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Arms Control

Arms Control

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Published by Jacobin Parcelle
Encyclopedia Series OF Conflict, War, and Peace : Arms Control
Encyclopedia Series OF Conflict, War, and Peace : Arms Control

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Published by: Jacobin Parcelle on Feb 17, 2009
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not as means to an end but as choice-worthy inthemselves. Their perceived importance for humanwell-being involves a reconsideration of central issuesof Aristotelian virtue ethics and its guiding concept of thegoodlife,aswellasananalysisoffeaturesessentialfor functioning as a human being. For the most part,such reconceptions attempt to integrate socioculturalpluralism, involving a multiplicity of competing ideasof the good life. Such pluralism requires a conceptionof politics as basically deliberative, since reasonedsocial and political decision-making depends on cre-ating joint convictions in areas of the contingent. Thisprocess depends on a rhetorical culture as a consti-tutive element of political culture. Since Aristotle’s
represents a synthesis of conceptual frame-works necessary for understanding the functioning of rhetorical culture, he provides a paradigm fordeveloping a theory of political deliberative argu-mentation under pluralist sociopolitical conditions.Under the title of
,’ Aristotle’s heuristic forsystematically exploring and presenting whatever ispotentially convincing has entered theories of (legal)argumentation (Pe
relman 1969) and social science
political science research (Hennis 1977). Even authorswith a critical distance from neo Aristotelianismnonetheless adopt Aristotle’s rhetorical heritage bydiscussing notions of deliberative democracy or poli-tics. The scope and rigor of Aristotle’s thought will nodoubt continue to inspire generations of socialscientists.
See also
: Aristotelian Social Thought; Causation:Physical, Mental, and Social; Citizenship: Political;Counterfactual Reasoning: Public Policy Aspects;Counterfactual Reasoning, Qualitative: PhilosophicalAspects;Democracy;Democracy:NormativeTheory;Ethics and Values; Idealization, Abstraction, andIdealTypes;IdentityandIdentification:PhilosophicalAspects; Individualism versus Collectivism: Philos-ophical Aspects; Knowledge (Explicit and Implicit):Philosophical Aspects; Knowledge Representation;Meaning and Rule-following: Philosophical Aspects;Models, Metaphors, Narrative, and Rhetoric: Phil-osophical Aspects; Person and Self: PhilosophicalAspects; Personal Identity: Philosophical Aspects;Policy History: State and Economy; Power: Political;Practical Reasoning: Philosophical Aspects; Respo-nsibility: Philosophical Aspects; Rhetoric; RhetoricalAnalysis; State and Society; State: AnthropologicalAspects; State Formation; States and Civilizations,Archaeology of; Truth, Verification, Verisimilitude,and Evidence: Philosophical Aspects; Virtue Ethics
Arendt H 1958
The Human Condition
. University of ChicagoPress, ChicagoAristotle 1926
The Loeb Classical Library
Greek Authors
,17 Vols. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MABarnes J, Schofield M, Sorabji R (eds.) 1975
Articles onAristotle I–III 
. Duckworth, LondonEdmondson R 1984
Rhetoric in Sociology
. Macmillan, LondonFlashar E 1983
eltere Akademie
. In:Flaschar E (ed.)
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. DiePhilosophie der Antike
. Schwabe, BaselGadamer H G 1975
Truth and Method 
, 2nd edn. Sheed andWard, LondonGuthrie W K C 1990
A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. VI:Aristotle. An Encounter
. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, UKHennis W 1977
Politik und Praktische Philosophie
. Klett-Cotta,StuttgartKeyt D, Miller F D (eds.) 1991
A Companion to Aristotle’sPolitics
. Blackwell, Oxford, UKMacIntyre A 1985
After Virtue
. Duckworth, LondonPerelman Ch 1969
The New Rhetoric
A Treatise in Argu
. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, INRicoeurP1992
Oneself as Another
.Universityof Chicago Press,LondonTotok W 1997
Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie
.Klostermann, Frankfurt, Germany, Vol. 1, pp. 359–466Wo
rner M 1990
Das Ethische in der Rhetorik des Aristoteles
.Alber, Freiburg
Munich, Germany
M. Wo
Arms Control
Arms control, a term popularized in the early 1960s,may be defined as the effort, between and amongcountries, to negotiate binding limitations on thenumber and types of armaments or armed forces, ontheir deployment and disposition, or on the use of particular types of armaments. It also includes mea-sures designed to reduce the danger of accidentalnuclear war and to alleviate concerns about surpriseattack. Although the two terms are often used inter-changeably,itisdistinctfromdisarmament,whichhasthe more ambitious objective of seeking to eliminate,also by international agreement, the means by whichcountries wage war (Blacker and Duffy 1984). Thegoalofeliminatingwarextendsfarbackinhistory,butinmoderntimesdisarmamentcameintofocuswiththeHaguePeaceConferencesin1899and1907.Theseandsubsequent efforts met with what can only be termedlimited success.Schelling and Halperin, in their seminal work,
Strategy and Arms Control 
, first published in 1961,listed three objectives for arms control: to reduce thelikelihoodofwar;tolimittheextentofdamageshouldwar occur; and to reduce expenditures on militaryforces. As US and Soviet weapons arsenals mush-roomed during the Cold War and each country spentliberally to keep pace with the other militarily, lateranalysts tended to offer less sweeping goals. These748
Aristotle (384–322 BC)
includedreducingthenumberofnuclearweaponsandredirecting the arms race into areas less likely tothreaten the stability of the international system.The end of the Cold War and the collapse of theSoviet Union gave rise to expectations, both at theexpert level and among publics more broadly, that thesudden cessation of the superpower arms race wouldcreate opportunities for radical reductions in thenuclear and conventional weapons arsenals of themajor powers.Although the leading industrialized countries havetaken some steps in that direction—US armed forces,measured in terms of total numbers, have declined byone-third since 1990—progress in eliminating thenuclear-weapons stockpiles of the US and Russia hasproven to be an elusive goal. To compound theproblem, the number of nuclear-armed states hasactually grown in recent years as India and Pakistan,in a series of highly publicized weapons tests in 1998,announcedtheirarrivalasfull-fledgednuclearpowers.The means to deliver these weapons, as well aschemical and biological agents, across hundreds (andeven thousands) of miles has also spread as countriessuchasNorthKorea,Iraq,andIrancontinuetoinvestheavily inprograms to develop and deploy long-rangeballistic missiles.Arms control, particularly between the US and theSoviet Union, aroused controversy from the outset.The Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed by represen-tativesoftheUS,theUnitedKingdom,andtheSovietUnion in 1963, provoked sharp debate when USpresident John F. Kennedy submitted this armscontrol‘first’forSenateapproval.Somecriticssawthetreaty, which prohibits the testing of nuclear weaponsabove ground, under water, and in space, as unen-forceable. These and other concerns notwithstanding,the treaty eventually was ratified and fears of Sovietnoncompliance proved to be unfounded.More favorably received in the US was the UnitedNations-sponsored Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT),which sought torestrict thesizeofthe‘nuclearclub’ by inducing non-nuclear weapons states torenounce the acquisition of such weapons in exchangefor a commitment (among other pledges) on the partof the nuclear-weapons countries to reduce their ownarsenals. The NPT, which entered into force in 1970,was renegotiated in 1995, at which time the signatorystates agreed to extend the treaty’s provisions for anunlimited period of time. Conspicuous by their ab-sence as states-parties to the NPT are the two newestdeclared nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, as wellas Israel, which is believed to possess a small butsophisticated arsenal of nuclear weapons.The NPT was critically important in facilitating thestart of bilateral US–Soviet negotiations in 1969 tolimit central strategic forces. Known by the acronymSALT, for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, thenegotiations resulted in two arms-control agreementsin 1972. The first and more important was theAntiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, by which the twocountriesagreedtolimitthenumberofABMsitesandthus not deploy nationwide defensive systems toprotecttheirhomelandsagainstnuclear-missileattack.The second accord was a 5-year freeze on the con-struction of long-range land- and sea-based ballisticmissile ‘launchers’ (underground silos and submarinemissile tubes, respectively). The so-called InterimAgreement on Offensive Weapons was a temporarymeasure to slow the competition in offensiveweaponry, pending negotiation of a more permanentand restrictive treaty (Newhouse 1973).The second phase of the negotiations, lasting from1972 to 1979, led to the signing of several agreements,including an accord further limiting US and SovietABM deployments and the 1974 Threshold Test BanTreaty, which restricts the yields of undergroundnuclearweaponstests.Themostimportantagreementconcluded during this period was the 1979 SALT IItreaty, a lengthy and complex document that at-temptedtoextendandrefinemanyoftheprovisionsof the 1972 Interim Agreement (Talbott 1979). The USSenate never ratified the treaty, however, largelybecause of the dramatic deterioration in superpowerrelations that began during the abbreviated admin-istration of President Gerald Ford and acceleratedduring the term of his White House successor, JimmyCarter. Despite the ambiguous legal status of thetreaty following the failure to obtain its ratification,both the US and the Soviet Union abided by most of its provisions well into the 1980s.Negotiations on US and Soviet strategic nuclearforces, renamed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks(START) by President Ronald Reagan, resumed inthe summer of 1982. Through the remainder of Reagan’s presidency, the two sides reached consensuson many key points, including the desirability of 50percent reductions in long-range nuclear forces andthe need for intrusive, on-site inspections to preventcheating.Amongtheissuesnotresolvedwashowtoconstructthe preferred relationship between strategic offensiveand defensive forces. In a dramatic reversal of itsearlier negotiating position, the US now favored therapid development and deployment of nationwidedefensive systems, as shown by its sponsorship of theStrategic Defense Initiative (SDI), first outlined byReaganinMarch1983inanationallytelevisedaddress(Fitzgerald 2000, Nolan 1989). The Soviet Union wassharply critical of SDI and resisted the conclusion of any new agreement to reduce strategic offensiveweapons, pending a commitment by the US to abideby the terms of theABM treaty, narrowly interpreted,through at least the end of the century.The rise to power of the Soviet leader MikhailGorbachev in 1985 signaled a fundamentally newphase in arms control. One of Gorbachev’s mostimportant foreign policy objectives was to curtailsharplythepoliticalrivalrybetweentheUSSRandthe749
Arms Control 
West by, among other steps, delimiting their militarycompetition. The first major result of this policy wastheIntermediate-RangeNuclearForces(INF)Treaty,concludedin1987,whicheliminatedallUSandSovietland-based nuclear missiles with ranges between 500and 5,500 kilometers. This was followed in 1990 by atreaty toreduce conventional forces inEurope (CFE),signed by 22 member-states of the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) and the now-defunctWarsaw Pact. At about the same time, US and Sovietnegotiators completed work on the long-awaitedSTART treaty, and in July 1991, President GeorgeBushtraveledtoMoscowtojoinGorbachevinsigningtheaccord.Lessthan6monthslater,Gorbachev—thearchitectofthemost ambitiousreformprograminthe74 year history of the Soviet Union—resigned aspresident and the USSR ceased to exist.At a hastily called summit meeting in June 1992,Bush and Russian Federation president Boris Yeltsinagreed to press for early ratification of the STARTtreaty. They also pledged to conclude a second andmore ambitious agreement to reduce US and Russianstrategic nuclear arsenals by up to two-thirds within adecade and to eliminate all multiple-warhead land-based missiles. Some 2 weeks before the inaugurationof Bill Clinton as US president in January 1993, thetwo sides made good on their promise and concludedtheSTARTIItreaty.AsrelationsbetweentheUSandRussia deteriorated during the second half of the1990s, the treaty itself languished; although finallyratified by both sides, nearly a decade after its signingmost of the agreement’s provisions still had not beenimplemented.TheUS–Russianarms-controlagendahasalsobeencomplicated by the confused, and confusing, nuclearlegacy of the Soviet Union. In the wake of the Sovietcollapse, four of the country’s now independentrepublics, including Russia, found themselves in pos-sessionofthousandsofnuclearweaponsandhundredsof long-range delivery systems. Under pressure fromRussia and the West, in May 1992 the governments of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine promised to abideby the terms of the 1991 START I agreement and to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. Withfinancial and technical assistance from the US, allnuclear warheads and their associated missile systemsdeployed on Belarusian, Kazakh, and Ukrainianterritory eventually were disarmed and dismantled.The denuclearization of the three former Sovietrepublics constitutes the most important—and per-haps the only unambiguous—arms control successstory of the 1990s.The abrupt end of Soviet rule gave rise to a secondkind of security problem for which policymakerseverywhere were ill prepared. The frequency andintensityofethnicallyandreligiouslyinspiredconflictsinsuchheretoforeremotepartsoftheformerUSSRasTajikistan and the southern Caucasus increased dra-maticallyfollowingthecollapseofcentralauthorityinMoscow. The breakdown of political control in theseand proximate regions, coupled with the extremepovertythatafflicted manyof thepeople caughtin thefighting, served both to prolong these struggles and tofrustrate diplomatic efforts to contain them.In addition, the unraveling of the Soviet Union’salliance relationships left a number of countriespoliticallyorphanedandthereforelesssecure.Thistooserved to increase regional instability. It also en-couraged some states—North Korea being a case inpoint—to seek to develop nuclear weapons of theirown despite the determined opposition of the majorpowers, especially the US.At the start of the twenty-first century the mostimportant challenge to arms control, however, is theprospective change in the relationship between long-range, offensive nuclear forces and weapons designedto defend against them. For the last 40 years, whatPhilip Green characterized in the mid-1960s as thedeadly logic of nuclear deterrence helped preserve theuneasytruce betweenWashington and Moscow. In itssimplest form, deterrence held that no rational lead-ership in possession of nuclear weapons would everintentionally authorize their use against a nuclear-armed adversary because of the near-certain knowl-edge that the victim of such an attack would retaliatein kind. With effectively no ability to ward off ordeflectsucharetaliatorystrike,thewould-beaggressorwould thus be deterred from initiating a nuclearexchange in the first place (Brodie 1965, Schelling1960).Asthecapacitytobuildnuclearweaponsspreadstocountries other than the so-called great powers,interest in acquiring the means to defend against theirpossible use has grown, particularly in the US. Even acomparatively modest system of active defenses—onedesigned to defeat a handful of incoming ballisticmissile warheads launched from whatever quarter—arousesconcern,however,becauseofthelatentabilityof such a system to expand and improve over time.The larger and more robust a system of nationalmissile defense becomes, the better it will be atdefending against more complex threats. The moreable it becomes, in other words, the more threateningit will seem to the more established nuclear powers,including Russia and China, for whom the unchal-lenged ability to retaliate with overwhelming forceconstitutes the bedrock of their security (Wilkening2000). According to the classic tenets of arms control,the large-scale deployment of strategic defensive sys-tems could therefore erode stability and increase thelikelihood of war.Itisprobablynotbeyondhumaningenuitytodesignand construct a ‘mixed’ strategic environment thatallows for a modicum of defense while preservingnuclear deterrence in its essentials. Given the under-standable urge to escape the persistent threat of nuclear annihilation, it seems safe to assume thatgovernments will persist in their efforts to square this750
Arms Control 

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