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Equilibriumpricewithinstitutionalinvestorsandwithnaive  traders  
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DominiqueDupont DivisionofMonetaryAairBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSysteApril1998 
 
MailStop69,FederalReserveBoard,Washington,DC20551;phone:(202)452{6483;fax:(202) 452{2301;e-mail
m1dyd99@frb.gov 
.IthankVincentReinhartandtheparticipantsoftheR&Slunch-timworkshopforhelpfuldiscussions.Theviewsexpressedhereinaretheauthor'sanddonotnecessarilyreecthoseoftheBoardofGovernorsortheFederalReserveSystem
JELClassication:G14,FinancialEconomics,InformationandMarketEcienc
 
Abstract 
Thispaperusesanequilibriummodeltostudyhowinstitutionalinvestorsinuencethevolatilitandtheinformativenessofassetprices.ThegrowthintheproportionofU.S.equitiesownedby institutionsinthepasttwodecades,theirresultingdominantpositioninnancialmarkets,and empiricalevidencethatinstitutionalownershipmayincreasevolatilitywarrantstudyingthisissufromatheoreticalstandpoint.Inthispaper,institutionalinvestorsareassumedtobe\rationalinformedtraderswhileindividualinvestorsaresupposedtobe\naive"informedtraders,insofar astheformerusetheequilibriumpricetoextractinformationwhilethelatterdonot.Using aframeworkwithacompetitivemarket,multipleinformedtradersandoneliquiditytrader,the papercomparestheinformativenessandthevolatilityoftheequilibriumpriceinaneconomywhertheinformedtradersarenaiveandinonewheretheyarerational.Themodelalsostudieshowthe informativenessandthevolatilityofthepricereacttochangesinparameterssuchasthequalityof theinformationoftheinformedtraders,theiraversiontorisk,thevarianceofthetrueassetpriceetc.Thepapernallyinvestigateshowanincreaseinthenumberofinformedtraders,whethetheyarerationalornaive,aectsthepricevariance,andassessestheimpactoftransactioncostonthevarianceofthepriceanditsinformativeness
 
Introductio
Doinstitutionalinvestors,presumablysophisticatedones,makeassetpriceslessvolatileandmorinformativeorthereverse?Thegrowingroleofinstitutionalinvestorsinthepastdecadewarrantmoreeortstoanswerthisquestion.TherelationshipbetweeninstitutionalownershipandvolatilithasbeeninvestigatedempiricallybySias(1996)andbroadimplicationsofownershippatternson nancialmarketshasbeendiscussedinFriedman(1996).Theobjectiveofthispaperistoanalyztheeectofinstitutionalinvestorsonthemarketpricebyusingatheoreticalframeworkand assumingthoseinvestorsaremoresophisticatedthanindividualinvestors,insofarastheformeruse theequilibriumpricetoextractinformationwhilethelatterdonotUsingthesecuritieslistedontheNewYorkStockExchangebetween1977and1991,andcontrollingforcapitalization,Sias(1996)ndsapositiverelationshipbetweenthefractionofshareshelbyinstitutionalinvestorsandthevolatilityofthestockreturn
andpresentsevidencethatthein- creaseintheshareofinstitutionalownershipprecedestheincreaseinvolatility,notthereverse.Sias alsopointstotheapparentinconsistencybetweenthisevidenceandmostoftheextantliteraturefromwhichhequotesthreeargumentsimplyinganegativerelationshipbetweenvolatilityandinstitutionalownership.First,fundmanagersmayshyawayfromriskierstocksforprudentialreasons (e.g.topreventlawsuits).Second,institutionalinvestors,beingabletoinvestmoreinresearchhavemoreandbetterinformationaboutthecompaniesintheirportfolio.Third,institutionalin- vestorsshouldbemorelikelytobehaverationally. 
Inthispaper,wearguethatitispreciselythe institutionalinvestors'abilitytorationallyusealltheavailableinformation|includingthemarket price|thatinducesahigherpricevolatility(andalowerpriceinformativeness)inthestocksthey dominate.Friedman(1996)discussesaseriesofimplicationsofthegrowingweightofinstitutional ownershipontheproperworkingsofthenancialmarkets.Henotesthattheincreasingconcentra- tionofdecision-makingcouldrenderthemarketpricemoresensitivetoeachinvestor'sidiosyncratishocks,whichwouldtranslateintoincreasedvolatility.MymodelinvestigateswhetheranincreasinthenumberofinstitutionalinvestorsosetsthiseectTherelationshipbetweeninstitutionalownershipandthevolatilityandtheinformativenessof 
Withoutcontrollingforcapitalization,institutionalinvestors'ownershipandstockreturnvolatilityarenegativelcorrelatedbecauseinstitutionalinvestorstendtoholdstockswithlargecapitalizationandthelattertendtobelesvolatile. 
Siasalsocitessomeargumentsthatcouldleadtotheoppositeconclusion,liketheasymmetryinincentivesfor thefundmanager
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