Strict Fregean Free Logic Author(s): Scott Lehmann Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol.

23, No. 3 (Jun., 1994), pp. 307-336 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227077 . Accessed: 25/05/2012 07:52
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SCOTT LEHMANN

STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC

term. , singular non-designating

even 'pV p' shouldlack a truthvalueif 'p' containsa ... for a strictFregean,

Brian ([15] Skyrms at479)

1. INTRODUCTION

In thecourse arguing thereferent a sentence its truthof that of is tookthesentence that who value,Fregeremarks "anyone seriously was to at whilesoundasleep'] be trueor ['Odysseus setashore Ithaca falsewould ascribe thename'Odysseus' reference...; it is of the to a for of reference thename thepredicate affirmed denied" at 62). that is or ([7] if onebelieves 'Odysseus' not refer,oneshould that does Accordingly, alsotakethesentence be neither norfalse.Thisposition be to true may rationalized twoFregean of is by principles: thetruth-value a sentence (i) a function (i.e.,is thevalueof a function the referents its of of at) constituent and are and there names, (ii)functions operations, where is no inputto an operation, there be no output can either. terms of non-referring as an "imperfection" natural Fregeregards A he "should the languages. "logically perfect" language, writes, satisfy thatevery wellconstructed a as conditions, expression grammatically nameout of signsalready introduced in factdesignate shall an proper as name object,andthatno newsignshallbe introduced a proper without a that beingsecured reference" at 70).He suggests failure ([7] to keepsuchconditions mindcanleadus intoerror, it is in and indeed casesin whichreasoning accord in with easyto construct terms accepted logicallawsgoesawrybecause maynot refer (e.g., that mustbetruebecause follows existential it concluding 'Godexists' by from mustbe trueby thelawof generalization 'Godis God',which self-identity).
Journal Philosophical of Logic23: 307-336, 1994.

C 1994 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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In artificial may be achievedby languages, logicalperfection for E.g., classicalsemantics formalfirst-order languages stipulation. V securesFrege'sconditionsby requiring universes be non-empty, that in that namesreferto individuals V, and that k-placefunctionnames +7. However,sincesuch arrangements functionsq -do k-ary designate of natural makeit difficult not clearawaythe imperfections they language, to regarda formalsentenceas givingthe logicalform of an ordinary terms.This is largelybecauseFrege'sfuncsentence with non-referring - principle above- is centralto the modern tionalview of language (i) have a sentences notion of logicalform.We imaginethat ordinary and that fixes theirlogicalproperties relations,i.e.: semanticstructure 1. The semanticvalue of a sentenceis a functionof the semantic sentence values of its non-logicalconstituents(e.g., a subject-predicate of is trueif the referent the subjectbelongsto the extensionof the and predicate); in and relationsare to be characterized terms 2. Logicalproperties of some totalityof possiblesemanticvaluesfor these constituents (e.g., logical truthis truthfor all possiblevalues,some accountbeing given of this totality). are Typically,such structures represented a readingof formal (via by constructions) sentencesof a formallanguageso constructedthat is and syntacticstructure both transparent mirrorssemanticstructure; of semanticvaluesare represented interpretations this by possible termif language.Now we cannotreada formalnameas a non-referring at must assignto eachformalnamea referent, least if we interpretations assume: 3. The actualsemanticvalues of the non-logicalconstituentsof a sentence(i.e., the valueswe imagineare inducedby some actualuse of the sentence)are among theirpossiblevalues. Or, to put it anotherway, (3) is not consistentwith 4. Thereare non-referring singularterms and 5. The possiblevalues of a singulartermare its possiblereferents. Since standardconditionson classicalfirst-order interpretations assure(5) for formalterms,it is hard to see how formalfirstthe ordersentences,so construed,can represent logical forms of terms. sentenceswith non-referring ordinary

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whichshouldwe (1) Assumptions through(5) are incompatible; We could abandonthe semanticnotion of logical form given give up? by (1) and (2) for a purelysyntacticone: the logicalform of a sentence is nothingmore than a notationwhich, via purelysyntacticderivation rulesfor manipulating such notations,determines logical properties its and relations(e.g., a sentencefollows from othersif its formis derivable from theirs).I assumethat we do not wish to take this way out. If we jettison semantics,to what may we appealin settlingon a correctand completebody of derivationrules? The priceof dropping(3) is a weakerconnectionbetweenlogic and truth;e.g., logical truthdoes not imply truth,if logical truthis truth for all possiblevalues,for the actualvalues on which truthdepends need not be among them. (5) will insurethat the actualreferents of termsare among theirpossiblevalues, so that familiarconreferring nectionshold wheretermsrefer.But wheretermsdo not refer,this is not assured.We certainlydo not want a sentenceto be logicallytrue but actuallyfalse,yet this possibilitycannot be excludedwithout(3). If 'Odysseus' does not refer,'Odysseusis Odysseus'is true,false, or neithertruenor false, and the basis for decidingwhich ought to be part of our accountof logical form. Classicalfirst-order semanticsis more usuallydefendedby questioning (4) in one of two ways. (a) We may follow Russelland regard "terms"as disguiseddescriptions, that, e.g., 'Odysseus so non-referring is Odysseus'is not an identitybut says somethinglike:one and only one personhas the properties ascribedto Odysseus(say,in TheOdyssey) and that personis self-identical.'Or (b) we may follow Descartesand that "non-referring" termsin fact refer,albeit Meinongin maintaining to objectsthatdo not exist,so thatby 'Odysseus' meannot an existing we individualbut nonetheless"a something,not a merenothing"([4]at 62). form masks a complex (a) requiresholdingthat a simplegrammatical logicalform, and it may be objected,as by Kaplan[10]and others,that we should not invoke hiddencomplexityunlessthereis good reasonto do so. That is, we should not adopt (a) until we have investigated the form (e.g., taking option of identifyinglogicalwith grammatical 'Odysseusis Odysseus'to be a simpleidentity)and found it to be unworkable. What appearsto underwrite (b)'s appealto non-existing objectsis the idea that a conceptof X presupposes But this seems X.

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wrong:an individualconcept - a conceptof X - is merelyone we imaginefitsjust one individual- X - if it fits anythingat all. Moreover, it is hardto grasphow any objectcan be suchthat it neitherhas nor lacks somewell-defined as believedtrueof some feature,2 Meinongapparently of courseindividualconceptswill generallybe non-existents,3 though noncommittal about lots of features.Accordingly,the move from insteadof sayingthingslike "Thereare conceptto objecthereis suspect; is among them, and 'Odysseus' refersto non-existent objects,Odysseus it," we oughtto say only "Thereareindividual conceptsthat fit nothing, the conceptof Odysseusis amongthem,and 'Odysseus' does not refer." If so, (b) is not a viable option. Such considerations give us reasonto exploremodifying(5) by the possiblevaluationsof a terma representation includingamong of situationsin whichit does not referat all. We must then say what semanticstructure deliversin this case, i.e., we must extendour understandingof (1) to the case wheresome of the functionalinputs are for lacking.The simplestprescription doing so is Frege's:no input,no output(whichI shall abbreviate'NINO').However,NINO has not been popular,largelybecauseit seemsto lead to an impoverished and counter-intuitive logic. We expectthat a sentencewill lack truthvalue if a constituentterm lacks a referent,so no sentencecontaining a name (e.g., 'Plato is Plato' as well as 'Odysseusis Odysseus')can be logicallytrue. It is more usual to proposethat logical form is such with that lack of inputdoes not precludeoutput,so that some sentences and termshave a truth-value some sentencescontaining non-referring namesare logicallytrue. My view is that (i) the Fregeanapproachis not as unpromising as it may appear,while (ii) the currently popularalternative supervaluationalsemantics- promisesmore than it can deliver.Part of the case for (i) will be made by developinga Fregeanfree logic for formal and first-order languageswith function-names identity.Its semantic basis, developedin s2, is very close to that proposedby Smiley[16] thirtyyearsago. Termsand formulaeare all taken as notationsfor allow for the value of a functionat an argument, interpretations and truthunder terms,and the notions of reference non-referring honor NINO. Logicalnotions are treatedin s3. Since interpretation may be valid sentencesgenerallyneedn'tbe true or false, an argument

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in a strongor a weaksense,accordingto whetherits conclusionis true or merelynotfalse undereveryinterpretation that makesthe premises true. Many of the formsof inferencewe regardas logicallaws are weaklyvalid;even the strongsensegives us morethan we mightexpect, since the treatment quantifiers s2 assuresthat existentials true of in are or false. Both sensesof validitymay be definedin termsof a notion of characterizable a variantof Jeffrey's tree satisfiability syntactically by method[9].The completeness is sketchedin s4. In s5 I argument to with others comparethisapproach logic freeof existenceassumptions in the literature. ThereI shallarguefor (ii), in partby suggesting the that have essentially"cooked"theiraccountof logical supervaluationists form to turn out desiredresults.
2. NINO SEMANTICS

Let L be a formalfirst-order languagewith identity,whosenon-logical variablesof variouskinds,k-place symbolsmay include(individual) functionnames,and k-placepredicates. Names are 0-placefunction sentences 0-placepredicates. shall take the logical are I names;primitive symbolsof L to be '=', '-', 'V', and '3' and assumeformationrules terms(variables; terms ... tk 1, generating names;and descriptive wherek > 0, fis a k-placefunctionname, and the ti are terms)and formulaerPtl .. tkl, formulae(primitive sentences; subject-predicate wherek > 0, P is a k-placepredicate,and the ti are terms;identities r = st], wheres and t are terms;negationsr-nF1, disjunctions VFF'1 , and existentialsFrvF1, whereF and F' are formulaeand v is a variable). An elementary formulais a subject-predicate identityformulaor the or are negationthereof.Sentences formulaewithout free variables. I use 'e', 'v', 'n', 'f', 'P' and 'R', 't' and 's', 'F', 'S', and 'X' (resp.), with or without sub- and super-scripts, variablesranging over as expressions, variables,names,functionnames,predicates,terms, formulae,sentences,and sets of sentences(resp.).F,(t) is the result of replacing each free occurrence v in F by t; as usual, if r3vF1is a of sentenceand t a constant(i.e., variable-free) term,F,(t) is a sentence. Let e be a constanttermor elementary sentence.If t occursin e, e will sometimesbe designated indicatesa fe(t)1;in such contexts, F(t)1 occurrence t in e, and Fe(s)1 designatethe resultof of will particular

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of by replacingt at that occurrence s. Occurrences terms t and t' in e are such that (i) one is containedin the other, i.e., e = e(t(t')) or e = e(t'(t)), or (ii) they are separated, have no symbolin common; i.e., in the lattercase, e may be designatedFe(t, t')1. I value to each An interpretationof L assignsan appropriate non-logicalsymbol: To the variablesof kind K: a (possiblyempty)range Vf of values. To each k-placefunctionnamef: a k-aryfunction/, i.e., a function/ whose domainis a (possiblyempty) set of k-tuples. functionY, i.e., To each k-placepredicateP: a k-arytruth-valued a functionwhose domainis a (possiblyempty)set of k-tuplesand whose rangeis {T,F}. Wherepossible,I suppressmentionof I and indicatevalues assigned by script.K, is the kind of v and .~, its range. The domainof a functionis the set of individualsat whichit is defined,i.e., has a value. For presentpurposes,we may identifyfunctions with theirgraphs.I assumethat thereis exactlyone 0-tuple (), so that the domainsof 0-ary functionsmay be {() } or 0. Under as a interpretation, constantterm t or sentenceS may be regarded a notation for the value of a 0-aryfunctionat (), with whichits value val(t) or val(S) may be identified.val is defined,with the help of an each term and formula assignmentof values to variables,by regarding as havingform FTal rkl, where4 indicatesa k-aryfunctionval(q), ... FtI... k1indicatesa k-tuple val(ral....klq), and
VAL: valt(qFc ... (k l) = valt(o)(val(Fral...kk)).

of An assignment values to variablesis a functionA assigningto E if each variablev a 0-aryfunctionvA such that vA (() X (SO .Xi is not definedat ()). Wherenecessary,I indicatethe is empty,vA 1. A v-variant A of dependence val on a particularassignment by rvalA that differsfrom A at most at v. of A is an assignment In applyingVAL,we look to the syntaxof t or F for the form and (dependingupon 4) to I, A, or a Fregeanaccountof r0l ... .rklI remarks shouldsuffice. for the logicaloperations val(q).A few clarifying

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If k = 0, [ . ..Tk is the empty expression and val( Fri...k 1) = (). is the 2-arytruth-valued functionwhose value at any pair of val('=') individuals(a, e) is T iff a is e. val('--')is the 1-aryfunctionXV: {T, F} -I {T, F} such that A(*) = T iff ' = F. val('V')is the 2-ary function : {T, F} --+{T, F} suchthat "'))= F iffI = V' = F In 3vF1,0 = '3' and FTl kl = l = rvF1; val('3')is the 1-aryfunc... tion I from truth-valued functionsto {T, F} such that '(F) = T iff a and val( vF1) is the truth-valued function such 9(a) = T for some 9that(i) if f = 0, the domainof F is 0, (ii) if X', 0, thenthe domainof f is {vA,(()): A' is a v-variant A and valA, definedat F} and for vof is variantsA' of A, f'(vA'(())) = valA'(F). VALis to be interpreted accordwithNINO. So valis not definedat in if (a) valis not definedat [fTr... rko1 (b) valis definedat or W l... 0kl a but val(ol. ... -k) is not in the domainof val(q). Thus the ,1I termsthat do not refer(underI and A) are variableswhose rangeis empty,namesn whose domainis empty,and termsrftl ... tkI such that some ti does not referor (val(tl),..., val(tk))is not in the domainoff. And the formulaethat get no truth-value (underI and A) are primitive sentencesP whose domainis empty,subject-predicate formulae ... tk] suchthat some ti does not referor (val(tl),..., val(tk))is not FPtl in the domainof 9, identitiesin whichat least one termdoes not refer, that lacktruth-value, disjunctions whichat and in negationsof formulae least one disjunctlackstruth-value. existentialsf3vF1alwayshavea But since1vF1 a truth-value, alwaysdescribes truth-valued function,albeitin some cases one whose domainis empty. For notationalconvenience mayconstruct we from vala total function Valon formulaeby letting Val(F) = val(F) if valis definedat F and setting Val(F)= N otherwise.As usual, the value (if any) of a constant termor sentencedoes not varywithA, so we may speakof the referent of a constanttermand the truth-value a sentenceunderL Constant of termsare co-referring (underI) if each refersand to the sameindividual. The followingfactsaboutextensionality be usedin the completeness will of s4. argument constanttermand t and t' areco-referring El. If s(t) is a referring then s(t) and s(t') are co-referring. E2. If S(t) is an elementary sentenceand t and t' areco-referring, then = Val(S(t')). Val(S(t))

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E3. If t is a constanttermand valA(t)= vA(()), then ValA(F)= ValA(F,(t)).

3. SATISFIABILITY*

To deal with logicalnotions, it will be convenientto expandL to L* by adding(a) an unlimitedlist of new names, (b) for each kind K, of variable, a new 1-placepredicaterK,1,and (c) a marker'*'. Interpretations of L* must satisfythe additionalconditionthat the predicatesrKv1 are functionsX, so that the rangeof variablesof kind assignedtruth-valued = T}. If S is a sentenceof L*, FS*1 a *-sentence L*. is is {a: of K, it,(a) = { *l: S E X}. If Y is a set of sentencesand *-sentences,Y is X* 1 iff satisfies*Y, i.e., makeseach satisfiable* some interpretation *-sentence Y true and none of the othersfalse. of An argument(X, S) is stronglyvalid(X s, S) iff X* U r-s]} is not satisfiable*; S) is weaklyvalid(X k, S) iff X* U {IS*l} is not (X, The with true satisfiable*. conclusionof a stronglyvalid argument with premisesis also true;the conclusionof a weaklyvalid argument true premisesneed not be true, though it cannot be false. Similarly, strongand weak sensesof logical truth,logical falsehood,and logical may be definedin termsof satisfiability*: equivalence a. S is stronglylogicallytrue(i.e., is alwaystrue) iff { -Sl } is not and satisfiable*; S is weaklylogicallytrue(i.e., is neverfalse)iff {[-IS*1} is not satisfiable*. b. S is stronglylogically false (i.e., is alwaysfalse) iff {S} is not S is weaklylogically satisfiable*; false (i.e., is nevertrue)iff {[S*1} is not satisfiable*. c. S and S' are stronglylogicallyequivalent (i.e., alwayshave the same S nor {S',r -S1 } is satisfiable*; and S' iffneither {S,r truth-value) -,S'1} neverhave differenttruth-values) iff are weaklylogicallyequivalent (i.e., nor {IS'*l,r ,S*1} is satisfiable*. neither{Fs*1,r S'*1} can A syntacticmethodfor determining satisfiability* be obtained relative method [9] for determining satisfiability by modifyingJeffrey's to classicalsemantics. Testinga finite set X of sentencesfor satisfiability this methodinvolvesverticallylistingthem and then applying by reductiverulesto constructa downwardbranchingarrayof sentences (a treefor X). A branchof such a tree is closedwhen it containsan for explicitcontradiction: classicalsemantics,either F--= ttl or both S

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and F-S1. If all branchesof the tree are closed, X is not satisfiable, since the reductiverulespreservesatisfiability (they are "downward An open(i.e., not closed)branchis finishedwhenits sentences correct"). constitutea Hintikkaset. If an open finishedbranchis obtained,X is satisfiablesince Hintikkasets are satisfiable(the rulesare "upward of correct").The completeness the method (and its extensionto enumerable derivesfroma mechanicalprocedure X) which,when to an enumeration a finishedtreefor (Si): either applied (Si), produces (a) aftera finitenumberof steps,a treefor someinitialsegmentof (Si) in whichall branches close,or (b) aftera possiblyinfinitenumberof steps,a tree for (Si) in which some possiblyinfinitebranchis finished. involvesmodifyingthe Adaptingthis methodto satisfiability* reductiverules,the rulesfor closing branches,and the notion of a Hintikkaset. The modifiedreductive rulesare given by the following if diagrams: the sentenceor sentencesat the top of each diagramappear in a branch then / may be extendeddownward addingthe arrayat P, by the bottom.
.,-,s1
S Si Si - 1 S1 ,S S-n$21 I r-,sl S2 ,Sl

S21 rvS1

-, VSIS2

SrI 1 r-S*
f3vF*1

! S*

I
S1*
3F* 1 r-,

S 1 rs*1 I rK1..1 FI,,(t)l

E1 x'l

n where doesnot occur in above K.,n*1

rF,(n).*1

S(s)
r=st'

r=st*1

s(s)*

1 S(t) rS(t)* where S is elementary s 0 t and S

rS*1

whereS is (a) an existentialor negatedexistential (b) or an identityor negatedidentityeach term of which is a *-sentence *-term of 0, i.e., occursin some elementary

of '

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The non-standard form of the *-disjunction is requiredfor rule the form of the negated upwardcorrectness; very non-standard ruleis required downwardcorrectness. the conclusion for If disjunction this of the negatedexistentialrule were a *-sentence, rule would not be downwardcorrect;e.g., let F = r= sfv], wheret or s doesn't referor the referentof t is not in the domainoff. /3is closedwhen it contains r-, = tt*1, or rS*l and r-S* 1 , or [S*l and rFS-, or S and -S*l. # is finishedwhen it satisfiesconditions hl-h7: hi. If r--S1 E 3, then S E /3;if F--,S*l E /3,then S*1 E /3. h2 If r V S1S21] , theneitherS1 E 3or S2 /3;if rv SIS1 E/, then E and rSzl E 3, or rFS;1 and -lS21 E/3, or [-Sl E 3 and E [Si1 E/3

rs[1E/.

and r-nTSE p. h4. If [3vF*l E 3, then for some n, FF,(n)*lE/3 and [K,n*1E 3. h5. If r-3vF*l E , then for each t suchthat rKvt*lE /3, F,(t)1 E 3. and [ = st*l E /3.If S(s) e 3, then h6. SupposeS(s) is elementary S(t) e p; if fS(s)*l /3,then fS(t)*l E p. h7. If S E /3and S is either(a) an existentialor negatedexistentialor (b) an identityor negatedidentityeach term of whichis a *-termof /3,

and r-nS1 3, S2E 3 r-nS213;if - VSIS2*1 then E or E E /3, E/3 r--S;1

h3. If - v S1S21E P/,then [-S, 1e I/3

and -S21 E P/3, S E/3and or

then[S* E /. 1

An finishedbranchthat is open satisfiesin addition: h8. NeitherrS*] P and r--S1E , nor r-S*1 3 and S E , nor E and r-,S*1E 3. rS* E #3

a Conditionsh l-h9 characterize Hintikka*-set.

4. COMPLETENESS

h9.r- = tt*1 P. s

can A finishedtreefor an enumeration of sentencesand *-sentences (ei) be obtainedby the followingstagedprocedure: Stage 0: Writedown eo. Stage i + 1: a. Add ei+1 to the top of the tree.

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b. Applyreductive rulesotherthantheidentityand negatedexistential rulesas far as possible,using namesfrom L* - L in applications the of existentialrule. c. Apply the negatedexistentialruleas far as possibleto pairs r- 3vF*1and rKt* availableat the completionof (b). d. Apply the identityrulesas far as possibleto pairsS(s) and [ = st*l or fS(s)*] and r = st*1 availableat the completionof (c). If T is a finishedtree for a finite initialsegmentof (es)in whichall branches since the reductiverules close, then (ei) is not satisfiable*, and closed branchesare not satisfiable*. The preservesatisfiability* rulepreserves since if KrV SIS2] negateddisjunction satisfiability* is not false underI becauseSi has no truthvalue, then I satisfies* If T is a finishedtreefor (ei) in whichsome open branch# is finished, then (ei) is satisfiable* because(a) 3 is a Hintikka*-setand (b) any Hintikka*-setis satisfiable*. skip the proof of (a), whichis straightI devote the remainder this sectionto establishing of forward,and (b). A Hintikka*-set0 determines interpretation that satisfies* Its an P. Ip is construction basedon a partitionof the set TERMof constantterms relationR on TERM.A finite sequence of3 inducedby an equivalence . . , t,) of L-termsti is a 3-sequence lengthn + 1)from to to tniff (to, (of either(1) n = 0 or (2) n > 0 and for each i: 0 < i < n thereare distinct termst' and t!' such that (a) ti = ti(t%), ti+l = ti(ti"),and (c) either (b) t =t orr t'ti*l E p. If s, t E TERM,let (s, t) E 9 iff there is E3 from= to s t; not all the termsin this sequenceneed be in a 6-sequence TERM.It is easy to see that R is an equivalence relationon TERM. For s E TERM,let [s]= {t: (s, t) E }. By the reflexivityof A: Fl. Ift E TERM,t E [t]. And from the symmetry and transitivity ~: of F2. If s, t E TERMand t E [s],then[t]= [s]. we By pastingtogether 3-sequences, have: F3. If [ft ... tk E TERM, ...skl E TERM,andfor each i, 1 rfsl [ti]= [si],then[Fftl... tk]]= [Ffs ... Skl].
4I

is definedas follows: ial. The rangeof v is {[t]:for some s E [t], fKs*l E /3}.

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ip2. Iffis 0-place, then/'(()) = [f] iffis a *-term of f; otherwise,/ has no value at (). i63. Iffis k-place and k > 0,/(([tl],..., [tk])) = [rfsl... sk] if there are si E [ti] such that Ffs, ...Ski is a *-term of P; otherwise, / has no value at ([tl],..- . , [tk] 0-place, i04. If P is). E 0; Y(()) = T if IS*l E PandY(()) = F if --S*1 otherwise, 9 has no value at (). ip5. If P is k-place and k > 0, q(([tl],..., [tk])) = T if there are s E [ti] E such that rPsl ...s1 E , and Y(([tl],..., [tk])) = F if there are si E [ti] I e ; otherwise, Y has no value at such that --Psl ([tl],..., [tk]). ...si1 As required, the range I# gives to v is {[t] : f',([t]) = T}. By F3, Il is

at at well-defined functionnames;by h8, it is well-defined 0-place at predicates.To establishthat it is well-defined other predicatesand that it satisfies* we need to verifysome additionalfacts. In proofs /, induction,IA is the inductionassumption. by (mathematical)
F4 (a). If t is a *-term of/3, then val(t) = [t].

to by (b). If s is connected a P-sequence the *-termt, then

val(s) = [t] = [s]. (c). If t E TERMand t refers,thenthereis a *-termin [t].

(d). If t E TERMand t refers,thenval(t) = [t]. Proof. (a). By inductionon the numberof functionnamesin t. If t
is a name, then val(t) = [t] by ip2. Otherwise, t = fftl ... tk . Since t is a *-term, (i) the ti are *-terms and val(t1) = [ti] by IA and

= = (ii)/(([tl],..., [tk])) [t]by ip3. So val(t) [t]. inductionon 6(s, t), the length of a shortestf-sequence (b). By
connecting s to t: assume F4(b) for s', t' with 6(s', t') < 6(s, t). If 6(s, t) = 1, then s = t, and val(s) = [t] = [s] by F4 (a). If 6(s, t) > 1, let

connectings to t. t E [s],so P-sequence (to,... tn)with n > 0 be a shortest

[t] = [s] by F2. to and t~ are *-terms, so by F4 (a), val(to) = [t'] and val(tK')= [t']. (t , to')is a 0-sequence, so to' e [to], and by F2, [to]= [tg]. Thus to and tg are co-referring. (tL,...I, t,) is a f-sequence connecting tI to t, so 6(tl, t) < 6(s, t) and val(tj) = [t] by IA. Since tl = to(tg') and s = to = to(t'), s and ti are co-referring by El. So val(s) = [t] = [s].

(c). By inductionon the numberof functionnamesin t. Suppose t E TERMand t refers.If t is a nameand refers,then t is a *-term ip2; by

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by F1, t E [t],so there'sa *-termin [t].Otherwise,t = ftl ... tk]. If t refers,the ti referand (val(tl),..., val(tk))is in the domainof f. Since t E TERM,ti E TERM;so by IA, there'sa *-termt E [t]. So ti is connectedby a f-sequence to a *-termt', and val(ti)= [ti] by F4 (b). Iff is definedat ([ti],..., [tk]),theremust by i/3 be si E [ti]suchthat [fsl ... Sk is a *-termof 0. By F2, [si]= [ti];so by F3, [Ifsl...Sk l] = [ft, . .. tkl]. ByF1, 9S1 ... Sk!E [ftl ... tk1],SO there'sa *-termin [t]. s (d). If t E TERMand t refers,thenthere'sa *-term E [t]by F4 (c) and = [t]by F4 (b). val(t) I Part (b) of the followingfact is crucialin the arguments subsequent for facts. F5. Supposethat (to,... , tn), wheren > 0, is a shortestf-sequence from to to tnand thatfor some i: 0 <i < n, F= t~l ] E . Thenifj is the e greatestsuchi: (a). For each i: j < i < n, ti = ti(t', t~),and if si = ti(t, ii'),then (to,... tj,Sj+1,..., Si) is a f-sequence; (b). t, = t(,(') andthereis a f-sequenceof lengthnfrom to to Proof. r = tj't*l] Ef and for each i:j < i < n, r = tt'*tl E p. tn(t.). (a). By inductionon i. Basis:i =1j+ 1. To establishthat the occurrences tj' and tj+1 of in tj+1are separated,so tj+1= tj+1(t', tj3+1), supposeon the = or contrarythat (i) t'" tj'(t1j+1) (ii) tf = t!fI(t'). In case (i), and tj is t By h6, = t'(tjl, )tj*1E , so tj+l(t'(tj'+1)) ... t),t **, I,) is j+l(tj). f-sequence from toto t,, so (i) is a shorter (to, = and tj is impossible.In case (ii), tj+2 is tj+I(t, 1) tj+i1(tj ,(t')) so again(to,..., tj, tI (I(t,,(t)).Byh6 = t+ ef, t-j't+l tj+2,..., tn) is a shorterf-sequence from toto t,, and (ii) is impossible as well. Therefore, = t ). So ti = tj+I(t1,tj+1). Since tji+1 tj+ (tj, = tj+(tj, (to,... , ty, sj+ sj+l) is a f-sequencein virtueof the fact that r = It+1 p. t' ,tj',), Inductivestep:suppose(a) holds up throughi, so that for m: -

and m-<i, = t,(t', ti), sm= tM, tm), (to, t, Sj+l,)...,s;) is a f-sequence.Sinceti = ti(t' tm(tj, = ti(t", ..., establish that the ti), ti+1 t"').To of and occurrences t"' t,'+,in ti+1are separated, ti+1 = ti+l (tj',t+1), i.e., = or (ii) supposeon the contrarythat (i) t3'= t'+1 tP+(t"'). t'(t'+ l)

<

320

SCOTT LEHMANN

)) = ti(t j"(t"1), t'). But si = ti(tj,t'), and by h6, l E 3. So (to, ... , Sj+1,. . , si, ti+2, .. , tn) is a shorter ti+i(tj'(t"" = tj (t'+1)t tj, from to to t,, and case (i) is impossible. 3-sequence To show that case (ii) is also impossible,considerhow the relevant of occurrences t" and t+1, in ti+l may be related: so 1. Theoccurrences separated, ti+l = ti+l(t+l (tf'), are Then ti). and ti = ti+I(t' So si = ti(tj, tf') = = ti+l I ti+2 +2= lI(t), t). ti+l(t+, ti) t1+J tE). By h6, = t ,(tfit"+1*l f. So (to,..., tj, sj+l,.. E ti+1(ti+1(t), a shorter sequencefrom to to t,, and (1) is impossible. tj+2,... , t,) is / 2. t1'contains t+1, so t = t(t+ I). Thenti = ti(t), t+ = t(t and ti+2 = ti1(t/(t!+1)). By h6, [ = tt"(t1 )*1 E 3. So (to,..., t, to and (2) is a ti+2,...*, ) is shorter3-sequencefrom to t,, impossible. = t (tf'). Since ti = ti(tjt,t), 3. tI1 containst', so t!+1 I = ti(tf, t') and the relevantoccurrenc.sof tf' and t,"in t ti+ are separated,i.e., t!+l 1 1(t!,). tI1 = ti+ l(t+l (te',t)). So = and ti = ti+2= ti+1(ti+1)and tj = ti+I(t +l(tI, t!)). If ti = ti(t!',tI), then I ti+2 jI ti-- +l-= ti+(t *l Ep. = ti(t, t), so , ti)). By h6, = t+ (t, t)ti +1 (tj Si si So as in case (1), (to,.. . , tj, si+1,.. .si, ti+2, tn) is a shorter from to to in, and (3) is impossible. 3-sequence Therefore,ti+I = ti+l(t'W, tf+1),and si+1 may be definedas To show that (to,... , tj, sj+,.. . ,si+1) is a P-sequence, ti+l(tJ,tf+l). of considerhow the relevantoccurrences t" and t!+1in ti+1 may be related.By the argumentof (2), t!' cannot contain t+ 1; so either(i) are tIf contains tI' or (ii) these occurrences separated.In case (i), (t!)) and therefore ti+l = ti+I(t', t+ (t')), so t, = ti+ (t7, = ti,+(t), t!+ (t')). In case (ii), ti+I = t+l (tf',t!+1, t'), because si ti+ = of tf) and the occurrences tf' and tI'in ti+l are therefore ti ti(tj', f separated.So si+I = ti+l(tJ, , tI') and t, = ti 1(t', , t,); so = ti+1(tq, t+1l,t'). In eithercase, then, the 3-sequence(to,..., tj, si I si+1,... ,si) can be extendedto s,+, in virtueof = t'i+t' *1e /3. (b). Ifj = n - 1, then t, = tn(t!'),tn-1 = tn(t), and (to,..., tn-1) is a (b) /-sequence of lengthn from toto tn(t!).Otherwise, follows from (a): )
S

Incase(i),ti+1= ti+1(tj'(t!)) = ti(t',(t tf') ti+2= +), and

So if t, t(tf'), sn-1 = tn(tf)and (to,..., tj, sj+l,... ,s-1) is a /-sequence of length n from to to tn(t').

tn-1 =

so

tn-(t!',tn._.), =

tn

tn-l(t',t"

1) and sn-1 = tn-l(tj, t"N_).

STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC

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F6 and F7 are generalizations h8 and h9 whichfacilitateproofs of of cases(f.ii)and (f.iii)of the THEOREM.F6 assuresthatI0 is well-defined at k-placepredicates k > 0. for F6. Let P be a k-placepredicatewithk > 0. Iffor each i : 1< i <k, then si E TERM,ti E TERM,andsi and ti are co-referring, (i) if ... t1 E 3, thenfPsl ...Sk] P and FPs ...s 1 /3, and(ii) if Sptl ... tkl 3 and rt . . tl 1 /3. ,PsI...s 1 ~ /, then [--Ptl are then both referto Proof.If si, ti e TERMand co-referring, = [ti]by F4 (b). Since [si]= [ti],a /-sequence connectssi and ti. The [si] proof is by inductionon.i6(si, ti), where6 is as in the proof of F4 (b): assume F6 for (s',...I ,s) and (t, ..., t') with Ei6(s!, t ) < Eib(si, ti). If ECi(si, = k, thensi = ti for each i, and the claimis just h8. If ti) ti) > k, then for some i, 6(si,ti) > 1. The termssj, tj with]j i do LCi(si, not enterthe argument essentially,so to cleanup notation,let i = k = 1 and drop the subscript'i'. Thus rPtl ... tk = =Pt1, ,Psl ... sk = [kPsl,

and = [s]. [t]

I give the argument case (i); in virtueof the scope of h 6, it may be for transformed an argument case (ii) by interchanging and 't', into for 's' and 'P' and '-,P'. SupposerPt*l E so t is a *-term of Let (to, i n) , /3, /3. with n > 0 be a shortest#-sequenceconnectings to t. Either(a) I = t't*1 E /3for some i or (b) r = titt'*lfor each i. In case (a), letj be the greatestsuch i. Thenby F5 (b), = t(tq')and a of < (s, t). By F4 (a) /3-sequence lengthn connectss t t(t) so (,)) to t(t), so (s, and F4 (b), s and t(t%) co-referring. h6, FpPt(t)*1 so t(tf) E are By E/3, TERM.So by IA, -pPsl /3 and FPs*l1 P. In case (b), = tt'l Ep. If Psl E Ps*l E , then /or or r-Pt l e /3by h6, since It = t(tg'),and ti E TERM.This -,Ptl1 E /3 violatesIA, since tl and s are co-referring F4 (a) and F4 (b), and by < 6(s, t). U 6(s, t1) F7. If s, t E TERMandare co-referring, then = stl] /3and r-= st*l 0 0. rterm t of TERMis connectedby a Proof. By F4 (c), a referring to a *-term; A(t) be the lengthof the shortestsuch let /-sequence termsof TERM.The sequence.Assumethat s and t are co-referring = is proof that f-n stl /3and r- = st*1 0 0/3 by inductionon A(s)+ A(t): assumeF7 for s', t' with A(s') + A(t') < A(s)+ A(t).

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= If A(s) = A(t) = 1, then s and t are *-terms.So if r-n st1 E 3, = then K-n st*] E / by h7. The proof that F-,= st*l /3 is like that of F6, using h9 in place of h8; it follows that = st] P/.Now K.n considerthe case whereA(s) > 1 or A(t) > 1; for definiteness, supposeA(t) > 1. t is connectedto a *-termby a shortest 3-sequence (t = to,..., tn)with n > 0. So either(a) F= t!'t*l1e / for some i or (b) F= t!t'*l E P for each i. In case (a), letj be the largestsuch i; then by F5 (b), tn = tn(tj')and a /-sequence of lengthn connects t with t,(t'). Since tnis a *-term,it occursin some elementary of *-sentence p; thus by h6, tn(t) is also a *-termand (to,..., t) is not the shortestsequenceconnectingt to a *-term,so (a) is impossible.In case (b), = tt"*l1 E /3. If , = stl E 3 or - = st* E 3,
then

KA(t1)< A(s) + A(t), this is impossibleby IA. So F- = stl 0 P and = st*l 4P/. F8 and F9 facilitateproofs of cases (b) and (c) of the THEOREM. F8. If P is a k-placepredicatewithk > 0 and rPtl ... tk1E /3,then Val(Pti ... tk)) F. Proof. SupposerPtl ... tkl E but Val(rPt ... tkl) = F. Then ti E TERMand Y((val(ti),..., val(tk)))= F. So val(tt)= [ti]by F4 (d), and thereare si E [ti]such that r-Psj ... s*l E by i#5. Sincesi is a *-term,val(si)= [si]by F4 (a). [si]= [ti]by F2, so F6. contradicting Accordingly, st and ti are co-referring, Val(rPtl . .. tk1) F.

= stl E 3 or F, = stl

E p by h6. But since A(s)+

F9. If r = ts] e 3, then Val(F=ts]) # F. Proof. Supposer = tsl e but Val(r= tsl) = F. Then t and s refer. The proof is by inductionon A(t)+ A(s), whereA is as in the proof of F7: assumeF9 for t', s' with A(t')+ A(s') < A(t)+ A(s). If A(t) = A(s)= 1, then t and s are *-terms,so F= ts*l E/3 by h7. by Therefore,t and s are co-referring F4 (b), and Val(F=tsl) = T. If A(t)+ A(s) > 1, we may suppose A(t) > 1, so that a shortest /3sequenceconnectingt to a *-termis (t = to,..., t,) with n > 0. As in the proof of F7, = t't"'*lE /3. Since = ts E/3, F= tis] = = to(t")s1eP3 by h6. Since A(ti) + A(s) < A(t)+ A(s), Val(r= t1sl) $ F by IA. By

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So F4(b), both t and tl referto [t,,]and are thus co-referring. by E2, F. Val(K= tsl) I THEOREM.I satisfies* p. mathematical inductionon the numberof logical Proof.By assumethat if S' has fewer symbolsin S, whereS E 3 or fS*1 e 13: symbolsthan S, Val(S') $ F if S' E 3 and Val(S) = T if logical a. S is a primitivesentence.By ip4. b. S is ptl ... tkl. If S E 3, then Val(S) $ F by F8. If S* E 3, then and val(ti)= [ti]by F4 (a) and (ii) (i) the ti are *-terms = T by ip5;so Val(S) = T. Y(([tt],..., [tk])) c. S is I = tsl. If S E 1, then Val(S) $ F by F9. If FS*I1 3, then t E and s are *-terms whichare co-referring F4 (b); so Val(S)= T. by e. S is r3vF1.Then FS*1 3by h7, and by h4, thereis a namen E such that both iF,(n)* E 3 and fKn*1 E . Since FK,,n*l 13, E T by ip5, and n is a *-term,so val(n)= [n]by F4 (a). v,([n])=

I fS* e.

d. S is rv S1S21. h2, IA, and VAL. By

= Val(S)TbyVAL.

=T Val(F,(n)) byIA,soifvA) = [n], (F)= T byE3.So VaA

f. S is [-,S'1. Thereare the followingsubcases: i. S' is a primitivesentence.By ip4. ii. S' is fPtl... tkl. If Val(S') = T, then the ti referand ((val(t), . .. , val(tk)))= T. By F4 (d), val(ti)= [ti],so by ia5, there are si E [ti]such that [Ps . sk E 3.si is a *-term, s, and are so ti ... r -Ptl... co-referring F4 (b). But then S = by by tk1 13 F6, contrary to supposition.So Val(S')A T. If [S*l E 13, (i) the ti are *-terms then and val(ti)= [ti]by F4 (a) and (ii) [tk]))= F by i,5; so Val(S') = F. iii. S' is F= ts1.If Val(S') = T, then t and s are co-referring, so by F7 neitherS E 3 nor [S*1 3, contraryto supposition.So E Val(S') # T. If fS*1 E 3, then t and s are *-termsand referby F4 (a), so Val(S') 3 N, and thus Val(S') = F. iv. S' is a negation.By h 1 and VAL. v. S' is rV S1S2 E 3. If SE 3, then by h3, K-S1l E 3 and E r--S21 3, or Si E p and r-s1 1 E , or S2 E 3and rS2] E 3. By IA and VAL, Val(S1)$ T and Val(S2)5 T, or Val(SI)= N, or

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SCOTT LEHMANN

1 Val(S2)= N. So by VAL, Val(S') # T, and Val(S) # F. If FS* e , then Val(S)= T by h3, IA, and VAL. vi. S' is r3vF1.By h7, rS*l1 . Suppose Val(S') = T. Then by e VAL,the rangeof v is not empty and ValA(F)= T for some A. By ipl, = valA(t)= val(t).= [t].By E3, Val(Fv(t))= ValA(Fv(t)) T. But r-,F,(t)l E by h5, so by IA and VAL, Val(F,(t)) # T. So contraryto supposition,Val(S') # T; therefore,Val(S') = F. I
vA(()) = [t] for some t such that [Kt*l E . t is a *-term, so

5. DISCUSSION

In this sectionI considerfeaturesof the formalsystemoutlinedin and betweenit and some other ss2-3, noting similarities differences free logics. I have allowedvariablesof differentsorts becausein some of cases theiruse simplifiesthe representation logical forms.However, if differentvariablesare permitteddifferentranges,logical laws may fail for reasonsthat have nothingto do with lack of reference or truth-value; e.g., 'V-,Pn3vPv'won't be true if Y(n(())) = T we but n(()) t .Xv.To focus on the problemof reference-failure, may restrictattentionto formallanguagesin whichthe variables are all of one kind and interpretations may be regardedas specifying and qV assigningk-placefunction-names and a (possiblyempty)universe partialk-aryfunctionson T. The completeness predicates of s4 is unaffectedby these restrictions. (We may also argument the drop the rangepredicateK from L*, re-writing quantifierrules as: r3vF*l1 F= nn*l wheren does not occur in 0 above r = nn*l
and il as:

[ 3vF*1

rF,(n)*l

wheret is a *-term of / above [rF,(t)l

= {[t]: some s E It] is a *-term of P}). Let this system be I

SFFL (for 'strictFregeanfree logic').

STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC

325

a. Semantics The semantics SFFL is Smiley's[16],except thatVamay be empty of and the existentialquantifier treatedsomewhatdifferently is (see

below).
A k-placepredicate need not be false of the k-tuplesof V of which it is not true,and we may think of the k-tuplesof whichit is true togetherwith those of whichit is false as constitutingits domain of Sucha semanticscan accommodate view that sentences the application. such as '2 is mortified' and "slowly'hibernates', whilegrammatical, are not false but meaningless.4 Predicatesemanticsof this sort can be found in Ebbinghaus The 3-valuedsystemof Schock[14]is similar, [5]. if the thirdvalue is interpreted N; here a predicategets two as underinterpretation, fPtl is true(false)if the referent and "extensions" of t is in both (neither)of them and has the thirdvalue otherwise. This treatment predicates of may also be discernedin the nominal of interpretations Meyerand Lambert[13],althoughthe individuals of q thereare supposedto be names and not actualor possible objects,nominalinterpretations beingjust convenientrepresentations of whichatomicformulaeare true, whichfalse, and whichneither. A more standardsemanticsfor k-placepredicates with k > 0 P would specifythat the valueof 9 was F at any k-tuplefromV for whichit was not T. The tree methodgiven in s3 can be adaptedto this changeby replacing'identityor negatedidentity'in the statement of the last reductive rule and in h7 with 'elementary sentence'.The of s4 will go throughwithoutmajorchange, completeness argument except that the proof of F8 in this case is more like that of F9. Underinterpretation, variablesmay rangeover 0 and functionnamesand predicates may designateoperationsthat are not everywheredefined.val is as in classicalfirst-order semantics,exceptthat provisionmust be made for these cases;here that provisionis NINO. In particular, since '=' and 'v' designatebinaryoperations,their semanticinputsare orderedpairs;and whereone termfails to refer or one formulafails to get a truth-value, thereis no pair, henceno and henceno output. input, Some logicians,at least by implication,questionwhethera Fregean view of semanticstructure need be so strict,van Fraassen,who

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SCOTT LEHMANN

claimsthat his supervaluational systemcan accommodateNINO for contingentsentences([17]at 223), also maintainsthat r = sti must be false, not truth-valueless, when t refersbut s does not. He writes that "sinceit is necessarythat if b is identicalwith an existent,then b also exists, it follows that if 'a exists and b does not exist' is true, then 'it is not the case that a = b' is also true"([17]at 220) and "that SantaClaus does not exist is sufficientreasonto concludethat the Presidentof the United Statesis not SantaClaus..." ([18]at 489). But all that follows from 't refers','s does not refer',and the principle 'if r = stl is true and t refers,then s refers'is 'F= st1 is not true',not 'r = stl is false'.The desiredconclusionwill follow if r = st1 must be true or false, but van Fraassendoes not arguefor this thesis. whatfollowsfromthe truthof r3x = txl and r-'3x = sxl is Alternatively, is This argument weakly, not the truthof [F-= stl, but its non-falsity.5 but not strongly,valid, as may be seen from the treesbelow:
3x = tx*
n3X = Sx*
~ St*

3x = tx*
3x = sx*

= st*

Ka*
= ta*
= sa

-= - St = st Ka*
= ta*
-= sa = sa

= sa*

(closed)

=aa* (open and finished)

what Kleene([11]at 334) termsits weak SFFL gives disjunction sense.Woodruff[19]claimsthat the strongsense (one truedisjunct is rendersa disjunction by true)is required Frege'sthesis that reference He arguesthat the weak reading,togetherwith a functionof sense. the sense-reference thesis, entailssomethingridiculous,viz, that there is at most one proposition.Woodrufftakes the thesis to entailthat (i) the proposition[p]expressed a sentence of L may be identified by p with (the graphof) a functionfrom possibleworldsto {T,F,N}, of wherepossibleworldsin turn are identifiedwith interpretations L.

STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC

327

Healsoassumes (ii)theset[L]of propositions that in expressibleL

"has at least the structure a lattice,if we take the meet of the of thatp and the propositionthat q to be the propositionthat proposition p and q, and theirjoin to be the propositionthatp or q" ([19]at 128). Woodruffdoes not identifythe lattice-relation<, but it is presumably where[p]entails [q]iff q is true whenever is true.Finally, entailment, p Woodruffassumesthat (iii) for some sentenceu of L, [u]is the constant N-function.Given(i)-(iii), the weak readingof disjunction (and conjunction) impliesthat [p]= [u]for any p. However,assumptions (ii), and (iii) are dubious.Fregecertainly (i), would resistexplicating 'proposition'in a way that entails,as does (i), that logicallyequivalentsentencesexpressthe same proposition.(ii) makeslogicalrelationsdetermine logical semantics,ratherthan the otherway around.E.g., if [L]must be a lattice underentailment, then entails [r]only if [p]entails [r]and [q]entails [r],and this [rvpql] meansthat we cannotread 'v' weakly,for an interpretation under whichp or q is true (and r is not) need not be an interpretation under which I Vpql is true,unlessof course [FVpql] = [p]= [q].The problem with (iii) is that it is hardto dreamup a sentencethat is logically as of truth-valueless, is required (i)'s identification possibleworlds by with interpretations. Woodruffsuggeststhat "we may think of u as a sentencesuchas 'theroundsquareis red'" ([11]at 124);but thissentence whichof courseguarantees appearsto havea subject-predicate structure, its truthundersomeinterpretation. Sinceunderinterpretation assignment,the inputto an existential and is alwaysa truth-valued function(thoughperhapsone whose quantifier domain is empty),existentials in alwaysget a truth-value SFFL;e.g., is falseifV is emptyor t does not refer.6 SinceF3v= vt1 is trueiff r3vRvt] t refers,r3v= vt1may be readas ft existsl,7takingVi to represent what thereis (according I). Understoodas 1-B3v--1-formulae, to universals as alwayshave truth-values well. However,one may preferto treatthe universalquantifier a basic operator,since r-'3v-nPfvl be true as can without fPfvl being truefor each value of v. If, as in [2, 15, 16],4 weredefinedon 1-aryfunctions9: &/-- {T, F} so that 9(g) = T if = F for each W(,) = T for some a E and (g9)= F if W(a,) a E 1, then existentials could get no truth-value. E.g., F3vRvv'l would lack truth-value l wereempty and [3vPfvywould lack if

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SCOTT LEHMANN

truth-value V?werenon-emptybut/ mappednothing into the if oft domainof Y. Thisunderstanding does not permitreadingr3v= vtl as Ftexistsl. and differences semanticsimilarities The table below summarizes betweenSFFL and the systemsof Smiley[15],Woodruff[19],Schock [5], [14],Ebbinghaus Bencivenga[2],and Skyrms[15];entriesin the corrections. valuespriorto supervaluational last two columnsrepresent '-' means:not possiblein this system.

SFFL rpl.: t does not refer Ptl: t refersbutto somthingnot in domainof Y r = ttl: t does not refer r = tsl: t refers; s does not refer rv FF21: F1 true; F2 truth-valueless Sv F F21;Fi false; F2 truth-valueless r3vFl:rangeof v empty rangeof v F3vFl: not empty;F always truth-valueless r3vFl:rangeof v not empty;F nevertrue sometimes false,sometimestruth-valueless N N

[16] N N

[19] N/T/F' -

[14] F N

[5] N N

[2] N

[15] N

N N N N F F

N N N N N T N N

F F T N F N

N N T F N

N F T N F N

N N N N F9 N

b. Logic As noted in s3, both weak and strongsensesof logical notions may be and definedin termsof satisfiability* therefore,to the extentpossible,

STRICT FREGEAN FREE LOGIC

329

decided themodified van of that method trees. Fraassen remarks by "itwouldindeed interesting investigate properties those be to the of transformations preserve as [which non-falsehood], wellas theproperties of thosetransformations maytakea statement is neither which that truenorfalseintoa falsehood at leastdo not takea truth a but into falsehood." at 483,n.2).Thesecondtypeof transformation is ([18] weakvalidity; firstis givenby:X U { f-S*1} is not satisfiable*. the Yet another of validity transformations carry that non-falsehoods type intotruths is given X U{ I-n } is notsatisfiable*.N is taken be If to by: a truth-value, SFFLcanbe regarded a 3-valued as logic;satisfiability* andsatisfiability* canprobably adapted othermulti-valued trees be to logics. of Analogs '*'maybe foundin Smiley andWoodruff [19]. [16] introduces sentenial a with 't' Smiley operator (read'it is truethat') = T if val(F)= T andval(rtF1) F otherwise. = left Smiley val(rtFl) the axiomatic of technical development histheoryto a "more paper" of but never written, thetreemethod ([16]at 135)thatwasapparently canbe regarded "axiomatizing" a fragment his semantic as of s3 if etc. FS* system rtS1 '*-satisfiable', replaces 1,'t-satisfiable' replaces 't' maybe applied sentential to of sentences However, Smiley's parts wouldbe rendered Smiley's as whereas (e.g.,SFFL's13vF1 r3vtF1), is applied to wholesentences. capture feature, To we this only '*' adda coupleof simplification for 't': rules might FttF1
!FtI tF1

[F-ttF1
r-,tF1

[I

Accordingto Woodruff,it is not sentencesbut theirassertionsthat have logicalpropertiesor standin logical relations.He distinguishes the assertionof S (indicated two typesof assertions: unconditional simply I by S) is correcton interpretation iff S is I-true,while the hedgedassertionof S (indicatedby underlining is correcton interpretation S) I iff S is not I-false.Logicalnotions are then definedin termsof correctness; we mightdefinea set of assertionsto be satisfiable e.g., if thereis some interpretation which they are all correct.The on axiomatization Woodruffpresentsof his systemis defective,as he

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notes ([19]at 142,n.25);however,the method of s3 can probablybe let adaptedto it. If Xis a set of assertions, X* be the set that resultsfrom it by replacingS with S*l1and [S1with S; then (relativeto the same sentencesemantics) is satisfiableiff X* is *-satisfiable. X SFFL's tree-system as for may be regarded a tree-system satisfiability relativeto classicalsemanticsthat has been modifiedto characterize relativeto NINO semantics.If thesemodificationsare satisfiability* for languageswith strippedaway, we obtain a tree-system first-order that identityand function-names has standardclosurerulesbut an substitutionof identicalsin one directiononly. identityrule permitting The argumentof s4 can be adaptedto establishthat it is complete the relativeto classicalsemantics; proof is simpler,but analogsof F6 and in much the sameway. The advantage and F7 must be established in of its restrictive identityrule over those permittingsubstitutions can eitherdirection,as in [9],is that satisfiability more often be establishedby a finite open finishedbranch.E.g.,

S=fvvl F=wl
is open and finished,and therefore{r=fvvl } is satisfiable. c. Supervaluations Many classicallogicaltruthsare weaklylogically true in SFFL; among the exceptionsare r3v= vtl and r V 3vF3v-'F1. Relativelyfew are logicallytruein the strongsense,though in virtueof the semantic treatmentof '3' thereare more than one might expect. Skyrms'remark, quoted at the beginningof this paper,is not quite accurate: rV 3v = vtB3v= vtl is among instancesof the law of the excluded middlethat are stronglylogicallytrue. Many free logicianswill not be happywith what SFFL deliversin etc. the way of logicaltruths,valid arguments, They will think that the logical laws are less numerousthan those deliveredby the weak reading(e.g., that I V -Fv(t)3vF1, though weaklylogicallytrueby E3, is not logicallytrue)but morenumerousthan those delivered by the strongreading(e.g., that r = ttl, though not stronglylogically

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true, is logicallytrue);so they will believethat neitherreading of capturesthem.The challengehere is groundingthese attributions truth:just why, e.g., is r = ttl logicallytrue?Given the notion logical of logicalform outlinedin s1, this problemreducesto justifyingsome alternative NINO. To avoid circularity, justificationof this to the alternative cannotbe that it yieldsthe desiredlogical laws. I shallconcludeby considering whethersupervaluational semantics embodiesa principled alternative NINO. In first-order to supervaluationalsystems,as in SFFL, the possiblesemanticvaluesof I non-logicalsymbolsare given by interpretations in whichclassical existenceassumptionsare relaxed,but the value of a sentenceS under I is fixed by a two-stepprocess.If I does not determine truth-value a for S by VAL,we do not yet concludethat S is neitherI-truenor I-false. Instead,we considerways I' in whichclassicalconditionsmay be restoredin I so as to give S a truth-value VAL.S is then said to be by I-true(-false)if it is true (false)undereach such I' and to be neither true nor false underI otherwise.In some supervaluational systems, e.g., van Fraassen's[17],the I' are obtainedfrom I by a convention to assigningtruth-values atomicformulaewith referenceless terms; in others,e.g., Bencivenga's by expandingI's universeto include [2], non-actualindividuals. general,supervaluational In systemsdo not a truth-functional accountof the connectives; give e.g., FV FIF21can be trueunderI whileneitherF1 nor F2 is. semanticsmakesformalsentencessuch as [ = ttl Supervaluational and FV F-iF1logicallytruein the strongsenseof beingtrueunderevery It interpretation. shouldthereforeinterestthose who believethat sentenceslike 'Odysseus Odysseus'and 'Odysseus' is heightwas more than 6 feet, or it wasn't'mustbe true.It is less clear that it providesa rationalbasis for such beliefs.Is theresome reason,independent of desiredresults,to hold that when normalevaluationprocedures do not fix a truth-value are to proceedas above?Imagine(whatis in we fact the case )10that followingthis procedure tellsus that Fv -F,(t)3vF1 is logicallytrue. Shouldwe acceptthis resultor "correct" procedure the as to avoid it? If the former,what is compellingabout the method? so If the latter,what is compellingabout the "correction"? I do not thinkthat what the supervaluationists themselvessay on
its behalf gives anyone much reason to embrace this semantics. I shall

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The first is supposed developand criticizethreeof theirarguments. to justify rejecting NINO: in some no-inputcases, there are indeed semanticoutputs.The other two are supposedto point towardthe which these cases are and methodfor determining supervaluational in what outputsare forthcoming them. I i. Theargument from substitution. give the argumentfor 'Pegasus to is Pegasus'; maybe generalized othersentences. 'Cicerois Cicero' it (1) is logicallytrue;(2) "if a sentenceA is logicallytrue, then any sentence obtainedfrom A througha consistentsubstitutionof singularterms for singulartermsmustalso be logicallytrue"[18at 489];so (3) 'Pegasus is Pegasus'is logicallytrue;(4) any logicallytrue sentenceis true;so (5) 'Pegasusis Pegasus'is true. This argumentis inadequate,becauseit fails to groundthe substitution (1) principle(2). Classicalsemanticsunderwrites but not (2) - unless, of course,singulartermsrefer.NINO semanticswill groundboth (1) and (2), providedlogical truthis understoodweakly; semanticscan give but then (4) is false. Of course,supervaluational from substitutionis supposed us (1), (2), and (4); but the argument to help rationalizethis approach,not the other way around. It ii. Theargument from convention. may be arguedthat certain sentenceswith non-referring terms,e.g., 'Odysseusdevisedthe Trojanare horse stratagem', nonethelesstrue (or false) by convention(given, storiesor myths).If logical semanticswere to incorporatethis say, by view, a possiblevalue for a namewould be a referentor a convention to about its use given by assigningtruth-values atomic sentences does?In semantics it. But isn'tthisjust whatsupervaluational containing and I an the methodof supervaluations, interpretation specifiesreferents a classical"restoration" of I simplysuppliesa conventionfor the use I' of those termsthat, accordingto I, have no referent. is One difficultywith this argument that the answerto the rhetorical is 'Not quite'.If we wantedto formalizethe idea that sentences question termsmay be true or false by convention,we'd do it with non-referring a represent conventionfor the use of by makingan interpretation terms.Then the value (if any) of a sentencefor those non-referring by represented I would possiblevaluesof its non-logicalconstituents simplybe its I-value(if any). A moreseriousdifficultyis the assumption in that possibleconventionsmust be complete the sense of fixingthe

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truthvalueof eachatomicconstruction term. containinga non-referring But actualconventionsare incomplete; considervan Fraassen's remark that "althoughI can think of many artificialways to bestowa certain truth-value 'Pegasushas a white hind leg,' I cannot find a single on reasonto call it trueor to call it false"([18]at 481). Therefore, plausible the argument does not honor principle(3) of s1. If the possibleconventionsare to includethe actualones, we cannotrequirethat possible conventionsbe complete."1 if conventionsfor the use of nonAnd cannot referringtermsmay be incomplete,then (a) supervaluations formalizea truth-by-convention to sentenceswith nonapproach termsand (b) sentences whoselogicalformsare givenby I = ttl referring or rV F-IFl will sometimeslack truth-value thus cannotbe logically and true in the strongsense. iii. Theargument from mentalexperiments. Bencivengaobserves of sentenceS that, wheretermsrefer,the truth-value a first-order can be identifiedwith the resultof an ideal "practical experiment": determine whetherthe referents S's termshavethe properties of required S's logicalform) for the truthof S. Wheretermsdo not refer,such (by are experiments impossiblein principle,but we may still conduct "mentalexperiments" askingwhat might be the case were termsto by Were'Pegasus'to refer,it mightbe that Pegasushas a whitehind refer. leg, and it might be that it does not. But for some sentences,such as 'Pegasusdoes or does not have a white hind leg', all such "mental experiments" yield the same result.So, Bencivenga concludes,"it is at least reasonableto proposethe followingrule:when all the mental to experiments agreein assigninga certaintruth-value a certainsentence containinga non-denotingsingularterm,let that truth-valuebe definitelyassignedto the sentence,whereaswhen this is not the case, let the truth-value the sentence be left undetermined" at 225).And of of ([3] coursethis sortof ruleis just whatwe findin supervaluational semantics. Now "it is at least reasonableto propose"does not suggestthat a The compellingcase has been made for supervaluations. proposedrule is certainly"reasonable" the sense of decidingno-inputcases in a in way consistentwithstandardsemantics.And as long as we stay away from sentenceslike 'Pegasusexists',it doesn't seem to yield truth-values that are clearlywrong. But this is not much of a recommendation: standardsemantics saysnothingaboutno-inputcases,

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and very little is cl:ar about the truth-values sentenceswith of terms.Furthermore, Bencivenga's non-referring suggestionis really ratherodd. The truth-value any) of a sentencewhose termsdon't (if referis to be decidedby imagining,contraryto fact, that they do refer. That is, we are to decidethefact of the matterby makingassumptions contrarytofact. In general,this does not seem good advice.It is silly to think that realmarketsmust allocateresourcesoptimally becauseideal markets,definedby completelyunrealisticassumptions, do so. At the time of his death, the ambitiousguest of Hawthorne's tale [8] has achievednothing,and imaginingwhat might have been servesonly heightenthe irony of the situation;we certainlydo not becauseit wouldhave been so, but judge that his life was satisfactory for the avalanchethat endedit. If thereis somethingpeculiarabout to truththat makesit appropriate judge what'strue in some situation should tell us differentsituations,B',ncivenga totally by considering it is. what I Given the weaknessof these arguments, doubt that supercan valuationalconstructions reallyenableus to validatecertain familiarlaws of logic while at the same time takingnon-referring termsseriously.The naturalassumptionis that takingreference failureseriouslyinvolvesacceptingNINO, but this principlemakes termsyield the truth-value gaps that keep sentences non-referring such as [ = ttl and I v F-F1 from beinglogicallytrue in the standard semanticsseemsto confound (strong)sense. Supervaluational termscan, after all, this assumptionby showinghow non-referring this approachseemsto ground furthermore, yield truth-values; certainfamiliarlogical laws in just the way that principles(1) and (2) of s1 require.Now it is clearthat supervaluational
semantics does - or can be made to12 - produce desired results.

The issue, however,is whetherit is more than a technicaldevice don't give anyone for doing so, and the arguments considered just semanticsis merelya if supervaluational reasonto think that it is. But alternative NINO, then to technicaldevice,if it embodiesno principled it cannot groundthe laws of logic, and we have no reasonto think those like Lambert identifieslogicaltruths.Accordingly, that it correctly of [12]who look to it to save logic from unwelcomeinterpretations should, I think, look elsewhere. microphysics

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I thankthe anonymousreadersof earlierversionsof this paperfor and pointingout variousmisrepresentations directingmy attentionto some of the articlesdiscussedin s5.

NOTES be for The suggestion is thatRussell's here cumbersome analysis adopted non-referring terms terms of should that us commit only.Butit maybeargued a Russellian analysis such to thesame of terms insists, analysis referring as well.If, as Bencivenga logical properties andrelations "should independent be exists what notexist" at400), and does of...what ([1] whatbasis there forassigning can be and is is different 'Odysseus Odysseus' 'Plato Plato' forms? logical see 2 Fora contrary view, Zemach [20]. that mountain because is it is, explains "wecannot howhighthegolden 3 Findlay say indeterminate in respect height" at 57). of simply ([6] like have in hibernate'...simply notbeengiven meaning any 4 "... sentences 'adverbs current English." at 134). ([16] van that scheme in questions Fraassen's by 5 Skryms analysis suggesting theargument doesnotexist, n isnot...1 doesn't so warrant and values when r giving = nt1 fpnldifferent n doesn't ([15] 478). refer at are andt doesnotrefer, then 6 Thefollowing inconsistent: if V is empty (1) = F a ValA(F) ValA(F,(t)); a formula withk freevariables (2) designatesk-ary truth-valued function 11whose on values given F's truth-values various are under by is if For that is A; assignments(3)[3vRvnl false n doesnotrefer. (1)and(3)entail r3vRvt/1 if A-false 4 isempty, whereas entails it hasnotruth-value A.(1)and(3)hold that under (2) in SFFL; since failswhen is empty, I& SFFLdoesnotcompletely (2) embody Frege's functional of language. view valuation do notfixthevalues subject-predicate rules of sentences s Woodrufifs withnon-referring Hesuggests "failure reference notalways terms. that of need give riseto truth-value ([19] 138), in "sentences fictional as about characters" gaps" at at Such viewcouldbeaccommodatedadding a clauses ([19] 139). by covering specific such could that subject-predicate sentences; clauses be require fPn be true, rPn21 and be under interpretation an no false, rPn31 neither to assigning referent anyof the names. 9 Provided holds every in a-variant My of when hasno a-variant at 480). 4oa ([15] Mj 10Notethatthelogical truths delivered thesupervaluational (falsehoods) by procedure described above justthosesentences areweakly are that true logically (false). " Bencivenga's version theargument convention withtheobservation of from starts that"the truth-value a sentence 'Pegasus a white leg',oreven fact that of has hind the like thissentence a truth-value, has is ultimately beestablished theground some to on of convention" at 401,myemphasis). ([1] 12In[2],e.g.,Bencivenga what fix" develops looklikea "technical to keepthesupervaluational method making V-iPtivPvllogically from r true.
wherer(t) is the readingof t. 7 Strictly,fr(t) exists1,

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of Department Philosophy, of University Connecticut, Storrs,CT 06269-2054, U.S.A.