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term, we should be prepared for the possibility thatwar, as we know it, may not define future conflict.Whileemployingviolence inthe pursuit of dominancemay continue to fuel war, violence may shift fromphysical killing to a different order of threat andinequality, and dominance might be reckoned alongsuchnonmilitary factors aseconomics, environmentalcontrol, social viability, or a set of factors as yetunrecognized. War has not always been a part of thehuman condition, and perhaps future changes insociopolitical organization and ethical systems willrender war altogether obsolete. Effective research intothe causes, solutions and future of war will honecombinations of theoretical inquiry with ethno-graphy—helpingtoerasearbitrarydistinctionsbetweentheory and data (Nordstrom 1997). The greatestadvances will be in rethinking the very meanings of violence and aggression, going beyond simple biolo-gical and rudimentary social explanations to explorethe complex interactions of violence and power,economics, survival, and identity both within andacross local, regional, and transnational populations.
See also
: Conflict and War, Archaeology of; FirstWorld War, The; Military and Politics; MilitaryGeography;MilitaryHistory;NationalSecurityStud-iesand WarPotentialofNations;Second World War,The;Tribe;War:CausesandPatterns;War,Sociologyof; Warfare in History
Bibliography
Castells M 1998
End of Millennium
. Blackwell, LondonEnloe C H 2000
Maneu
ers: the International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Li 
es
. University of California Press,Berkeley, CAFerguson R B, Whitehead N L (eds.) 1992
War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare
. School of American Research Press, Santa Fe, NMFoster M L, Rubinstein R A (eds.) 1986
Peace and War: Cross-Cultural Perspecti 
es
. Transaction Books, Oxford, UKGregor T (ed.) 1996
A Natural History of Peace
. VanderbiltUniversity Press, Nashville, TNHolstiK J1996
TheState,War,andtheStateofWar
.CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, UKKaldor M 1999
New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in aGlobal Era
. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CAKeane J 1996
Reflections on Violence
. Verso, LondonNordstrom C 1997
A Different Kind of War Story
. University of Pennsylvania Press, PhiladelphiaNordstrom C, Robben A C G M (eds.) 1995
Fieldwork UnderFire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Sur
i 
al 
. Uni-versity of California Press, Berkeley, CARupesinghe K, Rubio Correa M 1994
The Culture of Violence
.United Nations University Press, TokyoSimons A 1999 War: back to the future.
Annual Re
iews inAnthropology
28
: 73–108Sluka J 1992 The anthropology of conflict. In: Nordstrom C,Martin J (eds.)
The Paths to Domination, Resistanceand Terror
. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA,pp. 18–36vanCreveldM1991
The Transformation ofWar
.TheFreePress,New YorkWarren K B (ed.) 1993
The Violence Within: Cultural and Political Opposition in Di 
ided Nations
. Westview Press,Boulder, CO
C. R. Nordstrom
War: Causes and Patterns
War involves large-scale organized violence betweenstatesorotherpoliticalunits.Althoughtheconductof warhaschangedinimportantwaysoverthemillennia,war itself has been a recurrent phenomenon in in-ternational politics. It is one of the primary sources of change in international systems and an importantfactor in the evolution of the social and politicalorganization of societies. Theorizing about the causesof war goes back to Thucydides’
History of thePeloponnesian War
between Athens and Sparta, butscholars are far from agreement on what causes war.
1. Patterns of Warfare
The current international system represents the mostrecent stage in the evolution and globalization of thesystem that originated in Europe about five centuriesago. Warfare in this system has historically beendominated by the ‘great powers,’ though the fre-quency of wars between these leading states hassteadily declined, while their severity has increased.The period since 1945 has been characterized by boththe longest period of great power peace in the last half millennium and a dramatic shift in the concentrationof war from Europe to other regional subsystems andfrom international wars to internal wars, many of whichhavebeenintractableethnonationalorreligious‘identity wars.’ These recent trends have led some toargue that we have reached a turning point in thehistoryofwarfare.Somearguethatmajorwarbetweenadvanced industrial states has become obsolete, whileothers argue that traditional wars over power orideology will give way to a ‘clash of civilizations’defined in terms of religious or cultural identity(Huntington 1996). These arguments reflect differenttheoretical perspectives on the causes of war.
2. Theoretical Approaches
Carl von Clausewitz (1976) wrote in his influentialbook
On War
thatwarisa ‘continuationofpoliticsbyother means,’ suggesting that war is an instrument of policy for advancing state interests. This implies thatwar ultimately involves a
political 
decision by state16354
War: Anthropological Aspects
 
political leaders, so to understand war one mustunderstand why political leaders choose war ratherthanotherstrategiestoachievetheirends.Technically,we must understand the
joint
decisions by rival states,becauseonesidecanusuallyavoidwarifitiswillingtomake enough concessions.
2.1 The
‘
Le
els of Analysis
’
Framework
Scholars previously emphasized monocausal explana-tions that identified a single primary cause of war,but political scientists have moved away from suchexplanations. Although they prefer parsimonious ex-planations that explain as much as possible with aslittle theoretical apparatus as possible, they generallyrecognize that there are many possible causes of warandthatthereisnosinglefactorthatiseithernecessaryorsufficientforwar.Oneanalyticframeworkthattheyhave found useful for categorizing the many possiblecausesofwarisbasedonpatternsofcausationlocatedat different ‘levels of analysis’: international system,nation-state, and individual. The first focuses onthreats and opportunities to states that originate intheir external environment and that affect the‘national interests’ of the state as a whole. The secondemphasizes the internal sources of foreign policydecision making that derive from either governmentalstructures or processes or from societal influencesoutside of the government. The third emphasizes thedistinctive role of key individual decision makers inthe processes leading to war.
2.2 Systemic
-
le
el Theories of War
Systemic-level causes of war include the anarchicstructure of the international system (defined as theabsence of a legitimate authority to regulate disputesand enforce agreements), the distribution of militaryand economic power among the leading states in thesystem,patternsofmilitaryalliancesandinternationaltrade, and other variables deriving from the externalenvironment of states. The leading systemic-levelapproach is‘realist theory,’ which begins with theassumptionoftheprimaryroleofsovereignstateswhoact rationally to advance their security, power, andwealth in an anarchic international system. Givenuncertainties regarding the current and future inten-tionsoftheadversary,politicalleadersfocusonshort-termsecurityneeds,adoptworst-casethinking,engagein a struggle for power, and utilize coercive threats toadvance their interests, influence the adversary, andmaintain their reputations.At a very general level, realist theory posits twodistinct paths to war. In one, the direct conflict of interestsbetweenstatesleadsatleastonesidetopreferwar to any feasible compromise. In the second, statesprefer peace to war but are driven by the structure of the situation and by uncertainty regarding the inten-tions of others to take actions to protect themselvesthrough armaments, alliances, and deterrent threats.These actions are often perceived as threatening byothers (the ‘security dilemma’) and often lead tocounteractions and conflict spirals which sometimesescalate to war.The leading realist theory is balance of powertheory. Although there are several versions of balanceof power theory, most posit that the primary goal of statesistoavoidhegemony,topreventanysinglestatefrom achieving a position from which it can dominateover others. This leads to the instrumental goal of maintaining a balance of power through the internalmobilization of military power, external alliancesagainst potential aggressors, or the use of force if necessary. The theory predicts that this balancingmechanism almost always works successfully to avoidhegemony, either because potential hegemons aredeterred by their anticipation of a military coalitionagainst them or because they are defeated in war afterdeterrence fails.Another theory that gives primary emphasis to thesystemic-level sources of war, but that is associatedwith a liberal perspective that downplays the con-flictual consequences of anarchy, emphasizes thepotential for cooperation among states, and includessome domestic factors as well, is the liberal economictheoryofwar.Thecoreofthetheory,whichoriginateswith Immanuel Kant’s
Eternal Peace
(1795
\
1977), isthat trade promotes peace. Trade leads to economicbenefits, but the economic interdependence generatedby trade leaves states vulnerable to any disruptionthrough war, and the fear of economic disruption andthe loss of the gains from trade deter political leadersfrom taking actions that are likely to lead to war.Realists challenge this view and argue that becausetrade and interdependence are usually asymmetricalthey often contribute to conflict rather than deter it,either because states may be tempted to exploit theirtrading partner’s vulnerabilities or because domesticgroups vulnerable to external economic developmentsdemand protectionist measures, which can lead toretaliatory actions, conflict spirals, and war.
2.3 National 
-
le
el Theories of War
Systemic-level theories, with their emphasis on theexternalforcesthatshapestatedecisionsforwar,positthatstatesinsimilarsituationsbehaveinsimilarways.The implication is that factors internal to states havelittle impact on foreign policy decisions. There issubstantial evidence, however, that decisions for warareofteninfluencedbyinternalpoliticalandeconomicstructures, political cultures and ideologies, and dom-estic political processes, and over the last decadeinternationalrelationstheoristshavebeengivingmoreattention to domestic factors.Regime type is particularly important, based onevidencethatdemocraticregimesbehavedifferentlyin16355
War: Causes and Patterns
 
important respects than do authoritarian regimes.Although democracies get involved in wars as fre-quently as do authoritarian states, frequently fightimperial wars, and once involved in war often adopt acrusadingspiritandfightparticularlydestructivewars,it is striking that democracies rarely if ever go to warwith each other. This ‘interdemocratic peace’ is basedon standard definitions of democracy (fair, competi-tive elections and constitutional transfers of executivepower) and war (which is often distinguished fromlesserconflictsbythethresholdofaminimumof1,000battle-related deaths).There are several interrelated explanations forinterdemocratic peace. To be valid these explanationsmust account not only for the near absence of warbetween democracies but also for the fact thatdemocraciesgetinvolvedinwarsjustaboutasmuchasother states do. One model emphasizes the insti-tutional constraints on democratic leaders—checksand balances, the dispersion of power, and the needfor public debate—that enable governmental or so-cietal groups to block attempts by political leaders totakethecountryintowar.Relatedtothis ‘institutionalmodel’ is the ‘political culture model,’ which suggeststhatthenormsofpeacefulconflictresolutionthathaveevolved within democratic societies are extended torelations between democratic states, and that thesenorms facilitate negotiated settlements.Authoritarian leaders face fewer institutional orcultural constraints, and they often attempt to exploitthe conciliatory tendencies of democracies. Thisundermines democratic political leaders’ expectationsthat their conciliatory negotiating strategies will bereciprocated, reduces the internal constraints on theiruse of force, and provides incentives for democraticregimestoresorttoforceagainstauthoritarianregimesboth to protect themselves and sometimes to facilitatedemocratic transitions.The institutional model of interdemocratic peaceassumes thatpoliticalleaders aremore inclined towarthan are their peoples, but this assumption does notalways hold. Jingoistic public opinion, often exacer-bated by the media, can force political leaders intowars that they would prefer to avoid or preclude themfrom making the concessions that might prevent war.There is a strong tendency for the use of force againstexternal adversaries to generate a temporary boost indomestic support for political leaders in the form of a‘rallyroundtheflag’effect.Politicalleadersanticipatethis, and are sometimes tempted to undertake riskyforeign ventures in an attempt to distract attentionfrom domestic problems or to blame other states orgroups for those problems. Many contemporaryethnic wars result in part from political leadersmanipulating images of ethnic rivals and mobilizingtheir domestic publics against those rivals in order toserve their own narrow political interests. Externalscapegoating can backfire, however, if it results in amilitary defeat.
2.4 Indi 
idual 
-
le
el Theories of War
Whereas systemic and national-level theoriesemphasize the role of international and domesticforces that lead to war and suggest that individ-ual political leaders have little impact, other theoriesgive significant causal weight to individuals, theirbeliefs about the world and specific adversaries, thepsychological processes through which they acquireinformation and make decisions, and their person-alities and emotional states. Some theories emphasizecognitive limitations and affective variables that im-pactmostpeopleinsimilarwaysandresultinstandardpatterns of deviations from ideal-type models of rational decision making. Other theories emphasizethe variations among political leaders in the way theydefine state interests, perceive threats to those inter-ests, assess the intentions of adversaries, evaluate themerits of alternative strategies to achieve those inter-ests,usethelessonsofhistorytoshapecurrentpolicies,and respond to the pressures and uncertainties of foreign policy crises. Misperceptions of the intentionsand capabilities of adversaries and third states can bea particularly important cause of war.
3. Conclusion
Althoughthelevels-of-analysisframeworkinitiallyledscholars to focus on the question of which level of analysis was most important in the causes of war, andthus to emphasize single-level explanations, attentionhas recently shifted to the question of how variablesat different levels interact in the processes leading towar.
See also
: Alliances: Political; Balance of Power:Political; Cold War, The; Conflict and War, Arch-aeology of; Conflict Sociology; Deterrence; ForeignPolicy Analysis; Imperialism: Political Aspects; Inter-nal Warfare: Civil War, Insurgency, and RegionalConflict; Military and Politics; Military Geography;Military History; Military Sociology; National Secur-ity Studies and War Potential of Nations; Peace;Peace Movements; Realism
\
Neorealism; War: Anth-ropological Aspects; War Crimes Tribunals; War,Sociology of; Warfare in History
Bibliography
Clausewitz C von 1976
On War
Howard M and Paret P.Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJHuntingtonS P1996
TheClashofCi 
ilizationsandtheRemakingof World Order
. Simon and Schuster, New YorkJervis R 1976
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJKant I 1977 Eternal peace. In: Friedrich C (ed.)
The Philosophyof Kant
. Modern Library, New York, pp. 430–76
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