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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
LEE COUNTY, ILLINOIS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaintiff,
Vs.
No.
2 CF 167
RITA A. CRUNDWELL,
Defendant.
MOTION TO DISMISS
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Now comes Defendant, by her attorney, Robert J. Thompson, Lee County PublicDefender, and moves the Court to Dismiss all counts of the Indictment filed herein and, in
support of which, states,
1.
The Defendant is charged with 60 counts of Class X Theft of governmental property inexcess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) on numerous specific occasionsbetween January 19, 2010 and April 16, 2012, inclusive.
2.
Pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/114-1(a)(2),
(a) Upon the written motion of the defendant made prior to trial before or after a pleahas been entered the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint
upon any of the following grounds:
(2)
he prosecution of the offense is barred by Sections 3-3 through 3-8 of the
Criminal Code of 1961, as heretofore and hereafter amended.
3.
Section 3-4 of the Criminal Code states,
(a) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for the same
offense, based upon the same facts, if that former prosecution:
(1)
esulted in either a conviction or an acquittal or in a determinationthat the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction;
 
(c) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted in a DistrictCourt of the United States or in a sister state for an offense that is within the
concurrent jurisdiction of this State, if that former prosecution:
(1)
esulted in either a conviction or an acquittal, and the subsequentprosecution is for the same conduct, unless each prosecution requiresproof of a fact not required in the other prosecution, or the offense was not
consummated when the former trial began.
The Defendant contends that Illinois' collateral estoppel statute applies in the instant matter,
specifically sections 3-4 (a) (1) and (c) (1), and that pursuant to this statute further prosecutionmust be barred.
4.
The Defendant has entered into a Plea Agreement in the Northern District of IllinoisUnited States District Court, Case Number 12 CR 50027, in which Defendant was sentenced to
235 months in Federal prison on a conviction of Wire Fraud. This sentence was ordered on
February 14, 2013. That Plea Agreement, which was entered November 14, 2012, states that theDefendant "from at least as early as December 18, 1990, and continuing to April 17,
2012...knowingly devised and intended to devise a scheme to defraud and obtain more than$53,000,000 from the City of Dixon, Illinois..."5.
The Plea Agreement and conviction in Federal court includes all acts and dates that are
contained within the State's Bill of Indictment in the instant matter. The State's indictment
charges Class X Theft of governmental property in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars($100,000.00) on numerous specific occasions between January 19, 2010 and April 16, 2012.The Federal matter covers these dates and more in charging Defendant with defrauding the Cityof Dixon from at least as early as December 18, 1990, and continuing to April 17, 2012.
 
In the course of entering the Federal plea agreement on November 14, 2012, theHonorable Philip G. Reinhard, U.S. District Judge presiding over the Federal indictment, did
inquire,
"Is any of the stipulated conduct or relevant conduct a part of the allegations in the stateproceeding?"The Federal prosecutor replied,"I believe that all the counts of theft that are alleged against her in Lee County are thesame conduct that is alleged to have occurred throughout the scheme of fraud in this
case."
The Court continued,"But that conduct you're going to ask that I consider ultimately if she pleads guilty in the
sentencing in this case. Is that correct or not?"
The prosecutor,
"It's all...the scheme to defraud encompasses all the money she took. They've allegedthat she took a porition of that money, so ultimately, I guess, yes." (Portion of
November 14, 2012 transcript attached as Exhibit A).
6. Section 3-4 of the Illinois Criminal Code prohibits any prosecution by the State's
Attorney if facts necessary to convict have been conclusively determined by a prior prosecution.The Defendant has been indicted in Federal court for all acts contained in the State's indictment.The Defendant has pleaded guilty to those acts and the Defendant has been sentenced for thoseacts in Federal court. Furthermore, the Federal prosecutor and the judge presiding over theFederal indictment have commented on record that the acts alleged in the Federal case are oneand the same with the acts alleged in the state case.
his is collateral estoppel. Collateral
estoppel is a requirement of due process, and it is a part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee
against double jeopardy. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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