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ZimringF E,HawkinsG J1973
Deterrence: The Legal Threat inCrime Control 
. University of Chicago, Chicago
D. S. Nagin
Deterrence Theory: Crime
1. Introduction
The word
deterrence
has been linked to differenttopics, including nuclear deterrence (see
Oxford English Dictionary
), but the focus here is on theoriesabout the effects of punishment on crime. Criminaldeterrence pertains to the omission or curtailment of crime out of fear of legal punishment, and the firsttheory can be traced to the utilitarian philosophersCesare Beccaria (1738–94) and Jeremy Bentham(1748–1832) who believed that people are motivatedfundamentally to obtain pleasure and avoid pain. Tothe extent that potential offenders anticipate pleasurefromcrime,theycanbedeterredbyincreasingthepainassociated with it. In particular, potential offenderscan be deterred by making legal punishment
certain
,
celeritous
, and
se
ere
, with
certainty
being the like-lihoodofbeingcaughtandpunishedforcrime,
celerity
being the swiftness of punishment, and
se
erity
beingthe amount of punishment (von Hirsch et al. 1999,p. 6). Reduced to one fairly simple statement: ‘Therate for a particular type of crime varies inverse-ly [negatively] with the celerity, certainty, andseverity of punishments of that type of crime’ (Gibbs1975, p. 5).
2. Complexities
Although that statement is still the basis for con-temporary deterrence theory, there are several com-plexities, one of which has to do with the distinctionbetween
specific
and
general 
deterrence (Stafford andWarr 1993). Whereas
specific deterrence
refers to thedeterrent effects of directly experiencing a legal pun-ishment,
general deterrence
refers to the deterrenteffects of indirectly experiencing it. So when a personis imprisoned for committing a burglary and is thenreleased, the imprisonment deters
specifically
to theextent that the released offender refrains completelyfrom burglary, or at least curtails the amount of burglary that he or she commits, out of a fear of further imprisonment. To the extent that people otherthan the imprisoned offender learn about the im-prisonment and refrain completely or in part fromcommitting burglary out of fear of being imprisoned,those people have been
generally
deterred. The dis-tinction is important because a given punishmentmight deter
only
specifically or
only
generally insteadof both.Another complexity is implied in the foregoingdiscussion of specific and general deterrence. Criticssometimes dismiss the possibility of deterrence byarguing that the commission of a crime itself isevidence against deterrence. For example, it some-timesisarguedinreferencetocriminaljusticepolicytoimprison drug traffickers that continued drug traf-ficking reveals that the threatened imprisonment didnot deter potential offenders. However, the argumentignoresthedistinctionbetween
absolute
and
restricti 
e
deterrence(Gibbs1975,pp.32–4).Totheextentthataperson refrains completely from committing a crimeout of fear of punishment, that person is deterred
absolutely
. However, a person may not be deterredabsolutely but, instead, be deterred
restricti 
ely
bycurtailingorlimitinghisorhercommissionofacrime,aswhen a person limitsthe amountof drug traffickinginordertoreducetherisk ofpunishment (perhapsoutof a sense of cumulative risk). With restrictive de-terrence, the key question is how much crime wouldoccur if there were either no or less threatenedpunishment for it.
3. Premises of Deterrence Theory
According to Gibbs (1975), there are three premisesof deterrence theory:(a) The greater the actual certainty, celerity, andseverity of punishment, the greater the perceivedcertainty, celerity, and severity of punishment.(b)Thegreater theperceivedcertainty,celerity, andseverity of punishment, the less the crime.(c) The greater the actual certainty, celerity, andseverity of punishment, the less the crime.Or stated diagrammatically: AP
 –
PP
 –
CR,where AP denotes actual punishments, PP denotesperceived punishments, CR denotes crime; the symb-ol
 –
denotes a positive relationship, and
 –
-denotes a negative relationship. In contrast to theactual certainty, celerity, and severity of punishmentin a given place and time for a given type of crime,perceivedpunishmentspertaintopeople’sperceptionsof the certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment(vonHirschetal.1999,p.6).Forexample,iftheactualcertaintyofarrestforburglaryinaparticularUSstatein a given year is 25 percent (law enforcement officialsactually make 25 arrests for every 100 burglariescommitted), people may perceive the certainty of arrest for burglary to be 25 percent or they mayperceive it to be higher or lower than 25 percent.Deterrence theorists since Beccaria and Benthamhave assumed that there is a strong positive relation-shipbetweenactualpunishmentsandperceivedpunish-ments (Premise 1), and that assumption is important3550
Deterrence: Legal Perspecti 
es
 
for two reasons. First, ‘to the extent that changes inactual penal policies do not alter potential offenders’beliefs about the likelihood or severity [or celerity] of punishment, they cannot generate any … deterrence’(vonHirschetal.1999,p.6).Second,demonstrationof a positive relationship between actual and perceivedpunishments is important to distinguish deterrencefrom other possible preventive consequences of pun-ishment. To illustrate, suppose there was a strongnegative relationship among US states between theactualcertaintyofimprisonmentforautotheftandtheauto theft rate. It may not be fear of legal punishment(deterrence) that accounts for the relatively low autotheft rates in states with a high certainty of im-prisonment for auto theft; to the extent that im-prisonmentservestolimittheopportunitiestocommitauto theft (it is difficult to commit auto thefts inprison), the imprisonment of large numbers of autothieves can cause a low auto theft rate through
incapacitation
and not fear of legalpunishment. Therewouldbeevidenceofdeterrenceonlytotheextentthat(1) the people in states with a high actual certainty of imprisonmentforautotheftperceivedittobehighand(2) there were low auto theft rates in states with highactual and perceived certainty of imprisonment forauto theft.
4. Additional Complexities
An additional complexity is that the deterrent effectsoflegalpunishmentmaybecontingent.Tobeginwith,the deterrent effects of a particular property of punishment—say, certainty—may be contingent onthe levels of the other punishment properties—saycelerity, and severity. For example, Tittle (1969, p. 47)reported in a study of the relationship among USstates between the actual certainty and severity of imprisonment and rates for seven crime types (e.g.,homicide) that the actual severity of imprisonmentacted ‘as a deterrent only when there was a high[actual] certainty of punishment.’ Similarly, Grasmickand Bryjak (1980) reported in a study of the re-lationship among individuals between the perceivedcertaintyandseverityofpunishmentandself-reportedcrime that perceived certainty has stronger effects athigher levels of perceived severity and that perceivedseverity has stronger effects at higher levels of per-ceived certainty.The deterrent effects of legal punishment also maybe contingent on
extralegal punishments
, includingself-imposed punishments (e.g., guilt, shame) andsocially imposed punishments (e.g., divorce or em-ployment loss). William and Hawkins (1986, p. 561)have indicated that extralegal punishment may resultfrom legal punishment (e.g., an offender may ex-perience loss of employment following imprisonment)and, thus, should be ‘part of the … deterrence pro-cess.’ However, extralegal punishment also may beinflicted independent of legal punishment. For ex-ample,GrasmickandBursik(1990,p.840)havearguedthat offenders may experience guilt or shame fromcommitting a crime regardless of whether they arecaught and legally punished. Hence, the deterrenteffects of legal punishment may vary by the likelihoodofexperiencingswiftandsevereextralegalpunishmentfor committing crime. For example, the deterrenteffects of legal punishment may be greater amongthose who have little to risk in the way of extralegalpunishmentforcrimebecausefearoflegalpunishmentmaybetheir onlybarriertolaw-violatingbehavior. Inthat connection, Burkett and Ward (1993, pp. 128–9)found that those who believed marijuana use to besinful were unlikely to contemplate engaging in thebehavior; and, hence, the threat of legal punishmentfor marijuana use was irrelevant for them. Only thosewho did not consider marijuana use sinful weredeterred ‘because they appear[ed] to contemplate theact and, by reasonable inference, the probable con-sequences of their behavior.’Policymakers need not worry that punishment doesnot deter all potential offenders as long as
enough
potential offenders are deterred. However, there isevidence that legal punishment sometimes is counter-productive by causing potential offenders to commit
more
crime.Inrelationtospecificdeterrence,Shermanand Smith (1992) reported that arrests for domesticassaults produced more subsequent assaults by un-employed offenders because they did not perceivepolice intervention as legitimate and ‘displaced [theiranger about being arrested] onto their present orfuture romantic partners or other citizens’ (Sherman1993, p. 465). According to Sherman (1993, p. 460),legal punishment provokes such ‘defiance’ (persistentor more serious law-violating behavior) to the extentthat offenders (1) perceive the punishment as unfair,(2) are weakly bonded to other community members,(3) perceive the punishment as stigmatizing, and (4)deny the shame associated with it.
5. Links between Deterrence Theory and otherTheories
The connection between contemporary deterrencetheory and the Beccaria-Bentham belief that peoplecalculate the pleasure and pain associated with be-havior means that deterrence theory can be linked toother, more general, theories of human behavior.Akers (1990) has argued that deterrence theory issubsumable under more general
social learning
or
beha
ioral principles
. ‘Threat of legal punishment isone source or indicator of aversive stimulus under thegeneral concept of differential reinforcement (balanceof rewarding and aversive stimuli)’ (Akers 1990,p.658).Differentialreinforcementreferstotheoverall3551
Deterrence Theory: Crime
 
balance of rewards and punishments for a behavior,includingpast,present,andfuturerewardsandpunish-ments. General deterrence is equivalent to observa-tional
\
vicarious learning in social learning theory,which involves observations of other people and howtheir behavior is rewarded and punished; and specificdeterrenceisequivalenttoexperientiallearning,whichinvolves direct, personal experience with the rewardsand punishments for a behavior (Stafford and Warr1993).Both deterrence and social learning theory can belinkedto
rationalchoicetheory
inthatbothaddressthequestion of why people in certain situations
decide
or
choose
toengageinparticular behaviors (Akers1990).However, the meaning of ‘rational’ is ambiguous. Tosome deterrence researchers, rationality implies con-scious and deliberate calculations about the rewardsandpunishmentsforcrime(e.g.,Bachmanetal.1992).Incontrast,othersdenythatovertmentalcalculationsof any kind are necessarily involved (e.g., Casey andScholz 1991). Moreover, rational choices are some-timesconceivedaswillfulratherthandetermined(e.g.,Bachman et al. 1992), but Cornish and Clarke (1986,p. 13) have claimed that the ‘rational choice pers-pective is … neutral with respect to the free will-determinism debate.’Disagreement about the meaning of the word‘rational’stemsfromtheexistenceofdifferentversionsof rational choice theory: old rational choice theoryand new rational choice theory, each with differentassumptions about rationality (Felson, 1993). Oldrational choice theory, as set forth by such utilitarianphilosophers as Beccaria and Bentham assumed thatpeopleengageinconsciousanddeliberatecost
\
benefitanalysis in order to maximize the rewards and mini-mize the punishments for their behavior. The newversion of rational choice theory entails weaker as-sumptions about rationality—that people intuit therewardsandpunishmentsforabehaviorandthattheyare imperfect processors of information and conse-quently must behave within the limits of their abilitiesto pursue what they perceive as most satisfying (e.g.,Cornish and Clarke 1986). The assumption of ‘maxi-mizing’ is rejected and replaced by alternative as-sumptions, such as ‘satisficing’ and ‘bounded’ or‘situatedrationality.’Asfortheissueoffreewillversusdeterminism, new rational choice theory posits that‘people make choices, but they cannot choose thechoices available to them’ (Felson 1986, p. 119).Like new rational choice theory, deterrence theorydoes not require a strong assumption about ration-ality. In particular, crime need not be preconceived orcarefully planned for legal punishments to deter, onlythat potential offenders choose between crime andconformitytothelawonthebasisoftheirestimatesof the rewards and punishments involved. Also like newrational choice theory, deterrence theory does notrequire that people have free will. Indeed, a negativerelationship between properties of legal punishment(e.g.,theperceivedcertaintyofpunishment)andcrimeis as compatible with a strictly deterministic con-ceptionofhumanbehaviorasitiswithfreewill(Gibbs1975, p. 24).
See also
: Bentham, Jeremy (1748–1832); Crime: Soci-ological Aspects; Crime, Sociology of; Criminal Jus-tice, Ethics of: Aspects of Human Dignity; CriminalJustice,Sociologyof;CriminalLawandCrimePolicy;Deterrence; Deterrence: Legal Perspectives; Impris-onment: Sociological Aspects; Law: Economics of itsPublic Enforcement; National Security Studies andWar Potential of Nations; Prisons and Imprisonment;Punishment, Comparative Politics of; Punishment:Social and Legal Aspects; Rational Choice in Politics;War: Causes and Patterns; Warfare in History
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