International Symposium on Information Technology 2008 (ITSim'08), KL, Malaysia
Biometric Template Protection Using Watermarking with Hidden Password
Encryption
Md. Rajibul Islam
Multimedia University,
Faculty of Information
Science and Technology
(FIST), Jalan Ayer Keroh
lama, 75450 Melaka,
Malaysia
md.rajibul.islam05@mmu.e
du.my
Abstract
For quite a few years the biometric recognition
techniques have been developed. Here, we briefly
review some of the known attacks that can be
encountered by a biometric system and some
corresponding protection techniques. We explicitly
focus on threats designed to extract information about
the original biometric data of an individual from the
stored data as well as the entire authentication system.
In order to address security and privacy concerns, we
present a biometric authentication scheme that uses
two separate biometric features combined by
watermark embedding with hidden password
encryption to obtain a non-unique identifier of the
personage. Furthermore, to present the performance of
the authentication system we provide experimental
results. The transformed features and templates trek
through insecure communication line like the Internet
or intranet in the client-server environment. Our
projected technique causes security against attacks
and eavesdropping because the original biometric will
not be exposed anywhere in the authentication system.
1. Introduction
Now a day, in traditional verification methods
biometric systems propose numerous benefits. It is
unfeasible to share and complicated to replicate. Even
direct secret observation will not able to obtain
Biometric information. It enhances user feasibility by
improving the need to memorize long and random
passwords. It sentinels against repudiation by the user.
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Md. Shohel Sayeed Andrews Samraj
Multimedia University, Multimedia University,
Faculty of Information Faculty of Information
Science and Technology Science and Technology
(FIST), Jalan Ayer Keroh (FIST), Jalan Ayer Keroh
lama, 75450 Melaka, lama, 75450 Melaka,
Malaysia Malaysia
shohel.sayeed@mmu.edu.my andrews.samraj@mmu
.edu.my
Biometrics supplies the same level of security to all
users unlike passwords and is highly challenging to
brute force attacks. Identification and authentication
refers to two special tasks: finding the identity of a
person given the biometric versus verifying the identity
given the biometric data and the claimed identity.
We offer a biometric authentication scheme in this
paper to address the security and privacy concerns. In
particular, two biometric features (e.g. fingerprint and
palmprint) are combined to obtain a non-unique
identifier of the individual and stored as such in a
central database. While the combined biometric ID is
reducing anxiety of security and privacy and not a
unique identifier as well, we show that it can still be
used in authenticating a person’s identity. As a
particular example, we demonstrate a biometric
authentication system that uses two separate biometrics
of the same individual to form a combined biometric
ID.
However, it is now acknowledged that biometric
systems are vulnerable to attacks. One of the most
solemn attacks is against the stored templates. A stolen
biometric template cannot be easily revoked and it may
be used in other applications that utilize the same
biometric feature.
A. Security Vulnerabilities
To some possible attacks biometric authentication
systems may become vulnerable. Some of those
security vulnerabilities are presented as follows:
Spoofing attacks on the sensor, replay attack on the
channel between sensor and matcher, substitute attack
on the storage database, tempering on storage database
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 and matcher, masquerade attack during verification the
channel between sensor and matcher, Trojan horse
attack on matcher, overriding attack and yes/no
response during decision making after matching and
privacy issue During Decision Making after Matching.
B. Sketch of some Biometric Template
Security Approaches
Numerous researchers have proposed some
approaches, which are summarized below. Here, a little
briefing of their manner, qualities and negative aspects
are sketched below.
In Encryption [14], Template is encrypted using
well-known cryptographic techniques. The main
advantage is Matching algorithm and accuracy are
unaffected and limitation is Template is exposed
during every authentication attempt. One-way function
is applied to the biometric features in Non-invertible
transform template security approach. The benefit is
matcher need not be redesigned since transformation
occurs in the same feature space. The weakness is it
usually leads to increase in the FRR. In Hardening /
Salting [16], User-specific external randomness is
added to the biometric features. It increases the entropy
of biometric features resulting in low FAR but if the
user-specific random information is compromised,
there is no gain in entropy. In Secure sketch [12], a
sketch is derived from the template; sketch is secure
because template can be reconstructed only if a
matching biometric query is presented. It is more
tolerant to intra-user variations in biometric data; can
be used for securing external data such as
cryptographic keys. Limitation is template is exposed
during successful authentication and Non-uniform
nature of biometric data reduces security. A key is
derived directly from biometric features in Key
generation [13]. It is most efficient and scalable
approach. Constraints are tolerance to intra-user
variations is limited, resulting in high FRR. Hardened
fuzzy vault [15], a hybrid approach where the
biometric features are hardened (using password)
before a secure sketch (vault) is constructed. Here,
hardening increases the entropy thereby improving the
vault security; also enhances user privacy but not user-
friendly, user needs to provide both the password and
the biometric during authentication. In proposed
Watermarking with Hidden Password Encryption
(WHPE), we present an upgraded approach where two
biometric features are synthesized and encrypted with a
hidden password which is derived from the biometric
classification. The advantage is biometric templates are
never exposed anywhere in the biometric system. Thus
improves the security of the biometric template and
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user privacy in the whole client-server model of
biometric authentication system. Here, user needs to
provide two biometric data during each and every
authentication session. Hence, sometimes very
bothering. Not user - friendly.
2. Proposed Watermarking with Hidden
password Encryption (WHPE)
Our projected scheme consists of four main steps as
shown in Figure 1. First of all, performed
preprocessing and DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transform)
of the fingerprint image to make it prepared for the
watermark embedding process. Second step is
palmprint classification, so that the system can get a
hidden password that we have fixed according to six
categories of palmprint. In third step, two different
biometric images derived from the same user are
applied to the watermark embedding process. The
embedded template is then secured by the
watermarking based on DWT. Finally, the
watermarked template is encrypted using the hidden
password derived after palmprint classification from
the second step. In this work, we call this approach
“Watermarking with Hidden Password Encryption
(WHPE)”.
A. Palmprint classification
A novel algorithm for the automatic classification
of low-resolution palmprints using principle lines has
been proposed by Wu et al [1]. The algorithm has the
ability to classify palmprints into six categories
according to the number of principal lines and the
number of their intersections. The principal lines of the
palmprint are identified first using their position and
thickness. Then a set of directional line detectors is
developed. After that they extract potential beginnings
(“line initials”) of the principal lines and then, a
recursive process is applied to extract the principal
lines in their entirety based on these line initials. The
proportions of these six categories (1–6) in the
database containing 13,800 samples [2] are 0.36%,
1.23%, 2.83%, 11.81%, 78.12% and 5.65%,
respectively. They have shown 96.03% of accuracy to
classify palmprints.
B. Watermarking Algorithm
For watermarking, the fingerprint image is used
as the base or the cover image and the palmprint
features are used as the watermark [4][5]. These
features are the palmprint template obtained by
convolving the palmprint image with preprocessing.
297

Watermark Embedding Algorithm: Let FPuni be
the unique fingerprint image of size s × s and FPdwt (i,
j) be the corresponding four level discrete wavelet
transformed image, where i = 1,2,3,4 denotes the
wavelet decomposition level and j = a, h, v, d denotes
the approximation, horizontal, vertical and diagonal
sub-bands respectively. Let PPuni be the unique
palmprint image of size t × t, where s ! t and PPdwt (i,
j) be the corresponding two level wavelet transformed
image with i=1,2. At level-2, the coefficients of
approximation band of the palmprint image are
embedded into the detail sub-bands of the fingerprint
image. A Hidden Password F1 is used to embed the
coefficients in the possible 3*S*S locations, where S is
the length and width of the sub-bands. Embedding at
level-2 is described in Equation (1).
Next, the approximation band in the second level of
the palmprint image is further decomposed to the third
level. At level-3, the coefficients of the approximation
band of the palmprint image are embedded into the
detail sub-bands of the fingerprint image using another
auto generate key F2 whose upper bound is 3*T*T. T
is the height and width of sub-bands at level-3.
Equation (2) describes the watermark embedding
process at level-3.
The inverse wavelet transformation is performed on
the modified FPdwt (i, j) to obtain the final watermarked
fingerprint image FPwm. Figure 1 shows the process of
embedding palmprint image in the fingerprint image.
FPdwt (2, j)= { PPdwt (2, a) according to F1
FPdwt (2, j) elsewhere
FPdwt (3, j)= { PPdwt (3, a) according to F2
FPdwt (3, j) elsewhere
C. Watermarked Template binding by
Hidden Password Encryption
Hidden password improves user privacy to
encryption of the watermarked template because it
enables the creation of revocable templates and
prevents cross matching of templates across different
applications. The distribution of WHPE template is
statistically more similar to uniform distribution than
the distribution of original template. This recommends
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better resistance against attacks on the WHPE
template. Moreover, the additional variability
introduced by hidden password-based watermark
embedding reduces the similarity between WHPE
templates of different users. This decreases the False
Accept Rate (FAR) of the system significantly. If we
imagine client-server structural design for the
biometric system where preprocessing, feature
extraction and watermark embedding are applied at the
client side and hidden password encryption, matching
is performed at the server, the server never watch the
original template. Only the watermark embedded
template would be exposed during successful
decryption and the original template is never exposed
at the server.
Two common methods for cracking a users’
password are, dictionary attacks and social engineering
techniques. In the proposed system, hidden password is
implicitly verified during authentication by matching
the WHPE biometric features. Even if an adversary
attempts to guess the hidden password, it is not
possible to verify the guess without knowledge of the
user’s biometric data. This provides resistance against
dictionary attacks to learn the hidden password.
However, it is still possible to glean the hidden
password through social engineering techniques.
Therefore, hidden password based transformation
alone is not sufficient to ensure the security of the
biometric template. Due to this reason, we use the
watermark embedding process to secure the biometric
template. Note that the hidden password used in
constructing the watermark embedding that secures the
transformed template is fixed forever. Therefore, if the
hidden password is compromised, the security of the
WHPE is not affected and it is computationally hard
for an attacker to obtain the original biometric
template. Because of the template is however
synthesized by watermarking. Finally, the watermarked
template is encrypted using a hidden password derived
from the palmprint classification. This prevents
substitution attacks against the watermarked template
because an adversary cannot modify the watermarked
template without knowing the hidden password or the
key derived from it.
298
 (a) Client
Webcam

Palmprint Acquisition Fingerprint Acquisition

Wu’s Classification Fingerprint

Algorithm Preprocessing

Palmprint
Preprocessing
DWT

Cat1 Cat2
Embedding Auto Generate Key F2
Palm Template
Hidden password F1 in Fingerprint
Cat4 Cat3
IDWT

Cat5 Cat6 Watermarked

Fingerprint
Template

Encrypted
Database Template

(b) Server

Figure 1(a): Enrolment phase- Proposed Watermarking with Hidden password Encryption (WHPE)

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 (a) Client
Webcam

Palmprint Acquisition Fingerprint Acquisition

Wu’s Classification Fingerprint

Algorithm Preprocessing

Palmprint
Preprocessing
DWT

Cat1 Cat2
Embedding Auto Generate Key F2
Palm Template
Hidden password F1 in Fingerprint
Cat4 Cat3
IDWT

Cat5 Cat6 Watermarked

Fingerprint
Template

Yes/no
Decrypted Matching
Database Template

(b) Server

Figure 1(b): Verification phase- Proposed Watermarking with Hidden password Encryption (WHPE)

3. Experimental Result and Discussion A. Experiments and Results

The proposed watermarking with hidden password
encryption (WHPE) scheme has been tested on the
webcam database.
Our webcam database is a database with 1000
images (100 fingers × 5 impressions/finger and 100
palms × 5 impressions/palm) of size 480×580. We
followed the standard of FVC2000 [6], FVC2002 [7],
FVC2004 [8] fingerprint databases where each
database contains fingerprints from 110 fingers. The

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 experiments are designed and performed to study
effects of the watermarking on the performance of the
proposed secure fingerprint-based authentication
system. In this experiment the compassion of
watermarking schemes on biometric images is
analyzed.
To carry out the tests, we watermarked the 1000
images from our database including both 500
fingerprints and 500 palmprints, ran feature extraction
and recognition on the watermarked images, and
compared the results to that of using the original
fingerprints. In order to perform watermark-embedding
process we used each impression of palmprint on each
fingerprint impression, which are obtained from the
same individual. And by following this process, we got
six watermark embedded templates for single
individual and like this in the whole database we got
500 templates from 100 individuals. First, to obtain a
baseline performance of the authentication system,
each fingerprint is matched with rest of the fingerprint
database i.e., 499 fingerprints to obtain 499 normalized
matching scores. Among the normalized matching
scores obtained for a fingerprint, one would expect 4
high scores and 495 low scores. For each hypothesized
threshold matching score, the performance of the
system was characterized by the true rejects (TR) and
the True accepts (TA).
Table 1: Standard results obtained from the tests
Tests
Experiment 1 Original image
Experiment 2 Original image
Experiment 3 Watermarked image
The averaged matched true acceptance for
experiment 1 and experiment 3 is around 90%. So we
have proved that our WHPE scheme will perform
successfully and better. The security level also
remaining strong because in our proposed scheme the
original biometric is not exposed anywhere.
B. Discussions
Although numerous techniques have been proposed
to enhance the security and privacy of the biometric
authentication system, but still it’s a risky issue. It has
been largely disregarded the study of potential
vulnerability of Biometric Authentication against
attacks. That means a complicated attacker could
achieve access to both the embedded templates and the
whole attack phases described in section. But a user’s
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We classified our test in three different experiments
and our experiments representing the performances of
the authentication system using original fingerprint
database for matching in the experiment 1 and the
matching performance between the original fingerprint
data with watermarked fingerprints obtained by WHPE
in the experiment 2 and finally the matching using the
same set of watermarked fingerprint database with
watermarked fingerprint data in experiment 3. We
performed all these experiments and obtained the
results that are revealed in table 1.
From a visual inspection of the matching results
generated in our final experiments, we observed that
experiment 1 and experiment 3 had no significant
effects on the performance of the authentication
system, where experiment 2 had significant and
undesirable effect. This is because, in WHPE scheme
the watermark embedding affects a significant number
of pixels in a local neighborhood so that some minutiae
cannot be extracted during matching session. As a
result experiment 2 obtained awful matching results.
These results have demonstrated that the watermarked
images can obtain approximately the same accuracy as
the original unwatermarked fingerprints in the
matching/authentication session on our proposed
secure authentication system.
Matching Phase TA (%) TR (%) Matched
TA (%)
Original image 90.8 9.2 94.1
Watermarked image 52.6 47.4 53.1
Watermarked image 89.3 10.7 91.9
biometric is not obtained. Such an attacker, fully
familiar with the system and exploiting its weaknesses,
will not be doing just a watermark extraction process in
order to break the embedded template. As a substitute,
he will develop different attacks that can be run in a
realistic time frame. The WHPE must be flexible
against those on-line attacks.
Here, we discuss the security of the above scheme.
First, we cite the security framework of the proposed
authentication scheme. If challengers’ success to steal
the template stored in the database, they can get the
encrypted template. Subsequently they attempt to
extract the template and ruin the file so that it may no
longer be useful. Hans Georg Schaathun, [3] presented
some attacks in watermarking layer. A real
watermarking scheme cannot be expected to be
infallible. The attacks are, (1) Non-collusive
watermarking attack: Non-collusive watermarking
301
 attacks can be applied to any mark. By garbling the
segment, the pirates cause the extraction algorithm to
fail with some probability. (2) Collusive watermarking
attack: A collusive watermarking attack applies to
detectable marks. By combining different versions of
the same mark, for instance by averaging, the pirates
can weaken the watermark and cause extraction to fail
with some probability. (3) Cropping a segment: A
pirate can crop the file by removing certain segments.
If the pirates use a very strong watermarking attack or
extensive cropping, they will also ruin the file, because
they have no information about the hidden password,
which is used for embedding and encryption. Suppose,
the hidden password is compromised then they can
become impostor of the decryption and they will able
to obtain a watermarked template which is still secured
in the authentication scheme because the original
template will never be exposed any where in the
system, even in the matching process.
However, even if adversaries hijack the whole
database, because it receives no personal information,
of course including the original template and the
extracted feature, the takeover does not threaten the
user’s privacy. Then we consider the case of a
malicious authentication server collects information. In
this structure, it receives watermark embedded and
encrypted transformed data. As abovementioned, they
imply no information before extraction the embedded
and encrypted data. Besides, the malicious sever
cannot know the corresponding watermark embedded
process, hidden password and encryption process.
Hence, the malicious server obtains no information
about original templates.
Next, we consider security of the information
transformed by WHPE against hill-climbing attack [9]
[10], replay attack [11], collusion attack. Hill-climbing
attack [11] uses of replied matching score in order to
make a fake. When the application server sends the
matching score to client or adversary as shown in Fig.
3, the adversary transforms embedded feature data
selected from database that the adversary constructs.
The adversary sends the transformed features to the
authentication server for matching. Because this
system used the hidden password to seek the
corresponding data, it is difficult for the adversary to
improve the fake from the replied matching score.
Therefore, the probability of the adversary’s success on
our proposed authentication scheme becomes less than
conventional biometric authentication.
Normally, replay attack is impossible, if previously
obtained information is not reusable. When adversaries
eavesdrop on the communication between the client
and the authentication server, they obtain only
embedded transformed features or encrypted data,
which are not reusable. Hence, no adversary successes
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replay attack on the proposed authentication scheme. If
the adversaries can snoop to the communication from
the proposed scheme, and obtain the information of
any embedded template or encrypted data or decrypted
data, when they reuse this information, the client and
the database can detect replay attack by verifying the
difference among the information of the data used in
WHPE scheme.
Only the attack will be established possibly when
the user’s biometric as well as according to our scheme
the attacker compromises the fingerprint and the
palmprint both.
4. Conclusion
We proposed the authentication scheme to protect
the biometric templates and to improve the security
and privacy level of biometric authentication system in
this paper. The main concept of the proposed
authentication scheme is that stolen biometric
information is not reusable, in every authentication for
even same person. In the scheme we used hidden
password, which was derived from palmprint
classifications. The hidden password concept is very
similar to the password concept [15] but here user
needs to remember the password and also the password
is very easy to guess. Finally, we obtained the view of
the security of our proposed authentication scheme
against the attacks described in section 1(a). The
performance of the authentication scheme is presented
by the experiments and results.
5. References
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classification using principle lines,” Pattern Recognition,
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[2]. Palmprint database from Biometric Research Center,
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[8]. Maio, D. Maltoni, R. Cappelli, J. L. Wayman and A. K.

Jain, “FVC2004: Third Fingerprint Verification
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[10]. Dimovski, D. Gilogoroski, “Generating highly nonlinear

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[11]. K. Jain, A. Ross, and U. Uludag, “Biometric template

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[12]. Y. Sutcu, Q. Li and N. Memon, “Protecting Biometric

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[13]. S.W. Sun, C.S. Lu, and P.C. Chang, “Biometric

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[14]. Colin Soutar, Danny Roberge, Alex Stoianov, Rene

Gilroy, and B.V.K. Vijaya Kumar “Biometric Encryption™,”
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[15]. Karthik Nandakumar, Abhishek Nagar and Anil K. Jain,

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[16]. A.B.J. Teoh, A. Goh and D.C.L. Ngo, “Random

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