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Mining Copper Gengyi
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Mining Copper
Mining Copper Production, Sharing ,Contract
Mining Copper
997 Million, USD
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Asian Legal Resource Centre, in a submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council
in June warned that Burma is in danger of a land grabbing epidemic (ALRC-CWS-20-032012). And in 2011 the AHRC issued an appeal on a similar case in which a group of farmers
were themselves prosecuted after a company-backed gang assaulted them (AHRC-UAC-0732011). In the current case, the army company and its partner entered the area, as in other
cases, insisting that they had authority to occupy the land as the copper mine is a "state
project"; that is, a project to which no dissent or disobedience is permitted. They then
negotiated with the affected farmers, offering them compensation for land and to resettle
them. However, the farmers soon found that these promises were hollow, the methods of the
companies not those of negotiators but of fraudsters: the amount of compensation given a tiny
fraction of the value of the land, it also not taking into account the value of dwellings,
monasteries, schools and other immovable property; the amount of land offered at a
resettlement site also too small to rear animals or cultivate gardens. The company also offered
resettled persons one job per household, but when farmers moved, they found that this offer
was for women only, and was merely to do some menial cleaning for an amount of about
USD3 per month, which is pocket money.
Not only do the farmers' recent experiences inform them that the promises made by officials
and their collaborators are not to be trusted, but also historical memory too warns them
against promises made, later not kept. In 1978, during the period of rule by the former dictator
General Ne Win, the government set up a copper mining operation in the area, then too
ejecting four villages of their occupants and confiscating over 2100 acres of land. The project
failed, but the government did not return the confiscated land to those farmers who had lost it
and who would otherwise have continued to cultivate it, for their own benefit and that of
society. In 1993, another copper mining project set up nearby villages in the area polluted the
area with effluent and other by-products that made the land untenable for crops. And in 2003,
the water supply of a number of villages was polluted similarly by a mining project.
The problem for the farmers then, as now, was a problem of enforceability. When officials
and companies make promises that they do not keep--to compensate, to relocate, to employ-what option do they have but to stay silent, or to protest? No middle path exists along which
farmers can be reasonably expected to go in order to obtain redress, to get what is owed to
them. No independent judiciary or credible administrative system exists through which they
might make a claim and expect it to be heard with fairness: that is, with a measure of certainty
that the process of deliberation, if not the outcome, will contain minimal guarantees. And in
this problem of enforceability we encounter a larger problem for all people in Burma in the
current period, a problem of profound importance for everyone interested in the country's
current political and social circumstances. When there is no authority that can adjudicate
fairly between the interests of an army owned company and those of some farmers, how can
we say that the place is becoming less authoritarian, more democratic? What does it mean that
those holding positions of authority and influence can win the day against those without,
regardless of what rules in fact exist? What does it mean that a commitment once made
cannot be enforced? Can a system operating under such conditions be described as no longer
authoritarian? Or is it rather a case of one type of authoritarianism in transition to another?
These questions go to some of the larger problems associated with the Letpadan land grab that
make it important to people all around Burma, since they are problems with which millions of
people in the country are, in one way or another, concerned. The government of Burma
should therefore send a clear signal that enforceability is not, after all, a figment, and that the
commitments made to farmers matter a great deal. It should do that much in this case by
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conceding to the farmers' demands. To this end, the Asian Human Rights Commission iterates
and endorses those demands, each of which constitutes an insistence on the right to
enforceability of rights, as follows:
1. Not to seize agricultural land against cultivators' will.
2. To solve the grievances of the farmers fairly.
3. Not to continue with constructions on the agricultural land without farmers' approval.
4. Not to use agricultural land as a dumping ground for industrial waste.
5. Not to demolish any more villages.
6. To take steps to prevent copper mining projects from polluting the environment.
7. To return all religious premises.
8. To halt the copper mining project in Sarlingyi, subject to further wide-ranging
consultations.
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