Cdi Policy Paper On Dpd-Ri

centre for democratic institutions
www.cdi.anu.edu.au
CDI Policy Papers on Political Governance

2006/1 Indonesia’s Regional Representative Assembly:
Democracy, Representation and the Regions
A report on the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD)
Stephen Sherlock
Introduction
The Indonesian state has been in a process of transformation since the fall
of the Suharto regime in 1998. The first wave of reform under the unelected
Habibie government of 1998-99 saw the removal of restrictions on civil
rights such as freedom of speech, association and assembly, the creation
of a range of new political parties and organisations and the country’s
first democratic election in over 40 years in June 1999. The movement of
the parliament (DPR) back into the centre stage of political life and the
subsequent election of a new President then led to a series of constitutional
reforms that were completed in 2003. The constitutional reforms
strengthened the powers of the parliament and eliminated most of the
powers of the previously powerful quasi-legislative body, the MPR. The The CDI Policy Paper
power to elect the President was removed from the MPR and was placed series focuses on
in the hands of the people through direct election. In addition, a new pressing issues of
political governance
assembly, the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD) or Regional Representative in the Asia-Pacific
Assembly/Council was created with the intention of increasing the role of region. The series
the regions in making laws. publishes original
papers commissioned
by CDI, each of which
As a new representative assembly with some quite unusual features, deal with important
the DPD has not yet been analysed in any detail. This study provides an issues for policymakers
interested in issues of
introduction to the structure and operation of the DPD and examines some democracy, governance
of the key issues that have emerged in discussion and debate about the and political institutions.
DPD in its early formative period. The study considers certain questions The papers feature new
research and policy
about whether the DPD is as representative of the regions as its proponents recommendations, and
would claim, whether it has provided a new entry point for regional aim to forge research-to-
aspirations into political and policy debate and what problems the DPD policy links and provide
new insights and analysis
on subjects of concern
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) – People’s Representative Assembly. to CDI.
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) – People’s Consultative Council.
Indonesia’s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions
faces in attempting to define a role for itself in the future of Indonesian

2 politics.
The DPD grew out of the view that Indonesia’s regions should have a greater
role in policy-making at the national level and that that role should be played
by a second chamber of the central parliament. The argument developed
in this paper, however, is that the DPD has
not yet shown that it can actually provide
Introduction....................................................1 significant input into the national legislative
process or act as voice of the regions. The
What is the DPD?.....................................................4 major problem is that the DPD is only an
Constitutional role and powers.............................4 advisory body and its areas of responsibility
are quite limited and, as yet, ill-defined.
An advisory body not an upper house...................6
Efforts by DPD Members to increase their
An assembly for the regions................................8 powers have become a major preoccupation
Structure of the DPD..........................................8 for the assembly and have arguably diverted
Leadership of the DPD....................................9 its attention from the more immediate task
Ad-Hoc Committees.......................................10 of demonstrating that it can effectively use
Steering Committee........................................10 the powers it already has. Critical issues
Legislation Committee....................................11 such as the definition and extent of the
House Affairs Committee................................12 DPD’s powers and how the assembly should
Committee for Inter-institutional Cooperation..12 interact with the legislative deliberations of
Ethics Council.................................................12 the DPR have not been seriously considered
and have been dealt with on an ad-hoc
Secretariat of the DPD.......................................13
basis. The result is that the DPD’s only
Who are the Members of the DPD?......................14 notable achievement to date is being what
Paths to power...................................................17 its leaders have called an “ombudsman” or
a “post office”, gathering grievances and
Social and Occupational Backgrounds of DPD
petitions amongst governmental and private
Members............................................................18
institutions and individuals in the regions.
The DPD electoral system: how representative?..22 The structure of the DPD is modelled on
Representation and “politics”..............................26 the DPR, but it is questionable whether the
internal organisational arrangements that are
Representation in the SNTV electoral system......27 appropriate for the DPR are
Centreactually the best
for Democratic
Institutions
Work in progress?: The first year of the DPD.......30 for a very different body like the DPD.
Research School of Social
Sciences
Making a non-party assembly work.....................35
DPD Members are elected as National
Australian individuals
University
Conclusion.....................................................38 and are not permitted to be sponsored
Canberra ACT 0200
by
political parties. Despite concerns that
AUSTRALIA
Appendix: DPD Members, Provinces & Votes........42 political parties would attempt to take
over and control the DPD through indirect
About the Author....................................................46 means, it appears that there has not been any
major organised forays into the assembly by
About the Centre for Democratic Institutions...........46 the parties. A possible exception is that of
Golkar, whose members and ex-members are
Stephen Sherlock
prominent in the DPD. This does not seem, however, to be the result of a
concerted effort by the party, but instead is a reflection of the fact that the 3
majority of people with governmental and political experience in Indonesia
have had some connections with Golkar in the past. The DPD has become an
alternative path through which former political operators from the New
Order have been able to recreate themselves in the democratic environment
and protect themselves from challenges to their influential status.

Apart from people with a background in the New Order, the DPD is also
composed of other identifiable kinds of individuals. The large number of
businesspeople elected to the DPD suggests that the assembly has become a
means by which independently wealthy people can win a national office
without depending on the support of political party. There is also a clearly
identifiable pattern for local figures with traditional sources of status and
influence to win a place in the DPD. Regions with strong localised support
for religious organisations like NU, Muhammadiyah or the churches have
tended to elect individuals with these backgrounds to the DPD. The election
results also show that it is a major advantage to be known in certain
localities as being part of an aristocratic or well‐connected family. Finally,
the minority of individuals in the DPD with a background of involvement in
academia, the law, media and community organisations indicates that it is
also possible to be elected to the DPD with a profile built around
professional standing and social activism.

The electoral system created for the DPD has given rise to some major issues
about the powers, legitimacy and representativeness of the assembly. Faced
with the reality of their limited powers, most DPD Members take comfort in
the view that their chamber is more legitimate and representative than the
DPR because it is composed of non‐party representatives. This is seen as
justification for the campaign to further reform the constitution in order to
increase the powers of the DPD. In fact, however, the unusual features of the
DPD’s electoral system create serious doubts that claims for greater
legitimacy and representativeness can be sustained. Moreover, the absence
of the discipline, predictability and organisational direction provided by
political parties can be seen as part of the reason why the DPD has so far
failed to develop policy priorities or a plan of action beyond lobbying for
increased powers. The first year of the DPD has been marked by drift and a
lack of discernable progress.

In
What is the DPD?
4

The DPD is an elected assembly designed to increase the participation of the
regions in the process of law‐making and the oversight of executive
government. It has 128 Members, with 4 representatives from each of
Indonesia’s 32 provinces. The DPD is the product of two parallel processes
of political change occurring in Indonesia since 1998: firstly, popular and
elite pressure for reform of the state to widen participation in decision‐
making and accountability and, secondly, the devolution of powers from the
capital, Jakarta, to the provincial and district (kabupaten) levels of
government in the regions.

Constitutional role and powers

The legal basis for the DPD is Articles 22C and 22D of the Constitution of the
Republic of Indonesia, which were inserted into the document as part of the
constitutional amendments. The Constitution states that the DPD is elected
from the provinces and has the following powers:

1) Propose Bills to the DPR related to regional autonomy, central
and regional relations, formation, enlargement and merger of
regions, management of natural resources and other economic
resources and Bills related to the financial balance between the
centre and regions.

2) Participate in the discussion of Bills related to the matters in
paragraph 1 above, as well as provide advice to the DPR on
Bills on the State Budget and Bills related to taxation,
education and religion.

3) Oversee the implementation of laws related to the matters in
paragraphs 1 and 2 above, as well as submit the results of such
oversight to the DPR in the form of material for its further
consideration.1

Article 22D, 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. (Undang‐Undang Dasar
1
Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945). Author’s translation.
Stephen Sherlock
The constitutional reforms also changed the composition of the MPR,
eliminating the previously unelected regional representatives and replacing 5
them with the Members of the DPD. Article 2 (1) of the Constitution states
that “the MPR shall consist of the Members of the DPR and the Members of
the DPD. The remaining roles of the MPR are now to amend the
Constitution, to swear in the President and to be the final decision‐maker in
what would be quite lengthy proceedings to dismiss the President. Some
leading Members of the DPD were part of the regional representatives
grouping in the MPR and they tend to look upon the DPD as in some ways a
successor institution to the MPR. The MPR is now composed of the
Members of the DPR and the Members of the DPD and two of the four
Speaker and Deputy Speaker position in the MPR are held by DPD
Members.

It is important to note that the Constitution does not explicitly state that the
DPD is a legislative body. The Constitution states that the DPR “holds the
power to make laws,” with the qualification that the DPR must reach “joint
approval” with the President (articles 20 (1) and (2)).2 The DPD is not
mentioned at all in the context of law‐making powers.

The constitutional amendments were embodied in Law 22/2003 on the
structure and composition of legislative bodies (commonly known as the
Susduk law, an acronym of its Indonesian title). The Susduk law provides a
little more detail on how the powers of the DPD are put into effect,
particularly by providing some guidance on its interaction with the DPR.
The law states that:

• the DPR invites the DPD to discuss the DPD’s proposed Bills,
in accordance with procedures determined by the DPR.
2 It might be noted here that these two clauses could be interpreted as contradictory. If the
DPR has the power to make laws, it should not be necessary for it to obtain joint approval
from the President. Before the constitutional amendments, the power to make laws resided
with the President alone. Removing the power from the President and explicitly stating that
it resided with the DPR was seen as an important step for democratisation. In practice,
however, the new formulation is ambiguous and gives executive government an effective
power of veto at all stages of deliberations on a Bill. There are a growing number of Bills
that have become frozen in the process because the government has refused to agree to the
DPR’s draft Bill. See Stephen Sherlock, The Indonesian Parliament after Five Years of Reformasi,
United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, Jakarta, 2004 , pp. 29‐30. But, in
any case, the DPD cannot pass or agree to a Bill, it can only provide advice.
In
• discussion with the DPD takes place before the DPR begins
6 discussion on the Bill with the government.3
• advice from the DPD on matters within its purview is to be
regarded as material for the DPR to take up for further
consideration, including in its discussions with the
government.
• the DPD gives advice to the DPR on the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK).

An advisory body not an upper house

The first thing that is most evident from a reading of the Constitution and
the Susduk law is that the DPD is only an advisory body. It has a role in the
legislative process in that it has the power to draft laws on regional issues, to
participate in the discussion on the State Budget and Bills in certain other
issues and to oversee the implementation of certain laws. But the DPR is
under no obligation to pass or even to consider seriously laws drafted by the
DPD or to accept its advice. As mentioned, the Constitution gives the power
to make laws to the DPR and the Susduk law makes it clear that input from
the DPD is taken at the discretion of the DPR.

The DPD is sometimes referred to in media reports as Indonesia’s “Senate”
and many DPD Members appear keen to be called “Senators”, probably in
an attempt to boost perceptions of the chamber’s importance. This usage is,
however, highly misleading because the DPD is in no way comparable to the
US Senate or to upper houses in the bicameral parliaments that exist in both
the Westminster tradition and in many presidential systems of government.
In the US Congress, the UK Parliament and in many other parliaments, all
legislation must pass through an upper house in order to be passed and, in
many cases (such as the Australian Parliament) the upper house has veto
powers. Even to talk of the new Indonesian system as “bicameral” is
questionable because it suggests that all legislation passes through two
houses (Patterson & Mughan 1999). But the DPD does not pass legislation, it
can only introduce or give advice on a certain range of Bills in the DPR. Even
the more generic term of “second chamber” that is often used in
comparative literature is appropriate only in a strict literal sense when
3 The Constitution provides that all Bills must be discussed jointly by the DPR and
government counterparts and that “joint agreement” between the two sides is required for a
Bill to pass into law.
Stephen Sherlock
discussing the DPD (Baldwin & Shell 2001). The fact that the DPD is an
advisory body and is limited in even the areas where it can advise make it 7
difficult to accord it even nominal or ceremonial equal status with the DPR.

The DPD is thus a quite unusual example of a second chamber because it
represents the odd combination of limited powers and high legitimacy. Its
role in law‐making is limited to certain areas of policy, its powers are only
advisory and no Bill is actually required to pass through it in order to be
passed, yet at the same time it has the strong legitimacy that comes from
being a fully elected chamber. This combination does not seem to be
replicated anywhere else in the world. There are second chambers that
combine strong powers with the strong legitimacy of popular election, such
as the US Senate and the Australian Senate, and these chambers have often
played a prominent role in their countries’ political scene. On the other
hand, there are countries, such as Canada, whose second chambers have
strong powers but lack legitimacy because they are appointed by executive
government. The Canadian Senate has a range of powers that sound
impressive but which have historically been rarely exercised because the
Canadian electorate and the Senators themselves do not regard a body
composed of government appointees to have the popular authority to
impose its will on the lower house (Franks 1999).

There is a rich variety of forms of second chambers, but the norm is
generally for their powers to be considerably or somewhat less than their
“lower house”, particularly with regard to financial bills, and for their
system of selection to be in some way indirect (either inheritance,
appointment or election by other legislatures or institutions) and thus
conferring a lesser legitimacy than direct popular election (Patterson &
Mughan 2001). Thus political theory and actual practice in most democratic
countries has tended to come to regard lesser powers for a second chamber
to be a natural accompaniment to indirect election and vice versa. The
design of the DPD, however, has created expectations amongst its Members
and supporters that its voice should be listened to. Indeed, as shall be
discussed below, many DPD Members consider that the method of election
for the DPD has actually conferred a greater legitimacy on the DPD than on
the DPR. But its powers are such that it does not have the capacity to force
the “other chamber” (the DPR) or the government to accept its position on
any legislative or policy question.
In
An assembly for the regions
8

The DPD could be seen as akin to the second chambers of a number of
countries in that its framers aimed to increase representation of the regions.
Internationally, such representation is sought to be achieved in a variety of
ways. In some countries, regional representation is based on the system of
popular election. The US and Australian Senates are both popularly elected,
but the electoral district is the state (province), with each state having an
equal number of representatives, regardless of population. Other second
chambers, such as the German Bundesrat and the South African Council of
Provinces, aim for regional representation by having their Members elected
from or by the provincial legislatures or provincial executive government.
The Canadian Senate is composed of Members who nominally represent the
provinces (with numbers varying according to provincial populations), but
the appointments are made by the Prime Minister of the Confederation.

The DPD is said to be an assembly for the regions because its constituencies
are the provinces and because its Members are elected as individual non‐
party candidates. In addition, to ensure that large provinces do not dominate
the assembly each province has equal representation, even though
Indonesia’s provinces range in population from under 1 million to nearly 40
million. The voting system is by single non‐transferable vote (SNTV), which
means that the candidates with the four highest numbers of votes are
elected. Candidates for DPD election are not permitted to campaign as
members of political parties or on the behalf of parties. They may, however,
be members of political parties but may not be current office‐holders in a
party. The first election for the DPD was held in April 2004, in conjunction
with elections for the DPR and the assemblies at provincial and district level
(DPRD‐I and DPRD‐II). The first DPD was sworn in in October 2004.

Structure of the DPD

The internal structure of the DPD is closely modelled on the example of the
DPR, with certain important differences created by the absence of political
parties. The philosophical approach to decision‐making and their
embodiment in a number of organisational principles are clearly influenced
by those found in the DPR (Sherlock 2003). These include the direction of the
assembly’s business by a strong collective leadership, collective decision‐
making by consensus rather than an organised majority‐minority division
Stephen Sherlock
and the concentration of decision‐making power in specialised committees,
with plenary sessions reserved for largely ceremonial endorsement of 9
decisions made in ancillary bodies within the DPD.

Leadership of the DPD
The operation of the DPD is overseen by the Leadership of the House
(Pimpinan DPD), which is composed of a Speaker (Ketua) and two Deputy
Speakers (Wakil Ketua), whose duty is not only to preside over sessions but
to organise and lead the DPD. The Leadership is characterised in the Rules
of Procedure as being a ‘united collective leadership’.4 The philosophy
underlying this description is indicative of the particular role of the
Speaker(s) of the Indonesian parliament which has been transferred from the
DPR to the DPD. In most democratic legislatures it is usually considered that
the presiding officers should be impartial and ‘above’ partisanship, or
should at least give strong consideration to the rights of opposition parties.
The Leadership of the DPD, on the other hand, is seen as representing a
collective consensus of the various Members of the assembly. The
Leadership is considered non‐partisan not in the sense of being apart from
party divisions but in the sense of articulating, or even embodying, a
collective expression of all the main views in the DPD. It could be seen as
significant that the terminology to describe the office implies that it is one
that ‘leads’ rather than ‘presides’.

The Leadership is elected to be broadly representative of the regions. For the
purposes of electing the Leadership the country is divided into three zones
and one Member of the Leadership must come from each zone. The zones
are the Western Zone compromising the 10 provinces of the island of
Sumatra, the Central Zone compromising the 11 provinces of Java, Bali and
Kalimantan and the Eastern Zone compromising the 11 provinces on the
islands of Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua. The Speaker is
Ginandjar Kartasasmita from West Java and the two Deputy Speakers are
Irman Gusman from West Sumatra and Laode Ide from Southeast Sulawesi.5
Ad‐Hoc Committees
Just as the main working and decision‐making bodies of the DPR are the
Commissions and Special Committees, the real work of the DPD is centred
“satu kesatuan pimpinan yang bersifat kolektif” Peraturan Tata Tertib DPD, Article 18.
4
The actual election of the first DPD Leadership in September 2004 is described in some
5
detail in “Dari Daerah untuk Bangsa”, Legislatif, 1‐15 November 2004, pp. 25‐29.
In
on four Ad‐Hoc Committees (Panitia Ad‐Hoc (PAH)) which, despite their
10 name, are standing committees. Their role is to discuss Bills emanating from
the DPR or initiated by the DPD and to execute the DPD’s powers in the area
of the oversight of executive government. The structure and allocation of
functions of the PAH reflects the powers and authority of the DPD.

PAH I: regional autonomy, relations between the centre and the regions, and
the creation, dissolution and amalgamation of regions.6
PAH II: management of natural resources, management of other economic
resources, balance of central and regional finances, and taxation.
PAH III: education and religion.
PAH IV: the state budget, results of the audit of the State Audit Agency
(BPK) and advice on the appointment of Members of BPK.

Each PAH is composed of 32 Members, with one Member from each
province, each Member being expected to serve on one PAH. The
membership of the PAH is selected annually in a plenary meeting of the
DPD, so current arrangements will mean that the membership will change
each year. The Committees are headed by a Leadership, composed of a
Chair and two Deputy Chair which, like the DPD Leadership is meant to be
a united collective leadership.

In addition to the PA, there are a range of other permanent bodies (alat
kelengkapan) of the DPD which are again modelled on their counterparts in
the DPR.
Steering Committee
The Steering Committee (Panitia Musyawarah) is composed of 32 Members
(one from each province) whose function is to draw up the agenda for the
sessions of the DPD and to determine policies for the operation and
management of the assembly and to oversee the work of the various bodies
of the DPD. It is headed by a Leadership with a Chair and two Deputy
Chairs, elected by the Members of the Committee at a plenary session
chaired by the DPD Leadership.

The Steering Committee’s roles are the same as those for the counterpart
body in the DPR, which is a very powerful organ in that chamber. In
6 The word “region” (daerah) is used interchangeably in two senses: to refer in general to the
areas of the country outside the capital and to refer collectively to the three levels of sub‐
national government, the provinces, districts (kabupaten) and sub‐districts (kecamatan).
Stephen Sherlock
remains to be seen, however, whether the Steering Committee of the DPD
will be as central to the functioning of the DPD as it is in the DPR. This is 11
one of the areas where the absence of political parties will have a crucial
effect on how the DPD is able to operate. The Steering Committee in the
DPR derives its powers not only from its ability to control what and when is
discussed, but also from the fact that it is made up of the Leadership of the
DPR, the Leadership of the Commissions and the Leadership of the party
caucuses (Fraksi). It is thus composed of the most powerful elements of all
the key bodies of the parliament and is the place were the party caucuses are
most directly and formally represented (Sherlock 2003).

The composition of the Steering Committee of the DPD, on the other hand, is
no different from the composition of all the other bodies of the DPD,
including the PAH. The 32 Members of the Committee are selected as
individual DPD Members and do not represent established power players
from other bodies of the assembly. The absence of party caucuses means that
the Committee is not an instrument for the enforcement of party direction
and discipline along the lines of its counterpart body in the DPR. It will be
important to observe what, if any, conventions come to be developed on the
selection of Steering Committee members. Of particular interest will be the
question of who, if anyone, is reappointed to the Committee over a number
of years and is thus able to build up technical expertise and influence.
Legislation Committee
The Legislation Committee (Panitia Perancang Undang‐Undang) is a
committee of 32 DPD Members (one from each province) whose function is
to plan and prioritise the agenda of the DPD’s deliberations on Bills and to
coordinate the discussion of Bills by the PAH and other DPD bodies. The
Committee can hold consultations meetings with the DPR, regional
legislatures, central and regional governments and the public and is the
point of contact between the DPD and the Legislation Council of the DPR
(Baleg) on the deliberation of Bills. The Committee is also responsible for
evaluating and developing the Rules of Procedure (Standing Orders) of the
DPD and the DPD Members’ Code of Ethics. It is headed by a collective
Leadership of a Chair and two Deputy Chairs.

The Legislation Committee is modelled on the DPR’s Legislation Council
(Baleg), a body that has become increasingly central to the work of the DPR
because the Council now oversees the production of all Bills initiated by the
DPR, often including the actual drafting of the Bills. The Council has also
In
become an important interface between the DPR and the government. Once
12 again, it will again be interesting to observe if the DPD Legislation
Committee takes on as influential role as its counterpart in the DPR.
House Affairs Committee
The House Affairs Committee (Panitia Urusan Rumah Tangga) is responsible
for the oversight of the internal affairs of the DPD, including the DPD’s own
budget. It is constituted in the same way as the other bodies of the DPD,
with a membership of 32 DPD Members, selected annually and with one
representative from each province. It is headed by a collective Leadership
composed of a Chair and two Deputy Chairs.
Committee for Inter‐institutional Cooperation
The Committee for Inter‐institutional Cooperation (Panitia Kerja Sama Antar‐
Lembaga Perwakilan7) is responsible for managing and developing relations
and cooperation between the DPD and other representative legislative
institutions, under the guidance of the DPD Leadership. The Committee
oversees the dispatching and reception of delegations from other legislative
bodies, both bilateral and multilateral, under the direction of the DPD
Leadership and the Steering Committee. The Committee is composed of 32
Members (one from each province) selected annually and headed by a
collective Leadership with a Chair and two Deputy Chairs.
Ethics Council
The Ethics Council (Badan Kehormatan) is charged with the responsibility of
investigating complaints made against DPD Members regarding their
continued fitness for office or allegations of violation of their oath or the
DPD Code of Ethics. The Council can call witness and gather other evidence,
can reach conclusions about its investigations and recommend sanctions
such as termination of a Member from a leadership position in the DPD or as
a Member of the DPD. But it must refer conclusions and recommendations
to a plenary session of the DPD for final decision. The Council is constituted
in the same way as DPD Committees, with 32 Members (one from each
province) and a Leadership of a Chair and two Deputy Chairs.
Secretariat of the DPD

7 This translates literally as “Inter‐Representative Institution Cooperation Committee”.
Stephen Sherlock
A major problem confronting the DPD is the fact that the financial and
human resources at its disposal to support its work are completely 13
insufficient, particularly for an assembly that is still in the formative stages
of its development. The resources available to support the DPR are meagre
and those it does have are poorly organised and managed, but the DPR at
least has the benefit of a complement of staff and physical resources
inherited from its earlier years of existence as a rubber‐stamp chamber
during the New Order. But the DPD is not even able to call on upon such
accumulated sources of support.

As an interim measure, the immediate administrative and specialist needs of
the DPD have been met by the Secretariat of the MPR. With the great
reduction in the powers and role of the MPR, and particularly since the end
of the work of the MPR committee on constitutional reform, this was a
logical short‐term move. But the MPR Secretariat was not designed for a
chamber that meets on a continuous basis like the DPD. The MPR Secretariat
does have the advantage that it is relatively flexible compared to the DPR
Secretariat and it was reportedly able to redirect staff existing staff to new
tasks. But the DPD is urgently in need of a Secretariat that is structured
around its own institutional needs. Current plans are that a DPD Secretariat
will be established by the end of 2005, but outside observers are sceptical
that this objective will be met. A Presidential Decree will be required to
establish the DPD Secretariat, but this has not yet been issued.8

The MPR Secretariat has a staff of around 300 personnel, with the great
majority of these being administrative and security staff.9 There are around
15 staff with the qualifications to provide the kind of intellectual support
necessary for a modern legislature. These include 5 legal drafters who had
been brought into the MPR Secretariat to work on the constitutional
amendment process. There are a number of staff with law and politics
backgrounds, but none with high level qualifications in disciplines such as
economics and education. These latter areas are, of course, a major focus for
the work of the DPD and the absence of staff with such expertise is a glaring
weakness that reflects the fact that the MPR Secretariat was not designed for
8 Interviews with MPR Secretariat staff and staff of international agencies. Jakarta, May
2005.
9 The DPD building is located inside the DPR/MPR compound, but the MPR Secretariat is
responsible for the security of the DPD building as well as the MPR Secretariat building.
The DPR Secretariat is responsible for the perimeter security of the compound and for DPR
facilities.
In
the purposes of supporting the DPD. DPD Members are provided with an
14 allowance for one member of staff each. Most of these staff are not well
qualified and tend to be regarded by Members as an opportunity to dispense
patronage or to employ relatives.
Who are the Members of the DPD?

An important element of the discussion and debate that led to the formation
of the DPD was the idea that it should be made up of people different from
those that tend to fill the ranks of the DPR. It was intended that the DPD
should not be dominated by the professional party politicians in Jakarta, but
should contain people from a diversity of backgrounds who are strongly
connected with a base in the regions.

The first clear trend is the strong presence of Members with Golkar
connections, with one estimate putting it at 24, or 19 per cent of the
assembly. These range from former national leaders such as the Suharto‐era
Ministers Ginandjar Kartasasmita (now the DPD Speaker) and Sarwono
Kusumaatmadja, to provincial party functionaries such as the Aceh
representative, Helmi Mahera Al Mujahid, to the North Sumatra
representative, Raja Inal Siregar, a former Governor of that province and
retired military officer, who described himself as an “adviser” to Golkar.10
One of the Deputy Speakers of DPD, La Ode Ida, also worked as an adviser
to the Golkar Faction in the DPR from 1997 to 1999.11 A large proportion of
those with a relationship with Golkar appear to be from the “green” or
Islamic elements of the party, with a number having been involved in ICMI
and Muhammadiyah.

The prominence of former Golkar figures is not surprising because it was by
far the official party during the Suharto regime and membership was
critically important to the acquisition of any kind of position of public office
or influence. Golkar was the only party permitted to organise at the regional
level and it was a parallel but integral part of local administrative structures.
In many regions Golkar leaders make up a major proportion of the
individuals with political and administrative experience and with a high
public profile in their local communities and provinces. The situation is
reminiscent of the hold on public life still held by figures from the Stalinist
10 Profiles of Members of the Regional Representative Council 2004‐2009, MPR RI Secretariat
General & International IDEA, Jakarta, 2004.
11 Ibid., p. 287.
Stephen Sherlock
parties of the former Soviet bloc. There was never anything like a “purge” of
New Order figures after the fall of Suharto, so many appear to have used 15
their longstanding networks and profile as a launching pad for election to
the DPD. Three other Members declare themselves to have had associations
with other parties, two from parties that existed under the New Order, PPP
and PDI/PDIP and only one from a party launched since 1998, the Islamic
PBB.

Possibly the most striking feature of the composition of the DPD is the
prominence of business people. About 50 Members describe themselves as
being “entrepreneurs”, in “private business” and so on, which makes them
the largest single group in the DPD. There are some who have had previous
experience in public office, but the DPD is notable in that it seems to have
attracted a large number of individuals with a purely business background
that have had little previous overt involvement in public politics.

A large number of religious leaders or individuals with connections to an
Islamic or Christian organisation were elected to the DPD. Around 30 DPD
Members, or 23 per cent of the assembly, have such connections as a major
part of their profile. These include prominent leaders of the Islamic
modernist organisation Muhammadiyah, such as Irman Gusman from West
Sumatra, as well as a number of figures who are well known in their
provinces for their role in the Islamic traditionalist organisation, Nadhlatul
Ulama (NU) and in Islamic schools (pesantren) run by NU. In the large
provinces of West, Central and East Java, where NU is especially influential,
5 of the 12 DPD Members have a prominent background in NU pesantren.12
There are 8 DPD Members with links to Christian organisations, mainly
from eastern Indonesia where Christians are concentrated. In many cases,
however, they could not necessarily be described as “religious leaders”
because their religious affiliations are just one part of their profile.

Along with religious leaders from organisations with a strong local identity,
there is a group of individuals who are prominent in their province or
region because their families have traditional local aristocratic or adat
connections. The clearest example is probably Gusti Kanjeng Ratu Hemas,
the wife of the highly influential Sultan of Yogyakarta. Two of the four
Balinese Members are scions of the aristocratic families of Bali. Representing
North Maluku are Nita Budhi Susanti, the wife of the Sultan of Ternate and
12 Profiles of Members, op. cit., pp. 125‐179.
In
Djafarsyah, the Sultan of Tidore, while Arief Natadiningrat and Ratu Cicih
16 Kurniasih come from traditional ruling families in West Java and Banten
respectively. One of the Central Sulewesi representatives, Nurmawati
Bantilan, has a family name famous in the province for its long history of
occupying prominent professional and public positions.

Many of the DPD Members have had a background in regional government
and administration, either as civil servants, members of regional assemblies
such as DPRDs,13 or as leading officials such as provincial Governors and
district heads (Bupati). Nine Members have held local government office
under the Suharto regime or since 1998, 5 have been Members of provincial
or district legislatures and 6 were Members of the MPR as regional
representatives, meaning that they were appointed by local assemblies.
Many individuals with such a background have had careers in the civil
service and this is reflected in the background of many DPD Members. The
heavy involvement of the military in local administration under the Suharto
regime has, however, not lead to high military or police numbers in the
DPD. The presence of 5 former uniformed officers in the DPD from the
police and military would be considered quite unusual in most democratic
countries, but it could be seen as relatively small in the context of Indonesian
history.

The final category of DPD Member which can be identified are those with a
background in academia or the professions, particularly the media and law.
The Deputy Speaker of the DPD, Laode Ide, best exemplifies this strand in
the DPD membership, with a professional background in higher education
combined with a public profile built around public commentary in the
media and work for non‐government organisations (NGOs), as well as a
short period as an adviser to the Golkar faction in the DPR. There are 20
Members who give their occupation as lecturer or academic, as well as 4
Members with legal qualifications and 11 with a background in the media.

Female representation in the DPD is perhaps higher than many people
expected, with 27 women being elected. This is 21 per cent of the assembly, a
figure which compares favourably with the 11 per cent representation of
women in the DPR (Bessell 2004). A couple of the women could be seen as
continuing in the tradition of Megawati, Benazir Bhutto or Indira Gandhi
13 DPRD = Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional People’s Representative Assembly.
These exist at the provincial level, where they are known as DPRD‐I and at district
(kabupaten) level, where they are known as DPRD‐II.
Stephen Sherlock
and being elected because of their relationships with male figures. A most
notable example, as mentioned above, is the wife of the Sultan of Yogyakarta 17
who is a very popular figure in his province and the only member of one of
the former aristocratic families who has a national profile. Sultana Hemas’
election demonstrated the great local popularity of the Sultan in Yogyakarta
because she actually received the highest individual vote (in percentage
terms) of any candidate for the DPD. With 43.31 per cent of the vote in her
province, she far exceeded the vote of any other DPD Member, most of
whom received from 5 to 20 per cent. Interestingly, the candidate with the
second highest vote was another “wife”, Aida Ismet, the wife of the
Governor of Riau Islands, who won 35.78 per cent. Further surveys would
be required to identify the extent to which voters who supported women
candidates did so because of the candidates’ gender.

Paths to power

There are a number of clear patterns to the kind of people who have been
elected to the DPD. Their backgrounds could be put into five categories:
business, government and the bureaucracy, religion, aristocratic/traditional
and professional/social activist. It is important to be clear, however, that
these are not watertight categories into which each Member can be neatly
placed. On the contrary, there is a large overlap between them and many
Members could be identified in more than one way. The Deputy Speaker,
Irman Gusman, for example, has prominent Islamic modernist connections,
having been involved in both Muhammadiyah and ICMI, but he clearly
identifies himself as a businessman with “a modern management approach”
to politics, rejecting associations with “sectarianism”.14 In a similar way,
most of those with an aristocratic background identify themselves as
businesspeople or professionals.

With these reservations in mind, the following tabulation produced by the
international development organisation, International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Systems (IDEA) presents a view of the composition
of the DPD which gives a good impression of the relative strengths of
different kinds of DPD Members.
14 Interview with Irman Gusman, Jakarta, May 2005.
In
Social and Occupational Backgrounds of DPD Members
18
Source: International IDEA

No Category Total
1. Golkar background 26
2. Other party backgrounds (PDIP, PPP) 2 (1‐1)
3. MPR (Regional delegates, Social group delegates) 9 (6‐3)
4. DPR 2
5. Regional parliaments (DPRD I/II) 8
6. Business people 50
7. National Executive (Ministers) 2
8. Regional Executive (Governors, District Heads, other) 6 (3‐1‐2)
9. NGO/activist 8
10. Academia 20
11. Islamic Traditionalist 19
12. Islam Modernist 21
13. Non Islamic religious organisations 6
14. Military (TNI/Polri) 5
15. Media 11
16. Law 4

The usefulness of these categorisations is that they give an insight into the
sources of prominence, influence and resources on which DPD Members
drew in order to win election. They provide a broad picture of the paths to
power for DPD candidates. Without the organisational and financial
resources of political parties behind them, candidates for the DPD mobilised
political and/or financial capital behind them in a number of ways.

Some drew upon their standing as leaders of religious organisations or as
members of families with high traditional status and were able to translate
the respect of local people into electoral support. In the case of the religious
leaders, this had both local and national dimensions, in that NU,
Muhammadiyah and the Catholic and Protestant churches are notionally
Indonesia‐wide bodies but actually have a strongly regional character to
their patterns of adherence. Hence the DPD figures most clearly associated
Stephen Sherlock
with NU come from East and Central Java, while those with
Muhammadiyah connections are strongly represented amongst the 19
Members from Sumatra and most of the Christian Members are from eastern
Indonesia. In the case of aristocratic and adat figures, local allegiances were
clearly paramount. Thus one path to the DPD was to draw upon highly
localised religious and other traditional identities or allegiances, frequently
referred to in Indonesian political discourse as “primordial”, a term that
often has disparaging connotations.

Other DPD candidates were able to mobilise electoral support out of their
background as powerful political figures during the New Order, whether as
ministers, governors, district heads or prominent officials in the regional
bureaucracy. Recent research has shown that there is marked trend for some
new provincial legislatures and positions of district heads and mayors to be
taken over by “politicos” from the previous regime who have been highly
successful in surviving the transition and thriving in new positions of power
that are, in theory at least, now democratically accountable (Robison &
Hadiz 2004, Malley 2003). According to Hadiz (2003: p.5), it is an indication
“of the success that Soeharto‐era local elites have had in reconstituting their
power in a more democratic environment dominated by parties and
parliaments”. The evidence from the DPD suggests that this new assembly
has also become one of the ways in which this is being achieved.

Not only is the DPD being seen as a new path to power in itself, but the
assembly is also being used as a stepping stone to power in the regions. At
the time of writing, direct popular elections for the positions of governor,
district heads and mayors are being held for the first time. Around ten DPD
Members are candidates for these elections, a fact that was greeted with
acclamation by the majority of Members when it was announced by Speaker
Ginandjar at the May 2005 plenary session of the DPD.15 That such a large
number of Members would stand for a new office so soon after taking on the
responsibilities of a position in the DPD does not suggest that they took their
seat in the DPD very seriously. Should most of those Members be successful
in their bid for new offices and leave the DPD, it could have a highly
disruptive effect on a chamber that has only just begun to function as a
representative assembly and which, as discussed below, still has very few
achievements to its name. Of equal concern is the fact that the majority of
Members do not appear to view this development with any concern or
15 Observation by the author, May 2005.
In
opprobrium. Many Members consider that standing for other offices while
20 still a DPD Member is justified by the fact that they could achieve a great
deal more in the powerful positions of governor, district head or mayor, as
compared to working in the relatively powerless DPD.16

The relative prominence of DPD Members with a background in academia,
the law, media and community organisations suggests that a further way of
mobilising support for a DPD is through professional standing and
involvement in professional and other organisations, activism or advocacy.
This is a very diverse group and further observation and research is required
here to gather insight into the manner in which such people gathered
support amongst the electorate. It seems, however, that there were very few
Members explicitly sponsored or supported by NGOs. The most notable
exception is Muspani from Bengkulu, a lawyer by profession who has been a
leading figure in human rights and environmental organisations and whose
candidacy for the DPD was championed by a number of NGOs in his
province. Notwithstanding the prominent role accorded NGOs and civil
society organisations in international development and democratisation
literature, the sector remains very weak in Indonesia and is dominated by
the urban middle class, professionals and students. There capacity to
mobilise electoral support has been shown to be weak in other national and
regional elections.

It appears that a combination of factors is often required for people with a
professional or activist profile to be elected. Laode Ide, for example, is
known for his media profile and advocacy work, but he has lived most of
professional life in Jakarta, far from his “home” province of Southeast
Sulawesi. In this province, however, he was able to boost his support
through the strong recognition of his family name which denotes that he
comes from a local aristocratic family. One might also mention the example
of Ferdinanda Ibo Yatipay from Papua who is a retired civil servant, but
who campaigned on a platform of supporting the establishment of the
Papuan People’s Council.

The reaction of many DPD Members at the plenary session indicated that they fully
16
approved of the candidacy of their colleagues in the regional heads elections and saw no
negative implications for the functioning and status of the DPD. A number of Members told
the author that they fully understood and supported their colleagues’ actions, but one or
two expressed surprise and disappointment.
Stephen Sherlock
The final, and perhaps most common, path to a seat in the DPD is through a
business background. The largest single grouping that one can identify in 21
the DPD is business people and entrepreneurs. As previously noted, it is a
longstanding characteristic of Indonesian politics that politicians acquire
business interests during (and as a result of) their involvement in politics.
But the interesting feature of the DPD is that there is a large number of
Members who identify themselves as businesspeople and do not appear to
have a history of previous involvement in politics, at least in the sense of
being office‐holding politicians.

The most likely explanation for this is that in the absence of the patronage
and financial support of political parties, business people are much more
likely to have their own personal resources to mobilise. It is well known that
wealthy individuals can obtain a favourable place on a party ticket for
election to the DPR or a regional legislature by giving generously to a party.
But this route to office, of course, means involving oneself in the internal
machinations of the party and possibly being subordinated to a patron and
the power‐brokers within the party machine. The DPD, on the other hand,
may seem attractive as an independent path to personal political influence,
free of party entanglements, for a person with sufficient means to pay the
substantial costs of an electoral campaign. Election campaigns usually
involve considerable expenditure, not only on printing, advertising etc, but
also for the distribution of gifts of clothing, food packages and so on to
voters and for the payment of transport and attendance money to those
attending rallies. An ambitious individual without large resources must
enter the political game through a party, but the DPD allows a businessman
with funds and time on his/her hands the luxury of a “non‐political” entry
into politics and a free hand to play the game as he/she pleases.

An important observation on the composition of the DPD and the paths its
Members have taken to a seat is that there really does not seem to have been
a concerted effort by the political parties to move into the DPD and to
control it indirectly by placing their supporters in the assembly. As
previously noted, there is a substantial proportion of the DPD who are
members of Golkar, have Golkar connections or a history of involvement
with Golkar. But research to date does not suggest that this was an
organised effort by the party. Rather, it is a reflection of the fact that Golkar
allegiances were essential for a political or bureaucratic career under the
New Order and, to repeat a point made earlier, the politicos or apparatchiks
of the New Order are continuing to play a prominent role in post‐Suharto
In
political life, including within non‐Golkar parties (Hadiz 2003, 2004). And, of
22 course, some Golkar or ex‐Golkar figures are widely regarded to have stood
for election to the DPD precisely because they had lost influence in the party.
Both Golkar and non‐Golkar Members of the DPD insist that those with
links to Golkar do not work as a political bloc within the assembly. As
elaborated below, however, some Members have observed that the influence
of New Order modes of thinking and organisation are clearly evident
amongst those with a Suharto‐era past. Only 3 DPD Members appear to
have connections with other parties, a fact which reinforces the impression
that there has not been a major attempt by the parties to win a presence in
the DPD.

Of course, were the DPD a more powerful body there would certainly be a
great deal more interest from the political parties. If, as so many Members of
the DPD wish, the powers of the DPD are enhanced, successive elections
may see a large number of candidates being covertly or indirectly supported
by the parties. It should not be forgotten that the law does not prevent party
members from standing in DPD elections, nor is the nature of party support
for a candidate clearly defined. So far, however, the parties have overtly
respected the goal of keeping the DPD free of control by political
organisations. Future research on the conduct of DPD elections and the
functioning of the chamber will probably uncover an interesting web of
connections between DPD Members and political parties. It seems very
likely that the first party that might attempt to exercise some organised
influenced over the DPD would be Golkar since its members or ex‐members
are both most prominent and the most experienced in the assembly.
The DPD electoral system: how representative?

As previously mentioned, the DPD was designed to be a regional house
with non‐party representatives. Therefore a particular electoral system was
introduced with these objectives in mind: all provinces have the same
number of representatives, candidates can only stand as individuals and the
voting system is single non‐transferable vote (SNTV). The election of
individual non‐party candidates has, for many partisans of the DPD, become
the single most important distinguishing feature of the assembly. They have
argued strongly that DPD Members are “representatives of the people”, in
contrast to DPR Members who merely “represent political parties”.

Stephen Sherlock
Predictably, many DPD Members support this position, with some seeing
the DPD as a “balance” to the party loyalties of the DPR and many going to 23
the extent of claiming to have greater legitimacy than the DPR because the
DPD is a more true reflection of the electorate’s aspirations. Amongst those
who make such claims are leading Members such as the Speaker Ginandjar
Kartasasmita.17 Following on from the prominent public debate that lead to
the creation of a system of direct election of the President in 2004, partisans
of the DPD have begun to inject new and specific meanings into the phrase
“direct election”. In this discourse, a vote for an individual candidate is
presented as the only vote worthy of the title “direct” and a vote for a party
candidate is portrayed as a lesser and somehow less genuinely democratic
choice.18 Of course, much of this language, especially its more extreme
formulations, is part of the arguments mustered to support the campaign for
increased powers for the DPD in relation to the DPR, as well as to increase
the size of the assembly from its current status of one‐third of the DPR.

Rhetoric aside, what has been the effect in practice of the special features of
the DPD electoral system and how well have the ideals of representativeness
been realised? In particular, how well do the claims for a special higher
quality of representativeness stand up to closer scrutiny? Studies of systems
of election for representative chambers have repeatedly shown that the
particular methods and procedures for creating parliaments and
governments can have important effects on election results . Moreover,
different systems can be used to achieve different objectives. Proportional
representation systems, for example, are usually employed when the most
important goal is to make the assembly as close as possible a reflection of the
electorate’s opinions, while majoritarian systems such as single member
electorates (in Indonesia called the “district system”), usually emphasise the
importance of stability of government and of reaching decisions (McLain
1991). As McLain emphasises, however, “’representation’ is one of the
slippery core concepts of political theory” and the various objectives implicit
in the different views are not always compatible (McLain 1991: 172).
Particular systems may not only fail to achieve the expected results, they can
also produce outcomes that were completely unintended by their creators.

The most obvious effect of the electoral system for the DPD is that vastly
greater representation is given to smaller provinces than larger ones: the
17 Interview with the author, Jakarta, May 2005.
18 See Profiles of Members, op. cit., eg. pp.21, 40, 58, 61, 93, 104.
In
small provinces of around 1 million have one representative per 250,000
24 people while provinces with over 30 million people have one representative
for over 7 million people (Datta: 8). The provinces of eastern Indonesia and
Sumatra have many more representatives than those on Java. Java contains
60 per cent of Indonesia’s population but has only 19 per cent of seats in the
DPD because it has just 6 provinces and therefore 24 DPD Members. The
three largest provinces, East, Central and West Java contain around half the
population of Indonesia but have less than 10 per cent of the seats. At the
other extreme, the 16 provinces of eastern Indonesia (including Bali), which
together have just 20 per cent of the country’s population, received exactly
half of the seats in the DPD. The 10 provinces of Sumatra, with the
remaining 20 per cent of the population, have 40 of the 128 seats (31 per
cent).

The advocates of regional weighting along provincial lines would argue that
this result was the intended and desirable result of the system and ensures
that smaller, remote and poorer provinces are given greater representation
to compensate for their disadvantage and location. Closer examination,
however, reveals that the system is a rather crude instrument for achieving
such objectives and that many anomalies have created unfair results for
many provinces and regions and for particular groups within them.

In the case of Java, for example, while it may be true that Java is the home of
Indonesia’s great and powerful, the island also contains huge numbers of
the country’s poor whose geographical proximity to the centres of power
provides little material benefit. In any case, questions could be raised about
the rationale for giving four seats to the province of Banten, which shares the
putative advantages of being located on Java (and is right next to Jakarta),
but has a relatively small population, while the masses of people in a huge
province like West Java, with no particular economic advantages, also has
four representatives? Equally, the centre of power and privilege, Jakarta, still
has four DPD Members even though its population is far below the big
provinces of Java. Similar questions might be raised about why the citizens
of Yogyakarta, a small and highly influential city, have as many DPD
representatives as their vastly more numerous Central Javanese cousins.

Similar anomalies could be pointed to in eastern Indonesia. For example,
relatively large provinces such as East and West Nusa Tenggara or South
Sulawesi have fewer DPD representatives per head of population than the
Stephen Sherlock
smaller provinces on Sulawesi and Kalimantan, even though the former
share all the remoteness and disadvantage of eastern Indonesia. 25

Of greater concerns is the possible perverse effect of the system on the
dynamics of eastern Indonesian politics. The already very small province of
Maluku was divided into the two new provinces as part of conflict
resolution in the area, thus doubling its representation in the DPD.
Unsympathetic observers in larger neighbouring provinces might ask
themselves why an incapacity to live peacefully with one’s fellows should be
rewarded with greater representation in Jakarta. Such arrangements could
even be seen as creating further incentives to fissiparous tendencies in an
already conflict‐prone region. Indeed, a common interpretation of the
decision to divide Papua into three provinces, in violation of the Special
Autonomy Law, was that certain locally‐based elites saw it as a way of
increasing the range of mechanisms for accumulating power and wealth,
including seats in local assemblies and governments and in the DPD.

The only region that appears to have DPD representation in rough
proportion to its population is Sumatra, although it is slightly under‐
represented. But the fact that Sumatra is an exception is, in itself, anomalous.
Many regions of Sumatra are arguably no better geographically or
economically placed that much of eastern Indonesia, yet they have been
allotted far fewer representatives in the DPD. And as in eastern Indonesia,
questions could be raised about why, for instance, the small number of
citizens of Riau and Riau Islands, who are strategically located near
Singapore and whose provinces have good natural resources, have the same
number of DPD Members as larger and less well‐located and endowed
provinces in the rest of Sumatra. The division of the old province of Riau
into two was certainly not caused by a desire for more DPD representation,
but the possibility of having double DPD seats might be an extra element of
encouragement for other provinces to emulate the Riau example.
Representation and “politics”

The principal of regional representation implies that placing a particular
individual in an assembly who is elected by the population of that province
means that that individual “represents” the province. The suggestion is that
minority groups within those provinces (defined variously on lines of
ethnicity, religion, socio‐economic standing and so on) benefit from
representation that they would otherwise be deprived of. Yet, at the same
In
time, the inference is also made that these “representatives” would not be
26 bound by sectional identities but would speak for their province as a whole,
the unspoken assumption of which is that all the people in the province have
common interests. Provincial representation was therefore meant,
simultaneously, both to supersede and to speak for minority interests and
identities.

Many creators of the DPD were probably aware of the complex reality of the
abstract idea of “representation” in practice. But they focused their attention
on the issue of the potential for cooption of provincial representation by
political parties. Hence the idea of non‐party candidature for DPD election.
As mentioned earlier, the objective was to bring a new type of representative
of regional opinion to the national legislative process, one of a different
breed from the party politicians who congregate in Jakarta. During debate
on the Susduk law in the DPR there were differences of opinion about how
connected to party affiliations that DPD candidates should be permitted to
be, but the common idea was that quarantining the campaign from party
candidates would lead to a different and more genuine kind of
representation that was free of “politics”. Thus it was decided that
candidates could not be funded or sponsored by parties and they could not
hold office in a party structure.

It appears, however, that the goal of non‐party representation has proved to
be incompatible with the goal of provincial representation. While the
provisions on party support and membership were meant to distance all
parties from the DPD on an equal basis, the provincial composition of the
DPD has actually greatly enhanced the influence of some political traditions
in the assembly over others. If all parties were evenly supported throughout
the country this would not happen, but the reality is that most Indonesian
political parties are quite regional in character, with concentrations of
popularity in different areas.

Golkar in particular has benefited from the regional composition of the DPD.
We have already noted the strong presence of DPD Members with Golkar
connections, either as holders of national or regional administrative office
that required Golkar membership during the Suharto era, or as figures in the
party structure and party organisations. But if Golkar’s position in the DPD
was explicable only in terms of strengths the party inherited from the New
Order, it could be expected that Golkar‐connected DPD Members would
come from a uniform cross section of Indonesia’s regions. In fact, however,
Stephen Sherlock
they tend to come from provinces in eastern Indonesia, where the
pervasiveness of Golkar within local administrative structures and political 27
life under the New Order was always much greater than in Java. Golkar has
been able to hold onto a dominant position in these areas after the collapse
of the Suharto regime, a dominance that has enabled its networks to win a
large number of DPD seats, even though the candidates were not officially
endorsed by the party. In the DPR also, Golkar is particularly strong in
eastern Indonesia (Sherlock 2004). Thus because the eastern regions are
greatly over‐represented in the DPD, there was an inherent advantage in
having a Golkar background. The weighting designed to advantage a
particular region has created clear political effects, effects that are arguably
an imbalance in political representation.

The opposite effect has, of course, been felt in Java because of its under‐
representation in the DPD. This is especially notable in the case of Members
with connections to NU. As mentioned earlier, 5 of the 12, or 42 per cent of
DPD Members for East, Central and West Java have strong NU connections.
If this figure was replicated in a truly proportional DPD, up to 20 per cent of
the DPD might have NU connections and might be sympathetic to the
National Awakening Party (PKB). Of course it is not possible to assume that
NU or PKB support would be translated in such a mechanical way into a
differently constituted DPD. But this calculation does give some indication
of the representational disadvantage suffered by a major religious and
political current because of the way the DPD is elected.
Representation in the SNTV electoral system

In addition to the anomalies created by equal numbers of DPD Members per
province, the SNTV electoral system (also known as “first past the post”) has
also produced some notable election results which raise interesting
questions regarding the representativeness of the DPD. Internationally, this
system has received frequent criticism (Wall 2004) and many countries in the
Asia Pacific region have moved away from it as part their processes of
political reform (Reilly 2004: 11‐14). The SNTV system in multi‐member
constituencies has led to a situation where not one single DPD candidate
received an absolute majority of votes in his/her constituency. In fact, all but
four DPD Members were elected with less than 20 per cent of the vote and
62 per cent (79 Members out of 128) received less than 10 per cent. The SNTV
system in multi‐member constituencies leads to a great scattering of votes
across candidates and the winning candidates often receive only a small
In
number of votes above the candidates they defeat (Reilly 2004). In a large
28 province such as West Java, for example, the vote was spread across 42
candidates. Since almost all DPD Members received the support of only 5 to
20 per cent of the people of their province, claims that they represent the
province should be treated carefully. (See Appendix for DPD Members’
votes.)

The system produced an extraordinarily high rate of “wasted” votes, that is
votes that did not elect any candidate. In over half of the provinces (17 of 32)
the combined vote for all four successful candidates ranged from as low as
27 per cent of the total vote in their province to a high of 40 per cent. In other
words, from 60 to 73 per cent of the voters in those provinces did not vote
for any of their putative representatives in the DPD. In only six provinces
did the total vote for the four successful candidates equal an absolute
majority.

The vastly different sizes of the provinces affected the size of the vote for
individual candidates, but not markedly so. The bigger the province, the
greater were the chances that a Member would be elected with less than 10
per cent. In the four large provinces on Java, only 2 of the 16 Members just
managed to cross the 10 per cent threshold (11.15 and 11.26 per cent). Both of
these were candidates with strong NU connections. The very small
provinces of Papua, West Irian Jaya and North Maluku returned 4 Members
with between 10 and 20 per cent each and gave these 4 candidates more than
50 per cent of the vote in total. But even many relatively small or middle
sized provinces did not return very high votes for individual candidates or
very high total votes for all successful candidates. In Aceh, North Sumatra,
Riau, South Sumatra, Lampung, Bangka Belitung, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara,
Central and West Kalimantan and Southeast Sulawesi the total vote for all
winning candidates was less than 40 per cent of the electorate and either 3 or
4 candidates in each province failed to receive more than 10 per cent.
Standing in a small province gave a candidate a better chance of receiving a
relatively higher vote than standing in a large province, but virtually all
candidates still failed to receive the support of even a fifth of their
constituents.

It is interesting to note some particular local results that were heavily
influenced by the SNTV system. Because SNTV often has the effect of
scattering the vote across a large number of candidates, single communities
that otherwise have a strong overall identity may not achieve the level of
Stephen Sherlock
representation that might have been predicted. This occurred in the case of
South Sulawesi, where a province with strongly Islamic modernist character 29
elected only two Islamic candidates, with the other two going to Toraja
Christians. This occurred because a large number of candidates were fielded
out of the Islamic community because of internal divisions, thus splitting the
vote. The Christian community, on the other hand, proved more cohesive,
put forward fewer candidates and achieved representation in the DPD well
above its numbers in the province.

Of course, in a proportional representation (PR) system such as used for the
DPR, the vote for successful individual candidates might also be a small
percentage of the electorate, as might be the quota won by, or allotted to
other candidates. But the existence of parties melds candidates together into
blocs that arguably provide each individual Member with a more credible
claim to represent a wider constituency. Moreover the PR system in the DPR
has produced a far smaller number of “wasted” votes than the
extraordinarily high numbers recorded for the DPD. The great majority of
Indonesians did not actually vote for the candidates elected to the DPD.

There is continuing debate about the merits of different electoral systems in
the literature on this subject. The debate is probably unresolvable because it
involves balancing off different and competing objectives. There are
strengths and weaknesses in any electoral system, but the claims for greater
legitimacy or representativeness made by proponents of the DPD system are
difficult to sustain in the face of close analysis. The combination of three
elements, equal numbers of representatives for each province regardless of
population, the banning of party candidates and the SNTV voting system,
have produced a highly idiosyncratic pattern of representation in the DPD.
This may be not be seen as problematic if the particular objectives of special
representation for remote and poor regions and minorities was consistently
achieved. But, as has been argued above, it is difficult even to make a case
that the stated objectives of the DPD system have actually been realised in
practice.

Work in progress?: The first year of the DPD

The first DPD was elected in April 2004 and its Members sworn in October
2004. As has been mentioned, the DPD has limited powers but is
surrounded by the legitimacy that comes from direct popular election. This
In
has confronted the Members of the DPD with the challenge of using the
30 political clout of popular legitimacy to bolster the limitations of the powers
and authority that has been conferred on it. As an entirely new body, the
DPD has embarked on this project while needing to establish a basic
institutional framework and set of procedures for internal organisation and
for relating to the DPR, the central government, provincial legislatures and
provincial governments. What progress has the DPD made in its first year of
operation and what does its progress so far suggest about its future role in
Indonesian politics?

The principal achievements of the DPD to date have largely been internal
institutional ones. Since the DPD is new, it is understandable that it needs to
dedicate a considerable part of its first months in establishing its own
internal rules, procedures and structures. The DPD has adopted Rules of
Procedure or Standing Orders (Peraturan Tata Tertib) and the various bodies
of the DPD provided for in those Rules have been constituted (Yudhini
2004). Many of the operating procedures have been put into practice in a
range of deliberations. A cycle of sessions has been established which
involves a number of weeks of plenary sessions and meetings of Committees
and other bodies, interspersed with a number of weeks of recess during
which Members are expected to carry out “working visits” in their provinces
to “gather aspirations” amongst their constituents.

It is significant to note, however, that virtually all of the work of the drafting
of the Rules of Procedure was actually done by officials in the MPR
Secretariat during the final session of the MPR Committee which produced
the changes in the Constitution. The DPD Members themselves produced
only minor amendments to the draft Rules of Procedure they received from
the MPR, mainly to introduce the idea of the three regions that should be
represented in the DPD Leadership. This principle also became reflected in
the composition of the Leaderships of the various Committees.

The drafting of the Rules of Procedure by parties other than the Members
themselves appears to have had a significant effect on shaping internal
arrangements in the DPD. As noted above, the structure of the DPD was
modelled very closely on the DPR, but this is not necessarily desirable when
the DPD has such different powers, functions and composition from the
DPR. The Steering Committee of the DPR, for example, is a very powerful
body because it allows for coordinated management of DPR business by the
most influential elements of the House and it brings together the political
Stephen Sherlock
parties and the working bodies of the DPR. The DPD Steering Committee,
on the other hand, is a collection of individual Members selected on a 31
somewhat random basis. With one‐quarter of the assembly sitting in the
Committee, there seems to be a danger that the flow of work through the
DPD could be impeded if such an unwieldy body finds it difficult to agree.
While the Steering Committee of the DPR might have an unfortunate
tendency to dictate to ordinary Members of that chamber, it does so because
it represents the leaders of the parties. The members of the Steering
Committee of the DPD, on the other hand, represent no‐one except
themselves and have no authority to back up their decisions.

Of particular concern is that the Rules of Procedure provide very little
guidance on the crucial issue of how the DPD should interact with the DPR
or the President and central government ministers. The Rules are silent on
the nature of the working relationship with regional executives and
legislatures. On questions such as how the DPD should relate to executive
government, the assumption seems to have been that the DPD could largely
imitate the procedures of the DPR. The problem, of course, is that the DPD’s
powers of oversight over executive government are far more limited than
the DPR’s. The DPR, for example, has the power to summon (panggil)
Ministers and government officials to appear before it, but the DPD only has
the authority to invite (undang). Critical issues about what this means in
practice have not been resolved. For example, if a Minister is invited to
appear, is it necessary for the President to agree to the Minister’s attendance
and can a DPD Committee and a Minister make an agreement on something
without Presidential approval? Are such meetings to be only for exchange of
information or can government representatives be made to account for and
justify government actions? On whose authority should an invitation to a
Minister or official be issued, the DPD Leadership, the Committee or a
plenary session?

Because the functions of the DPR are so different from the DPD’s, there is no
guidance to be found in the DPR Rules of Procedure on certain issues that
are critical to the functioning of the DPD. In particular, because the DPD’s
main potential influence over the legislative and policy‐making process is
through its input into the decisions made by the DPR, its working
relationship with the DPR must be clear and explicit. From the DPD’s point
of view, the rules governing the relationship should be organised and
scheduled to facilitate its maximum involvement and input. Few of these
details have, however, been decided upon. On the matter of the DPD’s input
In
on the State Budget, for instance, no provision has been made to specify at
32 what point in the DPR’s deliberation of the Budget that the DPD should
make its recommendations. Technical questions with critical political
ramifications, such as when and how the DPD should receive the draft
Budget and whether it should come straight from the government or
through the DPR, have yet to be worked out. Within the DPD, the question
of who should carry out the Budget function has also not be resolved.
Should it be the role of PAH IV alone, or should the plenary be required to
endorse the decisions of PAH IV, or should the matter be referred to a
special task force of some kind?

The fundamental question of how the DPD’s areas of authority are to be
defined has not been clarified. What, for example, is an issue of regional
autonomy and what is not? And more importantly, who is to make these
decisions and who will decide which Bill meets the criteria for DPD
involvement and which do not? Will such decisions be made by the DPD or
the DPR alone, or will they be made by negotiation between the two
institutions. Because basic questions about how the DPD can actually carry
out its constitutional mandate in practical terms have not been seriously
tackled, at the time of writing (May 2005) many of the working bodies of the
DPD have not yet begun to operate in an active sense. Few of the PAH have
been able to develop a set of priorities for their work, let alone establish a
plan of action for the coming period. Even basic procedural questions such
as when and how PAH should report to the plenary have not been dealt
with.19

Because many procedural questions have not been ironed out by either the
leadership bodies or the Members of the DPD, evidence of the work of the
DPD in political and policy terms is hard to find. The Assembly has become
the focus of petitions and complaints by large numbers of individuals,
organisations and institutions throughout Indonesia. When Members
undertake their “working visits” they find no shortage of people in their
constituencies who want to come to them with business, employment,
financial, family and other problems and disputes, as well as more organised
lobbying on the part of foundations, non‐government organisations, firms
and so on. They have also become the target of lobbying by regional
legislatures and administrations, particularly at the district and sub‐district
For a detailed discussion of many of the procedural issues that need to be dealt with by
19
the DPD see Yudhini (2004).
Stephen Sherlock
level, which appear to see DPD Members as a channel to put pressure on
higher levels of government in Jakarta to address local problems and to 33
support new projects. They also report that significant numbers of people
look upon their representatives as sources of direct financial assistance
(sumber dana).

Some DPD Members have also become involved in what they have called
“controlling” the conduct of the elections for the positions of Governors and
district heads (bupati), positions which are being directly elected for the first
time in 2005. This involves Members going to their respective provinces and
observing the actions of local officials. For instance, they have scrutinised the
selection process for candidates to see if regulations are being correctly
implemented. In cases where irregularities have been found, DPD Members
have reported the incidents to the media and raised them with the local
office of the Election Commission (KPUD).20

It is notable that most of the DPD’s activities to date have largely involved
the Members acting independently in their individual capacities. Tasks that
require collective strategic thinking, planning and coordinated action have
not been prominent in the work of the assembly. In particular, the DPD’s
record of achievement in lawmaking is non‐existent. This is not to suggest
that, in the time available to date, the DPD should already have passed Bills
through the DPR, or even that it could be expected to have drafted some
Bills. But no available evidence indicates that the DPD has directed attention
to developing a list of priorities for legislative action or has even selected one
or two of the Bills currently under deliberation in the DPR as appropriate
targets for DPD involvement. The DPD Legislation Committee has met on a
number of occasions but has not yet been able to draw up any specific
proposals for draft Bills to submit to the DPR or for input into Bills already
before the DPR. The National Legislation Program for 2005 (Prolegnas), a list
of proposed legislation for the coming year, names certain Bills as within the
purview of DPD involvement, but the list was drawn up by the government
and the DPR together, without any input from the DPD.

The issue that has occupied the greatest amount of time and energy amongst
DPD Members has been their campaign to increase the powers of the
assembly. As noted previously, the constitutional amendments gave only
very limited powers to the DPD and from the very beginning of their terms
20 Interviews with DPD Members, Jakarta, April 2005.
In
in office, DPD Members have both argued publicly and lobbied privately to
34 have the constitution further amended to strengthen the authority of the
DPD. Their arguments focus on the contention that current arrangements
have created “soft bicameralism” which, it is argued, does not reflect the fact
that the DPD is a directly elected chamber with as much or even greater
legitimacy than the DPR. It is also sometimes argued that “strong
bicameralism” is a feature of large federations, with the inference that, as a
large diverse country, Indonesia should have similar constitutional
arrangements. Such an argument would, however, appear to be
counterproductive in a political culture such as Indonesia’s, where talk of
federalism is often seen as tantamount to encouraging separatism. The
assertion that the DPD would promote fissiparous tendencies and threaten
the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia was, in fact, the main thrust of
those who opposed the creation of the DPD during the constitutional
debates in the MPR (Pahlevi 2004).

But whatever the merits of the arguments in favour of bolstering the powers
of the DPD, concentrating efforts on such a campaign at this early stage
would seem to be problematic. When the assembly has yet to show any real
results from its presence on the political scene, it could be argued that it is a
diversion of resources from the immediate task of demonstrating to both the
electorate and the policy‐making elite that the DPD can actually provide a
representative voice for the regions in the national decision‐making. Indeed,
discussions with DPD Members suggest a level of preoccupation with the
question of the assembly’s powers that reflects an inability to develop a
strategy for using its existing authority effectively.21 Voices both inside and
outside the DPD have urged it to develop at least one Bill to present to the
DPR as a demonstration of the assembly’s potential. If such a Bill were to be
rejected by the DPR, the rejection could be publicised in the media as
evidence of the DPR’s obstruction and indifference and used to bolster the
case for increased powers for the DPD. While such devices have been
verbally accepted, there has been no progress towards realising them.22
Instead, any strategy for achieving the constitutional change has
concentrated on backroom lobbying with Members of the DPR and the
government. Discussions with leading Members makes it clear that they see
Interviews with DPD Members, Jakarta, April – May 2005.
21
Interviews with academics, commentators and MPR Secretariat officials, Jakarta, April –
22
May 2005.
Stephen Sherlock
the goal of increasing the DPD’s powers not as a long term project but as
something to be achieved within the five‐year life of the current DPD.23 35

The reality of the first months of the work of the DPD is that it has not
moved beyond being a body whose Members gather complaints and
petitions from members of the public and pass them on the relevant
authorities in executive government. The Deputy Speaker, Laode Ide, noted
regretfully that the DPD was becoming just a “post office” and had had been
given little opportunity by either the DPR or the government to become
involved in policy‐making.24 The Speaker, Ginandjar, expressed a similar
view, likening the DPD to a large but inefficient and expensive
“ombudsman”.25 This result seems to be a combination of the factors
external to the DPD, especially the difficulty of getting cooperation from the
DPR and the government when the assembly’s powers are so limited, and
the internal incapacity of the DPD to organise itself, draw up clear and
detailed priorities and develop strategies to implement its plans.

Making a non‐party assembly work

Observation of the operation of the DPD in its less than one year of existence
indicates that it has yet to develop ways to expedite decision‐making in an
assembly composed of individuals who are not subject to party discipline or
fraction or caucus‐based organisation. The most basic unit of organisation on
which the DPD has attempted to depend is that of a delegation from each
province. Because DPD Members theoretically represent a province, one
Member from each province is represented on each PAH and other working
body of the DPD and the Speaker routinely calls for one Member from each
province to report back from working visits or to speak on a particular
matter before a plenary session of the assembly. This appears to be seen as a
kind of surrogate for the practice followed in the DPR where each party (or
fraction) is represented on the working bodies of the DPR and each party is
invited by the Speaker to give its views on decisions being deliberated. Some
provincial teams reportedly work more cohesively than others, with the four
Members from Bali being observed to cooperate most effectively.26 Beyond
23 Interviews with DPD Members, April – May 2005.
24 Interview with Laode Ida, Jakarta, April 2005.
25 Interview with Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Jakarta, May 2005.
26 Interviews with observers from international organisations and DPD Members, April –
May 2005.
In
generalities, however, there is rarely much commonality of views amongst
36 the four delegates from each province. The Members from South Sulawesi,
for example, comprise a Protestant pastor, a former naval officer and two
Islamic clerics. Critically, the system has not yet been tested over any
seriously controversial issue. Discussions in plenary sessions have yet to
make a decision on a divisive question and bodies such as the PAH have so
far barely operated as decision‐making entities.

Other attempts to bring the DPD Members into functional groupings have
included the creation of regional and subject‐specific caucuses. The
Members from the provinces of Sumatra have formed themselves into a
Sumatra caucus, as have those from Kalimantan. A caucus of Members from
“conflict regions” has also been established, bringing together Members
from provinces in eastern Indonesia that have been affected by internal civil
conflict, such as Maluku, North Maluku, Papua and West Irian Jaya. There
have also been caucuses set up to discuss issues such as the environment
and social welfare. At the time of writing, however, such caucuses have not
become anything other than discussion groups.

Some Members have observed that although the Golkar and ex‐Golkar
Members do not operate in a factional manner, there is a distinct tendency
for them to think and act in common ways which are shaped by the legacy
of the New Order.27 In particular, they are seen as giving priority to the
protection of the perceived common interests and image of the Members of
the DPD as a body. Some Members, particularly those from an activist
background, are critical of former figures from the New Order who the
critics consider are more interested in defending their own positions, wealth
and influence than in strengthening the DPD as a representative institution
and law‐making body. There are also latent tensions between former
operatives from the New Order and younger Members with a activist,
professional or business background over ways to achieve political ends.
The latter are more inclined to want to take issues into the public realm and
use the media to gain public support for their position, while the former
want to adhere to the traditional methods of private lobbying and the
exercise of personal influence. Whether such differences will manifest
themselves in organised factions or even the growth of informal groupings
remains to be seen. In particular, it will be insightful to observe the
operation of the DPD Leadership because it is composed of a formerly very
27 Interviews with DPD Members, Jakarta, May 2005.
Stephen Sherlock
powerful figure from the New Order, Ginandjar Kartasasmita and two
younger men with an academic/activist and business background, Laode Ide 37
and Irman Gusman respectively.

The DPD has so far failed to develop some way to channel the various
personal interests and agendas of its Members into workable units. This is a
major element of the explanation for the assembly’s failure to become more
than an “ombudsman” or a “post office”. Internationally, it is the norm for
legislative assemblies to be driven by the interaction between parties,
factions or groupings of some kind, whether such interaction is conflictual,
competitive or cooperative. Discipline and/or political coherence within
those groupings tends to facilitate decision‐making and to provide
predictability about how most members will act on any issue. There is a
voluminous literature on the role of political parties in parliaments, much of
it highly critical of the behaviour of parties, but there is general agreement
about the function they perform in making parliaments work. Not only are
parties a key element of internal operations, they often play a major part in
developing the policy options that are debated.

The DPD, on the other hand, faces the reality of trying to make decisions in
an assembly composed of disparate individuals. It is a commonplace of
political commentary that chaos and unpredictability are the common
results of a proliferation of political parties within parliaments. It may only
be a partial exaggeration to say that the DPD is sometimes like an assembly
with 128 different parties. All of the Members have come to the DPD with
some particular objective in mind, whether personal or political, but there
are few mechanisms through which those particular interests can be sorted
into priorities for action. One Christian Member, for example, was
particularly motivated to be elected to the DPD to promote the idea of
interfaith dialogue. But there is little sign that even his Christian colleagues
are committed to a similar goal and, in fact, the greater reality is that such
ideas are received with hostility by a range of Islamic Members who take
every opportunity to argue for the adoption of Islamic sharia. Such a
diversity of views is, of course, not unique to the DPD, but other assemblies
tend to sift the multiplicity of agendas through the coalition‐building that is
inherent both in the very formation of political parties themselves and in
their negotiations with other parties.
Conclusion

In
The creation of the DPD can be seen as one of the final acts in the
38 institutional rebuilding of the Indonesian state since the end of the New
Order. A series of constitutional reforms and the introduction of free
elections for all levels of government at the centre and the regions have
transformed the range of possible future directions for Indonesian politics.
But for all the institutional reforms that have occurred, much has not
changed in the political scene. Powerful vested interests are still managing to
resist a basic change in the nature of power politics and there are still
remarkably few new players that have entered political life despite the
openings that should, in theory, have been created by reformasi and
democratisation since 1998. As a new institution, the DPD has arrived at a
time when the building blocks of democracy all seem to be in place, but
questions are beginning to be raised about what that actually means in
practice.

The DPD was created with two main expectations: that it would provide a
way for a new kind of representative from the regions to enter into the
world of national level decision‐making and that as an institution it would
allow the voice of the regions to be heard in the making of laws and the
oversight of central executive government. This paper has attempted to gain
some early insights into questions such as how representative of the regions
the DPD actually is in practice, what kind of people have been elected to the
DPD, how the assembly has operated in its first year of existence and what
achievements it has to its name so far. The paper has concluded that the
predictable result of the DPD’s very limited powers has been that it has
struggled to find a role for itself. This has been exacerbated by a lack of
cohesion and strategic direction that appear to flow from the internal
structure and composition of the DPD itself. On the other hand, it does
appear that the objective of keeping the assembly out of the control of
political parties has been largely achieved and that the DPD has attracted
some new individuals onto the national political scene, while providing a
place where some figures from the old regime have been able to reinvent
themselves in the new era of electoral politics.

The DPD is still a very new body and it would be unfair to suggest that it
has already failed to fulfil the hopes vested in it by its creators and
supporters. But early indications are that fundamental structural features
built into the DPD make it very difficult for the assembly to have its voice
heard in lawmaking, oversight and accountability of government and the
provision of both popular and regional representation. A combination of
Stephen Sherlock
weak authority and an idiosyncratic method of composition and election
have tended to keep it at the margins of political power in Jakarta. The 39
Speaker of the DPD, Ginandjar, has expressed the view that the DPD has
about two years to make its mark in political affairs, with the inference that
it would otherwise be confined to permanent impotence. Nevertheless, the
history of second chambers throughout the world shows that such
institutions tend to wax and wane in their power and influence, and it may
well be possible for the Members of the DPD to establish an important place
for the institution in national political life. The evidence so far is that such a
project will be a difficult undertaking.

In
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40
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In
Appendix: DPD Members, Provinces & Votes
42

1. Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Total No. Votes Percentage
Drs. H.A. MALIK RADEN, MM. 211,362 10.14
H. HELMI MAHERA AL MUJAHID 163,683 7.85
H. ADNAN NS, S.Sos 145,733 6.99
Dra. Hj. MEDIATI HAFNI HANUM 143,594 6.89
2. North Sumatra Total No. Votes Percentage
Drs. H. ABD. HALIM HARAHAP 810,232 15.38
Ir. NURDIN TAMPUBOLON 321,570 6.10
RAJA INAL SIREGAR 316,358 6.00
Drs. H. YOPIE SANGKOT BATUBARA 277,649 5.27
3. West Sumatra Total No. Votes Percentage
H. H. IRMAN GUSMAN, S.E., MBA 348,200 17.59
Drs. H. ZAIRIN KASIM 171,962 8.68
AFDAL. S.Si 170,872 8.63
Dr. MUCHTAR NAIM 116,795 5.90
4. Riau Total No. Votes Percentage
Drs. H. SOEMARDI THAHER 226,570 11.38
DINAWATY, S.Ag. 140,069 7.04
INTSIAWATI AYUS, SH. 125,890 6.32
Dra. Hj. MAIMANAH UMAR 124,129 6.24
5. Jambi Total No. Votes Percentage
NUZRAN JOHER, S.Ag. 137,018 11.29
Dra. Hj. NYIMAS ENA, MM. 125,548 10.35
MUHAMMAD NASIR 125,205 10.32
Drs. H. HASAN 113,379 9.34
6. South Sumatra Total No. Votes Percentage
Hj. ASMAWATI, SE., MM. 447,540 14.31
Drs. H. M. KAFRAWI RAHIM 203,262 6.50
Drs. M. JUM PERKASA 193,920 6.20
Ir. RUSLAN WIJAYA, SE, M.Sc. 143,451 4.59
7. Bengkulu Total No. Votes Percentage
Dipl. ING. BAMBANG SOEROSO 126,128 20.56
H. MAHYUDIN SHOBRI, SE. 81,278 13.25
MUSPANI, S.H. 58,742 9.57
Dra. ENI KHAERANI, M.Si. 47,095 7.68
8. Lampung Total No. Votes Percentage
H. H. KASMIR TRI PUTRA, S.Pd, MM 289,684 8.73
Hj. HARIYANTI SAFRIN, SH 255,012 7.68
Stephen Sherlock
SUJADI 220,382 6.64

A. BEN BELLA 191,441 5.77 43
9. Bangka Belitung Total No. Votes Percentage
H. ROSMAN DJOHAN 47,407 10.09
Drs. RUSLI RACHMAN, M.Si 40,219 8.56
FAJAR FAIRI HUSNI, SH. 39,735 8.45
Hj. DJAMILA SOMAD, B.Sc. 36,392 7.74
10. Riau Islands Total No. Votes Percentage
AIDA ISMET 202,283 35.78
Ir. H. IDRIS ZAINI 64,988 11.50
BENNY HORAS PANJAITAN 59,715 10.56
HENDRY FRANKIM 53,218 9.41
11. DKI Jakarta Total No. Votes Percentage
Hj. BRA. MOORYATI SOEDIBYO, SS., M. Hum, 457,996 10.30
Ir. SARWONO KUSUMAATMADJA 455,541 10.24
H. BIEM TRIANI BENYAMIN. S 360,573 8.11
Ir. H. MARWAN BATUBARA, MSc 316,528 7.12
12. West Java Total No. Votes Percentage
Prof. Dr. Ir. H. GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA 1,869,767 9.83
PRA. ARIEF NATADININGRAT, SE 1,666,685 8.76
Prof. Dr. H. MOHAMAD SURYA 1,551,876 8.15
KH. SOFYAN YAHYA, MA 1,179,439 6.20
13. Central Java Total No. Votes Percentage
Dra. Hj. NAFISAH SAHAL 1,767,178 11.26
Ir. H. BUDI SANTOSO 1,043,376 6.65
Drs. H. SUDHARTO, MA. 1,007,669 6.42
KH. ACHMAD CHALWANI 881,050 5.58
14. DI Yogyakarta Total No. Votes Percentage
GKR. HEMAS 834,130 43.31
Drs. H. ALI WARSITO 132,407 6.88
Drs. H. ABDUL HAFIDH ASROM, MM. 126,348 6.56
H. SUBARDI 112,282 5.83
15. East Java Total No. Votes Percentage
H. MAHMUD ALI ZAIN 1,955,025 11. 15
K.H. A. MUJIB IMRON, SH. 1,434,375 8.18
KH. M. NURUDDIN A. RAHMAN, SH. 1,268,498 7.23
Drs. H. MARDJITO GA 1,050,629 5.99
16. Banten Total No. Votes Percentage
K.H. THOYIB AMIR 302,358 7.54
Dra. Hj. RATU CICIH KURNIASIH 298,040 7.44
In
H. APUD MAHPUD 238,624 5.95

44 H. SAGAP USMAN 229,776 5.73
17. Bali Total No. Votes Percentage
I WAYAN SUDIRTA, SH. 245,343 12.68
NYOMAN RUDANA 157,475 8.14
Drs.IDA BAGUS GEDE AGASTIA 131,780 6.81
Dra. IDA AYU AGUNG MAS 123,961 6.41
18. West Nusa Tenggara Total No. Votes Percentage
Drs. H. HARUN AL RASYID, M.Si. 256,944 13.09
Drs, H. SYAHDAN ILYAS 187,713 9.57
Drs. H. LALU YUSUF 135,233 6.89
6.05
H.L. ABDUL MUHYI ABIDIN, S.Ag. 118,716

19. East Nusa Tenggara Total No. Votes Percentage
FRANS X ASSAN 291,062 14.09
Drs. YONATHAN NUBATONIS 205,034 9.93
JOSEPH BONA MANGGO 152,952 7.41
WILHELMUS WUA OPENG 148,074 7.17
20. West Kalimantan Total No. Votes Percentage
Dr. PIET HERMAN ABIK. M.App., SC 172,563 9.44
MARIA GORETI, S.Sos., M.Si 138,901 7.60
SRI KADARWATI 136,687 7.48
H. ASPAR, SE 133,260 7.29
21. Central Kalimantan Total No. Votes Percentage
Dr. KH. HADERANI H.N 121,126 14.68
Prof. KMA. M. USOP, MA 69,106 8.37
H. ABI KUSNO NACHRAN 66,319 8.04
PERMANASARI 64,096 7.77
22. South Kalimantan Total No. Votes Percentage
Ir. H.M. SAID 249,888 17.37
Drs. H. MUHAMMAD SOFWAT HADI, SH. 195,988 13.63
H.A. MAKKIE, BA. 136,726 9.51
Drs. H.M. RAMLI 78,914 5.49
23. East Kalimantan Total No. Votes Percentage
Drs. NURSYAMSA HADIS 198,964 16.19
LUTHER KOMBONG 160,616 13.07
Ir. Hj. EKA KOMARIAH KUNCORO, MA. CED 79,536 6.47
Ir. Hj. NUR ANDRIYANI 78,249 6.37
24. North Sulawesi Total No. Votes Percentage
Ir. MARHANY V.P. PUA 238,143 19.30
Stephen Sherlock
ARYANTI BARAMULI PUTRI 158,133 12.81

EDWIN KAWILARANG 117,628 9.53 45
Dra. SIENTJE SONDAKH MANDEY 76,176 6.17
25. Central Sulawesi Total No. Votes Percentage
Hj. NURMAWATI D. BANTILAN, SE 186,337 16.28
Drs. ROGER TOBIGO 113,412 9.91
M. ICHSAN LOULEMBAH 101,660 8.88
Drs. H. FAISAL MAHMUD 83,435 7.29
26. South Sulawesi Total No. Votes Percentage
H.M. AKSA MAHMUD 790,375 18.89
636,856
Ir. H. ABDUL AZIS QAHAR MUDZAKKAR 15.22

ISHAK PAMUMBU LAMBE 210,866 5.04
BENYAMIN BURA 175,697 4.20
27. Central Sulawesi Total No. Votes Percentage
LA ODE IDA 154,367 17.17
Drs. K.H. MARWAN AIDID 66,062 7.35
Ir. H.M. YUNUS SJAMSOEDDIN 52,012 5.79
Drs. H. YOKOYAMA SINAPOY 48,378 5.38
28. Gorontalo Total No. Votes Percentage
Drs. A.D KHALY 84,754 17.71
Prof. Dr. HI. NANI TULOLI 52,520 10.98
HI. AMIR ADAM 50,971 10.65
ROELAND NIODE 47,078 9.84
29. Maluku Total No. Votes Percentage
Ny. MIRATI DEWANINGSIH, ST 128,193 19.51
ABRAHAM DOMINGGUS TUAPATTINAYA,
62,477 9.51
BA
MIDIN B. LAMANY, SH 42,429 6.46
Drs. Hi. H.A. RAHAYAAN 40,711 6.20
30. North Maluku Total No. Votes Percentage
ANTHONY CHARLES SUNARJO 65,842 15.36
Drs. JUANDA BAKAR 65,322 15.23
Ny. NITA BUDHI SUSANTI 60,814 14.18
HI. DJAFARSYAH 54,370 12.68

31. West Irian Jaya Total No. Votes Percentage
SALOME CHRISTIN SAWAY, SH 52,143 18.54
ISHAK MANDACAN 44,808 15.94
Dr. Ir. ABDUL M. KILIAN, MS 37,706 13.41
Drs. H. WAHIDIN ISMAIL 37,476 13.33
In
32. Papua Total No. Votes Percentage

46 MARCUS LOUIS ZONGGONAO, BA 194,090 20.86
TONNY TESAR 149,078 16.02
FERDINANDA IBO YATIFAY 134,169 14.42
Pdt. Drs. MAX DEMETOUW 102,297 10.99

Source: Sekretariat Jenderal MPR & International IDEA, Profil Anggota
Dewan Perwakilan Daerah 2004‐2009

--
About the Author

Stephen Sherlock is an Associate at the Centre for Democratic Institutions and a
political analyst and development consultant, specialising in Indonesia and South
and Southeast Asia. He worked for eleven years as an analyst and policy adviser
on Indonesia and East Timor in the Australian Parliament and now divides his time
between Indonesia and Australia, as a consultant on governance and political
change. Email: stephen.sherlock@bigpond.com
About the Centre for Democratic Institutions

CDI was established in 1998 to assist in the development and strengthening of
democratic institutions in developing countries.
Its mission is to harness Australian and international best practice in support of

developing countries’ needs for democratic governance.
CDI’s work combines technical assistance and capacity building programs,

networking, and interpersonal and knowledge exchange, including the
dissemination of CDI’s original research on democracy and its institutions.
Its focus countries comprise Indonesia and Timor-Leste in South East Asia and
Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in Melanesia.

CDI Policy Paper Series on Political Governance 47
http://www.cdi.anu.edu.au/research/PPS_Home.htm
Series Editor
Ben Reilly
Assistant Series Editor

Luke Hambly
2006/01
Stephen Sherlock -
Indonesia’s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation
and the Regions. A report on the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD
Centre for Democratic

Institutions
Research School of Social
Sciences
Australian National
University
\
Canberra ACT 0200

Centre for Democratic Institutions Phone: 61 2 6125 0605 AUSTRALIA
Australian National University Fax: 61 2 6125 9726
Canberra ACT 0200 Email: cdi@anu.edu.au
AUSTRALIA Website: www.cdi.anu.edu.au

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centre for democratic institutions

CDI Policy Papers on Political Governance

faces in attempting to define a role for itself in the future of Indonesian

2. Other party backgrounds (PDIP, PPP) 2 (1‐1)

3. MPR (Regional delegates, Social group delegates) 9 (6‐3)

6. Business people 50

8. Regional Executive (Governors, District Heads, other) 6 (3‐1‐2)

10. Academia 20

11. Islamic Traditionalist 19

12. Islam Modernist 21

15. Media 11

SUJADI 220,382 6.64

H. APUD MAHPUD 238,624 5.95

ARYANTI BARAMULI PUTRI 158,133 12.81

Ny. NITA BUDHI SUSANTI 60,814 14.18

HI. DJAFARSYAH 54,370 12.68

32. Papua Total No. Votes Percentage

About the Author

About the Centre for Democratic Institutions

Its mission is to harness Australian and international best practice in support of

CDI’s work combines technical assistance and capacity building programs,

Assistant Series Editor

Centre for Democratic

Canberra ACT 0200

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