find more reproduction areas, on the other hand these can be easily destroyed and fishes will be stranded during lower water levels. The Merowe reservoir can be used for commercial fishing a few years after compounding. The composition of fish population is expected to be similar to Lake Nubia or the Aswan reservoir. An increase in population and plankton in the early stages is followed by a stabilization process, when environmental conditions also reach a steady state. A decline of fish will be observed due to an increase in predator fish population. Traditional fishing methods will not be suitable anymore, once the reservoir is filled [5, 37]. The Lahmeyer Report states that the fish resources will not be sensitive to environmental change caused by the reservoir, arguing that there will be only lateral movement, none of the present fish species is in danger, there is no commercial interest in fishing and local population does not eat fish. The fact that the present fish population of Lake Nubia indeed consists of several migratory fish is neglected. B.3.2 Water loss Impounding the river to form the reservoir lake will increase the surface area of the Nile subjected to solar radiation and therefore increasing evaporation losses. The EIAR gives two different values for evaporation, 2.4 km3/yr and later 1.9 km3/yr. Older studies (e.g. Sadek et al. 1997 for Lake Nasser [38]) calculate evaporation rates which are 30% lower. In relation to the annual flow of the Nile of 84 m/yr, the water loss is roughly two percent of the annual river inflow or 8% of the Sudans contingency constituted in the 1959 Nile Water Agreement. According to the official website Merowe dam is basically intended for generating hydropower, however it is also constructed to serve for irrigation purposes. Two irrigation intakes have been incorporated in the dam structure design. According to Yang Zhong, the Deputy Manager of the contractor firm, the reservoir is capable to irrigate 60,000 hectares of farmland, benefiting more than 3 million people [39]. Taking the numbers introduced in the Lahmeyer study, the possible amount of water used for irrigation can sum up to 60% per year of the reservoir volume or 9% of the annual river inflow. B.3.3 Downstream effects Water exiting a turbine contains very little suspended sediment which can lead to scouring of river beds and loss of riverbanks downstream. Erosion rates of the river bed and banks are expected to increase (Table 4). Spawning areas along the river stretch turn into impropriate habitat conditions with consequences on downstream fishery and fishes. The river water levels will fluctuate daily with a magnitude between 2.6 m and 4.9 m downstream of the dam. Fluctuation will occur some 20 km along the river and dampen out further downstream. Sudden changes of water level result in a wall of water and will threaten people working on the river banks or on small boats. 15

Changing water levels will also have a significant impact on small-scale irrigation pumps and ferry landing sites. The construction of a small dam to limit the amplitude of daily level fluctuation was not taken into consideration and therefore was not evaluated in any impact study.
Table 4: predictions for river bed degradation downstream of Merowe dam (Monenco 1993)

Years after completion 2 years 5 years

km 17 0.1 m 0.4m

Distance downstream km 25 km 40 km 56 0.9m 0.1m -0.5m 1.0m 0.2m -0.4m

km 75 -0.2m -0.1m

B.3.4 Greenhouse gas emissions Applying the Aswan High Dam scenario to Merowe Dam the EAWAG study predicts an annually contribution of carbon for greenhouse gasses between 250,000 and 300,000 tons per year. This compares to average greenhouse gas emissions from reservoirs in Canada or Finland (calculated in g CO2/(m2yr)). According to IRN calculations, the Merowe Project will emit roughly the same amount of greenhouse gases as a natural gas project generating the same amount of electricity. The EIAR predicts a carbon amount of only 40,000 t arguing that the reservoir will be cleared of all biomass. B.3.5 Increased salt content and sedimentation Assuming a sediment load entering the Merowe reservoir equal to that of Aswan High Dam, the load of sediments sums up to 143x106 tons per year (1.7 g/l at a flow rate of 84 km3/yr). Continuing with the AHD scenario, this load will be mainly deposited in the upper stretch of the reservoir, forming a delta close to the reservoir inflow. The predicted water velocity in the future reservoir of ~3 km/h leads to a sediment retention of 90% of the suspended load. Using the physical parameters of Shalash (1982) [40] the average sedimentation rate will be 10.5 cm/year, meaning the total volume of the reservoir will be lost in 150 years. The dead storage capacity will be lost in less than 50 years. This is much shorter compared to AHD reservoir, which would loose its dead storage capacity in 360 years - without the Merowe Dam being built. Another issue is the increase of salt content due to evaporation. It is expected that the reservoir water will loose about 15% of its volume (1.7km3/yr) due to evaporation. A 15% increase of salt content in the reservoir is the consequence. When the reservoir is also used for irrigation purposes, a volume of up to 9% of the river inflow (7.4 km3/yr) will be exposed to radiation and will eventually return with a higher salt content back to the reservoir or further downstream. In general the Merowe Dam together with the AHD will allow a higher salt water intrusion from the Mediterranean into the Nile Delta and will accelerate salinization of the fertile farmlands present. B.4 Health

Insufficient medical services, the lack of proper water supply and sanitation characterize the state of health at Merowe. Usually water is stored in large clay pots. Drinking water is often obtained from ponds at the end of irrigation canals. Health education and waste management are undeveloped among local population. 16

Currently 4000 people die every month of Malaria in Sudan. As the Merowe reservoir is filling with sediments, new reproduction areas for hosts of plasmodium causing Malaria will become available. During low water levels, submerged islands will become wetlands or pounds, providing new breeding grounds for insects and mosquitoes. During construction of the dam new breeding possibilities are available in ditches, puddles or excavations, increasing the risk of infections for local workers and population. The history of dam construction also showed, that standing waters favored the increase in population of the vector snail, host of schistomiasis. In case of the Aswan High Dam however the infection rate dropped by 75% since its construction, due to proper sanitation and water supply for the population [41]. William Robin (1999) [42] identified an additional 18 major health impacts related with the construction of Merowe Dam, like increased cases of river blindness and rift valley disease. Two major epidemics of rift valley fever also occurred at Aswan Dam after construction. Research of the Queen Mary University of London [43] on the other hand, sees the construction of Merowe Dam as an ideal opportunity to fight malaria up to extinction in the area by deploying sterile male mosquitoes. According to a health impact analysis by Blue Nile Associates [44] the construction of the dam will reduce Fig.4: collection of insect larva on the shores of the Nile diarrhea and malnutrition B.5 Archaeological heritage

The area upstream the 4th cataract has been densely populated through nearly all periods of (pre)history, but very little archaeological work has ever been conducted in this particular region. Recent surveys have confirmed the richness and diversity of traceable remains, including among others the noted towns and cemeteries from the Pharaonic period and the Napato-Meroitic era, which stretched from 900 B.C. to A.D. 350. At Gebel Barkal, the postMeroitic tumuli, or grave mounds of Zuma and the Christian monastery of Ghazali give an insight on the cultural heritage. No archaeological research project was planned before the Fig.5: Workers excavating an ancient church near the Niles construction. Described as an fourth cataract (taken from Sudan Tribune) important opportunity for final rescue of valuable remains the EIAR commemorates the fact, that now funding from 17

all over the world was made possible for scientific evaluation and public exhibition. In fact it is a race against time. Eight foreign institutions are currently involved in salvage archaeology in the region; however by Feb 27th 2007 representatives of the communities affected by Merowe Dam have requested that archaeologists excavating the reservoir area should leave immediately. Promises for a museum to exhibit their cultural heritage were not kept and the fear of loosing their history to other communities is seen as a dishonor of the commitments that were made with the Manasir community. Archaeological teams from Germany, Czech Republic and Canada have left to return home [45].

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C Evaluation of Performance
C.1 C.1.1 PER analysis Introduction

As a summary to our research work, we will perform an educated attempt to break down the (future-) consequences of the Merowe Dam into beneficial and detrimental consequences of the dam, represented by numeric values (PER scores). The Environmental Assessment Report done by Lahmeyer International as well as the independent review conducted by Eawag aquatic research and the performance of Aswan High Dam, a project of similar size and similar conditions lead to a first performance score analysis. Usually a PER analysis involves three variables: the optimal performance (OP), when everything turns out as planned, the counterfactual performance (CP) for the scenario of the dam not been built and the actual performance (AP). As we stated that the Sudan is in desperate need of electrical power and the dam construction will be presumably finished mid 2008, we tried to evaluate alternatives of electricity production in chapter C4. As the Dam is actually not performing, we chose to split the AP into two future performance (FP) values using the forecasted scenarios of Lahmeyer and Eawag, when possible. We chose four topics for analysis: (sustainable-) hydropower generation, international tensions/relations, displaced/affected people including their cultural heritage and consequences for the environment. These are split into various aspects, for example the topic hydropower generation is split into production, stability and sustainability aspects. Then each aspect is given a number from 0 (worst score) to 10 being the highest. An average over the aspects gives the final value to be used for PER analysis. For each topic the PER score is calculated using the following formula: AP CP FP CP = PER = OP CP OP CP The highest PER score of 1 is achieved when the actual performance is the optimal one. The given objective was fully effective and its targets were fully achieved. A score towards 0 indicates ineffective management or bad planning. A negative score means that the construction of the dam made things worse than before. C1.2 PER Scores

C1.2.1 Hydropower production The dam is constructed to run with a max. power of 1250 MW and an average power production equal to 50 % of capacity (Lahmeyer). The reservoir will reach its dead storage capacity in more than 150 years (Lahmeyer). The Eawag report comes to a much shorter lifespan of only 50 years (see chapter B3.5). Another question is, if electricity can be distributed to the people and industry. Sudan heavily suffered under bad distribution systems and black-outs, crippling businesses which could not afford their own generators and pushing up operational costs for those that could. However 19

the national grid and distribution systems have undergone extensive improvements since 1997, so that load shedding and blackouts have been reduced to a great extent.
Table 5: PER analysis on Hydropower Production

Attribute Production 1) Stability 2) Sustainability 3) Average

CP 1 1 5 2.33

OP 10 10 10 10

FP Lahmeyer 10 10 10 10

FP Eawag 10 10 3.33 7.78

PER

1 / 0.70

1) Both EIA come to the conclusion that Merowe Dam can operate as planned with an installed 1250 MW power at 50% power production. It seems the optimal planed performance can be achieved (FP=10). The Eawag study even gives an indication that efficiency might be higher as the reservoir could store more than 150% of its planned capacity. Not building the dam would leave Sudan in the state of heavy power shortage (CP=1). Alternative power production would only be available in later future. 2) According to Roskar (2000) [13] there is a high probability that the flow of the Nile will not be lower than 80 km3/yr in the future and it might slightly increase to 95 km3/yr around 2125. The Eawag study calculates that the reservoir can operate as designed. Not building the dam would leave Sudan in the state of intermittent power supply (CP=1). 3) Due to different calculation in sedimentation rate Eawag predicts the storage capacity to diminish by 34% in 50 years instead of predicted 17% by Lahmeyer. The retention rate differs by a factor of 3 (90% Eawag, 30% Lahmeyer). On the long term it is likely that other power sources are used for sustainable power production instead of Merowe Dam, therefore a factor of 5 was given for the counterfactual performance.

The PER score from table 4 of 0.7 or even 1 in case of Lahmeyer, indicates that the production and distribution of hydropower will be managed well. Presuming an effective reservoir/sedimentation management and a reliable power distribution, the FP score based on Eawag data is likely to rise. The PER will fall when the addressed issues will not be managed well as indicated in Sudans past. C1.2.2 International tensions and relations As conducted in chapter B1, the construction of Merowe Dam was in conformity with the 1959 agreement. No issues have been raised by Sudans neighboring states relating water quotas. Problems may arise if increased salinization starts to affect Egyptian agriculture. AHD reservoir, however will profit of major sediment intake reduction, 30 to 90% of the sediment load will be deposited in Merowe reservoir.
Table 6: PER analysis on international tensions and relations

Attribute Conformity with treaties 1) International prestige 2) International relations 3) Average

CP 6 2 2 3.33

OP 7 3 5 5

AP 6 1 3 3.33

PER

1) Construction of the dam is in conformity of 1959 agreement. Ethiopia is not included in this water management scheme and is opposing the agreement (-> CP&AP=6). The optimum performance (for Sudan and Egypt) is 7, a treaty handling also salinization and sedimentation, respectively fertilization issues.

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2) Sudans prestige is low, especially in the western world (CP=2). Merowe Dam could have been an object for increased (economic-) reputation (OP=3). The chance was missed, Merowe Dam mainly produces negative news (AP=1). 3) Merowe Dam helped to improve relations between Sudan and the financial backing nations, and especially China - given the chance to demonstrate their construction skills in their largest foreign project at that time. Suppression of local population is counterproductive in lifting the trade embargo by the US (AP=3).

The PER score of 0 is indicating that constructing the dam has in the sum no impact on international relations. However, (economic-) relations to the majority of countries and especially international reputation is already very low. construction of Merowe Dam will have positive effects on relations between China and Sudan and other nations linked to the project. Negative aspects of the construction on prestige and international relations will contribute to continuing bad reputation; however these aspects will be topped in reality by the human crisis in Darfur. C1.2.3 Resident people and cultural heritage All issues regarding resettlement of local tribes and compensation was managed by the Dam implementation unit (DIU) installed by the ministry of irrigation. Until now tensions between the local population and the DIU resulted in the loss of three lives. Furthermore as indicated in detail in chapter B2, many promises were/could not be kept due to insufficient planning. The rescuing of cultural heritage and excavating of archaeological sites looks like a complete flop as well. Among other reasons, promises for a museum were not kept and archaeological teams were forced to leave the reservoir area by the local population. The danger of loosing knowledge about ancient history and cultural heritage is imminent.
Table 7: PER analysis on resident people and cultural heritage

Attribute adjacent industry 1) Housing 2) Farming 3) Health 4) Cultural heritage 5) Quality of life 6) Compensation
7)

CP 8 5 5 3 5 5 0 4.43

OP 9 7 6 8 8 7 7 7.42

AP 4 2 1 3 1 1 1 1.86

PER

Average

-0.86

1) Downstream ferries and agricultural farming is affected by seasonal fluctuations of water level as indicated in chapter B3.3. Local industries have adapted to this scenario fairly well (CP=8). The Dam will reduce seasonal effects and will create daily fluctuations in water level of up to 4.6 m instead. A small dam as proposed in the Eawag study could reduce this effect, leaving enterprises better of (OP=9). Without a regulated daily flood e.g. ferry landing stations and farming pumps will have to adapt to the new scenario (AP=4). 2) We listed 12 reasons why resettlement failed in terms of housing in chapter B2. Intended was a slight upgrade of housing for local population (CP=5 to OP=7), however due to the mentioned shortcomings, it could not be achieved (AP=2) 3) Simple farming (CP=5) was common along the future reservoir. Farmers were granted more land (3:1), however less fertile. With the right techniques and improved knowledge this was

21

considered as a gain for farmers (OP=6), however the soil turned out to be almost infertile and only to be cultivated by high financial efforts by local farmers. (AP=1). 4) The health situation in the region is characterized by insufficient medical services and hygiene (CP=3) (see chapter B3.6). The Lahmeyer report states that Malaria is a common disease, however gives no referral how to address problems of increased mosquito breeding areas. According to studies by Blue Nile Associates and Queen Mary University of London [43, 44] significant improvements in health might be accomplished up to extinction of Malaria in this region (OP=8). None of the proposed measures have been realized, a hospital for workers has been built (AP=3). 5) It is known that the reservoir region was populated back to ancient times and historic ruins exist in the area, however no funds were available for excavation (CP=5). The fear of loosing important parts of Niles former history, made international funding available for rescue work (OP=8). Broken promises caused concern to local people, resulting in a partial stop of excavation work. Currently 3 out of 8 teams left. The future of archaeological work is unclear. (AP=1) 6) People lived a simple life, but were more or less satisfied (CP=5). Higher living standard and an improvement of education was anticipated in the resettlement scheme (OP=7). Partial loss of identity and unhappiness led to civil unrest resulting in three deaths (AP=1). 7) Not building the dam results in no compensation (CP=0). Compensation was higher as proposed by the first 1993s Report delivered by the Canadian Company Monenco Aqra and financed by the World Bank, however compensation was less than the demands of the local population (OP=7). Further reduction of compensation and violation against Sudanese law led to civil unrest. 2/3 of the population will be ineligible of any compensation (AP=1).

The failure of resettlement and archaeological rescue is also represented in a negative PER score, leaving all local people in a worse state than before. The threat of loosing their cultural identity is imminent. The effort to improve the situation by negotiations with representatives of the Manasir and the DIU peaked in the assassination attempt of two Manasir leaders [46]. No significant improvement is expected in the near future. C1.2.4 Environmental consequences The construction of a dam will have positive and negative influences on many environmental aspects. To forecast these effects is a difficult task and depends on many unknowns and estimations. They can only be reduced by permanent observations and ongoing research. The uncertainty is also reflected in the big differences to be found in both EIA reports. Detailed forecasts for environmental changes can be found in chapter B3 ff. In general for wildlife a reservoir is characterized by reduced species diversity but on a higher productivity level. For the local population the higher productivity level of fish will not play an important role in the Merowe case, as their diet contains little fish and export is difficult. Downstream population and local economy like farms and ferry services will have to adapt to - and bear the cost for reduced nutrient content and heavy daily fluctuation levels of the Nile. A small dam in short distance to Merowe Dam to alter the heavy downstream fluctuations in water level as well as a fish ladder for migratory fish was not realized. The dam is also built for irrigation purposes, however will be only used for power generation in the near future. Irrigation will significantly change the environmental impact as indicated in chapter B3.5. After the construction of the dam, the environment will suffer. Some fish species will profit, however in general the environment will be worse off. The negative PER score represents this. The fact that little biodiversity exists and the reservoir will be placed in a desert area, lead to insufficient evaluation by the Lahmeyer report. The Eawag review lists many shortcomings and gives recommendations for future operation. A statement on the Eawag review was refused by Lahmeyer. 22

Table 8: PER analysis for environmental consequences

Attribute Aquatic ecology 1) Terrestrial ecology 2) Sedimentation, soil Erosion 3) Water loss, quality & salt content 4) Greenhouse gas emission
5)

CP 7 3 6 7

OP 9 4 8 8

FP Lahmeyer 9 1 5 8

FP Eawag 7 1 2 8

PER

Average

6.2

7.2

-1.2/-3.2

1) Before the dam was built almost no impact on aquatic biodiversity existed. The local populations diet contains no or little fish (CP=7). The optimum case would be to preserve this diversity and increase populations (OP=9). Preservation measures were or could not be taken. In the future diversity will decrease, the fish population will increase (FP=7). The Lahmeyer study states that fish resources are not sensitive to environmental change caused by a new reservoir (FP=9). More details to be found in chapter B.3.1 2) The project area consists mainly of desert with emergent vegetation after rainfall. The cultivated areas and river banks leave some refuge for birds and minor animals (CP=3). In the optimal case wildlife will find a new habitat on the reservoir shore and will be less disturbed by humans (OP=4). Nesting grounds will disappear a long time before the reservoir will be filled, as the reservoir will be cleared out of vegetation. The shore will mainly consist of bare rock. Most wildlife population will be lost as indicated in chapter B.3.1(FP=1). 3) Annual flooding of the Nile left sediments rich in nutrients for vegetation (CP=6). Special sluices have been constructed to avoid sedimentation in the lake, the dam is stopping the danger of uncontrolled flooding (OP=8). Erosion will increase downstream, due to daily fluctuations in water level. Eawag states that the flushing of the reservoir sediment will not work as the special sluices are far away from where the sedimentation occurs. Sediments will be deposited at the entrance of the reservoir 3 times faster than assumed by Lahmeyer (FP=2&5). 4) Water loss and salt content will remain unchanged without dam (CP=7). The reservoir is an area subjected to evaporation. Losses of water and therefore an increase in salt content will increase if the dam is used for irrigation. Various numbers are given in both reports, mentioned also in chapter B3.2. Water quality will not degrade (OP=8). As uncertainty is large and is dependant on the purpose of the dam, FP will be also assumed 8, but can change significantly with time. 5) A flowing river is barely emitting greenhouse gas (CP=8). The reservoir is cleared of (desert-) vegetation, almost no emission is expected (OP=9). Eawag review predicts a magnitude higher emission than Lahmeyer as expressed in detail in chapter B.3.4 (FP=2&7).

C.1.3

Summary of PER Analysis

It is hard to evaluate a project that is still under construction. Some of the positive or negative effects will manifest years after the Dam has been built and electric power is generated. First indications towards success or failure in terms of economic profit, environmental impact and future performance have been given in previous chapters. However they will be of limited significance, as new facts are created every day. A worst case scenario not mentioned yet, is a complete destruction of the dam by an earthquake or terrorist attack. The threat of terrorism is given, as Sudan is suffering of civil unrest e.g. in the region of Darfur. Earthquakes triggered by the reservoir may be unlikely, however the fact that the reservoir is placed in an area that has or still is 23

undergoing tectonic uplift, might be an underestimated threat to the project. Seismologic-, GPS- or INSAR- surveys, to insure tectonic stability were not conducted. Both issues are not or briefly discussed in previous reports and cannot be estimated with current knowledge. The PER scores represent common features of dam construction. Industrial targets are promising to be met, while the price will usually be paid by the environment and by local population. Merowe is no exception to that. The lack of proper planning and the neglect of human rights issues already lead to uprisings and human casualties. All lessons learnt from previous dam constructions in Africa seem to be forgotten. C.2 The 1959 agreement as a framework to manage Merowe-dam-related international conflicts.

The preamble of this agreement starts with the phrase As the River Nile needs projects . This start sums up the purpose of the whole agreement, which is to provide a foundation for consensus and cooperation in the development, execution and administration of Nile management projects. The absence of interstate conflicts during and after the construction of Aswan High Dam, Rosseires dam, and many other water management projects indicates that the 1959 agreement fulfilled its purpose within the prevailing circumstances. In this agreement Sudan was allocated 18.5 km3/yr and the consent of Egypt was given to any projects to use this quota. Article two item two of this agreement states In order to enable the Sudan to utilize its share of the water, the two Republics agree that the Republic of Sudan shall construct the Rosseires Dam on the Blue Nile and any other works which the Republic of the Sudan considers essential for the utilization of its share Until now Sudan consumes around 14 km3/yr [23], leaving enough water to account for the evaporation losses of Merowe Dam, estimated to be 1.75 km3/yr [5]. Therefore, 1959 agreement can still provide a framework to construct Merowe Dam. A shortcoming of this agreement is the absence of any provision for water quality. This shortcoming may become a flash point if the salinity of the river water increases significantly due to evaporation losses or riparian urban development. The increase in salinity will then be felt downstream in the Nile delta. If salt content increases in the delta waters, farmers there will tend to plant more rice as it can mitigate and endure salinity increase. Rice plantations however will exacerbate the problem of water quantity. Currently, the ministry of irrigation tries to limit the areas planted with rice each year to save water. Such increasing salinity, besides increasing water consumption by favoring rice plantation, will hinder projects to reuse drainage water. It will also reduce the amount of fertilizers that can be added to compensate for the absence of the fertilizing silt. However, industrial and urban pollution of the Nile River in Egypt could be reduced significantly. The resulting increase in water quality could then account for the increase in salinity due to Merowe Dam. Detailed studies on this issue do not yet exist. The shortcoming of the 1959 agreement in terms of water quality may lead to future discrepancies between Egypt and Sudan. C.3 Assessment of Merowe Dam as an electricity production option

In this section we discuss some alternatives for electricity production and compare the two most feasible alternatives to the adopted option of hydropower using the weighted score methodology. In these discussion and comparison we examine how efficient would each of the technologies be in providing 1250 MW of power, the 24

nominal generation capacity of Merowe dam. Subsequently, we study in details the economic performance of Merowe dam project using cash flow analysis and discuss how the dam can be viewed from sustainability perspective C.3.1 Weighted score assessment of electricity production alternatives The weighed score methodology consists of the following steps: 1- Generate set of alternatives In this set the probable alternatives are listed and discussed, and then the feasible ones are selected for further considerations. For the problem in hand, the do-nothing alternative was discarded from the outset since the need for electricity generation in Sudan is so acute and can not be disregarded. The use of nuclear energy was not considered due to obvious reasons (embargo, etc.). The alternatives are: distributed photovoltaic cells, solar (thermal) power plants, wind farms and thermal power plants. Scale considerations, as we explain below, narrowed these alternatives to the last 3 options. 2- Determine the set of important attributes This set should include characteristics of the project, e.g., execution time, capital cost, operating and maintenance cost, availability of funds and technical assistance, the ease of application and reliability. It also includes the changes the project is expected to induce in the environment and society, e.g., creation of jobs, and impact on air, water and soil quality. 3- Weigh each of the attributes versus all the others. In this step a quantity of 10 points is divided between each pair of attributes. The importance of an attribute relative to another is reflected in the fraction of the 10 points assigned to it, with the other attribute assigned the remainder. In each pair, the attribute considered to be more important from the decision makers point of view, takes the largest fraction. An attribute weight will be the sum of all its points in all pairs. This assignation of importance and thus assessment of weights of each attribute depends on the peculiarities of each project. 4- Determine the relative score of each option in each of the attributes This determination of scores can be done based on quantitative data in most of the attributes. For example, the option with the lowest capital investment would receive a score of 10. Any other option will receive a smaller score inversely proportional to quotients of its cost divided by that of the cheapest alternative. Another example is the execution time; the dam will have the shortest execution time since all necessary studies are more or less carried out and the technology is mature. Therefore it will get a score of 10. The thermal power plant will require slightly more time for construction, as most of the components have to be imported. It will get a score of 9. The time required to build the solar-thermal and wind farm will be at least twice as long as the time required by the dam due to the need for detailed studies. 5- Multiply the weight of the attribute with the score of each option in this attribute, to get a weighted score. 6- Calculate the sum of weighted score for each option.

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7- Rank the options based on this sum. C.3.1.1 Alternatives C.3.1.1.1 Thermal power plant The highest estimate of greenhouse gas emission from dam reservoir suggests that it will be close to CO2 emissions from a natural gas fed power plant with the same electricity generation capacity [5]. However, Sudan does not have noteworthy natural gas reserves and therefore would most probably use fuel oil for electricity generation. In this case CO2 emission will be many times as much [3]. Sudans share in global greenhouse gas production is small compared to that of any OECD country. For example energy-related greenhouse gas production in Sudan was 0.3 tons per capita in 2003 [14] compared to, for example, 10.5 tons in Germany [16] and 19.1 tons in Australia [18]. The disparities are even higher in transportation-related greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore such a factor plays a modest role in decision making. However, other local environmental impacts of thermal power plants must in all cases be taken into account. Fuel-oil is the most probable fuel if a thermal power plant is constructed in Sudan. Natural gas is scarce and lighter oil fractions can fetch high market prices. Fuel oil can cause health and environmental problems because of SOx, NOx, and particulate matter emission. Heavy metal contamination of soil and water is imminent without filters. Estimations of external cost, i.e., quantification of the environmental impact, give an external cost an order of magnitude higher than that estimated for hydropower (illustrated in Figure 6). This figure shows also the external costs of the various electricity production technologies. The levelised cost of electricity produced in heavy fuel oil steam turbine power plants can be as low as 1.5/ kWh. The overnight cost and the power generation capacity of a thermal power plant are comparable to those of the dam. It is also a reliable well established technology.
Figure 6 External costs of various electricity generation technologies[1]. Note the logarithmic scale
10000 Estimate of external cost in year 1995 /kWh 1000 100 10 1 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 Technology Wind PV Biomass Hydro Nuclear fission Gas Oil Coal

C.3.1.1.2 Distributed photovoltaic panels Herman Scheer [47] makes a compelling argument that distributed solar power systems are the most plausible road toward a strongly sustainable economy. However this alternative faces three main obstacles to becoming the main electricity production technology in Sudan. It is very expensive in comparison to any other 26

option, levelised cost is around 50 /kWh. At this price, power must be heavily subsidized to enable people with modest income to access electricity. Moreover, it can not boost economic activities that depend on economy of scale. There is also no local industry capable of producing advanced photovoltaic panels and no change is expected in the near future. Thus the country will be dependent on foreign assistance. Another issue is the availability of silicon, the principle component in the solar panels. It is also used in electronic devices, which are at very high demand right now. Therefore, the world market and production capacity of the silicon are currently unable to satisfy a huge surge in demand, if a country with the size and acute electricity shortage like Sudan decides to adopt photovoltaic panels for electricity generation. Two other drawbacks of lesser severity are the significant energy and chemicals consumption involved in the manufacturing of solar panels and the need for regular maintenance and dust removal. C.3.1.1.3 Wind farms Wind power is the most economically promising clean and renewable electricity production technology, with a levelised cost of 4-8 / kWh [48]. In Egypt this cost is 2.5/kWh [49]. Based on levelised cost alone wind farms can compete with gas, coal and nuclear electricity production technologies, whose levelised cost is in the range of 2.5-6/kWh [50], but not with a heavy oil thermal power plant. A downside of wind energy is the considerably long planning time and capital to collect the necessary data. It took Egypt 8 years to prepare a wind map with Danish financial and technical assistance [51]. Moreover, optimization of layout, which requires a certain level of experience, is crucial to get satisfactory performance. Wind farms might disrupt birds migratory routes, however, the effects of wind farms on birds is comparable to those of other manmade structures with similar sizes [52]. The main environmental concerns of wind power are visual changes in the landscape, noise, and light reflection from the blades. Such effects have minimal impact on humans if the wind farms are constructed in uninhabited places, as they usually are. What constitutes a serious obstacle to adopting this alternative is that the required electricity generation capacity is enormous compared to the current levels of application of wind power. The generation capacity of the dam is equivalent to all the wind power installed capacity in the UK and the Netherlands combined [53]. A wind farm with the same production capacity would have 2000 600 kW turbines, typically with a blade diameter of 35 meters mounted on a 50 meter concrete or steel tower [48]. Intermittency of power generation is another drawback. C.3.1.1.4 Solar-thermal power plant This technology to harness solar energy is gaining ground in the renewable energy market, with countries like Spain and Germany leading the way. Currently, solar thermal projects are underway in Morocco, Algeria and Egypt, usually combined with gas-fired thermal power generation in hybrid designs to compensate for the intermittency of sunshine. The levelised cost of this option ranges between 815/kWh [54], which is higher than that of other conventional technologies and wind energy. However, the speed of research and development in this field and the increased interest by many countries in this technology makes it a promising option. The power generation capacity of a typical solar thermal power generation plant is less than 1/6 of the installed power generation capacity of Merowe dam.

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From the above we formulated the alternative to the dam as 1- A combination of a wind farm and a solar thermal power plant, 2- A fuel-oil based thermal power plant. C.3.1.2 Assessment criteria Our comparison of the 3 alternatives is based on 10 attributes. The relative weights of the attributes are given in table 9. Of these 10 attributes, 4 are related to environmental and social aspects (air quality, water quality, soil quality and creation of jobs), with a total weight of 3.4. 3 attributes focus on economic and financial aspects (capital cost, operating and maintenance cost, and availability of external funds) with a total weight of 3.6. 3 attributes express technical performance (reliability, ease of application and execution time) with a total weight of 3. The relative weights are given in Table 9. The only attribute where we think that substantial weight must be assigned is the availability of external funds and technical support since Sudan, after decades of civil war and economic embargo, can not finance and execute such a large increase in its electricity generation capacity only with its own resources.
Table 9 Assignation of relative importance and assessment of attribute weights

attributes Capital cost OM cost Creation of jobs Ease of application Reliability Air quality Water quality Time External funding Soil quality

Capital OM Creation cost cost of jobs 5 5 5 5 7 5 4 5 10 4 5 5 5 8 5 5 5 5 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 10 5

Ease Air Water External Soil Reliability Time weight of quality quality funding quality app. 5 2 5 5 5 4 4 5 10 3 3 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 10 5 5 5 6 6 7 5 5 5 10 5 6 5 6 6 7 5 5 5 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 6 5 5 7 5 5 5 5 10 5 0.9 0.84 0.94 1.04 1.02 0.82 0.8 0.9 1.9 0.84

C 3.1.3 Results of weighted score assessment for most promising alternatives Some of the scores are based on quantitative data, while others are based on informed presumptions. For instance the solar-wind option was rated low in reliability because power is produced with variability that is hard, or impossible, to control and the ability of this option to respond to peak or sudden surge in demand is very limited. On the other hand, the thermal option was rated very low in air quality because of the fuel used which would most probably be heavy fuel oil. The weights and the scores and the final result of the weight score assessment are given in Table 10.

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Table 10, results of weighed score assessment of the three selected options

attributes

relative score of options dam solar-wind thermal options weights 0.82 0.88 0.94 1.08 1.02 0.82 0.8 0.9 1.9 0.84 10 10 7 10 7.5 5 5 10 10 5 82.33 5 3 10 5 2.5 10 10 5 5 10 62.69 5 3 7 7 10 1 7 9 7 7 64.78

Capital cost Operation and maintenance cost Creation of jobs Ease of application Reliability Air quality Water quality Time Availability of external funding Soil quality Weighted sum

C.3.2 Economic assessment of the dam C.3.2.1 Cash flow analysis and Net Present Worth (NPW) To assess the profitability of any project one must analyze its cash flows over a certain time span to obtain some measures of profitability like payback time, internal rate of return and net present worth. Of these measures the Net Present Worth (NPW) is the most informative and commonly used project evaluation criterion [55]. The time span is usually taken to be the life time of the project. To carry out cash flow analysis for Merowe dam project we needed to gather some data and make some assumptions. The data and assumptions are given in Table 11. Some of the assumptions are based on data from other sources. For example the operating and maintenance costs are the average operation and maintenance costs of all hydropower projects in the United States [56]. The sales price is taken to 0.9 the price of electricity in Egypt. There are two points of view for selecting the discount rate: 1- the minimum acceptable rate of return on investment and 2- the rate of returns on the second most attractive alternative for investment. In deciding the discount rate we followed the second perspective and used the interest rate on US treasury bonds, that is approximately 5%. We also assumed an availability ratio, which is the percentage of the power produced to the installed capacity, of 60%, taking into account the learning curve and the need for overhauls. We also assumed that the availability ratio will increase by a fixed 2%, as in the case of AHD, until full capacity is reached. This will happen long before silt starts to influence hydropower production. According to the estimates of EAWAG, dam operation will not be influenced by silt during the first 50 years, which is the time horizon of our cash flow analysis. We used a moderate inflation rate in operation and maintenance cost since all quantities are calculated in US dollars. The assumed inflation rate in energy price is also moderate taking the projected huge increase in global and local energy demand into account. For the interest rate, the grace period and the maturity period we used those of the loan offered by the Arab Development Fund[57], we assumed that the other funding sources will offer the same conditions. Finally the life time 29

assumed is much shorter than the estimated life time of the dam, taking silting into account. Results of the cash flow analysis are given in table 12.
Table 11, Data and assumptions of Cash flow analysis

Data funding by the Sudanese government external funding production capacity Assumptions operating and maintenance cost sales price availability ratio rate of increase in production discount rate inflation in O&M costs inflation in sales price loan interest rate method of payment grace period maturity period project life time

$575,000,000 $1,391,000,000 1.25 GW 0.71 /kWh 4.0 /kWh 60% 2% yearly untill full capacity is reached 5% 5% 8% 3% equal installments 7 years 25 years 50 years

Cash flow analysis predicts more than satisfactory performance. The predicted internal rate of return (IRR) is high enough for most economic enterprises. The net present worth (NPW) reflects the impressive gains from the project around $57 billion. Beside these two figures we made a sensitivity analysis in order to find: 1- The increase in operating cost which would be enough to reduce the IRR of the project to the discount rate, or respectively the operating cost at which the NPW is zero. The use of this number in decision making is discussed in the next section. Note that it is higher than the sales price because of the difference in the inflation rates 2- The sales price at which the IRR equals the discount rate. This price indicates the total cost of the project, both capital and operating. It can be viewed as the minimum sales price and might be used in pricing electricity for the local market.
Table 12, Results of cash flow analysis

Internal Rate of Return IRR Net Present Worth NPW(2007) Maximum O&M costs (2007) Minimum sales price (2007)

30.9% $27,171,611,004 5.4 /kWh 0.64 /kWh

C.3.2.2 Merowe dam from a sustainability perspective C.3.2.2.1 Weak sustainability, incorporation of externalities The main concept behind weak sustainability is that natural capital and man-made capital are exchangeable. This concept is precursory to the concept of external cost, where the environmental goods and services used, or destroyed, in an economic activity are priced. The consequent concept is that sustainability can be achieved if the proper prices are attached to external environmental costs and the economic 30

activities are charged these prices in the form of taxes, thus correcting the market failure of disregarding the environmental costs of the economic activity. A complementary concept to interchangeability is the preservation of critical environmental capital, in other words the components and characteristics of the ecosystem whose proper price is deemed infinitely large [58]. Without fixing a minimum critical environmental capital, development is very weakly sustainable [58]. This type of development is precarious and can lead to real social and environmental disasters as in the case of the Pacific Island Nation of Nauru. In this case the islanders traded the ecological system of their island for revenues from phosphate mining. Unfortunately the financial turmoil of the Asian-Pacific market during the late 90th eroded most of their money and thus they are now left with little means for subsistence [59]. Various studies have been carried out to estimates of external costs for hydropower production, adopting different methodologies [60]. The different estimates are presented in figure 7. The reason for the disparities in theses estimates are explained by Sundqvist [60] and are not the scope of this report. Interestingly, the two countries, where the largest estimates of external costs were obtained are major hydropower producers. In Sweden, hydro power supplies are around 60 TWh, approximately 45% of the total electricity production. Installed hydropower capacity is 16,400 MW [61]. Norway is completely dependent on hydropower. 99.4 % of the total annual electricity production is obtained from hydropower plants. A trading scheme with other Nordic countries, mainly producing nuclear energy, serves to even the variations in supply and demand over the year [62]. From a weak sustainability perspective, Merowe dam should be given the go ahead if it can pay for its external costs. The maximum operating cost beyond which the IRR becomes equal to the discount can serve as a guide to the maximum external cost Merowe Dam is able to compensate, while still being profitable in economic terms. From the cash flow analysis we found this value to be 5.4/kWh. This value, as we can see in figure 7, is much larger than almost all the estimates for the external cost of hydropower production in several countries. This could lead to the conclusion that the economic earnings of the dam are enough to compensate for external environmental damage up to 5.4/kWh. Such a value is improbable if the dam is constructed similar to many other dams, where the external cost estimates predict a much smaller value. However, there are two flaws in this argument. First, the critical natural capital must be defined in terms of minimum health standards of the environment. Second, even if the natural capital is assumed to be exchangeable with man-made capital, the human suffering and demise of the individuals in the affected communities certainly are not, at least for them. Externalities, i.e., side effects of an economic activity that affect somebody other than the people engaged in the economic activity and are not reflected fully in the price, are not always negative. In some case the externalities of an economic activity are deemed positive and thus this economic activity can become worthy of subsidies [10]. However, this is rarely the case with environmental externalities. The conclusion of this section is that economic benefits of Merowe Dam will be higher than its external cost. Environmental- and social impacts should not be disregarded or neglected. The NPW of the dam is high enough to make mitigation measures affordable; however the Sudanese government may be short of capital to 31

invest in mitigation measures before the dam starts to generate revenue. A smart impact study to be presented to the funding bodies, would have recommended the incorporation of consensual social and environmental mitigation measures.
Figure 7, the threshold external cost of Merowe dam (the red horizontal line) versus the external cost of hydroelectricity generation in various countries (shaded columns where a range is given and a dash when only a single value is given). Data from studies reviewed by Sundqvist [60], Note the logarithmic scale.

100 External cost /kWh

26.26

18.53 7.83

10 1.62 1 2.68 1.43 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.32 0.25 0.02 0.03
US UK No US No Ch, At, Gr, It, 1 No Pt, Se, Ch, ,19 , 19 , 19 , 19 , 19 19 19 19 99 , 19 199 19 99 1999 91 99 9 92 93 94-1 95 97 99 99 9 998

1.5 0.71 0.47 0.32 0.07

1.76

0.1

32

Conclusions

Merowe dam will be a profitable project. Its profit will probably compensate for negative external costs, if these costs are within the range found in other hydropower projects. However, resettlements issues are poorly managed, resulting in undue suffering of the affected communities. A possibility for international tension to arise between Egypt and Sudan exist, however, no provisions are made to avoid it from either states. Many environmental issues are overlooked; however devastating environmental impacts are not expected. The following is a summary of what we learned and what we found in this study: Resettlement projects must be considered as an integral, inseparable part of the dam planning and funding. No funding body should contemplate participating in a dam project without clear, well reasoned resettlement plans presented hand in hand with technical issues. However, managing the resettlement issues should be delegated to a separate body independent of the dam administration. These resettlement and compensation plans must be agreed upon with the affected communities and people prior to dam construction or granting of its funds. However, the mandate given to the government to manage the state natural resources should be taken into account and respected. Integration of resettlement plans with dam design and planning should help optimizing the whole project. In other words, dam design and operation plans should aim to minimize the financial and human cost of resettlement while observing two sets of constraints: hard constraints with respect to keeping the quality of life of the affected communities intact or improved, soft constraints with respect to the dam specification controlling its economic performance (electricity generation capacity, flexibility to satisfy peak, and year-round, demand in electricity, etc.). However, soft here does not mean that this set of constraints is of a secondary importance, it solely indicates that they probably have a wider range of acceptable values. Merowe Dam can be a very successful economic enterprise. It will supply electricity at less than half of the levelised cost of the cheapest conventional technology (fuel-oil thermal power plant), or at of the levelised cost of the cheapest renewable technology (wind), and still be profitable. The debate between dam opponents and dam proponents should be divided into two parts: the dam as a structure and the dam as a policy. Confounding these two aspects hinders problem solving and conflict resolution in the cases where problems are mainly caused by policy faults while the dam performance is satisfactory. Dam opponents can conclude that the dam as a structure should not exist because of problems caused by deficient policies, while dam proponents stick to emphasizing its positive outcomes as a structure, paying little attention to the crises created by poor planning and policy faults. The epilogue is dedicated to developing this point. Evaluation of the dam should be carried out on three levels: the river basin, the state constructing the dam, and the communities in the proximity of the dam. Construction of the dam can have overall positive effects on the state constructing it while causing dire impacts, both as a policy and as a structure, on the local level or on the basin level. International treaties must contain provisions for water quality. The expected increase in salinity of the Nile might force Egyptian farmers to plant certain crops that will increase water demand. 33

Friendship, engagement and cooperation can be more effective in influencing policies than boycotts, threats and continuous criticism. The absence of mutual relations limits, or even eliminates, the leverage of a party to change the other parties policies. As we have seen the absence of working relations between the West and Sudan rendered the standards advocated by NGOs and Western funding bodies inconsequential. Governments and trans-national corporations, that do not share the same view, can usually provide enough capital and technical assistance to controversial development projects. The concepts of weak sustainability and external costs must be used with caution. The critical components and the critical characteristics of the ecosystem must be decided prior to any pricing of the environmental goods and services exploited, or damaged.

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E Epilogue Large dams are intended to boost human welfare by controlling floods, generating electricity and providing water for irrigation. However, in several cases supposed improvements in human welfare after construction of the dam are dubious[3]. This undesirable situation is due to policy failures in some cases while in others the dam structure itself is to blame. Examples for situations when the dam as a structure is the cause of failure are illustrated in the following questions: 1. Is the sedimentation rate so high such that the service life is too short for the dam to be profitable? 2. Does the reservoir weight induce substantial earthquake threats such that an event leading to the failure of the dam, and consequent destructive floods, becomes probable in its service life? 3. Does the decrease in food production caused by soil erosion, submergence of reservoir land, loss in fishery and loss of land fertility outweigh the increase in food production due to stable irrigation, water saving measures, alleviation of droughts and fish farming? 4. Is the cost of reinforcing river banks, the river mouth and its coastline against erosion as well as compensation for lost homes and property higher than the revenues from electricity sales and increase in crop production? 5. Is the environmental damage too high? When the answer to any of these questions is yes, then it is unlikely that the construction of a dam can generate a positive overall outcome. In other cases, the dam as structure does satisfactorily fulfill its part in the generation of electricity and revenue, protection against floods, and securing water supply for perennial irrigation, however human welfare is not boosted and the environmental degradation advances. Examples for situations where the wrong policies are the cause of failure are illustrated in the following questions when the answer is No: 1. Does the produced electricity reach the people who paid for the dam construction and those who suffered of resettlement? 2. Are revenues from electricity sales used in sustainable and comprehensive development schemes? 3. Are the resettlement schemes and compensations ready to be delivered to the displaced people without agonizing delays and litigation? 4. Is the infrastructure, like irrigation and drainage canals necessary to use the water newly made available for irrigation, in place and functioning? 5. Do the resettled farmers have an overall benefit from the new infrastructure? 6. Does the government engage in the debate about development policies, objectives? Are the government actions transparent and provide enough information for a fair debate about critical issues? Are different opinions acknowledged and is opposition integrated in dialogue instead of violent oppression? Even the most successful dam comes with a price. The people, who will build the dam, must know this price and why it is that much. It is up to them to decide whether they can, or should, pay for it.

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