Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273241
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Lucian A. Bebchuk
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AbstractThis paper critiques the proposed emergency legislation forspending $700 billion on purchasing financial firms’ troubled assets toaddress the 2008 financial crisis. It also puts forward a superioralternative for advancing the two goals of the proposed legislation –restoring stability to the financial markets and protecting taxpayers.I show that the proposed legislation can be redesigned to limitgreatly the cost to taxpayers while doing much better in terms of restoring stability to the financial markets. The proposed redesign isbased on four interrelated elements:
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No overpaying for troubled assets
: The Treasury’s authority topurchase troubled assets should be limited to doing so at fairmarket value.
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Addressing undercapitalization problems directly
: Because thepurchase of troubled assets at fair market value may leavefinancial firms severely under-capitalized, the Treasury’sauthority should be expanded to allow purchasing, again at fairmarket value, new securities issued by financial institutions inneed of additional capital.
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Market-based discipline
: to ensure that purchases are made atfair market value, the Treasury should conduct them throughmulti-buyer competitive processes with appropriate incentives.
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Inducing infusion of private capital
: to further expand thecapital available to the financial sector, and to reduce the use of public funds for this purpose, financial firms should berequired or induced to raise capital through right offerings totheir existing shareholders.Compared with the Treasury’s proposed legislation, the alternativeproposal put forward in this paper would provide a far better way touse taxpayers’ funds to address the financial crisis.Key words: Financial crisis, bailout, subprime mortgages, creditor run.JEL classification: E5, G1, G2, H3, H5, H6, K2, N2
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William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law,Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on CorporateGovernance, Harvard Law School; Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research.For helpful comments and discussions, I would like to thank Jesse Friedand Holger Spamann. For financial support, I am grateful to the Harvard LawSchool Program on Corporate Governance, and the Harvard Law SchoolJohn M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business.
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