Mindas Motionhas beendesignedtorendercontemporary,state-of-the-artdynamicalresearchaccessible to ageneralaudience incognitivescience,includingreaders whomighthavenoparticular backgroundindynamics.Consequently,thebookprovidesaconceptualandhistoricaloverview ofthedynamicalapproachtocognition(chapter1),atutorialintroduction todynamicsforcognitivescientists(chapter2),and aglossarycoveringthemostfrequentlyused terms.Additionally,eachchapterAnishes withaGuideto FurtherReadingwhichusuallylistsintroductoryorbackgroundmaterialas wellas furtherresearch in thesame area.Dynamicstendsto be difficult.Mostcognitivescientists haverelativelylittletraininginthemathematics ofdynamics(calculus,differentialequations,dynamicalsystemstheory,etc.)comparedwith theirbackgroundinthediscretemathematics ofcomputerscience(logic,complexitytheory,programming,etc.).Consequently,some ofthechapterscan bequiteformidable,andreaders newto thedynamicapproachmayhavedifficultyappreciatingtheargumentsandwhy theyareinteresting.Tohelpdealwith thisproblem,wehaveprovidedeachchapterwith abriefintroduction whichsurveysthe mainmoves andhelpslocatethechapter'sparticularcontribution inthe widerlandscapesofthedynamicalapproachandofcognitivescience.Weare ofcourseverymuch awarethatafewparagraphscannot dojusticeto thedepthandcomplexityof theideaspresentedinthechaptersthemselves;wehopeonlythattheyserveadequatelyasguidesandincentives.Thechaptersinthis bookspanagreatdeal ofcontemporary cognitivescience. Wehave beenparticularlyconcernedtodemonstrate that itwouldbe mistakentosupposethatdynamicsisnaturallysuitedfor"peripheral"or"lower"aspectsofcognition,while"central"or"higher"aspectsare besthandled withcomputationalmodels.Ontheone hand,manyof thechaptersaretargetedataspectsofcognitionthat havetraditionallybeenregardedas the home turfofcomputationalmodeling.Thus,forexample,languagereceivesmore attention inthis volume thananyother broadcognitivephenomenon;thechaptersbySaltzman;BrowmanandGoldstein;Elman;Petitot;Pollack;vanGeert;andPort,Cummins,andMcAuleyallfocus on oneaspector anotherof ourabilitytospeakandunderstand.Similarly,TownsendandBusemeyerdemonstrate thatdynamicsappliesto anotheraspectofcognitionthat istraditionallyregardedas"central,"namelydecision-making.On the otherhand,thedynamicalapproachaims to break downthedichotomyitself. Thedistinctionbetweenhigherorcentral and lowerorperipheral cognitiveprocesses isacontemporaryremnant of thetraditionalphilosophicalview that mindis somehowfundamentallydistinct innaturefrom the material world(thebodyand theexternalphysicalworld).From thispointof view,cognitivescience studies theinner,abstract,disembodiedpro-cesses ofpurethought,while othersciences such asmechanicsstudythebehavior of thebodyandphysicalenvironment. Thisdichotomyalsousuallyregardscognitive processes ascomplexand difficulttostudy,whereas thebodyisrelativelyunproblematic,asimplemachine.
Preface
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