Second, I do not agree that either claim should be interpreted as refering to norms whose content isformulated in a
vocabulary. For one thing, if norms are about what is right, wrong,good, bad, just, and unjust, then to that extent their content has to be formulated at least partlyin normative terms, because those terms are normative.If the idea is that it must be possible to identify in nonnormative terms what is supposed to beright, wrong, good, bad, just or unjust according to a given norm, that rules out norms relatingnorms, such as the principle that it is wrong to try to persuade someone to do something wrong.Failing to consider such norms begs a question against the simple innateness model, since at leastone of the proposals is that a principle of Double Eﬀect might be a norm of the relevant sort. Inone version of this norm, its content is that
it is worse to cause harm to someone (who has not consented to this) as (part of) your means to bringing about a greater good to others than to cause such harm as a side eﬀect of doing something that will bring about a greater good.
This contentincludes several moral notions: at least,
.Consider the widely accepted claim that there are universal linguistic principles. Linguists do notsuppose that the content of such principles can be formulated without appeal to concepts fromlinguistics. Why should a proponent of universal moral principles be committed to supposing thatthe content of the relevant moral principles can be formulated in nonnormative terms?Third, Sripada suggests that “more or less
putative examples of norm univesals are actuallyassociated with much underlying variability.” However, it is plausible that at least some moralnorms are default norms which hold other things being equal, where social context is relevant towhat counts as other things being equal. And it is not easy to distinguish the claim that diﬀerentmoralities have diﬀerent default norms from the claim that they share the same default norms thatinteract diﬀerently with their diﬀerent social contexts.Fourth, certain underlying norms may be
in people’s moral judgments without themselvesbeing explicitly known to the people whose moralities reﬂect those norms, just as there are under-2