Philopenus Influence

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Philoponus in the Arabo-Latin tradition
In the mid-sixth century of our era, two Neoplatonists - the pagan Simplicius and the Christian John Philoponus - confronted one another on a number of issues in their exegesis of the works of Aristotle. One of the main questions at issue between the two adversaries was the question of the eternity of the world. Had it always existed, as Aristotle believed, following Aristotle in book 8 of the Physics and the De Caelo, or had in come into existence or been generated (Greek gignesthai, egeneto), as Philoponus maintained, following the doctrine of the Bible and a literalist interpretation of Plato's Timaeus 1? Philoponus' arguments have already attracted scholarly attention, and it is to be hoped that new light will be shed on his debate with Simplicius by the first complete English translation of Book one of his Commentary on the Physics, which contains his arguments against Book six of Philoponus' Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World2. In any case, aspects of the debate between them, as vehicled by Arabic translations of several of Philoponus' key anti-Aristotelian and anti-Proclan works, were of tremendous importance for the development of Islamic theology and philosophy. Philoponus' views were partially accepted by al-Kind, through whom they were influential upon the so-called Plotiniana Arabica3, and by al-Ghazl ; and they were refuted by Frb. Echoes of the latter's arguments, transmitted by ibn Bjja, reached Maimonides and Averroes, whence they provided food for the reflection of Thomas Aquinas. The present article is envisaged as a survey of the some of the works and doctrines of John Philoponus, as they exerted an influence, through various intermediaries, particularly Frb and Averroes, to Thomas Aquinas. I begin with brief surveys of the Latin and Arabic tradition of Philoponus, followed by an analysis of some of the latter's chief arguments in favor of the world's temporal creation. The central part of the paper consists in a study of the text and translation (provided in an Appendix) of a selection of Averroes' quotations from and
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On the historical and philosophical background to these issues, cf. Chase 2011.
Philoponus' arguments, but not Simplicius' responses, have been translated by Wildberg 1987. The translation by I. Bodnar, M. Chase and M. Share of Simplicius In Phys. Books 1-5, is scheduled to appear in R. Sorabji's series Ancient Commentators on Aristotle in the course of 2012. Cf. Endress 1997, 56-57 ; 2002, 30 ; D'Ancona 2005, 1 : 36-41. I hope to return to this important subject in future publications.
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2 discussions of Philoponus' arguments, in the course of which I argue for the importance of taking Simplicius' text into consideration, which often provides the requisite doctrinal background for understanding Philoponus, and hence the Arabo-Islamic authors who adopted and adapted his arguments.
This paper discusses the influence of the works and doctrines of John Philoponus (c. 490574), as it came down through various intermediaries to Thomas Aquinas. One branch of this tradition is fairly straightforward, another less well-known and rather complex. Following the time-honored Aristotelian tradition, I'll discuss the clearest tradition first, then progress to the less clear. I. Philoponus and Thomas I.1. The direct Latin tradition : Simplicius In De Caelo No complete work by the Neoplatonist philosopher John Philoponus appears to have been translated into Latin in the Middle Ages. The only explicitly attributed text available to the Scholastics was a version of book II, chapters 4-9 of his commentary on the De anima, but this work seems to have had little influence on either Albert the Great or Thomas Aquinas4. In his commentary on the De Caelo, Thomas' knowledge of Philoponus derives in the first instance from William of Moerbeke's Latin translation of Simplicius' Commentary on the De Caelo (completed in 1271). Thomas' own commentary on the De Caelo contains seven references to Ioannes grammaticus, qui dictus est Philoponus 5, but the Aquinate shows no particular interest in Philoponus as a historical personage, and no knowledge of, or at least no interest in, the fact that the Philoponus in question was a Christian. As far as Thomas is concerned, Philoponus was merely an adversary of Simplicius who wrongly argued against the Aristotelian doctrine of the perpetuity a parte ante and a parte post of the heavens. Thomas is aware of Philoponus' argument, which we'll study in a few moments, that a
Comment [RT1]: Mike, I would sugges you put in here 1-2 paragraphs indicating early on some of the key reasons why / ho Philoponus is important to Aquinas for those not familiar with the connections. Th will give the reader a clear and concise understanding of what is coming and its value.
Comment [LF2]: I agree, a brief explanation on the relevance of Philoponu argumentation regarding creation and ho these arguments were used by many Arab Jewish and Latin theologians and philosophers would be very helpful for the readers.
It has been argued, notably by Sten Ebbesen, that several fragments of Philoponus' commentary on the Posterior Analytics circulated in Latin during the Middle Ages, under the name of Alexander. See the references in G. R. Giardina (in press), 468.
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In De caelo, lib. 1, l. 6 n. 3.
3 celestial body, since it is finite in magnitude, has only finite power (virtus), and therefore cannot last forever. Thus, despite the fact that Philoponus put forth these arguments in order to argue in favor of the Christian view of creation, Thomas, following Simplicius and Averroes, rejects them. Philoponus, says Thomas (following the Neoplatonic line of argument) misinterpreted Plato's Timaeus as teaching a temporal beginning of the heavens, whereas in fact all Plato meant to point out was their dependency on a higher cause. Above all, Thomas, unlike Philoponus, believes that although the world did have a beginning, it will have no end . I.2. The Arabo-Latin tradition Philoponus' reputation in the Arabic tradition, where he was known, among other sobriquets, as John the Grammarian (Yay al-naw) was a strange one. He was said to have been a Jacobite bishop of Alexandria, deposed for having abandoned his faith in the Trinity, and to have lived long enough to witness the Muslim conquest of Alexandria, under Amr b. al-, in 6417. Some, if not most of Philoponus' authentic works were translated into Arabic8. Three of these will interest us primarily here : the Against Proclus on the eternity of the World, which survives almost entirely in Greek9 ; the Against Aristotle, the original Greek
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Comment [RT3]: It would be good to have a note here with reference to 1-2 pieces of literature on this.
In Phys., 8, lectio 21, 1147 ; Summa Theol. 1, 104a.4, ad 1 and 2. Philoponus believes the world shall be instantly destroyed when God chooses to do so, but only to prepare the way for the emergence of a better world at the Resurrection. This appears to have been the theme of the lost eighth book of his Against Aristotle : cf. the fragment recently discovered by M. Rashed (2007, 271 ff.) in the Kitb al-minfaa by the 11th-century Antiochene Melchite theologian Ibn al-Fadl Abdallah al-Ank. Troupeau 77, Gannag. Philoponus was even, on some accounts, indirectly responsible for the burning of the library of Alexandra (Gannag 7). According to a plausible hypothesis, the name of John the Grammarian may have been confused in the sources with that of John of Nikiu, Jacobite bishop of Egypt in the second half of the seventh century. It remains unclear exactly how many. Graf, writing in 1944, affirmed that Neben einen kleinen Auswahl seiner philosophischen Schriften wurde nur sein polemische Werk gegen die Lehre des Proklus von der Ewigkeit der Welt in arabischer Uebersetzung bekannt und benutzt (GCAL I, 417). Contrast this claim with that of E. Gannag, who affirms that Philoponus' philosophical works, cites avec parcimonie, ont pourtant t quasiment toutes traduites . The first four books of Philoponus' commentary on the Physics were translated by Qus b. Lq, while the translation of the last four books was attributed to the Syrian Christian Abd al-Mas ibn Nima al-im, the translator of the Theology of Aristotle (P. Fenton 1986, 242). Although now lost, these translations were influential on the scholia accompanying Isq ibn unain's translation of the Physics, preserved in the ms. Leiden Or. 583 ; cf. A. Hasnawi 1994, and the dissertation by E. Giannakis, Philoponus in the Arabic Tradition of Aristotles Physics, University of Oxford 1992. Except for Proclus' opening argument, missing in the only extant Greek manuscript, but which survives in at least two Arabic translations. One, preserved in two Istanbul manuscripts stemming from the circle of Al9 8 7
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4 text of which survives only in fragments preserved mainly by Simplicius10, and what is likely to have been a third separate work, the Book on the proof of the contingency of the world. This last work is probably the one refuted by Simplicius near the end of his massive commentary on the Physics11, and an Arabic translation of a summary12 of it survives in at least two manuscripts. It was commented on by the Christian philosopher Ibn Suwr, disciple of Yay ibn Ad in 10th-century Baghdad13. Some version of Philoponus' arguments seems to have been refuted by Avicenna in his treatise concerning that which has been established according to him with regard to the proofs of those who affirm that the past has a temporal beginning and to their being resolved into syllogisms 14. In any given case, it is hard to tell exactly what work by Philoponus a given particular argument comes from. In his Contra Aristotelem he often repeats, sometimes in abbreviated form, arguments he had already set forth in the Contra Proclum a procedure that frustrates Simplicius, who had not read the latter work and he is likely to have done the same in the De contingentia mundi. II. Philoponus' arguments
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Kind, contains eight of Proclus' eighteen arguments and seems to have been used by al-ahrastn in his Kitb al-milal wa-l-nial, p. 1025-1032 Badrn (Cairo 1947-1955) ; cf. G. Endress 1973, 15-17 ; A. Hasnawi 1994, 91 ; while the other, containing nine arguments, was carried out by Isq ibn unain (ed. Badawi, Neoplatonici apud arabes, text no. 27, p. 33-42). According to Anawati (1956, p. 23), Proclus' 18 arguments in favor of the eternity of the word were translated into Arabic several times and independently of Philoponus' refutation of them . For translations of Proclus' opening argument, cf. Anawati 1956 (French), Adamson, and McGinnis. AlQif possessed an Arabic translation of at least part of Philoponus' Against Proclus, while al-Brn cites it several times in his Taqq m li-l-Hind (p. 17 ; 111 ; 114 Sachau) ; cf. G. Endress 1973, 17-18.
10 Sorabji 1988, 259 ; D'Ancona 2003. For Arabic translations cf. Ibn al-Nadm, K. al-Fihrist (Leipzig 1871), I, 254, and, for al-Qif and Ibn Ab Uaybia, M. Steinschneider, AI-Farabi (St. Petersburg 1869), pp. 162 ; 220224. 11 12
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Simplicius, In Phys., p. 1326, 38 - 1336, 34 Diels.
Kitb Yay al-Naw f-l-dalla al ad al-lam, preserved in ms. 240 of the Hunt Collection of the Bodleian Library, fol. 195v-109v, and in Vatican ms. Arabo 103, fol. 30a-32b ; cf. S. Pines 1972 ; G. Troupeau 1984. Pines suggests that the extant summaries may represent translations of the kephalaia, summaries or subject-headings, that are often inserted at the beginning of Greek manuscripts. Treatise on the fact that the proof of John the Grammarian of the contingency of the world is more acceptable than that of the theologians , ed. Badawi, Neoplatonici apud Arabes, Cairo 1955, 244-248, and translated by B. Lewin 1954. Risla lahu al-ras Ab Al Ibn Sn f m taqarrara indahu f ujaj al-mubitn li-l-ma mabdaan zamniyyan wa-tallih ila-l-qiyst, preserved inter alia in ms. British Museum Add. Or. 7473. Cf. S. Pines 1972, 347 ff.
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5 Herbert Davidson has given an elegant account of the structure of Philoponus' arguments against the perpetuity of the world, and in favor of its having been created. He breaks them down into two main headings. One, known to Kind15, Frb16, Sijistn, Avicenna and Averroes, was based on the impossibility of an actually infinite number. The other, known to Ibn Ad, Ibn Suwar and, once again, Averroes, was based on the principle that a finite body can contain only finite power. Roughly speaking, the first argument boils down to the principle that in order for an entity to exist, it cannot have an infinite number of prerequisites17. Thus, whether we're talking about the transformations of one element into another (as discussed by Aristotle in the De generatione et corruptione), or the coming into being of an individual like Socrates, the chain of events leading to the occurrence of a particular elemental change or to Socrates' coming into being cannot be infinite, since, as had been known since Zeno, a quantity that is infinite in act can never be traversed. But if the world had existed forever, such causal chains would have been infinite. Therefore, Philoponus argued, the world has not existed forever, but its existence had a beginning in time : that is, it was created18. The standard answer to this objection, pioneered by al-Frb in his lost work On Changing Beings and adopted by Avicenna, was that an infinite series is objectionable only if its members exist simultaneously and are ordered. But neither infinite past time nor an infinite number of past ancestors meets these conditions, so that the objection fails19. Philoponus' second set of proofs as identified by Davidson, destined for a long and influential career in medieval thought, was based on the axiom that a finite body can contain only finite power20. Aristotle had used this principle in Physics VIII, 10 to argue for the necessity of an incorporeal Prime Mover : if the heavens are to move for an infinite time, as
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Cf. H. A. Davidson 1987, 107 ff.
Frb seems to have dealt with Philoponus in several of his works, notably in his al-radd al Yay alnaw (Against John the Grammarian), Arabic text ed. M. Mahdi 1972, study and translation M. Mahdi 1967. Here, Frb argued against the first five books of the Contra Aristotelem, in which Philoponus attempts to refute Aristotle's doctrines of the fifth body and lack of a contrary to circular motion, as set forth in the De Caelo. It appears to have been in his lost work On Changing Beings (F al-mawjdt al-mutaayyira) that Frb tackled the sixth book of Philoponus' Against Aristotle, devoted to arguments against Aristotle's proofs of the eternity of the world ; cf. M. Mahdi 1967 ; M. Rashed 2008. Cf. Wolfson 1976, 428 ff. ; Davidson 1987, 130 ff. ; Lettinck 1994, 402-403 ; 415 ; 658-659 ; Glasner 2009, 76 ff.
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Cf. Maimonides, Guide, I, ch. 74. Davidson 1987, 127 ff. Cf. A. Davidson 1987, 244 ff.
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6 Aristotle believes, they must be moved by an infinite power. But no finite body can contain infinite power ; therefore the Prime Mover must be incorporeal. In the fifth century, Proclus (412-485)21 used this principle to infer that the world requires an incorporeal cause not just to ensure its perpetual motion, as Aristotle had argued, but also its perpetual existence : in Aristotelian terms, God is not merely the final cause of the motion of the heavenly bodies, but their efficient cause, or cause of their existence as well. The world, Proclus concludes, is both perpetual (aidios) and generated (gentos) : perpetual because it had no temporal beginning and will have no end, but generated because God continuously grants it being, in quantities small enough for it to accept, throughout its perpetual existence. Proclus' student Ammonius (ca. 440-520) wrote a treatise to prove that God is both the efficient and final cause of the world, a viewpoint that was later to be adapted by Simplicius22, the Theology of Aristotle23, the author of the Harmony between Plato and Aristotle24 (who was probably not Frb, I believe, (following M. Rashed 2008, 2009), Maimonides25, and Averroes26. For the moment, let's retain as the key element of Proclus' argument that the world derives the eternity both of its motion and of its being from elsewhere : the world's perpetuity, as Proclus puts it using a phrase from Plato's Statesman, is episkeuast, adventitious or acquired after the fact. The Arabic summary constituting the first section of the De contingentia mundi opens with what may well be Philoponus' ipsissima verba : It is impossible that the world should be eternal a parte ante (azaliyyan) and it is obligatory that it should be created in time (mudaan) and have come into existence after not having existed.
Proclus, In Tim. 1, 268, 2-6. Cf. R. Sorabji 1988, 251 ff. ; C. Steel 1987, 13 f. ; A. Davidson 1987, 281 ff. ; I. Croese 1998, 48 ff. This notion may well go back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, who seems to have postulated the notion of a divine power originating in the heavenly bodies, which he held to bring about, and preserve, form and order in the sublunar realm (Freudenthal 2006, 37).
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In Phys., p. 1362-3 Diels. Theology of Aristotle, p. 27, 7-28,3 Badawi = p. 237, 7 - 238 D'Ancona et al.
Harmony, p. 63, 15 ff. Martini Bonadeo. The Theology and the pseudo-Frb both emphasize the extratemporal, instantaneous nature of divine creation, but so does Philoponus.
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Guide, 2, 21. De substantia orbis, I, p. 69 ff. Hyman.
7 To prove this affirmation, Philoponus27 took Proclus' argument and gave it a decisive twist, in order to construct the following proof : i. The body of the universe is finite (Aristotle, De Caelo I). ii. Therefore, it cannot contain infinite power (Aristotle, Physics VIII28). iii. Therefore, the world was created in time and came into existence after not having existed29. Now, iv. Someone might object (as Proclus did), that the world's perpetual existence might be bestowed upon it by the infinite power of God. But iv. Such an extrinsic cause would not change the fact that the world is perishable by nature30 ; that is, it bears within it the logos of destructibility and is therefore gentos. This much seems clear. There is, however, some controversy among modern interpreters over whether Philoponus' proof that the world is susceptible of generation and destruction suffices to prove that the world actually was generated and actually will be destroyed. Davidson has argued that Philoponus needs two additional premises to make this step : 1. In the course of infinite time, every possibility must eventually be realized31, and 2. If something is destructible, it must be generated32.
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De conting. mundi ap. Simpl. In Phys. 1326,38-1336, 34 ; De aet. mundi VI, 29, p. 233-242 Rabe. Philoponus does not hesitate to attribute this principle to Plato as well ; cf. De aet. mundi, p. 235, 4 ff.
Rabe. See R. Sorabji 1988, 257, citing Philoponus, Contra Arist., fr. 80 Wildberg = Simpl., In de Cael., 142, 2225 ; Simpl., In Phys., 1326, 38-1336, 24 ; 1358, 26-1359, 4. Simplicius (In de Cael. p. 361, 10-15 Heiberg), denies this, arguing that the world has a nature that is suitable for receiving its perpetuity from elsewhere.
31 A principle that seems to have been conceded by Simplicius. Cf. In Phys., p. 1170, 31 f. Diels, where he infers from the fact that something is perishable (phtharton) that it will perish later (dlon hs husteron phtharsetai). But Aristotle (De Cael., 282a22-25 ; 283a24-29) already notes that anything destructible must eventually be destroyed, and cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, who, in a fragment from his lost Commentary on the Physics (preserved by Simplicius, In Phys., 1170, 5 ff.) argues that If they [sc. what causes motion and what is movable] are imperishable, if one is motive and the other movable for infinite time, again, one of then will cause motion, and the other will be moved ; for this is what it is to be capable (dunaton) : that which would occur if what is said to be capable (dunasthai) did not perish first . 32 Simplicius holds (In Phys., 1171, 15 ff.) that Aristotle proves the reciprocal entailments (i) x is generable iff x is perishable, and (ii) x is ungenerated iff x is imperishable in Book I of the De Caelo ; cf. 282b5-283a4. 30 29
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8 Whatever its precise structure and persuasive force may be, Philoponus' version of the argument from infinite power was destined for a long and influential future in medieval Arabic and Latin thought. III. Philoponus and Averroes We have seen that nominal fragments of Philoponus are rare in Thomas Aquinas, and confined, with a few exceptions33, to the commentary on the De Caelo. This scarcity contrasts with the situation in Averroes, who confronts the views of Ioannes or Yay al-naw on numerous occasions34. In our Text 1, from the epitome of the Physics, Averroes attributes the view that there is a first motion to Plato and the other members of the Kalm . He goes on to say that Frb, Avicenna and Ibn Bjja thought that at Physics 8, 1, 251a6 ff. Aristotle cites his definition of motion in order to demonstrate that there is another motion prior to whatever motion one may choose35. This, Averroes concludes, was also the view of Philoponus, who attempted to refute Aristotle on precisely this point. Averroes himself initially accepted this interpretation, but after thinking the matter over long and hard36 he came to believe Aristotle's goal was not to prove that motion is eternal as a genus, but to show that the motion of the first sphere is prior to all individual motions37. As has been shown by a number of recent scholars, especially Puig Montada (1990, 1997, 1999a, 1999b) and Glasner (2009), this passage reflections a paradigmatic state of affairs in Averroes' intellectual development. Averroes initially38 accepts a position in this case, the
Closely following Averroes' commentary on Physics 4.5 ( = our Latin text 9), Thomas' De natura loci (Opuscule 51, vol. 5, Paris 1858, p. 368 ff.) mentions the views of Johannes Grammaticus. A selection of the fragments in which Averroes mentions Philoponus is given (with no claim to exhaustivenessvity) in the Appendix.
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This is what R. Glasner (2009) has called the succession argument ; cf. 6.2.1, p. 69 ff. ...quod apparuit mihi post longam perscrutationem, Averroes, Long In Phys., 345 I.
Thomas Aquinas (In Phys., lib. 8, lec. 2 n. 986) maintains that Aristotle means to speak about all motion, not just the motion of the heavens. This was already the view of Simplicius ; cf. In Phys. 1131, 9ff., Puig 1990, 207 ; 1999 b, 232.
38 In the first version of the Epitome on Physics, dating from 1159 (Puig 1990, 310), and some sections of the Long Commentary.
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9 straightforward interpretation, defended among others by Simplicius39, that Aristotle's goal in Physics 8.1. is to show that motion is eternal because every motion one may wish to choose is preceded and followed by another motion which he seems to have derived immediately ultimately from Philoponus, by way of Frb's On Changing Beings, probably as quoted by Ibn Bjja. Later on40, Averroes rejects this position, which he attributes to Plato, Philoponus, Frb, Avicenna, Ibn Bjja and the mutakallimn, and substitutes for it his own view, according to which Aristotle is talking not about motion per se, but investigating whether the first motion of the first mobile (i.e., the heaven), is caused by the Prime Mover, is eternal or generated in time. Averroes' final view, as expressed in the Tahfut (p. 188-9 Bouygues), is that infinite motions in the world are infinite in genus only because of the one single continuous eternal movement of the body of the heavens41. Our Text 2, from Averroes' Long Commentary on Metaph. Lambda, makes an interesting distinction among those who believe that there is both an efficient cause and that processes of coming-into-being actually occur (Table 1). First there are those who affirm the latent (ahl alkumn) that is, that all things pre-exist in all things, and that coming-into-being is merely the emergence of what already exists in a state of latency. On this view, the only function of the agent, who is merely an efficient cause of motion, is that of initiating this process of emergence. This school of thought, which holds that coming-into-being is substantial change, and that nothing comes from nothing, includes, with variations, the views of Avicenna, Themistius, Frb, and, according to Averroes, Aristotle himself. In contrast, those who maintain creation and invention emergence (ahl al-ibd wa-litir) hold that the agent creates the entire world without any need for preexistent matter. This, says Averroes, is the view of both Christian and Muslim mutakallimn, the first of whom, it is implied, was Philoponus. Our passage ends with the report from Frb's On Changing Beings that Philoponus claimed there is no possibility except in the agent : I assume that possibility (Arabic imkn) here renders the Greek to dunaton or h dunamis42, and so is more or less equivalent to matter, so that the claim that there is no possibility except in the agent amounts to the claim that God created matter.
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Puig 1999a, 156.
In the second version of the Epitome, other parts of the Long Commentary, perhaps edited first in 1186 (Puig 1990) and the Physical Questions, dating from about 1195.
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Cf. R. Glasner 2009, 75 ff. Cf. Goichon, Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sn (Paris 1938), no. 670, 1, p. 382.
10 Text 3, also from the Long Commentary on Metaph. Lambda, contains a statement of Philoponus' objection from finite power. If every body has finite power, and the heaven is a body, then the heaven has finite power. But what's finite is corruptible, and therefore, one presumes, will be corrupted or destroyed at some point in time. Averroes then reports Philoponus' response to the objection by Proclus noted shortly above : even if a finite body, because it is finite, must have limited power and therefore be destructible, said Proclus, why couldn't it acquire power sufficient to allow it to last forever from some external, infinite and eternal source ? This of course, is not only Proclus' view, but apparently that of Plato himself at Timaeus 41 a-d, when the Demiurge informs the lesser gods (i.e. the planets) that although they are not inherently immortal, they will in fact never be destroyed because the will of the Demiurge will always maintain them in existence43. We'll see shortly that a similar view was also attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias. At any rate, Philoponus apparently argued that this view, which amounts to maintaining that something generated (Greek genton) can nevertheless be aphtharton or imperishable, is excluded by Aristotle in the last chapters of Book I of the De Caelo. Indeed, even Simplicius agrees that here, Aristotle argues that something is generated iff it is perishable, and imperishable iff it is ungenerated44. Another version of these arguments appears in our Text 3a, from the Middle commentary on the De Caelo : all that is eternal and corruptible contains a potential for destruction. The heaven, as a body, is finite and therefore has finite power. It will therefore be corruptible per se, but incorruptible owing to the infinite power it receives from its motive cause. Here we encounter the attribution of this view to Alexander and to Avicenna, which we'll see again shortly below (Text 5). Our Text 4, from the Long Commentary on the De Caelo, presents the same variation on the argument from finite power : if the heaven is of finite extent and therefore power, it will be corruptible with regard to its finite power but incorruptible with regard to its infinite power, and this, presumably, is absurd. Text 4a, from the De substantia orbis, provides another testimony to this argument.
Plato, Timaeus 41b : , , , .

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43
Cf. Simplicius, In Phys., 1171, 15-20.
11 Our Text 5 is taken from Averroes' commentary on Physics VIII, 10, 266a27 ff. Since it has been discussed at length by Carlos Steel (1987), Richard Sorabji (date?1988, 1990b), and H. A. Davidson (1969, 1987), among others, we can go over it here fairly quickly. Given that every body has finite power, Averroes asks, does this apply to the celestial body that is, the outermost sphere or not ? If it does, then the celestial body is corruptible. Now Aristotle has proved that the presence infinite power in a body would entail the absurd consequence of instantaneous motion45 ; but this would not hold true of infinite power in an incorporeal agent. Averroes goes on to state that Alexander, in some of his treatises , claims that the celestial body obtains its eternity from its immaterial mover46. Yet this implies that there will be something corruptible that is never actually corrupted : such, as we have seen, was Plato's opinion, but Aristotle showed at the end of book One of the De Caelo that nothing with the potential of corruptibility can be eternal47. It was John the Grammarian, Averroes continues, who raised the most difficult puzzle of all against the Peripatetics, opining that the world is generable and corruptible. Aristotle had shown in book Two of the De Caelo that the heaven has finite power, and it was on this basis, along with the views of Alexander, that Avicenna came up with his idea of two kinds of necessity : necessary per se, like the celestial movers, and contingent per se but necessary ex alio, like the heaven itself48. Averroes, who seems to understand necessary here as tantamount to eternal , will have none of this. According to him, nothing contingent per se can acquire necessity from
45 Cf. Anneliese Maier, Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Sptscholastik ; 4, Metaphysische Hintergrnde der sptscholastischen Naturphilosophie, Roma : Ed. di Storia e letteratura, 1955, p. 259.
Davidson (1987, 321 n. 66) suggests one of Alexander's works referred to by Averroes may be On the motions of the spheres, but we have seen above that some passages from On the Principles of the Whole can also be interpreted in a similar sense. This supposition seems more likely than Sorabji's supposition that Averroes has simply confused Alexander with Proclus, but leaves open the question of whether the Alexandrian texts that influenced Averroes were all genuine, all apocryphal, or a mixture of both.
47 Aristotle, De Caelo, 283a24ff. Cf. Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Caelo, II, comm. 71 ; Thomas Aquinas, De Caelo et Mundo, Lectio 29, p. 74.
46
On this division, and Averroes' (mis-)understanding of it, cf. H. A. Davidson 1987, 318 f. Cf. Abranavel, Mifalot Elohim 2, 3, p. 126, translation Wolfson, Crescas, 597 ; 682 : Plato says that the heavens were generated from that eternal matter which had been in a state of disorderly motion for an infinite time, but at the time of creation was invested with order. Consequently by their own nature the heavens are corruptible just as they were generated, and it is God who implants in them eternity, as is written in the Timaeus. It is from this view that Avicenna has inferred that the celestial sphere is composed of matter and form and is corruptible and possible by its own nature, but necessary and eternal by virtue of its cause .
48
12 something else, for this would entail a contradiction. Instead, he argues that the heavens' passive power, that is, their power to receive motion, is finite. An enmattered form has neither infinite passion nor infinite action, since it is divisible as a result of its presence in the body. For Averroes, the celestial body is not made up of form and matter, but is simple. Its form cannot subsist on its own, but it is moved by its form : it contains no material form at all. Text 6, from the Long Commentary on the De Caelo, is based once again on a report from Frb, although this time the title of the Frbian work is not specified. According to Frb, Philoponus sought to deny the one-to-one correspondence between elementary motions and elementary bodies, as asserted by Aristotle (cf. De Caelo I, 2, 269a8 ff.). Philoponus produced the counter-argument that one kind of motion, viz., motion upwards, is to be found in elementary bodies as different as air and fire, while one another kind of motion, motion downwards, is to be found in the different elementary bodies earth and water. Averroes rejects this argument, alleging that since motions are defined by their points of arrival, if two motions had the same points of arrival they would be the same motion, so that fire's motion, for example, would be indistinguishable from the motion of air. The Frbian work from which this text is excerpted is likely to have been the Refutation of John the Grammarian. Our Text 7 is a rather difficult text from the long commentary on the Physics. It reflects Philoponus' arguments against Aristotle's doctrine in Physics 8, 1, once again probably following Frb in his On Changing Beings. As we have seen in the context of our Text 1, according to the standard interpretation, adopted by Simplicius, Frb, Ibn Bjja, and, at least initially, Averroes himself, the Stagirite had cited his definition of motion from Physics 3 ( the actuality of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially )49 in order to prove that there cannot be motion without the previous existence of things that are capable of such motion, an argument that formed one of the pillars of Aristotle's proof of the eternity of the world. Philoponus denied this, citing as a counter-example the fact that some things, such as the four sublunary elements, possess their natural motion as soon as they come into existence. In our passage, Averroes, following Frb, envisages two ways in which the object in motion (Latin motum = Greek kinton) is prior to motion (Latin motus = Greek kinsis) (see Table 2). In the first scenario, which I have called Mode One, characteristic of two of the four
49
Physics, 3, 1, 201a9 : , , .
13 traditional kinds of motion (generation/corruption and translation), the motum that is still potential is of a different kind from the motum in which the motion is (in quo est ipse motus). In other words, the motum containing potentiality might be, for instance, wood, where the wood is potentially fire (which is its actuality), but has not reached it yet, and in that sense still retains its potentiality. The motum in quo est motus, by contrast, might correspond to fire, which is already exercising in act its potential for upward motion. In the second mode by which the motum is prior to motus, the motum in potential is numerically identical with the motum in act. Here, the motum might be fire, which remains self-identical when exercising its dunamis of motion upward. The distinction alluded to so obliquely here is, I believe50, based on the doctrine, developed by the Peripatetic and Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle, of the double entelechy (Table 3). Here, the second kind of entelechy (Entelechy2) refers to what has achieved its completed or perfected form, having cast off all potentiality : it corresponds to the perfective aspect kekintai it has moved (and completed its motion) . Entelechy1, in contrast, corresponds to the present tense (kineitai) : it is in the process of moving ; here the object has begun its motion and is progressing toward its goal, which is its form, but has not yet reached it and therefore retains its potentiality. In the case of the motion whose goal is generation or destruction, Averroes continues, the subiectum (= Greek hupokeimenon) is that out of which the generation/destruction takes place. Averroes gives no illustration. In the case of the translational motion of the elements, which is characterized by a potentiality (potentia = Greek dunamis) temporally preceding that motion, the subiectum is also the body out of which the generation takes place, and here Averroes adduces the case of the element fire as an example. When fire is generated as a whole, it immediately possesses an ubi, that is, a place or direction of its motion, which is upward secundum totum. Likewise, when an individual part of fire is generated, it immediately possesses a part of that ubi51. However, the potentiality for that motion which, according to Aristotle, must exist prior to that motion does not inhere in the fire in act, but in the subject out of which the fire is generated, such as oil. This, Averroes continues, was the point of which Philoponus was ignorant, and this explains how he could maintain, deceiving himself and others, that there is a potentiality
The initial merit of this discovery belongs to Puig (date?), who has discussed Simplicius' distinction between two types of mobile in several important publications (1990, 1997, 1999a-b).
51 When an individual fire comes into being, it immediately occupies a portion of the highest region of the sublunar sphere. 50
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14 (Greek dunamis) existing simultaneously with that of which it is the potentiality, claiming, for instance, that the potentiality for upward motion is immediately united with the form of fire in act. Some additional light can be shed on this passage by our Text 8, from the Long Commentary on the De Caelo. Here we see once again that Philoponus' point, probably in the same argument we have just examined (Text 7), was to maintain, contrary to Aristotle, that some motions occur without the preliminary existence of any capacity or potential for motion. A preceding capacity for motion in is present in the object in motion (motum) only in a forced or counter-natural way (violente). Perhaps what Philoponus has in mind here is a case in which fire is impeded from moving upward by some obstacle : only then does a potential for upward motion that is prior to its actual upward motion actually reside within fire. If we omit such cases of forced or counter-natural motion, this capacity or potentiality (potentia = Greek dunamis) inheres not in the movable object itself, but in that out of which the thing in motion comes to be. Fire's potential for motion, for instance, does not inhere in place (loco, an recte? exspectaveris igne), but in the oil or fire out of which the fire comes into being. In order to improve our understanding of these two obscure fragments, I think we must have recourse to Philoponus' Contra Aristotelem, as preserved in Simplicius' commentary on Physics 8, 152. In fr. 109 Wildberg, Philoponus sets forth his argument that some things acquire their natural motion as soon as they come into being. Such things are movable (kinta) and capable of being moved (dunamena kineisthai)53, but in their case, motion is not preexisted by realities that are have a merely potential existence (ou prouparkhei ts kinses ta pragmata dunamei monon onta). If fire comes into existence in some low-lying place, it instantly receives the property of upward locomotion (tn epi to an phoran), and when water is formed in clouds it instantly tends to move downward, unless it is impeded (ei m ti klusei). Next, Simplicius tells us, Philoponus seems to be answering the objection (hsper enstasin lun) that wood, which is potentially fire, preexists fire's upward motion, so that Aristotle's doctrine that what is movable must preexist motion would be saved. Philoponus has a couple of ripostes against this view. First, Aristotle's definition ( the entelechy of the movable qua movable ) concerns motion, but the change from wood to fire is generation, not (local) motion : wood does not possess upward motion until it perishes and is transformed into fire. It
52
P. 1133, 20-1138, 11 Diels.
53 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, 8, 1, 251a9-10 : .
15 is true that generation does not take place without motion, but upward motion is nevertheless not the actualization of wood's potentiality. Increasingly exasperated with Philoponus' stupidity, Simplicius goes on to report additional arguments set forth by the man he contemptuously calls the Grammarian , who considers he has proved that what is capable of being moved (to dunamenon kineisthai) is not what preexists, such as wood, but that fire itself is capable of being moved. Philoponus now proceeds by reduction, arguing that if upward motion were the entelechy of wood, then fire and wood, which are contraries, would have the same entelechy. Wood, moreover, would wind up with two contrary entelechies : downward motion qua wood, and upward motion qua fire. Summing up his reasons for denying that the potential for fire's upward motion is previously existent in wood, Philoponus lays down (Table 4) that for object A to be described as potentially movable (kinton) by motion m, in the sense that what is capable of walking (badistikon) is man, not the elements of which he is made up, the following conditions must hold : 1. A must be proximately movable by motion m ; 2. It must be exclusively through A's nature that A is movable by motion m ; and 3. A must not perish as a result of motion m. If m = motion upward, then these conditions do not hold when A = wood, but they do when A = fire. Motion is thus the entelechy of the proximate capacity. It follows that what is potentially movable upwards (to dunamei kinton) is not wood but fire. But fire moves upward as soon as it comes into existence. Therefore, it is false that what is potentially movable temporally preexists motion in act. When he sets about refuting these arguments, Simplicius pounces on the point that Philoponus admits that things like fire and water are preceded by their generation, so that in this sense every motion is indeed preceded by another motion, although Simplicius denies that this is a crucial element in Aristotle's proof of the eternity of the world. But his main response (In Phys., p. 1136, 1 ff.) is to invoke the concept of the twofold nature of what is capable of being moved (to dunamenon kineisthai). On the one hand, there is that which has the perfect capacity let's call it dunamis2 that projects activity (to tn teleian ekhon dunamin tn probltikn ts energeias) : for instance, the capacity, always accompanied by actuality, that fire has for moving upward. The other variety of what is capable of motion we'll call it dunamis1 is what tends toward but does not yet possess such perfect capacity. If we
16 compare with our Table 3, we can see at a glance that the doctrine of the twofold dunamis is, as it were, the revers de la medaille of the theory of the twofold entelechy. Thus, according to Simplicius, when Aristotle says that what is capable of being moved preexists motion, he is referring to dunamis1, viz. that which tends to actualize its potentiality but has not yet fully done so. Ignorant of this distinction, Philoponus thinks he can refute Aristotle by showing that in the case of fire and water, motion co-exists with what is capable of being moved according to dunamis2. In other words, whereas Aristotle's point was to argue that dunamis1 must preexist motion, Philoponus stupidly tries to refutes him by proving that dunamis2 does not preexist motion, but is simultaneous therewith. He fails to understand that fire has the capacity for upward motion in the sense of dunamis2, whereas wood has it in the sense of dunamis1, and that wood has upward motion potentially (dunamei), insofar as it tends to become fire, while fire has it in act (kat' energeian). I believe this argumentation sheds at least some light on Averroes' text, and hence on Thomas Aquinas' adaptations of it. Finally, our Text 9, again from the long commentary on the Physics, occurs in the context of the discussion of whether the celestial body or the outermost sphere is or is not in place. Aristotle54 had declared that what has nothing outside of it cannot be in a place. But the eighth and outermost celestial sphere is not contained, i.e. it has nothing outside it. It therefore ought not to be in place, and therefore ought not to move. Yet it clearly does move, carrying out one revolution every 24 hours. What is more, to deny that the outermost sphere is in place seems to contradict the De Caelo (I, 2), where Aristotle affirms that all the celestial spheres move in place55. We are thus, according to Averroes, faced with two alternatives : either affirming that there is a motion that does not occur in a place, or accepting the existence of the void, and that space is an interval. Philoponus, we are told, opted for the latter alternative, yet he held the void was inseparable from bodies56. Aristotle, for his part, said the heaven is in place by accident, which caused embarrassment to his commentators.
54 55 56
Physics, 4, 5, 212a231-32. M. Rashed 2007, 95.
This citation, corresponding to Philoponus In Phys. (Corollarium de loco, CAG 17, 568-569), suggests that Averroes had at least partial access to the Arabic translation of Philoponus' commentary on the Physics. For additional instances, see R. Glasner 2009, 23 ff.
17 Themistius attempted to solve the difficulty by claiming that the heaven is in place by virtue of its parts, not as a whole, where by parts he understood the celestial spheres contained by the outermost sphere. Each of these spheres moves around the convex or external surface of the sphere it surrounds, and this latter, inner sphere can therefore be said to contain the sphere that surrounds it, albeit from within. The outer sphere is also in place if one considers what it contains. It is therefore better to say that the entire celestial body is in place, by virtue of the parts in its concavity, and/or because all of its parts except the last one (the outermost sphere) are in place. Themistius' solution, says Averroes, was not without its difficulties. It is not clear how something can be at rest if all its parts are motion. In addition, Aristotle himself states in Physics VI that the sphere moves as a whole (in which case its change of place is only according to form) and by its parts (in which case its change of place is according to form and substrate). Themistius' explanation that the sphere is not in place in a simple or absolute sense, because the sphere does not move as a whole, but only by parts, will therefore not hold water. Following Themistius, Averroes goes on to report the ancient debate over whether the heaven is in a place accidentally or by virtue of its parts. He then quotes the view of Ibn Bjja : Although bodies that move in a straight line are in a place only if they are contained externally by another body, this is not the case for spherical bodies. The latter have as their place the surface of the body they revolve around. The place of a rectilinear body, which is terminated by a round body, is thus external, while the place of a spherical body, which terminates in itself and is perfect in that it admits of no increase or diminution, is internal. All bodies are therefore in place simply and essentially, rather than accidentally or by virtue of its parts. This view of Ibn Bjja, Averroes concludes, is in fact the view of Frb, who adopted the stance of contradicting the aporiai of Johannes <Philoponus>. This lengthy and difficult text calls for a few remarks. First, like several other of the texts we've examined (1, 2, 6, 7) we note the mention of the name of Frb. Half of these texts specify that the Frbian work in question was the On Changing Beings, a work which, as Marwan Rashed has shown, seems to have been devoted to refuting the arguments against the eternity of the world set forth by Philoponus is his Contra Aristotelem. Although Steinschneider classified our text as a possible testimony to a commentary by Frb on the Physics, it seems more likely that Averroes read this testimony, too, in Frb's On Changing beings, one of the works in which the Second Master posuit se contradicentem quaestionibus Ioannis.
18 Second, the research of Marwan Rashed has carefully traced the history of the solution according to which the sphere of fixed stars is in the sphere of Saturn, therefore contained by it, with the result that the convex or external surface of the sphere of Saturn is the place of the sphere of fixed stars. First suggested by Galen, this view was combated by Alexander of Aphrodisias, and later picked up by Themistius, who in turn was followed by Ibn Bjja and Frb. For Simplicius, heaven is in place in the sense that it surrounds the center of the universe, which is essentially in place. This, as Rashed remarks, is remarkably similar to Averroes' solution. Rashed (date1995/2007? p. 130 n. 131) briefly considers the hypothesis that this convergence may be explained by common recourse to the commentary on the Physics by Porphyry, but rules out this possibility on the grounds that Averroes never cites such a commentary57. In any case, this is, I think, a good example of the way the study of the Greek commentary tradition of Late Antiquity can help to shed light on the study of the commentaries Averroes, and hence on the thought of Aquinas, who so often follows the great Cordoban. Conclusion The goal of this survey, necessarily incomplete, has been to emphasize once again the importance of the thought of John Philoponus for the understanding of the physical and cosmological doctrines of Averroes. Averroes' main source for Philoponus' works seems to have been Frb's lost work On Changing Beings, although it is hard to say whether Averroes knew this work first-hand, or only through the intermediary of Ibn Bjja. As has been well pointed out by previous scholars (Puig, Glasner), the general pattern of Averroes' attitude toward what he knows of Philoponus' doctrines is negative. Following Frb and Ibn Bjja, he regards Philoponus as the originator of mistaken views on the finitude and created nature of the cosmos. This is perhaps not terribly surprising : one would not expect Averroes, the unconditional admirer of Aristotle, to have much patience with a man who set out to refute the Stagirite. For Averroes, Philoponus is the distant ancestor of the philosophy of the Kalm, a view in which he may not have been too far off the mark, if one
Rashed's own explanation is that the Simplicius-Averroes explanation is in fact correct, and dans cette sorte de stemmatique philosophique, seules les erreurs sont signifiantes . One may feel that this amounts to sidestepping the question.
57
19 may judge, for instance, by the way Ghazl adopted many of Philoponus' anti-Aristotelian arguments in his Tahfut al-Falsifah58. Despite the considerable progress made over the last generation or so by such scholars as Puig, Glasner and Rashed (to name but a few), it remains true, as Van den Bergh wrote in 1954, that On the whole the importance of the commentators of Aristotle for Arabic and medieval philosophy in general has not yet been sufficiently acknowledged 59. Much work is still to be done, and a careful scrutiny of the late Peripatetic Neoplatonic commentaries of the Physics may well still a good deal more light on the physical doctrines of Averroes, Albertus Magnus, and Thomas Aquinas60. We may well have to re-elaborate certain communes opiniones, such as the one that holds that Simplicius' Commentary on the Physics was unknown to the Arab world. Despite the silence of the Arabic bio-bibliographical tradition, the numerous quasi-literal parallels between Simplicius' commentary on Physics 8.1 and certain fragments of Frb's On Changing Beings render this assumption increasingly implausible. It was H. Gtje's fundamental article61 that transformed this view into a virtually unquestioned axiom. Yet although Puig often remarks (e.g. 1999a, 158) that Frb often seems to be following Simplicius' arguments very closely, Glasner (2009, 91), who subscribes to the axiom, is forced to assume that Averroes thought up this solution (that the potentiality of fire resides in the wood) in order to brush off Philoponus' criticism . Yet since the same solution was given by Simplicius in his commentary on Physics 8.1 (cf. p. 1136, 20 ff.), surely the much more economical and plausible hypothesis is that Averroes was indeed aware of Simplicius' arguments against Philoponus, albeit indirectly, whether by way of Frb and/or Ibn Bjja, or by other channels that have not yet been identified. Michael Chase (goya@vjf.cnrs.fr) CNRS UPR 76/Centre Jean Ppin 7, rue Guy Mocquet
See, for instance, S. Van den Bergh's Introduction to his translation of Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), London 1954, vol. I, p. xvii ff.
59 60 58
Ibid., p. xviii.
It is not certain, for instance, that Puig's influential analyses of Simplicius' distinctions between two forms of potentiality, and his introduction of a third, intermediary stage (In Phys., 1128, 30 ff.) are entirely accurate. I hope to return to this point elsewhere.
61 H. Gtje 1982. Yet even Gtje concedes (p. 14) that the parallels between the works of Averroes and Simplicius' commentaries on the Physics and the De Caelo are numerous. Ccf. M. Chase 2008.
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20 Villejuif 94801, France
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23 Christian and Islamic Hellenism : studies on the transmission of Greek philosophy and sciences dedicated to H.-J. Drossaart Lulofs on his ninetieth birthday. Leiden (CNWS publications ; 50), p. 43-76. ____ (2002). Alexander Arabus on the First Cause. Aristotle's First Mover in an Arabic treatise attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias. In : C. D'Ancona & G. Serra, eds., Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione arabe. Atti del Colloquio La ricezione araba ed ebraica della filosofia e della scienza greche, Padova, 14-15 maggio 1999, Padova. (Subsidia mediaevalia Patavina ; 3), p. 19-74. Gannag, Emma (in press). Philopon (Jean-). Tradition arabe. In : Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, ed. R. Goulet, t. V : De Paccius Rutilius Rufus, Paris : Presses du CNRS. Gtje, Helmut (1982). Simplikios in der arabischen berlieferung. Der Islam 59, 6-31. Giardina, Giovanna R., et al. (in press). Philopon (Jean-). In : CNRS. Glasner, Ruth (2009). Averroes' Physics. A Turning Point in Medieval Natural Philosophy. London : Oxford University Press. Judson, Lindsay (1987). God or nature ? Philoponus on generability and perishability, in R. Sorabji, ed., 179-196. Kraemer, J. L. (1965). A Lost Passage from Philoponus Contra Aristotelem in Arabic Translation. JAOS 85 318-327. Lettinck, P. (1994). Aristotle's Physics and its reception in the Arabic world. With an edition of the unpublished parts of Ibn Bjja's Commentary on the Physics, Leiden etc. : Brill, (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, vol. 7). Mahdi, Muhsin (1967). Alfarabi against Philoponus. Journal of Near Eastern Studies 26. 4, 233-260. McGinnis, Jon (2007). Aquinas' Arabic sources on the age of the universe : a response to Gerald J. Massey. Divinatio 26, 191-204. Pines, Shlomo (1972). An Arabic summary of a lost work of John Philoponus. Israel Oriental Studies 2, 320-352 (= Collected Works vol. 2). Puig Montada, Josep, (1990). Averroes and Aquinas on Physics VIII 1. A Search for the Roots of Dissent. In : Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceeding of the Eight International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.), Helsinki 24-29 1987 (Vol. 2, pp. 307313). Dictionnaire des Phiosophes Antiques, ed. R. Goulet, t. V : De Paccius Rutilius Rufus. Paris : Presses du
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24 ____ , (1997). Les stades de la philosophie naturelle dAverros, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 7 : 11537. ____ (1999a). Zur Bewegungsdefinition im VIII. Buch der Physik. In : G. Endress & J. A. Aertsen, eds., Averroes and the Aristotelian tradition, Leiden etc., 145-159. ____ , (1999b). Averroes y el problema de la eternidad del movimento, in : La ciudad de Dios, 212 : 231244. Rashed, Marwan (1995). Alexandre d'Aphrodise et la Magna Quaestio. Rle et indpendance des scholies dans la tradition byzantine du corpus aristotlicien. Les Etudes classiques, 63, 295-351. Repr. in id., l'Hritage aristotlicien. Textes indts de l'Antiquit, Paris : Les Belles Lettres, 2007, 85-141. ____ , (2005). The problem of the composition of the heavens (529-1610) : a new fragment of Philoponus and its readers. In : P. Adamson, H. Baltussen and M. W. F. Stone, eds., Philosophy, science and exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin commentaries. London : Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, vol. 2 (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement ; 83), p. 35-58. Repr. in id., 2007, 269-292. ____ , (2008). Al-Frb's lost treatise On changing beings and the possibility of a demonstration of the eternity of the world. Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 18, 19-58. _____ , (2009). On the authorship of the treatise on the harmonization of the Opinions of the two sages attributed to al-Frb. Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 19, 4382. Sorabji, Richard, ed., (1987a). Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science, London/Ithaca : Cornell University Press. ____ , (1987b). John Philoponus. In : id., ed., 1987a. ____ , (1988). Matter, Space, & Motion. Theories in Antiquity and their Sequel, London : Duckworth. ____ , ed. (1990a). Aristotle Transformed, the ancient commentators and their influence, London : Duckworth. ____ , (1990b). Infinite power impressed : the transformation of Aristotle's physics and theology. In : id, ed., 1990a, 181-198. ____ , ed., (2004). The philosophy of the commentators, 200-600 AD : 400 years of transition. A sourcebook, London : Duckworth. 3 vol. Steel, Carlos (1987). Omnis corporis potentia est finita. In : J. P. Beckmann, L. Honnefelder, G. Schrimpf, G. Wieland, eds., Philosophie im Mittelalter. Hamburg.
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25 Troupeau, Grard (1984). Un epitome arabe du De contingentia mundi de Jean Philopon. In : Mmorial A. J. Festugire = Cahiers d'Orientalisme 10.. (Cahiers d'Orientalisme 10). Watts, E. J. (2006). City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London (The Transformation of the Classical Heritage 41). Wolfson, Harry Austryn (1976). The Philosophy of the Kalam. Cambridge-London : Harvard University Press.
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26 M. Chase, Philoponus in the Arabo-Latin tradition Tables

Table 1
Schools
latent (Mutazilites)
generation = change in substance ; nothing comes from nothing
maintain creation and invention (al-ibd! wa-li"tir! j) (Philoponus, mutakallim#n)
Immaterial giver of Form creates form, implants it into matter (Avicenna)
agent can be separate (producing animals/plants that do not proceed from similar seed or nonseparate (fire producing fire) from matter (Themistius, Farabi?)
agent produces compound of matter, form (Aristotle, Averroes)
Table 2
Modes in which motum is prior to motus Mode One Mode Two motum1 (e.g. wood) motum1 (e.g. fire) motum2 (e.g., fire) motum2 (e.g., fire) same origin motion of goal of motion relation between mota different generation/corrup tion ; translation actualization of a potentiality
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type of motion two
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Table 3 : The doctrine of the double entelechy
27
Type of entelechy Entelechy2 characteristics has achieved stative-perfective (kekintai) kineitai grammatical equivalent completed/perfect form ; cast off all potentiality Entelechy1 has begun but not completed its motion ; maintains its potentiality
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Table 4 : The doctrine of the twofold dunamis

Type dunamis/potentia Dunamis2 (perfect) projects activity/actuality (energeia) Dunamis1 (imperfect) tends toward but does not yet possess perfect capacity fire's (always exercizedexercizsed) wood's dunamis for becoming fire (not yet actualized) dunamis for upward motion of characteristics example
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Table 5 : Philoponus' conditions for describing cases of potential motion. For object A to be described as potentially movable (kinton) by motion m, in the sense that what is capable of walking (badistikon) is man, not the elements of which he is made up, the following conditions must hold : 1. A must be proximately movable by motion m ; 2. It must be exclusively through A's nature that A is movable by motion m ; and 3. A must not perish as a result of motion m.
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28 M. Chase, Philoponus in the Arabo-Latin tradition. Appendix : Texts

Pinax Text 1 = Averr., Epit. Phys. 8 251b28-252 a6, p. 234 ff. Puig Text 2 = Averroes Long in Metaph. XII, comm. 18, vol. III p. 1497, 7 ff. Bouygues = p. 108-109 Genequand Text 3 = Averroes, Long in Metaph XII, comm. 41 ad Metaph. L 7, 1073a3-13, vol. III, p. 1628 10 ff. Bouygues = p. 248 Martin = p. 163 ff. Genequand. Text 3a : Averr., Middle in De Cael. I, quaestio, Vol. V, 293v, G ff. Text 4 = Averr. Long in De cael. II, comm. 71 p. 408, 29 ff. Carmody Text 4a = Averr. De subst. orbis ch. 5, f. 11a. Text 5 = Averr. Long in Phys., VIII, 4, comm. 79, 426va-427ra (ad Phys. VIII, 10, 266a27 ff.). Text 6 = Averr. Long in De cael. I, comm. 8, p. 19, 54-68 Carmody Text 7 = Averr. Long in Phys., VIII, 1, comm. 4, 340 I ff. Text 8 = Averr. Long in De cael. IV, comm. 24, p. 705, 156-161 Carmody Text 9 = Averr. Long In Phys., 4, comm. 43, 141 F ff. Text 10 = Averr. De caelo et mundo, Paraphr. I. comm. 140, 293 I ff. Text 11 = Averr. Middle in De Cael. I, quaestio, Vol. V, 293v, I ff.
29 Text 1. Averroes, Epit. Phys. 8 251b28-252 a6, p. 234 ff. Puig Platn y todos los que le siguen, pertenecientes al Kalm, tanto de nuestra religin como de la cristiana, as como todo el que afirma la produccin contingente del mundo, se imaginaron lo que es por accidente como por esencia. Por esta razn afirmaron la existencia de un movimiento primero en el tiempo, pero no pudieron eludir el hecho que antes del mismo hubiera otro movimiento y aunque intentaron encontrar una solucin a esta apora, no lo consiguieron. La mayora remiti este problema a Aristteles, diciendo que su intencin en este lugar era demostrar que antes de cada movimiento hay un otro, y que solamente con este fin introdujo la definicin del movimiento, tal como se imaginan Ab Nar en su libro Sobre los entes cambiantes y los dems que le siguieron, tales como Ibn Sn y Ab Bakr ibn a-ig. Antes de todos ellos Juan /135/ el Gramtico ya se lo imagin, pues empez a refutar a Aristteles, por cuanto ste supona que antes de cada movimiento hay otro, por esencia. Text 2. Averroes long in Metaph. XII Comm. 18 f. 413 col. 2 l. 15 vol. IV, p. 1497, 7 ff. Bouygues = p. 108-109 Genequand : This question is extremely difficult and obscure and we shall explain it to the best of our abilities and according to the premises and principles which have been established in our science by the doctrine of the man whose doctrine, in the words of Alexander, is the least subject to doubts, the most adequate to being, the most adapted and suited to it and the most free of contradictions. We say : all people who posit an efficient cause and generation are in general divided, as we have found, into two schools diametrically opposed and between which there are intermediate schools. The two diametrically opposed schools are that of those who maintain the latent (ahl al-kumn) and that of those who maintain creation and invention (ahl al-ibd wa-l-itir). The supporters of the latent say that everything is in everything and that becoming is merely the emergence of things one from another *and that the agent is merely the emergence of things one from another*62 and that the agent is only needed in
As far as I can tell, there is nothing in the Arabic corresponding to the phrase between asterisks. Martin (1994, p. 133) gives what appears to be the correct translation, leaving out the phrase in question : Les partisans de la cration latente disent que tout est dans tout, que la gnration n'est que la sortie des choses les unes des autres et que l'agent n'intervient dans la gnration que pour faire sortir <les tres> les uns des autres et pour les distinguer entre eux
62
30 becoming in order to cause things to emerge one from another and to separate them one from another. It is evident that for them the agent is nothing more than a /1498/ mover. The supporters of invention and creation say that the agent produces the whole world and creates it completely and that the existence of a matter on which to act is not a condition of his action, but he creates everything. This is the view well-known among the theologians (mutakallimn) of our religion and of the religion of the Christians, so that the Christian John the Grammarian believes that there is no possibility except in the agent63, according to what Ab Nar says <in> On Changing Beings. Text 3. Averroes, Long in Metaph XII comm. 41 ad Metaph. L 7, 1073a3-13, t. III, p. 1628 10 ff. Bouygues = p. 248 Martin = p. 163 ff. Genequand
Translation Genequand
John the Grammarian raised strong objections against the Peripatetics concerning this problem. He says : if every body has a finite power and the heaven is a body, then it will have a finite power ; but everything finite is necessarily corruptible, so that the heaven is corruptible. If it is said that it acquires incorruptibility from the eternal separate power, there will be something destructible but eternal. But this has been shown to be impossible at the end of the first book of De Caelo et Mundo .
Text 3a : Averr., Middle in De Cael. I, quaestio, Vol. V, 293v, G ff.

293G Sed ardua his superest quaestio, eo quod ostensum est non dari aeternum corruptibile, cui ne aliqua corruptionis potentia insit : ostensum quoque est cuiusque corporis potentiam esse finitam, sive rectum fuerit corpus, sive rotundum, eo quod idipsum finitum est magnitudine. Quod cum ita fuerit, coeleste corpus utique, quia magnitudine finitum est, ideo ut potentia id finitum esse necesse est. &, quia potentia finitum, Yet this difficult question remains, since it has been shown that there is nothing eternal and corruptible in which no capacity for corruption inheres. It has also been shown that the power of all every bodybodies is finite, whether the body be rectilinear or round , since it is of finite size. This being so, it is necessary that the celestial body as a whole, since it is finite in size, be finite in power. And
64
Comment [RT4]: ? every body ?
63
...annahu laysa hhun imkn ill f al-fil faqa.
64 That is, whether it is a body moving in a straight line (the elements) or in a circle (the spheres and the fifth element, ether).
31
ideo possibile est ut corrumpatur ex se, incorruptibile vero propter infinitam potentiam, quae abstracta a materia eius H demque motrix virtus existit. Et hoc plane in quibusdam suis sermonibus censuit Alexander, & eius in hoc comes fuit Avicen. dicens ipsum necesse esse duplicem habere modum, unum, quo per seipsum necessarium est, alterum, quo per se quidem possibile est, necessarium vero ab alio. H is its motive force. This is what Alexander clearly thought in some of his works, and Avicenna, went along with him in this, saying that it must have two modes of existence, one that is necessary by itself, and another through which it is possible in itself, but necessary from something else.
since it is finite in power, it is possible that it may be corrupted from itself, but incorruptible owing to the infinite power which, separateabstracted from its matter,
Comment [RT5]: ? separate ?
Text 4. Averr., Long in De cael. II, comm. 71 p. 408, 29 ff. Carmody :
Johannes
autem
dedit
hanc
quaestionem
John, however, transmitted this question to the Peripatetics in such a way that they cannot avoid them,se issues insofar as they concede that there is finite potentiality in this celestial body. But For if there are two potentialities there, viz. finite and infinite, the result will be that it will be corruptible according to the finite one, and incorruptible according to the infinite one,
Peripateticis tali modo quod non possunt evadere ea, secundum quod concedunt quod in isto corpore celesti est potentia finita, quoniam si illic sint due potentiae finita scilicet et infinita, continget ut secundum finitam sit corruptibile incorruptibile. et secundum infinitam
Comment [RT6]: ? these issues ? Comment [RT7]: ? For ?
Text 4a Averr., De substantia orbis, ch. 5, f. 11a :

A. Hyman 1986, pp. 121-122 : Joannes autem dedit quaestionem, de qua plures consyderantes non potuerunt evadere, dixit enim si mundus est finitus, debet habere potentiam finitam, igitur est generabilis et corruptibilis etc. et scias quod haec quaestio est valde bona. And John has raised a question concerning the eternity of the world, and many of those who speculated on these matters found it difficult to evade this question. It is : if the world is eternal it must necessarily possess an infinite potentiality. On the other hand, Aristotle showed that the world is finite [in extension], and since it is finite, it has a finite power. Whence it follows that the world must be
32
generated and corruptible.
Text 5. Averr. Long in Phys., VIII, 4, comm. 79, 426 I ff.
426 I In propositione autem assumpta hic, qua dicitur quod omnis corporis est potentia finita, dubitari potest, utrum contineat corpus coeleste, aut non. Si enim continet J corpus coeleste, tunc corporis coelestis erit potentia finita : cuius autem est potentia finita, est corruptibile. Similiter dubitatur de propositione, qua utitur in declaratione huius, quod omnis corporis est potentia finita, quia scilicet dicitur quod, si esset potentia infinita, contingeret quod motus esset in instanti . Dicet nam aliquis, ut quod Ari. dicit consequens esse, si potentia corporea habet actionem infinitam, ipsam agere non in tempore : & non est se sequens, si actio infinita sit potentiae non corporeae, quod agat non in tempore. Prima qui K dem questio valde difficilis est, & multum scrupulosa. Et Alex. in quibusdam suis tractatibus respondens di<cit> corpus coeleste adeptum fuisse aeternitatem a suo motore, qui non est in materia : secundum hoc ergo erit aliquid, quod potest corrumpi, & tamen nunquam corrumpetur. & haec Platonis est opinio s. aliquid aeternum esse, quod potest corrumpi. Arist. autem in fine primi li. de Coe. & mundo
65
In the proposition assumed here, however, in which it is said that the power of every body is finite, it may be doubted whether this includes the celestial body or not. For if it includes J the celestial body, then the celestial body will have finite power : but that whose power is finite is corruptible. Doubts are likewise raised about the proposition used in this declaration, that the power of every body is finite, because, that is, it is said that if its power were infinite, the result would be motion in an instant. For someone might say that Aristotle says it follows that is a corporeal power has infinite action, it does not take place in time. But it does not follow that if infinite action belongs to an incorporeal power, it must act outside of time. Now, the former K question is difficult indeed and most subtle. Alexander, responding in some of his treatises, says that the celestial body has acquired immortality from its motor, which is not in matter ; thus, there will be something that can be corrupted, and yet never will be corrupted. This is Plato's opinion : that there is something eternal that can be corrupted. Aristotle, however, at the end of the first book of the De Caelo, proved it is impossible for something that has the
Cf. Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 1, 20, 12 ; Summa theol., prima pars, quaest. CV, art. 2, I q. 105 a. 2 arg. 3 : Praeterea, philosophus probat in VIII Physic., quod potentia infinita movet in instanti. Sed impossibile est aliquod corpus in instanti moveri, quia, cum omnis motus sit inter opposita, sequeretur quod duo opposita simul inessent eidem; quod est impossibile. Ergo corpus non potest immediate moveri a potentia infinita. Potentia autem Dei est infinita, ut supra habitum est. Ergo Deus non potest immediate movere aliquod corpus.
65
33
probavit impossibile esse aeternum, cui insit potentia ad corruptionem . Ioannes autem Grammaticus hanc sibi retinuit quaestionem contra Peripateticos in eo, quod opinatur quod mundus sit corruptibilis, et generaL bilis. Et haec dubitatio est fortior omnibus dubitationibus quae possunt accidere his : maxime cum Arist. expresse dicit in secundo de Coelo, & mundo quod Coeli est potentia finita : ubi reddit causam quare non insunt Coelo stellae maiores his quae insunt illi. si enim (dicit) hoc esset, fatigaret.
66
potential to be corrupted to be eternal. John the Grammarian, however, recalled this question against the Peripatetics, insofar as he believes that the world is corruptible and generL ated. This doubt is stronger than any doubt that can occur to them, especially because Aristotle expressly stated in Book Two of the De Caelo that the heaven's power is finite, where he gives the cause why there are no more stars in the heaven than it actuaaully has ; for if it did [have more], he says, it would grow tired.
Comment [RT8]: ????????
Text 6 = Averr. Long in De cael. I, comm. 8, p. 19, 54-68 Carmody :
According to what Farabi recounts, John the Grammarian strove to contradict the proposition that every simple motion that is identical in kind belongs to a simple body that is identical in kind, on the grounds that motion that is one in kind is found in bodies that differ in kind. For instance, since motion that is one in kind is found in air and fire, he imagines the same thing holds true of earth and water. Therefore, it does not follow that every motion that is one in kind has one body proper to it in kind. But what he says is not so, for <in that case> the motion of fire would be identical to the motion of air, if they moved to a place that was the same in kind, for it has already been said that motion that is one in kind is that which is toward a place that is one in kind. But the place of fire necessarily differs from the place of air, and therefore if air were placed in the place of fire, it would go downward. The same holds true of the
Et laboravit Iohannes Grammaticus secundum quod narravit Alfarabius in contradicendo propositioni dicenti quod omnis motus simplex idem secundum speciem est corporis simplicis eiusdem secundum speciem ex hoc quod cum in corporibus diversis secundum speciem invenitur unus motus specie, verbi gratia quia in aere et igne invenitur unus motus in specie, similiter fingit de terra et aqua ; quapropter non sequitur ut omnis unus motus specie habeat unum corpus in specie proprium. Et hoc quidem quod dixit non est ita : motum enim ignis esset idem cum motu aeris si moverentur ad eundem locum specie, quia iam dictum est quod motus unus specie est qui ad unum locum specie est : locum autem ignis necessario differt a loco aeris ; et ideo si aer poneretur in loco ignis, descenderet ad inferius, similiter de motu aque et terre scilicet quod specie differunt in se propter diversitatem suroum locorum.
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Aristotle, De Caelo, 283a24ff., with the commenary of Thomas Aquinas, De Caelo et Mundo, Lectio 29.
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motion of water and earth, viz. that they differ from each other owing to the diversity of their places.
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Text 7. Averr. Long in Phys., VIII, 1, comm. 4, 340 I ff. (commenting on Phys. VIII, 251a9 ff. (in marg. : Expositio Alfarabij). Cf. ibid 339A-B: Dico quod haec expositio, quam modo dixi, est, quae intellegitur primo aspectu, et hoc intellexit Alfarabius, secundum quod dixit in libro suo de entibus transmutabilibus, et hoc idem intellexit Avic. et Avempace Hispanus, sive quod intentio Aristotelis in primo istius tractatus est declarare quod ante omnem motum est motus, et ante omnem motum est motus, et ante omnem transmutationem est transmutatio, et quod motus non deficiet secundum genus). Cf. Puig 1999a, 157 f. ; 1999b, 236 ff. Idest, incipiamus igitur primo rebus, qqua mos est ut determinentur in initiis artium, quae sunt quasi principia earum : & incipiamus ex istis in hac scientia rebus, quarum definitiones determinavimus ex rebus naK turalibus. Et incoepit ponere ad hoc propositionem notam & est. Omne, quod est, postquam non fuit, necesse est ipsum fuisse ante in potentia : & quod motus generatus talis est, s. quod omne, quod movetur, postquam non movebatur, necesse est ut ante esse posse ut moveretur. Et induxit ad hoc certificandum duos modos, quorum unus est ex hoc, quod declaratum est de definitione motus, & secundus ex inductione, & d<ixit>. Dicamus igitur quod motus, & c.i. dicamus igitur, quia, cum declaratum est in Tertio istius libri quod altera definitionum motus est L entelechia moti, secundum quod est motum, idest & entelechia eius, quod innatum est moveri, necesse est ut res mobiles sint ante motum in unoquoque generum motuum &, cum res mobiles fuerint ante motum, tunc potentia ad motum erit ante motum.
It is to be understood from this that the moved thing is prior to motion in two ways : One of these is that the object in motion containing potentiality is of
Et intelligendum est ex hoc quod motum est prius tempore motu duobus modis. Quorum unus est motum, in quo est potentia, sit alterius speciei specie
35
another kind than the kind of object in motion in which the motion itself is present . The second is that that movable thing containing the potential for motion is moved in 340M act ; that is, what is potentially moved is numerically identical with what is moved in act . The first mode is found in two <kinds of motion> : in the motion of generation and corruption, and in the motions of the translation of simple bodies. For the motion that has generation as its end and fulfillment has as its subject that out of which comes generation, and the same holds true for corruption. But the subject of the translational motion of the elements, in which there is a potentiality temporally preceding this motion, 341A is the body out of which the generation of the element takes place . For instance, because, when fire is generated as whole, it immediately has a place , which is above as a whole, when an individual part of it is generated, it immediately has a singular part of that place. The potentiality for this motion therefore does not reside in the subject constituted by the fire in act, but in the subject out of which the fire is generated, such as burning fire or flaming oil. John the Grammarian was ignorant of this, and considered that some potentiality is found together with that for which it is the potentiality . For instance, wood, containing the potential for motion, upward is distinct from fire, which is actually in motion upwards. In the case of burning fire, potential and actuality are constantly linked. Simplicius (In Phys., p. 1136, 1 ff.) refers to this variety of mobile as that which has the perfect capacity that projects actuality (to tn teleian ekhon dunamin tn probltikn ts energeias). In other words, in the case of fire, the potential preceding it is situated in the wood or oil from which it comes into being.
70 71 69 68 67
moti, in quo est ipse motus. Secundus est, ut illud mobile, in quo est potentia ad motum, sit motum in ac340M tu, scilicet quod motum in potentia est idem in numero cum moto in actu. Primus autem modus invenitur in duobus, scilicet in motu generationis, & corruptionis, & in motibus translationis, quae est corporum simplicium. motus enim, cuius generatio est finis, & complementum, suum subiectum est illud, ex quo est generatio : & similiter est de corruptione. subiectum vero motus translationis elementorum, in quo est potentia praecedens hunc motum in tempore,
67
68
341A est corpus, ex quo est generatio elementi. v. g. quia, quando ignis generatur secundum totum, statim habet ubi, quod est superius secundum totum : & dum generatur pars singula illius, statim habet singulam partem illius ubi. Potentia igitur istius motus non est in subiecto, quod est ignis in actu, sed in subiecto, ex quo generatur ignis, v.g. igno combusto, aut oleo inflammato. Et hoc ignoravit Joannes Grammaticus. & existimavit, quod quaedam potentiarum invenitur cum illo ad quod est potentia.
69
70
71
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Latin ubi, literally a where . I follow the translation of Puig 1999a 157 : ein Platz.
In other words, Philoponus argued that as soon as some elemental bodies, such as fire, come into existence, they immediately possess the power, force, faculty or capacity (Latin potentia, Greek dunamis, Arabic quwwa or imkn) of motion upwards.
36
Text 8. Averr. long in De cael. IV, comm. 24 p. 705, 156-161 Carmody :

Averr. long in De cael. IV, comm. 24 p. 705, 156161 Carmody John was therefore in error when he said that motions have been found in substances without the existence in them of any temporally antecedent potential. He said this because the potential preceding that object in motion does not exist in the object in motion unless it is by force, but it is in the thing out of which the thing in motion comes to be. For instance, the potential for moving fire is not in a place, but in that out of which the fire comes to be, as in oil or wood
Et ideo erravit Iohannes, et dixit quod inventi sunt motus in substantiis sine potentia antecedenti secundum tempus existente illis substantiis ; et dictum fuit ei quod potentia precedens hoc motum non est in moto nisi violente, sed est in ea re ex qua fit mota res, verbi gratia quod potentia ad motum ignis in loco non est sed in illo ex quo ignis fit, ut oleo aut ligno
Text 9. Averr., Long In Phys. 4, 5, vol. 4, comm. 43, 141F ff.

72
141E
...accidit
in
eo
magna
quaestio,
quoniam
A great question arises with regard to it [the external celestial sphere] : since it obviously moves, and since all that is moved is in place, the entire orb must be in a place. We are therefore faced by two alternatives : either we postulate that there is some moved object that is not in place, or we postulate that F
manifestum est ipsum moveri : &, cum omne motum sit in loco, necesse est ut totus orbis sit in loco. ergo sumus inter duo, aut ponere quod aliquod motum non est in loco, aut ponere quod
141F locus est inane, & dimensio. Ioanes vero propter hoc obedit huic, s. locum esse, & dimensionem, & vacuum, non finem continentem, ut dicit Arist. licet apud ipsum non possit inane separari a corpore .
73
place is a void and an interval. That is why Johannes obeyed this, viz. that place is a dimension and a vacuum, not a containing limit, as Aristotle says, although for him the void cannot be separated from bodies. Indeed, those who say there is a vacuum
This section of Averroes' commentary in closely followed by Thomas Aquinas in his De natura loci (Opuscule 51), vol. 5, Paris 1858, p. 368 ff. Cf. Thomas, De physico auditu, lib. 4 l. 7 n.10-15, vol. 18, p. 337 ff. of the Parma edition (1865).
73
72
Cf. Philoponus, In Phys. (Corollarium de loco), CAG 17, 568-569.
37
quoniam dicentes vacuum esse, sunt bipartiti. alii namque dicunt ipsum separari a corporibus, & alii non, quorum est Ioanes grammaticus. Et Arist. dicit, cum hoc post, quod coelum, et anima sunt in loco per accidens. & in hoc dubitaverunt omnes expositores. Themistius vero dicit respondendo quod corpus coeleste non est in loco secundum totum, sed secundum partes, sive secundum G orbes, quos continet maximus orbis, sicut est dispositio in toto mundo. Fingit namque quod causa in hoc est, quoniam corpus caeleste non est mobile secundum totum, sed secundum partes, & apud ipsum partes coeli sunt in loco, qui continent suas partes, sed quia corpus altissimum, v.g. orbis stellarum fixarum non continetur ab aliquo, concessit quod hoc corpus est in loco propter suas partes intrinsecas tantum, s. quae sunt in concavo eius. istae namque partes moventur circa convexum, s. convexum corporis, circa quod revolvuntur, quasi circundet ipsas, licet sit intra. Et hoc idem contingit toti orbi, quoniam movetur moare divided into two camps : some say it can be separated from bodies, and others that it cannot, and John the Grammarian is one of the latter. And Aristotle says later that the heaven and the soul are in place by accident. All the interpreters have raised doubts about this. Themistius says in response that the celestial body is not in place as a whole, but by parts, or according to G the orbs
75
contained by the greatest orb, as is the
disposition in the entire world. Indeed, he imagines that the reason for this is that the celestial body is not mobile as a whole, but according to parts, and in <Aristotle> the parts of the heaven are in a place because they contain their parts, but because the highest body, viz. the orb of fixed stars, is not contained by anything, he conceded that this body is in a place only because of its internal parts, those that are in its concavity. For these parts move around the convex, or around the convex <surface> of the body around which they revolve, as though it surrounded them, although it is internal. And the same thing happens to the entire orb, since it moves with 141H
141H tu diurno, s. quod est in loco secundum partes quae sunt in concavo eius : si dixerimus quod motus stellati est alius a motu orbis. ergo melius est dicere quod totum corpus coeleste est in loco, sicut dicimus in corpore ultimo, s. secundum partes, quae sunt in concavo. aut dicamus ipsum esse in loco utroque modo, s. quia partes eius sunt in loco praeter ultimum, & quia partes concavi sunt in loco, si posuerimus quod motus diurnus est totius orbis essentialiter, & non stellati. & hoc est necesse secundum scientiam
a diurnal motion, that it is in place according to the parts that are in its concavity, if we said that the motion of the starry sphere is different from the motion of the orb . It is therefore better to say that the entire celestial body is in place, as we say in the ultimate body, viz. according to the parts that are in the concavity, or that we say that it is in place in both ways, or that its parts are in place except the last one, and that the parts of the concavity are in place, if we postulated that the diurnal motion pertains essentially to the entire orb, and not to the starry one. And this is
76
Themistius, Paraphr. in Phys., p. 119, 23-24 Schenkl : , .

76
75
As M. Rashed 2007, 85-141 has shown, this corresponds to the position of Alexander of Aphrodisias.
38
naturalem. Et in hoc, quod dixit TheI mistius, sunt quaestiones non modicae. ... omnes igitur homines, ut apparet de eis, non potuerant intelligere verba Arist. recte. Avempace ver respondit in hoc loco sic. quoniam sphaera, secundum quod est sphaera, non est in loco, quia aliquid extrinsecum continet illam, & quod hoc proprium est corpori recto, non corpori 142A rotundo, & locus sphaerae qui fingitur ab isto, secundum quod est sphaera, est convexum centri, circa quod revolvitur. quasi igitur locus eius est superficies convexi, quod continet sphaera, & est quodam modo continens sphaeram. Et nititur dicere quod definitio, quam induxit Arist. in loco, quoniam est continens divisum a re , debet intelligi in corporibus rectis ab extrinseco, & in rotundis ex intrinseco. Et dicit quod causa in hoc est. quoniam corpus rotundum finitur per se, & corpus rectarum dimensionum finitur per aliud, & ideo corpora recta, s. elementa indigent in hoc,
74
necessary according to natural science. In what Themistius I has said there are questions of no little importance. ... It appears from this that not all men have been able correctly to understand Aristotle's words. Avempace, however, responds to this passage as follows : a sphere, qua sphere, is not in a place because something external contains it, and this is proper to a rectilinear body, not a round 142A body , and the place of the sphere imagined by him, qua sphere, is the convex of the hinge
78 77
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around
which it revolves. Thus, the surface of the convex <body> that the sphere contains is, as it were, its place, and in some way it contains the sphere. And he strives to say that the definition Aristotle adduced of place, viz. that it is what contains, divided from the thing, must be understood in rectilinear bodies from outside, and in round ones from within . And he says that the reason for this is that the round body is delimited by itself, and the body of rectilinear dimensions is delimited by something else. Rectilinear bodies or elements are lacking in that
79
74 77
Cf. Aristotle, Physics., 209b30 ff., 211b1 f.
That is, bodies characterized by rectilinear motion (the four traditional elements), or by motion in a circle (the fifth element, ether).
78 Cf. Averroes, Long commentary on the De Caelo, comm. 27, p. 317, 93 Carmody. This reading does not seem to make much sense : assuming that the centrum is the celestial pole, how could it have a convex element ? The view which Philoponus (In Phys., CAG 17, p. 594, 14 ff.) attributes to the exegetes is that the place of the sphere of fixed stars, as far as its parts are concerned, is the convex surface of the inner sphere ( , that is, the external surface of the sphere of Saturn), which the parts of the fixed sphere touch successively.
In other words, the place of bodies characterized by rectilinear motion is their external limit, while the place of bodies that move in a circle, such as the sphere of fixed stars, is its internal limit. Cf. M. Rashed 2007, 85-141.
79
39
B quod finiantur corpore rotundo : rotundum vero non indiget corpore extrinseco, & causa in hoc est quoniam linea rotunda est perfecta, et non potest recipere additionem, aut diminutionem : linea vero recta est diminuta. Et secundum hoc sphaera erit in loco simpliciter, & essentialiter, sicut erunt corpora recta, & omnis sphaera sphaerarum coelestium, quoniam continet alia sphaera, habebit hoc per accidens, & secundum hoc omne corpus simpliciter erit in loco essentialiter. Et videtur mihi quod hoc, quod narravit Avempace, est opinio Alfarabii. Alfarabius n. e, qui posuit se contradicentem quaestionibus Ioannis. & una illarum quaestionum est ista, quae invenitur in libris nostris, sicut invenitur ex verbis Avempace, & non incidit in manus nostras B they are delimited by a round body , but a round body does not lack an external body. The reason for this is that a round line is perfect, and cannot receive addition or diminution : a straight line, in contrast, is deficient. In this sense, the sphere will be in place simply and essentially, as will rectilinear bodies, and each of the celestial spheres, in that another sphere contains <them>, will have this characteristic accidentally, and in this sense every body will be in place simply and essentially. And it seems to me that this, recounted by Avempace, is the view of Frb, for it was Frb who positioned himself as contradicting the questions of Johannes, and one of these questions is this one, found in our manuscripts, as is found from the words of Avempace, and it has not come down to us.
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80
Text 10. Averr. De caelo et mundo, Paraphr. I. comm. 140 , 293 I ff.f Joannes quoque grammaticus hanc dubitationem non preteriit et ejus dictamine concludit, mundum esse genitum.
80 In other words, the motions of the elemental bodies are limited by the boundaries of their respective sphere.

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Philoponus in the Arabo-Latin tradition

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Simplicius, In Phys., p. 1326, 38 - 1336, 34 Diels.

Cf. H. A. Davidson 1987, 107 ff.

Guide, 2, 21. De substantia orbis, I, p. 69 ff. Hyman.

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Puig 1999a, 156.

Plato, Timaeus 41b : , , , .

Cf. Simplicius, In Phys., 1171, 15-20.

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P. 1133, 20-1138, 11 Diels.

53 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, 8, 1, 251a9-10 : .

Physics, 4, 5, 212a231-32. M. Rashed 2007, 95.

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20 Villejuif 94801, France

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26 M. Chase, Philoponus in the Arabo-Latin tradition Tables

generation = change in substance ; nothing comes from nothing

maintain creation and invention (al-ibd! wa-li"tir! j) (Philoponus, mutakallim#n)

Immaterial giver of Form creates form, implants it into matter (Avicenna)

agent produces compound of matter, form (Aristotle, Averroes)

type of motion two

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Table 3 : The doctrine of the double entelechy

Table 4 : The doctrine of the twofold dunamis

28 M. Chase, Philoponus in the Arabo-Latin tradition. Appendix : Texts

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Text 3a : Averr., Middle in De Cael. I, quaestio, Vol. V, 293v, G ff.

Comment [RT4]: ? every body ?

...annahu laysa hhun imkn ill f al-fil faqa.

Text 4. Averr., Long in De cael. II, comm. 71 p. 408, 29 ff. Carmody :

Comment [RT6]: ? these issues ? Comment [RT7]: ? For ?

Text 4a Averr., De substantia orbis, ch. 5, f. 11a :

Text 5. Averr. Long in Phys., VIII, 4, comm. 79, 426 I ff.

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Text 6 = Averr. Long in De cael. I, comm. 8, p. 19, 54-68 Carmody :

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Text 8. Averr. long in De cael. IV, comm. 24 p. 705, 156-161 Carmody :

Text 9. Averr., Long In Phys. 4, 5, vol. 4, comm. 43, 141F ff.

Cf. Philoponus, In Phys. (Corollarium de loco), CAG 17, 568-569.

contained by the greatest orb, as is the

Themistius, Paraphr. in Phys., p. 119, 23-24 Schenkl : , .

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Cf. Aristotle, Physics., 209b30 ff., 211b1 f.

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