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WARRIOR'S RAGE: 1st ID Museum 5 September Presentation

WARRIOR'S RAGE: 1st ID Museum 5 September Presentation

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08/15/2013

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The
 
Battle
 
of 
 
73
 
Easting:
 
 A
 
Study 
 
in
 
Leadership,
 
Competence
 
and 
 
Mobile
 
 Armored 
 
Firepower 
 
in
 
 Action
.
 
Presentation
 
to
 
the
 
First
 
Infantry
 
Division
 
Museum
 
at
 
Cantigny,
 
5
 
September
 
2012Douglas
 
Macgregor,
 
PhDColonel
 
(ret)
 
U.S.
 
Army+1
 
703
 
975
 
6954
Warrior’s
 
Rage:
 
The
 
Great 
 
Tank 
 
Battle
 
of 
 
73
 
Easting
 
Naval
 
Institute
 
Press,
 
2009
 
“Pin
 
(the
 
Iraqi
 
Republican
 
Guard)
 
with
 
their
 
backs
 
against
 
the
 
sea,
 
then,
 
go
 
in
 
and
 
wipe
 
them
 
out…
 
Once
 
they’re
 
gone
 
be
 
 prepared 
 
to
 
continue
 
the
 
attack 
 
to
 
Baghdad 
.
General
 
Norman
 
Schwarzkopf,
 
November
 
1990.
“Attack
 
Iraqi
 
political
military
 
leadership
 
and
 
command
 
and
 
control;
 
gain
 
and
 
maintain
 
air
 
superiority;
 
sever
 
Iraqi
 
supply
 
lines,
 
destroy
 
chemical,
 
biological
 
and
 
nuclear
 
capability;
 
destroy 
 
Republican
 
Guard 
 
 forces
 
in
 
the
 
Kuwaiti 
 
Theater 
;
 
liberate
 
Kuwait.”
U.S.
 
Central
 
Command
 
Operations
 
Order
 
91
001,
 
17
 
January
 
1991
The
 
Mission:
 
Find
 
and
 
Destroy
 
the
 
Republican
 
Guard!
 
“Third
 
U.S.
 
Army
 
Personnel
 
Command
 
estimates
 
VII
 
Corps
 
will
 
take
 
20,000
 
casualties
 
in
 
the
 
first
 
five
 
days
 
of 
 
fighting
 
the
 
Iraqi
 
Army.”
Richard
 
Swain,
 
Lucky 
 
War.
 
Third 
 
 Army 
 
in
 
Desert 
 
Storm
,
 
page
 
205
“The
 
White
 
House
 
had
 
been
 
accustomed
 
over
 
the
 
years
 
to
 
the
 
military
 
coming
 
in
 
with
 
very
 
large
 
force
 
requirements
 
for
 
contingency
 
plans.
 
This
 
was
 
clearly
 
partly
 
out
 
of 
 
caution,
 
but
 
there
 
was
 
also
 
the
 
perception
 
at
 
times
 
it
 
was
 
to
 
dissuade
 
the
 
President
 
from
 
action.”
Robert
 
M.
 
Gates,
 
Deputy
 
National
 
Security
 
Advisor,
 
1990,
 
The
 
Generals’ 
 
War 
,
 
page
 
154.
“If 
 
Saddam
 
withdraws
 
with
 
most
 
of 
 
his
 
forces
 
intact,
 
we
 
haven’t
 
really
 
won.”
 
Brent
 
Scowcroft,
 
National
 
Security
 
Advisor,
 
1991
 
from
 
 A
 
World 
 
Transformed 
,
 
page473.
Expectations
 
in
 
1990
1991:
 
Conventional
 
Wisdom

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