may ﬁnd it advantageous to vote for a less preferredbut more viable candidate instead of ‘wasting’ his orher vote on a candidate with little chance. In contrast,multi-member districts and even single-member dis-tricts with decision rules other than plurality mayreduce the incentives for voters to deviate from theirﬁrst choice.Strategic behavior and an aversion to wasting one’svotemeansthatFPTPelectionsaretypiﬁedbycontestsbetween two major candidates, whereas alternativesystems often exhibit several viable candidates. Ex-tending this result to parties, FPTP systems routinelyhave only two major parties, a phenomenon that hasbeen coined
, named after the Frenchscholar who extensively described the relationship(Duverger 1954). Proportional representation sys-tems, however, usually have more than two parties, aresult that has come to be known as
(Riker 1982, Cox 1997).When there are only two viable candidates in anFPTP election, no abstentions, and the candidates arechoosing their positions to maximize their electoralsupport, the candidate ideologically closest to themedian voter is advantaged (Downs 1957). FPTPsystemsthustendtoproducemoremoderateoutcomesthan alternative systems. The incentive for candidatesto take moderate positions can produce candidateswhoareonlyminimallydiﬀerentiated,leadingsometoconclude that the choices in FPTP are often of littleconsequence. One potential advantage to such asystem, however, is that the outcomes from oneelection to the next tend to be more ideologicallyconsistent, resulting in small, incremental policychanges over time.
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G. D. Adams and W. R. Keech
First World War, The
TheoutbreakoftheFirstWorldWarinthesummerof 1914 has been attributed to accident, design andconfusion. The ﬁrst position suggests that no oneintended that armed conﬂict would break out in 1914;the second, that German and Austrian military elitesplanned the conversion of a Balkan diplomatic crisisinto an armed confrontation; the third, that politicaland military leaders throughout Europe began tomaneuverwithsomenotionthatwarwaspossible,butfound that they could not resist the momentum of confrontation (Joll 1992).What was the sequence of events subject to theseinterpretations, and which has commanded the sup-port of most historians who have addressed the issueof the descent into war in 1914? On 28 June 1914, theArchdukeFranz-FerdinandofAustria–Hungary,heirto the throne, was assassinated in Sarajevo. The crimewas carried out by a group of Serb student patriots inneighboring Bosnia, then a province of the Austro–Hungarian empire. Their aim was to demonstrate theforce of Slavic nationalism, and to challenge thedomination of these south Slavic lands by imperialistsin Vienna and Budapest.Inthis aim,theysucceeded completely. The govern-ment inVienna decided tomakethis crimea matterof state, and to lay the blame for this political murder onthe independent Kingdom of Serbia, and its intel-ligenceservices.On5–6July,AustrianoﬃcialswenttoGermany to seek support for their policy of makingSerbia ‘pay’ for the assassination. German oﬃcialsgave their approval, oﬀering a ‘blank check’ to theirAustrian allies. With this backing, on 23 July theAustrians presented Serbia with a list of demandswhich constituted a challenge to the status quo in theBalkans.This is where Russia entered the conﬂict. A hu-miliation for Serbia would humiliate her Slavic ally,Russia. With Russian backing, Serbia met most of theAustrian demands, but refused to capitulate com-pletely. In support of Serbia, Russia ordered partialmobilization of her armies on 29 July. In support of Austria, and in response to the numerical superiorityof Russian forces, the German army mobilized too.Once German mobilization was in progress, thenthe crucial link appears between a conﬂict in theBalkans and an all-European war. German military5688
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