In re Les Halles De Paris J.V.
, 334 F.3d 1371, 1373, 67 USPQ2d 1539, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
In reCal. Innovations Inc.
, 329 F.3d 1334, 1341, 66 USPQ2d 1853, 1859 (Fed. Cir. 2003); TMEP§1210.01(b)-(c). In the present case, the applicant seeks to register the mark “PINAR DEL RIO 1941”for cigars. The dominant portion of the mark is the term “PINAR DEL RIO.” The term comprises themajority of the wording of the mark and prominently displayed over the smaller and informational date“1941.” Therefore, the portion of the mark which creates the primary significance of the mark is theterm “PINAR DEL RIO.” Pinar Del Rio refers to a province and a city in Cuba. The city is located in amajor tobacco-growing area and is a center of the cigar industry. See attachment.The province relies on tobacco farming, with Pinar del Río producing 70% of Cuba'scrop, used to make the cigars that are prized overseas. The best tobacco, used for moreexpensive cigar brands, is grown in the flat lands of San Juan y Martinez.The applicant is located in Cost Rica, and the applicant’s specimen of use indicates that the applicant’scigars are made in Costa Rica. Given the world-wide fame of Cuban cigars in general and cigars fromPinar Del Rio in particular, consumers are likely to come to the mistaken belief that the applicant’sgoods come from Pinar Del Rio, Cuba. Furthermore, The misrepresentation regarding the geographicorigin of the cigars will be material to the purchaser’s decision to buy the goods. The examiningattorney has attached evidence which states the following.Cuban cigars are regarded as one of life’s most indulgent luxuries. Each year theirproduction falls far short of the worldwide demand for these premium vitolas. They arehighly sought after by both the aficionado and the novice, and as a result, they routinelycost in excess of $20 US dollars for a single double corona.Evidence of goods-place association need only show a reasonable basis for concluding that the public islikely to believe the mark identifies the place from which the goods originate.
In re Cal. Innovations Inc.
, 329 F.3d 1334, 1338, 66 USPQ2d 1853, 1855 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting
In re Loew’s Theatres, Inc.
, 769 F.2d 764, 768, 226 USPQ 865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Thus, to make a goods-place association,case law permits an inference that the consumer associates the product with the geographic locationbecause that place is known for producing the product.
Seeid.
However, the goods-place associationmust also be material to a consumer’s purchasing decision in geographically deceptive andgeographically deceptively misdescriptive refusals.
In re Cal. Innovations
, 329 F.3d at 1340-41, 66USPQ2d at 1857-58; TMEP §1210.05(b).Materiality is shown when one of the following is satisfied by the evidence of record: (1) the goods inquestion are a principal product of the place named in the mark, (2) the place is noted for or renownedfor such goods, or (3) the goods are, or are related to, the traditional products of the place named in themark.
SeeIn re Cal. Innovations
, 329 F.3d at 1341, 66 USPQ2d at 1857;
In re Save Venice N.Y., Inc.
,259 F.3d. 1346, 1352, 59 USPQ2d 1778, 1782 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
In re Wada
, 194 F.3d 1297, 1300, 52USPQ2d 1539, 1540-41 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
In re Loew’s Theatres
, 769 F.2d at 768, 226 USPQ at 868;
Inre House of Windsor, Inc.
, 221 USPQ 53, 56-57 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §1210.05(b)(i).The fact that the mark contains the date “1941” does not obviate the refusal. Geographically deceptiveand primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive matter need not be the entire mark, or even thedominant portion of the mark.
See
15 U.S.C. §1052(a), (e)(3); TMEP §1210.06(b). A refusal under
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