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labormarketdiscrimination.Further,itisnecessarytoknow exactly what is the cause of an observed wagedifferential if a society decides it wants to eliminatethis differential (see Altonji and Blank 1999 for anextensive discussion of these issues).
2.5 Rents
Mostoftheabovediscussionproceededasifwagesaredetermined in markets that are similar in process tothe markets for melons and equities. The fact that thecommodities involved in labor markets are humanbeings requires that this ‘model’ be modified to someextent. Indeed, a set of institutions has emerged toprovide modification of the outcomes that wouldfollow from the unfettered equilibrium of the labormarket. Among these institutions is trade unionism,whichhas,overtimeandacrosssocieties,takenseveralforms. Government policy—both directly throughlegislation determining wages and indirectly throughits role as employer—also affects the wage structure.At one level the existence of institutions such astradeunionscreatesanotherwagedifferentialinwhichto be interested. In terms of Eqns. (1) and (2), being aunion member or working in which wage rates aredetermined by a collective bargaining contract meansthat a worker could earn a higher wage than anotherworker who is not so situated. In this case,
W 
l
 β 
"
U 
j
(
is the complete wage equation, including allobserved and unobserved variables, where
U 
equalsone with union representation and equals zero other-wise. We do not, of course, observe everything abouttheworkersandhis
\
 job,soweestimatetheequivalentof Eqn. (2),
W 
l
b
"
U 
j
(
How good the estimator
b
"
is of the ‘true’ effect of unionism
β 
"
depends, as in the estimation of otherwage differentials, on the correlation of the omitteddeterminants of wages with
U 
. In the US, the con-sensus estimate of the average effect of unionism onwages is about 15 percent (see Lewis 1986).A more important effect of unionism and govern-ment policy is their influence on other wage differ-entials. Much of the above discussion of the structureofwagesandofwagedifferentialsreflectedtheimplicitassumption that relative wages are, at least in the longrun, free to adjust to their market-clearing levels. Thisassumptionisallrightfortheanalysisoflabormarketsin the US, Japan, and (during the past 20 years) theUnited Kingdom, but there are serious problemsassociated with its application to most other indus-trialized countries in which bargaining coverage isover 75 percent (vs. 18 percent in the US and 22percentinJapanintheearly1990s).Totheextentthatunion and
\
or government policy attempts to preventincreases in the dispersion of earnings, wage differ-entials will not behave as neatly as the elementarytheory suggests. Instead, wage structures will besubjecttoagreatdealofinertia,andtheywilladjustatbest very slowly to shocks in demand.That the wage structure is slow to change is not
perse
abadthing.Indeed,Iwouldjoinmosteconomistsinagreeing that stability of the distribution of income isa good thing. The problem with such policies, how-ever,isthattheyoftenleadtoheavyunemploymentof those groups whose relative wages are protected.
See also:
Comparable Worth in Gender Studies;Income Distribution; Inequality; Inequality: Comp-arative Aspects; Labor Markets, Labor Movements,and Gender in Developing Nations; Labor Supply;Labor Unions; Labor, Division of; Sex Differences inPay; Wealth Distribution; Work, Sociology of 
Bibliography
Altonji J G, Blank R M 1999 Race and gender in the labormarket. In: Ashenfelter O, Card D (eds.)
Handbook of LaborEconomics
, Vol. 3C. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, pp. 3143–3260Blomquist G, Berger M, Hoehn J 1988 New estimates of thequality of life in urban areas.
American Economic Re
iew
78
(1): 89–107Bound J, Johnson G 1992 Changes in the structure of wages inthe 1980s: An evaluation of alternative explanations.
Ameri 
-
can Economic Re
iew
82
(3): 371–92Brown C 1980 Equalizing differences in the labor market.
Quarterly Journal of Economics
94
: 113–34Card D 1999 The causal effect of education on earnings. In:Ashenfelter O, Card D (eds.)
Handbook of Labor Economics
,Vol. 3A. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, pp. 1801–63Deininger K, Squire L 1996 A new data set measuring incomeinequality.
The World Bank Economic Re
iew
10
(1): 565–91EhrenbergR,OaxacaR2000
ModernLaborEconomics
,7thedn.Addison-Wesley, Reading, MAInternational Labour Office 1999
Yearbook of Labour Statistics1999
. ILO, GenevaJuhn C, Murphy K M, Pierce B 1993 Wage inequality and therise in returns to skill.
Journal of Political Economy
101
(1):410–42Lewis H G 1986
Union Relati 
e Wage Effects: A Sur
ey
.University of Chicago Press, Chicago
G. Johnson
War: Anthropological Aspects
Sun-tzu,thefamousChinesemilitaryexpert,beganhisbook
The Art of War
with the words ‘Warfare is thegreatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, theWay (Tao) to survival or extinction. It must bethoroughly pondered and analyzed.’ These words,2,500 years later, still hold true: war has grown moredeadly, and more damaging to human existence.In the twentieth century alone, over 250 formallydeclared wars took over one 100 million lives. Un-declared wars, including political repression, commu-16350
Wage Differentials and Structure
 
nal violence, and tribal genocide took millions more;forexamplebetween50–100milliontribalpeoplehavebeen killed by forces and citizens of states in thetwentieth century. If we expand the definition of wartoincludesuchconflictsas‘thewarondrugs’andgangwarfare, casualties figures rise, though accurate stat-istics are not available on these forms of violence.As we enter the third millennium, one-third of theworld’scountriesareengagedinsomeformofpoliticalviolence. Whether these conflicts are called war or notoften depends more on political rhetoric than on anaccepted definition of the term. In addition, approxi-mately two thirds of the world’s security forces usehuman rights abuses tocontrol their populations. Thevictims tend to label this violence war or dirty war,while the state tends to classify this as defense orcounterinsurgency.The world has not always been characterized bysuch high levels of violent warfare. Wars today arelonger in duration, more deadly, and kill highernumbers of civilians than wars of preceding centuries.The reasons behind war and the ways in which it iswaged change across cultures and time. The changingcharacteristics of war demonstrate that organizedviolence is not a fixed and eternal fact of biology, noran inescapable feature of a Freudian psyche, but ahuman practice guided by norms of behavior andcodes of conduct situated in cultural values.
1. Defining War
Neither the two world wars nor the several hundredlocal and regional wars since 1900 have brought usclosertoasharedunderstandingofwar.Mostscholarsaccept a basic definition of war as the deployment of violence to force opponents to comply with one’s will.War is organized, group-level, armed aggressionrooted in hierarchies of dominance which assumewinners and losers in a contest over resources, people,and power. Yet war is defined differently by thewinners and the losers, by historical perspective, bysoldiers and pacifists—and in each case the definitionsare more politically charged than factually correct.For example, freedom fighter, terrorist, insurgent,rebel, traitor, and soldier are all terms variouslyapplied to the same actors by different groups seekingto maximize their own political and moral justifica-tions. Governments define war in their own interests,and militaries are loath to admit strategies that entailcivilian casualties, torture, and human rights abuses.The most basic understanding of war is affected bydifferentialandbiasedreporting;forexample,casualtystatistics for World War Two vary by millions,depending on the nationality and viewpoint of theresearcher. Controlling the definitions of war areintegral to the waging of war (Sluka 1992).Theethnographicstudyofwarandpeacehasaddeda new dimension in the understanding of politicalviolence. This academic research has demonstratedthat war is a far more complex reality than classicaldefinitions positing a violent contest between two ormore armed forces seeking a military, and thuspolitical, victory (Warren 1993, Nordstrom andRobben 1995). Soldiers often battle unarmed civiliansandnoteachother—evidentfromtheethnic cleansingof the Yugoslav forces in Bosnia and Kosovo or thetwomilliondeathsinSudan’scivilwar.Paramilitaries,private militias, death squads, and roving bands of armedpredatorygangspatrolwarzones.Someoperateat the behest of state forces while others are in-dependentofallsovereignorrebelcontrol.Mercenaryforces are a global phenomenon today, and rangefrom informal groups such as the Yugoslav mercen-ariesfightinginCentralAfricatotheformalExecutiveOutcomeorganization,comprisedofformerapartheidSouth African soldiers, who broker with governmentsas well as rebel groups. Battlezones are also home tolooters, sex workers, criminals, and profiteers. War-zones are a bazaar of international arms and suppliesmerchants who reap billions of dollars yearly world-wide. International nongovernmental organizationsare found in all warzones today, providing servicesranging from conflict resolution to humanitarian anddevelopment aid. Finally, the fronts of wars are hometo the inhabitants. Regardless of formal militaryregulations mandating the legal role of women, chil-dren, and the aged in war, all of these people fight forsurvival when they find themselves on the frontlines.Armed or unarmed, women defend homes and towns,children are forced to take up arms and fight, and theaged battle forced sieges. The unscrupulous sell outtheirneighborsforafewcoins,andthealtruisticsetupmedical clinics, schools and trade routes to providecritical resources under bombardment.
2. The De
elopment of War
War is a fairly recent invention, in terms of theanthropological expanse of human existence. Hu-mans, as a species, have lived 90 percent of theirhistory without war. Social hierarchies and conceptsof ownership appear necessary for the advent of war.The earliest form of human organization was theband:fluidegalitarian groups ofnomads. The archeo-logical record indicates that while interpersonal viol-ence was known in bands—determined by punctureand crushing wounds from weapons—it was limited.It did not reach the level of formalized intergroupviolence among contending warriors.The first indications of organized warfare occur asownership of animals, goods, and property createdivisions within societies. With the historical devel-opment of tribal societies and protostates comes adifferentiation in power, and the emergence of organ-ized intergroup violence (Ferguson and Whitehead1992). These societies did not have standing armies16351
War: Anthropological Aspects
 
andmilitaryinstitutionsseparatefromgeneralsociety;warrior status tended to be open to all able-bodiedmen, and, less commonly, to women. The early yearsof tribal war were not necessarily a dangerously lethalactivity.For manytribal groups,preparations for warconstituted an elaborate ritual process. The rules of engagement were often well delineated: contendingfactions would meet in full battle regalia and hurlchallenges and possibly weapons. Casualties generallybroughtahalttotheaggressions.Here,itisthedisplayandenactmentofpower,andnotviolence,thatdefineswar. Among some communities—the archeologicalrecord suggests these were later developments—fighting was much more lethal, though the intent wasseldom, if ever, genocide. The goal was to forcesurrenderandextendcontroloverpeople,property,orterritory.Formalized military institutions and standing ar-mies develop with the rise of the ‘state’ as a form of political, economic, and socialorganization. The termstate here is used in its anthropological sense—originating some 8,000 years ago, and not in thepolitical science definition as developing in the mid1600s.(Thelatter,themodernstate,willbeconsideredin the next section.) Chiefdoms are replaced by royalfamiliesorgoverningbodies.Social,gender,andoftenethnic inequality is codifiedinlawsoflandownership,labor rights, and inheritance. Dispute resolution be-comes formalized into judicial systems, and the legit-imate use of force is restricted to state leaders andinstitutions. Contemporary warfare—fought amongcontenders for power, privilege, and gain—emerges.
3. The Changing Nature of War
Contemporarywarfareitselfhaschangeddramaticallyover time and circumstance, giving lie to any notionthat war is a ‘natural’ social phenomenon or a fixedproduct of overarching political organization (vanCreveld 1991). The era of the modern state provides agood illustration (Holsti 1996). In Europe, the end of the Thirty Years War (from 1618 to 1648) coincidedwiththebeginningofthemodernstate(markedbytheTreatyofWestphalia).TheThirtyYearsWardepopu-lated a large part of Central Europe. It was known forits sheer brutality: writers of the time speak of thewanton killing, torture, plunder, and destruction of anyone and anything who found themselves in thepath of the aggressors. The levels of violence areattributedtotheenduringimpactofreligiouswarsandthe Inquisition, to the transformations wrought byurbanization and early industrialization, and to theupheavals marking the shift from kingly rule to themodern state.Over the following two centuries the nihilismcharacterizingtheThirtyYearsWargavewaytowhathas been called the gentlemen’s war of the Enlight-enment period. Formal warfare during this era often,though certainly not always, followed strict rules of conduct and engagement: soldiers fought soldiers inhand to hand combat on battlegrounds apart fromhuman habitation. This was not a new era of war forhumankind: Buddhist and Hindu scriptures 2,000yearsBCEoutlinedsimilar‘gentlemen’swars’inAsia.While military texts tend to focus on these formalmilitaryengagementsbetweentwocontendingarmies,anotherformofwarfaredevelopedduringthis period:colonial repression of conquered peoples. In manyways these actions presaged the dirty war of contem-porary times—wars that brutally targeted unarmedpeople in attempts to instill political acquiescence.The colonial encounter gave rise to another distinctform of war: the guerrilla war, the mainstay of warsfor independence worldwide. Guerrilla warfare wasdeveloped by nonstate actors challenging financiallyand technologically superior state forces. Classicalguerrilla philosophy—institutionalized in the mid-twentieth century by military strategists such as MaoZedong,Che Guevara,and HoChi Minh—postulatesthatguerrilla forces,by definition,havethesupportof the broad population, and it is this that gives themindefatigable strength, crucial resources, and moralpolitical superiority. While in many cases this hasproven true, it is by no means always so. Guerrillagroups such as the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia,Renamo in Mozambique, and the Contras in Nic-araguademonstratedthatnonstateforcescanalsouserepressive tactics in an effort to control populations.
4. The Twentieth Century
The twentieth century was characterized by soph-isticated and far reaching developments in the in-ternational laws and institutions governing war andprotecting peace. Despite these, this period was thebloodiest in human history. Overall, wars in thetwentiethcentury werelongerinduration, more lethalin the cost to human lives, and more destructive tosocietal systems than in preceding times. Simplypointingoutthatthiserasawtheadventofworldwar,high-tech and nuclear war, and modern paramilitarywarfaredoesnotconveythechangesinthephilosophyand conduct of war that occurred during this time(Keane 1996). The most dramatic example concernstheethicsofwho mayand maynot betargeted in war.Over 80 percent of the casualties in World War Onewere soldiers. With the advances in modern tech-nologyand the idea that a country’s citizens were nowpartofthewareffort(giventheirroleinproducingthemeans of war), noncombatant casualties rise to 50percent of all war-related deaths in World War Two.This trend escalates rapidly in the last half of thetwentieth century: in the Vietnam war, more than 80percent of all casualties were noncombatants, and atthe start of the twenty-first century, civilians accountfor 90 percent of all war-related deaths worldwide.Not only has the line between combatant and non-combatant grown indistinct, the line between gender16352
War: Anthropological Aspects
of 00

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