the memo of February 3, 2002 which he attached to his Hearing Statement makes no argument infavour of Common Article 3 rights for any detainees at Guantanamo. His memo confirms my account.As regards subsequent practise at Guantanamo, the facts are incontrovertible: no detainees (whether AlQaeda or Taleban) were given any rights under Common Article 3 between February 7
th
2002 and July2002 (following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hamdan v Rumsfeld
). More significantly, Mr Feithactively supported the approval of new techniques for Detainee 063. When I asked him about theinterrogation of Al Qahtani he replied: “I’m not sure that I ever even got briefed on any of this”, andthen added:“I was not asked about their interrogation techniques”. That is patently untrue, as Mr Haynes’ memo of 27
th
November 2002 makes clear. That states that Mr Haynes had “discussed this with… Doug Feith” and he believed that Mr Feith joined in his recommendation in favour of the use of newtechniques. Mr Feith has provided no material to the Committee to indicate that he did not support theuse of new techniques on Al Qahtani that so plainly violate the standards reflected in Common Article 3.The bottom line is that all the materials that are available undermine Mr Feith’s claims and confirm myaccount: as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy he did not support rights for any detainees atGuantanamo under Common Article 3. That conclusion flows inexorably from our conversation, fromcontemporaneous documents, and from what happened generally at Guantanamo and specifically inrelation to Detainee 063. That said, through the Committee I can assure Mr Feith that if there are anydocuments or other materials in his possession that support a different conclusion I hope he might sharethem with the Committee and thereby allow me and others to take them into account.Mr Feith’s letter restates the points he made during the hearing on 15
th
July. It is true that I did notrespond to them on the day, but that was only because I obtained access to his statement only veryshortly before the hearing began. After the hearing I prepared a note responding to each point, a copy of which is attached. I refute each of Mr Feith’s claims.Mr Feith raises a point as to the accuracy of my account of my conversation with General Myers. Iwould be pleased to provide the Committee a copy of the transcript and audio of that conversation, if requested. I confirm my account: in the conversation with General Myers it became clear that he waslabouring under a misapprehension as to what decision had been taken on Geneva:
General Myers
: But in this case, after all the arguments were done, the decision was, we don’tthink in the technical sense it applies, but we’re going to behave as if it does.
Sands
: You distinguish between Taleban, to whom it applied but in respect of whom theycouldn’t have rights because they hadn’t worn insignia, uniforms, etc., and Al Quaeda to whomit didn’t apply. And, as Doug [Feith] put it to me, he was responsible for that formulation. He’snot a man who’s shy of promoting his own …
General Myers
: I have to think about that for a minute because, this is a heck of a time, wewere certainly discussing both the Taleban and Al Qaeda in those days and, I thought we’d said,I’m fairly certain, we said for both groups that Taleban was different from Al Qaeda but in theend, for both groups, we would treat them as if it did apply, to include …
Sands
: As if it didn’t apply?
General Myers
: No, as it would apply, as it did apply.Finally, I reject Mr Feith’s assertion that I have failed to honour any agreement as to the terms of our conversation. It may be that with the passage of time he does not recall that in June 2007 we had anemail correspondence. On June 3
rd
I wrote to him to let him know that I would be in Washington DC, inthe following terms:“Might you be available to get to get together briefly? I can also then take you over material Iam using from our last conversation, which I found very helpful.”He responded later that day, as follows:
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