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Light Recon Strike Groups (LRSG) Briefing M

Light Recon Strike Groups (LRSG) Briefing M

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douglasmacgregor.com
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01/09/2015

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The Past as Prologue: Understanding Why There Was NoAmerican Blitzkrieg in 1942
The Current Inter-War Period: Where to from here?
Transforming Army Ground Forces: What Does TransformationReally Mean?
The Path to Change: New Joint Operational Concepts
What is the LRSG Organizational Concept?
Summary
 
LRLRLRSGSGSG
Concepts for Transformation fromBreaking the Phalanx: A Briefing forThe Raytheon Corporation
Briefing Outline
Presented by Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, US Army
 
 
Why Was there No American Blitzkrieg in1942?
In a period of fiscal constraint, and in the absence of compellingthreats, the Army between 1919 and 1939:
 – 
Focused on traditional roles—re-fought the last “successful”war or, in the British Case, the Empire - constabulary force
 – 
Tried to advance the Single Service way of fighting
 – 
Endeavored to preserve status quo
 – 
Fought for budget share
 – 
Tinkered on the margins - no real innovation
 – 
Experimented with the familiar
 – 
Until recently promoted BG George Marshall became Chief of Staff, the top leadership cloned itself—those who did notconform vanished!
 
 
Would More $ Have Made a Difference?
Traditional view
: Tight budgets and Congressional/publicapathy responsible for Army not being ready for World WarII
 Another view
: Congress was disinterested in what washappening inside the Army and fiscal constraints weresignificant, but given the institutional realities in the interwarU.S. Army, it is likely that:
 – 
The Ground Army would have pressed to fill personnelauthorizations and fought for more end strength
 – 
The Air Army would have built more bombers andbomber formations
Intellectual—not exclusively fiscal—deficits wereresponsible for the state of the U.S. Army in 1941.

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