PERSONS Complete Digests Atty Kat Legarda PDF

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KATRINA LEGARDA | 1
NCC1-18 Revised Administrative Code (RAC) Secs. 18-24 [1987] NCC2 Pesigan v. Angeles 129 SCRA 174 Nature: Petition to review the order of the Caloocan City RTC Facts: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with Batangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates: 1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian, 2) permit to transfer/transport from the provincial commander; and 3) three certificates of inspections. In spite of the papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the towns police station commander while passing through Camarines Norte. Confiscation was based on EO No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of carabaos & carabeef from one province to another. Issue: WON EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982 Held: No. The said order isnt enforceable against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because its a penal regulation published more than 2 mos. later in the OG. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in A2 of the CC & 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word laws in article 2 includes circulars & regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations & make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential EOs having general applicability should be published in the OG. It provides that every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a violation of EO No. 626-A because its confiscation & forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation wasnt in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda & Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos. Judgment: Order of dismissal and confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos, reversed and set aside. Respondents to restore carabaos, with the requisite documents, to petitioners for their own disposal in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs. Important point: Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations & make the said penalties binding on the persons affected hereby. Justice & fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of the publication on the Gazette.
Taada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders. The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable. HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
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citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
Farinas vs. the Executive Secretary 417 SCRA 503 In Farias, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected officials) of the Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned from their respective offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on appointive officials continues to be operative they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy. The petitioners in Farias thus brought an equal protection challenge against Section 14, with the end in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions apply equally to both elected and appointive officials. We held, however, that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials. Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the Constitution, failed muster. We ruled: The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous. The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner: The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification. Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis--vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the
same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not
infringed.
MRCA v. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 344 National Electrification Administration vs. Gonzaga G.R. No. 158761 (December 4, 2007) Not in OG or newspaper of general circulation Electric Coop Election Code Of general interest because everyone consumes electricity Garcilliano vs. House of Representatives G.R. No. 170338 (December 23, 2008) The SC declared invalid for lack of compliance with the publication requirement the previous Senate inquiry in aid of legislation on the Hello Garci tapes. However, the Senate may now call for a new inquiry on the same following the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure in two major dailies last October 2008. The Court cited sec. 21, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which mandates the publication of the rules of procedure of either the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees before it may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. The SC reiterated its ruling in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations that the phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each NCC3 Kasilag vs. Rodriguez 69 PHIL 217 F: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio (EA). The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In clause V, the parties stipulated that EA was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 yrs, the debt w/ interest thereon, in w/c event the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of RA 496; in clause VIII the parties agreed that should EA fail to redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 yrs, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm. The Court said that the respondents cannot justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication requirement by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and that they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the ConstitutionThe constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate, it said. It added that the respondents invocation of the provisions of RA 8792, Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet was incorrect, stressing that the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents but such does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the CFIBataan, the contract of sale of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force. One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that EA was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements, bec. the such contract is a lien and as such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land bec. he knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale, and further, that the latter could not sell the land bec. it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act 2874. xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by w/c it is invalidated. The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in GF bec. he was
unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question is w/n GF may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of GF but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws bec. he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of GF. The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.
Elegado v. Court of Appeals 173 SCRA 285 Foreigners cannot be any less bound by our laws in our own country Elegado was a Filipino lawyer representing the foreign company shows ignorance of the law. Manzano vs. Sanchez A.M. No. MTJ-00-1339 (March 8, 2001) Facts: Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children. However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time, Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David, had, prior to the solemnization, issued an affidavit stating that they were both married; however due to incessant quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer communicated with them. They lived together as husband & wife for 7 years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez. Issue: NCC 4, cf. NCC 2252 2269 Revised Penal Code (RPC) 22 Family Code (FC) 256 WON Payao and Davids marriage is valid. Held/Ratio: No. Although the couple had lived together for seven years (as the affidavit shows and which the Judge relied on in crafting his decision), Article 34 of the FC also requires that there must be no legal impediment to marry each other. Also in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated. The judge ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage (regardless of the couple being separated) is a diriment impediment which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. And besides, free and voluntary cohabitation with another for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Frivaldo vs. Comelec G.R. No. 120295 (June 28, 1996)
Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governorelect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictators agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus Election Code. Issue: Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. Held: The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldos citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitors stance is assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of
candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibilityQualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon.
Gregorio vs. CA G.R. No. L-22802 (November 29, 1968) Retroactive effect of procedural law; General Rule: exception The retroactive effect of a procedural law is not violative of any right of a party who may feel that he is adversely affected. Aruego vs CA 254 SCRA 711 Facts: Jose M. Aruego, a married man, was alleged to have an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian in 1969 until his death in 1982. Out of this relationship came two daughters, respondents Antonia and Evelyn Aruego. Complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights Main basis: Continuous possession of status of illegitimate children through the following: o Regular support and educational expenses o Use of fathers surname o Payment of maternal bills o Taking to restaurants and dept. stores at times of family rejoicing
Attendance to school problems Calling and allowing to his office Introducing them as children to family friends. LC held that Antonia is illegitimate daughter while Evelyn is not Respondent invoked A285 of CC, while petitioners contend that FC is applicable because the case was decided after its effectivity
o o o
Issue: WON the FC (where action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate children prescribes upon death of parent) can be applied in the case Held: NO. The case was filed prior to the effectivity of FC. Its retroactive application will impair vested rights of respondent to have case decided under A285 of CC. Private respondent was a minor when it was filed, an exception provided in A285.
Cang vs CA 296 SCRA 128 A256 of the FC provides for its retroactivity insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or actual rights in accordance to the CC and other laws. FC August 3, 1988: A188; consent of adoption: (1) person to be adopted (if 10 ); (2) parents by nature Francisco vs CA 299 SCRA 188 Facts: Petitioner Teresita Francisco is the wife of respondent Eusebio Franciso. Eusebios children by the first marriage are also respondents in the case. The spouses have acquired a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, an apartment house, and an additional house and lot, which were all administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated by tuberculosis, heart disease, and cancer. Eusebios children by the first marriage succeeded in securing a general power of attorney from their father which authorized Conchita (one of the children) to administer the house and lot and the apartment. Petitioner filed a case for the annulment of the general power of attorney and to be declared administratix of the properties. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents, saying that petitioner failed to prove that the properties were acquired during the marriage. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: WON CA erred in ruling that the properties are not conjugal but capital Held: NO. The party who invokes A160 must prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during overture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal partnership. This presumption is rebuttable only with strong, clear, and convincing evidence. Petitioner, however, admitted that Eusebio brought the land into their marriage, and evidence showed that he inherited it from his parents. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively pursuant to A148 of CC. Essentially, property owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the marriage, is considered as his/her separate property. Acquisitions by lucrative title are properties acquired gratuitously by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it was acquired during the marriage, is it is Eusebios exclusive property by virtue of lucrative title. Also, the fact that the land was registered in the name of Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco, is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses covered to. It is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio. Finally, Eusebio was not suffering from serious illness to impair his fitness to administer his property.
NCC6 PEFTOK Integrated Services vs. NLRC G.R. No. 124841 (July 31, 1998) Quitclaims were prepared and readied by PEFTOK and employees were forced to sign the same for fear that they would not be given their salary on pay day, and worse, their services would be terminated if they did not sign the said quitclaims under controversy. NO VOLUNTARINESS Valderama vs. Macaide 470 SCRA 168
The contention of the petitioners that the respondents had waived their right of first refusal is not supported by evidence. (requirements of waiver) 1. 2. 3. He must actually have the right which he renounces. He must have the capacity to make the renunciation. The renunciation must be made in a clear and unequivocal manner. DM Consunji vs. CA G.R. No. 137873 (April 20, 2001) The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. NCC7 cf. 1987 Constitution, Art. XVIII Sec. 3 Mecano vs. COA G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1992) NO implied repeal. Two categories of implied repel: where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal. if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. Both are not applicable to the RAC and the Administrative Code of 1987. Solangon vs. Salazar G.R. No. 125944 (June 29, 2001) Rationale of CA: Upon the repeal of the Usury Law by Central Bank Circular No. 905 on 22 December 1982, there is no more interest ceiling or maximum rate of interest, and the rate will just depend on the mutual agreement of the parties. Interest at 6% per month, or 72% per annum is iniquitous or unconscionable, and hence, contrary to morals (contra bonos mores), if not against the law. It is more consonant with justice that the said interest rate be reduced equitably. An interest of 12% per annum is deemed fair and reasonable. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that the interest rate of 72% per annum is ordered reduced to 12 % per annum Thornton vs. Thornton (August 16, 2004) SC holds that the Family Code Act of 1997 did not empower the family courts to exclusively issue writs of habeas corpus and it did not revoke the capacity of SC and CA to issue writs of habeas corpus. In relation to the word exclusive, although it is assumed that the language of the laws should follow common understanding, the spirit of the law and intention of the lawmakers come first than legal technicalities. The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. NCC8 De Roy vs. CA 157 SCRA 757 Non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the OG There is no law requiring the the publication of SC decisions in the OG before they can be binding Duty of lawyer in active la practice to keep abreast of SC decisions particularly where issuances have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advanced reports of GRs and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals. Pesca vs. Pesca
G.R. No. 136921 (April 17, 2001) The interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law (legis interpretado legis vim obtinet) The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. citing the Canon Law NCC9 RPC5 NCC 10-12 cf. 1987 Constitution, Art. XII Sec. 5 Rules of Court Rule 129 (2), (3) Martinez v.Van Buskirk 18 Phil. 79 Acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a time has to have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable or imprudent and that, under the circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in unloading his wagon. Alonzo vs Padua 150 SCRA 379 The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977. NCC13 cf. Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 22 RAC Sec. 31 Armigos v. CA 179 SCRA 1 NCC13 (last paragraph) is similar, but not identical, to 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday, it shall be excluded. Namarco v. Tecson 29 SCRA 70 Years defined as 365 days, months are of 30 days not the natural or solar months unless they are designated by name. (Spanish Code) Change in legislation should be done by the congress re: NCC13 Go v. Dizon 214 SCRA 41 [Concurring Opinion, J. Regalado] 23 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines promulgated by this Court to implement BP129 clearly states: Perfection of Appeal in cases where appeal is taken, the perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party. Quiqui v. Boncaros 11 SCRA 416 Their Motion for Reconsideration, although dated August 16, 1979, was filed with the trial court on August 17, 1979 or one day beyond the 30-day reglementary period prescribed by Section 3 of Rule 41.

SEC. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37 NCC15 cf. FC26par.2 Barreto v. Gonzales 58 Phil 67 Matrimonial residence of the couple has always been the Philippines (both Filipinos), the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confere jurisdiction upon the court of the State to dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. Tenchavez v. Escao 15 SCRA 355 Nature: Direct appeal from decision of court of first instance Facts: Tenchavez and Escano entered into a secret marriage before Catholic chaplain, Lt Moises Lavares. After their marriage was revealed, they were separated as Tenchavez went back to Manila to work while Escano stayed in Cebu then Misamis In Misamis, Escano asked for petition to annul her marriage but this was dismissed because of her non-appearance at hearing. Afterwards, she went to the US without informing Tenchavez and secured a divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and mental in character in Nevada. Respondent then married again to Russell Moran, had children and became a US Citizen On July 30, 1955 Tenchavez filed the procedings for legal separation and damages against wife and parents in law ISSUE: WON divorce in Nevada was legal HELD: NO, divorce and 2nd marriage are not recognized as valid As stated in Art 15, since marriage was contracted by Filipinos in Philippines, only competent civil court can annul it, thus remaining valid Civil code does not admit absolute divorce and is not even part of the code, instead of divorce, legal separation is used, wherein marriage is still recognized. -
To recognize decree of divorce of foreign courts would be violation on public policy and article 17 of civil code Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts, or property and those which have for their object public order, policy, and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in foreign country. o Would also discriminate in favor of wealthy persons who can get divorced elsewhere. Would not make difference if Tenchavez was also in court of Nevada when divorce was filed since mere appearance cant confer jurisdiction on court which had none. Tenchavez now has grounds to divorce respondent since she had intercourse with someone other than her husband, entitling him to ask for legal separation under basis of adultery Result: Petitioner has grounds to file for legal separation, recover 25,000 by way of moral damages and fees
Board of Commissioners vs. de la Rama 197 SCRA 853 There being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there rises a presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law..Santiago (grandfather) was not pressed by the CID to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content with his testimony that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. NCC17
German vs. Donaldson 1 Phil 63 Held that a power of attorney executed in Germany, should be tested as to its formal validity by the laws of that country and not by the provisions of the CC. Government v Frank contract was entered into in Illinois by a minor in the Philippines but had the capacity in Illinois. NCC19-22 People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690 Moral and exemplary damages are awarded to the victims heirs despite acquittal of accused on grounds of reasonable doubt. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Doctrin (Urbano v IAC) a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. De Tavera vs. Philippine Tuberculosis Society 112 SCRA 243 The provisions of the NCC oh Human Relations are merely guides for human conduct in the absence of specific legal provisions and definite contractual stipulations. The Code of By-laws of the Society contains specific provisions governing the term of office of petitioner. LLorente vs. Sandiganbayan 202 SCRA 309 Carpio vs. Valmonte G.R. No. 151866 (September 9, 2004) To find the existence of a abuse of right, the following elements must be present: i. There is a legal right or duty; ii. Which is exercised in bad faith; iii. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs Reyes G R No 154259 (February 28, 2005) Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. NCC37-39 NCC4O-41 1987 Constitution, Art II Sec 12 P D 603 [Child and Youth Welfare Code], Art 5 FC 164 RPCArts.256259 Roe v Wade 41OUS 113, 93SCt 705, 35Led 2d147 3-6 months (trimesters); stages of birth is equal to a childs PERSONALITY In the US, a fetus is not a person, as compared to the Philippines
Geluz v. CA 2 SCRA 801 a. Dead child has no right b. Against the 1987 Constitution and PD603 c. Legal capacity e.g. inheritance d. LIFE at BIRTH: absolute precedent of rights
Quimiging v. Icao 34 SCRA 134 Nature: Appeal from order of the Zamboanga del Norte CFI. Reyes, J.B.L., J.: Facts: Icao, a married man, succeeded in having sex with Quimiguing several times by force and intimidation and without her consent (rape!); as a result Quimiguing became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao. Quimiguing claims support at Php 120.00/month, damages and attorneys fees. Icao moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action since complainant did not allege that the child had indeed been born; trial judge sustained defendants motion. Hence, this appeal. Issue: WON the case merits the protection of Art. 40 NCC and if so then does the child have the rights, through the mother, to claim support. Held: YES. Ratio: Plaintiff, through an amended complaint, avers that as a result of the intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl. The SC says that since, as provided in Article 40 NCC (the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to it, provided, it be born later with the conditions specified in following article), petitioner Quimiguings child, since time of conception, and as having fulfilled the requirement of having been born later, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee. Disposition: Orders of the lower court reversed and set aside and case remanded to lower court for further proceedings.
De Jesus v. Syquia 58 Phil 866 Facts: Antonia de Jesus went to court for the purpose of recovering damages from Cesar Syquia stemming from a breach of a promise to marry and to compel the defendant to recognize and support her two children. Cesar Syquia had an affair with Antonia de Jesus which resulted in de Jesus giving birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931. For a year or so, Syquia supported de Jesus and his child. He, however, lost interest in the relationship when De Jesus became pregnant with their second child. Syquia left and eventually married another woman. De Jesus now claims that Syquia broke his promise to marry her. NCC 42 Limjoco v Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante 80 Phil 776 Estate continues personality The state or the mass of property, rights and assts left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, become vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise. Under the present legal system, rights and obligations which survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. Dumlao v. Quality Plastics 70 SCRA 472 Service of summons on a dead person is void. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. Eugenio v. Velez
Issue: Whether de Jesus can claim damages for breach of promise to marry Held: The trial court did not grant damages to de Jesus for supposed breach of contract. Action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law. At any rate, such promise was not satisfactorily proven by De Jesus. During the course of their relationship, defendant never expressed anything to that effect.
185 SCRA 425 A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. Right to bury a dead person does not include a common law husband who is still married. Marcos v. Manglapus G.R. No. 88211 (October 27, 1989) Death of Mr. Marcos has not changed the factual scenario under which the Courts decision was rendered The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. NCC 43 ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3 (jj) - (kk)(1989 Rev. Rules on Evidence) Joaquin v. Navarro 93 Phil 257 Nature: Three proceedings instituted in CFI Manila were heard jointly and were given a single decision. This was appealed to the CA, whose decision modified the former. A subsequent appeal to the SC ensued. Facts: Feb. 6, 1946 While the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses of JN, Sr. and AJ (mother of petitioner), together with their three daughters P, C, and N, and their son JN, Jr. and the latters wife, AC, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of the city. Building was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, the Club was set on fire, and the Japanese were shooting those who tried to escape. Three daughters were shot and died. JN, Sr. and son decided to abandon the premises to seek safer haven. AJ remained. Upon attempting to escape, JN, Jr. was shot and died. Minutes later, the Club, already on fire, collapsed. JN, Sr. and daughter-in-law died three days later. Friend and former neighbor FL who escaped with JN, Sr. from the building, survived to narrate the story. The RTC claims that the mother, natural child of petitioner Joaquin, survived the son; the son dying first before the mother. CA claimed the reverse. If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of succession. If the mother died first, the respondent Antonio, son of JN, Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit. Decision was reviewed by the SC. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the discussion of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court having repealed Art. 43 of the CC or not is relevant to the case at bar. No. Neither of the two provisions is applicable. Both provisions, as their language implies, are intended as a substitute for facts, and so are not to be available when there are facts.1 (2) WON the mother died before the son or vice versa. No. The son died first. The facts are adequate to solve the problem of survivorship without the need for statutory presumptions. The presumption that AJ, the mother, died first is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. The opposite theory is deduced from established facts which, weighed with common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability.
1 Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court reads: When two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes according to the following rules Article 43 of the CC is of the following tenor: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or more persons who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges the prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.
NCC 44-47 Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 (Corp. Code), Secs. 2, 4, 17 NCC 1767-1768 Barlin v. Ramirez 7 Phil 41 Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Camarines. Willard, J.: Facts: Ramirez, having been appointed parish priest by the plaintiff Barlin, took possession of the Church in 1901 until a successor had been appointed in 1902. Defendant Ramirez refused to surrender the Church and Barlin filed a suit; the municipality of Lagonoy joined Ramirez as defendants, claiming possession and ownership of the Church and contesting Barlins authority and capacity to order that Ramirez be replaced and surrender the Church to the appointed successor. Issue: WON the Catholic Church is the rightful owner of the Church? Held: Yes. Ratio: The Roman Catholic Church is a juridical entity in the Philippine Islands, and under Article 46 of the Civil Code, Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. Disposition: Judgment of the Lower Court affirmed.
Camid vs. Office of the President G.R. No. 161414 (January 17, 2005) It has been opined that municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. Catalan vs. Basa G.R. No. 159567 (July 31, 2007) a. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property b. In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donors capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. NCC38-39 R.A. 6809 A.M. NO: 03-02-05-SC Rules on Guardianship Suffrage, Sec. 1 Art. V 1987 Constitution {cf. Sangguniang Kabataan] Marriage, FC 5; cf. R.A. 6809 NCC 1327 NCC 1390 (par. 1) NCC 1403 (par. 3) NCC 1397 NCC 1399 NCC 1489 NCC 1426 1427 Mercado v. Espiritu 37 Phil 215 Facts: The plaintiffs alleged that as the sole heirs, along with their two sisters, to a 48 hectare tract of land which belonged to their mother the sister of the defendant. The defendant cajoled, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sell their land for a sum of P400 as opposed to its original value. The plaintiffs demand the annulment of the sale, the return of the land, and the remuneration of the thing benefited by the defendant. According to the Defendant, the plaintiffs mother had sold a portion of the original land to the defendant for a sum. (instrument exhibit 1)The plaintiffs father subsequently, mortgaged the remaining parcel to the defendant for a sum to cover his childrens welfare after his wifes death. (Pacto de retro; instrument exhibit 2) The plaintiffs had alleged themselves of legal age and ratified the absolute and perpetual sale of the land in consideration of the P400 (instrument exhibit 3). Cross-complaint filed for damages due to
the malicious and unfounded complaint by the
plaintiffs.
Bambalan v. Maramba 51 Phil 417 Facts: -Petitioner Isidro Bambalan, a minor, owned a piece of land -Isidro was forced by his mother Paula Prado to sell the land to Genovena Muerong, since she was threatening Paula of imprisonment due to the load Genoveva gave Paula. -To have the document of the sale acknowledged, the respondent even purchased the cedula of the petitioner -Isidro didnt try to conceal his age; in fact the respondent was well aware that Isidro was a minor. -Decision in Mercado vs. Espiritu cannot be used since the petitioner didnt try to hide his age *The land in question wasnt even registered in the Register of Deeds; the sale of the land cannot be executed without registration as provided in section 50 of Act. 496 Issue: Was the sale of the land valid or void, since Isidro was a minor at the execution of the alleged sale? Held: The sale of the land is void. 1.) because Isidro is incapacitated to enter into such contracts, 2.) because the land wasnt even registered and hence, cannot be sold. Ratio: Art. 1390 NCC: The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties: (1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract... Art. 38 NCC: Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act (aptitude for the exercise of rights), and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. Art. 1397 NCC: The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract. (1302a)
Suan Chian v. Alcantara 85 Phil 669 Under the doctrine laid down by Mercado v Espiritu, herein followed, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by a valid consideration. The circumstance that about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed the appeallants of his minority, is of no moment, because appellees previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing the contract. Braganza v. Villa-Abrille 105 Phil 456 Facts: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have no paid, Abrille is sued them in March 1949. The Manila court of first instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to pay according to the contract they signed.The family petitioned to review the decision of the CA whereby they were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, praying for consideration of the minority of the Braganza sons when they signed the contract. Issue: Whether or not the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are to be bound by the contract of loan they have signed. Held: The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in the contract because they minority of her sons does not release her from liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest. However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which found them similarly liable due to their failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained previous sources in Jurisprudence in order to hold the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to his age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of deceit. The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount they have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written contract is unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they may have profited by the money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine money is equivalent to P1,166.67.
RPC 12(2)-(3) Republic Act No. 9344, Juvenile Justi~ and Welfare Law RPC13(2) PD 603 Sees. 189 204 Also see: Rule 3, Section 5 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure FC 45 (2) NCC 1327 (1), 1328 RPC 12(1) Rule 101, Rules of Court US v. Vaquilar 27 Phil 88 Facts: Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and his daughter, as well as injuring other persons with a bolo. Eyewitnesses testified that the defendant appeared to be insane prior to the commission of the crimes. They also testified that the appellant was complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing. The witnesses evidence for insanity include: appellants eyes were very big and red with his sight penetrating at the time he was killing his wife. he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not, he wouldnt have killed his family at the moment of cutting those people, he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut anybody at random sister said, then he pursued me.he must have been crazy because he cut me Issue: Whether or not these pieces of evidence are sufficient to declare the accused as insane, therefore exempt from criminal liability. Held: The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane. The appellants conduct was consistent with the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person with an unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of crazy is not synonymous with the legal terms insane. The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person (not saying a word in the cell, crying out loud at night) who has reflected and felt remorse after the commission of the crime. The court further held that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity which results not from any disease of the mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system where the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented after a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal state of mind.
People v. Rafanan 204 SCRA 65
Standard of Legal insanity by People v Formigones (2 distinguishable tests): i. Test of cognition complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act. ii. Test of violation that there be a total deprivation of the will The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. Standard Oil v. Arenas Facts: The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment, including the appellant Vicente Villanueva who acted as surety to the loan. The CFI of Manila ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs SOCNY. While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared and alleged that her husband was declared insane on July 24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was authorized by the court as guardian to institute the proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity. Issues: (1)Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that the person does not have capacity to act. (2) Whether or not the appellant, was incapable of entering into contract at the time the bond was executed on December 15, 1908. Held: The court affirmed the trial court decision that Villanueva possessed the capacity to act. The SC held that there is no evidence to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a person suffering from monomania of wealth is really insane and therefore is deranged and incapable of binding himself in a contract. From the testimony of his wife, it seemed that Vicente has the liberty to go wherever he wished, that he had property of his own and was not deprived of its management, as well as the fact that he had never squandered any large sum of money.

As for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof that showed that at the date of the giving of the bond, December 15, 1908, the appellant was incapable of acting because of insanity. The witnesses who as physicians, testified that they observed insane periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908, but NCC 1327 (2), 807 & 820 ROC Rule 92 Sec. 2 RPC 31,41 FC 150-15; cfFC 87 NCC 1490 NCC 2035 cf. NCC 963-967 cf. Art. IV, Sees. 1-5, 1987 Constitution NCC381396 NCC 1381, 1491, 2236 Villanueva vs CA GR No 114870 (May 26, 1995) PRODIGAL = gambler, away from home, slightly incompetent Husband and wife cannot sell or donate to each other Affinity by blood Always start from self Parents 1st degree Brothers/Sisters 2nd Cousins 4th Grandparents 2nd Aunts/Uncles 3rd Your brothers wife is not your relative! (by blood or affinity)
none at the time of the execution of the said bond on December 15, 1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought to legally deprive her husband management over his estate knowing full well that he was insane.
o o o o o o o
Art. II, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution; cf. NCC 403 See also: Rule 3 Section 4, 1997 Rules Of Civil Procedure NCC5O cf. FC 55, 101, 149, 152, 101
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300 Facts: March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor. March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos did not meet the residency requirement. March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the COMELECs head office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was the result of an honest misrepresentation and that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. April 24, 1995 COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that found Montejos petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos corrected certificate of candidacy void, and her original certificate cancelled. May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution drafted on April 24. May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos proclamation to the office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes. However, this was reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would be suspended even if she did win.

May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner of the said Congressional election. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus candidate, of the first district of Leyte. Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framers of the constitution)2. The confusion of the honest mistake made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in the residence where the candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections. This honest mistake should not be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only actual residences incurred during their marriage; and as such, she was required to change residences and apply for voters registration in these cited locations. When she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile of origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husbands right to transfer residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or intend to lose the wifes domicile of origin. After the death of her husband, her choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she wrote the PCGG chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and their farm in Olot, Leyte. (2) WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of the Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the House of Representatives. Yes. The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any event, Sections 6
2 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr. Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986. 3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections. (3) WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the question of the petitioners qualifications after the elections. No. The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Puno, J. (Concurring): All her life, Marcos domicile of origin was Tacloban. When she married the former dictator, her domicile became subject to change by law and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the CC. She has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte. Francisco, J. (Concurring): Residence for election purposes means domicile. Marcos has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte. Romero, J. (Separate): Womens rights as per choosing her domicile after husbands death is evident in this case. Marcos living in Leyte is sufficient to meet the legal residency requirement. Vitug, J. (Separate): It seems unsound to vote for someone who has already been declared disqualified. The Court refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunal on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. Voted for dismissal. Mendoza, J. (Concurring): The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. It has none and the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in an appropriate forum (not necessarily COMELEC, but the HRET). Padilla, J. (Dissenting): Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to. The controversy should not be blurred by academic disquisitions. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner disqualified. And the law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted.
Regalado, J. (Dissenting): A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets married. The death of her husband does not automatically allow her domicile to shift to its original. Such theory is not stated in any of the provisions of law.
Davide, Jr. J. (Dissenting): A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a government branch or agency has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The COMELECs resolutions are within the scope and jurisdiction of this particular agencys powers. In agreement with Regalado, re: womans domicile.
THE FAMILY CODE E.O, 29, as amended by E.O. 227, R.A. 8609, R.A. 7160 FC 255, cf. FC 36 in rd. to 39, FC 105, FC 162, FC 257 FC 253, 255 Lupo Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes 243 SCRA 32 Facts: Atienza, visiting his house in Makati wherein he has two children with De Castro, saw the respondent Judge Brillantes sleeping in his bed. The houseboy claimed that the judge had been cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza files charges on the judge on the ground that the respondent is already married and has five children. Judge denies the claim of being married stating that the alleged union wasnt valid because it lacked a marriage license. Although upon the request of the womans parents they held another marriage ceremony later that year, they still didnt apply for a marriage license. The woman abandoned the Judge nineteen years ago leaving their children to his care. He claims that Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was thus governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage on 1991, governed by the Family Code.
Issue: WON the judge can contract a second marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity. Held/Ratio: No. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the FC, said Article is given retroactive effect since it does not prejudice or impair any vested right. His failure to secure a marriage license on two possible occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith as a lawyer and judge. Dismissed from service.
Bernabe vs. Alejo 374 SCRA 180 The right of children to seek recognition granted by the NCC to illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the FC took effect cannot be impaired. NCC185 allows an illegitimate child to file for recognition within 4 years of attaining age of majority, thus gave child a vested right which the FC cannot impair. FC1 FC 1 cf. NCC 52, FC 149 Art II Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution Art. XV Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution FC 1 cf. Rule 131 Sec. 3, 1989 Rules on Evidence NCC 220 Muslim Code, (P.D. 1083) Sec. 14
Goitia vs Campos-Rueda 35 Phils 252 Facts: Jan 7, 1915 parties were legally married but after a month woman left because of gross acts by her husband Marriage a contract in so far as civil effects are concerned requiring consent of parties o After marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the 2 o Reciprocal rights arise and legal existence becomes one o Termination of it should result in some relief ISSUE: WON art 149 is absolute and therefore cant grant wife any support since she was the one who left home Person obliged to give support can either pay the pension fixed or receive and maintain in his home the person. HELD: NO Separation is different from support given to wife as agreed upon in the contract they entered into when they got married when husband promised to support wife. Wife is still part of conjugal domicile even if she doesnt live in house anymore
RESULT: should pay support Sermonia v. CA 233 SCRA 155 Prescription period for the filing of a Bigamy case starts at the discovery of the subsequent marriage. Constructive notice does not apply to bigamous marriages since the essence of such marriages is to conceal the first marriage and deceive the first spouse. Perido v. Perido 63 SCRA 97 A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the marriage did not take place. In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and a woman living together as husband and wife are presumed married. People v. Malabago G.R. No. 115686 (December 2, 1996) Parricide case, need to establish marital relationship in order to prosecute the crime of parricide. The best proof of marriage is a marriage certificate. To prove a marriage in the absence of a marriage certificate, oral evidence will suffice as long as it is not objected. Go vs. Court of Appeals 272 SCRA 752 A wife is solely liable for the damages caused by a contract she entered individually, since under FC 73 wives can work without the consent of husband. Trinidad vs CA G.R. No. 118904 (April 20, 1998) The absence of a marriage certificate does not mean that the marriage did not take place. Evidence of marriage: 1.) marriage certificate 2.) witness to ceremony 3.) public and open cohabitation baptismal certificates indicating the marital relationship De Jacob vs CA 312SCRA772 The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and subsequent loss. The fact of a marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage certificate. Due execution and loss of marriage certificate constitutes a condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents Silverio vs Republic (October 22, 2007) For marriage purposes (and everything else for that matter) a male is defined as the sex that bears spermatozoa, while the female is the sex that bears ova. A medical sex change does not change the these physical attributes. FC1 cf. NCC221 Panganiban v. Borromeo 58 Phil 367 A notarized contract that permits concubinage and adultery, barring the opposition of a spouse is not judicially recognizable. Although the consent of a party is a bar to the prosecution of the said crimes, the acts are still contrary to customs, good morals and against the sanctity of marriage which is constitutionally provided for.
In re Santiago 70 Phil 66 Facts: Respondent lawyer prepared for a married couple (who had bee separated for 9 years) a document wherein it was stipulated, inter alia, that they authorize each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing whatever right of action one might have against the other. When the husband inquired if there could be no trouble, respondent lawyer pointed to his diploma which was hanging on the wall and said, I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid. The husband remarried. Issue: Whether Santiago should be disbarred from the practice of law Held: The respondent was suspended from practice of law for one year for having been ignorant of the law or being careless for giving legal advice by trying to beak the marriage through a private contract. The document is contrary to law, good morals and public order. Marriage is an inviolable social institution that cannot be made inoperative by the stipulations of the parties.
Selanova v. Mendoza 64 SCRA 69 FACTS: The case stems from a document prepared and ratified by Judge Alejandro Mendoza which extrajudicially divided the assets of the Selanova couple, effectively authorized the spouses to commit marital infidelity and ratified their personal separation without the express and prior approval of the court. ISSUE: WON the private contract is valid. HELD: No. Even before the enactment of the New Civil Code, the law prohibits extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership without court approval. Mendoza, in his defense, claimed that he ratified the document on the pretext that Saturnino Selanova and his wife Avelina Ceniza would later seek the approval of the courts. The law requires, however, that prior approval of the court be sought by the parties seeking the dissolution of conjugal partnership during the marriage in order for it to have the effect and force of law. Clearly, Judge Martinez erred in ratifying this arrangement. The contract as it stands is not judicially recognizable and is therefore void.
Lichauco-de Leon v. CA 186 SCRA 345 The issue in this case is whether or not a letter pardoning one spouse is valid. In this case it wasnt since the consent of de Leon was vitiated as the girl threatened to file cases against the guy, scandalizing their entire family. NCC 19 - 21; NCC 2176; NCC 1403 2(c) MC22 Domalagan v. Bolifer 33 Phil 471 Facts:
In November 1909, Jorge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer entered into a conrtract by virtue of the terms of which Domalagan was to pay Bolifer P500 upon the marriage of his son Cipriano to Bolifers daughter, Bonifacia. In August 1910, Domalagan completed his obligation by paying Bolifer P500 plus P16 as token of future marriage. Bonifacia Boliger joined in lawful wedlock to Laureano Sisi in Agusut 1910 Upon learning the marriage, Domalagan demanded the return of P516 plus interest and damages (he was obliged to sell real property belonging to him in order to raise P500) CFI ruled in favor of Domalagan and concluded that he delivered to Bolifer the sum of P516 and that Carlos Bolifer received and did not return said amount Bolifer appealed to the SC
Issue: WON the verbal contract entered into in regard to the delivery of the money by reason of a prospective marriage valid and effective? Held: Yes. Par. 3 Sec 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Action does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of the said section, that parties will be unable to prove it. Said section simply provides the method by which the contracts mentioned therein may be proved. It does not declare that said contracts are invalid. A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If the parties to an action make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence
other than in writing, it will just be as binding upon the
parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
Cabague v. Auxilio 92 Phil 294 The verbal agreement to marry must be proven by the proper party: the person involved in the agreement (one of the people getting married) Hermosisima v. CA 109 Phil 629 Action for breach of promise to marry has no standing apart from right to recover money or property advanced upon faith of such promise. Damages can be claim if seduction was involved though, in this case the dude being 10 years younger than the girl, seduction could not have been present says the SC. Wassmer v. Velez 12 SCRA 648 FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a Marriage License on August 23, 1954. The wedding was to take place on September 4, 1954. As expected, all the necessary preparations were undertaken for the said event. However, two days before the wedding, Francisco Velez left a note for Beatriz informing her that the wedding will not push through because his mother opposed the union. The following day, he sent her another note stating that the wedding will push through as planned. Francisco Velez never showed up and has not been heard since then. Beatriz subsequently filed suit for damages. ISSUE: WON Beatriz Wassmer has a right to file for damages for breach of promise to marry?
HELD: Yes. Beatriz Wassmer can claim for damages. Under Art. 21 of the Civil Code, Beatriz can claim damages for the actions of Francisco Velez. While it is true that breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se, the court reasoned that what Velez committed could hardly be described as a simple breach of promise to marry. To leave the bride two days before the wedding, after making all the necessary preparations, with no justifiable reason, is morally reprehensible. His behavior is verily against societys concept of good morals and customs. Beatriz Wassmer can collect compensation for damages arising from Velez reckless, oppressive and malevolent actions.
Tanjanco v. CA 18 SCRA 994 FACTS: Araceli Santos filed suit against Apolonio Tanjanco for breach of promise to marry. Santos claims that she began living with Tanjanco in December 1957 and consented to having sexual relations with him only because of his protestations of love and promise of marriage. Santos sexual relations with Tanjanco lasted until December 1959 when Santos became pregnant. Consequently, Santos filed suit against Tanjanco for emotional distress, mental anguish and humiliation arising from Tanjancos breach of promise to marry her compounded by the embarrassment she suffered when she resigned from her job. Action was premised by the Court of Appeals on Art.21of the Civil Code. ISSUE: WON the acts of Tanjanco constitute a violation of Art. 21 specifically as it pertains to the crime of seduction.
HELD: No. The essential feature of Art. 21 is seduction based on the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission. In law seduction is more than sexual intercourse or breach of promise to marry. It carries with it the idea of deceit, enticement, or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. The facts as it stands shows that Santos, a woman of adult age, voluntarily carried on and maintained intimate sexual relations and mutual passion with the defendant. Plainly, such an arrangement is incompatible with the notion of seduction. Santos was not a victim of deceit. A relationship that has persisted for one year cannot be anchored on mere artful persuasion. Hence no case is made under Art. 21.
Baksh v, CA 219 SCRA 115
FACTS: Characters o (Private Respondent) Marilou Gonzales: Filipina, working iat Mabuhay Luncheonette in Dagupan City Pangasinan, 22 years old o (Petitioner) Gashem Shookat Baksh: Iranian, student of Medicine in thr Lyceum of Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. Gasham and Marilou met at the Mabuhay Luncheonette in Dagupan City where Marilou is working and Gasham frequently eats. Gasham courted Marilou and promised to marry her (end of semester October 1987). Gasham even went to Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to meet Marilous parents and family. Marilou lived with Gasham in the Lozano Apartments in Dagupan City. Respondent o Because of Gashams promise to marry Marilou, she consented to sexual congress. o After a week, Gasham started maltreating her, and she decided to leave. o During an intervention conducted by a representative of the Barangay Captain Gasham said that he was not going to marry Marilou anymore and that he was married to someone in Bacolod City already. o In his appeal: he is not familiar with Filipino customs, not accustomed to Christian or Catholic rites, common-law wife is now his legal wife, and the mere breach of promise to marry is not actionable. Petitioner o He never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married to Marilou and did not seek the consent and approval of her parents. o He did not maltreat her, and he asked her to stop going to his apartment because she was stealing money and passport. o No confrontation with a representative of the Barangay Captain took place. Trial Court favored Marilou, using Article 21 of the Civil Code as basis and ordered Gasham to pay damages to Marilou o Parties were lovers o Marilou was not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances o Gasham through deceit, machinations and false pretenses promised to marry Marilou. o Marilou because of Gashams promise to marry her agreed to have sex with Gasham o Because of the promise, Marilous parents made preparations for the wedding o Gasham did not fulfill his promise to marry Marilou
Gasham has abused Filipino hospitality, offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and tradition o Marilou would not have the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. Court of Appeals affirmed Trial Courts decision o Marilou not a woman of loose morals, a virgin, barrio lass not used and accustomed to modern urban life o Marilou would not have allowed herself to be deflowered by Gasham if not for the persuasive promise to marry her o Gasham not a man of good moral character: admitted having a common-law wife in Bacolod City o Acts of Gasham are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, derogatory and insulting of our women ISSUE: Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis if Article 21 of the Civil Code HELD/DECISION: Yes. If applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Petition denied! RATIO: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. It was deliberately eliminated in the New Civil Code because it is prone to abuse. Art. 21 was instead put in place that would put into place a legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. Quasi-delict (Spanish culpa aquiliana): limited to negligent acts that causes damage to another Torts (American): includes negligent acts and also intentional criminal acts, assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. Sec. 2176 of the Civil Code is limited to Quasidelicts Intentional and malicious acts with certain exemptions shall be governed by the Revised Penal Code, while negligent acts or omissions shall be covered by Art. 2176 of the Civil Code. Sec. 21, together with Sec. 19 and 20 broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs A mans promise to marry is the cause of the acceptance of love by a woman, and it is the reason why the woman consented to a sexual congress, and when there is proof that he had no intention of fulfilling the promise, and it was a mere deception to obtain her consent to the sexual act, can justify the award for damages under Sec. 21, not because of the breach of
promise but because of the intent and deceit involved, provided that such injury should have been committed in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. Gashams condescending remarks regarding Marilous ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty, and dishonorable
employment reiterates his intention to merely fool or deceit Marilou into sexual congress by proposing to her. Blatant disregard to Art. 19 which directs every person to act with justice, giver everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
FC 2-3; FC 5; FC 45 cf. NCC 53 RPC 350-351 De Mijares vs Villaluz 274 SCRA 1 Promise to marry case. Seduction is more than a promise to marry for sex, it involves deceit, enticement, abuse of confidence in order to get laid. Since the parties have been having sex regularly for 2 years, seduction cannot apply since the regularity of the act shows voluntariness and mutual passion. Thus girl cannot recover for damages. Mallion vs Alcantara 506 SCRA 336 Sought annulment on the grounds of psych incapacity, the case was dismissed. Filed again for annulment on the grounds of lack of marriage license. The court said that since both cases involved the same issue and the same remedy its Res Judicata. (note: maam says this decision is wrong, Morigo is correct with respect to this issue). FC2(1) cf. FC 148 Silverio vs Republic (supra) FC 5; FC 35 (1); R.A. 6809 cf. FC 21 NCC54&80(1) RPC344 cf. DOJ Opinion 145 S.1991 (Oct. 1991) Garcia vs. Recio 365 SCRA 437 Facts: A Filipino (Recio) was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen in 1987. In 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian family court. On 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen and married a Filipina (Garcia) in Cabanatuan City. The application for marriage license showed that Recio was single and Filipino. Late 1995, couple started living separately. On May 1996, conjugal assets were divided in accordance with Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. On 1998, Garcia filed a complaint to nullify the marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that Recio had a subsisting marriage when they were married and that she only became aware of this on November of the preceding year. Recio says otherwise and claims that his first marriage was dissolved by the Australian divorce decree, was legally capacitated to marry, and that Garcia was aware of this as early as 1993. On 1998, five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. RTC declared the marriage dissolved because the Australian divorce had ended the marriage. Garcia filed current petition in the SC. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the divorce between Recio and Samson was proven The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws. (2) WON Recio was legally capacitated to marry Garcia No. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. Since he is an Australian, none of the records he produced do not absolutely prove that he has legal capacity to marry on January 12, 1994. However, Garcias prayer to declare the marriage null and void based on bigamy cannot be granted because it may turn out that Recio did, in fact, have capacity to marry. Hence, the SC believes that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates.
Te vs. Choa G.R. No. 149530 (October 22, 2001) Outcome of annulment case had no bearing on the determination of Arthurs innocence or guilt in bigamy case. Ground for annulment cited by petitioner was for voidable marriage. Therefore, at the time he committed the crime of bigamy, marriage was still valid and subsisting. FC 14, FC 45 cf NCC 61 & 95 (1) Anaya vs Palaroan (November 26, 1970) Facts: After one month of marriage to Anaya, Fernando Palaroan filed a complaint to annul it on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Complaint was dismissed. However, during the negotiation of the amount from Anayas counterclaim, Fernando allegedly divulged that several months prior to the marriage, he had premarital relationships with a close relative. Anaya filed suit to annul on the ground that the marriage solemnized between them constituted fraud in obtained her consent. Fernando denied the allegation and counter claimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit; he did not pray for a dismissal of the complaint but its dismissal with respect to the alleged moral damages. Aurora replied stating that Fernando had no intention of performing his marital duties and obligations since the marriage was contracted as a means for him to escape marrying the close relative that was intimated above. Issue: WON the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage. Held/Ratio: No. Fraud is explicitly defined by Article 86 of the CC. And also states that no other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud that will give grounds for the annulment of marriage.
Villanueva vs CA 505 Scra 564 Force and intimidation is no moment since he was a security guard. In the light of appellants admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latters pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying her. FC 35: The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other FC 35 (5); NCC 86 (1) FC 45 (2) FC45(3);FC46,NCC13381344
FC45(4);NCC13351337 FC 45 (5) FC45(6) Jimenez v. Caizares 109 Phil 27 Facts: 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for Aug 3, 1950 Joel Jimenez and Remedios reconsideration since impotency was never really Canizares wed established. Rather than nullifying marriage Court should have compelled her to undergo and 7 June 1955 the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a examination decree annulling his marriage in the Court of First ISSUE: WON marriage may be annulled on sole Instance of Zamboanga. This was because her testimony of husband that his wife is impotent vagina was too small for his member and thus HELD: NO they couldnt copulate and thus she is impotent law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, 14 June 1955 - wife was summoned and served that must be proved to exist by indubitable a copy of the complaint. She did not file an evidence, to annul a marriage. answer Not proven in this case since wife has 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order been unresponsive. Court says that it requiring the defendant to submit to a physical may not so much be indifference as it is examination by a competent lady physician to that she is shy and embarrassed about determine her physical capacity for copulation the situation 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree o RESULT: presumption is in favor of potency. annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and Case is thus remanded to lower court for further the defendant since plaintiff had no response proceedings. whatsoever
Republic v. CA 236 SCRA 257 The duty of the civil registrar is to keep record of all applications for marriages. Thus, its certification is valuable. Their marriage was secret, thus there is failure to offer other witnesses to corroborate her testimony. Also, Edwin failed to answer and was declared in default. Cosca v. Palaypayan 237 SCRA 249 Illegal Solemnization of marriage: He solemnized marriage without the requisite of marriage license. He did not sign their marriage contracts. Sy vs. CA G.R. No. 127263 (April 12, 2000) Filipina did not expressly state in her petition the incongruity between the date of issuance of marriage license and date of marriage ceremony. License was issued a year after marriage ceremony. Thus, marriage was contracted without marriage license. Thus under Art 80 of NCC, marriage is void. Alcantara vs. Alcantara G.R. No. 167746 (Aug. 28, 2007) A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art 53 of NCC. Their marriage contract reflects a marriage license number. A certification was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification is precise since it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued. Issuance of a marriage license where none of the parties is resident, is just an irregularity. marriage is still valid even if the marriage license is issued in a place not the domicile of the parties FC9-10 PC 11 FC 12-14; FC 21 cf. NCC 84
Sevilla vs Cardenas 497 SCRA 429 FACTS: Jaime O. Sevilla claims that he and Carmelita N. Cardenas appeared before Rev. Cirilio Gonzales at the Makati City Hall where they executed a marriage contract. Marriage license number 2770792 from San Juan, Rizal was indicated in the contract, which Jaime never applied for A church ceremony was conducted on May 31, 1969 before Monsignor Juan Veloso at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish using the same license. They lived as husband and wife; went to Spain for Jaimes medical education supported by Jaimes parents. When in Spain their marriage turned bad since Jaime was having a hard time balancing marriage and medical studies; obsession of Jaime with Carmelitas knees, infemural sex and Jaimes drug addiction. Upon return to the Philippines, they started to live separately but were attending family counseling until 1976 They separated in 1978. Jaime went to the US to get a divorce in 1981 and a judicial separation in 1983 He was also married to another woman while in the US 3 certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan states that the marriage license with that number cannot be found The parish where they were wed presented a Certified copy of a Marriage certificate dated April 11, 1994 RTC: marriage is null due to lack of marriage license cf. DOJ Opinion 50 S. 1991 (April 30, 1991) DOJ Opinion 146 S. 1991 (Oct. 17, 1991) FC 15- 19 P.D. 965 FC2O FC 24-25 Alcantara vs Alcantara (supra) FC 27-34, cf. NCC 76, P.D. 1083 Leda v. Tabang 206 SCRA 395 Manzano vs. Judge Sanchez Facts: Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children. However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time, Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David, had, prior to the solemnization, issued an affidavit CA: reversed RTCs decision; marriage license was probably issued but cannot be located (through Perlita Mercaders testimony); no diligent search
ISSUE: Whether marriage is valid or not HELD/DECISION: Valid. Decision of the CA affirmed RATIO: Marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage Despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register Civil registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of license #2770792 due to its loaded work Absence of logbook is not a conclusive proof of non-existence of license. EVERY INTENDMENT OF THE LAW OR FACT LEANS TOWARD THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE, THE INDISSOLUBILITY OF THE MARRIAGE BONDS Constitution: policy of strengthening the family; marriage not a mere contract but a social institution, protected by the State Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married ALWAYS PRESUME MARRIAGE
stating that they were both married; however due to incessant quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer communicated with them. They lived together as husband & wife for 7 years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez. Issue: WON Payao and Davids marriage is valid. Held/Ratio: No. Although the couple had lived together for seven years (as the affidavit shows and which the Judge
relied on in crafting his decision), Article 34 of the FC also requires that there must be no legal impediment to marry each other. Also in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated. The judge ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage (regardless of the couple being separated) is a diriment impediment which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. And besides, free and voluntary cohabitation with another for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
De Castro vs. De Castro G.R. 160172 (February 13, 2008) validity of marriage can be collaterally attacked even in an action for support. Such will determine the legitimacy/illegitimacy of the child Republic vs Dayot G.R. No. 175581 (March 28, 2008) FC7,10,31&32 NCC 56, 74, 76 R.A. 7160 (1991 Local Government Code), Secs. 444(b)(1)(xviii), 445 (b)(1)(xviii) ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007 Guidelines On The Solemnization Of Marriage By The Members Of The Judiciary Aranes vs Occiano 380 SCRA 402 Facts: Araes filed charges against Judge Occiano of for Gross Ignorance of Law. Occiano solemnized Araes marriage without the requisite marriage license in latters house which is outside judges jurisdiction. Araes was not able to claim her right to inherit his deceased husbands property and she was deprived of receiving her husbands pension. Occiano avers that the ceremony took place in Araes house because the groom had a difficulty walking & he couldnt stand traveling. Judge was aware that there was no marriage license but due to the pleas of the couple and everything was prepared already and the visitors were there, he agreed to solemnize the marriage. He reminded them that marriage wont be valid without the license. They promised to give it within the day but they never did. Araes desisted and said that she had filed the case in a fit of rage but Court still decided the case. Issue: WON the marriage was valid with regards to the lack of a marriage license and the lack of the judges jurisdiction. Held/Ratio: No. Judges can only solemnize marriage within their territorial jurisdiction. Marriage license is a requisite for marriage and without it, marriage is void. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. And since there was no license, Occiano didnt have the authority to officiate the ceremony
Navarro v. Domagtoy S.C. A.M. MTJ-96-1088 (July 19, 1996) Facts: Dapa, Surigao del Norte Municipal Mayor Navarro filed charges against Judge Domagtoy for gross misconduct and inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. He solemnized the wedding of a couple despite knowing that the groom was merely separated from his wife. He presumed that mans first wife was already dead because the would-be groom has not seen her for seven years. Presumption was made without the requisite summary proceeding. Second instance was when he performed another marriage ceremony in Dapa, which is outside his jurisdiction. Issue: WON judge acted with gross misconduct.

a judges chamber or courtroom if: (a) at the point of death (b) in remote places (c) request of both parties in writing & sworn statement (Art. 8 FC). The second couple was not under any of these conditions. Only appellate and SC justices have jurisdiction over entire country. Judges with specific jurisdictions can only officiate within those areas.
Held/Ratio: Yes. The first marriage was bigamous. Presumption of death for purposes of marriage requires a summary proceeding (Art. 41 FC). Affidavits claiming that a person has not been heard of for more than seven years are not sufficient proof of the persons death. The second marriage, on the other hand, is beyond judges jurisdiction. Marriage can only be held outside FC 7 (2) cf. NCC 92-96
Villar v. Paraiso 96 Phil 659 Paraiso was disqualified when he ran for mayor while he was still holding a religious position granting him the power to solemnize marriages FC 4; FC 35 (2) RPC 352 cf. Tenchavez v. Escao(supra) FC23-24 FC4 FC3(3);FC6cf.FC33,FC8 Martinez v. Tan 12 Phil 731 Facts: Rosalia Martinez was visiting her brother in Palompon, Leyte. She met Angel Tan there and they were married by a Justice of Peace. Tan and Martinez first submitted a petition requesting the Justice to solemnize their marriage. Upon arriving at the office of the justice, they signed another document to ratify their petition under oath. Then the marriage was solemnized and a marriage certificate was signed by Tan, Martinez, Ballori and witnesses Esmero and Pacita Ballori. The couple did not live together and when Martinez went home to Ormoc, her relatives convinced her to file charges claiming that the marriage was not valid since she signed the document in her own home thinking that it was a paper authorizing Tan to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage. Issue: WON the marriage is valid. Held/Ratio: Yes. They were married since there was an expression of mutual consent and both of them appeared before the justice of the peace. Court ruled that General Orders No. 68 Sec. 6 states: No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence solemnizing the marriage that they take each other as husband and wife. Letters of Martinez to Tan regarding the marriage and asking for her parents consent are proof that marriage took place and is valid. Parties ratified their petition under oath. They both understood Spanish thus they knew the contents of the document they were signing.
FC 8; FC 28-29; FC 32-33 FC6;FC22 Madridejo v. De Leon 55 Phil 1 Facts: Flaviana Perez, a widow from a previous marriage to de Leon, lived with Pedro Madridejo and a son named Melecio was born to them. Three years later, the couple got married under circumstances of articulo mortis. The priest who solemnized the marriage failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the marriage can be considered valid.
Yes, the failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate does not affect the validity of their marriage because it is only an irregularity of a formal requisite. (2) WON the marriage legitimized Melecio Madridejo.
No. To be legitimized by a subsequent marriage of ones parents, a natural child must be acknowledged before or after the celebration of the said marriage. Plaintiff in this case did not meet these requirements and is thus void of legitimacy.
People v. Borromeo 133 SCRA 106 Facts: Elias Borromeo was convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide after killing his wife. There were witnesses and police officers who testified against him. He claims that he cannot be charged with parricide (and thus, only homicide) since he was never legally married to the victim because (a) officiating priest testified against it and (b) no marriage contract was executed. Issue: WON Borromeo can be considered married to the victim. NCC 17 NCC15&17 FC 26; FC 21, FC 10 Yao Kee v Sy-Gonzales 167 SCRA 786 Aside from failure to show the documents of marriage, Chinese customs on marriage were not proven by Yao Kee. Republic vs. Orbecido III G.R. No. 154380 (October 5, 2005) Facts: Orbecido married Villanueva in the Philippines and had two children. Villanueva, wife, left for the US, was naturalized and eventually remarried. Orbecido petitioned for authority to remarry using Par. 2 of Article 26, FC. No opposition. OSGs motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this appeal stating: that the questioned provision only applies to valid mixed marriages between Filipinos and aliens; that the remedy is annulment or legal separation; and that there is no law that governs respondents situation. Issue: Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law? FC26inrelation to: FC 35(1), 35(4), 35(5), 36, 37 & 38 cf. NCC 71 DOJ Opinion No. 11 S. 1990 (Jan. 17, 1990)
Held/Ratio: Yes. Mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the marriage registry does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. People living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law.
Held/Ratio: Taking into consideration legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Par. 2 Art 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties, who at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce degree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. The reckoning point in the provision is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
FC 147,cf.RPC 350 Rule 131 Sec. 3, 1989 Rules on Evidence cf.NCC 220 FC 26 par. I NCC Book II, Title III (484-50 1) Lesaca v. Lesaca 91 Phil 135 Baldomero sold properties before the second marriage but bought it again after the said marriage. There was no proof that the money spent was from the CPG. Yaptinchay v. Torres 28 SCRA 489 Common-law wife was not able to prove that they jointly bought the property in Forbes Park so it belonged to the legal marriage. Eugenio v. Velez (supra) FC4 cf. VII (D) of Outline FC35cf. FC234, RA6809 FC 35(4), 39, 40, 41,44 RPC 344, 349 Mercado vs Tan 337 SCRA 122 Ty vs. CA G.R. No.127406 (November 27, 2000) FACTS: March and August 1977: Edgardo Reyes married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva August 1980: marriage was declared null and void for lack of marriage license (civil), null and void ab ignition for lack of consent of the parties (church) April 1979 (before declaration of nullity): Edgardo Reyes married Ofelia Ty; April 1982 church wedding January 1991: Edgardo filed a Civil case praying for the declaration of his marriage with Ofelia null and void due to lack of marriage license and because he was still married to Anna Maria Ofelia submitted their marriage license and the certification that Edgardos marriage with Anna Maria is declared null and void RTC: marriage to Ofelia null and void ab initio CA: affirmed trial courts decision If marriage is contracted before the Family Code no, if after the Family Code yes. Petition granted RATIO: Both marriages governed by the Civil Code hence, no judicial declaration is necessary Art. 83: Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the 1st spouse of such person with any person other than such 1st spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The 1st spouse had been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the 2nd marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than 7 years, is generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the 3 cases until declared null and void by a competent court. The sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
ISSUES: Whether the decree of nullity of the 1st marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly HELD/DECISION:
Morigo vs Morigo
422 SCRA Morigo is not guilty of bigamy even if he did not get a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage. First marriage was void ab initio due to lack of ceremony and solemnizing officer so it does not bear any legal effect. Tenebro vs. CA G.R. No. 150758 (February 18, 2004) [concurring opinion, Justice Vitug] REASONS: 1) Nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage (Phil penal laws are concerned) 2) Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second marriage as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity 3) April 10, 1990: petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas; wed by Judge Alfredo Perez of the City trial Court of Lapu Lapu city 4) Lived together without interruption until 1991 when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986 5) Petitioner left the conjugal wedding with Ancajas and cohabited with Villareyes 6) January 25, 1993: petitioner contracted another marriageNida villegas before Judge German Lee Jr. RTC Cebu City br 15 7) Ancajas heard of third marriageconfirmed with VillareyesVillareyes confirmed through letter that she was married with petitioner 8) Ancajas filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner (Criminal Case: 013095-L) PETITIONERs CLAIMS 1) He cohabited with villareyes from 1984-1988 sired two children but denied valid marriage ceremony to solemnize marriage (said he only signed contract for his allotment as a seaman 2) Verified by brother if a marriage exist (Civil Register Manila)no record of said marriage DECISION OF TRIAL COURT: November 10, 1997 finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under art 349 of the RPC. Sentencing him to 4 years and 2 months prison correccional as minimum to 8 years and day of prision mayor as maximum CA: Affirmed decision of the trial court and petition for reconsideration was denied Hence this instant petition: assigned errors: 1) When it affirmed decision of RTC despite non existence of the first marriage and insufficiency of evidence 2) Finding him guilty despite clear proof that marriage between the accused and private complainant had been declared null and void ab initio and without legal force and effect DECISION OF SC: 3rd and 4th requisites for crime of bigamy are presentaffirm the judgment of the CA; Petition for review is DENIED; assailed decision of CA convicting tenebro of the crime of bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years and two months of prison correccional as minimum and 8 years and one day of prison mayor as maximum REASONS; 1) Art 349 elements of bigamy: a) Offender has been legally married b) First marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the CC c) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage and d) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity Denies existence of marriage and argues the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity (lacks essential requisites of validityretroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated) Hence argues that four elements of the crime of bigamy are absent and prays for acquittal But Court said I fails on two accounts: 1) Prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral to prove the existence of the first marriage (marriage contract Manila City solemnized November 10, 1986 before Rev. Julieto Torres, handwritten letter of Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994) petitioner presented documents (certification issued by NSO Oct 7, 1995 and City Civil Registry of Manila Feb 3, 1997have no records of the said marriage) 2) Public documents applicable to all marriage contractSec 7 Rule 130 of the Rules of Courtoriginal public document is admissible evidence 3) Documents presented by Tenebro only said office have no record of such marriage absence of a record is different from documentary evidence as to absence of a marriage ceremonydocuments (certifications) given after marriage with second wife)
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On the issue of nullity due to psychological incapacity: retroacts?= so since marriage with Ancajas was void ab initio bigamy was therefore not committed==== aS second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of first marriage, petitioners marriage with Ancajas would be null and void from the very beginning completely regardless of the petitioners psychological incapacity or capacitybut this does not however presents an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability Art 349 of the RPC criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been dissolved legally or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in proper proceedings As soon as the 2nd marriage was contracted April 10, 1990the crime of bigamy had already been consummated The declaration of the nullity of a second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is NOT an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validityrequisites are essential and formal requisitesin this case requisites of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and ANcajas Third marriage contracted while two past marriages are still subsistingdeliberate disregard for sanctity of marriage
declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy? Yes. Except for a void marriage on account of psychological incapacityvoid marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity The complete nullity of a previously contracted marriage being void ab initio and legally inexistent can outrightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy Strong reservation on the ruling that bigamy is still committed though marriage is ab initio null and void (if marriage is contracted before th judicial declaration of its nullity) Canon law-reconcile grounds for nullity of marriage Reasons why except those due to psychological incapacity: a) Breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of marriage b) Other grounds are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity however, being a mental state may not be so readily evident c) It remains valid and binding until declared judicially as void DISSENTING OPINION CARPIO, J. CALLEJO, Sr. J. Vote to grant pro hac vice the petition Since second marriage is null and void ab initio, such marriage in in contemplation of criminal law never existed and for that reason, one of the essential elements of bigamy has disappeared
SEPARATE OPINION VITUG, J. Would the absolute nullity of either first or second marriage prior to its judicial
Mallion vs Alcantara (supra) FC 41 in relation to FC 42-44 NCC 390-39 1, PC 55 (9), FC 101 Republic vs. Nolasco 220 SCRA 20, March 17, 1993 Nolasco cannot declare that his English wife was presumptively dead as he did not diligently look for her in Liverpool. Bienvenido vs. Court of Appeals 237 SCRA 676 (October 24, 1994) Facts: o Deceased Aurelio Camacho married Luisita Camacho while still married to Consejo Velasco. He then had another relationship with Nenita Bienvenido with whom he bought a house on Delgado St where they have been leaving for the past 14 years Upon death of Aurelio Camacho, Luisita is contending that house belongs to her since it is conjugal property. ISSUE: WON Luisita has rights to property HELD: NO o Art 83 of Civil Code provides that if person has been absent for seven o
years the absent spouse is presumed to be dead However cannot be invoked in this case since it was Aurelio who actually left Luisita. First exception refers to subsequent marriage of abandoned spouse and not remarriage of deserting spouse Art. 739(1) of the Civil Code declares donations made between persons who are guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation to be void o can only be brought by the innocent spouse, perhaps in this case by the first wife, but certainly not by Luisita whose marriage to Aurelio is itself void. The last
paragraph of Art. 739 clearly provides: In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullify may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner's ownership is evidenced by a deed of absolute sale 7. It was error for the Court of Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the instance of one whose marriage to the seller is void.
RESULT: property belongs to Nenita Bienvenido who properly showed she paid for house with Aurelio.
Armas vs Calisterio 330 SCRA 201 (April 6, 2000) Facts: 1)
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April 24, 1992: Teodorico Calisterio died intestate leaving several parcels of land (value: P604,750.00) He was survived by his wife (respondentMarietta Calisterio) Teodorico was second husband of Mariettamarried previously to James William Bound (jan 13, 1946) James Bound disappeared w/o trace on February 11, 1947 11 years later Marietta and teodorico were married (may 8, 1958) w/o Marietta having secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead Oct 9, 1992: petitioner, surviving sister of teodorico filed with RTC of QC a petition entitled In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, petitioner claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the deceased- marriage between Marietta and Teodorico as bigamous thereby null and void Prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas Jr. be appointed administrator w/o bond of the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled mArietta opposed the petitionfirst marriage w/ Bound had been dissolved due to his absence, whereabouts being unknown contends to be the surviving spouse of teodorico and sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent
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RTC: issued order appointing Sinfroniano C. Armas Jr and respondent Marietta administrator and administratix of the intestate estate of teodorico Marietta appealed the decision to CA CA: decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered a) mArietta Calisterios marriage with teodorico remains valid b) house and lot situated as 32 Batangas St San Francisco del Monte QC belong to conjugal partnership property c) marrieta Calisterio being teodoricos compulsory heir is entitled to one half of husbands estate and sister of Teodorico the other half d) ordered TC to determine competence of MArrieta Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodoricos estate CA denied motion for reconsideration
SC DECISION: Assailed judgment of the CA is AFFIRMED except in so far only as it decreed in par of the dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise entitled, along with her to the other half of the inheritance in lieu of which it is DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedents estate pertains solely to the petitioner to the exclusion of her children REASONS: 1) Marriage happened in 1958law in force at that time was the Civil Code not the family code
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Art 83 of the new Civil Coderetroactive only when it would not prejudice ort impair vested acquired rights in accordance wit Civil code and other laws A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Art 83 to be deemed valid until declared null and void by a competent courtthe burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage Mariettas first husband, James William Bounds had been absent or had disappeared for than eleven years before
she entered into second marriagesecond marriage having been contracted during the regime of the Civl Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of judicial declaration of presumptive death of james Bounds 5) Conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta pertains to them in commonupon its dissolution, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portionsone portion going to surviving spouse and the other to the estate of the deceased spouse Appellate court erred in granting to petitioners children, along with their mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the estate of deceased brother
Republic vs. Bermudez Lorino 449 SCRA 57 (January 19, 2005) Gloria abandoned husband who was a violent alcoholic. They were separated for 9 years. The trial courts ruling that the husband was presumptively dead is final. Republic vs. Court of Appeals 458 SCRA 200 (May 6, 2005) Apolinaria filed for presumptive death of her husband Clemente Jomoc after being absent for 9 years. Such declaration is under a summary proceeding. Manuel vs. People 476 SCRA 461 (November 26, 2005) Manuel was guilty of bigamy since he did not get a declaration of presumptive death of his first wife who BTW was only in prison. Republic vs. Court of Appeals 477 SCRA277 (December 9, 2005) Alegro did not diligently search for his missing wife. He only reported to the NBI that his wife was missing after the OSGs appeal to the declaration. FC44 FC36 FC 36, 39, 68-73 R.A. 8533 Lim v. CA 214 SCRA 237 alleged schizophrenic wifes psychiatrists testimony admissible in court, not a breach in patient-physician relationship; during trial, use hypothetical questions Salita v. Magtolis 233 SCRA 100 Bill of Particulars stating wife inability to understand the demands of husbands profession (doctor) is enough ultimate cause thus there is a cause of action Krohn v. CA 233 SCRA 146
husband may use wifes confidential report/ medical record to show psychological incapacity Santos V. CA 240 SCRA 20 psychological incapacity must refer to mental (not physical) incapacity to comprehend basic mental covenants characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, incurability, existing at the time of the marriage Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA G.R. No. 119190 (January 16, 1997) Facts: 1) mother (forced) ; 2) that her husband will consummate the marriage He insists on the validity of the marriage
RTC QC Br 89 which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity 2) Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to CA (42758) which affirmed the RTC decision (Nov 29, 1994) 3) Denied motion for reconsideration (February 14, 1995) 4) May 22, 1988 plaintiff married defendant at Manila cathedral, Intramuros manila marriage contact-evidence 5) Wedding reception South Villa Makati house of defendants mother 6) No making love on the first nyt after marriagesame with second, third and fourth nights 7) Baguio cityfirst week as husband and wifewith mother, uncle, his mother and nephew of defendantn sexual intercourse within the 4-day stay 8) May 22, 1988- March 15, 1989but during this period no attempt of sexual intercourse between them, not even saw husbands private parts 9) Submitted themselves to medical examinationCGH- January 20, 1989 10) She was healthy, still a virgin; her husbands results were kept confidentialgiven medication but confidentialasked to return but never did 11) Impotent husband, closet homosexual, defendant married her a Filipino citizen to acquire and maintain residency status CLAIM OF DEFENDANT: if marriage will be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, it will be fault of the wife He did not want marriage to be annulled due to: a) He loves her so much b) He has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable c) The relationship is till young and differences can still be reconciled\ d) Defect can be cured with medical technology Admitted that no sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989 blames wife Two reasons given by him: 1) she is afraid that she will return jewelry ofher
12) Submitted himself to examinationDr. Sergio Atleza Jr said he has no signs of impotency and capable of erection DECISION OF TRIAL COURT: declared Void marriage . let copy be furnished the local civil registrar of QC and of Manila CA: affirmed TCs decision DECISION OF SUPREME COURT: petition to be bereft of merit; assailed decision of the CA dated Nov 29, 1994 AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. REASONS: 1) Private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaintno independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between husband and wifeonly basis is admission of petitioner 2) Need to prevent collusion between parties CC provides that no judgment annulling marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgments 3) But since petitioner did not want marriage to be annulled then no collusion between parties 4) Issue that failure to have sexual intercourse meant psychological incapacity of both other reasons may existthe court said the fact that no coitus happened between themno need to determine who did not want to have sex with whom 5) Wanted to have sex but refusesmaybe because of pain?== no attempt to discover what the problem with his wife could be 6) One of the essential marital obligations under the FC is to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriageif one although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constanteven canon Law attribute the cause to psychological incapacity
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Court find the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court
Republic v. Olaviano Molina (1997) Facts: 1) Lalas a social worker and Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison (psychiatrist of BGH) TRIAL COURTS DECISION: May 14, 1991: declaring marriage null and void CA: denied appeal of petitioner and affirmed in toto the RTC decision SOLICITOR GENERAL: insists that the CA made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase psychological incapacity. He said that appealed decision tended to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world Solicitors appeal was deniedRTC relying on the fact that marriage between parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities. SG argued that opposing and conflicting personalities is not equivalent to psychological capacity PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY: is not simply neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties SC RULING: Petition is meritorious REASONS: 1) Justice Vitug: psychological incapacity refers to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage; this condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated 2) It should be characterized by: a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence and c) incurability 3) In the present case: There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacitybut merely a difficulty if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations Mere showing of irreconcible differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity It is essential to show that the parties are incapable of meeting their marital responsibilities and not mere failure -
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Petition for review on certiorari under the Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 decision of CA affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the RTC of La Trinidad Benguet which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio on the ground of psychological capacity under Article 36 of the Family Code Case filed August 16, 1990 (nullity of marriage) April 14, 1985: marriage of Roridel and Reynaldo, san Agustin Church Son: Andre Molina After a year of marriage: Showed signs of immaturity Preferred to stay with peers and friends squandering his money Depended on parents for aid and assistance Never honest with wife about finances
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February 1986: relieved from work October 1986: intense quarrel March 1987: Roridel resigned from job in Manila and went to live with parents in Baguio City 9) Few weeks later: Reynaldo left Roridel and their child and abandoned them 10) Reynaldo psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations REYNALDOs CLAIMS 1) Filed August 28, 1989: contended that misunderstandings were due to: a) Roridelss strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her friends even after marriage b) Her refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals c) Roridels failure to run the household and handle their finances THE FOLLOWING WERE STIPULATED: 1) Petitioner is not asking for support for her child and her 2) Respondent is not asking for damages 3) Parties are separated in fact for three years 4) Common child of the parties is in custody of the petitioners wife WIFEs WITNESSES: Friends: Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla; Ruth
No gravity in the problem, neither juridical antecedence nor incurability 4) Court invited two amici curiae (Most rev Oscar Cruz and Justice Ricardo Puno: their guidance: a) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff- any doubt should be resolved in -- favor of the validity and continuation of the marriagepermanence, solidarity and inviolability of marriage b) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be 1) medically or clinically identified; 2) alleged in the complaint; 3) sufficiently proven by experts and 4) clearly explained in the decisionthe evidence must convince the court that the parties or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. c) The incapacity must be proven existing during the time of the celebration of the marriage d) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurableincapacity must be relevant to assumption of marriage obligations not necessarily those not related to marriage like exercise of profession e) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage- illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability and not a refusal, neglect or difficulty much less ill will f) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arts 68-71 of family code (to husband and wife) and ARTs 220, 221 and 225 (parents and their children) g) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courtsArt 36 taken from the Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law (1983)- what is decreed to be canonically void be also civilly void h) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor general to appear as counsel for the state DECISION OF SC: petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano and Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SEPARATE STATEMENT: PADILLA, J Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own factsthe facts in this case does not support conclusion of psychological incapacity SEPARATE OPINION ROMERO, J. Not mere refusal and neglect or difficulty Neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is the resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annullable (Art 45 family Code) Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent, it refers to obligations attendant to marriage Psychological incapacity is insanity of a lesser degree Remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry Bases for determining void marriages: a) Lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract b) Reasons of public policy c) Special cases and special situations (includes psychological incapacity) Canon Law- valid and void marriage only In the case conflicting and opposing personalities of the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity (Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA) Concurs that this marriage remains subsisting and valid CONCURRING OPINION VITUG, J. Should give much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment Marriage void ab initio, Art 45- merely voidable, Art 55- legal separation The term psychological incapacity to be ground for the nullity of the marriage under Art 36 of the FC must pass the following tests: a) Incapacity must be psychological or mental not physical in nature b) Psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal to understand, assume and discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love and respect
and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support c) Psychology condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations may occur only thereafter and d) The mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable Section 2 Art. XV (marriage as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State) , Section 12, Art II ( The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution), Section 1, Article XV ( The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development) of the Constitution show how the state regard marriage and the family
Republic vs. Dagdag 351 SCRA 425 Nature: Petition for a review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. Facts: Erlinda Matias (16) married Avelino Dagdag (20), Sept. 1, 1975 and had two children. A week after the wedding, husband would oftentimes disappear for months, indulge in drinking sprees, would return home drunk and force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse with him. If she did not comply, she was beaten. The last time Erlinda saw him was on Oct. 1993. She later learned that he was imprisoned but escaped from jail and was now a fugitive. A certificate issued by the Jail Warden on Feb. 14, 1990 declared that he was still at-large. July 3, 1990 Erlina filed with the RTC Olangapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Dec. 17, 1990 RTC issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until Jan. 2, 1991 to present controverting evidence. Although he found that there was no collusion, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Dec. 27, 1990 RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Jan. 29, 1991 Investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given till January 2, 1991 to present controverting evidence. The OSG likewise filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it in Order dated Aug. 21, 1991 stating that the fact that Avelino failed to support his family is a violation of essential marriage obligation in Art. 68 of the Family Code. The OSG then appealed to the CA which consequently affirmed the decision of the RTC (April 22, 1993). OSG petitioned for review to the SC. Issues:
5 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, interpreting Art. 36 of the Family Code with its set of guidelines.
WON the husband qualifies as being psychologically incapacitated on the basis of the provision in Art. 36 of the Family Code. Held/Ratio: No. Erlinda failed to comply with the evidentiary requirements5: particularly guideline no. 2 which requires the root cause of psychological incapacity to be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation that her husband is a fugitive was not sufficiently proven. Petition by OSG is granted. Assailed decision by the CA is reversed and set aside. Notes: The guidelines governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition.
Choa vs. Choa 392 SCRA 641 Facts: 1) 2) 3) declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged psychological incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. FIRST ISSUE: Resort to certiorari weakness and gross insufficiency of respondents evidence she was entitle to the immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari in general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings but this is not absolutein this instant where judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 a denial of demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may be assailed through a petition for certiorari SECOND ISSUE: Denial of Demurrer to Evidence DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE: an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or situation the issuethis challenges the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a verdict Evidence against respondentis grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage First: petitioner claims that the filing of petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of latters psychological incapacity to complu with essential obligations of marriageabnormal for wife who instead of protecting name of husband had acted to contrary documents presented by respondent during trial do not show alleged incapacity of his wife to rule that filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only erroneous but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity Second: neither is the testimony of respondent taken by itself or in conjunction w/ his documentary offerings sufficient to prove petitioners alleged incapacity -testimony of respondent: 1) lack of attention to children; 2) immaturity; 3) lack of intention of procreative sexualitynone of these constituent psychological incapacity * Third: insufficiency, if not incompetency of the supposed expert testimony presented by respondent (Dr. Antonio M./ Gauzon), failed to
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petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981 two children: Cheryl Lynne and Albryan October 27, 1993: respondent filed before RTC Negross Occidental Br 51 complaint for annulment of his marriage to petitioner (Civil Case no. 93-8098) Filed amended complaint dated Nov 8, 1993declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based on her psychological incapacity Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed MOTION TO DISMISS (Demurrer to Evidence) dated May 11, 1998
RTC: Dec 2, 1998 Order: denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence; held that respondent established a quantum of evidence that the petitioner must controvert; motion for reconsideration was denied in mArch 22, 1990 order; petitioner elevated to CA CA: petition DISMISSED (CA GR SP NO. 53100); denial of demurrer was only interlocutory hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not available Proper remedy was for defense to present evidence and to take appeal if decision is unfavorable Propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence rests on the sound exercise of the trial courts decision Petitioner failed to show that issues in the court had been resolved arbitrarily or w/o basis ISSUES: 1) upon denial of demurrer of evidence, is petitioner under obligation to present her evidence and just appeal after if decision is unfavorable (Rule 33 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) (is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence?) 2) in upholding lower courts denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, did CA violate, ignore or disregard in whimsical manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this court in Molina and Santos (in its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?) DECISION OF SC: Petition is MERITORIOUS. The petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of CA REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED and the case for
identify and prove root cause of alleged incapacity no meical or clinical proof of incurability if there was true incapacity nor was it grave enough - assessment of petitioner by dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by respondentnever conducted any p[psychological examinations NOTE; definitions of psychological incapacity mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties (Art 68 FC) mere neglect, difficulty or refusal in the performance of marital obligations and mere showing of irreconcilable differences or conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity
In case at bar, respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each otherno showing of the gravity and juridical antecedent or incurability of problems besetting their marital union TC should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by respondent and taken into account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter concluded that it was useless to proceed further with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof It was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this courts rulings in pointcontinuing the process of litigation would have been a total; waste of time and money for the parties and an unwelcome imposition on trial courts docket
RP vs. Quintero-Hamano G.R. No. 149498 (May 20, 2004) Japanese husbands abandonment not psychological incapacity Dedel vs.CA G.R. No. 151867 (January 29, 2004) wifes infidelity which (didnt exist prior the marriage); her abandonment; that she had sexual affairs with several men not psychological incapacity Antonio vs.Reyes G.R. No. 155800 (March 10,2005) FACTS: December 1990: Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes were married March 1993: Leonilo filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the grounds of psych incapacity Marie was psych incapacitated o She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son and instead introduced the boy to Leonilo as the adopted child of her family o She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David attempted to rape and kill her when in fact no such incident happened o She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician Dr. Consuelo Gardiner o She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice teacher affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company; and that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor o She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marques and sent lengthy letters to Leonilo claiming they are from Blackgold and touting Marie as the number 1 moneymaker in the commercial industry o She represented herself as a person of greater means, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income o She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts o Experts: Marie was a persistent and constant liar and pathologically extremely jealous Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila rendered the marriage void RTC: declared marriage null and void CA: reversed judgment
ISSUES: Whether or incapacitated
not
Marie
was
psychologically
HELD/DECISION:
Yes. Petition granted-marriage null and void RATIO: It is settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lck thereof The Court of Appeals did not dipute the veracity of the evidence presented Intent of the FC: case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the finding of experts and researchers in psych disciplines, and by the decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law Molina guidelines were satisfied o Sufficiently provided evidence o Root cause has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision o Psych incapacity existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage o Gravity is sufficient to prove disability. Leonilo couldnt tolerate Marie for a year. Failure of Marie to distinguish truth from fiction or at least abide by the truth. A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, mush less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. o Obligations complies with Art 68 to live together observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support o CA failed to recognize that the Catholic Church annulled the marriage Incurable; psychosis is quite grave and a cure thereof a remarkable feat
Ferraris vs. Ferraris G.R. No, 162368 (July 17, 2006) Facts: 1) show that the CA committed any reversible error is DENIED WITH FINALITY REASONS: 1) Issue of WON psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case 2) Psychological incapacity- refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage; malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of marital bond one is about to assume; most serious cases of personality disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to a marriage 3) During the relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent 4) Problems began when petitioner started doubting respondents infidelity 5) Respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving the house attitude whenever they quarreled, violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, sexual infidelity, abandonment and lack of support and his preference to spend more time with his bandmates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage
Reconsideration of the resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying petition for review on certiorari of the decision of CA
RTC: denying petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriage with Brix Ferraris Suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity and evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity CA: affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court Evidence did not establish proof of psychological incapacity not shown that his defects were incurable and already present at the inception of marriage Dr. dayans testimony failed to establish how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has mixed personality disorder and failed to show that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondents character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying w/ essential marital obligations DECISION OF SC: motion for reconsideration is DENIED; motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently
6)
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Psychological defects spoken here were more of a difficulty if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological not physical illness 8) Sanctity of marriage stated in Constitution protected by the state Art 36 should not be confused with divorce law nor equated with legal separation
Paras vs. Paras G.R. No. 147824 (August 2, 2007) unfitness of a lawyer to practice profession is not equal to unfitness as a husband Republic vs. Court of Appeals 268 SCRA 198 (February 13, 1997) FACTS: April 14, 1985: Roridel O. Molina was married to Reynaldo Molina; son: Andre O. Molina After a year of marriage Reynaldo showed signs or immaturity and irresponsibility o Spend more time with friends o Squandered money o Depended on his parents for aid and assistance o Lied to Roridel about their finances o February 1986: Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila o March 1987: Roridel resigned from her work in Manila and lived with her parents in Baguio City o Shortly after Reynaldo left Roridel and Andre o Roridel: psychologically incapable of complying with the essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; presented witnesses o Reynaldo: Roridels insisting on maintaining her friends even after marriage; Roridels refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; Failure to run the household and handle finances, were the reasons for their frequent quarrels o RTC: marriage void o CA: marriage void; denied appeal of Reynaldo o SolGen: CA made an erroneous mistake in the interpretation of psych incapacity and established the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture o SolGen: marriage broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities
ISSUES: Whether or not the behavior of Reynaldo constitutes psychological incapacity HELD/DECISION: No. RATIO: Psych incapacity (Vitug in Santos): no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psych incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated Dr. Gerardo Veloso (Judge Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila): gravity, juridical antecedence, incurability Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psych incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness. Art. 36 guidelines (1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity (2) The root cause of the psych incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(3) (4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the marriage Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68-71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation/s must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. What is decreed canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
Incapacity should not be a result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects of the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code Lack of appreciation of ones marital obligation; psych incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage. Bases for determining void marriages: (a) lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract, (b) reasons of public policy and (c) special cases and special situations Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union in invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the marriage ceremony The professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases It could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite ti valid matrimonial consent.
SEPARATE STATEMENT (PADILLA): As to whether or not psych incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case In the field of psych incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. SEPARATE OPINION (ROMERO):
CONCURRING OPINION (VITUG): Tests: (1) Incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical (2) The psych incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume and discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support (3) The psycholigic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations may occur only thereafter Mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable
Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals 320 SCRA 76 (December 08, 1999) Facts: 1) 2) CA affirming the decision of RTC which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner January 1, 1981: petitioner and private respondent married (Silang Catholic Parich Church, Cavite)
3)
4)
5)
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Three children born: Maie (may 3, 1982); Lyra (May 22, 1985) and Marian (June 15, 1989) July 10, 1992: filed complaint RTC Br 18 tagaytay City annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity ALLEGATIONS Private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support family and contribute to management of household Devoting most of time engaging in drinking sprees w/ friends Cohabited with other women though married with whom he had illegitimate children Because of his promiscuity private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with sexually transmitted disease PR irresponsible. Immature and unprepared for duties of married life Ordered to give support to their three children P9000 every month; she be awarded custody of their children and she be adjudged sole owner of parcel of land (Don Gregorio Subd, BUcal dasmarinas Cavite) as well as jeep which private respondent took with him when he left conjugal home on June 12, 1992 Not close to their children Met in 1977 at Phil Christian University (petitioner 5 years older than respondentteacher and student) Respondent continued studies after marriage supported by parents and petitioner Aside form her salary augmented their income by doing sideline businesses Respondent left but received again by the petitioner to save their marriage Smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse
Once beaten by husband when she confronted her about Tess confined at De LA sale University Medical Center (cerebral concussion) Oct 1992; petitioner learned that respondent left for middle east and since then whereabouts had been unknown RTC DECISION: dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage What were mentioned were not ground for annulment but for legal separation (art 55 of FC) CA: affirmed decision of RTC (January 30, 1996) quoted Santos vs CA Acts and attitudes complained happened after the marriage and there is no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute psychological incapacity under Art 36 of FC
DECISION OF SC: Petition is DENIED, decision of CA AFFIRMED. REASONS: 1) Differentiated Voidable (Art 46) , Void marriage and legal separation (Art 55) 2) Petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time of the marriage respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities 3) Quoted Republic vs CA: root cause of psychological incapacity. 4) Expert testimony should have been presented Separate proceeding for other contentions (custody, support etc)
Marcos vs. Marcos 343 SCRA 755 (October 19, 2000) ailure to give support, physical abuse, abandonment not psychological incapacity so need to undergo psychological exam Malcampo-Sin vs. Sin 355 SCRA 285 (March 26, 2001) Facts: Florence and Phillip Sin were married Jan. 4, 1987. Florence filed a complaint in RTC Pasig for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity on Sept. 20., 1994 which consequently dismissed the petition on the basis of insufficiency of evidence. Florence then filed an appeal to the CA which reaffirmed the trial courts decision. She filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it as well. The SC noted that during the proceedings, the State did not participate except for the manifestation issued by the fiscal stating that there was no collusion between the parties. Issue: WON the RTC and CA erred in dismissing the petitions without due participation of the State in the proceedings.
Held/Ratio: Yes. It is important for the State to participate in the proceedings as exemplified in Republic v. Dagdag wherein the decision of the trial court was said to be prematurely rendered since the investigating
prosecutor was not given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Factual disputes of the case will not be heard since this falls within the province of the trial court. Remanded to the RTC for proper trial.
Pesca vs. Pesca 356 SCRA 588 (April 17, 2001) Guidelines set in Molina/Santos mandatory; emotional immaturity and irresponsibility not psychological incapacity Choa vs. Choa 392 SCRA 641 (November 26, 2002) Facts: 6) violate, ignore or disregard in whimsical manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this court in Molina and Santos (in its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?) DECISION OF SC: Petition is MERITORIOUS. The petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of CA REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED and the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged psychological incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. FIRST ISSUE: Resort to certiorari weakness and gross insufficiency of respondents evidence she was entitle to the immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari in general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings but this is not absolutein this instant where judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 a denial of demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may be assailed through a petition for certiorari SECOND ISSUE: Denial of Demurrer to Evidence DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE: an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or situation the issuethis challenges the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a verdict Evidence against respondentis grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage First: petitioner claims that the filing of petitioner of a series of charges against him
petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981 7) two children: Cheryl Lynne and Albryan 8) October 27, 1993: respondent filed before RTC Negross Occidental Br 51 complaint for annulment of his marriage to petitioner (Civil Case no. 93-8098) 9) Filed amended complaint dated Nov 8, 1993declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based on her psychological incapacity 10) Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed MOTION TO DISMISS (Demurrer to Evidence) dated May 11, 1998 RTC: Dec 2, 1998 Order: denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence; held that respondent established a quantum of evidence that the petitioner must controvert; motion for reconsideration was denied in mArch 22, 1990 order; petitioner elevated to CA
CA: petition DISMISSED (CA GR SP NO. 53100); denial of demurrer was only interlocutory hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not available Proper remedy was for defense to present evidence and to take appeal if decision is unfavorable Propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence rests on the sound exercise of the trial courts decision Petitioner failed to show that issues in the court had been resolved arbitrarily or w/o basis ISSUES: 3) upon denial of demurrer of evidence, is petitioner under obligation to present her evidence and just appeal after if decision is unfavorable (Rule 33 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) (is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence?) 4) in upholding lower courts denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, did CA

are proof of latters psychological incapacity to complu with essential obligations of marriageabnormal for wife who instead of protecting name of husband had acted to contrary documents presented by respondent during trial do not show alleged incapacity of his wife to rule that filings are sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only erroneous but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity Second: neither is the testimony of respondent taken by itself or in conjunction w/ his documentary offerings sufficient to prove petitioners alleged incapacity -testimony of respondent: 1) lack of attention to children; 2) immaturity; 3) lack of intention of procreative sexualitynone of these constituent psychological incapacity * Third: insufficiency, if not incompetency of the supposed expert testimony presented by respondent (Dr. Antonio M./ Gauzon), failed to identify and prove root cause of alleged incapacity no meical or clinical proof of incurability if there was true incapacity nor was it grave enough - assessment of petitioner by dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by respondentnever conducted any p[psychological examinations
NOTE; definitions of psychological incapacity mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties (Art 68 FC) mere neglect, difficulty or refusal in the performance of marital obligations and mere showing of irreconcilable differences or conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity In case at bar, respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each otherno showing of the gravity and juridical antecedent or incurability of problems besetting their marital union TC should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by respondent and taken into account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter concluded that it was useless to proceed further with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof It was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this courts rulings in pointcontinuing the process of litigation would have been a total; waste of time and money for the parties and an unwelcome imposition on trial courts docket
Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals 412 SCRA 41 (September 24, 2003) Facts: child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on the relationship
respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married union begot five children On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the noncomplied marital obligations: o During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the whole day o When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a
between the petitioner and the respondent Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no cause for action ISSUE: WON petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana HELD: YES , since petition stated legal right of Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana, and her act or omission as seen in facts (cause of action 46)
FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND GRAVE NATURE OF ILLNESS Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage petition does not need to show (NOT) root cause since only experts can determine it b the physical manifestations of physical incapacity RESULT: PETITION IS DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE OF ACTION Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
Siayngco vs. Siayngco 441 SCRA 422 (October 27, 2004) Inability to conceive and domineering attitude not psychological incapacity. Republic vs. Iyoy 470 SCRA 508 (September 21, 2005) Hot-tempered and extravagant wife left husband then married an American not psychological incapacity Yu vs. Yu 484 SCRA 485 (March 10, 2006) procedural: a series of motions, habeas corpus and custody petitions -SC has not yet ruled whether either/both spouses are psychologically incapacitated. Catalan vs. Court of Appeals 514 SCRA 607 (February 6, 2007) Facts: 1)
CA reversed decision of RTC of dagupan City declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B. catalan and Merope Braganza void on the ground of bigamy and the denied motion for reconsideration 2) June 4, 1950: mabini, Pangasinan; married 3) Migrated to the US and allegedly became naturalized citizens of US 4) After 38 years of marriage, divorced in Aril 1988 5) June 16, 1988: Orlando married Merope in calasiao, pangasinan 6) Contending that said marriage was bigamous; Merope has subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan 7) Respondents filed motion to dismiss but denied RTC: judgment in favor or petitioner; subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando catalan is declared null and void Defendants jointly pay moral damages (P300,000) and exemplary damages (P200,000) and attorney s fees (P50,000) including cost of suit; donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the property donated is ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Branganza
CA: GRANT the appeal and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed decision, civil case DISMISSED; motion for reconsideration denied ISSUES: 1) Whether petitioner has the required standing in court to question the nullity of the marriage between respondents 2) Whether the failure of the court of appeals to declare the questioned marriage void constitutes reversible error DECISION OF SC: Case is REMANDED to the trial court for its proper disposition a) If it is proven that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondents remarriage, then the TC should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral damages from P300,000 to P50,000 and exemplary damages from P200,000 to P25,000 b) If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same
REASONS: 1) Need to ascertain the allegations that they were naturalized in the US and whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree 2) If these are proven, then this case is not dealing with Filipino citizens whose marital status is governed by the FC and our CC but with American citizens who secured their divorce in the US and who are considered by their national law to be free to contract another marriage 3) Two kinds of divorce: a) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii- terminates the marriage; and b) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro- suspends and leaves the bond in full force 4) A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner 5) Need to present divorce evidence and foreign law for deciding on this matterto know if she has personality or standing in this case 6) One with Proper interest to file a casea petition to declare the nullity of marriage like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and mist be based on a cause of action (Sec 2a of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) Petitioners personality to file petition cannot be ascertained because of absence of divorce decree and foreign law allowing itto know if respondent is allowed to remarry after a divorce or not
Zamora vs. Court of Appeals (February 7, 2007) Facts: 1) CA: August 5, 1999: affirming the ruling of the trial court (Santos vs CA and Republic vs CA and Molina); denied motion for reconsideration DECISION OF SC: petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution of CA dated August 5, 1999 and January 24, 2000 are AFFIRMED. REASONS: 1) It is true that in Santos vs CA no specific mention of presentation of expert opinion but it is important is the presence (Marcos vs Marcos) of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to Sec 2(d) of AM No 01-11-10 SC: Rule on declaration of Absolute nullity of Void Marriages and ANnulment of Voidable Marriageswhat to allegethe complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged
CA affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage 2) June 4, 1970: married in Cebu City 3) Union did not produce a child 4) 1972: private respondent left for US to work as nurse, and later became a citizen (1989) 5) Returned in the pHils once in a while 6) Petitioner filed complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of private respondent 7) Alleged that wife is horrified by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not born a petitioner a child; alleged she abandoned petitioner and lived in the US; lived together only for not more than three years 8) Respondent denied allegations: She do not refuse to have a child She loves children Petitioner is unfaithful to herhad two affairs with different women and he begot atleast three children with them RTC: June 22, 1995: nothing in the evidence showed respondent is suffering from psychological incapacityComplaint DISMISSED
Republic vs. Tanyag-San Jose 517 SCRA 123 (February 6,2007) Being jobless, a drug-user, and having anti-social personality not psychological incapacity. Navarro vs. Navarro GR No. 162049 (April 13, 2007) Person who had depression/escapism; Person who is always jealous not psychologically incapacitated
Paras vs. Paras (supra) Almelor vs RTC-Las Pinas GR No. 179620 (August 26, 2008) Homosexuality (which was not proven that it was concealed before the marriage not psychological incapacity. Laurena vs CA GR No. 159220 (September 22, 2008) Homosexuality, infidelity, insensitivity not psychological incapacity Te vs Te GR No. 161793 (February 13, 2009) Husband - psychologically incapacitated - has personality disorder and unready to commit. Wife - psychologically incapacitated - has antisocial personality disorder, aggressive and rebellious. Republic vs. Cabantug-Baguio G.R. No. 171042 (June 30, 2008) Mamas boy not psychological incapacity FC 37 cf. NCC 963-967 FC 38, compare FC 38(6) with NCC 80(6) RPC 246 NCC 80(7), 82 NCC 963-967 FC53 FC 36, PC 39, FC 40 Sec. 2, A.M. No. 02-1 1-10-SC. March 4, 2003 Enrico vs. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli G.R. No. 173614 (September 28, 2007) Dispute over land causing heirs/children go to court claiming that the marriage was null and void for lack of marriage license, SC applies the current rule of AM 02-11-10-SC (2003) - which says that petition for nullity may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, and that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and solely belongs to them What the heirs should've done is file for a declaration of nullity VIA a "proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse" FC 39; FC 36 par. 2 in relation to~ FC 255; FC42,par.2 FC 237 in rel to R.A. 6809 VII (E)( 1 0)(b) above FC48 Ancheta vs Ancheta 424 SCRA 725 Petitioner files for dissolution of conjugal partnership, and then respondent files for nullity on grounds of psych incapacity. TC grants nullity coz of PI. Later on respondent marries again, petitioner files for against the decision on grounds of PI but is denied. SC: Grants the petition stating the declaration of nullity was w/o a state appointed attorney to prevent collusion hence, the case is remanded. FC 48; cf. NCC 2035 A.M. No. 02-1 1-10-SC. March 4, 2003 Jocson v Robles 22 SCRA 521
Petitioner files for annulment of marriage, and respondent supports the claim that he was only forced into the marriage through a joint affidavit executed by him, his father and brother. SC: annulment denied on grounds that judgment rendering a marriage annulled cannot be made upon stipulation of facts or confession of judgment (confession here being that the respondent himself admitted to being forced into the marriage) - NCC - 88 and 101 prohibit this. Tolentino v Villanueva 56 SCRA 1 Petitioner prays that his petition for annulment be allowed even if the sermons were not served to the respondent. SC: denied because in accordance with NCC - 88, 101, in case of non-appearance of defendant, court shall order a prosecuting attorney to inquire w/n collusion exists, and if not, the attorney shall intervene to make sure that evidence is not fabricated and no collusion is in place. Salcedo-Ortanez v CA 235 SCRA 111 Respondent files for annulment for lack of marriage license and/or psych incapacity and provides 3 taped telephone conversations of the petitioner as evidence. Petitioner challenges the use of tapes as evidence but is dismissed by the CA. SC: the tapes are obtained in violation of the anti-wiretapping law, CA decision is set aside. Malcampo Sin vs Sin 355 SCRA 285 Petitioner files for declaration of nullity due to psych incapacity, and is dismissed. SC: even if the petition is dismissed, process should be correct - the state did not participate through an appointed fiscal to prevent collusion hence the case is remanded to the lower court for proper trial. Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588 Petitioner files for nullity through psych incapacity. Denied. SC: Petitioner, based on the standards set in Santos and Molina, has failed to make a case out of psych incapacity. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated to psych incapacity. Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755 Petitioner files for psych incapacity which is given by the RTC, but CA reverses on grounds that a psychological evaluation is needed. SC: Psych evaluations are not needed to settle psych incapacity but regardless there is no showing that the respondent's defects were present at the inception of the marriage no is it incurable. The illness can only be traced for a certain period and not during the celebration of marriage. Petition denied. FC5O-54 But seeFCl47-148 FC4O Bobis vs. Bobis G.R. No. 138509 (July 31, 2000) (Legarda: wrong case rushed to the supreme court before lower court decides on the nullity) Respondent contracts a second marriage w/o declaration of void of the first case. Respondent files for declaration of nullity of second marriage and while ongoing information for bigamy was filed against him. Respondent then files a motion to suspend the proceedings of bigamy because of the pending nullity case makes it a prejudicial question. TC Grants. SC: FC - 40 - effective during the 2nd marriage requires a judicial declaration before a party can remarry, it doesn't erase the fact that he did marry for a second time. Declaration of nullity won't affect the bigamy case. Mercado vs.Tan G.R. No 137110 (August 1, 2000)
Mercado marries Tan, declaring that he is single even if he was still married. Tan files for bigamy. Petitioner files for declaration of nullity for his first marriage. CA says he is guilty of bigamy. SC: Petitioner contracts 2nd marriage w/o judicial declaration of nullity of the first. Given that bigamy is already consummated, its immaterial that he is now filing for a declaration of nullity. FC 36 is not a defense to bigamy. VITUG: FC40 applies to VOIDABLE marriages and FC36 and 53. Ty vs CA 346 SCRA 327 FACTS: March and August 1977: Edgardo Reyes married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva August 1980: marriage was declared null and void for lack of marriage license (civil), null and void ab ignition for lack of consent of the parties (church) April 1979 (before declaration of nullity): Edgardo Reyes married Ofelia Ty; April 1982 church wedding January 1991: Edgardo filed a Civil case praying for the declaration of his marriage with Ofelia null and void due to lack of marriage license and because he was still married to Anna Maria Ofelia submitted their marriage license and the certification that Edgardos marriage with Anna Maria is declared null and void RTC: marriage to Ofelia null and void ab initio CA: affirmed trial courts decision If marriage is contracted before the Family Code no, if after the Family Code yes. Petition granted RATIO: Both marriages governed by the Civil Code hence, no judicial declaration is necessary Art. 83: Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the 1st spouse of such person with any person other than such 1st spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (3) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (4) The 1st spouse had been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the 2nd marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than 7 years, is generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the 3 cases until declared null and void by a competent court. The sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
ISSUES: st Whether the decree of nullity of the 1 marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly HELD/DECISION:
Carino vs Carino 351 SCRA 127 SC: absent a judicial decree declaring the 1st marriage void, it remains valid (pursuant to Art. 140 of the FC) and 2 marriage is bigamous. Resp. gets nothing except what she can prove as her property via individual income by Art.148 of FC. Morigo vs Morigo 422 SCRA 376 He was acquitted via the retroactive application of his declaration of nullity w/c rendered his first marriage void ab initio. Lacking one element of the crime of bigamy (the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead) he was rightfully acquitted. (addtl principle: voidable marriages, not defense for bigamy) FC 50, FC 43(2) cf. FC 102(4) Compare with FC 147-148 Valdes v. QC-RTC G.R. No. 122749 (July 31, 1996) Facts: 1) Petition for review bewails on a question of law an alleged error committed by RTC
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failed to apply correct law that should govern the disposition of family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both of the parties of the contract January 5, 1971: Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez married 5 children June 22, 1992: valdez sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Art 36 of the FC RTC declared marriage null and void Consuelo Gomez sought for a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Arts 50, 51 and 52 of the FC; she asserted that the FC contained no provisions on the procedure for liquidation of common property in unions without marriage RTC: clarification: considering that Art 147 of the FC explicitly provides that property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their family home and all their other properties for that matter in equal sharesprovisions on co-ownership will apply Petitioner moved fore reconsideration of the order (issue regarding family dwelling) petition denied Appealed
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DECISION OF SC: Trial court correctly applied the law; Questioned orders, dated May 5, 1995 and October 30, 1995 of the trial court are AFFIRMED. REASONS:
in void marriages, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of art 147 or 148 such as the case may be, of the Family Code Art 147 is the remake of Art 144 of the CC 2) this peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively lives together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage 3) under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly of said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family housedhold. Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couples separate property are not included in the co-ownership 4) the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately a court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve the incidental and consequential matters it did not commit error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the family home and all their common property in equal shares as in concluding that in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them the provisions on coownership under the CC not Arts 50, 51 and 52 in relation to arts 102 and 129 of the FC should aptly prevail--- these are only for valid and voidable marriages (community and conjugal partnerships)
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FC 50-53, FC 51 in rel to NCC 886, 888; FC176 NCC 908, 1061 Sec. 21, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003 FC 4 cf. 45 Weigel vs. Sempio-Dy 143 SCRA 499 Facts: Karl Wiegel filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva on the ground of Lilias previous existing marriage to one Eduardo Maxion. Lilia admitted to the previous marriage but claimed that it was null and void since she was forced to enter the said union. In the pre-trial that ensued, both parties agreed that the issue was whether the previous marriage was void or merely voidable. Lilia asked the court for an opportunity to present more evidence but the respondent judge denied the petition. Lilia appeals to the SC in hopes of modifying the agreed facts and to allow her to present evidence in her favor. Issue: WON the prior marriage was void or voidable.

irrelevant since the previous marriage wasnt void but merely voidable (therefore valid, until annulled). Since no annulment was made, her current marriage is therefore void.
Held/Ratio: The petition is devoid of merit. There is no need to prove that her marriage was vitiated by force. Assuming, however that this is so, it would still be
Terre vs. Terre 211 SCRA 6 Facts: The man, a lawyer, pursued a woman despite knowing that she was already married. He convinced her to marry him and that the first marriage was void because the woman married her first cousin, and was thus void ab initio. Since it was void, according to the lawyer, it was no longer necessary to go to court to declare it as such. She agreed to marry him. After the birth of the first child, the lawyer disappeared and contracted a second marriage while claiming that his marriage to the woman was void from the beginning since she had already married her first cousin. Issue: WON an action for judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage is necessary before entering a subsequent marriage. Held/Ratio: Yes. Even if the first mistake was contracted in good faith, the lawyer would still be liable for bigamy after he contracted his second one. It was deemed that the moral character of the respondent was deeply flawed and thus, should be disbarred and struck out from the Roll of Attorneys.
FC 4(1), 47(1), R A 6809 cf FC 14 FC 45(2), 47(2) Lim vs. CA 214 SCRA 237 Not a breach of confidentiality. In the case at bar, the doctor was brought in as a medical expert, and not as the attending physician of the petitioner. Based on the pleadings from the lower courts and petitioners failure to prove otherwise (that the physician blackened the reputation of the petitioner), it shows that Dr. Acampado was there simply as an expert of psychiatry. FC 45(3), 46, 47(3) NCC 1338-1344 Buccat v Buccat 72 Phil 49 Facts: Couple got married, stayed together for 89 days, but suddenly, respondent gave birth to a baby boy after 9 months of being pregnant. As a result of this, plaintiff abandoned respondent and sued her on the basis of her not being a virgin when they were married and thus the marriage was obtained by fraud. CFI Baguio, however, ruled in favor of the respondent. Issue: WON the marriage was valid.
Held/Ratio: The Court upheld the decision of the CFI Baguio in favor of the respondent because they saw no reason to reverse it. They got married when the woman was seven months pregnant. It is an incredible allegation that the wife's advanced pre-natal state was not suspected by the husband. There was no fraud involved.
Aquino v Delizo 108 Phil 21 Facts: Fernando Aquino claimed that his wife deceived him before their marriage by concealing the fact that she was pregnant by another man. The baby was born four months after the marriage. The lower court and the appellate court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the child couldve been born out of lawful wedlock between the spouses. Aquino brought new evidence to the court, chief among which were affidavits of the plaintiffs brother and the defendant herself claiming that they were parents of the child born four months after the marriage. Issue:
WON the concealment of pregnancy by another man prior to marriage can be considered fraud and as such, can it be a ground for annulment. Held/Ratio:
Yes. Under Article 85, par. 4, it is explicitly declared as fraud. Using Buccat v. Buccat as a defense in this case is untenable since in the present case, she was only four months pregnant during the marriage and at that stage the court is not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent.
Anaya v. Palaroan 36 SCRA 97 Facts: After one month of marriage to Anaya, Fernando Palaroan filed a complaint to annul it on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Complaint was dismissed. However, during the negotiation of the amount from Anayas counterclaim, Fernando allegedly divulged that several months prior to the marriage, he had premarital relationships with a close relative. Anaya filed suit to annul on the ground that the marriage solemnized between them constituted fraud in obtained her consent. Fernando denied the allegation and counter claimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit; he did not pray for a dismissal of the complaint but its dismissal with respect to the alleged moral damages. Aurora replied stating that Fernando had no intention of performing his marital duties and obligations since the marriage was contracted as a means for him to escape marrying the close relative that was intimated above. Issue: WON the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage. Held/Ratio: No. Fraud is explicitly defined by Article 86 of the CC. And also states that no other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud that will give grounds for the annulment of marriage.
Macarrubo vs Macarrubo 424 SCRA 42 Facts: Atty. Macarrubo married thrice and thrice had reasons for a void marriage: 1st marriage: psychological incapacity, 2nd marriage: consent by fraud, 3rd marriage: for lack of a marriage license (pending) Held: Disbarred for lack of good moral character. Almelor vs. RTC of Las Piflas G.R. No. 179620 (August 26, 2008) Homosexuality in itself is not grounds for annulment, but consent vitiated by fraud as manifested in a concealment of homosexuality is sufficient grounds. However in this case homosexuality before and at the time of the celebration of the marriage was not proven and thus the petition for annulment is denied.
FC 45(4), 47(4) NCC 1335-1337 RPC 344, last paragraph FC 45(5), 47(5) Jimenez v. Caizares 109 Phil 273 Facts: Aug 3, 1950 Joel Jimenez and Remedios Canizares wed 7 June 1955 the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. This was because her vagina was too small for his member and thus they couldnt copulate and thus she is impotent 14 June 1955 - wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant since plaintiff had no response whatsoever FC (45(6), compare with FC 46(3) FC47 FC47 Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 02,11-10-SC. March 4, 2003 VII(E)( 13 )(b)-(d) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003 Barcelona vs. CA G.R. 130087 (September 24, 2003) Facts: o respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married union begot five children On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the noncomplied marital obligations: o During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the whole day When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration since impotency was never really established. Rather than nullifying marriage Court should have compelled her to undergo and examination ISSUE: WON marriage may be annulled on sole testimony of husband that his wife is impotent HELD: NO law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. Not proven in this case since wife has been unresponsive. Court says that it may not so much be indifference as it is that she is shy and embarrassed about the situation RESULT: presumption is in favor of potency. Case is thus remanded to lower court for further proceedings.
present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no cause for action ISSUE: WON petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana HELD: YES , since petition stated legal right of Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana, and her
act or omission as seen in facts (cause of action 46) FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND GRAVE NATURE OF ILLNESS Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage petition does not need to show (NOT) root cause since only experts can determine it b the physical manifestations of physical incapacity RESULT: PETITION IS DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE OF ACTION Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
A.M No. 02-11-12-SC. March 4, 2003 FC 49-54 Tuason vs. CA 256 SCRA 158 Facts: June 1972 marriage date 1989 filed for declaration of nullity of marriage as pscyh incapacity petitioner failed to show up in hearing thus nullification was granted ISSUE: WON petitioner can file for relief since he was in rehab FC 50, FC 43(2) ef. FC 102(4) Compare with FC 147-148 FC 50-53, FC 51 in rd to NCC 886, 888; FC 176 NCC 908, 1061 FC 4 1-44, compare with NCC 83, 85(2) and 87(2) cf. RPC 349 Jones v. Hortiguela Facts: Dec 1914 Marciana Escano married Arthur Jomes. On 1918 he left and never came back Oct 1919 Escano filed to declare him an absentee granted under art 186 of CC order was published in OG and El Ideal May 6, 1927 Escano married Hortiguela May 9, 1932 Escano died leaving Hortiguela as judicial administrator of her entire estate. Only he and Angelita Jones, daughter from first marriage were her heirs Represented by Paz Corominas since she was a minor May 3, 1934 declared that she was the only heir and her husband should be made administrator of estate Marriage between Escano and Hortiguela was null and void Was a minor and had been assisted by Hortiguelas same lawyers thus her rights were impaired. ISSUE: WON Escano and Hortiguelas marriage was valid. HELD: YES Rules on judicially declaring a person as absentee are different from estate and marriage Estate need to declare someone as absent for precautions for administration of estate of absentee Not necessary in marriage Only need to be absent for 7 years which he was for 9 years before 2nd marriage was made. Recognized Hortiguela as her step-father RESULT: hortiguela has right to be administrator and heir to part of estate. HELD: NO, counsels own negligence not to state he was in rehab Intervention of state isnt necessary since no olds barred contest negates collusion RESULT: petition for relief is denied.
Lukban v. Republic
98 Phil 574 Facts: Dec 10, 1933 petitioner married Lourdes Lukban but left after a fight. Never came back in 20 years. ISSUE: Won Francisco can be declared presumptively dead HELD: No, since it isnt authorized by law and to be declared a widow is dependent upon the death of her husband State of absence will always remain disputable RESULT: petition is denied Gue v RP presumption of death cant be declared since you cant be dead. Pon: Montemayor, J Nature: appeal from order of Court of First Instance in Manila Facts: -Oct 1944- when they got married -Jan 1946 husband went to Shanghai , she followed but came back on 1949 Afterwards never came back ISSUE: WON husband can be declared presumably dead through Art 390 of CC HELD: no cause for action since he will only be presumed dead and this will never become final. May however be used to obtain divorce.
Gue v. Republic 107 Phil 381 Facts: 1) settlement of the estate of the absentee as it is clear he did not leave any * A judicial presumption even if final and executor, would still be a prima facie presumption only and it still disputableit is for this reason that it cannot be a subject of a judicial pronouncement or declarationproof of actual death would still have to be determined 6) Appealed- invoked the provisions of Art 390 of the New Civil Codeabsence of 7 yearsfor succession shall not be presumed dead till after an absence of 10 years 7) According to appellant with promulgation of the NCC in 1950, the courts are now authorized to declare persons presumptively dead SOLICITOR GENERAL:opposed to the petition; same reason as above (*) SC: the appeal order dismissing the petition is AFFIRMED
Appeal from an order of the CFI Manila dismissing the petition of Angelina Gue 2) Oct 11, 1944: married to William Gue and had a child Anthony Gue; another child Eulogio 3) on January 5, 1946 her husband left Manila and went to Shanghai China but since then had not been heard of, neither had he written to her nor in any way communicated with her and she failed to locate him despite of her efforts and diligence 4) they had not acquired any property during the marriage 5) she asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of William gue (Art 390 of the CC) CFI: after publication and hearing, issued the order of dismissal no right had been established by the petitioner upon which a judicial decree may be predicated and this action is not for
SSS vs. Jarque vda. De Bailon G.R. No. 165545 (March 24, 2006) Facts: Bailon contracted 3 marriages in his lifetime Alice Diaz -1st wife was presumed dead Elisa Jayona 2nd wife Teresita Jarque respondent. ISSUE: WON 2nd marriage is made void by appearance of first wife who was presumed NCC 15, 17 FC26 Benedicto v Dela Rama (December 8, 1903) Facts: dead. HELD: NO 2nd marriage is valid more than 1st marriage and SS had no jurisdiction to say that 1st marriage was the valid marriage 1st wife is deemed absent until action for annulment is filed. -
This is an action for divorce on the ground of abandonment and adultery 2) The answer charged the plaintiff with adultery, denied the adultery imputed to defendant, and asked for divorce CFI: granted the divorce to plaintiff and 81, 042. 76 pesos as her share of the conjugal property- court assumed that the provisions of the civil code relating to divorce contained in title 4 of book1 are still in force 3) Married in July 1891 to august 1892 happily together 4) The defendant suddenly without any previous warning took his wife to the house of her parents, left her there and never lived with her afterwards 5) The plaintiff: complains that husband committed adultery with one GREGORIA BERMEJO in 1892 6) Other two charges relate to 1899 and 1901 insufficient evidence ARGUMENTS; a) The power of the gov gen, without such order to suspend the operation of the code b) The order of suspension is inoperative did not mention the book of this code in which the suspended titles 4 and 1q2 were to be found c) Title 4: relates to marriage and divorce , title 12: to civil registry (book 1) SC: this is an error Ratio: 1) July 31, 1889, the Civil Code as it existed in the peninsula was extended to the phils and took effect on dec 8, 1889 2) On dec 31, an order was published which states that titles 4 and 12 of the CC are suspended in the archipelagono decree can be found published in the Gaceta 3) The history of Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 is well known. As a consequence of the religious liberty proclaimed in the consti of 1869, the whole of the law was in force in the peninsula. But that basis was wanting in these islands, and prior to the promulgation of the CC in 1889, no part of the law was in force here, except arts 44 to 78 which were promulgated in 1883 4) It is claimed that if these are suspended, the only marriages in the islands would be canonical and the only courts competent to declare a divorce would be ecclesiastical 5) There can be no doubt that the order of suspension refers to titles 4 and 12 f book 1 and it has always been understoodfollows that arts 42-107 of the CC were not in force here 6) The canon law had not as such any binding force outside the church-
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however, any part of the canon law which by proper action of the civil authorities had become a civil law stood upon same footing as any other law in spain COUNCIL OF TRENTthese decrees have in spain the force of a civil law It may be doubted if these decrees, even if considered as extended to the phils and in force here, furnish any aid in the solution of the question CANONISTS: declare adultery to be a ground for divorcehowever, the causes for divorce are nowhere distinctly stated therein The laws of the church which do state what these causes are have not the force of civil laws The DECRETAL LAW abolishing in the peninsula the special jurisdictions was extended to the phils DECRETAL LAW STATES: ecclesiastical courts shall continue to take cognizance of matrimonial and ellemosynary causes and of ecclesiastical offenses in accordance with provisions of canon law and have jurisdiction over causes of divorce and annulment of marriage as provided by the Council of Trentbut incidents with respect to the deposit of a married woman, alimony, suit money and other temporal affairs shall pertain to ordinary courts PARTIDAS: contain provisions relating to the subject of divorcestates that when spouses are separated by law, it is not then considered that man separates them, but the written law and the impediment existing between them Two forms of separation with two reasons: one is religion and the other the sin of fornication Religion if on desires to take holy orders and the other should grant permissionwith authority of the church Divorce due to adultery or fornication brought before the judge of the holy church, includes spiritual fornication In here the spouses are separated but the marriage still subsists, neither one of them can contract second marriage at any time excepting in the case of separation granted by reason of adultery in which case the surviving spouse may remarry after the death of the other No other person but the spouses themselves can make an accusation for such a cause and it ought be made before the bishop or the ecclesiastical judge either by the parties themselves of their attorneys
19) This divorce did not annul the marriage 20) That either spouse has been guilty of adultery is a defense to his or her suit so is the fact that she has pardoned herif after a divorce has been granted to the husband, he commits adultery, there is a waiver of the judgment ISSUE: Were these provisions of the partidas in force in the island prior to 1889? The general rule was that laws of the Peninsula did not rule in the colonies unless they were expressly extended to them, as to certain laws, this result was, however, accomplished in another way RECOPILACION de lasLEYES de INDIASprovision thatand as to all matters not provided for by the laws of this compilations, the laws of the compilations and the PARTIDAS of tese kingdoms of the Castile shall be followed in the decisions of causes in accordance with the following law By the operation of this law (TORO), first enacted in 1530, those laws of the PARTIDAS herein before referred to relating to divorce, upon the discovery and settlement of the Phils became at once effective thereinthey have remained in force since all civil laws of the state as distinguished from laws of the church Being in force on august 13, 1898they continued to be in force with other laws of a similar nature The PARTIDAS recognized adultery as a ground for divorcetherefore according to the civil as well as canonical law in force in august 13, 1898the commission of the offense gave the injured party the right to a divorce That provision of the substantive civil law was not repealed by the change of sovereignty The complete separation of the church and the state under the American govt while it changed the tribunal in which this right should be enforced, could not affect the right itself The fact that ecclesiastical courts no longer exercise such power is not important The jurisdiction formerly possessed by them is now vested in CFI by virtue of ACT no. 136 The RESULT: A) the courts of CFI have jurisdiction to entertain suit for divorce B) that the only ground therefore is adultery
C) that the action on that ground can be maintained by husband and D) that the decree does not dissolve the marriage bond
DECISION: the CFI of Iloilo therefore, committed no error in assuming the jurisdiction of this case The adultery of the defendant was fully proved Adultery of the plaintiff is however, plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence (PROOFletter) Letter: confession of guilt? MAIN ISSUE: adultery 1) The lack of evidence destroys the theory of the court below and of the appellee that the defendant expelled the plaintiff from his house because he was tired of her and desired the company of other women 2) Not adequate to explain the sudden termination of their marital relations 3) Testimony of the defendant correctly explained the theoryhe stated that on his return from an inspection of one his estates his wifes maid gave him a letter in the handwriting of his wife and directed to her lover, a Spanish corporal of the civil guard, named ZABAL 4) She admitted the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees and implored him to pardon herthat same day he took her to the home of her parents, told what had occurred and left her there 5) If The plaintiff is guilty the defendant has condoned the offenseno factual evidence on this claim PRINCIPLE: a) Law 6 , title 9 partida 4, the wife can defeat the husbands suit for divorce by proving that he has pardoned her but no laws in the partidas which say that the effect of the pardon would be so farreaching as to entitle her to a divorce against him in a case like this present one CONCLUSION: Neither of the party is entitled to a divorceboth committed adultery JUDGMENT REVERSED COOPER, J. DISSENTING Immaterial which law governs , since under each causes for divorce are substantially the same, one of which is adultery
Higher court not to review the findings of the lower courtsmore competent since they have the witnesses Condonation: offending party is restored to the same position he or she occupied before the offense was committed the only condition being that the offense must not be repeated Not proper to say that just because plaintiff has once been guilty she would forever lose her right to a divorce makes condonation conditionedparty granting it shall forever have the right to commit the same offense himself with impunity
Condoned offence not being sufficient as a cause for divorce, is not a bar to divorce in favor of the plaintiff condonation restores equality before the law The court has not only reversed the judgment of the trial court but has entered a judgment against the plaintiff To deprive the plaintiff of the judgment which she has obtained and make a final determination of the case here without giving her an opportunity of correcting this error, if such exists, is inequitable and unjust
Arca vs Javier (July 31, 1954) Tenchavez v. Escao (supra) Van Dorn v. Romillo 139 SCRA 139 Facts: 1972 Van Dorn a Filipino and Romillo a US citizen married in Hongkong o established residence in Phil 1982 obtained divorce in Nevada, US o petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn June 8, 1983 Romillo is contesting for his share in Galleon Shop which he contends is conjugal property ISSUE: WON Romillo still has rights on conjugal property HELD: NO June 11, 1982 already acknowledged in divorce proceedings in Nevada Court that the and petitioner had no community property as of said date. US divorce releases Romillo from marriage under American law where divorce dissolves marriage thus also relinquished any rights he may have obtained through marriage including property Cannot hold Fil law against petitioner is not valid since own law would discriminate her. -
Somera v. Pilapil 174 SCRA 663 FACTS Sept 7, 1979 Imelda Pilapil a Filipino married Erich Geiling German in Federal Republic Germany. They later resided in Malate, Manila Jan 1983 asked for divorce which was obtained on Jan 15 1986 June 27, 1986 Geiling filed two complaints of adultery with William Chia and Jesus Chua ISSUE: WON he can still file for adultery after German divorce HELD: NO 344 of RPC only offended spouse may bring case of adultery to court and should still be spouse when complaint was filed. Since he filed it after he divorce was decree he is now not considered a spouse o absurd to bring action determined by his status before or subsequent to commencement of adultery. Marriage in his part was already extinguished thus he cannot sue as spouse anymore -
Quita vs CA 300 SCRA 406 Facts: Fe Quita married Arturo Padlan on May 18, 1941 but had no children. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce
in the US and subsequently remarried. On April 1972, Arturo died without a will. Blandina Dandan, who was married to Arturo on April 1947 and had five legitimate children with the deceased, claimed to be the surviving spouse. The trial court invoked the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escano, which held that a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the Civil Code was not entitled to recognition was valid in this jurisdiction, and discarded the divorce between Fe and Arturo. It expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo. Blandidas marriage to Arturo was bigamous since it was contracted on April 1947. During the proceedings, when asked by Blandida whether or not Fe was entitled to inherit from
decedent considering their divorce, Fe replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. Issue: WON Fe is entitled to inherit in spite of the divorce secured in the United States. Held/Ratio: No. Her statement in the facts implied that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Llorente vs CA 345 SCRA 592 Facts: Lorenzo, serviceman of the US Navy, visited his wife in the Philippines and discovered her pregnant and having an adulterous relationship with his brother. Wife, Paula, gave birth to a baby boy whose certificate stated that the child was illegitimate and the line of the fathers name was left blank. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and the couple drew a written agreement wherein: (1) support for Paula would be suspended, (2) marital union would be dissolved in accordance with judicial proceedings, (3) a separate agreement would be made re: conjugal property, and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous acts. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce; wife was represented by counsel. Divorce was granted on 1952. He returned to the Philippines and on 1958 he married Alicia Llorente. Alicia lived in the same town as Lorenzos ex-wife but did not know of the latters previous relations with her new husband. Regardless, their 25-year union produced 3 children. On March of 1981, he wrote a will which was notarized which bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. On January 1984, the court, finding that the will was duly executed, admitted the will to probate. However before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula then filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Although Alicia filed a similar petition, RTC issued a joint decision awarding the testamentary dispositions of the will to Paula (because Llorenzos divorce to her was void and inapplicable in the Philippines) and the illegitimate children conceived through Alicia. This was later modified to classify only one child by Alicia as qualified to be considered illegitimate and Alicia herself to be declared as co-owner of whatever properties the couple may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation. The latter appealed, was denied by the CA, and thus the existence of current petition. Issue: WON Alicia is entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente. Held/Ratio: Yes. The fact that Lorenzo became an American citizen, procured a divorce from Paula, married Alicia, executed his will, and then died is duly established and undisputed. The trial court and the CA disregarded the wills dispositions in favor of Alicia because they considered her a mere paramour. But the divorce should be recognized as a matter of comity. Now the effect of such a divorce is best determined by the trial court.
Garcia vs Recio 366 SCRA 437 Facts: A Filipino (Recio) was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen in 1987. In 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian family court. On 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen and married a Filipina (Garcia) in Cabanatuan City. The application for marriage license showed that Recio was single and Filipino. Late 1995, couple started living separately. On May 1996, conjugal assets were divided in accordance with Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. On 1998, Garcia filed a complaint to nullify the marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that Recio had a subsisting marriage when they were married and that she only became aware of this on November of the preceding year. Recio says otherwise and claims that his first marriage was dissolved by the Australian divorce decree, was legally capacitated to marry, and that Garcia was aware of this as early as 1993. On 1998, five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending respondent was
able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. RTC declared the marriage dissolved because the Australian divorce had ended the marriage. Garcia filed current petition in the SC. Issues/ Held/Ratio: (1) WON the divorce between Recio and Samson was proven The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Diego vs Castillo 436 SCRA 67
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws. (2) WON Recio was legally capacitated to marry Garcia No. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected. The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. Since he is an Australian, none of the records he produced do not absolutely prove that he has legal capacity to marry on January 12, 1994. However, Garcias prayer to declare the marriage null and void based on bigamy cannot be granted because it may turn out that Recio did, in fact, have capacity to marry. Hence, the SC believes that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates.
RP vs. Orbecido G.R.No. 154380 (October 5,2005) Facts: Orbecido married Villanueva in the Philippines and had two children. Villanueva, wife, left for the US, was naturalized and eventually remarried. Orbecido petitioned for authority to remarry using Par. 2 of Article 26, FC. No opposition. OSGs motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this appeal stating: that the questioned provision only applies to valid mixed marriages between Filipinos and aliens; that the remedy is annulment or legal separation; and that there is no law that governs respondents situation. Issue: Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Held/Ratio: Taking into consideration legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Par. 2 Art 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties, who at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce degree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. The reckoning point in the provision is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
San Luis vs. San Luis G.R. 133743 (February 2, 2007)
Facts: 1)
Gov. contracted three marriages: a) Virginia Sulit (March 17, 1942) out of which were born 6 children (Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita, and Manuel) in 1963 Virginia predeceased Felicisimo 2) May 1, 1968: felicisimo married Merry Lee Cowin (American citizen) with whom he had a son TobiasMerrly Lee filed complaint for divorce before the family court of the Court of First Circuit of Hawaii which issued decree Granting absolute divorce and awarding child custody (dec 14, 1973) 3) June 20, 1974: felicisimo married felicidad San Luis (respondent) in Los Angeles, CA no childrenlived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on dec 18, 1992 4) Respondent sought dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and settlement of felicisimos estatefiled petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati 5) Respondent alleged that she is the widow of felicisimo that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage and son by second marriageprayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her 6) Feb 4, 1994: petitioner Rodolfo San Luis child of felicisimo in the first marriage filed motion to dismissgrounds: improper venue to state a cause of actionshould have been filed in the province of laguna because this was the place f residence of felicisimo prior to his death; claimed further that respondent has no legal personality to file petition since she was only a mistress of felicisimo since the latter during the time of his death was still legally married to Merry Lee 7) Feb 15, 1994: Linda invoked the same grounds 8) Feb 28, 1994: RTC issued an order denying the motions 9) Unaware of the denial of motions to dismiss: respondent filed (Mar 5, 1994) opposition submitted documentary evidence that felicisimo regularly went home to their house in New ALabang, villahe, Alabang MM; presented absolute divorce decree issued by court n Hawaii to prove that second marriage was dissolvedclaims felicisimo has legal capacity to marry her 10) Petitioners asserted that par 2 art 26 of FC cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with felicisimo since this would impair vested rights in derogation of Art 256 of the FC 11) Oct 24, 1994: motion for reconsideration was dismissedrespondent, as widow of
decedent possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that the venue was properly laid TC: dismissed the petition for letters of administration; 1) Felicisimo was duly elected gov of laguna petition must have been filed in sta cruz laguna 2) Because marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous thus void ab initio (divorce obtained by merry lee not valid in the Phils) 3) Art 26 par 2 cannot be retroactively applied for it would impair the vested rights of felicisimos legitimate children CA: REVERSED and SET ASIDE orders of the trial court Said that term residence refers to actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicilesince he actually resided in Alabang Muntinlupa even though he is discharging his functions in lagunathus the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati Held that felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of Art 26 par 2 of the FC (Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr) and Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera) Found that marriage between Merry Lee and felicisimo was validly dissolved by virtue of decree of absolute divorce (not a bigamous marriagecourts cannot deny what the law grants) ISSUES: 1) Whether venue was properly laid 2) Whether respondent has the legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration DECISION OF SC: Petition lacks Merit.; Petition is DENIED. The decision of CA reinstating and affirming the RTC which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIMRED. Case REMANDED to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and felicisimo Found that respondents legal capacity to file subject petition for letter of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of felicisimo or as his co-owner under Art 144 of the CC or Art 148 of the FC
REASONS: 1) Section1 Rule 73 of rules of courtpetition for letters of administration should be filed in the RTC of the province in which he resides at the time of his deathrule for determining residence (Garcia Fule vs CA) contradistinguised from domicile
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Residence or residespopular sense, meaning, the personal actual or physical habitation of a person, signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereatmeans simply residence, personal residence not legal residence or domicile no particular length of time required, however, residence must be more than temporary Incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence is the same as domicile for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of felicisimothis is often used in election laws Since respondent proved that deceased also maintained a residence in Alabang Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his deathsubject petition was validly filed before the RTC of Makati LEGAL PERSONALITY: issue: whether the fil was divorced by his alien spouse abroad and may validly remarry under the CC marriage solemnized before the FC took effectno need to retroactively apply art 26 but use the sufficient jurisprudential basis affirmativePilapil vs. Ibay-Somera; Quita vs CA, Van Dorn vs. ROmillo JR. Historical background and legislative intent behind art 26 par 2 Van dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is valdly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of Art 26 par 2 of the FC thereof our lawmakers codified the already established through judicial precedent--the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served
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The law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of the intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature is to RENDER JUSTICE 10) Proof of authenticity and due execution of documents must be presented --- public document requirements: a) an official publication; b) copy attested thereof by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Phils copy must be: a) accompanied by certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Phil foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and b) authenticated by the seal of his office 11) Present; validity of divorce 12) Even if felicisimo is not capacitated to remarry, respondent still has legal capacity she may be considered the co-owner of felicisimo as regards properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation NOTE: IF she proves validity of divorce and capacity to remarry bu felicisimo but fails to prove that their marriage was validly performed according to law of the USconsidered co-owner in Art 144 of the CCparties living together without benefit of marriage or void from the beginningco-ownership If fails to prove the validity of both divorce and marriageapplicable art would be Art 148 of FC regulating property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to remarryregime of limited co-ownership
AMOR-CATALAN vs. CA G.R. No. 167109 (February 6,2007) Bayot vs CA G.R. No. 155635 (Nov. 27, 2008) FC4,FC16, NCC84, RPC351-352 R.A. 6955, An Act to Declare Unlawful the Practice of Matching Filipino Women for Marriage to Foreign Nationals R.A. 9208, Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003
SEPARATION OF THE SPOUSES Benedicto v. De la Rama 3 Phil 34 FC 23 8-248 NCC 221 (1) Albano v. Gapusan 71 SCRA 26. Facts: law considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership FC 26, Par 2 = Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law -
Albano a municipal judge prepared and notarized a document providing for personal separation of Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership o if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage, as the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other. o Did this since they were separated for a long time and to forestall violent incidents between husband and wife ISSUE: WON Judge Albano can notarize a personal separation? HELD: NO
In re: Atty. Rufillo Bucana 72 SCRA 14 Facts: November 10, 1975 notarized an Agreement executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon wherein the they agreed that "in case anyone of them will remarry both parties offer no objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them o Allow them to have concubine, extra-marital affairs Defense: said to have been prepared by his clerk and he only signed it out of negligence ISSUE: WON he committed grave act of misconduct in notarizing agreement HELD: YES, guilty of malpractice it is for the notary to inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify and to take part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been admitted to the practice of law, and as such, in the commingling of his duties notary and lawyer, must be held responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by the court even to the extent of disbarment."
FC 26 paragraph 2 Tenchavez v. Escao, supra Van Dorn v. Romillo (supra) Somera v, Pilapil, (supra) Muslim Code 45-5 5 NCC97 A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC. March 4, 2003 FC 55(8) RPC 333 & 334 RPC 247
Goitia v. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil 252 Facts: Jan 7, 1915 parties were legally married but after a month woman left because of gross acts by her husband Marriage a contract in so far as civil effects are concerned requiring consent of parties o After marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the 2 o Reciprocal rights arise and legal existence becomes one o Termination of it should result in some relief ISSUE: WON art 149 is absolute and therefore cant grant wife any support since she was the one who left home Person obliged to give support can either pay the pension fixed or receive and maintain in his home the person. HELD: NO Separation is different from support given to wife as agreed upon in the contract they entered into when they got married when husband promised to support wife. Wife is still part of conjugal domicile even if she doesnt live in house anymore RESULT: should pay support
Gandionco v. Peflaranda 155 SCRA 725 Facts: On Separation: civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense o governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure o refers to civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense." o action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other o decree of legal separation on ground of concubinage may be issued without criminal conviction of concubinage thus no need to wait On support o can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge RESULT: petition is dismissed -
29 May 1986 - respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages 13 October 1986 respondent also filed in Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City a complaint against petitioner for concubinage, 14 November 1986 respondent filed for support of pendent lite which was granted on 10 December 1986 Petitioner contends that civil action for legal separation and its consequences should be suspended in light of criminal charge of concubinage under Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure o After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered ISSUE: WON other actions should be suspended due to criminal action of concubinage HELD: NO
Ong vs Ong 505 SCRA 76 Facts: February 25, 1976 petitioner Imelda Ong executed in favor of private respondent Sandra Maruzzo, then a minor, a Quitclaim Deed transferring parcel of land to Sandra On November 19, 1980 petitioner then revoked such quitclaim and donated it to son Rex Ong Jimenez on Jan 20, 1982 June 20, 1983 - Sandra Maruzzo, through her guardian ownership/possession and nullification of the Deed of Donation o Petitioners claim that quitclaim is null and void since she was of no legal capacity to accept such donation

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RTC/ CA - held that the Quitclaim Deed is equivalent to a Deed of Sale and thus Sandra had a right to it March 15, 1985 reached age of majority and replaced guardian as respondent ISSUE: WON Sandra has a right to the land through quitclaim HELD: YES presumption is that there is a sufficient cause of the contract thus need to prove otherwise Article 741 of the Civil Code provides that the requirement of the acceptance of the FCC 55 compare with FC 46(4) FC 5 5(9), compare with NCC 97(2) FC 101 par. 3, compare with separation in fact FC 55, compare with NCC 99 FC 57, compare with NCC 102, NCC 99
donation in favor of minor by parents of legal representatives applies only to onerous and conditional donations where the donation may have to assume certain charges or burdens o In this case no such burden was assumed by then minor thus quitclaim is recognized even without a guardian RESULT: CA ruling is affirmed
Lapuz v. Eufemio 43 SCRA 177 August 18, 1953: Camen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufeimo S. Eufemio, alleging: September 21, 1934: Civil Marriage September 30, 1934: Canon Marriage Lived together until 1943 when Eufemio abandoned Lapuz No children Lapuz found out Eufemio was cohabiting with Go Hiok on or about March 1949 Prayed for issuance of legal partnership and that Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership of profits Eufemios answer: Declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Lapuz on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs with Go Hiok alias Ngo Hiok During pendency of case, Lapuz died in a vehicular accident (May 31, 1969) June 9, 1969: Eufemio moved to dismiss petition for legal separation on 2 grounds: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. June 26, 1969: Counsel for Lapuz moved to substitute the deceased by her father, Macario July 29, 1969: Court dismissed the case Carmen Lapuzs cause of action has not survived Did not act on the motion for substitution Eufemio acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio. ISSUE: WON death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, WON abatement also applies if the action involves property rights? HELD: (1) YES, action for legal separation is purely personal (1) made by innocent spouse (2) can still stop proceedings if they reconcile the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself (2) YES solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree Art 106 of civil code provides for rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses thus cannot be transferred to anyone after their death rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. enumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court do not enumerate actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage even actions of bigamy, when one has died all actions cease. the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved
questions of property are now carried out not in nullity of marriage proceedings but intestate
proceedings.
Matubis v. Praxedes 109 Phil 789 Facts: Socorro MatubisZoilo Praxedes (1/10/43). But from 5/30/44 they lived separately from each other. They had an agreement on4/3/48 where: They relinquish their rights over each other as h & w That they cannot prosecute each other for concubinage or adultery (condonation) That each is no longer entitled to support from the other spouse Neither can claim anything from each other On Jan 1955, Zoilo cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth on Sept. 1955 and recorded as Zoilos. they also publicly appeared as h&w. Socorro then filed on 4/24/56 @CFI CamSur for legsep and change of surname against husband due to abandonment and concubinage. TC declared that Zoilos acts constitutes concubinage but dismissed complaint due to: CC 102 said action for legsep can only be filed a year after such grounds have arisen. Socorro said to have known cohab of Zoilo since Jan 1955 but action was filed on FC 58-60; Sec 19, RA 9262 A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC. March 4, 2003 Araneta vs Concepcion 99 Phil 709 FACTS: 1) Petitioner filed action against his wife for legal sep ground: adultery 2) Defendant filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5000 for herself and said children and the return of her passport to enjoin plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her as well as pay for attorneys fees 3) Plaintiff denied misconduct imputed to him and alleging that defendant has abandoned the childrenconjugal properties were worth only P80,000 contends defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she has abandoned them and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children to love, respect and care of a true mother and w/o means to educate them CFI: granted custody of the children to defendant and a monthly allowance of P2300 for support for her and the children, P300 for a house and P2000 as attorneys fees; reconsideration denied DECISION OF SC; Writ prayed for is ISSUED and the respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support pendent elite in accordance with this opinion. The ocurts order fixing the alimony and requiring payment is REVERSED RATIO: 1) main reason given by judge for refusing plaintiffs request that evidence be allowed to be introduced: art 103 of CC6 months allowancecooling off period 2) provision of code is mandatorycourt understands that the introduction of any evidence, be it on the merits of the case 4/24/56 which was outside reglementary period CC 100 legsep can be invoked by innocent spouse, i.e. that there was no condonation. But agreement b/w Zoilo and Socorro showed that there was condonation (Exhibit B of their agreement) Therefore this petition. ISSUE: WON TC erred in saying that petitioner filed her case for legal separation out of time and cannot claim it since she is not an innocent spouse HELD: YES knew of legal separation on Jan 1955 but only made the complaint on April 24, 1956 o Art 102 of NCC provides for time one can file for legal separation As shown in the agreement she condoned and consented to (1) living separately (2) can commit grounds for legal separation ie concubinage Condonation and consent are expressed thus cannot claim to be innocent spouse which law provides for (NCC 100)

allegations of adultery letter of authenticity as evidenceabandonment of conjugal abodeevidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to the custody and alimony pendent elite may be lawfully exercised 8) the rule is that all the provisions of the law even if apparenty contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if necessary 9) thus determination of custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period evidence not affecting the casue of the separation, like the actual custody of children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which is best for their custody 7)
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or on any incident, is prohibitedstatus quo to be preserved for this time it may be noted that since 6 mos have elapsed since the filing of the petition may not be allowedreasons for granting the preliminary injunction should be given tat the scope of the art cited may be explained cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation but this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of children and alimony and support pendent elite according to the circumstances the law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances, if these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may be casued
Ocampo v Florenciano 107 Phil 35 1938 - marriage 1951 - plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas June 1951 - sent her to Manila study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year; 1952 - defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately June 18, 1955 - wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame; signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action July 5, 1955 - the complaint for legal separation was filed ISSUE: WON husband can file for legal separation based on adultery when (1) wife confessed to the adultery (2) did not actively search for wife when she left conjugal home HELD: YES on both instances 1. what is prohibited is using ONLY the confession as grounds for legal separation since this may be evidence of collusion between the two. However in this case, there is strong evidence other than the confession to prove the adultery of the wife o def of collusion: the agreement between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce o merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand 2. not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return. o Wife was the one who left the husband. Agreed with CA - his action was not filed within one year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity. But still pushed through with proceedings and reversed CAs decision
Lapuz vs Eufemio (supra) Samosa vs Vamenta Jr.
46 SCRA 110 on 6/18/71 petitioner Lucy Samosa filed for legsep for concubinage and attempt against her life. She also sought for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property (under admin and management of priv resp). Clemente Ramos (priv resp) opposed such saying that hearing the pet for injunction would only make the prospect of reconciliation dim. CFI Judge Vamenta Jr granted such motion to suspend hearing on the injunction. And thus this certiorari ISSUE: WON preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy on exclusive property of wife that is currently being administered by her husband can be tried in court even before the 6month period allotted in cases of legal separation HELD: YES Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the sixmonth period. Art 103 provides that in cases where court deems proper, it can appoint another to manage property between husband and wife. o In this case her paraphernal property o Would show that it is not an aggravating circumstacnce to the prescribed 6-month period deemed as the cooling off period In any case, more than 6 months have already passed thus court can hear both legal separtion and mandatory injunction. -
Pacete v. Cariaga 231 SCRA 321 Priv Resp Concepcion AlanisPetitioner Enrico Pacete on 4/30/38 which produced a daughter (Consuelo). Pacete contracted 2nd marriage in 1948 with Clarita de la Concepcion. She learned of such marriage only in 8/1/79. She averred that during their union, Pacete acquired vast properties (lands, fishponds, several motor vehicles), that he fraudulently placed several properties under his name or Claritas or children with Claritas, and other dummies. On 10/29/79 Alanis filed @ CFI Cotabato for the dec of nullity of the marriage b/w Enrico and Clarita dela Concepcion as well s for their legal separation, accounting and separation of their properties. PAcete filed beyond the original period given. Plaintiff filed for motion to declare PAchete in default which the court granted. On 3/17/80 CFI Cotabato I decreed legsep of enrico and concepcion alanis and held marriage between clarita and enrico as null and void. ISSUE: WON petition for certiorari can rightfully be claimed by petitioner who missed the deadline for submission of answer. FC58 FC 61 par. 1 FC 61 par. 2 De Ia Via v. Villareal 41 Phil 13 Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance: divorce; partition of the conjugal property, and alimony pendente lite in the sum of P400/month 1) adultery; husband ejected her from conjugal home and thus she established her residence in Iloilo, that she had no means of support and was only living at the expense of one of her daughters HELD: YES As stated in Art 101, at the non-appearance of defendant the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. o In this case there was no state intervention thus petition for certiorari is granted and proceedings before it are set aside o Need for state intervention and compliance with other statutory requirements when legal separation is filed for even when other remedies such as of land are attached to it. petition for certiorari is allowed when the default order is improperly declared, or even when it is properly declared, where grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration
2) preliminary injunction restraining her and prohibiting her husband from conjugal property since defendant was trying to alienate or encumber said property CFI granted preliminary injunction but respondent appealed claiming that CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction since wife should follow his domicile and that the judge has exceeded his power in granting the preliminary injunction. ISSUE: 1. WON a married woman ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage 2. WON the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action HELD: 1. YES, when the husband has given enough reason for her to do so as example, cause of divorce. The law will recognize a wife as having a separate existence, and separate interests, and separate rights, in those cases where the express object of all proceedings is to show that the relation itself ought to be dissolved The law making the domicile of the husband that of the wife is applicable only to their relations with third parties, and has no application in cases of actual separation and controversy between themselves as to the temporary or permanent severance of the marriage ties by judicial proceedings 2. YES, in protection of her share in the property Section 164 of Act No. 190 provides: A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established, in the manner hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of the judge granting it: 1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded
and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually; 2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; 3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, on is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. - is a logical and necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon Courts of First Instance law making the husband the sole administrator of the property of the conjugal partnership is founded upon necessity and convenience as well as upon the presumption that, from the very nature of the relating between husband and wife, the former will promote and not injure the interests of the latter. when that relation ceases and, in a proper action, the wife seeks to dissolve the marriage and to partition the conjugal property, it is just and proper, in order to protect the interests of the wife, that the husband's power of administration be curtailed, during the pendency of the action, insofar as alienating or encumbering the conjugal property is concerned. , if the defendant should dispose of all or any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action for divorce, and squander or fraudulently conceal the proceeds, that act "would probably work injustice to the plaintiff," or that it would probably be "in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual RESULT: judge acted within his jurisdiction
Sabalones v. CA 230 SCRA 79 Samson- Remedios married Samson Sabalones- member of diplomatic service left to his wife remedios Sabalones the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15 years Oct 5, 1981 Samson-Thelma !985 retired as ambassador but didnt go back to wife and kids 1989 filed action for judicial authorization to sell conjugal property claiming that he is very sick and living alone without income Prayer of Remedios asked to grant legal separation and liquidation of property Appealed in Ca, she prayed for preliminary injunction which was granted
WON CA can issue a writ of preliminary injunction against husband on part of his conjugal property HELD: YES Purpose of prelim injunction: preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit.

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Requirements: (1) existence of a right (2) actual or threatened violation. Art 61 of FC which provides for an administrator of conjugal assets was already made when TC denied petitioner any share on conjugal relations and CA gave respondent the preliminary injunction Allegations: harassing tenant of Forbes park, having other properties, issuing quit claim on US conjugal party and all of which was not
contested by petitioner thus just gives more reason to grant preliminary injunction RESULT: prelim injunction is granted however this does not permanently make the respondent the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets.
FC 62 cf. FC 49, FC 198 Yangco v. Rhode 1 Phil 404 cant ask for support without necessary evidence -Complaint filed by Victorina Obin against petitioner praying she be declared lawful wife of said Yango, sheb e granted divorce, and allowance of alimony and attorneys fees -Luis contested declaration of marriage since there was not witness to it. -granted alimony even if there was still doubt as expressed by judge. ISSUE: WON judge had jurisdiction to grant alimony/support to Victorina Obin HELD: NO Need to show documents or circumstances of relationship that allows one to ask for support. In this case, evidence should be the canonical cerificate This case, only claimed to be the wife and judge who issued the support said he issued it with doubt. DISSENT: Should give support to wife, unfair to her Court of First Instance had the jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues upon which the right to alimony depended, and whether the remedy by an appeal from an erroneous exercise of this jurisdiction is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy that had been provided, and if cases occur in which it does not afford adequate relief it is the default of the legislative power and it rests with it to provide additional remedies. . Article 68 of the Civil Code provides that after a petition for a nullity of marriage or for a divorce has been interposed and admitted certain provisions shall be adopted during the pendency of the suit, among which is a provision for the support of the wife and such children as do not remain under the power of the husband. o
De la Via v. Villareal, supra Araneta v. Concepcion (supra) Samosa v. Vamenta (supra) Lerma v. CA 61 SCRA 440 - May 1951 Lerma (P) and Diaz (R )get married - Aug 1969 P files a complaint for adultery vs. R and her lover Teodoro Ramirez - Nov 1969 R files for legal separation and / or separation of properties, custody of children and support pendente lite (during pendency of action) for youngest son, Gregory on the grounds of concubinage and attempt against her life CFI (1970) R is entitled to support pendente lite from the date of Rs filing the complaint, the amount would be a monthly support of Php 1, 820 - P raised the petition to the CA CA (1971) - initially issuing a preliminary injunction on the decision of the lower court to give the respondent the opportunity to present evidence to the lower court, the CA dismissed the petition after the respondent asked for a reconsideration saying that he were not asking for a chance to present evidence to the lower court CFI (1972) R and Ramirez are convicted of adultery, this decision was appealed to the CA - P files a new case of adultery against R and new lover, Manila policeman Jose Gochangco - P raises the petition against the giving support pendent elite to the SC, claiming, among others, that R did not ask for the enforcement of the CFI orders until he filed a second adultery charge against R
ISSUE: WON respondent can still claim for support even though she has already been convicted of adultery HELD: NO Adultery is recognized as a defense for support o CC Article 303 - obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance
CC 921 - one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation If allowed one would only need to file a case of legal separation no matter how groundless in order to get support Mere filing would not set Art 292 of FC to action. Still preclude loss of such right in certain cases.
Pacete v. Cariaga supra FC 56(2); NCC 100 Matubis v. Praxedes, supra People v. Sansano 50 Phil 73 People v. Schneckenberger 73 Phil 413 FACTS: 1) May 15, 1926: accused Rodolfo married the complainant Elena Ramirez Cartagena 2) After 7 years, agreed for reason of alleged incompatibility of character to live separately from each other 3) May 25, 1935: they executed document agreement 4) June 15, 1935: accused w/o leaving the phils secured a divorce decree from civil court of Juarez, bravos dist of Chihuahua mexico 5) May 11, 1936: he contracted another marriage with co-accused Julia medel in the justice of peace court of malabon, rizal and lived together as husband and wife in manila 6) Because of the nullity of the divorce decree, complainant herein instituted two actions against the accused one for bigamy and another for concubinage CFI: first culminated in the conviction of accusedsentenced to a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor 7) on the trial for concubinage, accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy and the case was dismissed DECISION OF SC; Judgment is reversed and the accused is ACQUITTED RATIO: 1) plea of double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the defense of bigamy for which he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial in the court are two distinct offenses in the law 2) BIGAMY: celebration of second marriage while the first is still existingoffense against civil status which may be prosecuted at the instance of the state 3) CONCUBINAGE: mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife; offense against chastity and may be prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party 4) DOUBLE JEOPARDY: test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense 5) the accused should have been acquitted of the crime of concubinage 6) the document executed by and between the accused and the complainant in which they agreed , while illegal for the purpose for which it was executed , constitutes nevertheless, a valid consent to the act of concubinage within the meaning of sec 344 of the RPC 7) there can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the other 8) consent bars the offended party from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousnessgiven
CA: the Court held that the dismissal before trial to be premature and without deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the merits TC: accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence and sentenced to penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor -this appeal
expressly or impliedly after the crime has been committed 9) PARDON: refers to the offense after its commission 10) CONSENT: refer to offense prior to its commission 11) Both means that offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong FC 56(1)
12) Prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended aprty from prosecuting the offense If these is morally condemnatory in a situation of this character, the remedy lies not with the court but with the legislative dept of the govtwhat the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits of the courts authority
Ginez v. Bugayong 100 Phil 616 FACTS:
August 27, 1949: Bugayong married Ginez Bugayong serviceman in the US Navy Bugayong began receiving letters from his sister-in-law informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife October 1951: Bugayong sought the advice of Navy chaplain as to the propriety of a legal separation August 1952: Bugayong went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife Bugayong and Geniz proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong (cousin) and stayed and lived together for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. They repaired Bugayongs house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. 2nd day: Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery. Instead of answering, Geniz packed up and left, which Bugayong took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her November 18, 1952: Bugayong filed a complaint for legal separation against Geniz Geniz vehemently denied the averments of the complaint Motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) Assuming arguendo the truth of the allegations of the commission of "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery", the cause of action, if any, is barred by the statute of limitations; (2) That under the same assumption, the act charged have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband; and (3) That the complaint failed to state a cause of action sufficient for this court to render a valid judgment. Court ordered the dismissal of the case on the 2nd ground (condonation) Assignment of errors brought to CA:
Premature dismissal of case; In finding that there were condonation on Bugayongs part; and in entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. Case lifted to SC Question of law ISSUE: WON Act of sleeping with wife for two days was already a sign of condonation to the infidelity she allegedly committed HELD: YES definition: conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed; forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation o may be express or implied o US jurisprudence shows that one single act of sexual intercourse implies condonation condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity. such acts necessary implied forgiveness. It is entirely consonant with reason and justice that if the wife freely consents to sexual intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband's guilt, her consent should operate as a pardon of his wrong." In this case slept with her for 2 nights and 1 day after almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. Thus falls under exemptions in Article 100 of NCC: The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage
Arroyo v. CA 203 SCRA 753 Facts: o Nov 2, 1982 Dr Jorge Neri filed criminal complaint for adultery against wife Ruby Neri with Eduardo Arroyo o Witnessed by Jabunan in Baguio Motions of reconsideration by accused party were denied Aug 26 1991 Dr Neri prayed case to be dismissed since he consented to his wifes infidelity Petitioners thus filed motions for dismissal or grant new trial
ISSUE: WON pardon made by spouse after court ruled that one is guilty of adultery can enable for a new trial to commence 1. Whether or not Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance is sufficient to cast reasonable doubts on his credibility; 2. Whether or not Mrs. Neri's constitutional right against self-incrimination had been violated;

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3. Whether or not Dr. Neri's alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing the criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto; and 4. Whether or not Dr. Neri's manifestation is sufficient basis for the granting of a new trial. HELD: NO On self-incrimination o disregarded when her admission to her husband in the privacy of their conjugal home that she had indeed lain with petitioner Arroyo o constitutionality of admitting it as evidence The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from respondent-accused. Does not attach (1) when not an investigating officer as Dr. Neri is not (2) when it was spontaneous confession (3) Also, husband is not precluded under the Rules of Court from testifying against his wife in criminal cases for a crime committed by one against the other no evidence that they entered into agreement allowing adultery FC56(4) FC6O FC 5 6(3), (5), compare with NCC 101 and 221(3)
Not all recantations are given new trials o question whether a new trial shall be granted on this ground depends on all the circumstances of the case, including the testimony of the witnesses submitted on the motion for the new trial. Moreover, recanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and it is the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that such testimony is true. o Already had other opportunities to recant evidence (1) compromise agreement (2) affidavit documents merely stated that Dr. Neri had pardoned petitioners 18 and the complaint was filed out of "pure misunderstanding" 19 without hinting that Dr. Neri knew of the adulterous relations attempt to cure deficiency of two previous documents PARDON HAS TO BE GIVEN BEFORE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT HAS BEEN FILED. once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. o In this case given after the trial court had already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In protection of family and marriage as inviolable institution.
Brown v. Yambao 102 Phil 168
FACTS: July 14, 1955: Brown filed suit for legal separation from Yambao Alleged under oath: While he interned by the Japanese invaders from 1942 5o 1945 at UST interment camp, Yambao engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share. Complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable. Court directed City Fiscal or his representatives to investigate (CC101) Through the City Fiscals questioning, it was revealed that after liberation, Brown lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her Court denied petition for legal separation on the ground that while the wifes adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under CC100 (Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them)
that there had been consent and connivance Browns action had prescribed under CC 102 (An action for legal separation cannot be filed within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within 5 years from and after date when such cause occurred. ISSUE: WON findings of City Fiscal Rafael Jose that Brown lived with another woman after war and had children with her can stop him from legal separation proceedings HELD: YES Define collusion: the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce proceedings" legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wife's default was calculated (emphasis of marriage as more than mere contract) o NCC Art 100 now bars him from filing legal separation since he is also guilty of concubinage o NCC Article 102 also bars him since he filed out of time. Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945 can not be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred
Ocampo v. Florenciano (supra) FC63 fC 63(3); FC 213 NCC 106(3) P.D. 603 (CYWC) Art. 17 par. 3 Matute v. Macadaeg 99 Phil 340 Facts: Armado Medel filed legal separation form Rosario Matute after finding out her relationship with his brother, Ernesto Medel. Custody of children was granted to him When he left for US, he left children to care of sister. Rosario also lived there too. March 1955 children moved to Cebu to live with Father April 1955 Rosario asked for permission to bring children to Manila to attend her fathers funeral. Armado said okay as long as they come back after two weeks Rosario filed for custody of children and support for them.

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Court of First Instance denied her request and ordered her to give back children o Asked for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to to cease and desist from enforcing in any way the order of the respondent Court dated June 19, 1965, and after hearing, to annul the said Order and to award the custody of the children to your petitioner. ISSUE: WON she can be granted custody of children HELD: NO Reasons given: 1) she is their legitimate mother and they wish to stay with her, not their father Armando Medel; (2) three (3) of the children are over ten (10) years of age, and, hence, their aforementioned wish must, pursuant to Rule 100, section 6, of the Rules of Court, be heeded, unless "the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge" of them "by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity or poverty"; (3) the act of infidelity of which she had been found guilty in the decision of November 6, 1952, does not involve "moral depravity"; (4) in any event, it is a thing of the past, not a present reality; (5) respondent Armando Medel is now unfit to have the children under his care, for he is living maritally with a woman by the name of Paz Jesusa Concepcion; and (6) although he had married the latter, after securing in the United States a decree of divorce dissolving his marriage with petitioner herein, said decree is null and void and, accordingly, he is guilty of bigamy.
Custody of children she has now was only given by Armado thus he is free to ask for them back. The abuse of discretion given is not a very grave one and she is poor and as said living under the charity of her brothers. sections 1 and 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, reading: "SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, end adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board, or officer as the law requires, with costs. "SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal corporation board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, with costs." Petition is denied.
Lapuz vs. Eufemio (supra) Macadangdang vs. CA 108 SCRA 314 Mejias is married to Anahaw Majias allegedly had intercourse with Macadangdang sometime in March 1967 Due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967 October 30, 1967: Mejias gave birthday to a boy (Rolando Macadangdang) April 25, 1972: Mejias filed a complaint for recognition and support against Macadangdang Macadangdang opposed claim and prayed for its dismissal Court dismissed the complaint CA reversed the judgment and declared Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang. ISSUES: Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; and Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. HELD: YES The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between aforenamed

spouses. Art. 255: Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of Mejias and Anahaw Rolando was born on October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967, the time difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have been born prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent underwent a normal nine-month pregnancy. Presumption of legitimacy becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other same province Physical impossibility: (1) impotence of husband; inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function (2) living separately in such a way that access was impossible; and (3) serious illness of the husband. NO. Art. 256 provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy Art. 257: adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife Art. 220 PETITION GRANTED. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. FC 63(2), FC 64 FC 198 NCC 370-372 Laperal v. Republic 116 Phil 672 Facts: Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria. They are now legally separated. Elisea wants to resume the use of her maiden name. Petition was opposed by the City Attorney on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the CC and that is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The lower court originally dismissed the petition but changed its mind and granted it on the ground that it was merely for a change of name. It also reasoned that the use of the married name would give rise to confusion in the womans finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Issue: WON a wife can use her maiden name after a decree of legal separation has been granted. Held/Ratio: No. Legal Separation alone is not a ground for wifes change of name. Art 372 specifically mandates the wife to continue using name and surname employed before the legal separation. Her marriage status is unaffected by the separation. Rule 103 (provision for a change of name in general) does not prevail over the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
FC 63(4) Solo Parents Act FC 65-67 Lapuz vs. Eufemio (supra Macadangdang vs. CA (supra)
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES cf.NCC 113-114 FC68 FC 68; FC 72 NCC 92 1(4) RPC 11(2) RPC 247 Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng 103 Phil 255 Facts: the defendant-appellant shall be considered relieved from the obligation of giving any support to his wife. ARROYO v ARROYO must show LEGAL CRUELTY in order to get support, court cant order spouse to come back home Street J. Facts: 1910 Mariano and Dolores married July 4, 1920 wife left home to live separate from husband o Then moved to ask the court to grant her relief: (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. o Cause: cruelty of husbabd o Court rules that she live apart form her husband granting her 400/month ISSUE: WON husband is entitled to pay wife who left him for support (2) WON wife can be compelled by the court to live with her husband HELD: both NO (1) Must first show enough reason, LEGAL CRUELTY for her to leave must show BODILY harm with MENTAL feelings shown in this case: wife is very jealous which caused them to have fights, neither was unfaithful, cruelty she talked about was heightened Art 142 and 143 of NCC protects wifes rights for her husband to support her (2) not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other Can only give judicial declaration that wife has not presented sufficient cause for her to leave and it is her duty to return.
Married on May 1951 Went to Zamboanga, husband left her with her parents for a while with her promise that she would go back to Manila. She didnt Sept 30 1953 Atilano filed for support of 200/month against her husband in the premise that they were living separately since Oct 1952 due to their bickering o Husband replied that he preferred to support her in their own conjugal home in Manila o Was awarded 75/month but with the observation that separation was due more to in-laws than anything else and her demand to move to a different house from them ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to receive support from her husband when she is the one who left the conjugal dwelling HELD: depends on the situation, in this case NO ART. 299. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in his house the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in this case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto; Thus, husband is only obliged to pay for support if there is moral or legal reason for him not to provide support in own home. In this case, the primary reason for her leaving are the in-laws and even if this would be seen as legal basis, the fact that husband promised that if she came home he would provide a separate home for them negates this basis. RESULT: has option of supporting his wife at their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of the parents of the husband. Should plaintiff wife refuse to abide by the terms of this decision, then
Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, supra Arroyo v. Vasques-Arroyo 42 Phil 54 Cuaderno v. Cuaderno 12 SCRA 505

Nov 17, 1956 began living separately o Due to husband inflicting bodily injuries o Took her to her mothers house Aug 14, 1957 Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court ordered husband Angel Cuaderno to support his wife Lourdes Cuaderno with 150/month. CA: reversed their decision since they may resume cohabitation which is their duty as husband and wife o Acknowledgement of de facto separation
ISSUE: WON CA can order them to live together as their duty HELD: NO Cohabitation between them must be due to spontaneous mutual affection and not a legal order 150/month is reasonable since wife doesnt have a job and husband is still continuing to support her as the separation has been brought about by the husband and under the circumstances established during the trial, the same shall subsist until a different situation between the parties shall take place.
Lacson v. Lacson 24 SCRA 837 Facts: feb 14, 1953 (CHEESY!) when they got married Jan 9, 1963 when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to Manila March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila o Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with Carmen o This was affirmed by the CFI May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her in JDRC since she said she only entered into agreement to gain custody of her younger children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7 years old. CA: ruled that compromise agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared null and void and as such the execution of said judgment is void too. ISSUE: WON support should be awarded to the wife HELD: Yes, should have but was filed out of time NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure." Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been declared null and void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise o However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose which parent they want to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, as long as above ten) already 1968 o Court may also award custody to who they deem more fit through evidence. Art 356 of the NCC - Every child: (1) Is entitled to parental care; (2) Shall receive at least elementary education; (3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian; (4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development. However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the agreement is valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership since it had judicial sanction. (art 190/191 of NCC) Corroborated by already 5-year separation o
Ilusorio vs. Bildner G.R. No. 139789, May 12, 2000. Facts: March 11, 1999 Erlinda Ilusorio filed for petition of habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium (association and companionship with ones spouse) April 5, 1999 CA dismissed it due to lack of unlawful restraint of one Potenciano Illusorio. Oct 11, 1999 filed an appeal in SC asserting her rights for custody of husband. This was answered by their children and husband in a separate case saying that he never refused to see her

Sept 20, 2000 set the case in S to determine physical and medical condition of Potenciano and if it an issue. Jan 31, 2001 court denied Erlindas motion that Potenciano be produced before court and be medically examined March 27, 2001 court denied motion of reconsideration for physical/mental examination to be conducted. ISSUE: WON Erlinda can be granted custody of her husband through consortium Held: NO Illegal restraint had not been proven in CA Potenciano declared that his children were not preventing him from seeing anybody, including his wife. o Court was also wrong in deciding to grant wife with visitation rights since this impugns on the right to privacy of the husband which is a constitutional right esp since he is deemed to be with his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice FC 69 par. 1, compare with NCC 110 Abella v. COMELEC 201 SCRA 335 De la Villa v. Villareal, supra FC 70-71 FC 73, compare with NCC 117 Art. II Sec. 14 and Art. XIII Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution cf. NCC 113 compare with ROC Rule 3 Sec. 4 cf. R.A. 7192, An Act Promoting the Integration of Women as Full & Equal Partners of Men in Development and Nation Building cf. R.A. 8187, An Act Granting Paternity Leave... Yasin v. Shariah Court 241 SCRA (1995) Facts: May 5, 1990 Hatima Yasin, a Muslim,who was divorced from her husband who married another asked for her surname to be changed back to her maiden name Court ruled that Rule 103 of Revised rules of Court, Sec 1 should apply since no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority (Art 376 of NCC) o Must show proper and compelling reason for change ISSUE: WON a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name. HELD: NO Petitioner doesnt seek to CHANGE her name but to RESUME use of it o Divorce is recognized in Muslim law as one that severs the marriage bond and where can again contract another marriage Art 370 of NCC woman is only permitted and not ordered to use husbands surname after death of husband. Art. 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." Art 371 of NCC when one is the innocent party to an annulment marriage one MAY
Question of mental capacity has already been decided by CA who declared that there wasnt any manifestation for this to be an issue. Quoting Art 12 of 1987 COnsti and Art 68 and 69 of FC which said that spouses are duty bound to live together and take care of each other o Cant apply since theyve been living separately since 1972 which is evidence of absence of empathy between empathy - shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. RESULT: became moot and academic since husband had passed on June 28, 2001. Motion for reconsideration is denied.

still use husbands surname. When guilty, one SHOULD use her maiden name. Thus the use of maiden name is more of an OPTION than a DUTY. Also, no judicial authority to have her name changed to her husband when she marries thus no judicial confirmation should be needed when she changes it back. Only necessary for civil status. o Thus rule 103 shouldnt be applied. o Changed through: prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name RESULT: . Petitioner is authorized to resume her maiden name and surname. Romero: women should be given equal rights as men to resume use of their names
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Republic Act No. 7192 "promoting the integration of women as full and equal partners of men in development and nation building. . . ." the dissolution of the matrimonial bonds consequent upon the granting of absolute divorce or the declaration of nullity of marriage or its annulment, provides legal ground for the automatic dropping of said family name and the resumption of the use of her maiden name Vitug: showed that before a law allow a married woman to use her maiden name and surname was proposed but turned down
Republic Act No. 9262 Anti-Violence Against Women and Children SHARICA MART L. GO-TAN vs SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN G.R. No. 168852, September 30; 2008 Facts: April 18, 1999 when Sharica Tan and Steven Tan got married Jan 12, 2005 - petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)[6] against Steven and her parents-in-law for verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of the the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004." Feb 7, 2005 respondents are arguing that parents-in-law arent covered by RA no 9262 WON parents in law can be charged with violence as co-conspirators HELD: YES RPC is suppletory to RA no 9262 as found in Sec 47 of RA no 9262 thus conspiracy can be part of RA 9262 o conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals Sec 5 of RA 9262 also recognizes that violence may be committed by an offender through another
FC1;FC76 FC 66, 67, 128, 135, 136 FC77 FC81 FC78 FC 79, in rel. to NCC 3 8-39 FC81 FC 80 (2) and (3) in rel. To NCC 16 FC (3) in rel. To NCC 17 FC82 Solis vs Solis 53 Phil 912 [1928] Facts: Juan Lambino and Maria Barroso had three children Alejo, Eugenio, and Marciana June 2, 1919 made a donation of propter nuptias to Alejo and Fortunata of land due to their impending marriage
In case of death of donees, 1/2 of land donated would revert to donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half o Alejo died followed by Juan, after death wife got lands again Fortunata wants part of her land ISSUE: WON marriage makes the donation valid HELD: NO The donation propter nuptias is not valid and did not create any right, since it was not made in a public instrument marriage is a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation FC84 FC 84; NCC 761 FC85 FC8T FC87
does not revoke the donation with presence or without o marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation. Result; no need to give land Dissent by Street: believes marriage makes it an obligation.
Matabuena v. Cervantes 38 SCRA 284 Facts: 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations between live-in partners. Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.
Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals (supra) Sumbad vs CA 308 CRA 575 Facts: 1936 George Taits wife Agata died Afterwards lived with Maria Tait to whom he donated on April 2, 1974 parcels of land to Dec 24, 1977 George died

1982-1983 Maria Tait sold lots, some of which to the private respondents July 24, 1989 petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait field action to nullify deeds of sale and to recover the lands in their name o Alleged they are children and compulsory heirs of George and Agata and that Maria sold lands without their consent. TC and CA both ruled that petition was without merit ISSUE: WON donation was made in violation of Art. 133 of the Civil Code, now Art. 87 of the Family Code HELD: NO Art. 133. Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. -
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Record doesnt show that George married Maria and if marriage took place. If they werent married petitioners shouls show evidence that at time the time the deed of donation was executed, their father and Maria F. Tait were still maintaining common-law relations Beatrice Taits testimony is only to the effect that in 1941 Maria F. Tait became their stepmother. There is no evidence on record that George K. Tait, Sr. and Maria F. Tait continuously maintained common-law relations until April 2, 1974 when the donation was made.
Arcaba vs. Tabancura vs. de Batocael G.R. No.146683. Nov. 22, 2001 Facts: Jan 19, 1956 Francisco Comille and wife Zosima Montallana were owners of a lot Oct 3, 1980 Zosima died leaving the lot to Francisco Jan 24, 1991 Francisco executed deed of donation intervivos to Cirila, a helper-slashmistress-slash common law wife for her faithful services over the last 10 years Oct 4, 1991 Francisco died with no children Feb 18, 1993 respondents filed petition to nullify the donation since she was only common law wife and thus donation is void under Art 87 of FC TC made donation void and was strengthened by CA decision ISSUE: WON Cirila is entitled to the lot HELD: NO Sufficiently proved that she was common law wife thus cant get lot through donation as found in Art 87 Cohabitation: repeated sexual intercourse, public assumption of marital relation, o Conduct saw that they were more than just caregiver and patient. Not given any salary, Francisco told her niece Cirila was his mistress, Cirila used his surname to sign for business permits, health cerficates, and death certificate. o
FC 86; NCC 765 Mateo vs Lagua 29 SCRA 864 Facts: 1917 Lagua and wife Alejandra donated to their son and his wife Bonifacia Mateo lots. o Couple took possession of them but they were still under donors name 1923 son Alejandro died. His widow and child came to live with the in-laws who gave them the owners share of the harvest of the land. However in 1926 Cipriano refused to give them their share so Bonifacia had to obtain it through JPC 1941 Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the land to their son, Gervasio while still continuing to give Bonifacia the owners share of harvest until stopping on 1956. o Learned that her brother in law owned land on 1955 and had it declared null and void by the Court of First Instance 1957 Gervasio and his wife Sotera commenced action against Bonifacia for reimbursement of improvements made by them and another case to annul the donations of the two lots since it was prejudicial to not only Cipriano for his own
support and for his forced heir Gervasio Lagua Nov 1958 Cipriano died 1960 court said Gervasio and Sotera were possessors in bad fatih and not entitled to reimbursement. Also, action to anul donation has prescribed since its been over 41 years Appeal to CA which affirmed the court decision but with the change that Gervasio is entitled to part of the land since it exceeded what should be given which should be part of Ciprianos disposable portion in his will and should thus be given to Gervasio since it would be prejudicial to him as the heir. ISSUE: WON Court of Appeals acted correctly in ordering the reduction of the donation for being inofficious and in ordering herein petitioners to reconvey to respondent Gervasio Lagua an unidentified 494.75 square-meter portion of the donated lots. HELD: NO - proper nuptias has marriage as the motive of the donation alone and are without onerous (heavy obligations) consideration , they remain subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor's death, if they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.2 FC 48; 44; 61 FC75 FC88 FC89 FC 89 par. 2 FC 90; of NCC 484-501 FC91 FC as of NCC 164 FC 93 of NCC 160 FC92;FC95 FC94
Disposable portion is to computed as such (Art 908 of NCC): net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. o CA just based it on the area and not the value of the properties. in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee's share as legitime in the properties of the donor. o CA had no evidence to declare lot as inofficious RESULT: CA decision is set aside.
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs De Garcia 30 SCRA 111 Facts: what a debtor owes by reaching the debtor's property when it is in the hands of someone other than the debtor) was issued by Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcias, Oct 1960 spouses Josefa de Garcia and Vicente Garcia filed in Court of First Instance a petition to stop the selling of their sugar from their conjugal partnership as a writ of garnishment issued by Court of First Instance against Vicente since he wasnt able to pay part of his indemnity to Luzon Surety Co. ISSUE: WON conjugal property can be used to pay for Vicentes indemnity HELD: NO Art 161 of NCC - only obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the
Ladislao Chavez and Luzon Surety Co executed a surety bond to PNB to guarantee a crop loan for Ladislao o Same date, Ladislao with Vicente Garcia signed indemnity agreement binding themselves to indemnify Luzon Surety Co against whatever it may incur April 1956 PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao And Luzon Surety Co to recover money Aug 1957 third party complaint was received by Garcia due to the indemnity agreement Sept 1958 lower court condemned Garcia and Ladislao to pay PNB Aug 1960 writ of garnishment (A legal procedure by which a creditor can collect
conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family o liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership o to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code In this case, this is not benefiting his family in anyway and even if Art 163 says that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property, this is limited to what benefits his family o benefit was clearly intended for third party, Ladislao Chavez RESULT: conjugal property cant be used
Gelano vs CA 103 SCRA 90 Facts: Sept 17, 1945 Insular Sawmill corporation was organized. For it to carry on, it leased the paraphernal property of petitioner-wife Guillermina Gelano. Her husband Carlos received from the corporation cash advances on the rentals Carlos Gelano however refused to pay his unpaid balance to Insular Sawmill and Guillermina also refused to pay since the amount was for the personal account of husband and did not benefit their family. This happened again TC rendered decision that ordered Carlos Gelano anf Guillermina to pay even after the corporation has ceased to exist ISSUE: WON obligations by Carlos Gelano were peronsl al obligations and thus as spouses cant be held liable HELD: NO Obligation contributed greatly to the benefit of the family thus the conjugal property is liable for his debt (Art 116 of NCC/ paragraph 1, Article 1408, Civil Code of 1889). CAs mistake : Only the conjugal partnership is liable, not joint and several as erroneously described by the Court of Appeals, the conjugal partnership being only a single entity.
G-Tractors, Inc., vs CA 135 SCRA 192 -Luis Narciso is married to Josefina Narciso. He owns a logginc company - Feb 1973 Luis Narciso entered into Contract o Hire of heavey Equipment with petitioner G-Tractors where G-tractors leased former tractors. Co tract stipulated payment for rental. However Luis wasnt able to pay -Property of Luis was sold to pay for his debt, one of which was conjugal property of land. ISSUE: WON land that is owned by both spouses can be sold to pay for Luis debt HELD: YES all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership "do not require that actual profit or benefit must accrue to the conjugal cf. FC 100 (3), FC 12 1(5) and FC 94(4) FC 90, FC 96 in rel. to NCC 206 FC 96; FC 90 Yu Bun Guan vs Ong 36 SCRA 559 Facts: April 1961 Yu Bun Guan and Elvira Ong got married Before separation Bun Guan asked Elvira Ong to do a simulated sale of property she bought on March 20, 1968 out of her own partnership from the husband's transaction", but it suffices that the transaction should be one that normally would produce such benefit for the partnership. o Debts he accumulated were for the support of his family and thus cant be deemed his exclusive and private debts. Wifes name does not need to be in the information when the conjugal property is the one being contested in trial since she is not the recognized administrator. Only necessary the other way around. Sec. 4, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court and Article 113 of the Civil Code

personal funds so that she wouldnt be involved in the obligation. Promised it would be named to their children after. Never happened 1992 separated and Elvira filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim of the land o Yu Bun Guan contends however that he just used Elvira as a dummy to buy property since he was still a Chinese National that time (declared false by TC and CA) ISSUE: WON Elvira Ong can regain her property HELD: YES Provided enough evidence to show it was paraphernal property (womans property that she owned prior to the marriage)
Evidence: (1) the title had been issued in her name; (2) petitioner had categorically admitted that the property was in her name; (3) petitioner was estopped from claiming otherwise, since he had signed the Deed of Absolute Sale that stated that she was the "absolute and registered owner"; (4) she had paid the real property taxes Bu Yun Guans contention that she used her income, salaries and savings, which are conjugal in nature to buy the land made it coowned by them was disregarded through the evidence. RESULT: land is with Elvira esp since it was void since it was a simulated sale.
FC96 FC 100(3) FC 101 FC61 FC 96-98 FC 100; cf. FC 239 FC 104 Delizo v. Delizo 69 SCRA 216 facts: April 1891 Dec 1909 first marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Rosa Vllasfer who died (18 years) Oct 1911 May 1957 second marriage to Dorotea de Ocampo until Nicolas Delizo died (46 years) Petitioners and respondents are fighting over the land owned by Nicolas whether it belongs to the conjugal property of the first or second marriage TC first partitioned the land to the first marriages heirs since there was no liquidation of conjugal property of first marriage thus the co conjugal partnership was converted into one of co-ownership between Nicolas Delizo and his children of the first marriage o but was appealed by petitioners from 2nd marriage CA: ruled that Caanawan lands were acquired during the first marriage and the fact that lands were registered under Nicolas married to Dorotea is merely descriptive of his civil status. o Did not agree with the partition of TC held that of conjugal property from first marriage is husbands own separate property when he remarried again. o Also held that since it was at the time of the 2nd marriage that the land was cultivated, it is is entitled to reimbursement for the increase in value of the 47 hectares Thus that is given to the first marriages heirs must be deducted by the improvements made by the 2nd marriage. o Declared partition as follows: Onehalf of the Caanawan property to share of Rosa Villafer or 1/6 thereof for each child of the first marriage; and 20% of all the other properties or 1/15 thereof for each such child. to Nicolas Delizo descending to his heirs both in the 1st and 2nd marriage. ISSUE: WON partition of lands made by CA is correct HELD: NO Lands acquired in first marriage were from the homestead act and at the time of the 1st marriage, the lands werent owned by Nicolas Delizo yet since he did not fulfill the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such lands. o Act no 926 - the right of the homesteader to the patent does not become absolute until after he has complied with all the requirements of the law o Thus Caanawan lands werent conjugal property of first marriage due to non-compliance
Thus held that land properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership since to leave the
heirs from the first marriage out would only enhance discord and not promote family solidarity.
Belcodero v. CA 227 SCRA 303 Facts: In 1970 Josefa, the common-law spouse, conveyed to Josephine, her daughter, full ownership of the property Juliana then filed for a reconveyance of the land to her and her children Issues: WON the property in question is the conjugal property of Alayo Bosing and Juliana Oday Held: Yes Ratio: Under NCC 160, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or wife. This was not rebutted at all. Moreover, the Family Code cannot apply since there are prior vested rights. Co-ownership is repudiated if both spouses has an impediment to marry. -
Bosing married Oday on 1927 In 1946, Alayo Bosing left the conjugal home to live with a certain Josefa. In 1949, Alayo purchased land and then in the deed he presented himself as married to Josefa In 1959, the lot was transferred to the name of Josefa Bosing married to Alayo Bosing In 1958, Alayo married Josefa while his prior marriage with Oday was still subsisting.
Jocson v. CA 170 SCRA 333 Facts: Moreover, he said that there could be no sale between father and daughter on the same roof, and the unliquidated conjugal property also cannot be sold. Trial Court sided with the petitioner. Ca reversed Issues: WON the property in question is Conjugal. Held: NO. Before tackling the main issue, it must considered that Moises said that Agustina didnt have enough funds, but then Agustina is in a buy and sell business; and the purchase price was even more than the assessed price. Lastly, Certificates of Title in insufficient to prove that a certain property is conjugal, it does not at all prove that the properties were gained in the spouses lifetime. Registration and Acquisition of title are two different acts. In the contrary, it is clear that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, because it was registered in his name alone. -
Petitioner Moises Jocson and Respondent Agustina Jocson- Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. Alejandra predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled Emilio Jocson conveyed by sale almost all of his properties to Agustina Jocson, including his 1/3 share in the estate of his wife. Moises says that it should be partitioned between him and Agustina therefore declaring the said documents null and void. Defendant Moises says that the first document was signed through fraud and deceit. Same with the second and third document.
Ansaldo v. Sheriff 64 Phil 115 Facts: Upon the express guarantee of the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands, the Philippine Trust Company granted Agcaoili a credit in current account not to exceed 20,000. Angel Ansaldo in turn agreed to indemnify Fidelity and Surety Company for any losses and damages from the obligations of Agacaoili to PTC. Agcaoili defaulted hence FSC brought an action against Ansaldo for the recovery of 19K, and caused the sheriff to levy on the joint savings account of Ansaldo and his wife. Ansaldo said that they levied on a conjugal property, hence not liable to Ansaldos personal obligations. Ansaldo filed action in CFI to declare it null and void. It was granted by CFI.
Issues: WON joint savings account is liable for the payment of the personal obligations of the husband. Held: No.
Ratio: It must be proven that the fruits of the paraphernal property benefited the family to prove that it is conjugal. In this case, there was no effort to prove that the obligations contracted benefited the family of Ansaldo.
Sps. Estonina v. CA G.R. No. 111547, Jan. 27, 1997 Facts: TCT 82229 was cancelled and T-99961 was issued in favor of Trinidad Estonina. Spouses Atayan pleaded that the auction be declared null and void. RTC rendered a decision that the said land was gained by Consuelo and Santiago during the marriage, hence presumed to be conjugal. CA however said it was not conjugal. Issues: WON the said land is conjugal property Held: No. Ratio: It was acquired during the marriage hence it is presumed to be conjugal (Santiago and Consuelo). However, the petitioners failed to prove that the property in question was gained during the marriage of Consuelo and Santiago. Registration and acquisition are different. So, only 1/10 could be given to Consuelo. -
Lot C is owned by Santiago Garcia who died on October 2, 1967 In 1973, Trinidad Estonina was granted the land TCT No. 1975 by CFI. It was also mentioned there that Trinidad covered all rights that Consuela Garcia may have. Children of the first wife, Adela, executed a sale transferring unto Atayan spouses 4/10 of their share in the land TCT T-82229. Children of the 2nd wife, Consuelo Garcia, also sold 4/10 of the land to the Atayan spouses. Estrella Garcia (the widow of his son) also sold 1/10 to Spouses Atayan. Estonina then bought the land in a public auction which was opposed by Consuelo Garcia.
FC, FC 107 cf. FC 88 FC 105(2) of FC 256 Castro vs. Miat 397 SCRA 271 Facts: Moises and Miat bought 2 parcels of land (one in Pque and one in Paco) Moises then wanted the Paranaque property to himself but would leave the 2 properties to his sons. Moises and Concordia bought the property on installment basis on 1977, and it was only on 1984 it was finished. Alexander agreed to sell the said lot to Romeo. However, Romeo found out that the property was sold to Castro by Moises. Moises bought the property through mortgage from Castro Alexander received 2/3, Moises 1/3, Romeo NONE CA rendered a decision nullifying deed of sale between Moises and Castro and ordered them to reconvey the land to Romeo for 36K
Issues: WON the Paco property is the capital property of Moises. Held: No Ratio: It is conjugal share. Since it was acquired through join funds. Moises and Concordia bought the property during the marriage. There was even a letter from Moises to Romeo conveying the land. Moreover, Castro is not a buyer in good faith. Since they knew that there was an adverse claim.
FC 105 of FC 74-74 Malang vs Moson 338 SCRA 393
FC 108 cf. NCC 1767-1768 PNB v. Quintos
46 Phil 370 Facts: (a) Those acquired by onerous (heavy obligations) title during the marriage at the expense of the common property whether the acquisition is made for the community or for only one of them; (b) those obtained by the industry, salary or labor of the spouses or any of them; (c) the fruits, rents or interest received or accruing during the marriage, from the common or the private property of each of the spouses. o Conjugal partnership DOES NOT merge the properties they acquired before. The rest of the property that the spouse acquired before their marriage is separate from the conjugal partnership. Guaranteed by absolute separation of capitals ISSUE: WON they are jointly liable for the debts incurred through conjugal partnership HELD: YES CC 1698 = partners are not solidarily liable with respect to the debt of the partnership. CC 1137 - solidarity will exist only when it is expressly determined partner cannot be solidarity liable for the debts of the partnership, because,there is no legal provision imposing such burden upon one. RESULT: properties of the conjugal partnership of the defendants are liable for the debt to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly liable for the payment thereof.
June 20, 1918 PNB granted the defendants a credit to the amount of P31, 284 to which defendants mortgaged stocks from BPI, Compaia Naviera, Davao Agriculture and Commercial Company etc. o In the document, it did not clearly show that they were husband and wife, except in their civil statues o Does not show that they bound themselves solidarily to the debt incurred. April 2, 1921/ July 22, 1921 complaint was filed requiring Mr. Ansaldo to pay his debt. SC First TRIAL Defendants claim that their debt is not of a solidary nature and should thus only bind one to the extent of their share in the obligation thus should not be charged to their conjugal partnership. o However Art 1408 of NCC provides all debts incurred by both husband and wife during the marriage are chargeable to the conjugal partnership thus Margarita Ansaido, the wife, is part of the obligation as her husband as the legal manager of the conjugal partnership is liable for the debt. o SC first decision: conjugal partnership should be used to pay for the debt incurred as well as private property of each of them since they are both obligated SC 2nd TRIAL (DECISION UPON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION) Reasserts that conjugal property is liable for the debt they incurred as husband and wife. o Conjugal partnership begins existing at celebration of marriage Confined to properties stated in Art 1401 of CC -
Ansaldo vs Sheriff of Manila (supra) FC 109 Laperal v. Katigbak 10 SCRA 493 Facts: Appeal from decision of CFI of Manila declaring property to be the paraphernal property of defendant-appelle Evelina Kalwa. The appellants maintain that it should be considered as conjugal property Laperals sought for recovery of money evidenced by promissory notes made by Katigbak and for the recovery of jewelry that katigbak was supposed to sell. Nov 1, 1950 - TC ordered Katigbak to pay back the Laperals and return the jewelry. Dec 1950 Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw filed for judicial separation of property and separate administration which was granted. Feb 1, 1955 Laperals filed complaint that the separation of property should be annulled and should be deemed as conjugal property

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Dec 27, 1958: SC rendered judgment that while the conjugal property should be used to pay the debt of Katigbak, the paraphernal property of Kalaw shouldnt. TC: rendered judgment that Kalaws property was indeed paraphenral. ISSUE: WON property being contested is part of conjugal property HELD: NO Art 160 of CC- properties acquired during marriage are deemed conjugal property unless it is proven that it belongs exclusively to husband and wife
Shown through: (1) title is in name of wife alone (2) husband gave his marital consent to their being mortgaged by his wife (3) wife is financially able to buy proeprty In this case, proved that mother of Evelina bought the contested property for her, it was under Evelinas name, Ramon Katigbak issued a manifestation where he stated he had no interest in the property, husband could not have afforded to buy it. RESULT: land is paraphernal and thus cant be subject to the debts of Katigbak.
Berciles v. GSIS 128 SCRA 53 Facts: -GSIS recognized Pascual Berciles as an acknowledged natural child and other private respondents Maria Luisa Berciles Vallreal, mercy Berciles Patacsil and Rhoda Berciles as illegitimate children of Judge Pascual Berciles with Flor Fuentebella and thus have rights to his retirement benefits - this was contested by his wife Iluminada Ponce and their children. ISSUE: WON GSIS was correct in upholding their status as a natural child and illegitimate children HELD: NO Art 287 pf NCC illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to support and such successional rights are granted in the code, but for this article to be applicable, there must be admission or recognition of paternity of illegitimate child. No evidence of admission o (X)There was no evidence that he intervened when his name was put in the birth certificate of Pascual FC 109 (2) of FC 113, FC 115 Veloso v. Martinez 28 Phil 255 Plata v. Yatco 12 SCRA 718 Facts: 1954 Amailia Plata purchased land 1958 sold the property to Celso Saldana but he resold it ot her seven months after when she was already married to Gaudencio Begosa Sept 1958 Amalia mortgaged to Cesarea Villanueva the property in consideration of a loan of 3,000. Gaudencio also signed the deal Amalia and Gaudencion failed to pay mortgage and the land was then sold to Cesarea and husband Gregorio. They then sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer which was granted However, Amalia resisted all efforts ejecting her from the party since she is claiming that land was her own paraphernal property and not conjugal property ISSUE: WON Amalia is bound by the detainer judgment against Gaudencio Begosa HELD: NO Sufficiently proved that property contested is her own exclusive paraphernal property since she owend it before marriage and even if Saldana did give it back to her when she Berciles, thus his part in the birth certificate is null and void o (X) baptismal certificate has no weight as well o (X) living together does not prove filiation o (X) pictures are not proof of filiation o their mother was not recognized to be married to the deceased RESULT: retirement benefits are distributed equally to the five recognized heirs from his marriage to Iluminda Ponce who is also an heir. o Art 966 of NCC if a widow or widower and legit children or descendants are left, surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children Art 980 of NCC children of deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

judgment against the husband alone doesnt affect the paraphernal property of Amalia. Thus she had a right to ignore the judgment of eviction against her husband. RESULT: cant decide at the moment whether property is validly conveyed to Cesarea and Gregorio. Up to CFI of QC.
was already married it did not transform it to conjugal property since there was no prood that they money paid to Saldana came from common or conjugal funds. Thus since Cesarea and Gregorio were also aware that property was paraphernal as clearly stated in land records, illegal detainer
Lim v. Garcia 7 Phil 320 Facts: Hilario Lim died intestate in 1903, with an estate valued at P50k. It was alleged in the inventory by the administrator, Luis Lim, that everything but a house and lot, P10k (paraphernalia) and P700 (acquired as payment for the land that he sold) were the conjugal property of Hilario and his wife, Isabel Garcia. The administrator contends that the said properties were the separate properties of Hilario because he allegedly brought them into the marriage alone. The 3 parcels of land were only conveyed to Isabel as a gift or for valuable consideration by Hilario during the coverture; hence, it is a void donation. The P700 was the price he had received for the sale of a certain lot. Issue: WON the parcels of land were conjugal property Held: No, the evidence show that the properties were not acquired by Isabel by conveyance from Hilario but by third parties by way of exchange for a certain property she had inherited from her fathers estate. Hence, they are her separate properties according to Civil Code Art. 1396 (3) since they were acquired by exchange of her separate properties. While the RTC held that they were part of her dowry, the record did not prove that it was so and evidence strongly supported the presumption that it was and continued to be part of her separate estate. Regarding the P700 (the balance of the price received for the lot) and the buildings constructed thereon, SC held that they were part of the conjugal properties since the buildings were constructed out of the conjugal partnership funds. Even if the land sold was the separate property of Hilario, Civil Code 1404 holds that the buildings, erected during coverture on a land belonging to one of the spouse, will be considered as conjugal partnership property, that is after allowing the owner of the land the value thereof.
FC 109(4);ofFC 118-119 FC 110 FC 110 2nd par.; FC 142, FC 75 Veloso v. Martinez, supra Manotok Realty v. CA 149 SCRA 372 Facts: Authorized as the special co-administrator of the testate estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda, Vicente Legarda sold 280 sq.m. of the Legarda Tambunting Subdivision to Dr. Abelardo Lucero for P30/sq.m., payable on an instalment basis. Lucero paid the initial amount of P200 and Legarda issued a receipt and delivered the property to him. Although he was ordered by the CFI to sell the Subdivision, Legarda failed to execute the necessary document/s and to submit the same to the Court for approval as he was ordered. He did not execute and register a deed of sale in a public instrument. Meanwhile, Lucera subsequently leased the property on 1953 to six tenants, who paid monthly rentals and constructed their houses thereon. On July 31, 1956, CFI authorized Philippine Trust Company as administrator of the estate to sell the subdivision at the earliest possible time. Hence, it sold the same portion of the property to Manotok Realty, Inc. Although the property was advertised for sale, Lucera failed to appear in the estate proceedings. Instead, he waited for Legarda, who was no longer a special coadministrator, to send him the formal

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contract in order for him to make further payments. In 1957-1958, PTC refused to entertain Lucero when he finally went to them for payment of the property because the estate was then involved in litigation. Consequent to the litigation, a deed of sale was then issued to Manotok Realty, Inc. on March 13, 1959; the same was approved by the Court. On Jan. 1966, Manotok Realty, Inc. demanded the surrender of the actual and material possession of the property and on March 4, 1966, it filed a complaint for ejectment. Although summonses were served to Lucero and tenant Sojio, Lucero instead executed a deed of assignment of the lot in favour of his lessees. When RTC favoured Manotok Realty, Inc., Lucero alleged on appeal to CA that the sale made by Legarda was valid because Legarda was authorized to do so and hence, there was no need for the approval of the probate court.
Issue: WON sale between Legarda and Lucero was valid Held: NO, the Court directed Legarda to sell the subdivision by executing the necessary document/s and submitting it to the Court for approval which Legarda failed to do especially where the sale was on instalment basis. Moreover, the receipt does not conform to the legal requirements of contracts of sale since it was neither executed in a public instrument nor registered with the Registry of Deeds. By virtue of Sec. 1, Rule 73 (Estate of Olave v. Reyes) and Sec. 4, Rule 89 (Vda. de Gil v. Cancio) of the Rules of Court, the Court as a probate court is authorized to approve sales of immovable properties belonging to an estate of a decedent. Hence, the sale was invalid and unenforceable (against third parties). Lucero and Sojio were also found to have acted in bad faith since the latter waited a long time before going to PTC, ignored the Court summons, and instead executed a deed of assignment, while the latter constructed a house when he was a mere lessee.
Ong vs CA 204 SCRA 297 Facts: Teodora B. Ong and obtained a loan from Francisco Boix in the course of her own logging business in CamSur. But due to management, she defaulted in her obligations and Boix consequently filed for the collection of the sum due. CFI declared Teodora and her husband, Ramon (who was enjoined in the petition for the payment of interests by Boix), in default and the Sheriff levied and auctioned the parcel of land, which was in the name of Teodora B. Ong in the Tax Declaration. Title was transferred to Boix as the highest bidder; the same was registered Ramon, however, later contends that the property was conjugal because Teodora used his surname Ong in the Tax Declaration; it was clearly an indication that she had acquired it during their marriage and hence, it was conjugal and unenforceable to Teodoras obligations. -
Issue: WON property is conjugal and not binding to Teodoras obligations Held: No, the land was paraphernal property since the Tax Declaration clearly stated only Teodora Ong as the owner of the land (while Tax Declaration of the house was made under both their names). The use of the surname Ong is insufficient to uphold the presumption of conjugal property especially where there was no evidence that it was acquired during the marriage the sine qua non requirement of such presumption (Maramba v. Lozano). Only the fact that the Tax Declaration is in the wifes name is presented. Nonetheless, even if the property was indeed conjugal, it can still be liable for Teodoras obligations because she incurred such in the course of her business which Ramon knew and did not object to. Since her profits are enjoyed by the conjugal partnership, it would only be just and equitable if the conjugal partnership also answer to the obligations.
FC 111-112, of FC 236, amended by RA 6809 Palanca v. Smith-Bell 9 Phil 131 Facts: Emiliano Boncan Yap borrowed P14k from the International Banking Corporation in order to construct a house. He then conveyed the house to his wife, Alejandra Palanca de Boncan, on Sept. 20, 1904, which the latter accepted, as a guaranty for the payment of his debt to IBC. When Smith, Bell & Co. later obtained a judgment and writ of execution against Emiliano for the collection of money and he failed to pay, the property was levied. Alejandra filed for
declaration that the property was her exclusive property and demanded its possession and the dissolution of the levy. Issue: WON exclusively property is Alejandras
Held: NO, because the borrowed P14k of Emiliano was made upon credit of the property of his wife, the money became conjugal property by virtue of Civil Code 1401 (3). The subsequent use of the money to the construction of the house also made the house conjugal property and liable to the payment of his debts by virtue of Civil Code 1408.
Lim Queco V. Cartagena 71 Phil 163 Wong et al. v. IAC 200 SCRA 792 Facts: Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6, 1964 Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time living separately During the marriage or on January 6, 1971, Romarico bought a 1,787 square-meter parcel of land in June 1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan who consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale valued at 199,895 Hongkong dollars or P321,830.95 Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of money Trial court promulgated a decisions 9 in favor of the Wongs. A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Levied upon were four lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson ... married to Katrina Henson Lots were sold eptember 9, 1977 August 8, 1 978, Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision because he was "not given his day in court the court, finding that there was no basis for holding the conjugal partnership liable for the personal indebtedness of Katrina, ruled in favor of reconveyance Romarico and Katrina had in fact been separated when Katrina entered into a business deal with Anita Wong. Thus, the business transaction involved the personal dealings of his estranged wife writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico since he was not represented in court On the matter of ownership of the properties involved, having been acquired during the marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership 26 even though Romarico and Katrina had been living separately Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with them her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. 30 In addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial under the Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; 32 when the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts 33 or by the husband 34 and when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. 35 Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them
Issue: whether or not the execution of a decision in an action for collection of a sum of money may be nullified on the ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at public auction are the alleged exclusive properties of a husband who did not participate in his wife's business transaction from which said action stemmed Held:
FC 106 FC 116 Torela v. Torela 3 SCRA 391 Facts: son and daughter vs father and stepmother December 21, 1929, Decree No. 440157 was issued in favor of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, decreeing that he is the owner of a certain parcel of land (Lot No. 3770) March 5, 1958, Felimon Torela, filed a Motion Ex-Parte alleging that Lot No. 3770 of the Cauayan Cadastre having been acquired by him by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife. He, therefore, prayed that the court order the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to change his (movant's) civil status, appearing on the face of the original certificate of title, "from Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego to Felimon Torela, married to Marciana Gepanago" Court granted the motion Felimon, Torela executed a definite deed of sale whereby, for and in consideration of P3,000.00, he sold Lot No. 3770 of the Cadastral Survey of Cauayan to Marcos P. Mahilum and Maria Luna Mahilum Petitioners (children) claim that the land was conjugal property and they were entitled to the proceeds. They claim that while in their youth they had seen their father Felimon and their mother Graciana Gallego clean the lot in question Felimon Torela declared that he and his first wife Graciana were married in 1915 and the land in question was decreed in the name of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego,. According to Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code, the following properties belong to the conjugal partnership: 1. Property acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only; 2. Property obtained by the industry, wages or work of the spouses or of either of them; 3. The fruits, income, or interest collected or accrued during the marriage, derived from the partnership property., or from that which belongs separately to either of the spouses Felimon Torela testified that he inherited the contested property from his parents
Issue: Whether or not the parcel of land herein involved is a conjugal property of the spouses Felimon Torela and Graciana Gallego (plaintiffs' mother)
Held: the property in question is not one of those enumerated in Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code. On the other hand, as it was inherited by Felimon from his parents and brought to the marriage with his first wife, the same is deemed his separate property (Art, 1396, Old Civil Code). For these reasons, defendant Felimon Torela had lawfully disposed of his property to the exclusion of his children by his first marriage
Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals failed to take into account Article 1407 of the Spanish Civil Code, which now correspond to Article 160 of the New Civil Code, and which reads as follows: Art. 1407, All property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Petitioners claim that since the lot in question was registered in the name of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, it must be presumed to be the conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana so that one-half thereof should be adjudicated to them as their inheritance from their mothe While it is true that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as above stated, nonetheless the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption
there is nothing in the record to show that the lot in question was acquired during the marriage of Felimon Torela and Graciana Gallego Decree No. 440157 which confirmed the ownership of Felimon Torela over the land in question described him as married to Graciana Gallego was merely descriptive of his civil status at that time and cannot Magallon v. Montejo 146 SCRA 282 FACTS: Case was instituted against Martin Lucerna to compel partition of parcel of land in Magsaysay (homestead) Respondents claimed to be the common children of Martin Lucerno and Eustaquia Pichan (who died in 1953) Respondents asserted right to of the land as their mothers share in her conjugal partnership with Martin Martin denied being married to Eustaquia but admitted living with her without the benefit of marriage until she allegedly abandoned him Martin denied the paternity of two of the respondents who, he claimed, were father by other men RTC: Martin and Eustaquia were married Respondents are their common children Martin had begun working the homestead, and his right to a patent to the land accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia Entitled respondents to the land IAC affirmed Original certificate of land was issued only on Nov. 22, 1978 Certificate of Title issued in the name of Martin Lacerna married to Epifania Magallon ISSUE: WON the respondents should be given the title for of the land HELD: YES Parcel of land was part of the conjugal partnership of Martin and Eustaquia Land has been titled through fraud or mistake in such a
be taken as proof that the land was acquired during their coverture. The further circumstance that the land was registered during their marriage cannot in itself constitute proof that it was acquired during their marriage for land registration under Act No. 496, as amended, does not confer title; it merely confirms a title already existing and which is registerable
situation, the property should be regarded as impressed with an implied, or constructive trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto. (Civil Code Art. 1456) Magallon, as the trustee of a constructive trust, has an obligation to convey to the respondents that part of the land in question to which she now claims ostensible title Magallon showed no proof of marriage contract between herself and Martin Magallon cannot invoke the presumption established in Art. 160 of the Civil Code that property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being no proof of her alleged marriagne ine to Martin Presumption doesnt operate where there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired Martin could have concurred with the 3 respondents in the succession of of the land, each of them taking an equal share beyond review because Marin allowed the judgment to become final and executory RTC ordered to effect the partition
Cuenca v. Cuenca 168 SCRA 335 FACTS: Respondents - legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject parcels of land - allege that some of the parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all others are conjugal - allege that Engracia Basadre and Agripino were not legally married because at the time they lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar
Petitioners - Denied legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino and Maria as well as the legitimacy of the respondents - Claimed that Agripino and their mother Engracia Basadre were legally married and that they are the legitimate children thereof - Contend that subject parcels of land are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia Appellate Court - Agripino, in his lifetime, expressed in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon proofs that properties in question belong exclusively to Maria as her paraphernal property -Tax declarations presented by petitioners are not real evidence to prove ownership or possession - Petitioners wanted to present new evidence to prove: o That Engraciaand Agripino were legally married o That other petitioners were the legitimate children o That subject parcels of land were conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia ISSUES: WON Engracia is entitiled to inherit from Agripino WON the subject parcels of land were conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia (WON presumption should hold) FC117
HELD: Yes Engracia was entitled to inherit from Agripino Cuenca together with the respondents (legit children by Maria) in accordance with Art. 892 of the NCC Appellate Court declared Engracia as surviving spouse no need to prove legality of marriage much less to prove the legitimacy of the other petitioners NO oArt. 160 of NCC: all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife oPresumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and doesnt operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired oDocuments sought to be presented do not show that the claims to the subject parcles consisting of homestead lands were perfected during the marriage of Agripino and Engracia oPresumption cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved Documents show that 5 out of 8 parcels covered are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora or Retituto oPresumption cannot prevail Petition Dismissed
Cheesman vs IAC 193 SCRA 93 FACTS: Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were married (1970) but separated (1981) June 4, 1947: Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory rights executed by Armande Alteras in favor of Criselda Cheesman Thomas Cheesman was aware of the deed and did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of property, leasing it to tenants July 1, 1981: Criselda sold the property to Estelita without the knowledge or consent of Thomas July 31, 1981: Thomas brought suit against Criselda and Estelita, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent Answer: property was paraphernal, purchased by Criseldas exclusive funds RTC: sale was void ab initio Summary judgment: sale was valid Evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption in Art. 160 of NCC Property was Criseldas paraphernal property Legal presumption could not apply inasmuch as the husbandplaintiff is an American citizen and therefore disqualified under the consti to acquire and own real properties ISSUES:
Tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name of Criselda with knowledge of Thomas and without his objection)
WON Thomas has rights over the property WON the residential land is conjugal property WON the property would be conjugal property if Criselda used conjugal funds HELD: NO Constitutional provision (Sec. 14, Art. XIV of 1973 Consti) prohibits sale to aliens of residential land Thomas acquired no right over the property by virtue of the land NO Thomas had, and has no capacity or personality to question the Petition Denied
subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land against constitution NO Against constitution
Villanueva vs CA 427 SCRA 439 FACTS: Oct 7, 1926 - Plaintiff Eusebia is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas 5 children During their marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandue City and Consolacion (22 properties) Nicolas is co-owner of a parcel of land in Mandaue which he inherited from his parents as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately 8 parcels of land in Mandaue City earns income (Nicolas only one to receive) 1945: Nicolas no longer lived with legitimate family and cohabited with Pacita (1 illegitimate son) Pacita has no occupation, no properties of her own 1985: Nicolas suffered a stroke 1985-present: Illegitimate child Procopio has been receiving the income of said properties Defendants asked for settlement but no such thing was reached RTC judgment in favor of respondents (legit family) Art. 116 (presumption) Eusebia presented solid evidence, petitioners failed to meet standard proof required to maintain their claim that the subject properties are paraphernal properties of Nicolas Appeal was made Eusebia died on 1996 heirs substituted 1996: Pacita and Nicolas married CA affirmed RTC decision
ISSUES: WON subject properties are conjugal
HELD: YES Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of FC (Art. 105) Under FC, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal Burden of proof party claiming that they are not conjugal Subject properties were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia
Tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Art. 116 Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will of one of the spouses No unilateral declaration by one spouse can change the character of conjugal property (intent of Nicolas in misrepresenting himself as single in deeds of sale was to exclude Eusebia) Cohabitation of a spouse with another person does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage Petition Denied
Zulueta v. Pan-Am 49 SCRA 1 FACTS: Altercation between Zulueta and Capt. Zentner of Pan-Am led to the off-loading of Mr. Zulueta, Mrs. Zulueta, and Miss Zulueta Plane trip from Wake Islands to Philippines Mr. Zulueta was 20 to 30 minutes late in boarding because he had to relieve himself at the beach (HAHAHA) Previous decision: Relying upon Art. 172 of CC, which provides that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands consent, except in cases provided by law and it is not claimed that this is one of such cases SC denied a motion filed by Mrs. Zulueta for the dismissal of this case, insofar as she is concerned (she having settled all her differences with the defendant) without prejudice to this sum (P50,000 awarded to her) being deducted from the award made in said decision Compromise Agreement between petitioner and defendant PAN-AM maintains that the damages involved are not among those forming part of conjugal property under Art. 153 of CC
ISSUES: WON the damages claimed form part of the conjugal partnership HELD: YES Award was made in favor of the petitioners collectively Presumption is that the money to purchase plane tickets had come from the conjugal funds Considering that the damages in question have arisen from a breach of plaintiffs contract of carriage with the defendant, for which the plaintiffs paid their fare with fund presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership, we hold that said damages fall under paragraph 1 of Art. 153, the right thereto having been acquired by onerous title during the marriage.
Damages involved do not come under Chapter 3, Title VI, Book 1 of Civil Code (Paraphernal Properties) Hence, the rights accruing from said contract, including those resulting from breach thereof by the defendant are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta Defendant insists that the use of conjugal funds to redeem property does not make the property redeemed conjugal if the right of redemption pertained to the wife no proof that the contract of carriage with PANAM or the money paid therefore belongs to Mrs. Zulueta Motion Denied
Mendoza v. Reyes 124 SCRA 154 FACTS: Properties in question were bought under installment basis from Araneta Ponciano and Julia had to borrow money to pay; jointly obtained a loan to complete the construction of building and to pay balance on price of lot Deed of sale: vendee Julia, with Poncianos signature under the phrase with my marital consent Titles of land were named after Julia Reyes, married to Ponciano Reyes Spouses failed to pay seasonably their obligations (loan) On March , 1961, while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots in question together with their improvements to Medozas without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano Julia and Ponciano were living separately and were not in speaking terms Complaint filed by Ponciano Reyes for the annulment of a deed of sale for 2 parcels of land with their improvements executed by his wife, Julia De Reyes as vendor and the spouses Efren Mendoza and Inocencia De Mendoza as vendees o Ponciano: properties were conjugal properties; sold without his knowledge and consent Spouses Mendoza alleged that properties were paraphernal properties of Julia supported by Julia CFI: dismissed complaint; Julia can validly dispose of properties without the consent of her husband CA reversed the decision ISSUES: WON the subject properties are paraphernal in character HELD: NO o Art. 135. (1) that which is acquire by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether acquisition be for the partnership or for only one of the spouses. No question that disputed property was acquired by onerous title during marriage Common fund? Records: funds from loans obtained by spouses. Under Art. 161 all debts and obligations contracted by husband and wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership Julias testimony is without merit o The fact that the land is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature
Under NCC: Castillo v. Pasco 11 SCRA 102
FACTS: October 1931: Marcelo Castillo, Sr., being a widower, married Macaria Pasco, a widow who had survived 2 previous husbands Petitioners were children and grandchildren of Marcelo Castillo, Sr., by his previous marriage 1932: Gabriel and Purificacion Gonzales, as co-owners of the litigated fishpond, executed a deed of sale conveying said property to spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco (paid in installments) April 3, 1933; Marcelo died June 8, 1934: Macaria married her 4th husband, Luis San Juan Petitioners filed complaint for partition and accounting CA dismissed complaint: fishpond is Macarias exclusive paraphernal property because it was purchased with exclusive funds of the wife (a woman of means even before marriage to Marcelo) Payment of installments: o 1,000 = 600 Gabriel Gonzales owed to Pasco + 400 cash from proceeds of sale of one of Macarias nipa huts o 2,000 = proceeds of loan from Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, to whom the fishpond was mortgaged by both spouses o 3,000 = loan secured by a mortgage on 2 parcels of land assessed in the name of Macaria and one of which she had inherited from a former husband, while the other lot encumbered was assessed in her exclusive name Mortgage to Dr. Jacinto paid by Macaria (Marcelos estate was inadequate to pay off his debts) ISSUE: WON the litigated fishpond is Macarias paraphernal property HELD: PARTLY o 1932 the applicable law was Spanish Civil Code of 1889
property acquired for onerous consideration during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate property depending on the source of funds employed for its acquisition Art. 1369: That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or the husband is separate property Art. 1401. To the conjugal property belong property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only. Last clause indicates that the circumstance of sale of fishpond in question being made by the original owners in favor of both spouses is indifferent for the determination of whether the property should be deemed paraphernal or conjugal o 1st Installment petitioners: no express finding that 600 owed by Gabriel Gonzales came exclusively from private funds of Macaria Art. 1416 wife cannot bind her husband without his consent her private transaction are presumed to be for her own account o 2nd and 3rd Installments Petitioners: money was raised by loans to both Marcelo and Macaria as joint borrowers conjugal liabilities Paid with money from conjugal partnership o Property belongs to both patrimonies in common, in proportion to the contributions of each. 1/6 is paraphernal 5/6 is conjugal o Payment of Macaria of mortgage debt to Dr. Jacinto does not result in increasing her share in the property Dismissal of original complaint is revoked and set aside and record remanded to court of origin for further proceedings
FC 119 FC 120 Padilla vs Padilla 74 Phil 377 FACTS: Liquidation of conjugal property required before settlement of will of deceased Narciso Padilla Widow, Concepcion Paterno Vda. De Padilla commenced instant proceedings by filing a petition wherein she prayed that her paraphernal property be segregated from the inventoried estate and delivered to her together with the corresponding reimbursements and indemnities; that she be given of the conjugal partnership property; and that her usufructuary right over of the portion pertaining to the heir instituted in the will be recognized. CFI declared certain sums of money to be paraphernal and ordering the same to be delivered to the widow P 50,000.00 Testators mother and instituted heir, Isabel Bibby Vda. De Padilla appealed
Narciso and Concepcion were married in 1912 Husband (med student then) brought little into the partnership, while wife contributed a considerable amount Practically all the conjugal partnership property came from fruits of the paraphernal property Husband left no children and gave whole estate to mother Property included in the inventory is appraised at 261,000 ISSUE: WON the Torrens titles are final and incontrovertible WON the value of the paraphernal land to be reimbursed to the wife is that obtaining at the time of the construction of the building or the value at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership WON the value of the paraphernal buildings which were demolished to make possible the construction of new ones, at the expense of the conjugal partnership should be reimbursed to the wife HELD: NO There is nothing sacrosanct (inviolable) and definitive in the certificate of title when the conjugal partnership is liquidated. The true and real owner may be shown Because of feelings of trust existing between the spouses, certificates of title are often secured in the name of both, or
of either, regardless of the true ownership of the property and regardless of the source of money Upon liquidation, trust should be recognized and enforced so that the real ownership of the property may be established Torrens title should not be turned into an instrument for deprivation of ownership That prevailing from the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership Art. 1404 of CC. Mere construction of a building from common fund does not automatically convey the ownership of the wifes land to the conjugal partnership Erecting a building is merely a exercise of the right of usufruct pertaining to the conjugal partnership over the wifes land In consequence of this usufructuary right, the conjugal partnership is not bound to pay any rent during the occupation of the wifes land because if the lot were leased to a 3rd person, instead of being occupied by the new construction from partnership funds, the rent from the third person would belong to the conjugal partnership YES The value of the old building at the time they were torn down should be paid to the wife Judgment affirmed
Caltex vs Felias 108 Phil 873 Spouses Juliano and Eulalia Felias donated Lot No. 107 to their daughter, Felisa Felias (Private Respondent) on March 31, 1928. March 26, 1941: Trial court held that in a case against respondents husband (Simeon Sawamoto), he had to pay Texas Company (Phil.) Inc. a sum of P661.94 plus legal interest and attorneys fees. A writ of execution was issued to the provincial sheriff who levied upon Lot No. 107 together with the improvements and a small parcel of coconut land and sold these at a public auction to Texas Company now Caltex (Phil.) Inc. Provincial Sherrif executed a final deed of sale which was duly recorded on a TCT. Felisa filed an action, declaring herself the owner of the 2 parcels of land. Trial courts decision: Sale of Lot. No. 107 is null and void Sale of coconut land is NOT. It rightfully belongs to Caltex. Both parties appealed and CA declared that: Lot. No. 107 belongs to Felisa and ordered the Register of Deeds to Cancel the entry of the levy,
the certificate of sale and the deed of sale by the sheriff. Caltex is still the exclusive owner of the small parcel of coconut land. Issues: What is the status and ownership of Lot 107 of the cadastral survey of the City of Agusan a the time it was levied upon and later sold by the Sheriff? Held: IT EXCLUSIVELY BELONGS TO FELISA FELIAS. Ratio: It was discovered by the CA that it was donated by her parents to her, it is her paraphernal property. (exclusively owned by her) It was sold by the Sheriff who believed it to be conjugal property as stipulated in Art 1404 of the OCC and Art. 158 of the new Civil Code (this is a 1960 case!)
Art. 1404 (2): Buildings constructed during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouse shall also belong to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be paid to the spouse owning the same. Art. 158 (2): Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same. HOWEVER, the building was already there even before the lot was donated to Felisa. Therefore, Art. 1404 should not apply. Felisa exclusively owns both LAND and the BUILDING upon it. This being her own means that it is not subject to the obligations of her husband. Furthermore, the building was destroyed at the time of the sale by the Sheriff, which means that the said house included in the deeds executed were no longer in existence
Vda de Padilla vs Paterno 3 SCRA 678 Facts: - 1912 Narciso Padilla married Concepcion Paterno Feb 12 1934- Padilla died leaving his mother as universal heiress. -TC: made most of the properties of Padilla conjugal due to buildings being erected on the once paraphernal property - Probate court: ruled that paraphernal properties which were only under the administration of Narciso Padilla should be given back to Concepcion Paterno ISSUE: - WON income of estates that were declared paraphernal in character only belongs to Concepcion Paterno - WON Concepcion can still claim for fruits of her paraphernal property since probate court already awarded her no fruits before and thus it would be res judicata - WON she is entitled to the improvements of the R. Hidalgo Propery HELD: -(1) YES, ownership of land is retained by wife until she is paid the value of the lot as result of liquidation of conjugal partnership. Mere construction of building from common funds does not automatically make the land conjugal - destruction of improvements in paraphernal property made said property still paraphernal and should be returned to estate of widow. - (2) YES, Concepcion is sole owner of all income from paraphernal property from the time of administration of deceased Narciso Padilla until their delivery to the estate of deceased. - however those that were reimbursed or paid to the estate of Concepcion and thus have become conjugal, fruits should be shared since they are now conjugal. - belong now to both heir of husband and estate of Concepcion
Calimlim v. Fortun 129 SCRA 675 Facts: Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas and Fernando Canullas were married on Dec. 19, 1962. The land were their house was on was inherited by him when his father died. 1978: Fernando abandoned his family and lived with Corazon Daguines, private respondent.
During the pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of concubinage. 1980: Fernando sold the subject property with the house to Corazon for P2000. He described in the document of sale that the house was also inherited by him from his parents. On the same year, Corazon filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages against Mercedes because she was unable to take possession of the lot and the house. The latter resisted because she and her 5 children were still living on the land, the coconut trees on the land were built and planted with conjugal funds. She also believes that the sale of the land with the house and improvements was null and void. The objects of the sale are conjugal properties and she had not given consent to the sale. Respondent Court declared that Corazon Daguines is the lawful owner of the land, she is also entitle to half of the house on the and. Upon appeal to the same court, judgment was modified, stating that the Corazon is true owner of land and of 10 coconut trees. The sale of the conjugal house, however, is null and void and the 3 coconut trees and other crops planted during the marriage. Issues: W/N the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of conjugal property. W/N the sale of the lot together with the house and its improvements was valid. Held: YES. Both the land and the house belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal partnership is
INDEBTED to the husband for the VALUE OF THE LAND. NO. Contrary to morals and public policy. Ratio: Regarding the first issue: Art. 158 (2) of the Civil Code. The spouse owning the lot becomes the CREDITOR of the conjugal partnership for the lot because this belonged to him before the marriage. The value of the lot will be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Thus conjugal property will only happen when the spouse who owns the land is reimbursed of such. And when one is reimbursed, conversion from paraphernal to conjugal retroacts to time conjugal buildings were first built Padilla vs. Paterno Since it is considered conjugal and Mercedes did not consent to the sale, it cannot be sold to Daguines. Regarding second issue: Contract of sale of sale is null and void. The husband sold this in favor of a concubine after abandoning his family. Sale was subversive of the stability of the family. Art. 1409 of the Civil Code states that contracts whose cause, object or purpose are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are VOID AND INEXISTENT from the beginning. Also, the law also prohibits couples who live together without the benefit of marriage from selling/donating to each other since it would be prejudicial to those who actually are married.
Maramba v. Lozano 20 SCRA 474 Facts: 1948: Plaintiff Maramba files a complaint for the collection of a sum of money from spouses Nieves and Pascual Lozano. This was granted by the court. 1960: Not satisfied with the judgment, LOZANO appealed to the CA who dismissed appeal because it was not filed on time. Record of the case was then remanded to the court a quo and a writ of execution was issued. Aug. 18, 1960: a levy on a parcel of land in the name of Nieves Lozano was made. A notice of a sale at a public auction was also made and scheduled for Sept. 16, 1960.
However, Lozano had made a partial payment by then and asked for an adjournment of the sale to October 26. During this time, her husband died. She then prayed for a restraining order on the sale of the lot for sale being her paraphernal property. She also prayed that her liability be then fixed at of the amount awarded in the judgment. The sale proceeded anyway. June 28, 1961: trial court grants the motion of Nieves Lozano. The sale on her property was allowed to proceed to satisdy her liability which is only half now from the original. (from P3,500.07 to P1,750.04) Issues/Held/Ratio: W/N the decision of the trial court last 1959 could still be questioned. NO. SC states that a decision that is final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. W/N the judgement was joint or solidary.
JOINT. General rule is that when a judgment does not order the defendants to pay jointly and severally (as in this case), none of them may be compelled to satisfy the judgment in full. W/N the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds of the properties sold at the public auction. It cannot. This is only on properties acquired during the marriage. In this case, it is established that the property is paraphernal to the wife alone. The court has previously stated that the construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one of the spouses does not automatically make it conjugal. The ownership remains the same until the value is paid but payment can only be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership. Since there was no liquidation yet in the conjugal partnership of Nieves and Pascual, her exclusive property cannot be made to answer for the liability of the other defendant. While they may both use the building constructed in paraphernal land, ownership is still with her until liquidation of partnership pays for it.
Embrado v. CA 233 SCRA 335 Facts: Lot 564 was sold to Lucia Embrado, as can be proven in a Venta Definitiva by spouses Carpitanos. The deed was prepared and signed on July 2, 1946, although it was effective since 1941. 1943: Petitioners got married to each other. Feb 13, 1948: The sale was registered and Transfer Certificate No. T-99 was issued in her name alone. Originally, her status on the Title was single, but it was changed to married to Oreste Torregiani by the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte. The couple established their home on the lot and in 1958, constructed a residential/commercial building. 1971: Lucia sold for P1000 Lot 564 to her adopted daughter, Eda Jimenez. Jimenez proceeded to selling parts of the lot to Cimafranca and Salimbagat. Petitioners instituted an action for declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and damages against private respondednts. Alleging that the initial sale of Lucia to Eda was void because of lack of consideration and Oreste did not consent to the sale of the conjugal property. CA ruled for the respondents, saying that Lucia does not need the consent of Oreste because the lot is her paraphernal property. CA also believes that Cimafranca and Salimbagat are buyers in good faith. Lucia was misled into signing the deed of sale. She thought that the lot was only intended as a security for a loan of the Jimenez spouses. They also believe that Cimafranca and Salimbagat are buyers in bad faith.
Issues/Held/Ratio: W/N Lot 564 was paraphernal property of Lucia or conjugal property. Conjugal. First of all, the sale was not completed until the DELIVERY of the object to the creditor. (Art 1496 of the Civil Code) The construction of the building on the lot was done during the marriage already and according to Art. 158, the land becomes conjugal upon 2 conditions: Construction of building was at the expense of the partnership Land is owned by one of the spouses. W/N sale to Jimenez was valid. Not valid. Evidence shows that the Jimenez spouses had no sufficient means of livelihood so it is questionable how they were able to obtain the money for the property. FC 121
Eda never proved also how she obtained the money to pay. Also, based on the decision in the first issue, the land beng conjugal needed the consent of Oreste as well. The sale is void ab initio being contrary to law. Thus this also applies to Cimafranc and Salimbagat quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum W/N Cimafranca and Salimbagat are buyers in good faith. If this is so, the sale to them is valid. NO. The relationship of Cimafranca and Salimbagat to the Jimenez spouses show that it would be impossible that they did not know of their financial situation. It is a general rule that a buyer of real property must be wary before buying property and invstigate the rights of those in possession of a certain property. The fact that they looked in the Register of Deeds to see the title is not an excuse, especially if they know about the bad financial status of the Jimenezes.
Mariano vs CA 174 SCRA 59 Facts: 1) Respondent Daniel Sanchezs wife (Esther Sanchez) files an action before the CFI of Caloocan for the recovery of the value of ladies dresses allegedly purchased and delivered to Petitioner Lourdes Mariano. 2) Writ of preliminary attachment is issued upon the posting of an P11,000 bond by the ESPONDENTs wife for the seizure of s property to the amount of P15,000. 3) After s motion to discharge attachment denied, she files for certiorari with CA. 4) CA orders Trial Court to receive evidence on WON the attachment had been improperly issued. 5) TC rules that the attachment was improperly issued. Renders decision in favor of : - to pay the P15,000 - to pay Total of P32,500 in damages. -P11,000 bond used to pay damages w/ the remainder to be levied on the conjugal property of and his wife. Thus files for annulment of execution w/ CFI as the administrator of the conjugal partnership reasoning that conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife 7) QC CFI orders hearing orders sheriff to desist in the auction. motions to dismiss the action and is DENIED. 8) files w/ the CA a certiorari and is upheld by the 7th div. but is later dismissed by the 8th division. Thus she goes to SC. Issues: WON the conjugal partnership of the is liable for his wifes liability in connection with her business. Held: YES, there is no dispute to the fact that the consented to the business of his wife and that their family benefitted from this business. As such this income was used to maintain their family and is within the coverage of the liability incurred upon the conjugal property. (see FC ART 121 par. 2) 6)
Ayala vs CA 286 SCRA 272 Facts: 1) assails the CA decision affirming the RTC decision holding the Conjugal partnership of Ching not liable for the debts incurred. 2) Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) takes a P50,300,000 loan from AIDC, Ching EVP in said company executes security agreements for the loan. 3) PBM fails to pay the loan and AIDC sues

4) CFI holds PBM and Ching jointly and severally liable to pay. 5) Pending appeal CFI issues Writ of execution upon the putting up of a P8m bond. 6) The sheriff poses a notice of sale on 3 of Chings conjugal properties. 7) files injunction on with CFI arguing subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. 8) CFI rules for issues TRO on auction and sale. 9) petitions for certiorari w/ the CA, CA issues TRO on the CFI decision. 10) Auction of the properties takes place and are sold to AIDC who are the only bidders. Certificate of sale is issued and the redemption period expires w/o being claimed by . 11) In the meantime while the CA decided that CFI decision w/ TRO be set aside, the Civil Case should push through. 12) AIDC motions to dismiss the case for being moot and academic w/ the consummation of the sale. DENIED by CFI. 13) TC declares the sale on execution null and void. appeal DENIED. 14) appealed to CA. DENIED agreeing with the contention that PBM rather than the conjugal partnership of Ching was benefitted by the loan. (FC ART 121 Par. 2) moreover the burden of proof of the fact that the conjugal partnership benefitted in this case lies with the creditor party (AIDC) who did not prove this fact of beneficience sufficiently. 15) On appeal argue that there is no need to prove the benefit since the mere nature of the transaction is sufficient to prove liability of a party. Issues: WON a surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer incurs civil liability on the conjugal partnership of the former. Held: NOT NECESSARILY, given that the agreement was entered in to not primarily to benefit of the family of the husband it cannot be said that his conjugal partnership is automatically liable, in any case the burden of proof to confirm the benefit and subsequently the liability of the conjugal property rests with the debtor who in this case did not sufficiently prove the said fact. Art 121 of FC shows that conjugal partnership shall be liable for all debts and obligations contracted during marriage by the designated admin-spouse for benefit of conjugal partnership of gains o Read together with Art 161 where benefit is understood to not actually accrue but to be the reason for the admin-spouse to enter into such a deal o Difference between one where husband contracted obligation for his own business that is for benefit of his family and where the husband merely acted as surety ofr loan contracted by another for the latter business (MAIN reason for obligation is not for family) Benefits contemplated in Art 121 is one resulting directly from the loan and not just a by-product of it which the latter example is.
Ching vs CA 423 SCRA 356 1) Same Chings in Ayala vs. CA properties wrongfully levied. Same deal another loan not paid and conjugal partnership not held liable. 2) PBMCI (Philippine Blooming Mills Company, inc.) takes a P9m loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) Ching signs a promissory note. 3) As added security Ching w/ Tanedo and Kiat Hua executed a continuing guarantee w/ ABC binding them to guarantee the payment of all PBMCI obligations amounting to P38m (w/ subsequent loans of 12m and 13m). 4) PBMCI fails to pay. ABC files the complaint to recover the unpaid loans with a preliminary attachment against PBMCI and sureties Ching, Tanedo and Kiat Hua. 5) RTC initially denies preliminary attachment later agreeing after a bond was posted on the argument by private that the defendants were disposing of their properties w/ intent to defraud their creditors. 6) On July 26, 1983 the deputy sheriff of the trial court seizes 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks belonging to Alfredo Ching.

7) On Nov 16, 1993. Encarnacion Ching (the wife) files a motion to set aside the levy on the attachment alleging that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied were from her conjugal funds and that the debt incurred by her husband due to suretyship to PBMCI through the unpaid loan did not redound to their family. 8) ABC files motion to Quash 9) Trial Court rules for ordering the return of the stocks. 10) CA on appeal by private ABC nullifies the TC order citing that was a third party claimant w/o legal personality in the matter and that art 160 of the CC does not apply here where spouses failed to prove the source of the money (whether from the wife or the husband as a means of establishing ownership) used to acquire the stock and that they belonged exclusively to Alfredo. 11) spouses file for instant petition claiming that the source of the funds used in acquiring the stock is of no moment to the claim under art. 160 of the CC given that the conjugal partnership and such ownership of the shares is presumed even if the stocks are under the name of only one spouse. 12) contends that CA was correct in ruling so since the debt incurred by Alfonso through his suretyship was in pursuit of his
profession and thus incurs liability on his conjugal partnership. Issues: 1) WON the wife of the husband indebted has standing to oppose the attachment of property while being a third party to a suit. 2) WON incurring debt in pursuit of ones career as an executive via suretyship incurs civil liability on ones conjugal partnership. 1) YES, when the sheriff wrongfully levies on attachment and seizes the property of a third person in which said sheriff holds no right the authority of the court which authorized the levy may be invoked by the third party to determine whether the levy was proper or improper. NO, no presumption can be inferred from the fact that the husband enters in to suretyship that the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefitted. Even arguing that such involvement in a suretyship would thus further the husbands career in a corporation or in this case sustain the corporation and perpetuate his income thus translating to earnings for his family, such a cause would still be indirect and not privy to the conditions set by ART 161 of the NCC which contemplates direct benefits to the family. (similar to 121 of FC) Moreover being that the loan was issued PBMCI the private respondents had the burden of proof to establish the liability of spouses conjugal partnership to the debt.
Homeowners Savings and Loan vs. Dailo G.R. No. 153802, Mar.11, 2005 Facts: 1) Miguela and her husband deceased Marcelino Dailo were married on Aug 8, 1967. 2) uring their marriage they purchased a house and lot in San Pablo city from Sandra Dalida the deed of absolute sale is issued to Marcelino. 3) On Dec 1, 93 Marcelino authorizes a special power of attorney (SPA) in favor of a Lilibeth Gesmundo authorizing her to obtain a loan from bank to be secured by the spouses house and lot. The loan of P300,000 is obtainedmortgaging the property to bank. 4) All these transactions were enacted w/o the knowledge and consent. 5) Upon maturity of the loan foreclosed the property and bought the said property in auction and consolidated ownership on June 6, 96. D 6) Marcelino dies in Dec 20, 1995. In a visit to the property Miguela discovers that a caretaker is already residing in her house and that her car w/c was parked in the property was razed by a boy under the caretakers watch. 7) Claiming her ignorance of the mortgage and sale of the property and being that it was conjugal in nature she filed a case for the nullity of real estate mortgage and certificate of sale affidavit of consolidation of ownership, deed of sale, reconveyance w/ a prayer for preliminary injunction and damages against.

8) prayed to dismiss citing the fact that Marcelino was the exclusive owner. 9) TC sides w/ and grants all prayers w/ damages. 10) CA affirms TC Issues: WON the conjugal Partnership is liable for the payment of the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo the same having redounded to the benefit of the family. Held: Not Necessarily, the adherence to Art. 121 par. 3 which the use to incur liability on the property places the burden of proving the benefit given to the family of the debtee on the
the debtor alleging such a benefit. In the instant case this fact was not sufficiently proven. The sweeping conclusion furnished by the that the loan Marcelino acquired was utilized to construct housing units to the benefit of his family, is unfounded in the absence of proof of the matter. Moreover the matter of benefit to the family was only raised on appeal and is thus not well founded and even less proven. Also discussed here is the lack of consent where consent of both parties is necessary when one is selling land (art 124 of FC)
Javier v. Osmea 34 Phil 336 FACTS: Florentino Collantes, husband of Petrona Javier, became indebted to the estate of Tomas Osmena Sheriff executed judgment of debt by selling at public auction all the right, title, interest or share which the Collates had or might have in 2 parcels of improved real estate and especially the usufructuary interest therein of Pascuala Santos, the surviving widow of Felix Javier, which interest was acquired by Petrona Javier (wife) o Land inherited by Petrona from her parents o Usufructuary right acquired from Petronas fathers 2nd wife for the sum of P3,000 (amount was borrowed giving as security for the loan an mortgage on the property she had inherited) Successful bidder: Osmena estate Petrona Javier claimed that Collantes had no rights in said properties or in the usufructuary interest filed for annulment of sale Osmena estate: admitted exclusive right of ownership; claimed that the money which which said usufructuary interest was purchased belonged to the conjugal partnership and therefore the right of usufruct belonged to said conjugal partnership CFI: annulled only the sale of 2 properties
ISSUE: WON fruits of paraphernal property should be used to pay off the debt incurred by the husband HELD: YES Art 1401 of Civil Code fruits, revenue, or interest collected during marriage coming from partnership property of from that which belongs to either of the spouses is community property o Thus fruits of paraphernal property form part of assets of conjugal partnership and are liable for payment of marriage expenses Wife manages paraphernal property but the fruits of such are managed by the husband as the administrator of conjugal property. Debt he incurred in this case was to meet the obligations of the conjugal partnership and were for the benefit of the family in his exercise of profession or industry. Thus conjugal partnership can be used to pay it off
Vda. De Sta. Romana v. PCIB 118 SCRA 330 FACTS: PCIB Administrator of the estate of the deceased C.N. Hodges PCIB filed for the recovery of a parcel of land (Lot 1258-G) purchased by Ramon Sta. Romana from C.N. Hodges Sheriff levied on the rights and interests of Ramon Sta. Romana over Lot 1258-F and improvements, also purchased from C.N. Hodges Third party claim was filed by Emilio Sta. Romana who claimed that Lot 1258-F and its improvements had been sold to him RTC: rescinded Contract and ordered return of possession of Lot 1258-G CA affirmed decision Trial judge issued a writ of execution Sheriff issued a notice of sale at public auction of the rights and interests of Ramon Sta. Romana over over Lot 1258-F

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Ramon Romana died intestate Petitioner Socorro L. Vda. De Sta. Romana, surviving spouse, filed a motion to quest the writ of execution Petitioner prayed that the writ of execution and levy on execution made on Lot 1258-F and the improvements existing theron be annulled insofar as her share in the said properties Respondent moved to dismiss on ground of res judicata CFI: granted motion to dismiss
ISSUE: WON wife should get of property of husband who died when the land in question is used to pay off debt HELD: NO
As long as conjugal partnership subsists, there can be no share of husband or wife. Only when conjugal partnership is dissolved between husband and wife can they claim it. Any levy on conjugal partnership property to satisty monety judgment against husband is null and void in this case, the auction was made before the conjugal property was dissolved thus wife cant claim it. Also showed that the debt was for the benefit of the conjugal partnership non-inclusion of wife in suit to enforce obligation is immaterial. Need not be joined by wife in suit against conjugal partnership (section 4, rule 3of rules of court and Art 113 of CC)
G-Tractors v. CA (supra) DBP v. Adil 161 SCRA 307 FACTS: Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from the DBP in the sum of P2,000.00 in a promissory note whereby they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations Obligation remained outstanding and unpaid Confesor, who was by then a member of the Congress of the Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11, 1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the same on or before June 15, 1961 Defaulted in payment DBP filed complaint Inferior court ordered payment CFI of Iloilo reversed order
Issue: WON conjugal partnership may be used to pay debt in promissory note when husband was the only one who signed it HELD: YES Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership. in this case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.
Mariano v. CA (supra) Wong et al. v. CA (supra) 200 SCRA 792 Ong V. CA (supra) 204 SCRA 297 Ayala Investment vs. CA (February 12, 1998) Facts: 16) assails the CA decision affirming the RTC decision holding the Conjugal partnership of Ching not liable for the debts incurred. 17) Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) takes a P50,300,000 loan from AIDC, Ching EVP in said company executes security agreements for the loan. 18) PBM fails to pay the loan and AIDC sues 19) CFI holds PBM and Ching jointly and severally liable to pay. 20) Pending appeal CFI issues Writ of execution upon the putting up of a P8m bond.

21) The sheriff poses a notice of sale on 3 of Chings conjugal properties. 22) files injunction on with CFI arguing subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. 23) CFI rules for issues TRO on auction and sale. 24) petitions for certiorari w/ the CA, CA issues TRO on the CFI decision. 25) Auction of the properties takes place and are sold to AIDC who are the only bidders. Certificate of sale is issued and the redemption period expires w/o being claimed by . 26) In the meantime while the CA decided that CFI decision w/ TRO be set aside, the Civil Case should push through. 27) AIDC motions to dismiss the case for being moot and academic w/ the consummation of the sale. DENIED by CFI. 28) TC declares the sale on execution null and void. appeal DENIED. 29) appealed to CA. DENIED agreeing with the contention that PBM rather than the conjugal partnership of Ching was benefitted by the loan. (FC ART 121 Par. 2) moreover the burden of proof of the fact that the conjugal partnership benefitted in this case lies with the creditor party (AIDC) who did not prove this fact of beneficience sufficiently. 30) On appeal argue that there is no need to prove the benefit since the mere nature of
the transaction is sufficient to prove liability of a party. Issues: WON a surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer incurs civil liability on the conjugal partnership of the former. Held: NOT NECESSARILY, given that the agreement was entered in to not primarily to benefit of the family of the husband it cannot be said that his conjugal partnership is automatically liable, in any case the burden of proof to confirm the benefit and subsequently the liability of the conjugal property rests with the debtor who in this case did not sufficiently prove the said fact. Art 121 of FC shows that conjugal partnership shall be liable for all debts and obligations contracted during marriage by the designated admin-spouse for benefit of conjugal partnership of gains o Read together with Art 161 where benefit is understood to not actually accrue but to be the reason for the admin-spouse to enter into such a deal o Difference between one where husband contracted obligation for his own business that is for benefit of his family and where the husband merely acted as surety ofr loan contracted by another for the latter business (MAIN reason for obligation is not for family) Benefits contemplated in Art 121 is one resulting directly from the loan and not just a by-product of it which the latter example is.
Security Bank vs Mar Tiera Corp G R No 143382, Nov 29, 2006 Facts: May 7, 1980 respondent Mar Tiera Corp, through Pres, Wilfredo Martinez applied for credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company. It was secured with an indemnity agreement made by Wilfredo Martinez et al. 1994- however business failed and they werent able to pay Security Bank who then filed in RTC-Makati a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of Respondent Corporation and respondent Martinez. Part of this property was the conjugal house and lot of Wilfrido and Josefina Martinez Luckily, RTC and CA found that the obligation contracted by Martinez did not redound to the benefit of his family, thus they ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses. ISSUE: WON conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement enters into by husband for a 3rd party HELD: NO Art 161 of CC conjugal partnership is liable for all debts and obligations contracted by husband for the BENEFIT of the conjugal partnership. o To protect solidarity and well-being of family as a unit thus limiting the liability of conjugal partnership. Acting as a surety for the benefit of another person or entity and not the family is not part of the debts and obligations under Art 161 since it is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not the surety or his family.
Only when one contracts it as the principal obligor in the contract and is the direct recipient of the money
and services can Art 161 apply
Ramones vs Agbayani 137808, Sept 30, 2005 Facts: May 23, 1979 Santos Ramones, without knowledge of his wife Aldegonda Ramones, sold part of the lot that is part of their conjugal property to Aurora Agbayani March 7, 1980 Santos Ramones died and afterwards Aldegonda built a septic tank and restroom in the land that was sold to Agbayani. Thus Agbayani filed a complaint RTC: ruled that Deed of Sale is void since it was without the consent of Aldegonda CA: reversed RTC ruling since while Art 166 prohibits the selling of property by the husband without the consent of his wife, the wife may only question such transaction within 10 years and have it annulled as found in Art 173 of CC. Aldegonda did no such action. ISSUE: WON sale of real property belonging to conjugal partnership of husband without his wifes consent is void. HELD: NO Art 166 read with Art 173 merely makes it voidable. FC cannot be retroactively applied so Civil Code is law that governs. Deed of Sale was also governed under CC.
Luzon Surety v De Garcia (supra) BA Finance v CA 161 SCRA 608 Facts: May Augusto abandoned his wife and children July 1, 1975 Augusto Yulo secured loan from BA finance corp as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in own behalf and as representative of A&L industries which is managed by his wife, Lily Rulo whom he said gave him authority to procure loan and sign the promissory note. Augusto failed to pay loan. Thus BA Finance filed a complaint against the spouses. Lily Yulo contended thought that they were already separated when promissory note was executed, that her signature was forged, and she was the sole proprietor of A&L and never gave Augusto any authority to sign the promissory note and said business already closed. Both TC and CA dismissed petitioners complaint and ordered them to pay Lily damages. ISSUE: WON A&L can be made answerable for obligations since it is part of the conjugal partnership of spouses HELD: NO While A&L is part of conjugal property, it cant be made liable since the obligation contracted by Augusto is not for the benefit of the conjugal partnerships (Art 161 of CC) o Evidenced by his abandonment two months prior to when he contracted the promissory note. Made it appear that wife gave him authority to procure such loan.
Costuna vs. Domondon 180 SCRA 333 Sps. Amadeo and Estela Costuna bought 3 parcels of land during their marriage and registered the same in the name of Amadeo. Amadeo was later hospitalized (on different dates) for 3rd degree burns on his legs. While already ill due to old age, he went to his relatives in Samar to settle his property documents. Because of his failure to return, Estela refused to give her consent to the action of partition of their conjugal partnership and the deed of sale allegedly filed by Amadeo in Samar for the purpose of financing his medical needs. Hence, Amadeo executed the mentioned deed of sale, which sold his indeterminate share on the 3-parcel property, in favour of Laureana Domondon. When Amadeo died, Estela sought the execution of Amadeos will, executed prior to his trip to Samar, which named her as sole. Laureana opposed the motion, claimed her
share in the property and sought to have Estela give consent to the deed of sale. CA: husband may not sell real estate without consent unless (1) sale of personal properties (2) real properties acquired before NCC (3) real properties acquired after NCC but wife is in a leprosarium, declared spendthrift or under civil interdiction, (4) purpose is to pay conjugal liabilities (5) purpose is to secure future of children or finishing a career. Support of spouse by conjugal property is not relieved when they do not live on the same roof.
medical expenses of Amadeo who allegedly abandoned conjugal home and wife HELD: (1) NO Amadeo sought the petitoners consent but petitioner withheld it. However when deed of sale was made, she did nothing to impugn it and assailed it for the first time when Respondent filed a case in RTC-QC. Amadeo only sold his share of community property. Her share in the property is intact. When consent is unreasonably withheld, one should consider law as falling within the recognized exceptions (2) YES it falls under the obligations protected by Art 161 of CC since it gives a discernible advantage or good to the conjugal partnership, directly or indirectly. Health would obviously benefit their conjugal partnership
ISSUE: (1) WON deed of sale should be nullified since it waas without the consent of the wife (2) WON conjugal partnership should be made liable for payment of hospital and
Carlos vs. Abelardo 380 SCRA 361 On Oct. 31, 1989, Honorio Carlos issued a check worth $25k, in the name of Pura Vallejo, against his personal account in Bankers Trust. It was allegedly a loan to his daughter Maria Theresa and her husband Manuel Abelardo for the purchadse of a house and lot from Vallejo in order to help them in their married life. Vallejo issued an acknowledgement receipt. The failure of the spouses to pay led Honorio to formally demand the payment. Maria Theresa acknowledged their debt to her father but claimed that it was payable on a staggered basis. Despite this acknowledgement and the evidence of Honorios Banks Trust Check (the one paid to Vallejo) and his formal demand, Manuel denied the nature of the money as a loan. He claimed, instead, that the amount given was his share in income from Honorios business, H. L. Carlos Construction. He even presented 10 BPI checks against the account of HLCC to prove that he had been receiving profit from HLCC. However, he is not included in HLCCs Articles of Incorporation or Organizational Profile as stockholder, officer, employee, or agent. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that a check of $25k had been issued to Vallejo against FC122 People v. Lagrimas 29 SCRA 153 Facts: 1) 2) 3) October11, 1962 Judgment finding Froilan Lagrimas guilty of murder becomes final. Writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity in the case was issued and 11 parcels of land in the name of the accused were scheduled for auction on Jan. 5, 1965 December 29, 1964 the wife of Lagrimas files a motion to quash the writs of attachment and execution on the properties citing that they belong to the spouses conjugal property and thus could not be held liable for the husbands individual indemnity. the personal account of Honorio and that the same was received by the spouses and given to Vallejo for payment of a house and lot that became their conjugal dwelling. ISSUE: WON conjugal property should pay for the loan of 25, 000 even when acknowledgement was not signed by husband HELD: YES Art 121 of FCC conjugal partnership is liable for (1) debts and obligations that benefit the conjugal partnership of gains made by both the spouses or one of them but with the consent of the other (2) debts and obligations that are without consent f one of the spouse but their family has benefited Evidence here shows that family did benefit since they used the loan to buy the house which became their conjugal home. -
4)
LC grants the petition which is later reversed by a second judge of the same court only to be reaffirmed by a third judge ruling for the wife of the accused on March 5, 1960. 5) LC rules that indemnities may be imposed on the conjugal properties of the accused only after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and the liquidation of the assets thereof pursuant to ART 161 of the NCC. Issues: WON civil indemnities may be taken from the offenders conjugal properties even before the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and the liquidation of its assets.
Held: YES, the Civil Code provides that indemnities may be imposed on the conjugal property of an offender when the offenders exclusive properties are insufficient to cover the cost his indemnity. In this the law does not contemplate that the conjugal partnership must be dissolved and its assets liquidated before the indemnity is to be drawn. It merely requires that the offending spouse repay the liabilities taken from the conjugal partnership when such partnership is to be dissolved. However it is a condition in the article that the indemnities collectible from the CPG must not eat in to the funds for the maintenance of the family and the education of the children as it would lead to injustice.
Go vs Yamane 489 SCRA 107 Facts: 1) Wife of Yamane is involved in a suit entitled Florence Pucay De Gomez et al. v. Cypress Corporation for this she hires a certain Atty. Guillermo De Guzman. 2) Atty. De Guzman files for writ of execution on a property of the wife of as payment for attorneys fees awarded in the aforementioned suit amounting to P10,000 the auction of the property is scheduled on Aug 11, 1981. 3) On Aug. 8, 1981, the files a third party claim on the property claiming that it is conjugal in nature and thus not liable for the wifes personal obligations 4) Sheriff however proceeds w/ the auction and the property is sold to spouses Go. One year later the sale becomes final as no redemption is filed and the deed of certificate of sale is issued to the on Aug 26, 1982. 5) Sept. 4, 1984. files for annulment and cancellation of the auction sale on same grounds as before (3) 6) answer contending res judiccata, no cause of action, lack of lawful remedy, and absence of irregularity in the sale. on the other hand file a complaint for damages contending fraud and misrepresentation for selling a P200,000 property to pay P10,000 in attorneys fees. 7) RTC decides in favor of stating had no cause of action since the property was deemed not conjugal as it was registered in his wifes name. 8) CA reverses RTC decision: presumption of conjugality attaches to property acquired during the marriage, unless proof that exclusive funds were used in purchase are adduced. (TCT and deed of absolute sale indicate owner married to Yamane) do not prove this in instant case thus decision in favor of . Auction and sale annulled. ISSUES: WON property is conjugal and can pay for the debts of the wife and here sisters HELD: Yes, property is conjugal but CANNOT pay for debt Property as conjugal: o (X) Unilateral declaration of wife that property is paraphernal property is determined by law and not will of one spouse o (X) deed and title are only under name of one spouse mere registration is not sufficient to establish its paraphernal nature. Property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal property thus stronger evidence should be given ie purchased with exclusive money o (X) non-redemption of sale redeeming it would have been estopped him from later impugning its validity lien between sisters and Atty De Guzman cant be charged with conjugal property since it wasnt for the benefit of the family. Same with indebtedness because her obligation has not been shown to be one of the charges against conjugal partnership. o Right are merely inchoate prior to liquidation of conjugal partnership. Cant answer to personal obligation when there is no evidence that it was for support of the family, or administration of conjugal partnership was transferred to wife by courts of when wife gives moderate donations for charity.
FC 123 FC 124 Guiang vs CA 291 SCRA 372 Facts: 1) Gilda Corpuz marries Judie Corpux Dec 24, 1968. In Feb 14, 1983 they buy Koronadal lot (lot in contention) for P14,735 from Manuel Callejo. 2) Apr 22, 1988 Corpuz spouses sell half of the property to spouses Guiang. build their house and live next to neighbors, the Corpuzes. 3) In 1989, w/ consent from her husband, Gilda left for Manila to secure work abroad, became victim of illegal recruiter but stayed in Manila till Mar 11, 1990 when she went back to Koronadal. 4) In Jan 1990 daughter learns of her fathers plans to sell the family home in Koronadal to the owner of the adjoining lot (the Guiang)and writes to her mother about it who replies objecting to the sale. 5) The daughter gives her mothers reply to their neighbor Luzviminda Guiang for thte latter to advise her father accordingly. 6) In the absence and w/o the consent of his wife the sale pushes through. Judie Corpuz sells to Luzviminda Guiang . for P30,000. 7) 4 days later to cure the defect of the previous contract Luzviminda Guiang goes to the widow of the previous owner of the lot (Callejo) and signs an agreement for the sale of the lot 8) March 11, 1990 comes home finds kids living separately in different places and husband is nowhere to be found. He is said to have found another wife. and kids stay in the family home in Koronadal (already sold). 9) file complaint to the barangay of the area for trespassing against the and her kids. On Mar 16, parties sign amicable settlement: and kids to leave by Apr. 7,1990. rebuts amicable settlement. 10) file motion of execution on the amicable settlement w/ MTC of Koronadal. 11) May 28, 1990, files complaint against her husband and for the nullity of deed of sale on their property for being sold w/o her consent. 12) RTC and CA rule in favor of Gilda Corpuz. ISSUE: WON contract without the consent of wife is void HELD: YES Contract elements: (1) cause (2) object (3) consent FC 124 specifically states that without consent, the contract is VOID, different from NCC where it was just voidable Also cant be ratified by the amicable settlement since a contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract is also void (Art 1422 of CC) Plus settlement does not mention continuing offer to sell property or acceptance of such continuing offer.
Heirs vs Mijares 410 SCRA 97 Lot 4349-B-2 is a 396 m2 covered by TCT 205445 in Balintawak QC registered under Spouses Vicente and Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes, purchased using conjugal funds during converture (inc. apartments in the CPG). Vicente married Ignacia in 1960 but were de facto separated since 1974. In 1984, Ignacia learned that on 3/1/83 Vicente sold 4349-B-2 to Mijares spouses (resps) for 40k and therefore new TCT 306087 was issued. She also found out that Vicente filed for admin and appointment as guardian of their 5 minor children @MTC QC XXI where he misrep that Ignacia died on 3/22/82 and that he and the 5 kids are the sole heirs. Vicente was appointed guardian on 9/29/83 + authorized on 10/14/83 to sell estate of Ignacia. On 8/9/84 she wrote Mijares spouses to return shares in lot. Thereafter she filed for annulment of sale. Mijares spouses claimed to be good faith buyers and that the sale was valid due to the courts approval. Vicente also contended that what he sold was only (his share) and left intact her share, that he never misrep her. On 2/15/90 TC declared sale as null and void wrt share of Ignacia. That purchase price was 110k and ordered Vicente to return 55k to Mijares couple.
Ignacia filed for Motion for modification that sale be declared viod in its entirety and that Mijares reimburse to her the rentals from 3/1/83. TC granted on 5/31/90 and said that the sale was void in entirety, ordered Vicente to reimburse the full 110k. TC on 6/29/90 amended the previous order and directed the Register of Deeds to issue new TCT in the name of Ignacia and Vicente+Vicente paying 50k to Ignacia for damages. Pending appeal, Ignacia died thus was substituted by compulsory heirs, they were contending that rentals should be reimbursed. On 1/26/2000 CA reversed TC, upholding that the Mijares were in good faith thus the sale was valid.
ISSUE: WON voidable deed of sale of property due to lack of consent pertains to only wifes share HELD: NO, whole property Governing rules Art 166 and 173 of CC o 166 husband cant alienate real property of conjugal partnership
unless wife has been declared a spendthrift, or under civil interdiction or in a leprosarium o 167 wife may annul said contract within ten years from transaction questioned both laws were complied with o Nov 25, 1978 entered into contract o June 4, 1986 sale was filed o March 1, 1983 action to annul Alienation must be annulled in its entirety and not only in so far as the sahre of wife in the conjugal property is concerned o Limitation of contract shall prejudice wife was not spelled out in statute Conjugal partnership is liable for many things when it is existing thus husband has to be stopped from disposing it without consent of wife.
Roxas v. CA 198 SCRA 541 Melania (pet) is married to Antonio Roxas but is now living separately . Melania then found out that estranged husband Antonio Roxas entered into a contract of lease w/ Cayetano on 3/30/87 involving CPG in Nova QC TCT 378197. Melania planned to a flea market w/ 20 stalls for grocery and dry goods in said area and invested 135k for the prep and construction. Mayors permit and Municipal license was already issued for 1986 but when she attempted to renew for said year, it was blocked by Antonio Cayetano. She therefore seek redress saying that there was unlawful deprivation from her operating her business as conjugal owner. On 7/31/89 Cayetano moved to dismiss saying that there was no cause of action. TC dismissed said complaint and CA affirmed TC. ISSUE: WON a lease is an encumberance and/or alienation within scope of Art 166 of NCC HELD: YES Defintions: o Lease Art 1643 of NCC one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite. However no lease for more than 99 years shall be valid. Grant of use and possession. o Encumberance includes not only liens but also attachment, LEASES, and other restrictions Lessor transfers right of use in favor of lessee. Thus his right is impaired and may even be ejected by lessee if lessor uses the leased realty. Thus it is a burden and encumberance on the land o Alienation when lessee becomes the owner of the thing affected by the lease Thus consent of wife is necessary if lease is for more than one year since it is now considered as a conveyance and encumberance within the provisions of the CC by which real property is conveyed or encumbered. Art 173 of CC remedy of wife to annul the contract.
Ysasi v. Fernandez 23 SCRA 1079 Facts: Juan Ysasi (pet) married Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi (resp). Juan conceded that Hacienda ManucaoA is CPG. Since 1948 spouse have been shuttling back and forth from PI to Spain (where they also own real estate) but Juan travels more frequently. Hacienda Manucao-A is managed by Valentin Bilbao (1952-1965) but Juan is overall admin. In 1965 Jon (son) took over as manager. 1966, Juan told younger son Jose Mari to assist Jon but Jon refused to let Jose Mari act as cashier, dissension thus developed.
Such prompted wife to leave Spain (May 1967) to fix problem. She brought letter from Juan to sons and a list of matter that she was to ascertain and report to husband. Husband then contends that she never made any report. June 1967, jon resigned which was accepted by Juan who designated Valentin to take over. But upon Valentins arrial in PI on 8/19/67, Jon refused to hand over hacienda saying that his mother took possession as admin. Wife filed pet on 9/5/67 @CFI Negros Occidental where she sought admin of CPG or separation of property, praying that she be appointed receiver litis pendentia on the grounds that Juan is not in the position to manage since he is already of old age (77 yrs old) and has a blind left eye Abandonment without just cause Husband moved to set aside order appointing wife as receiver but she opposed. On 9/22/67 she further prayed that a disinterested person (BPI) be assigned as receiver if dispute continues. Resp judge on 10/7/67 turned aside 9/5 orders appointing her as admin.
Juan moved for a writ of prelim mandatory and preventive injunction to compel wife and son to turn over hacienda to Valentin, but wife and son opposed. Repsondent Judge denied petition for mandatory injunction on 12/22/67. Thus petition where husband prays for prelim mandatory injunction to compel wife and son to hand over hacienda.
ISSUE: WON husband may be deprived of conjugal partnership of properties upon allegations of fraud and abuse of such powers HELD: NO Code recognizes authority of husband to be administrator of conjugal property and mere allegations of fraud may not take this right away from him. The CAs resolution of putting hacienda into receivership of BPI would destroy the husbands rights when it should be used to preserve and secure them. RESULT: respondents are directed to turn over authority to petitioner
Docena vs. Lapesura 355 SCRA 658 Facts: - Casiano filed for recovery of land against his lesees, petitioner-spouses - Petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation since time immemorial - TC initially rules for petitioners, but REVERSES on appeal, ordering petitioners to vacate the land and to pay rent - May 22, 1995 - Casiano files Motion for Execution, Sheriff issues an alias Write of Demolition - Petitioners file for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA, denied on grounds of it is beyond the 60 days, and the certificate of non forum shopping was only signed by one of the petitioners (Antonio) ISSUE: WON certificate of non-forum shopping may only be signed by one of the spouses HELD: YES Homeowners Savings Loan Bank vs Dailo (supra) Alinas vs Alinas GR No 158040, April 14, 2008 Facts: - Petitioners separated in 1982 leaving behind two lots: - Lot 896-B-9-A with a bodega (LOT A) - Lot 896-B-9-B with the petitioners' house (LOT B) (This is the Lot which talks about conjugal partnership of gains) While the general rule is that certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all petitioners the signing for conjugal property does not make it insufficient. Since the husband is recognized as the administrator of the conjugal property the husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action without being joined by his wife. While administration of conjugal property is joint, it does not require the spouses to always act together. Each may validily exercise their full power to manage alone as limited by FC ART 124. Court presumes that husband has personal knowledge of wifes filing, and is clearly intended for benefit of family. -
Petitioners entrusted both properties to Respondents with the agreement that any income from rentals should be remitted to the SSS and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City (RBO) as the rentals would be for payment of petitioners' loans.

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Sometime in 1993, petitioners find out that both lots were titled in respondents' name Apparently both LOTS were foreclosed, and reacquired by respondents Furthermore, records show that Onesiforo executed Absolute Deed of Sale, dated March 10 1989, selling LOT B to Victor. Petitioners file for recovery of lots RTC renders decision: Lot A is respondents'. The sale of LOT B, is null and void, since Onesiforo sold w/o wife's consent Respondents file with CA CA renders decision: Lot A is respondents'. LOT B's sale in so far as Rosario's share of 1/2 is concerned is of no force and effect.
ISSUE: WON sale conducted by husband without consent of wife to whom he is separated with is void HELD: YES Art 124 of FC says that the absence of authority or consent of wife shall make the disposition or encumberance void. Respondent spouses who bought land (1) knew that it was conjugal property (2) knew that the wife did not know of the selling since they were separated (3) sale documents do not bear the wifes signature, thus they are seen as buyers of bad faith However, petitioners are still ordered by court to reimburse them with interest.
FC 124 Uy vs. CA 346 SCRA 246 Facts: - Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza suffers a stroke on March 25, 1991 - A piece of property was planned on being sold - Upon knowledge of the planned selling, Teodoro (Ernesto's son) files for petition praying for a court appointed guardian to administer the property given the present physical and mental incapacity of Ernesto - Gilda (Ernesto's wife) files for petition praying for sole powers of administration of conjugal properties and authorization to sell the same - Alleging that the her husband's medical treatment's bills needed to be paid, hence the need to sell - RTC awards petition to Gilda, pursuant to FC Art. 124 and governed by the rules on summary proceedings of Art. 253 - Teodoro files for Motion of Reconsideration - While above case was pending, Gilda sells the property to Jose and Glenda Uy - Teodoro files opposition to the motion for approval of the deed of sale - TC approves sale / CA reverses the decision ordering the TC to dismiss the proceedings to approve the deed of sale ISSUE: WON Gilda Jardelez may assume sole powers of administration of conjugal property and sell land since her husband is incapacitated with a stroke to do so. HELD: NO Art 124 contemplates a situation where spouse is absent, separated, or abandoned the other or where consent is withheld of cannot be obtained. Such rules dont apply to cases where non-consenting spouse is incapacitated. Rule 93 of 1964 Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy in judicial guardianship proceedings. Also, FC also recognizes that for the wife to assume power of administration it has the same powers and duties as a guardian under rules of court o THUS, they must still observe rules of sale of wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary proceedings In this case, TC did not comply with procedure in Revised Rules of Court and did not serve notice of petition to incapacitated spouse and require him to show
FC 100(3) FC1O1 FC61 Sabalones v. CA (supra) FC 124-125 Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon 120 SCRA 628 Cheeseman v. IAC 193 SCRA 93 (supra) Frenzel vs. Catito G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003 Facts: Alfred (Australian, German descent) pilot with New Guinea airlines. Started business in Philippines in 1974 and married Teresita Santos (Fil). They separated without divorce in 1981. 1983 He met Ederlina Catito (Fil) a masseuse in Australia. Unknown to him she is married to Klaus Muller (German) and lived in Germany for a while. She is fluent in German and Alfred enjoyed talking to her. Alfred offered Ederlina to stay in Phil and engage in business. She put up a beauty parlor. Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina. They acquired properties in the name of Ederlina which Alfred consented to since he plans on marrying Ederlina. Klaus wrote Alfred about his marriage with Ederlina and begged Alfred to return Ederlina. When Alfred confronted Ederlina, she admitted that she and Klaus were married but she assured Alfred that she would divorce Klaus. He agreed to continue the amorous relationship and wait for the outcome of Ederlinas petition for divorce. Alfred hired the lawyer. Alfred acquired more properties in the name of Ederlina. Ederlinas petition for divorce was denied because Klaus opposed the same. A second petition filed by her met the same fate. Klaus wanted half of all the properties owned by Ederlina in the Philippines before he would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus threatened to file a bigamy case against Ederlina Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating. He demanded the return of all the properties acquired by him and Ederlina during their coverture. Alfred filed a Complaint on October 28, 1985 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for recovery of real and personal properties located in Quezon City and Manila. For Ederlina transfered funds from their joint account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own account without his knowledge and consent. Using the said funds, Ederlina was able to purchase the properties subject of the complaints. He also alleged that the beauty parlor in Ermita was established with his own funds, and that the Quezon City property was likewise acquired by him with his personal funds. Alfred also filed a complaint against Ederlina with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, for specific performance, declaration of ownership of real and personal properties, sum of money, and damages. (RTC Davao in favor of Ederlina, case dismissed) RTC of QC: the purchaser of land is Ederlina (Alfred as an alien was precluded from recovering the properties from the respondent) CA: upheld RTC (the petitioner knowingly violated the Constitution; hence, was barred from recovering the money used in the purchase of the three parcels of land. It held that to allow the petitioner to recover the money used for the purchase of the properties would embolden aliens to violate the Constitution, and defeat, rather than enhance, the public policy) Pertinent Issues: whether or not the land belongs to Alfred Held/Ratio- No. It belongs to Ederlina. The constitution prohibits Alfred from owning lands. He cannot recover the money used to buy the properties.
Ayuste vs.CA GR no. 118784, Sept. 2, 1999 Facts: Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on September 24, 1961. They bought a machine shop (managed by Rafael) in Lucena and bought a parcel of land also in Lucena. The title of land was in the name of Rafael married to Christina. In 1987, Rafael sold the land in favor of private respondent. The
deed of sale was signed by Rafael and Christina. In 1990 Christina filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale. She claims that her signature was forged and the sale was without her knowledge of consent. - RTC: sale is null and void - CA: sale is valid, the annulment was instituted after Rafael died (the deed is voidable but complaint should be raised during the marriage as required by Art. 173.) Pertinent Issues: whether or not the sale is valid -Held/Ratio- Yes. The sale is valid. Art. 173 The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband. Registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds constitutes a notice to the whole world. Since the deed of sale was registered on March 5, 1987, Christina Ayuste is presumed to have constructive notice of the sale from such date.
Villaranda vs. Spouses Villaranda G.R. No. 153447, Feb,23, 2004 -
Facts: Land was left to Vicente Villaranda and Honorio Villaranda and their siblings by their parents. In 1976 Honorio and Vicente executed the deed of exchange where Vicente agreed to convey his 64.22square-meter portion to Honorio, in exchange for a property in Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City. After the execution of the Deed, Honorio took possession of the 64.22-square-meter lot and constructed a building thereon. On April 6, 1992, a subdivision plan was completed, in pursuit of which TCT No. T65893 for the 64.22 square-meter share of Vicente was issued in his name. Honorio and Ana brought an action before the RTC to compel Vicente to comply with his obligations under the Deed of Exchange. They want Vicente to identify and delineate his undivided portion of the property and convey to them the 64.22square-meter Divisoria lot, in compliance with his obligations under the Deed. During the pendency of the case, Honorio conditionally sold the Divisoria lot to Colorhouse Laboratories, Inc. Vicente contends that because the property had not been delivered, the Deed had not been consummated. Moreover, he claimed that the Deed had already been revoked by both parties. RTC: in favor of Honorio, contract valid CA: upheld RTC The provisions of the Civil Code were applicable to the case at bar, since the Deed of Exchange had been entered into prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the absence of the wifes signature on the Deed made it only voidable, not void.
The CA further found that Ana was aware of the execution of the Deed, and yet she brought no action for its annulment within ten (10) years from its execution. Pertinent Issues: Whether there was a perfected and consummated deed of exchange Whether the Deed of Exchange which was not signed by the wife of Respondent Honorio G. Villaranda is valid and enforceable. Held/Ratio- Yes. The deed is valid. The absence of the signature of Ana on the Deed does not prove lack of her consent thereto, because a contract may validly exist even if the parties have not reduced their stipulations to writing. Too, assuming that her consent to the Deed is lacking, such fact would not render the agreement void, but merely voidable. There is no evidence that any action to annul the transfer made by Honorio was ever brought by Ana within ten years from "the transaction questioned." Her right to bring an action to invalidate the contract has thus prescribed. Hence, the assailed Deed is still valid and enforceable. The legal prohibition against the disposition of conjugal property by one spouse without consent of the other has been established for the benefit, not of third persons, but only of the other spouse for whom the law desires to save the conjugal partnership from damages that might be caused. Not being the proper party, Vicente cannot avail himself of the remedy prescribed by Article 173.
Ainza vs.CA G.R. No. 165420. June 30, 2005
Facts: Antonio and Eugenia owned a lot with an unfinished residential house located in Quezon City. In April 1987Concepcion bought one-half of an undivided portion of the property from her daughter, Eugenia and the latters husband, Antonio, for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No Deed of Absolute Sale was executed to evidence the transaction, but cash payment was received by the respondents, and ownership was transferred to Concepcion through physical delivery to her attorney-in-fact and daughter, Natividad Tuliao (Natividad). Concepcion authorized Natividad and the latters husband, Ceferino Tuliao (Ceferino) to occupy the premises, and make improvements on the unfinished building. Respondents caused the subdivision of the property. Antonio said that he bought the property in 1980 and introduced improvements thereon. That he and his wife allowed Natividad and Ceferino to occupy the premises temporarily. Antonio requested Natividad to vacate the premises but the latter refused and claimed that Concepcion owned the property. Antonio filed an ejectment suit on April 1, 1999. Concepcion, represented also filed on May 4, 1999 a civil case for partition of real property and annulment of titles with damages. Antonio claimed that his wife, Eugenia, admitted that Concepcion offered to buy one third (1/3) of the property who gave her small amounts over several years which totaled P100,000.00 by 1987 and for which she signed a receipt. RTC: Sale is valid. In favor of Concepcion.( sale was consummated when both contracting parties complied with their respective obligations. Eugenia transferred possession by delivering the property to Concepcion who in turn paid the purchase price. ) CA: sale is null and void. (Applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the Court of
Appeals ruled that since the subject property is conjugal, the written consent of Antonio must be obtained for the sale to be valid. ) Pertinent Issue: whether there was a valid contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion Held/Ratio: Sc: Valid. There was a perfected contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion. The records show that Eugenia offered to sell a portion of the property to Concepcion, who accepted the offer and agreed to pay P100,000.00 as consideration. The contract of sale was consummated when both parties fully complied with their respective obligations. Eugenia delivered the property to Concepcion, who in turn, paid Eugenia the price of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), as evidenced by the receipt . The oral contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion was evidenced by a receipt signed by Eugenia. Antonio also stated that his wife admitted to him that she sold the property to Concepcion. The action to annul an oral contract must be commenced within six years from the time the right of action accrued. No action was commenced by Antonio to annul the sale, hence his right to seek its annulment was extinguished by prescription. Under Art. 173 Antonio is still barred from instituting an action to annul the sale because since April 1987, more than ten (10) years had already lapsed without any such action being filed. Antonio failed to exercise his right to ask for the annulment within the prescribed period, hence, he is now barred from questioning the validity of the sale between his wife and Concepcion.
Alinas vs. Alina (supra) FC 127, FC 100 cf. FC 239 FC128 Partosa-Jo v. CA 216 SCRA 693 FACTS: 1980, Prima Partosa-Jo filed two complaints against Jose Jo for a)judicial separation of conjugal property and b) complaint for support for her and their daughter Monina 29 Nov 1983: Negros Oriental RTC rendered judgment in favor of Prima but failed to include judgment on judicial separation of property in the dispositive portion Prima elevated this to CA, CA affirmed judgment on support but dismissed petition for separation of
property for lack merit saying that it was not allowed as their separation was due to their agreement rather and not because of abandonment ISSUES: W/N the decision of RTC can be questioned given that it is final and executory W/N she is entitled to judicial separation of conjugal property on the ground of abandonment
HELD/RATIO: The RTC failed put judgment on separation of property in the dispositive portion, BUT it was made in the penultimate paragraph reading as follows: o all the properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant is subject to separation of property The RTC held that they were legally married and that the properties were acquired during coverture although they were in the name of a dummy (Chinese national kasi)
Prima submits that their agreement was not to be separated but for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her
pregnancy and that he would visit and support her. But when she returned to their house in Dumaguete in 1942, he refused to accept her. She is entitled to separation of property on ground of abandonment. Abandonment implies departure of one spouse with intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause and without providing for means although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The physical separation of the parties, coupled by the refusalm by Jose Jo to give support to Prima, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for legal separation of their conjugal property. Aside from this, he admittedly cohabitated with other women and have not established just cause for his refusal to comply with his duties as husband. Court ordered for division between the two hal/half. It should include properties such as those which were registered in the name of other persons in violation of the anti-dummy law. The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his extramarital flings and a succession of illegitimate children, he must now make an accounting to his lawful wife of the properties he denied her despite his promise to her of his eternal love and care.
FC 126 (10 FC 63 (2), FC 66 FC 50 in rd. To FC 43 (2) FC 134-138 FC129 Metropolitan Bank vs Pascual GR No. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008 FACTS: Nicholson Pascual m. Florencia Nevalga on 19Jan1985. During the union, they bought a 250-square meter lot in Makati from Clarito and Belen Sering. In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psycholohical incapacity. 31July1995, RTC ordered dissolution and liquidation of exspouses conjugal partnership of gains, however, they failed to liquidate it. 30April1997, Florencia, with Norberto and Elvira Oliveros obtained a 58 Million Peso loan from Metrobank. To secure obligation, they mortgaged their properties, including the lot in Makati. Florencia gave Metrobank a copy of the RTC decision and a waiver allegedly executed on 9Apr1995 by Nicholson in favor of Florencia covering conjugal properties that were listed therein but did not include the Makati property. They failed to pay their obligation so Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings and at the auction sale emerged as the highest bidder. 28June2000, Nicholson filed for nullity of marriage alleging that the property was conjugal and was mortgaged without his consent RTC declared the mortgages invalid and ordered Metrobank and Florencia to pay Nicholson P100,000.00 moral damages and P75,000.00 attorneys fees.
CA affirmed with modification, deleting the fees imposed
ISSUE/S: W/N the property is conjugal W/N the Mortgage was valid HELD: The disputed property is conjugal. Metrobank virtually recognized the conjugal nature of the property when it refered to them as spouses, comortgagor in a)the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure b) published notice for foreclosure and c) demand letter to vacate premises of the property. Contrarty to Metrobanks submission, the matter of the use of conjugal funds as an essential requirement for the presumption of conjugal ownership to arise is WRONG. only proof acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise presumption. The declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not FC 129 FC 129; FC 43(2) FC 63(2) FC 130 (cf. FC 104) FC131 FC132
automatically result in the regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal assets. While the declaration of nullity severed the marital bond and dissolved conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired continues to subsist as conjugal property until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. Pending its liquidation, the CPG is converted into an implied ordinary coownership. What governs the property relation is Art 493 which says the effect of the alienation or the mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Florencia has the right to mortgage undivided interest without consent Mortgage is valid insofar as the share of Florencia is concerned.
Santero v. CFI 153 SCRA 728 Facts: Private respondents are requesting for a Motion for Allowance from the estate of deceased Pablo Pascual (legitimate father of private respondents) which was granted by the CFI. Petitioners (also legitimate children of Pascual with another woman) oppose the motion on the grounds that most of the private respondents are already of age. NOTE: neither of the women are legally married to Pablo Pascual. Issue: FC 143-146 FC 103 &FC 130 FC 66(2) FC144 FC145 FC 142 FC 146 FC 87, NCC 1490 FC 134 Maquilan vs Maquilan W/N court acted with grave abuse of discretion by granting the motion for allowance. Held: NO Ratio: Petition lacks merit. Art. 290 (support for children can apply even beyond the age of majority) and 188 (right to allowance) apply. It doesnt matter if they are of age, gainfully employed and married. The New Civil Code entitles the children to allowance as advances of their shares in the inheritance from their father, Pablo. A substantive right cannot be impaired by a procedural one (Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court)
June 8, 2007 Facts: Spouses Maquilan were happily married until Virgilio discovered that Dita was having an affair. He filed a complaint for adultery in which Dita and her paramour were found guilty. June 15 2001: Private respondent filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages. During pre-trial of case, spouses created a COMPROMISE A G R E E M E N T. This is with regard to some particular properties that they either decided to divide between them or give to their common child, Neil. Compromise agreement was given judicial imprimatur by respondent RTC Judge. Jan. 15, 2002: Petitioner files an Omnibus Motion saying that his lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Agreement. Respondent Judge denied Motion. Aug. 30, 2002: CA also dismissed petition for lack of merit. The conviction of the crime of adultery of Dita does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. She was only sentenced with the penalty of prision correccional, without civil interdiction, which would have deprived her of the right to manage her property. Since petition for declaration of nullity was not yet decided, it would be premature to apply Art. 43 and 63 of FC (re: effects of nullified marriage or LS) The spouses also VOLUNTARILY agreed to a separation of their property which was FC 135 cf. FC 55 (10) FC 136, FC 74-75, FC 134 Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson (supra) FC 137 par. 1 FC l37par.2 FC 138 ofFC 66 (2) FC 139-140; of FC 66(2) FC 141 cf.FC67 FC 142 FC 35-38, 53; FC 41,44; FC 45 FC 147 Maxey v. CA 129 SCRA 187 cf. NCC 144 Facts: Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) lived as husband and wife in Davao, out of this common law marriage, they had 6 children (petitioners) 1903 when they started living together approved of by law, in accordance with FC 134. It is the petitioner and his lawyers fault for not checking nor objecting to this right away before it was approved of. Main Issue: Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid. HELD: YES. The court fully concurs with the CA Ratio: Art. 134 of the FC says that separation of property may be effected and is subject to judicial approval. In the case at bar, this was clearly allowed by the RTC so it holds. Obiter: voluntary separation of property is subject to rights of all creditors of CPG and other persons with pecuniary interest (Art 136 FC) Re: Dita being a guilty spouse: the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification. Conviction of adultery does NOT carry the accessory of civil interdiction, rendering the agreement still valid, as opposed to what the petitioner believes. (Look at ratio of CA) Again, the petitioner cannot use the excuse that he was misinformed by his previous counsel. Negligence of the counsel binds the client. (Salonga vs. CA)

1911-1912 when Melbourne bought the lands 1919 when they married in church and when 1st wife died. 1953- husband remarried, when 2nd wife sold the land. 1961 when children discovered sale Plaintiffs are currently praying for the annulment of the documents of sale over particular lands that were sold to private respondent couple by their fathers 2nd wife. They allege that common properties belonged to their parents who acquired the lands during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital. Sales of land by their father were done without their knowledge and consent and only after their mother, Regina had died in 1953. Children discovered sale in 1961. Respondent spouses insist that they are buyers in good faith and they believed that the Melbourne was the sole owner of the parcels of land. Melbourne and maxey started living together in 1903. That same year, the children allege that they got married in the military fashion. They acquired properties in 1911 and 1912. They got married in 1919. Regina died sometime in 1919, soon after the church marriage. 1953: husband remarried. Issue: W/N spouses Maxey were married as early as 1903 in a military fashion as alleged by the children NO. The CFI and the CA were correct in rejecting this since the Act No. 3613 a.k.a. the Revised Marriage Law was approved much later (Dec. 4, 1929). It could not apply to a 1903 marriage. W/N common law spouses, prior to marriage, share conjugal property over lands acquired in 1912. RTC: applied Art. 144 that states that in common law marriages, the property acquired by both through work, industry, wages, salaries are governed by the rules of co-ownership.
CA: Ruled otherwise, they believed that the land was exclusive property of Melbourne Maxey. Art. 144 should not have applied because the Regina did not contribute to the acquisition of the profit. She had no income of her own. Cannot consider this a joint effort. SC: YES. Art. 144 of the Civil Code should apply there being no showing that vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its application. Art. 144 may be retroactively applied, they do not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right. Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share in properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized through decisions of this Court. (Aznar et al. vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055; Flores vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 94 Phil. 451; Marata vs. Dionio, L-24449, December 31, 1925; Lesaca v. Lesaca, 91 Phil. 135.) Under this new code, it is believed that even if it is only the man who works, there is still a 50-50 sharing of property acquired during their cohabitation together. The woman runs the household: "in the Filipino family, the wife holds the purse, husbands hand over their pay checks and get an allowance in return and the wife manages the affairs of the household. . . . (Dean Cortes) In the Philippines, the best man is the woman." (Gov-Gen Leonard Wood) Ruling: the petitioners should return one-half of the P1,300.00 purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of P650.00 on the other.
Domingo v. CA 226 SCRA 572 (All Opinions) Facts: 1969 previous marriage of Roberto Domingo and Emerlina dela Paz 1976 married Delia Soledad Domingo 1979 present Delia was working in Saudi Arabia while husband has remained unemployed (1983-present) o was the supporter of the family and purchased real and personal properties out of her personal earnings. Roberto was the administrator 1983 when Delia knew of first marriage 1989 when she discovered he had another woman and was also selling her property without her consent. o Thus asked lower court for (1) a temporary restraining order stopping Roberto from exercising any
act of administration and ownership over the properties (2) fomarriage to be declared null and void (3) Delia Domingo be declared sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at time of their void marriage. RTC denied for lack of merit since marriage is seen as void in the first place thus steps arent necessary CA: held that prayer for nullity along with separation of properties may be raised however they were still denied for lack of merit. Thus case is in SC ISSUE: WON respondent may recover certain real and personal property exclusively belonging to her
HELD: YES Distribution and separation of property of spouses is one of the reasons why theres a need to judicially declare that a marriage is void. Court that declares a marriage void will also provide for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of properties of spouses. It is a necessary consequence of judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage o Rules that apply: FC Art 43 and 44 o Separation of property will be according to regime of property relations governing them. CONCURRING BY VITUG When a void marriage is still in existence (without judical declaration of nullity) neither the CPG or ACP will apply instead, property relations shall be governed by co-ownership rules under Art 147 or Art 148 of FC.
Belcodero v. CA (supra) Valds v. QC RTC, supra Carino vs. Carino, supra Fehr vs. Fehr G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003 Facts: March 1983 petitioner and respondent moved in together in Manila. July 1983 bought Suite 204 of LGC condominium. Deal was executed by respondent and was issued under petitioners name 1985 got married 1997 marriage was declared void under FC 36 1999 RTC issued order resolving their property. This was contested by petitioner adducing that Suite 204, LGC condominium was purchased on installment basis when they were living exclusively as husband and wife without benefit of marriage thus rules on co-ownership should apply (FC Art 147) TC: affirmed ruling that condo unit was acquired before marriage thus is solely respondents property CA: dismissed petition for lack of merit. Thus the present petition. ISSUE: WON Suite 204 is solely respondents property HELD: NO FC Art 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to marry but whose marriage is still void. o Elements: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife (3) union is without benefit of marriage or their marriage is void = all 3 elements are present in this case o Capacitated legal capacity of party to contract marriage o presumed that property was obtained through joint efforts. Evidence clearly shows that condo unit was obtained when they were living exclusively together thus is considered COMMON PROPERTY of petitioner and respondent Civil code provisions on co-ownership should thus should thus apply to answer property regime of the parties. -
Joaquino vs Reyes 434 SCRA 260 Facts: - Rodolfo A. Reyes and Lourdes P. Reyes were married on January 3, 1947 but since 1962,
Rodolfo had been living with his paramour, Milagros B. Joaquino. - As Vice President and Comptroller of Warner Barnes & Company, - Rodolfo obtained a loan of P140k from Commonwealth Insurance Corporation in order to purchase a house and lot in BF Homes, Paraaque. He also mortgaged the same (through a Special Power of Attorney) to pay the balance of the purchase price and secured a life insurance policy from Philam Life Insurance Corporation to guaranty the payment where he paid monthly amortizations. The property was registered under the name of Milagros Joaquino only even though it was purchased with the earnings, and hence conjugal funds, of Rodolfo. - When Rodolfo died on September 12, 1981, Milagros and their natural children claimed that Milagros was unaware of Rodolfos marriage, that the house and lot as Milagros exclusive which she allegedly obtained with her own funds, that she only authorized Rodolfo to mortgage the house and lot as a matter of convenience but she personally provided funds for the amortization, and that she did not benefit from Rodolfos emoluments and other pecuniary benefits. On the other hand, Lourdes and their children claimed that the properties were conjugal properties because they were paid for by the earnings of Rodolfo during the marriage. Issue: WON house and lot are conjugal properties Held: YES The presumption in favour of the conjugal partnership operates in the case at bar because the properties were acquired during coverture (NCC 160). Even though Rodolfo was already living with Milagros when the properties were bought, the rules of co-ownership between persons cohabiting as husband and wife (under NCC 148) only applies to properties acquired by both through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry. Ownership then is proportional to their respective contributions, which are considered equal absent proof to the contrary. o Art 153 what are conjugal properties o Art 144 DOESNT APPLY common law marriages are entitled to co-ownership (50/50) laws IF COUPLES ARE NOT INCAPACITATED TO MARRY EACH OTHER WHICH IN THIS CASE
THEY CLEARLY ARE THUS CANT APPLY. (X) applied to adultery/concubinag e ART 148 does when common-law couple have a legal impediment, only property acquired by them through ACTUAL, JOINT CONTRIBUTION OF MONEY, PROEPRTY OR INDUSTRY, shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective properties This also wasnt proven by petitioner since she had no job or money to gain the properties in question. Thus they are conjugal.
The financial capacity of Rodolfo as VP and Comptroller of WBC, his retirement package, his application for the mortgage loan intended of housing and his monthly amortizations and semi-annual premiums payable to Commonwealth by Philam sufficiently prove that Rodolfo purchased the property by his own funds. And where his salaries are considered cp, the loan and the purchased properties were also cp. On the other hand, Milagros only showed Affidavits and undated Certifications to prove that she purchased the properties by her own money, borrowing from her siblings, selling jewellery and selling a drugstore four years prior. The registration of the properties under Milagros name can thus be considered only as a donation that is void under NCC 739 (1) especially where Rodolfo intended to deprive Lourdes of ownership over the properties.
In terms of the illegitimate childrens right to Rodolfos estate, their rights must be determined in a special proceeding instituted for that purpose. The issue was not raised or presented in the original and supplemental complaints for reconveyance of property and damages, in the answers of Milagros and her memorandum. Hence, the illegitimate filiation of her children could not have been duly established in the case at bar.
Gonzales vs Gonzales 478 SCRA 327 Facts:
Before they started living together on March 1977, Francisco Gonzales offered Erminda Gonzales to be his partner in Fiesta Pizza, his pizza business, and to take over its operations. She accepted the offer and took care of the business daily operations, personnel management, outlets supervision, and met people during inspections. - Despite their marriage on Feb. 4, 1979, the same was declared void under FC 36 on Feb. 12, 1997. Erminda then sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and claimed the pizza business to be conjugal property where she contributed to 80% of the total management. Francisco, however, claimed that it was exclusive. Issue: WON properties should be divided equally between husband and wife Held: YES because the marriage was declared void, the property regime that applies is co-ownership under FC 147. Under the rules of coownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union (under a void marriage) are presumed to have been obtained through joint FC 148 of FC 50 in rel. to FC 49(2) and FC 50
efforts and will be owned by them in equal shares absent proof of the contrary. Francisco admitted in a handwritten letter dated Sept. 6, 1989 that Erminda had helped in the management of the business and was not a mere housewife. Hence, the business is coowned and both Francisco and Erminda are presumed to have contributed jointly. Art 147 applies when )1) when man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other without benefit of marriage (2) when man and woman live together under void marriage o Presumption is anything acquired during both instances are obtained through joint efforts and shall be divided equally. Party who didnt participate in acquisition by other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in acquisition if formers efforts consisted of care and maintenance of family and household.
Juaniza v. Jose 89 SCRA 306 FACTS: Passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways (Nov. 23, 1969) which resulted in the death to 7 and physical injuries to 5 of its passengers Eugenio Jose registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant Rosalia Arroyo for 16 years CFI decision on resulting cases for damages: o Ordered Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally to pay Rosalia Arroyo filed for Motion for Reconsideration denied o Lower court based her liability on Art. 144 of the Civil Code CA certified question to SC ISSUES: WON Art. 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry WON Rosalia who isnt a registered owner of the jeep can be held solidarily liable for damages with the registered owner of the same o
HELD: NO Co-ownership contemplated in Art. 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage
NO o
Rosalia Arroyo cannot e a co-owner of the jeepney o Jeep belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife o No basis for the liability of Rosalia Arroyo for damages Only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein
Gomez v. Lipana 33 SCRA 615 FACTS: Lipana contracted two marriages: o (1) Maria 1930 Loreto Ancino-

(2) Isidra Gomez y Aquino 1935 while 1st marriage was still subsisting (Isidra didnt know) Dec. 13, 1943 Lipana and Isidra purchased a piece of land in Cubao (P3,000) o Torrens Title issued in Feb. 1, 1944: Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez July 20, 1958 Isidra died intestate and childless, survived only by her sisters August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of Isidras estate prayed for the forfeiture of the husbands share in the Cubao property in favor of the estate o Art. 1417 of the old Civil Code Trial Court ruled in favor of the estate o Because 2nd marriage was void ab initio and the husband was the one who gave cause for nullity o
ISSUES: WON Art. 1417 of the old Civil Code is applicable HELD: NO o Since Lipanas 1st marriage hasnt been dissolved or
declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. o Under the 2nd paragraph of Art. 1417, it is upon the termination of the partnership by either of said causes that the forfeiture of the guilty spouse takes place When did the conjugal partnership formed by virtue of 2nd marriage terminate? Isidras death in 1958 Art. 1417 was no longer in force changed by NCC (took effect 1950 o No action lies under Art. 1417 for the forfeiture of the husbands share. RESULT: recognize right of 2nd wife to her husband while other half is conjugal partnership of first marriage. Thus decision is reversed.
Yap v. CA 145 SCRA 229 Facts: Maning Yap married Talina Bianong in 1939 and they had 4 children. 2 of which died in infancy. Herein petitioners are the two surviving children, Shirley and Jaime. While the first marriage was still subsisting, Maning married Nancy on December 11, 1948. They had four children. On February 21, 1964, Maning died because of a plane crash. On March 3, 1964, Talina sought the issuance of letters of administration for the estate of Maning. It was opposed by Nancy and her minor children. Talina was initially appointed special administratix and then later Shirley Yap was appointed regular administratix. Since there was a residue of properties and collectible debts after payments to creditors, the court set the case for hearing to arriave at a declaration of heirship for the purpose of liquidating the conjugal partnership of Maning and his surviving spouse and to determine the heirs entitled to inherit his intestate estate. Lower court declared Talina and her children as the legal heirs of Maning . The CA reversed this decision and ruled that the estate should be equally divided into two equal part: to Talina and her children and to Nancy Yap and her kids by virtue of the Leyes de Partidas. Petitioners contend that since Maning died in 1964 when the NCC was already effective, the Spanish Civil Code should be followed. Issue: WON the second wife is entitled to inherit Held. No Ratio: The records show that the properties in question were acquired by Talina and Maning during their marriage. Hence, these properties in the absence of any evidence to the contrary are considered conjugal properties of Talina and Maning (Art. 142, NCC) Pursuant to Art. 142 and Art. 185 of the NCC, the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains after money claims filed by creditors against the intestate estate of Maning approved by the lower court have been paid by the administratix should be equally divided between Maning and Talina as their shares. The share of

Ruling: Petition is granted. Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals (supra) Agapay vs Agapay 276 SCRA 340 Facts: industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision since it for relationships that have legal impediments o Art 147 is the law that recognizes relationships without legal impediment and proof of care and maintenance of family and household equates to joint effort. Erlinda failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to buy the subject Riceland hence the riceland reverts to the first marriage With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years oldhowever the notary testified that the property was purchased by Miguel but put in the name of Erlinda- the transaction was essentially a void donation Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage Compromise agreement entered into by Carliana and late Miguel is not a separation of property and should not be inferred as such. NO LIQUIDATION WAS MADE.
Maning would then comprise his intestate estate to be distributed to his heirs.
Nancy Yap, the second wife cannot inherit from Maning Yap because their marriage was void ab initio (Art. 83, NCC)
Miguel Palang married Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol on July 16, 1949 October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii July 15, 1973 Miguel married with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, jointly purchased a parcel of rice land. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 issued in their names September 23, 1975 Erlinda allegedly purchased a house and lot and title was issued in her name October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel died July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages of the house and lot together with the riceland
Issue Who is the owner of the two pieces of property Held: Carlina, the first wife Under FC Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernandez G.R. No. 137650, Apr 12, 2000 Facts: Spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building and that they had allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989 without the payment of any rent. They agreed that after a few months guillerma tumlos would start paying rent but she failed to pay after repeated demands. They prayed that defendants be ejected Guillerma Tumlos averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a covendee of the property in question together with [Respondent] Mario Fernandez Defendants alleged Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest Guillerma administered the property, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. It was also during the early part of 1996 when Mario accused her of being unfaithful and demonstrated his baseless jealousy Petitioners central theory and main defense against respondents action for ejectment is her claim of coownership over the property with Respondent Mario Fernandez. At the first instance before the MTC, she presented a Contract to Sell indicating that she was his spouse CA rejected petitioners claim that she and Respondent Mario Fernandez were co-owners of the disputed property
Issue: A. B. Held:
Is the petitioner a co-owner of the property? Can the claim for support bar this ejectment suit? the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code which provides Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other, or
to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a coownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC, it is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article,[21] only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. "If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the coownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. "The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith Petitioners argument -- that the Family Code is inapplicable because the cohabitation and the acquisition of the property occurred before its effectivity -deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to say that the law itself states that it can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. In this case, petitioner failed to show any vested right over the property in question. Moreover, to resolve similar issues,
we have applied Article 148 of the Family Code retroactively Petitioner failed to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to
purchase the subject property. She anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez
Malilin vs Castillo 333 SCRA 628 Facts: bench appears to have been prematurely filed. ISSUE: Can plaintiff validly claim the partition and/or payment of coownership share, accounting and damages, considering that plaintiff and defendant are admittedly both married to their respective spouses under still valid and subsisting marriages, even assuming as claimed by plaintiff, that they lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage? In other words, can the parties be considered as coowners of the properties, under the law, considering the present status of the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each other, even assuming that they lived together as husband and wife (?) HELD: Yes -Article 148 shall apply in this case. If the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership even though the couple are not capacitated to marry each other. -Petitioner sought partition of real properties and a substantial amount of personal properties consisting of motor vehicles and several pieces of jewelry. By dismissing petitioners complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, the appellate court unwittingly denied petitioner his right to prove ownership over the claimed real and personal properties. The amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 7, 1998, is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City for further proceedings on the merits.
-Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo -petitioner and respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted. -during their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs brokerage corporation and also acquired properties which were registered solely in Elviras name. -In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. -She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the fact was that they were still legally married to their respective spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal properties involved in petitioners action for partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered solely in her name. -RTC dismissed case. It also ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties actually lived together as husband and wife because Art. 144 of the Civil Code can not be made to apply to them as they were both incapacitated to marry each other. Hence, it was impossible for a coownership to exist between them. -CA granted respondents motion. It said in its decision that the desired declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition will utterly be an indirect or collateral attack on the subject titles in this suit. Verily, plaintiff-appellant should have first pursued such remedy or any other relief directly attacking the subject titles before instituting the present partition suit. Apropos, the case at
Saguid vs. CA G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003
Facts: -Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married but separated de facto from her husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July 1987 -the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father. -In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. -On January 9, 1997, private respondent Gina Rey filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque -She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her. -Petitioner Jacinto Saguid claims that expenses for the construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that private respondents meager income as fish dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said house; Gina did not work continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month duration each year. When their house was repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did not share in the expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and business of her parents -RTC rendered judgment in favor of Gina Rey -CA affirmed RTC ruling ISSUE: whether or not the parties can be considered as co-owners of the properties Held: YES
- it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 14830 of the Family Code. In this case, the proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. - Art 148 applies even if cohabitation or acquisition of property occurred before FC took effect since no law before it answers cohabitation of couples living in adultery or concubiange - The controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00. -Both parties claim that the money used to purchase the disputed personal properties came partly from their joint account with First Allied Development Bank. There is no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each. - Private respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the controverted house to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent of P55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing which the house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private respondents claim.
Villanueva vs CA, 427 SCRA 439 (supra) Joaquino vs Reyes 434 SCRA 260 Francisco vs Master Iron Works 451 SCRA 494 Facts: Josefina Castillo was only 24 when she married Eduardo Francisco in 1983. Imus Rural Bank then executed a deed of sale for 320,000 in favor of Josefina married to Eduardo. Eduardo then, on 1985, executed an affidavit of waiver where he declared that Josefina purchased two parcels of land including a house before their marriage. In 1986, Josefina mortageged the said property to Leonila Cando for a loan of 157K
1990 Eduardo bought 7500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works but failed tp pay. MIW filed a complaint against him, and the trial court sided with MIW on 1992. Sheriff Alejo levied on the property of Josefina which made her execute an affidavit of third party claim saying that the two parcels of land were paraphernal. The property was sold in an auction for 1,350,000 Josefina amended her complaint, to reconvey the property with moral damages. Josefina then filed a petition to annul her marriage with Eduardo on the grounds of bigamy. RTC of Paranaque granted her plea. RTC 1997 found also the sale of the two parcels of land were null and void BUT the CA reversed the RTCs decision! Saying that the property was conjugal in nature. Issues: WON the said property is the paraphernal property of Josefina Held: No
Ratio: They are not paraphernal since she wasnt able to prove that she bought the said land with her funds before the marriage. There is no proof that she contributed money on the acquisition of the said property. The presumption of conjugality was not overcome. evidence lacking: no proof to show that she borrowed money to buy land from mother and sister and also failed to divulge their names. o 3rd claim party affidavit claiming that properties are exclusively from the fruits of own labor negates what she said that she borrowed the money o failed to testify against whose account the check was drawn and issued and whose account it was o was 23 when she married so doubtful that shed have money before to buy such property o bought the property 1 year and 7 months after marriage AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER executed by Eduardo to protect property against third party claims against him. Also significant is he still attached his marital conformity to the lands mortgage.
Atienza vs.de Castro G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006 Facts: Issues: WON the disputed property is the exclusive property of Yolanda Held: Yes Ratio: Since they are not capacitated to marry each other in their cohabitation, FC 148 applies. Under this regime only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their contributions. Absent of proof of contribution, it shall be presumed to be equal. He did not show any evidence that he contributed in the parcel of land while the accountant showed bank accounts which apparently shows that she was capacitated to buy the said land. evidence of De Castro: job as accountant and businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending, and jewelry retail, promisorry notes of dealings with clients, bank account statements, and business transactions = had financial capacity on the other hand Atienza merely provided evidence that Yolanda had no such sufficient funds and didnt provide for evidence regarding his own capacity to pay for such property.
Lupo Atienza hired De Castro as accountant for his two corporations (Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation) in 1983 Then their relationship became intimate despite Lupo being a married man! They lived together in the later part of 1983. They had 2 children, after the second child they parted ways. Then Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for a judicial partition of a land between them in the Bel-Air subdivision Lupo said Yolanda bought the said property with his own funds. Yolanda on the otherhand said she bought it with her own funds. Trial Court said that the contested property is owned common by him and Yolanda and ordered the partition into two equal parts. CA reversed the TC! Saying that it was the exclusive property of Yolanda.
Acre vs Yutikki 2007 Beatriz Acre and Sofronio Acre, Jr. married on November 8, 1957. Have 6 children (petitioners) 1972 Sofronio left conjugal dwelling Petitioners find out that Sofronio married Evangeline Yuttikki May 18, 1972, while still married to Beatriz Sofronio dies Nov 16, 1996 During respondents marriage with Sofronio they acquired properties, one registered to Evangeline Acre married to Sofronio Acre another to E. Acre, married to S. Acre and N. del Mar, married to Jose del Mar (Nellie is Evangelines sister) Petitioners file with RTC for recovery of properties, saying Sofronio acquired it w/ his own funds TC dismisses, saying that the properties are owned in common by Evangeline and Sofronio CA dismisses appeal as well, declaring defendant- appellee exclusive owner
Issue: W/n the CA erred in declaring Evangeline the owner of the contested properties? Held: No. Petition denied, CA decision AFFIRMED. The marriage between Evangeline and Sofronio is indeed bigamous, as such their property regime is under FC 148 o Properties acquired by the parties out of their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership o If there is no contribution from either or both of the spouses, clearly there can be no coownership Petitioners did not present any evidence that shows Sofronio made an actual contribution in acquiring the said properties. Clearly, co-ownership does not exist here. CA correct in saying that the first land in question was registered under Evangeline Acre married to Sofronio Acre, the second land in question under Evangeline Acre married to Sofronio Acre, and Nellie Del Mar, married to Jose Del Mar rule well settled that the words married to preceding Sofronio Acre Jr. are merely descriptive of the status of Evangeline.
Signey v SSS GR No. 173582, Jan. 28, 2008 Facts: Rodolfo Signey, SSS member, died on May 21 2001, in the records he had designated Yolanda as primary beneficiary and his 4 children with her as secondary beneficiaries. 3 women started claiming his death benefits from SSS (in order) 1. Yolanda Signey (petitioner) o Claimed death benefits first (July 6 2001) 2. Gina Servano (respondent) o Claimed death benefits (July 13 2001) o Has 2 minor children with Rodolfo o Claims that she and Yolanda were common law-wives, while Editha is the legal wife. 3. Editha Espinosa (respondent) o Claimed death benefits (Oct 2001) o Claims that she is the legal wife SSS denies Yolanda, saying Ginas 2 children are the primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law Says also that the marriage between Yolanda and Rodolfo is null and void because Rodolfo was still married with Editha Yolanda files a petition with Social Security Commission (SSC) along with a waiver of rights by Editha wherein Editha waived all claims of benefits from SSS because she (Editha) was married to a diff person SSC affirms the SSS Decision Despite the new waiver by Editha, SSC gave more weight to the confirmed marriage of Rodolfo and Editha SSC: Mere designation by Rodolfo in the records of who his beneficiaries were is not a controlling factor SSC then applies SSS Law (RA 8282) where it says that dependent legit / illegit children may be primary beneficiaries, and they have to be minors. Rodolfo had one legitimate child who died earlier than he did His children with Yolanda are all over 21 years old His children with Gina are qualified (them being minors) marriage with the
o o
o o o
Issue: 1. W/n petitioners deceased is valid?
2.
W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits against the illegitimate children?
Held: No. There is no merit to the petition 1. The existence of a prior marriage between Editha and Rodolfa is supported by evidence 2. Section 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282 is very clear (court applies statcon) (found in the case pg. 638): o It defines who are dependents: Legal Spouse Legitimate, adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not employed and is under 21 years old o Whoever claims entitlement benefits should establish his/her right by substantial evidence o Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and bec the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. o Ginas 2 minor children are entitled to 100% of the benefits o Has 2 minor children with Rodolfo o Claims that she and Yolanda were common law-wives, while Editha is the legal wife. 4. Editha Espinosa (respondent) o Claimed death benefits (Oct 2001) o Claims that she is the legal wife SSS denies Yolanda, saying Ginas 2 children are the primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law
Says also that the marriage between Yolanda and Rodolfo is null and void because Rodolfo was still married with Editha Yolanda files with SSC SSC affirms the SSS Decision Sayin
Issue: 3. W/n petitioners marriage with the deceased is valid? 4. W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits against the illegitimate children? Held: No. There is no merit to the petition 3. The existence of a prior marriage between Editha and Rodolfa is supported by evidence 4. Section 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282 is very clear (found in the case pg. 638): o It defines who are dependents: Legal Spouse Legitimate, adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not employed and is under 21 years old o Whoever claims entitlement benefits should establish his/her right by substantial evidence o Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and bec the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. Ginas 2 minor children are entitled to 100% of the benefits
Borromeo vs Descallar GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009
Facts:
1) Wilhelm
2)
3)
Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983. In 1984, he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 19851 and March 10, 19862 and A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 covering the properties in Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien
4) 5)
6)
7)
and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Thus they erased Jambrichs name from the document only retaining his signature in certain areas. Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons. April 1991, respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about P150,000.00. To pay the debt he sold his rights to the Agro-Macro properties to the petitioner. On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred
in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged. 8) On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before the Regional Trial Court, alleging that the deed of sale issued for the property in favor of the respondent do not reflect the true agreement of the parties, the latter having paid nothing for the said properties. 9) Respondent denies the allegation citing that she had paid for the property solely and exclusively using the money from her copra business. 10) RTC rules for the petitioner (Borromeo) citing the proofs presented on the earning capacity of Jambrich at the time the property was purchased over the supposed earnings of the respondent from her Copra business (which were markedly fictional since the respondent was still working as a waitress for P1000 a
month at the time of the purchase of the properties. 11) April 10, 2002 Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA sides w/ respondent citing: In the case at bar, the title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto. Issues: WON Respondent has a right over the said property. Held: NO, it was proven in the RTC trial that the properties in question were in fact purchased from the exclusive funds of Wilhelm Jambrich who at the time of acquisition had sufficient income compared to the waitress wages of the respondent. As such the purchase of the property could clearly be attributed Janbrich and subsequently to the petitioner. Furthermore the vice of alienage plaguing the sale of the property to Jambrich was in fact cured by the transfer of the property to the petitioner who is a Filipino citizen citing the case United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian.
FAMILY RELATIONS FC 149 Alavado v. City of Tacloban 139 SCRA 230 Facts: -Ricardo was employed as a carpenterforeman by the City Engineers Office of Tacloban City -Last day of service was August 19, 1974. (On leave from April 23 to May 23, 1974). On August 6, he went to work only to supervise laborers but he suffered sever headache. Died on August 7, the day after of Cerebral Hemorrage. -W filed claim for death benefits, in her own behalf and of minor children. -The hearing officer in Tacloban City issued an award granting W 5200php as death benefits and 200php as burial reimbursement. -Tacloban City appealed. On Nov 29, 1975, WCC dismissed Ws claim for death benefits on the ground of lack of filiation between claimant and deceased. -According to WCC, Matilde only presented a marriage certificate. MC is not an authentic proof of marital status. She should show original Marriage Contract or MCertificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar. For filiation, her presentation of birth certificate is not enough. BC is not authentic proof of kinship of the person baptized. --WCC said W failed to prove that she was leggaly married to deceased because of a lack of marriage contract. She only submitted was a copy of marriage cert issued by church, which shows that they were married on August 9, 1939. They lived together for 35 years until death of H. ISSUE: W the claimant and her children had the right to claim death benefits of the deceased. HELD: Yes. -Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor. If such relationship was not denied or contradicted, the presumption of marriage must be admitted as fact. -public and open cohabitation as husband and wife, birth certificate and baptismal certificate were held as competent evidence. -There is no evidence on record that will overthrow the presumption of marriage. -The marriage certificate is enough proof of marriage. It is certified to be a true copy of the original issued by the Local Civil registrar of City of Tacloban. -The provisions of the WCC must be interpreted in favor of laborers, WCC being a social legislation aimed at protecting the rights of the workingmen. WCC decision is set aside. Award is reinstated.
Arroyo v. CA
FC 150- 151 NCC 2035 ROC Rules 6 Sec. 1(j) RPC 20, 247 and 332 Gayon v. Gayon 36 SCRA 104 Wainwright v. Versoza 26 SCRA 78 Magbaleta vs Gonong 76 SCRA 511 De Guzman vs genato 89 SCRA 674 OLao vs Co Cho Chit 220 SCRA 656 Tribiana vs.Tribiana G.R. No. 137359, Sept. 13, 2004 Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. vs. Acua G.R. NO. 154132, August 31, 2006
FC 152,FC 161 Taneo vs CA 304 SCRA 308 FC 153, compare withFC 159 FC154 Patricio vs. Dario G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006 FC 155, FC 160 Modequillo v. Breva 185 SCRA 766 Sian Valley v. Lucasan 109 Phil 294 Honrado vs.CA G.R. No. 166333, Nov. 25, 2005 Cabang vs Basay GR No. 180587, March 20, 2009 Ching vs CA (supra) Modequillo vs Breva 185 SCRA 756 Facts: As liability for a vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 which killed Audie Salinas and which injured Renato Culan, Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay were ordered to pay indemnity for damages to spouses Salinas and to Juanito. Consequently on July 7, 1988, a writ of execution and levy were issued against a parcel of residential lot and an agricultural land, the titles of which were under the name of Modequillo. Modequillo then motioned to quash, alleging that the residential lot was their family home that had been constituted since 1969, prior to the case and hence exempt from liability by virtue of FC 155. Held: The family home is not exempt from liability. Modequillos house and lot were constituted as a family home NOT under the NCC (by judicial or extrajudicial means) but under the FC by operation of law when the FC took effect on August 3, 1988. FC 162 provides that all existing family residences at the time of the FCs effectivity are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to the family home under the FC. FC 162 has a prospective application. Hence, his family home was constituted only on August 3, 1988 and not on 1969 when it was first occupied as a family home. The accident took place on March 16, 1976 and the judgment became final on Jan. 29, 1988, prior to the constitution of the family home in August. Liability can thus be held against the family home.
PATERNITY AND FILIATION FC163 FC 164 cf. FC 166 in reT to NCC 256-257 Tan v. Trocio 191 SCRA 764 o Facts: April 1971 when as Felicidad said, Galileo Trocio raped her which begot a son, Jewel Didnt immediately tell the police since Trocio was thereatening to have her alien husband and to tell authrorities that she was violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operation of her vocational school Nov 1979 Felicidad filed case of disbarment against Atty. Trocio Trocio denied allegation of rape, only testifying that he dealt her and her familys cases and said she was only doing this because he declined on her request to increase his fee so that she may get the extra. Feb 13 1986 since Trocio failed to attend the hearings etc, Provincial fiscal of Lanao Del Norte, on prima facie evidence presented, held Trocio administratively liable. ISSUE: WON Trocio should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct HELD: NO, there is lack of evidence After incident, she still asked him to be the lawyer for her cases such as a robbery case and her claim for indeminity when a fire burned down the school The fear that her alien husband would be deported has actually been an absent fear since she said she lost contact of her husband on the night the tryst happened. Keeping her peace for 8 years could be construed as a condonation of his alleged immoral conduct. Testimony of household help that they heard her cries for help is negated by fact that she said it happened in school premises. How could the help have been there then? INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW IT WAS HIS SON: (1) unusual closeness as testified by her household help (2) pictures of Jewel and Trocio together = not enough ground to establish paternity Presumption is Jewel is the child of the alien husband since he was born on 1972 when husband and Felicidad were living together.
Angeles vs Maglaya 469 SCRA 363 Facts: Nov 20, 1939 when Aleli Maglaya was born 1948 when deceased Francisco married Belen Angeles 1988 when her mother Genoveva died March 1998 when Aleli Maglaya filed in Rtv Caloocan petition to be made administratix of late Francisco Angeles estate since she is sole legitimate daughter of Francisco. This was contested by his wife Belen Angeles. RTC: Aleli failed to prove filiation CA: reversed decision and said that Aleli was indeed a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva ISSUE: WON CA erred in declaring Aleli as a legitimate child HELD: YES Law applied: FC 164 children conceived or born during the marriage of parents are legitimate Aleli never showed any evidence of a marriage existing between Francisco and Genoveva. In fact, if they did marry, it would have rendered Franciscos marriage to Belen as bigamouse. However, Aleli herself recognized Belen as the surviving spouse in her petition for letters of administration Without evidence of marriage, one cant presume Aleli to be legitimate child CA erred in declaring that birth certificate indubitably establishes legitimacy o In order for legitimacy to be established, birth certificate must bear the signatures of BOTH mother and father. Only attending physicians signature was in the certificate. Thus it only showed the fact of birth of a child and not legitimacy Papers and photogrpahs that show Francisco Angeles as her father is not sufficient enough to prove filiation. RESULT: at best, could only be declared a natural child and NOT a legitimate child. SSS vs. Aguas ISSUE: WON Janet and Jeylynn are legitimate daughters of Pablo? HELD: Only Jeylynn is Jeylynn proven by birth certificate where signature of Pablo is present and the fact that she was born on 1991 when marriage between Pablo and Rosana who were married on 1977 was still susbsisting Pablo never once questioned legitimacy of Jeylynn Presumption of legitimacy, conditions that husband may contest (398) Janet birth certificate shown was only photocopy with no confirmation by civil register regarding her date of birth. Thus if one cant show that one is born during the marriage then cant be presumed legitimate Said that she was adopted but no papers to prove it and only legally adopted children are
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considered dependent children. Thus she cant
be a beneficiary.
SSS vs. Aguas, G.R. 165546 Feb. 27, 2006 FACTS: Pablo Aguas, SSS member and pensioner, died 12/8/96. Pablos surviving spouse, respondent Rosanna filed a claim with SSS for death benefits. She indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylynn, born 10/29/91 4/97, SSS received a sworn letter from Pablos sister Letecia contesting Rosannas claim for death benefits, alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode more than 6 years before the and lived w/ another man, de la Pena; Pablo had no legal children w/ Rosanna. Letecia enclosed birth cert of Jefren born 11/15/96 to Rosanna and de la Pena and that the 2 were married 11/1/90 Rosanna contends that Jeylynn was a legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her birth cert bearing Pablos signature as father Janet, who also claimed to be the child of deceased and Rosanna, joined as claimant. It appears in her birth cert that her father was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna. SSS summoned several persons; some stated that spouses real child was Jeylynn, Janet was only an adopted child but there were no legal papers. SSS ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as claimant. As for Jeylynn and Janet, they were not Pablos legitimate children. ISSUE: WON Jeylynn ad Janet are legitimate children of deceased (thus entitled to death benefits) HELD: YES (Jeylynn); NO (Janet) Jeylynns claim is justified by her birth cert w/c bears Pablos signature (showing she was born 10/29/91; Rosanna and Pablo were married 12/4/77 and marriage subsisted until latters death on 12/8/96). Under A164, FC, children conceived or born during the marriage of parents are legitimate. Presumption of legitimacy cant extend to Janet because her date of birth wasnt substantially proven. Under RA1161, only legally adopted children are considered dependent children.
Rivera vs Heirs of Villanueva GR No. 141501, July 21, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners are allegedly half-brothers, half-sis-in-law and children of a half-brother of deceased PACITA. Respondents are allegedly siblings, full and half-blood of ROMUALDO; respondents are denominated as heirs of Romualdo. Respondent Angelina is allegedly the daughter of Pacita and Romualdo. From 1927 until her death in 1980, Pacita cohabited w/ Romualdo w/out the benefit of marriage because the latter was married to Musngi who died on 4/20/63. In the course of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties. Pacita died 7/3/80 without leaving a will. 8/8/80, Romualdo and respondent Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition w/sale (an extrajudicial settlement of Pacitas estate). Petitioners filed a case for partition of Pacitas estate and annulment of cf. ROC Rule 131 Sec. 5(11) FC 42 in rel. to FC 43(1) FC54 cf. NCC 40 FC173-174 NCC 364,374,376 NCC 888, NCC 979 Moore v. Republic 8 SCRA 282 titles. RTC made 2 findings 1) Pacita was never married to Romualdo 2) respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Romualdo ISSUE: WON respondent Angelina was illegitimate daughter of Pacita HELD: NO, a closer examination of the birth cert reveals that respondent Angelina was listed as adopted by both Pacita and Romualdo. And mere registration of a child in his birth cert as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, it does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child. Thus, she cant inherit from Pacita. Pacita was 44 y.o., on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth; Pacita had been living childless w/Romualdo for 20 years
Facts: Petitioner Elaine Moore (American citizen) is married with Joseph Velarde (also American) had a son out of wedlock William Michael Velarde (now 14 yrs old) born also at US. Said marriage however was dissolved through a decree of divorce from SC of California on 5/31/49. Elaine had 2nd marriage with Don Moore on 9/29/56 at LA, CA. William (minor) lived with them. Elaine filed @ CFI Rizal a motion to have her childs surname be changed into Moore instead of Velarde. TC denied such petition therefore this appeal. Issue: Government of the Phil. Opposed such petition with the following issues a) WON law permits minor to adopt surname of the 2nd husband of his mother b) WON justifiable
reason exists to allow change of name c) WON mother has the authority to ask such Held: Regarding the 1st issue, RP said that through NCC 364 legitimate child should use the surname of his father. NCC 369 moreover cites that in case of annulment, child conceived before such decree shall use the surname of his/ her father. Likewise, same concept rules over decree of divorce; therefore law does NOT sanction such change of name. SC upheld such position, saying that confusion may arise wrt (with respect to) paternity and that said change may even redound to the prejudice of the child. Moreover, the child is still a minor and therefore aforesaid action is premature. Said child may in his mature age decide for himself to instigate such change of name.
Naldoza v. Republic 112 SCRA 658 Facts: Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio Divinagracia on 5/30/70. They had 2 children: Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Dionesio abandoned conjugal home after Zosima confronted him about his previous marriage. Also, he allegedly swindled 50k from Rep. Maglana and 10k from a certain Galagar, etc. Classmates of Jr. and Bombi were teasing them because of their swindler father. To obliterate any connection between her children and Dionesio (thereby relieving the kids of the remarks of classmates), Zosima filed @ CFI Bohol on 4/10/78 a petition to change surname of her 2 children from Divinagracia into Naldoza (her maiden name). TC dismissed pet. saying that aforementioned reasons (swindling, abandoning, previous marriage of Dionesio <but their marriage has not yet been annulled nor declared bigamous> ) were not sufficient grounds to invoke such change of surname. Furthermore, change of name would give false impression of family relations. Issue: WON two childrens prayer to drop their fathers surname is justified Held: NO. Following NCC 364, since Jr. and Bombi are LC (legitimate children), therefore they should use their fathers surname. Said minors and their father should be consulted about such, mothers desire should not only be the sole consideration. Change of name is allowed only upon proper and reasonable cause (Rule 103 Sec 5 ROC). Change of name may even redound to the prejudice of the children later on, may cause confusion as to the minors parentage and might also create the impression that said minors are ICs, which is inconsistent with their legal status. In Oshita v. Republic and in Alfon v. Republic, their petition to change names have been granted, but petitioners in said cases have already attained mature age. In this case, when these minors have attained the right age, then they can already file said action for themselves.
Marquino vs IAC 233 SCRA 348 Ong vs CA 272 SCRA 725 FACTS: -Respondents Alferdo Ong Jr. and Robert Ong are children of Saturnina Caballes allegedly by Manuel Ong. -Manuel (representing himself as Alfredo Go) was introduced to Saturnina by Vicente Sy and Constancia Lim (in 1953 at a night club in cebu). They had a relationship and lived together for 4 months. It was also established that prior to meeting Manuel, Saturnina cohabited with a paralytic. -Alfredo Ong Jr. (registered as Alfredo Go Jr.) was born in 1955 and Robert Ong (registered as Roberto Caballes) 1956. Roberto is surnamed Caballes because the midwife informed Saturnina that it should be the case since she werent married with Manuel. Manuels support dwindled. He stopped seeing her. She discovered his identity and asked for support but he refused. -In 1961 they asked for support but Manuel denied them. In two occasions Dolores Dy, Manuels commonlaw wife, treated private respondents like close relatives of Manuel Ong by giving them on November 2, 1979 and January 6, 1977 tokens of affection, such as
family pictures of Dolores Dy and Manuel Ong and by visiting them in their house on A. Lopez Street in 1980. -Manuel Ong also gave money to Alfredo, first, as the latters high school graduation gift and second, for the latters educational support. Manuel Ong even told Alfredo to comeback with a list of what he needs for school but when he came back with some friends in September 1982, Manuel turned down his request and ordered him to leave and threatened to call the police if he did not leave. -September 30, 1982, Alfredo filed a complaint for recognition and support against Manuel Ong. The complaint was amended on November 25, 1982 to include Robert as coplaintiff. Manuel died in May 1990 while the case is pending. TC-declared Alfredo and Robert illegitimate children of Manuel in accordance with Art. 283, pars. 2 and 4 of the Civil Code. CA-affirm TC, cited Art. 283, par. 3 as an additional ground for ordering the recognition of private respondents as illegitimate children. Issue: WON Alfredo and illegitimate children of Manuel Roberto are
Held/Ratio: Yes. Alfredo and Roberto are sons of Manuel. Using Article 283 Paragraph. 4 (The father is obliged to recognize) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father . Art. 283 operates as a blanket provision covering all cases in the preceding ones, so that evidence, even though insufficient to constitute proof under the other paragraphs, may nonetheless be enough to qualify the case under par. 4. In this case, the testimony of Saturnina Caballes that she had illicit sexual relation with Manuel Ong over a long period (1954-1957) which, had it been openly done, would have FC 165, 175476
constituted cohabitation under par. 3 is proof that private respondents were conceived and born during such relationship and constitutes evidence of Ongs paternity. This relationship was further established through the testimony of Constancia Lim. The evidence for private respondents is not negated by the admission of Saturnina Caballes that she had relation with another man before, because the relationship terminated at least a year before the birth of Alfredo Ong, Jr. and two years before the birth of the second child Robert Caballes. SC agree that this DOES NOT fall in Art 283 (2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family--- the times during which Manuel Ong met Alfredo and gave the latter money cannot be considered proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. The fathers conduct toward his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Does NOT fall in Art 283 (3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father---------While Saturnina Caballes testified that she and Manuel Ong lived together for four months as husband and wife in order to justify a finding of cohabitation, the relationship was not open and public so as to constitute cohabitation. Petitioner claims that Manuel is sterile (due to illness during World War). For despite living with 2 other women, Dolores and Victoria Veloria (later established as Victoria Balili) but they didnt have a child. CA dismissed this for there is no medical proof and Manuel acknowledged a Lourdes Balili (born 1939) as his natural child with a Victoria Balili. An adult male is presumed to have normal powers of virility and the burden of evidence to prove the contrary rests upon him who claims otherwise. Petitioner has not overcome this presumption
Osmea de Valencia v. Rodriguez 84 Phil 222 Facts: Plaintiffs say that they are the legitimate children of the defendant Pio Valencia in the latters lawful wedlock with plaintiff Catalina Osmena Defendants on the otherhand are the illegitimate children of defendant Pio Valencia with Emilia Rodriguez his common-law wife. Plaintiffs allege that they alone have the right to the surname Valencia Issues: WON the illegitimate children could use the surname Valencia Held: Yes Ratio: This cannot happen since if plaintiffs were correct then they could stop numerous inhabitants from using the surname Valencia as well. Moreover, Pio Valencia has acquiesced to this as well. Finally, there is no law granting the exclusive ownership over a surname.
Jao vs CA 152 SCRA 359 Facts:
In 1968, Janice Jao, a minor represented by her mother Arlene filed a case for support against Perico Jao. It seems from evidence that Perico Jao was introduced to Arlene in a club. Then they had sex. 1968, Jao accompanied Arlene to a hospital for a check-up, Jao paid the rentals in the hospital Arlene gave birth to Janice on August 16, 1968. Arlene said that they had sex on November 30 1967. Jao said that they had sex on January 18 1968. The NBI, upon order by the court, conducted a blood grouping test which results say that Janice could not have been the offspring of Perico Jao and Arlene Salgado. RTC sided with Janice, CA reversed.
Issues: WON Perico Jao is the parent of Janice Held: No Ratio: There could only be compulsory recognition when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father. Janice shouldve been conceived between Nov 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967 according to the court. However, Arlene herself said that they only started to cohabit on December 16, 1967. Hence, Janice was NOT conceived during cohabitation. Moreover, Arlene cohabited with 2 other men! Lastly, the blood grouping test (which showed that Janice could not have been a child of Perico and Arlene) is conclusive on nonpaternity. Hence, it cannot be said with certainty that Perico Jao is indeed the father.
Uyguangco vs CA 178 SCRA 684 Facts: Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, four legitimate children and properties which they divided among themselves. Graciano Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition against the petitioners, claiming that as the illegitimate son of the deceased and a Anastacia Bacjao, he must not be left out of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. He also claims that he received support from his father while in high school and was also assigned by his father as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Graciano could not prove his alleged filiation having none of the documents required in Art. 278 of the NCC (i.e. record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Neither may he resort to Art. 285 of the NCC because he was already an adult when his alleged dad died. Graciano insists however, that he is in continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family as is under Art. 283 of the NCC. Issue: WON Graciano may adequately prove filiation. Held: NO Ratio: The Civil Code provisions they invoke have been superseded or at least modified by the corresponding articles n the FC.
Since illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children (Art 175), Graciano may establish his filiation by the means given in Art. 172. Thus while he has no record of birth appearing in the civil registrar or a final judgment or an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, he insists that he has nevertheless been in an open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, which is admissible as evidence of filiation under Art. 172. As proof to this open and continuous possessionhe claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, received support from him, used the name Uyguangco without objection, a special power of attorney executed in his favor by Apolinarios wife, and another one by Suplcio Uyguangco, shared in the profits of the copra family business of the Uyguangcos and was even given a share in his deceased fathers estate as found in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the petitioners. However, since his father has already died, his action is now barred as Art. 172 specifically requires that when the action is based on other proofs of filiation such as open and continuous possession, the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Ruling: Petition Granted.
Mangulabnan v. IAC 185 SCRA 760
Facts: Edna Padilla Mangulabnan filed an action for damages and support for her child Alfie Angelo. The TC ordered Ambrocio Tan Chew Acero to pay monthly support. He then moved for a reconsideration but was denied on December 5, 1984. CA annulled the orders of the TC on the ground that even as to illegitimate children who are not natural children, there is a need for the latter class of children (spurious children) to be recognized either voluntarily or by judicial decree, otherwise they cannot demand support as in the case of an acknowledged child. Issue: WON recognition of an illegitimate child like the minor Alfie whose father is married and had no legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of his conception is required before support may be granted.
Held: NO Ratio: The requirement for recognition by father or mother jointly or by only one of them as provided by law refers in particular to a natural child under Article 276 of the NCC. Such child is presumed to be the natural child of the parents recognizing it who had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of conception. Thus, an illegitimate child like Alfie is not a natural child but an illegitimate child or spurious child in which case recognition is not required before support may be granted. However, under Article 887 of the NCC, in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be proved. The status of the minor child had been provisionally established as affidavits of petitioner and 2 witnesses, and the birth certificate were presented to prove the paternity of the child.
Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals 201 SCRA 675, September 24, 199 Facts: 1981: Private Respondent, Teopista Toring claims to be the illegitimate child of the petitioner, Casimiro Mendoza. She alleges that she was born on Aug. 20, 1930 to a Brigida Toring who was then single while Casimiro was married to Emiliana Barrientos Her mother was the one who told her that she was his child. She added that growing up, she was recognized because she was treated as such. Called him Papa Miroy, she used to visit him at his house, Casimiro helped her and her husband: he bought a truck for him to drive and when he sold it, gave the proceeds to the spouses, PRs son, Lolito, was allowed to build a house on his lot, He opened a joint savings account with her as co-depositor She had two witnesses: Gaudencio Mendoza (cousin of Casimiro) was informed by petitioner himself that he and Brigida Toring were sweethearts. Gaudencio was the one whom Casimiro would send to give money to Toring when Teopista was born. Isaac Mendoza (nephew of Casimiro) was informed by his father (Hipolito, Casimiros brother) and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza. He also delivered money to Teopista. Petitioner denied her claims up to his dying day. (May, 1986) Vicente Toring, who is the recognized illegitimate child of Petitioner and Brigida Toring, says that petitioner is only his halfsister because she has a different father. He substitutes for Mendoza in this case after petitioner died. RTC: rules for petitioner because private respondent failed to show enough evidence to prove of her filiation. CA: reversed decision. The two witnesses showed truthfulness, there is no reason for them to testify falsely. Vicente Toring would obviously have more to lose if petitioner wins this case so he has a motive. Issue: W/N Teopista is Casimiro Mendozas illegitimate child? Held: YES. Ratio: Although Teopista failed to show that she was in an open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, she has nevertheless established that status by another method. FC 175 grants the right of illegitimate children to establish their filiation in the same way as legitimate children. FC 172(2) allows them to prove filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. In the case at bar, the RTC failed to consider the testimony of Isaac Mendoza as another method of establishing status. Rule 130, Sec. 39, of the Rules of Court discusses the act or declarations about pedigree being allowed as evidence. It has to conform to 4 requisites so it wont be considered hearsay:
1.The declarant is dead or unable to testify Brigida and Hipolito Mendoza passed away at the time Isaac testified in court. 2.The pedigree must be in issue Main issue of case! 3.The declaration must be made before the controversy arose Isaac knew about this before PR filed in court
4.The relationship between the declarant (Brigida/Hipolito) and person whose pedigree is in question Casimiro) must be shown in evidence other than declaration. Presentation of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza where Casimiro is an heir. This, including the other evidence presented by PR and witnesses shows that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
De Santos vs. Angeles 251 SCRA 206, December 12, 1995 Facts: Feb. 7, 1941: Dr. Antonio Santos m Sofia Bona, had one daughter: Maria (petitioner) Antonio fell in love with another woman, private respondent Conchita Talag 1949: obtained a divorce decree in Nevada. 1951: married Conchita in Tokyo (obviously knowing their marriage would be invalid here), had 11 children. Mar. 30, 1967: Sofia died Apr. 23, 1967: Antionio m Conchita in Tagaytay City Mar. 8, 1981: Antonio died intestate leaving P15 million worth of properties May 15, 1981: PR went to court, asking for letters of administration in her favor to settle her husbands estate. Alleged that decedent was survived by 12 heirs; herself, petitioner, and her 10 surviving children with Antonio. Petition was granted. November 1987: Petitioner filed a motion arguing that the 10 children were illegitimate. November 1991: Court declared the 10 children legitimated. Issue: W/N natural children by legal fiction can be legitimized. Held: NO Ratio: 10 children are considered natural children by legal fiction: children born out of void marriages (bigamous marriage) another category for illegitimate children Art. 269 of the Civil Code expressly states that only natural children can be legitimated. Lim vs. Court of Appeals 270 SCRA 1, March 18, 1997 o o o FACTS: Maribels Story Maribel met Raymond during her first night as a receptionist at Tonights Club and Resthouse along Roxas Blvd. Petitioner wooed her and they soon lived together, with petitioner paying the rentals in a succession of apartments Maribel left for Japan in July 1981, already pregnant o o o o o o Returned to Manila in October 1981 Couple never married because petitioner claimed that he wasnt financially stable Maribel gave birth on January 17, 1982 Bill for confinement were paid by Raymond Raymond caused the registration of the name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the childs birth certificate Raymonds feelings towards Maribel waned Natural children are those born of parents who had no impediment to marry each other. The children of Conchita and Antonio were born while his marriage to Sofia was still subsisting.\The Civil Code provides three rights, in varying degrees, for children: use of surname, succession, and support. Since the 10 children are recognized by both parents, they are entitled to use of fathers surname. They may also receive support from Antonio. As a result of his death, they cannot be deprived of legitime but each child is only entitled to half of the share of Maria, who is the sole legitimate child of Antonio De Santos. NOTE: J. Romero decided this case using only the provisions of the Civil Code, even though the FC was already effective at this time. What makes them illegitimate children? Natural children by legal fiction are illegitimate children born out of a void marriage. In this case, their parents were in a bigamous marriage. What are the rights of an illegitimate child? Right to use of surname of father, being recognized by him Right to support Right to legitime, of the share of decedents legitimate child

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Maribel filed a complaint against Raymond for support Raymonds Story He met Maribel in 1978 at Tonights Club and Resthouse Maribel started to kiss him on the cheeks and neck, whispering to him that they could go anywhere and rest He declined saying that he only wanted someone to talk to They became friends, there was no intimacy Alleged that he wasnt Maribels only customer at the club In 1980, she left for Japan to work as an entertainer In 1981, she returned to Manila pregnant and appealed to Raymond for help because she claimed that she couldnt face her relatives in her condition Raymond got her an apartment and paid its rentals until she gave birth on Jan. 17, 1982 Raymond admits paying the bills but claims that Maribel was supposed to pay him back for it When she failed to do so, he stopped seeing her Raymond denies being the father of Maribels child RTC rendered judgment in favor of Maribel (granted support)
CA affirmed ISSUES: WON Raymond is the father of Joanna Rose HELD: Yes Letter 1 In return, I promise to be a loving & caring husband & father to both of you. Raymond considered himself to be the father of Joanna Contrary to his vehement assertion that he Maribel were just friends Letter 2 (Aug. 11, 1981) Petitioner lovingly told Maribel to take care of herself because of her situation, obviously referring to the state of pregnancy It was only after Raymond separated from Maribel that he started to deny paternity of Joanna Rose He didnt object to being identified as Joanna Roses father as disclosed in the Certificate of Live Birth Art. 175: Illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legit children Art. 172(1): The filiation of legitimate children is established by (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register Other evidences: Pictures of Raymond cuddling Joanna Rose
Tijing vs CA 2001 o FACTS: Petitioners are husband and wife with 6 children, the youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr. (born April 27, 1989) Bienvenida: August 1989 Angelita Diamante went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job; made Bienvenida wait while she went to the market; left her 4-month-old son Edgardo, Jr. under the care of Angelita; when she returned, both Angelita and Edgardo Jr. were gone Oct. 1993 Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan; Bienvenida went to Bulacan and allegedly saw Edgardo, Jr. for the first time in 4 years Claims that her son was already named John Thomas Lopez Avers that Angelita refused to return the boy to her despite her demand Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus Two witnesses: (1) Vasquez, who assisted in the delivery of Edgardo, Jr.; and (2) Benjamin Lopez (brother of Tomas Lopez), who testified that his brother couldnt have possibly father John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child o o o At 42yo, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989 Has 2 other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez Birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the Local Civil Reg of Manila on Aug. 4, 1989 RTC concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband couldnt have childred, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility; minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity granted petition for habeas corpus CA reversed and set aside the decision ISSUES: WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy WON Edgardo Tijing, Jr. and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of the petitioners HELD: YES The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto YES Evidences purporting to the fact that John Thomas Lopez is Edgardo Tijing, Jr.: Angelita could no longer bear children she underwent ligation in 1970
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Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son (because of an accident + admittance to Benjamin + Tomas and legit wife had no children after almost 15 years together) Unusual that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife 4 months after alleged birth Physician or midwifes duty
Filed 30 days after birth False entry of Married puts to doubt the other data in birth certificate Strong facial similarities between the child and Bienvenida Clinical records presented by Vasquez (assisted in Bienvenidas delivery) PETITION GRANTED.
Eceta vs. Eceta 428 SCRA 782, May 20, 2004 Facts: Certiorari of CA affirmation of RTC ruling awarding 1/8 portion of disputed property to illegitimate daughter Ma. Theresa Eceta. Rosalina Eceta marries Isaac Eceta in 1926, they acquire several properties including disputed property in Cubao. They also have a legitimate son Vicente. Isaac dies in 67 leaving properties to Rosalina and Vicente Vicenta dies in 77 leaving an illegitimate child Ma. Theresa (Ma. Theresa illegitimate for being born to unmarried parents). Vicentes heirs are his mother Rosalina and his illegitimate daughter Ma. Theresa. 91 Ma. Theresa files for Partition and Accounting w/ damages for the Cubao property citing her co-ownership thereof by being an heir to Vicente. Rosalina avers that the property is her exclusive property. During the pre-trial parties admitted their relationship as grandmother and grand daughter. RTC rules for Ma. Theresa awarding her of the property 10) Rosalina appeals to CA they affirm the decision but modify it by awarding the 1/8 only. Issues: WON the certified Xerox of a Xerox of the birth certificate is competent evidence of filiation. WON the admission made by the that is her grand daughter is enough to prove filiation. Held: Yes and Yes, duly authenticated birth certificate signed by Vicente is competent evidence of filiation. So are the following: -The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment -An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private hand written instrument signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof; -the open and continuous possession of the status of legitimate child -Any other means allowed by the rules of court and special laws (record of birth, will, court statement, any authentic writing). All of w/c do not require a separate action for judicial approval.
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Briones vs. Miguel 440 SCRA 455, October 18, 2004 Facts: Review of CA decision awarding custody of minor child to mother (custody til child reaches age 10 then he is to choose w/c parent he wants to stay with) w/ visitation rights to the Father, Joey D. Briones. Mar 5, 02 files for Habeas Corpus claiming the child was visited by s Maricel and Francisca Miguel relatives of the mother of the child, Loreta Miguel, under the pretext of taking the child to SM, then they did not return. claims that he extensively looked for the child but failed so he was compelled to file for habeas corpus. mother Loreta alleges that the child was not taken as he was fetched by her w/ the consent. and met in Japan and had a relationship together w/c bore the child Michael Kevin Pineda (relationship eventually soured accdg to Loreta because of illicit relationship w/ another woman, now married to Japanese national). 6) petitions for joint custody when the mom Loreta is away. Issues: WON the natural father of an illegitimate child may be denied custody of his own child. Held: Yes, the child being born outside of a legitimate marriage is considered illegitimate since his illegitimacy is not cured by his parents later marriage. As such he is covered by Art 176 of the family code that mentions among other things that a mother shall have parental authority over the illegitimate child, regardless of whether the father acknowledges paternity over the child. Acknowledgment of paternity is only a means of compelling support for the child not entitling custody. Moreover the Family Code does not distinguish b/w the natural and spurious nature of the illegitimate child as they are treated in the same category. Furthermore absent any compelling reason for depriving Loreta custody over the child (such
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custody shall remain w/ the mother, with the father granted visitation rights. (action moot since child off to Japan during the pendency of the action)
Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals 441 SCRA 96, October 21, 2004 Both the dad and son are named camelo, so you dont get confused Facts: Version of Florencia Regodos Controversy stems from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos Camelo Regodos was born on September 9, 1982. Florencia testified that she was the one supporting her child Florencia recounted that after her husband left in 1981, he went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as Camelos household help On January 2, 1982, Camelo brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Camelo promised to support her if she got pregnant Florencia claimed that she discovered she was carrying Camelos child 27 days after their sexual encounter On suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, Camelos wife sent her home. But Camelo instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos Version of Camelo Cabatania Basically he says that the father of the child is Florencias husband and when they had sex, she was already pregnant Petitioner refused support, denying the alleged paternity He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City Issue THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF THE CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS that the evidence was insuffucient It was further established by the CA that Florencia was posing as a widow but in reality was living with her husband Aside from self serving testimony, respondents only presented certificates of live birth and baptismal certificates Held Trial court and CA decided that the child was Camelos The trial courts finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was based on the testimony of the childs mother and the personal appearance of the child The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress The trial court and CA should not have overlooked this fact (though really stupid to presume that the kid is the son of her husband when he looks very much like the other guy)
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals 460 SCRA 315, June 15, 2005 Facts: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999 The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child Arnel is actually married and has a family of his own at the time he impregnated Fe Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964 July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court Issue:
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In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination Held: The petition is without merit. It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual relationship produced the child, Martin. Being the first case where DNA testing was the focal issue the court examines the history of DNA testing The court opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals In People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from the
bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile The SC upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence since both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence There is no violation of the right of self incrimination in DNA testing
Alba vs. Herrera GR No. 148220, July 29, 2005 Facts: (2) 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi Alba before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against (1) petitioner (Rosendo Herrera) Rosendo Herrera denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also (2) denied physical contact with respondents mother Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity. respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D who testified that the test is 99.99% accurate Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against selfincrimination trial court and CA granted the motion to conduct DNA paternity testing Issue: Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. Petitioner asks for the conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated into our judicial system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit Relevant Provisions The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows: ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. xxx ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide: SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. Held: By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as
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evidence. The Court moved from the issue of according official recognition to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis People v. Vallejo It all boils down to evidence and its admissibility Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court.[48] Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.[49] Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence
This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue The court goes on to discuss the Vallejo case on the caution with the method employed in the actual testing DNA. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests Nevertheless, the petition is dismissed
Angeles vs. Maglaya 469 SCRA 363, September 2, 2005 Facts: The reason for this case is that Aleli Maglaya filed a petition for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles because she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedents wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent Belen, the second wife averred that Aleli is not the daughter of Francisco because the birth certificate was not signed by him. Furthermore, she alleges that Aleli has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union Respondent testified having been born on November 20, 1939 as the legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, who died in January 1988 She also testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four (4) other witnesses testified on her behalf, namely: Tomas Angeles,[6] Francisco Yaya,[7] Jose O. Carreon[8] and Paulita Angeles de la Cruz.[9] Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word Yes appears on the space below the question Legitimate? (Legitimo?); pictures taken during respondents wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service records Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that filiation was not fully proved Trial court ruled that respondent failed to prove filiation CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC Issue: Whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado Held: The Tison case, established that: (a) a child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such child cannot be attacked collaterally the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code[20] may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise Only basis for establishing filiation by the CA was respondents gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth. There is absolutely no proof of the decedents marriage to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract doubtless the best evidence of Franciscos and Genovevas marriage, if one had been solemnized[21] was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent was Franciscos daughter respondent has not even presented a witness to testify that her putative parents really held themselves out to the public as man-and-wife she did not even allege that the marriage to Belen was bigamous hence negating her own

assertion that her mother and father were in a valid marriage Respondent had declared that her mother Genoveva died in 1988, implying, quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage with petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco were already spouses. Now, then, if, as respondent maintained despite utter
lack of evidence, that Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it follows that the marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to Genovevas death, would necessarily have to be bigamous Hence the resolution of the CA is reversed and set aside
Guy vs CA GR No. 163707, Sept. 15, 2006 Facts June 13, 1997: Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedio Oanes, filed petition for letters of administration before the Makati RTC. Karen and Kamille allege that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim). October 29, 2009: Sima Wei died intestate, leaving behind an estate valued at PhP10M in real and personal properties. His known heirs include his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. (Michael is herein petitioner). Karen and Kamille prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Weis estate, but for the meantime, prayed for the appointment of petitioner Michael as Special Administrator of the estate. Michael prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He contends there is no need for letters of administration being prayed for by Karen and Kamille because Sima Wei left no debts. Also, Karen and Kamille should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei according to FC175. Before Sima Wei died, Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Sima Wei. Michael now contends that because of this Release and Waiver of Claim, respondents are now estopped from making claims from the estate of the decedent. Pertinent Issues 1. W/N Remedios is deemed to have waived her daughters legitime by virtue of the Release and Waiver of Claim between her and the decedent 2. W/N Karen and Kamille are barred by prescription from proving their filiation in view of FC175 Held 1. NO 2. No decision on this issue Ratio 1. As we already know now, the law prohibits implicit waivers of rights. Although the document is titled Release and Waiver of Claim, there is nothing in the document that states unequivocally a waiver of hereditary rights. It merely states that Remedios received PhP300,000.00 for the education of Karen and Kamille. Also, under NCC1044, parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. In the case at bar, such an authorization is not present. The Release and Waiver of Claim is therefore null and void. 2. The court did not decide on this issue yet and decided to remand the case to the trial court for reception of evidence. A ruling on this issue would be premature considering the respondents have yet to present evidence, not before the SC, but before the trial court. Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent (FC175). It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. Petition denied; remanded as to the third issue.
Verceles vs. Posada G.R. No. 161338, April 27, 2007
Facts Maria Clarissa Posada was employed in the office of Mayor Teofisto Verceles, a close family friend. November 11, 1986: Teofisto tried to flirt with Clarissa while in a hotel restaurant when they were supposedly attending a conference, but Clarissa managed to escape and leave the hotel immediately. December 22, 1986: Teofisto requested Clarissa to brief him on the progress of barangay projects in his hotel. Once again, Teofisto made his advances, offered her a position. This time, Clarissa succumbed. September 23, 1987: Verna Aiza Posada was born to Clarissa. October 23, 1987: Clarissa and her parents sued Teofisto for damages. Pertinent Issue 1. W/N filiation of Verna was sufficiently established 2. W/N filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with support pendente lite Held 1. YES 2. YES Ratio 1. Any authentic writing is a ground for compulsory recognition and is in itself a voluntary recognition of filiation that does
not require a separate action for judicial approval. The handwritten letters of Teofisto in response to Clarissas confession of her pregnancy, two of which were in his letterhead as Mayor, are conclusive that he had sired Verna. His handwriting was also proven by comparison with the pictures of his youth and as a public servant he had given Clarissa that bear his handwritten notes at the back. Moreover, in his Memorandum he admitted his affair with Clarissa, his exchange of love letters, and his giving money during her pregnancy. Hence, under FC172(2), his private handwritten letters suffice to establish his paternity. He did not present evidence of his own to rebut Clarissas evidence. 2. Although the caption states Damages coupled with Support pendente lite, the caption is not determinative of its nature of a pleading where Clarissas averments (meeting with Teofisto, his offer of a job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support of the child) were essentially a case for recognition of paternity. Petition denied.
People vs Umanito GR No. 172607, Oct. 26, 2007 Facts: On July 15, 1989, Rufino Umanito allegedly raped AAA (name withheld), for which he was on October 15, 1997. Although AAA was an unmarried woman, 12-18 years of age and of good reputation, Rufino contended that she was actually impregnated by her married lover; that her mother only prodded her to accuse him; that he was at home the whole day of July 15, 1989, working in their picture frame family business; that he courted AAA but they were not sweethearts. On the other hand, AAA claimed that she met Rufino only on the day of the rape but later claimed that they were actually friends, and later, that they were actually close friends. Issue: WON Rufino is guilty of rape Held: Relevant to the determination of Rufinos guilt is the filiation of AAAs child who was born out of the alleged rape. Hence, Rufinos paternity over the child is key to his acquittal. SC thus ordered Rufino, AAA and child to subject themselves to DNA testing and remanded the case to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence under the New Rule on DNA Evidence, Sections 4, 5, 7, and 8. (The New Rule on DNA Evidence took effect on October 15, 2007.) By doing so, SC acknowledges the strong weight of DNA testing as exculpatory evidence in determining filiation, reiterating its rulings in People v. Yalar, Tijing v. CA, Herrera v. Alba, and Tecson v. COMELEC. This is because DNA is composed of two copies: one copy from each parent, and each DNA configuration is unique to a person.
Ugalde vs. Ysasi G.R. No. 13062, Feb. 29, 2008 Facts: On February 15, 1951, Jon de Ysasi and Lorea de Ugalde married in civil law and on March 1, 1951, married in church law. They had a child but they separated in April 1957. On June 2, 1961, they agreed to have their conjugal partnership dissolved as of April 15, 1957. The CFI approved this Amicable Settlement on June 6, 1961. However, on May 26, 1964, Jon married Victoria Eleanor Smith. Hence, on December 12, 1984, Lorea petitioned for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. Pending appeal in CA, a petition for Judicial Declaration of Nullity of their Marriage was filed and granted on May 31, 1995 for lack of a marriage license. The Certification of Nullity was issued on November 20, 1995. CA then decided affirmed RTC decision that no conjugal partnership exists and that the Amicable Settlement was valid; it added that their
marriage was void, deciding without knowing about the earlier judgment on the nullity of their marriage. Issue as stated in the case: WON CA did not err in affirming RTC ruling that there is conjugal partnership and that the Amicable Settlement is valid and in adding that their marriage is void Held: CA and RTC did not err in ruling the nonexistence of a conjugal partnership because it has already been dissolved by the Amicable Settlement which had been judicially approved,
and it also resulted from the subsequent declaration of nullity of their marriage. CA erred in adding the decision that their marriage is void because such nullity had already been decided in a separate case. Issue concerning illegitimacy explicit in the case: WON their child is legitimate but not
Presumptive Held: No. As a consequence of the declaration of nullity of their marriage, their child is illegitimate because the child was born outside of a valid marriage
Montefalcon v Vasquez GR No. 165016, June 17, 2008 Facts: 1999 Dolores Montefalcon filed with RTCNaga for acknowledgment and support by Ronnie Vasquez of their son Laurence as his illegitimate child 3 summons were delivered to Vasquez all of which remained unanswered 2001 court, taking Vasquez silence as truth to the allegations, declared Laurence as his illegitimate child and ordered him to support the child. Vasquez resurfaced after this decision and appealed it. Thus the case. ISSUE: WON Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez HELD: YES, and is thus entitled to support. FC Article 172, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) through record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final order This is evidenced by Laurence record of live birth which Vasquez signed and supplied the data. FC Article 195 - parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family RESULT: decision of RTC on legitimacy and support is reinstated. Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: (1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; (2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
DOJ Opinion No. 11 Series of 1990 DOJ Opinion No. 4, Series of 1998 FC 166 Andal v. Macaraig 89 Phil 165
Facts: Jan 1941 Emiliano Andal ,who was married to Maria Duenas, became sick with tuberculosis. His brother Felix went to live with them to help them with the farm. Sept 10 1942, Maria eloped with Felix and lived together from 1942-1943 Jan 1, 1943 Emiliano died. Maria didnt attend the funeral June 17, 1943 Maria gave birth to Mariano Andal Maria then filed for recovery of land that was originally given to Emiliano by his mother upon his marriage to Maria. Maria said that the land is her sons since he is the legitimate heir of Emiliano. ISSUE: WON Mariano is the legitimate son and can thus inherit the land
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HELD: YES Art 108 of NCC - Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of marriage or within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Emiliano is presumed to be legitimate sine he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of marriage. Evidence did not show that Emiliano, even when he was sick of tuberculosis, could not sexually perform so even if Maria was having an affair even before eloping with Felix, it is still presumed that Mariano is Emilianos son. RESULT: son is the legit heir and thus inherits the land of his father
Macadangdang v. CA 100 SCRA 73 o o o o o o o o o FACTS: Mejias is married to Anahaw Majias allegedly had intercourse with Macadangdang sometime in March 1967 Due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967 October 30, 1967: Mejias gave birthday to a boy (Rolando Macadangdang) April 25, 1972: Mejias filed a complaint for recognition and support against Macadangdang Macadangdang opposed claim and prayed for its dismissal Court dismissed the complaint CA reversed the judgment and declared Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang. ISSUES: Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; and Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. HELD: YES The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between aforenamed spouses. Art. 255: Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of Mejias and Anahaw Rolando was born on October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967, the time difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have been born prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent underwent a normal nine-month pregnancy. Presumption of legitimacy becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other same province Physical impossibility: (1) impotence of husband; inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function (2) living separately in such a way that access was impossible; and (3) serious illness of the husband. NO. Art. 256 provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy Art. 257: adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife Art. 220 PETITION GRANTED. REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. JUDGMENT
Ong vs. Court of Appeals 272 SCRA 725
Concepcion vs. CA G.R. No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005 Facts: Dec 29, 1989 Gerardo married Ma. Theresa. One year later Dec 1990 - their son Jose Gerardo was born. December 19, 1991 - Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy since she was still married to Mario Gopiao who she married on Dec 10, 1980 and which was never annulled. This was granted Ma. Theresa then filed for action to change Jose surname from Gerardo to hers and to disallow Gerardo visitation rights since Jose is now just his illegitimate son. Both TC and CA dismissed her petition. Ma. Theresa then filed for a motion for reconsideration where she said that Jose was not actually the illegitimate son of Gerardo but the legitimate son of Mario. CA thus reversed its ruling and declared Mario to be the father of Jose. Thus the case filed by Gerardo. ISSUE: WON Jose is the legitimate child of Mario HELD: YES Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. It is clear that Ma. Theresa and Mario were married when she gave birth to Jose. , Article 167 of the Family Code provides: Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate althouh the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Thus even if it is clear that she also married Gerardo, this does not negate the legitimacy of Jose as son of Mario. Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child No evidence to show that there was no way that they could have had contact within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child since they only lived four kilometres apart, she in Fairview QC and he in Loyola Heights QC Assertion of Ma. Theresa that Jose is the son of Gerardo cant be used since law is clear that an assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage. Birth certificate carries no weight since proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought to be established. In this case, legitimacy is certain. RESULT: declared son of Mario Gopiao after 15 years.
A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC (RULE ON DNA Evidence) effective October 15, 2007 Jao v. CA 152 SCRA 359 People v. Tumimpad 235 SCRA 483 Facts: Victim is Sandra Salcedo, a 15 yo Mongoloid with the mental capacity of a 5 year old, and daughter of Lt. Teofisto and Pastora Salcedo August 7, 1989 Sandra complains of constipation, the following day she points at Tumimpad and says Mama patayin mo yan, bastos! Due to repeated vomiting, lack of appetite, and mood swings, Sandra is brought to a doctor where she it is discovered that she is pregnant January 11, 1990 Sandra gives birth to a boy, Jacob. Pastora (mother) files complaint alleging that Sandra was raped by Constable Tumimpad and Constable Prieto sometime between March and April 1989. Hence, trial ensued During trial: Sandra is able to single out Tumimpad and Prieto as the perpetrators when she was shown pictures and during a police line-up o A blood test was also done and it showed Jacob O, Sandro B, Tumimpad O, Prieto -A Court convicts Tumimpad of rape, Prieto is acquitted
Issue: W/n the lower court erred in convicting the Tumimpad on rape based on a blood grouping test, and not on a paternal tests known as chromosomes or HLA test Held: No. Decision affirmed. The victim was able to identify Tumimpad as the perpetrator on more than one occasion, she is even able to detail how the rape took place Usually blood test results are used to prove the presumption of non-paternity where results show the impossibility of alleged paternity. In this case however, the blood test is used as evidence to merely show the possibility of Tumimpad being the father and results come out as positive of that possibility, that taken
with the testimonies and identifications made by Sandra are enough to prove Tumimpads
guilt.
TIJING (supra) Herrera vs. Alba (supra) AGUSTIN (supra) Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Minor Joanne Diaz G.R. No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007 Facts: Nov 1993 Rogelio and Jinky got acquainted, and the friendship blossomed into love. Jinky however, was already married to Hasegawa Katsuo, a Japanese national, in spite of this, the lovers lived together out of which Joanne Diaz was born on Feb 25, 1998 Rogelio initially recognized Joanne as his, only to abandon the family on Sept 1998, Jinky thereafter files a complaint Judgment rendered in favor of Jinky , Rogelio files a new motion and is granted RTC again rules for Jinky given the Rogelios admission that he was the one who shouldered hospital bills during Joannes birth and that on some instances he continued visiting Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rogelio goes to the Court of Appeals, during the pendency of the trial, however he dies, and is substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong. CA remands the case to the RTC for DNA analysis to finally determine the paternity of Joanne, hence the petition Issue: W/n the court erred in remanding the case for DNA analysis despite the fact that said People v. Quitoriano G.R. No. 118852, Jan. 20, 1997 FACTS: Quitoriano was charged of the crime of rape. He allegedly raped the victim, Edna Pergis, on December 24, 1992 in June 1993, her aunt, Teresa Pergis, discovered that Edna was pregnant. On August 2, 1993, private complainant filed a complaint for rape against accused-appellant She gave birth on October 31, 1993. CONTENTIONS: Accused: private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the alleged rape; therefore, the child could not have been the accuseds ISSUE: Whether or not the child could have been the accuseds. HELD: Yes. The fact that private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the alleged rape does not discredit her testimony. Dr. Honesto Marquez, a physician from the Marinduque Provincial Hospital, explained that the normal gestation period is 40 weeks or 280 days, but it can also extend beyond 40 weeks if the woman is having her first pregnancy. It is undisputed that the child delivered by private complainant on October 31, 1993 was her first. Hence, it is not impossible that the child was conceived in December, 1992, the date of the alleged rape. analysis is no longer feasible given that Rogelio Ong is dead Held: No, decision of the appellate court is affirmed. Case discusses DNA testing again, see Herrera vs Alba. The new rules on DNA testing allows for the application of DNA testing for as long as biological samples of Rogelio Ong is present Biological samples any organic material originating from the persons body, even if found on inanimate objects Thus, even if Rogelio is dead, biological samples may be available and used for DNA testing As held in Tecson vs Comelec: Any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to Presently, DNA testing has evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering, the Court therefore reiterates its stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity
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FC 166(3) FC167 Chua Keng Giap v. JAC 158 SCRA 18 FACTS:

Mothers testimonials: SY Kua herself testified that she is not her son. Petitioner: paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner is to be decided. Therefore, the testimony of the mother should not be credited. ISSUE: W/N Chua Keng Giap is the son of Chua Bing and Sy Kua. HELD: Yes. Who better than Sy Kao herself would know of Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than any one else, it was Sy Kao who could say ---- as indeed she has said these many years ---- that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb. Petition Denied.
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Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the regional trial court of Quezon City. He claims that he is the son of Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao. The private respondent, moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's capacity to file the petition. No cause of action because he is not the son of the abovementioned couple as testified by the mother herself. CONTENTIONS: Respondent: Res judicata: The latter, it was claimed, had been declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P. No. Q12592, for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan.
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Rodriguez v CA 245 SCRA 150 FACTS: On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was brought before court, by respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct examination, she was asked by counsel to reveal the identity of the plaintiff's father but the defendant's counsel raised a timely objection which the court sustained. The petitioner now comes to this court questioning the act of the lower court in sustaining the objection Contentions: Petitioner: Felicitas Agbulos Haber should not be allowed to reveal the name of the father of private respondent because such revelation was prohibited by Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Said Article provided: "When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she shall not reveal the name of the person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall he or she state any circumstance whereby the other party may be indentified." Respondent: Navarro v. Bacalla: the testimony of the mother of the plaintiff in said case, could be used to established his paternity ISSUE: Was the Lower Court correct in sustaining the objection? HELD: Yes. REASON 1: Private respondent cannot invoke our decision in Navarro v. Bacalla, 15 SCRA 114 (1965). While we ruled in Navarro that the testimony of the mother of the plaintiff in said case, could be used to established his paternity, such testimony was admitted during the trial without objection and the defendant accepted the finding of the trial court that he was the father of the plaintiff. Rule: the testimony of the mother may be used to prove paternity IF the father does not object. In the case at bench, petitioner timely objected to the calling of the mother of private respondent to the witness stand to name petitioner as the father of said respondent. REASON2: No similar prohibition found in Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines has been replicated in the present Family Code. This undoubtedly discloses the intention of the legislative authority to uphold the Code Commission's stand to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children. Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were repealed by the Family Code, which now allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children (Art. 175). Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate children is by any of the following:
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"The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: '(1) The record of birth appearing in the Civil Register or a final judgment; or '(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.' "In the absence of the foregoing evidence the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: FC 168, 169 FC 170, 171
'(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or '(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)'" Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."
Cobatbat-Lim vs IAC 166 SCRA 451 Facts: Case at hand is a squabble over the estate of late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat. Petitioner is Violeta Cabatbat-Lim who claims to be the only child of Esperanza while the resps are the sisters and children of a deceased brother. Priv resps (sisters of Esperanza) filed @ CFI Pangasinan for partitioning of Esperanzas estate (died intestate on 4/23/77). Part of her estate is the Calasiao Bijon Factory which is in possession of Violeta (alleged child of Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat). They were saying that Violeta is only a ward (ampon) through the ff evidences: Absence of any records that Esperanza was admitted to hospital where Esperanza was supposedly born Absence of birth certificate in the live birth section of the Provincial Hospital (1947-1948) Civil registry certification of 3/9/77 that there is no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat from 5/26/48 or 49 Certification that Esperanza and Proceso were only guardians (from Principal II of the Pilot School) Amparo Resides testimony on 5/21/48 that she was in the Provincial Hospital to watch a cousin give birth and there she met Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to an IC Baby Girl Lastimosa on 5/26/48 (now known as Violeta Cabatbat) Violeta on the other hand tried to adduce evidence that will support her claim. Among which he showed are the following: Her birth record filed 6/15/48 showing her birth of 5/26/48 and that shes an LC of Esperanza and Prospero Procesos testimony that shes his child w/ Esperanza Benita Lastimosas denial that she delivered at Provincial Hospital MC of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao showed that Esperanza is the mother of the bride Deed of Sale 5/14/60 where minor Violeta is assisted by mother Esperanza Deed pf Absolute Sale 4/21/61 assisted by father Proceso TC held that Violeta is NOT natural child of E and P therefore NOT a legal heir. Issue: WON Violeta is a natural child of Esperanza and Proceso Held: NO. TC and CA findings on filiation is given great accord, conclusive upon the SC. TC then said that the Registry Book of hospital admission doesnt even Esperanza was a patient on 5/26/48 and it doesnt even show that Esperanza was ever admitted from 12/1/47 6/15/48. On 5/26/48, Records only show that there was one birth at that day and that was Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to an IC baby girl Lastimosa. Absence of birth record in the Civil Regitry makes her exhibit doubtable. Moreover, her reliance on NCC 263 is misplaced as such action is not to impugn legitimacy but to claim inheritance as legal heirs from a childless aunt. They do not claim that shes an IC but that shes not a child of their aunt at all.
Gaspay v. CA 238 SCRA 163 Facts: Flaviano Gaspay died intestate on 10/14/83, then married to Agueda Denoso (childless). On 7/6/88 priv resp Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro alleged @ TC that shes acknowledged IC of Flaviano with Claudia Pason, prayed for issuance of letters of admin of Flavianos estate. Petitioners are Jr. (adopted son) and Eriberta (next of kin) who filed for an MTD (motion to dismiss) saying that Guadalupe is a stranger. TC denied the MTD saying that such was based on indubitable grounds but TC nonetheless dismissed petition saying that testimonial and documentary evidence failed to prove status of Guadalupe, failed to show Guad consenting to the acknowledgement as
IC and that such action should have been filed in the lifetime of Flaviano. CA reversed TC on 9/30/91 saying that: Evid is ample to prove filiation as IC Evid is sufficient to show that Guad consented to the acknowledgement as IC Action can be instituted after death of putative father Issue: WON Guadalupe is an IC Held: YES. TC did not discount the testimony of Martin Garin (agent to logging concessionaire of Flaviano for 18 years) who verified handwriting and signature of Flaviano in a letter addressed to Lupe and Toming (Guad and his husband Bartolome Alfaro)
regarding the hospitalization expenses of Guads daughter. CA said that TC must have assumed that Flavianos handwriting must have metamorphosed during the years but it could be possible that handwriting of Flaviano never changed at all. Also when Guadalupe filed said action, she still used Gaspay affixed to her legal surname as married to Alfaro, thereby shouting to the world her consent to the acknowledgment of an IC. As to the action being instituted after death of putative father, CA said action based on acknoweldgement may be brought even after death of putative father. She thereby proved entitlement to the admin of estate. Moreover, the petitioners neglected to apply for a letter admin 30 days after the death of Flaviano Gaspay.
Benitez-Badua v. CA 229 SCRA 468 Facts: Vicente Benitez married Isabel Chipongian, acquired many props in Laguna. Isabel predeceased Vicente, former died on 4/25/82 while latter died intestate on 11/13/89. On 9/24/90 Vicentes sis and nephew Victoria (priv resps) Benitez Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar filed @ RTC for issuance of letter of admin for Aguilar, saying that Vicente had no legal heirs since Marissa Benitez Badua was never a related by blood and not legally adopted therefore not a legal heir. On 11/2/90 Marissa opposed saying that shes sole heir and shes capable of managing estate. She presented the ff evids: Cert of live brith Baptismal cert ITR and Info Sheet for Members of Gsis of late Vicente naming her as daughter School records Private resps (Victoria) presented testimonial evids: That spouse failed to beget a child Isabel (then 36) was even referred to an obgyne for treatment Victoria Benitez Lirio (then 77 years old and about to die) elder sis of Vicente categorically declared that Marissa is not a biological child TC on 12/17/90 dismissed petition of Victoria. Ruled that Marissa is legitimate daughter and sole heir (relying on FC 166 and 170) CA reversed on 5/29/92 saying that Marissa is NOT biological child and therefore not legal heir. CA said that TC failed to apply FC 166 and 170. Issue: WON Marissa is a biological child of Vicente and Isabel and WON TC misapplied FC 166 and 170 Held: NO. Marissa is not a biological child and yes, TC misapplied said FC provisions. SC said that reliance on FC 164, 166, 170 and 171 are misplaced since said provisions show situation where husband denies own child with wife and not a situation where a child is alleged not to be a natural child of a couple. SC only sustained CA findings on ruling that Marissa is not a biological child Vicente and Isabel based on the ff: Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant, as substatntiated by his brother Dr. Nilo Chipongian, saying that shes been married already for 10 years but at age 36 was not yet pregnant and so she was even brought to the attention of Dr. Manahan who was a well known ob-gyne. Many other people (neighbors) corroborated this point that Iabel never became pregnant. Had she been, it would have been noticed by people around her. Marissas birth certificate is highly dubious because it showed that she was born in the Benitez household in Nagcarlan when she would have been born in the hospital and in the skillful hands of Dr. Manahan who was the obgyne of her putative mother. Extrajudicial settlement of Nilo and Vicente after Isabels death saying that they are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel for she has no other ascending or descending heirs Letter of Isabel to Vicente pleading him to give Marissa her share which she would not have need to do had Marissa been their legal heir
Lim v.IAC (supra) Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao 378 SCRA 563

Facts: CA reversed RTC w/c declared William Liyao Jr as IC of William Liyao and ordered Juanita et al to recognize jr as compulsory heir of the deceased William (successional rights to be granted thereof). On 11/29/76 Jr (represented by mother Corazon Garcia) filed for said action for compulsory recognition as IC of William Liyao, being in continuous possession of status as child and recognized as such child by decedent. Corazon had been legally married but was de facto separated with husband Ramon Yulo for 10 years and was said to have cohabited with William from 1965 up to his death in 1975. She has 2 other daughters by 1st marriage and it was claimed that Jr (Billy) was born during said cohabitation. This was supposedly with the knowledge of Williams LC by wife Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Tita Rose and Chritina who were both employed in Far East Realty Investment where William and Corazon are Pres and VP respectively. Both sides have virtually different stories. TC was convinced of the preponderance of evidence that William sired Jr (billy) because he was conceived during said cohab of William and Corazon and he has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of status of a child of William through his overt acts of: Securing birth certificate through confidential secretary Mrs. Rodriguez Openly and publicly acknowledging billy as son FC 172-173
Providing sustenance and introducing him even to his LCs CA reversed saying that: Law favors legitimacy Gave credence to marriage of Corazon with Ramon Yulo (legally married with no legal separation) That Corazon and Ramon were seen in each others arms during the time that Corazon and William were supposed to be cohabiting Birth cert and baptismal cert not enough proof of paternity in the case where William had a hand in preparing such docs Neither family pix would prove filiation Passbook presented did not show that William opened such for Billy and Corazon because it does not bear Williams signature and name Issue: WON Jr (billy) is an IC and WON he can impugn his own legitimacy to claim from estate of his supposed father Held: NO. presumption of legitimacy is strong. Even if Jr. insists that Ramon and Corazon have been separated already for 10 years such that there is physical impossibility for sexual union, de facto separation is of no bearing. Impugning legitimacy under NCC 255 can only be invoked by husband and only in qualified situations, his heirs. Petition cannot prosper because child born within valid marriage is deemed LC even though mother may have declared against said legitimacy or has been sentenced as an adulteress.
Diaz vs. Court of Appeals 129 SCRA 621, June 22, 1984 Facts: In 1911 Isidro Azarraga dies leaving 10 children the first 7 of who are illegitimate born to his mistress Valentina Abarracoso. The legitimacy of the 8th child is in question in this suit namely Leodegario, (the 9th Filomena was the only one established as legitimate being born to the valid marriage of Isidro and his lawful wife Calixta Lozada) Sept 10, 49 Leodegario dies intestate(no will) in an accident in Manila he leaves behind no spouse and no children to inherit his property amounting to P28,000 worth of real estate in Capiz. Oct 15, 49 original Maria Diaz, daughter of the decedents sister Filomena, (she died during the pendency of the case and was replaced by her heirs) files for letters of Administration w/ the CFI. Oct 25, 49 Amador Azarraga (4th illegitimate child of Isidro, half brother of decedent) files an opposition to the petition citing that the deceased is an illegitimate son of Isidro via Valentina Abarracoso and thus is his brother rather than the mothers. Mar 1, 50 CFI rules in favor of Aug 17, 70 20 years after granted admin, Eduardo Azarraga (heir of Amador) files for the removal of admin from citing failure to render a final accounting of the estate and a project of partition. He also requests to be granted admin. 8) s cite that the decedent is not a legitimate child of Isidro and thus is not the full blooded sibling of the mother who was a legitimate child. 9) asserts the opposite, that decedent Leodegario is legitimate 10) CFI again rules for 11) files with CA and is upheld and is granted admin to the prejudice of Issues: WON Leodegario is a legitimate child of Isidro and his legal wife Calixta Lozada Held: YES, the proved the legitimacy of Leodegario through his school records (UST Law) which cited the decedents name as Leodegario Azarraga y Lozada. It was further strengthened by the preponderance of the will of Pastora Azarraga which stated that the decedent and the mother Filiomena are full blooded siblings. Moreover the court order of 7)
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Mar 1, 50 (granting admin to the ) also acknowledges this fact of legitimacy.
CA set aside CFI affirmed.
Reyes v. CA 135 SCRA 439 Facts: Certiorari of CA decision reversing CFI dismissal of action for reconveyance by the . file w/ CFI for order compelling the Irene Reyes aka Irene Ramero to execute a deed of reconveyance on several props to the . allege that acquired the props in question through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation by registering herself as the sole child of decedent Franciscoo Delgado and thus entitled to inherit. who are the sisters and brother of the decedent claim otherwise since they allege the was born during the legal marriage of her mother Genoveva Ramero and the latters husband Justino Reyes. claims that she was the fruit of the cohabitation b/w her mother and the decedent during the time subsequent to the separation of her mother w/ Justino Reyes. She also claims continuous possession of the status of illegitimate child since she mentions that decedent supported her financially through her education. CFI rules against dismissing the order for reconveyance. appeal to CA which rules in their favor reversing the CFI declaring that the TCTs of the on the said props are null and void. CA rules that though was a spurious child of the decedent she was never recognized and thus cannot inherit. in her motion for reconsideration w/ the CA cites how she was in fact acknowledged by the decedent as proven by the latters consent noted on the marriage certificate. Issues: WON is a recognized child of the decedent and is thus able to inherit. Held: NO, it is a well established doctrine that for an illegitimate child to inherit he/she must first be recognized by the putative parent through voluntary or compulsory means. In this case the was never validly recognized by Francisco Delgado contrary to her assertions. The evidence she presented was not compelling to establish her filiation to the decedent. For instance her birth certificate was not signed by Francisco. Furthermore it cannot be said that her baptismal certificate is credible evidence regarding filiation since the statements contained therein only attest to the administration of the said sacrament on the said date. In addition to this her permanent student records and her written consent to her fathers operation both being unsigned and not written in her fathers handwriting cannot suffice as proof of filiation. Moreover the pictures she present did not give weight to her arguments as they are not constitutive of proof of filiation. Finally the alleged consent stipulated by Francisco in the marriage certificate cannot be given weight since it is not signed and does not appear in the decedents handwriting. Decision affirmed in toto
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Tison vs. Court of Appeals 276 SCRA 582, July 31, 1997 Facts: Mar 5, 83Teodora Dezoller Guerero dies w/ no children leaving the prop in question to her husband and the heirs of her brother(who died in 73), the . Jan 2, 88 After her death, her husband Martin Guerero adjudicates the house to him and sells it to Teodora Domingo. Martin dies on Oct 25, 88 and s Tison and Dezoller file for reconveyance Nov. 2, 88 for 1/2share of the prop. During the hearing the birth cert.s marriage cert.s w/c prove the filiation to the decedent Teodora through their common link to their father Teodoras brother Hermogenes Dezoller. More importantly they present the testimony of one of the Corazon Dezoller Tison attesting that some time in 1946 the decedent had actually acknowledged her as her niece (declaration of filiation). files a demurrer to the evidence citing that they fall short of the requirements set by Art 172 of the Family Code and that the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison was self serving and uncorroborated. Dec 3, 92 TC rules for granting the demurrer and dismissing the action for reconveyance. CA affirms citing the evidence presented was inadmisible. Issues: WON the satisfy of the quantum of proof mandated by Art 172 of the FC. Held: YES, the court held that legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally in an action for reconveyance, as such the court held that there being a presumption of legitimacy in relation to the status of the petitioners the s failure to adduce evidence disproving such a fact renders the presumption effective. Thus his choice to file a demurrer rather than adduce evidence to controvert the assertions comes as a implied admission of the fact of legitimacy. More importantly the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison fell within the definition of a declaration about pedigree that is exempt form
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the rule on hearsay based on the following conditions: 1) that the declarant is either dead or unable to testify; 2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is subject of inquiry, 3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration 4) that the declaration was made ante litem motum (before the commencement of the suit).
Moreover the declaration may stand only if it pertains to the claimants right over the declarants own estate (as in this case). If however the declaration is to claim a right from another family member other than the declarants estate the declaration may not be deemed credible. Judgment reversed and set aside.
Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals 289SCRA 188, April 20, 1998 Facts: Arturio Trinidad was born on July 21, 1943 from Felicidad Molato and Inocentes Briones, who allegedly married on May 5, 1942. Upon the death of Inocentes, Arturio lived with his aunt Lourdes in the property of Patricio Briones (father of Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix) until he grew up and got married. When Arturio returned to the property upon Lourdes invitation and sought to claim the share of his father on the land, Lourdes refused to partition the property and claimed that Inocentes never married, died single, and has no child. On the other hand, Arturio claimed that his parents were legally married but failed to provide their marriage certificate and his birth certificate to show his relationship with Inocentes because these were lost during the war. Issue: WON Arturio is the legitimate child of Inocentes Held: Yes The parents of Arturio, Inocentes and Felicidad, were validly married a. Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan certified that all its records of marriages and birth, among others, were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation Isabel Meren and Jovita Gerardo testified that his parents were married and cohabited as husband and wife Meren was one of the witnesses to the nuptials Jovita was the barangay captain who had attended the birth and baptismal parties of Arturio Arturio was born during their marriage and cohabitation The baptismal certificate of Arturio show his parents to be Inocentes and Felicidad and his birth to be on July 21, 1943, after the legitimate and legal wedding of Inocentes and Felicidad Family photos of Lourdes and Felix with Arturios wife and children substantiate his claim that they had lived together in the property, contrary to Lourdes claim that they had not
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Jison vs. Court of Appeals 286 SCRA 495, February 24, 1998 Facts: Francisco Jison was married to Lilia Lopez Jison in 1945 and together, they had Lourdes Francisco impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar, Lourdes nanny, who gave birth to Monina Joson on August 4, 1946 March 13, 1985: Monina filed a petition for recognition as Franciscos illegitimate child That Esperanza was still employed by Francisco at the time Monina was conceived in 1945 That sexual contact between Francisco and Esperanza was not impossible Castellanes, Sr., a worker in the Nelly Garden that Lilia managed testified that Lilia spent her evenings in the Nelly Garden, working from 6PM to 3AM That the affidavit she signed on September 21, 1971 where she denounced her filiation with Francisco was acquired under duress Bilbao, the procurement officer, hacienda overseer and administrator testified that he was present during the event d. That Francisco fathered Monina and recognized her as his daughter and That Monina has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as Franciscos illegit child where Francisco Sent her to school Paid for her school expenses Defrayed her hospitalization expenses Testified to by Monina herself and Ledesma, a banker and former mayor Gave her monthly allowances which he instructed his office personnel to do Paid for her mothers funeral expenses Acknowledged her paternal greetings and Called her his Hija or child Testified to by Tingson, Nelly Gardens paymaster who recorded its expenses and issued vouchers and who knew the persons receiving money from Franciscos office and who kept Moninas accounts in a separate book to hide it from Lilia, as instructed by Francisco
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Recommended her for employment in Merchant Financing Corporation that is managed by the wife of his first cousin Allowed her to use his house in Bacolod Paid for her long distance telephone calls Testified to by the houseboy, Duatin, that Monina was introduced to him as Franciscos child when she stayed there Monina calls Francisco Daddy Francisco instructed him to treat Monina just like the rest of his children He hid Monina whenever Francisco and Lilia were there, as instructed by Francisco Had her vacation in his apartment in Manila Allowed her to use his surname
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Issue: WON Monina is the illegitimate child of Francisco Held: YES
The preponderance of evidence mentioned above sufficiently established her filiation despite a. the Affidavit dated Sept. 21, 1971, attesting that Francisco is not her father, because it would not have been necessary if it were not true; Francisco had gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation b. Moninas birth and baptismal certificates were not signed by Francisco because these are not conclusive evidence of filiation c. Notes of Franciscos relatives attesting to Moninas filiation are without merit since i. they are not shown to be dead or unable to testify ii. they are not family possessions Rule 130, Secs. 39, 40 require that family possessions to be regarded as evidence of pedigree should be articles representing, in effect, the familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person
Labagala vs. Santiago 371 SCRA 360 Facts: Siblings Nicolasa, Amanda and Jose Santiago owned a parcel of land, which was registered in Joses name alone February 6, 1984: Jose died intestate Nicolasa and Amanda, as his legal heirs, sought the recovery of title, ownership, and possession of his 1/3 share in the property The case was filed against Ida C. Labagala who claimed To be Joses legitimate child with Esperanza Cabrigas His income tax return listed Ida as his daughter To have been the donee of his 1/3 share of the property A Deed of Sale, covering the entire parcel of the property, was executed on March 1979 in Idas favour BUT The sale was actually a donation To had caused the issuance of a title in her name over the entire parcel of land by virtue of the sale in order to prevent the property from being sold by public auction for Nicolasa and Amandas failure to pay its realty taxes To have always been staying on the property Previous ejectment cases by Nicolasa and Amanda were instituted against her in 1985 Cases were resolved in Idas favour Contentions of Nicolasa and Amanda Ida is a child of Leo Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas Leo Labagala signed and prepared the birth certificate of Isa Santiago as her father Birth certificate of Ida Santiago had the same birth date and place as the claimed day and place of Ida Labagala (1969, Manila) Ida did not present a birth certificate of an Ida Santiago and only alleged that she had been using the surname since her childhood iv. b. i. ii. iii. Jose stated in a Civil Case (No. 56226) that he did not have any child. The Deed of Sale was forged It was not signed by Jose but only thumbmarked, which Jose had never done Ida was unemployed then and could not have afford the price of P150k Ida concealed the sale as she registered the deed only on Jan. 26, 1987 or 8 years after the sale Issue: WON Ida Labagala is Joses child Held: NO NCC 263 does not apply Applies only for situations where doubt exists that a child is indeed a mans child by his wife (issue of legitimacy) Not for situations where a child is alleged not be the child at all of a particular couple Birth certificate of Ida Labagala is conclusive proof of her filiation with Leo and Cornelia BC was signed and prepared by the father, Leo Ida did not present any birth certificate in the name of a Ida Santiago Baptismal and Income Tax Return are not proofs of filiation but only of the fact that a baptism had been administered and that tax has been paid in a certain amount, respectively Use of a family name does not establish pedigree Ida contradicted herself in relation to her filiation with Cornelia In her testimony, she denied knowing Cornelia In her petition, she admitted that Cornelia is her mother, Esperanzas sister
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2. a.
b. i. 1. ii. 1.
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iv. 1. 2. 3. a. i. ii.
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Tecson vs. COMELEC, Poe, et al. G.R. No. 161434, Mar. 3, 2004 De Jesus vs. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon 366 SCRA 499 Facts: Aug 23, 1964 Danilo Jesus and Carolina Jesus were married. Their union produced two children, Jacqueline (March 1, 1979) and Jinky Jesus (July 6, 1982). June 7 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as his own illegitimate children with Carolina Aves de Jesus 12 March 1992 Juan Dizon died. Jacqueline and Jinky then filed an action to be part of the heirs of his estate as his illegitimate children in a notarized document. TC: ulitimately dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and for being improper since its not the proper forum to question their paternity and filiation. Thus the present case ISSUE: WON Jinky and Jacquelin are the illegitimate children of Juan Dizon HELD: NO Presumption of law is that of legitimacy. Those who are born in wedlock without conclusive proof that there was physical impossibility for the parents to conceive the child are considered legitimate. Upon the expiration of periods found in FC 170 and 171, this presumption of civil status becomes fixed and unassailable. It is only when the legitimacy of the child has been disputed can paternity of the husband be rejected. While the recognition of illegitimacy by Dizon was made in accordance with the rules on recognizing illegitimacy, this does not negate the legitimacy they hold with Danilo Jesus. Petitoners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth also identify Danilo de Jesus as their father. Thus, before they can be recognized as illegitimate children, they must first contest their status as legitimate children of Danilo Jesus.
Agustin vs. Court of Appeals 460 SCRA 315, June 15, 2005 Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999 The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child Arnel is actually married and has a family of his own at the time he impregnated Fe Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964 July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court ISSUE: WON DNA testing is self-incriminatory and violates privacy of person HELD: NO Being the first case where DNA testing was the focal issue the court examines the history of DNA testing The court opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals In People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
No evidence to show this If criminal can be subject to it at expense of death, what more in a civil case for paternity?
Ong vs. Diaz December 17, 2007 Facts: Nov 1993 Rogelio and Jinky got acquainted, and the friendship blossomed into love. Jinky however, was already married to Hasegawa Katsuo, a Japanese national, in spite of this, the lovers lived together out of which Joanne Diaz was born on Feb 25, 1998 Rogelio initially recognized Joanne as his, only to abandon the family on Sept 1998, Jinky thereafter files a complaint Judgment rendered in favor of Jinky , Rogelio files a new motion and is granted RTC again rules for Jinky given the Rogelios admission that he was the one who shouldered hospital bills during Joannes birth and that on some instances he continued visiting Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rogelio goes to the Court of Appeals, during the pendency of the trial, however he dies, and is substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong. FC175 Castro v. CA 173 SCRA 656 Facts: Background love story: Pricola Maregmen after marrying one Felix de Maya on May 23, 1913 realized the mistake she made and went back to her real love, Eustaquio Castro whom she lived with until her death on Sept 11, 1924. Their illicit affair bore them a daughter , Benita Castro on May 27, 1919. Two earlier civil cases were filed against Benita Castro. The first by her uncle and aunt Juan and Feliciano Castro that they and not Benita should be the forced heirs of Pedro Castro who died on May 27, 1923 and the second by Marcelina Bautista, the wife of her alleged father Eustaquio Castro who died on August 24, 1961. Marcelina also alleges that she and not Benita should be the compulsory heir of the property of Euestaquio. TC: consolidated the cases and ruled Benita is indeed the acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio Castro and is entitled to participate in the partition of the properties left by him. CA: affirmed the decision of TC and held that Eustaquio Castro voluntarily recognized Benita through the records of birth he registered himself. ISSUE: WON Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro CA remands the case to the RTC for DNA analysis to finally determine the paternity of Joanne, hence the petition
ISSUE: WON DNA testing is applicable when Rogelio has already died HELD: YES death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Def of biological sampling - any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. Any physical residue left by deceased RESULT: case is remanded to RTC for DNA testing
HELD: YES Since FC is now the law being used and no vested rights will be prejudiced, FC 172 can be used to prove that Benita possessed an open and continuous possession of the status of an legitimate child which action can be brought in her lifetime Evidence: lived with Eustaquio for 42 years, even when she was already married Aunt and Uncle Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro admitted that she was the daughter in Civil Case no 3762. Eustaquio himself reported and registered Benitas birth. Plus there was no indication that he should have signed certificate or taken judicial action in order for her to be recognized as his illegitimate child Eustaquio gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano Naval certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for Eustaqui rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family isnt necessary because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only immediate family of Eustaquio. OBITER: Unless she asks about NCC diff between voluntary and compulsory recognition IN THIS CASE, Eustaquio voluntarily recognized her since he himself took
care of and registered her record of birth in the municipality. Thus even if his signature was missing, his actions clearly show his voluntary recognition of her. voluntary recognition: natural child merely asks for a share in the inheritance in virtue of his having been acknowledged as such, and is not trying to compel the father or his heirs to make the acknowledgment NCC 131 law thspat applies for voluntary recognition: The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will or in some other public document acknowledgment has been formally and legally accomplished because the public character of the document makes judicial pronouncement unnecessary compulsory recognition - requires judicial pronouncement of illegitimacy since recognition was made in a private document. NCC 135-136 apply.
recognition is yet to be ordered by the courts because a private writing, lacking the stronger guaranty and higher authenticity of a public document is not self- executory. based on an express recognition so found and declared by the court after hearing diff between natural and spurious IN this case, she was a natural child of Eustaquio but a spurious child of Pricola natural - those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other spurious had legal impediment to marry when child was conceived and born. in case the recognition is made by only one of the parents, it will be presumed that the child is natural if the parents recognizing it had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of the conception
Lim v. CA 65 SCRA 160 Facts: Francisco Uy executed an affidavit that said he was the son and sole heir of deceased Susana Lim and her property now belongs to him Felisa Lim, the alleged natural daughter of Susana Lim, filed a suit in CFI against Francisco to nullify the said affidavit. She presented the ff. evidence to show that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of Susana: Certificate of baptism which states that Felisa is Susanas daughter Marriage contract which shows consent of Susana to the marriage of her daughter. On the other hand, Francisco provided the ff. evidence Application for alien registration which lists Susana as his mother Order of Bureau of Immigration cancelling application stating that Susana is his mother Identification certificate issued by Bureau of Immigration describing his Filipino citizenship taken from his mother Susana Lim TC: recognized Susana as the natural child CA: ruled that neither one of them showed that they were voluntarily or compulsory recognized by Susana ISSUE: WON Felisa is the natural daughter of Susana HELD: NO. Francisco is not a pertinent issue anymore since he decided to argue that he bought the property with his own money thus it should be declared as his through implied trust Felisas evidence hinges on her marriage certificate where Susana gave her consent. She declares that this is a public instrument, which shows Susanas recognition (Art 1216 of Civil Code of 1889). However, public instruments are defined as public documents authenticated by a notary or a competent public official. A marriage certificate is not a notarized public document but a mere declaration by the contracting parties of their marriage.
o o o o o
Baas v. Baas 134 SCRA 260 Facts: Plaintiffs alleged that late Raymundo Banas, was acknowledged natural son of late BIBIANO Banas therefore, by descent, they are entitled to decedents share Defendants denied that Raymundo was the natural son of late Bibiano, nor was he acknowledged by the latter; use of surname Banas by Raymundo was justified, Raymundo being Pedros (Bibianos brother) son Late Raymundo was a natural child, born 1894 of Dolores and of unknown father. It was Bibiano who shouldered raymundos school expenses (in Beda) until Raymundo became a teacher In 1926, Raymundo married Trinidad, niece of Bibianos wife (Faustina); Trinidad lived with Bibianos family before the marriage and took care of the latters children In Raymundos marriage cert, name of father was stated to be Bibiano. Pedro appeared as one of the sponsors. Dec 1928, Raymundo and Pedro executed sworn statements before an atty. Wherein Raymundo declared that he was the natural son of Dolores and came to know thath his father was Pedro and he realized that there
had been an error in his marriage cert; Pedro declared that he has a natural son named Raymundo whom he recognized, and he asked for the correction of the said cert June 30, 1930, Pedro Baas wrote to "M.R.P. Juez del Arzobispado de Manila" wherein he reiterated that he had recognized his natural son born of Dolores (who is insane), Raymundo; he requested for the correction of his sons and grandsons baptismal cert July, 1930 Bibiano executed sworn statement stating that Raymundo is Pedros son 1954, Bibiano died; 1955, Raymundo wrote to Atty. Faustino in which he complained about the alleged in justice done to him by Bibianos wife June 24, 1955, Bibianos heirs, the defendants, extra-judicially settled his estate by means of a deed of extra judicial settlement among themselves which was notarized by Atty. Angel Vecino, brother of Trinidad November 7, 1955, the spouses Raymundo Baas and Trinidad executed a mortgage over their house and lot in 1444 Kalimbas St., in favor of herein defendant Angel V. Baas 1962 Raymundo died; 1965, his heirs filed complaint for partition and recovery of hereditary share Trinidad said she discovered certain documents w/c established Raymundos filiation to Bibiano 1. handwritten note addressed to Raymundo w/ salutation Su padre from B. Banas 2) matriculation certs of Raymundo w/ Bibiano as father 3) report card w/ Bibiano as parent/guardian 4) autobiographies of raymundo w/ alterations
ISSUE: WON RAYMUNDO ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL BIBIANO
WAS SON
AN OF
HELD: NO The note w/ su padre unreliable, assuming its authentic, the same doesnt constitute a sufficient proof of a valid recognition Formalities of voluntary recognition under Article 278 of the New Civil Code is that recognition shall be express and made either in the record of birth, in a will, in a statement in a court of record, or in any authentic writing Note w/ su padre is a mere indication of paternal solicitude.The Filipinos are known for having very close family ties. Extended families are a common set-up among them, sometimes to the extent that strangers are also considered as part of the family. Tthe rule of incidental acknowledgment does not apply to plaintiffsappellants' note (w/ su padre) since it is not a public document where a father would ordinarily be more careful about what he says Even if the evidence presented by the plaintiffs-appellants constitute a sufficient proof of a voluntary recognition, still their complaint will not prosper since it is evident that if there was acknowledgment on the part of Bibiano, he had rectified or repudiated the same by his sworn statement Considering that Raymundo was born in 1894, and was already of majority age in 1915, long before Bibiano's death in 1954, he should and could have filed such action either under Article 135 of the Old Civil Code, or Article 283 of the New Civil Code Such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is not transmissible to the natural child's heirs; the right is purely a personal one to the natural child
In re Christensen 102 Phil 1055 Facts: Christensen, American citizen and his laborer Bernarda lived as husband and wife (but were not married) continuous for over 30 years; 2 children: Lucy and Helen Christensen died April 1953; he left a considerable amount of properties; in his will he appointed petitioner Aznar as executor, declared he had only 1 child (Lucy) giving to her the rest of his properties; 1000 for Bernarda and 3,600 for Helen (who, accdg to Christensen, is not in any way related to him) Respondents filed oppositions to the probate of the will; Helen contends that the dispositions therein were illegal because she and Lucy were both children of Christensen, yet she was given only 3,600 Bernarda claimed ownership over of Christensens prop (co-ownership) Lucy alleged that before, during and after conception of Helen, their mother Bernarda was generally known to be carrying relations with 3 different men and during the lifetime of the decedent, he verbally disavowed relationship w/ Helen ISSUE: WON Maria Helen Christensen Garcia had been in continous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased EdwardE. Christensen HELD: YES Helen was born in 1934, during the period when Bernarda was publicly known to have been living as common-law wife of Christensen (Bernarda testified in favor of Helen) Christensen spent the weekends with Bernarda and their child Lucy in the Christensen plantation. Even granting that Zosimo Silva (alleged lover of Bernarda who testified to that effect) at his stage fitted himself
into the picture, Helen's mother and the deceased were publicly known to be living together as husband and wife. In fact, Christensen from Helen's birth in 1934 providedfor her maintenance; shouldered the expenses for her education; tolerated or allowed her carrying the surname "Christensen" Hisrepudations of her relationship with him came about only after he andBernarda parted ways in March, 1950, and after Helen took sides with her mother. Furthermore, despite that decedent's desire that she continue her studies, Helen ignored the same
andgot married to a man for Christensen held no high esteem. Testator' last acts cannot be made the criterion in determining whether oppositor was his child or not, for human frailty and parental arrogance maydraw a person to adopt unnatural or harsh measures against an erring child The LC directing Lucy to acknowledge Helen is absurd , for the heirs would be compelled to recognize such child as a natural child of the deceased without a properprovision of the law. The Civil Code only requires a declaration by the court of the child's status as a natural child of the parent
Ilano v. CA 231 SCRA 242 FACTS: With Artemios promise of marriage, Leoncia eloped w/ him in April 1962. He came home to her 3 or 4 times a week The apartment where they stayed was procured by Melencio, employee of Artemio; Leoncia wa provided by Artemio, thru Melencio or the maid 700 a month; Artemios support was sometimes in form of cash or check like Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532, the signature appearing thereon having been identified by Leoncia as that of petitioner In Oct 1962, she delivered a still-born babay, the death cert was signed by Artemio. May, 1963 Leoncias niece stayed w/ the latter. When their 2nd child, Merceditas, was born, Artemio left instruction to give the birth cert to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early (so he wasnt able to sign the said cert) Artemio signed Merceditas report card as her parent and he was the 1 whom she recognized as her Daddy; he would bring candies, etc and he would take her for a drive and cuddle her to sleep (Artemio sometimes accompany leoncia for pre-natal check-up) Artemio denied of any relationship with Leoncia; he disowned the handwritten answers and signatures in death cert of the 1st child; he denied everything except the check Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the apartment for Leoncia, leased it in his name, paid the rentals and bought the necessities therefor. He and Leoncia lived together and shared the same bed. Wife and daughter of Artemio corroborated Artemios testimony that he was home on Dec 30, 1963 (2nd childs birth date) because he was sick then hospitalized and he never slept out of their house Artemio contends that order of appelate court directing him to pay back support is erroneous since the complaint against him has been dismissed by the trial court, therefore was absolutely no obligation on his part to give support to Merceditas ISSUE: WON Merceditas is illeg child of Artemio HELD: YES The role played by Melencio S. Reyes (alleged lover of Leoncia) in the relationship between Leoncia and appellant was that of a man Friday The belated denial of paternity after the action has been filed against the putative father is not the denial that would destroy the paternity of the child which had already been recognized by defendant by various positive acts clearly evidencing that he is plaintiff's father. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination by Artemio Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best regards, Temiong". Any other evidence or proof" (last par of A283) that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. (Article 203, Family Code of the Philippines.)
Baluyut v. Baluyut 186 SCRA 506
Facts: Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza were minors when they filed this petition. They were represented by their mother and guardian ad litem, Norma Urbano. The petition is filed against Felicidad Baluyut and the CA. Felicidad is the wife of the deceased, who had an illegal relationship with Norma Urbano because he was already married at the time. The petition states that the minors are his illegitimate children and therefore have a legal interest on the estate of the deceased Enrique Baluyut. They further allege that they were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of children of the decease during his lifetime b direct overt acts. (he supported them and maintained them. They added to having been deliberately excluded from the estate of Enrique Baluyut. Felicidad, who is the widow and appointed administratrix of the estate, opposed the petition. Trial Court: declared that the minors were the forced heirs of the deceased (under NCC 887(5)) and ordered Felicidad to provide monthly support for the minors. CA: reversed the decision; the petition was dismissed (although the CA did recognize them as Enriques illegitimate children) Issue: W/N the petitioners are the illegitimate children of the deceased and are therefore entitiled to monthly support. Held: Proof of filiation is not sufficient to confer upon them any hereditary rights in the estate of the deceased. The decision appealed from is affirmed. Ratio The illegitimate child must be acknowledged by the putative parent. (as was decided by SC in a previous case: Reyes, et al. v. Zuzuarregul, et al.) The illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from his parents, must prove his filiation through this means Voluntary or compulsory (NCC 283) recognition through: Record of birth
Parents will Statement before a court of record Any authentic writing (NCC 278) In the case at bar, there was no evidence to show voluntary recognition. The records of birth were not signed by the father even if it was in the name of Enrique Baluyut There is no evidence of authentic writing or statement before a court With regard to compulsory recognition, the petitioners relied on testimonies by the mother and another witness: The combined testimony of Norma Urbano and her witness Liberata Vasquez insofar as the issue of recognition is concerned tends to show that Norma was kept by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his mistress first in the house of Liberata and then in a house supposedly rented from one Lacuna. But this Lacuna was not even presented to testify in support of the claim of Norma and Liberate that Baluyut rented his house for Norma. And, according to Norma and Liberata, Baluyut visited Norma some twice a week in the house where she kept her as his mistress; that Baluyut paid the hospital bills for the delivery of the two younger children of Norma. But, according to Liberata herself, it was not Baluyut who personally paid the hospital bills but he gave the money for the payment of the hospital bills to Liberato and he requested her to pay the money to the hospital. This only shows that Baluyut was hiding his Identity as the father of the children of Norma, an act which is inconsistent with recognizing such children as his own. The SC is very strict in applying the law for compulsory recognition, much more than with voluntary recognition. NCC 283 enumerates the cases where the father is obliged to recognize the child: b.) when the child is in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family. c.) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father these enumerations are inconsistent with the testimonies of the witnesses. Baluyut appeared to be hiding the fact that he was the father of the minors.
Mendoza v. CA 201 SCRA 675 Marquino v. IAC 233 SCRA 348 (1994) Fernandez v. CA 230 SCRA 130 Facts:
Petitioners are filing for recognition and support against the private respondent claiming to be PRs illegitimate children Violeta P. Esguerra is single and the mother of the two petitioners, Claro Antonio and John Paul. Violeta and Carlito met sometime in 1983 at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. They started their illicit sexual relationship 6 months after meeting. She did not know that Carlito was already married until the birth of her two children. She said that they were married in civil rites in October, 1983 but in March, 1985 she discovered that the marriage license was spurious. Petitioners provided evidence in the form of: Birth certificates Baptismal certificate Photographs of Carlito during the baptism and of him and Claro while in Violetas home 4 witnesses: 3 are friends of Violeta who introduced Carlito to them as her husband and 1 priest who testified that Carlito presented himself as the father of petitioner at the baptism PR Carlito denied the allegations and said he was only a sponsor at the baptism of Claro. He had 2 witnesses: one who affirmed his initial
claim to being just a sponsor at the baptism and another as a waiter of a restaurant who said he never saw them together at the restaurant where Violeta said the frequented together. RTC: ordered PR to recognize the two as his sons and to provide P2000 as support each per month CA: reversed the decision. CA says that proof is inadequate. Issue: W/N the minors are the children of Carlito Fernandez. Held: NO. SC finds no merit in petition. Ratio: Documentary evidence provided for by the petitioners are insufficient. Photos are unreliable Baptismal certificates cannot be held as a voluntary recognition of parentage Birth certificates werent prepared (SIGNED) by Carlito himself and cannot be used as evidence. The testimony by the priest was misleading. He didnt really remember the face of Carlito and had to be shown a picture by Violeta first.
Jison vs. CA 286 SCRA 495 Eceta vs. Eceta (supra) David vs. Court of Appeals 250 SCRA 82, November 16, 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a rich businessman. Private respondent is a married man and a father. However, despite this, Daisie and Ramon cohabited Out of this union, Christopher J., was born (on March 9, 1985). Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988. The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed. 10. but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. 11. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus. Respondents: Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas, petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters and parents for support. In fact, he financially supported petitioner-appellee and her three minor children. It is, therefore, for the best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent-appellant ISSUE: Whether or not the child should be given back to Daisie. HELD: Yes.
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REASON 1: Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. REASON 2: Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." 3 In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC (reckoning time), cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way `unfit to have custody of her child. Rebuttals of respondnets arguments
On A. Rule 1021 1 (the rule on habeas corpus) makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." On B. Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.
Tonog vs. Court of Appeals 376 SCRA 523, February 7, 2002 FACTS: 1. September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America to work as a registered nurse Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents. On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith and it was approved Petitioner opposed. on October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her. The trial court granted the motion and the case to determine custody of Gardin Faith is now pending. The respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari asserting that temporary custody should be awarded to him because the child has lived with him all her life and It would certainly wreak havoc on the childs psychological make-up to give her to the custody of private respondent, only to return her to petitioner should the latter prevail in the main case. Subjecting the child to emotional seesaw should be avoided ISSUE: W.N. temporary custody should be granted to the father. HELD: Yes. In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and wellbeing of the child. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that [n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
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The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation. This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration. In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. COMMENT: The court never expounded on what these compelling reasons are. The best answer I could find is stated in the next paragraph saying that the SC cannot decide on questions of fact. And the determination of w/n the mother is a good mother is indeed a question of fact. But it still does not answer why custody was granted to the father. Is the compelling reason the fact that her mother is in the states? Is it the fact that the child is already staying at the fathers house and moving the child to and fro would cause the child distress? Are these reasons compelling enough for the court to award temporary custody to the father? I dont know Are cases regarding temporary custody exceptions to Articles 176 and 213? I dont know. For reference, I also posted the full text of the case.
Whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the parties respective merits vis--vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person. A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioners fitness to have final custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father WHEREFORE, The trial court is directed to immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision OBITER: Parental Authority and its Renunciation Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latters needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor. GR: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of EXC: adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Liyao vs. Liyao
378 SCRA 563, March 7, 2002 FACTS: Ramon Yulo and Corazon Garcia are married but are legally separated They have two children, Enrique and Bernadette William Liyao and Respondent Juanita Liyao are also married. William and Juanita have two daughter, Tita and Linda Christine While their marriages were subsisting, Corazon and William cohabited until the latters death. Out of this union, petitioner William Jr, was born. William Junior claimed to be the illegitimate son of William. Contentions of petitioner petitioner was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime." He presented witnesses including the children of Ramon Yulo and Corazon Garcia, saying that William always recognizes him as his son and that when there were guests William would say, Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a good looking son." his mother, Corazo Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born ISSUE: Is the evidence presented sufficient to prove that William Jr. is the illegitimate son of William Sr.? HELD: There is no need for the court to go to the substantive issues because from the onset, petitioner lacks the required personality to file the suit. the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory. It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband (in this case Ramon Yulo), presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. ISSUE 2: Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter? HELD: No. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law. Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of the child only in the following cases: (1) If the husband should die before expiration of the period fixed for bringing action; (2) If he should die after the filing of complaint, without having desisted from same; (3) If the child was born after the death of husband. (112) the his the the the
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LEONARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 125329. September 10, 2003

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Facts: Petitioner Ann Brigit Leonardo was born in Manila to common-law spouses Eddie Fernandez and Gloria Leonardo. In her Birth Certificate Leonardo was her surname. Wanting to change her surname to that of her father, they sent a letter to the Local Civil Registrar on August 1, 1994. The Local Civil Registrar denied their request citing FC 176 which states that petitioner, being illegitimate, should carry the surname of the mother.
Hence this case. Issues: WON AnnBrigit Leonardo could use her fathers surname Held: NO Ratio: The Family Code has repealed NCC 366 which allows natural children to use the surname of the father if the child is recognized by BOTH parents. Now, in the Family Code, an illegitimate child should use the surname of the mother even if the father acknowledges him/her. Hence, Ann Brigit has NO right to use the surname of the father.
Republic vs. Capote February 2, 2007 Facts: Respondent Trinidad Capote filed a petition to change the name of her ward from GIOVANNI GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI NADORES. Minor GIOVANNI is the illegitimate child of Corazon Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. He was born in 1982 before the Family Code. His father failed to take up responsibilities on matters of financial, physical and emotional support to GIOVANNI. cf. RPC 345, -RPC 46, 59 Solinap vs. Locsin 371 SCRA 711 Facts: On September 16, 1996, Juan Locsin Jr. was appointed as the sole administrator of the Intestate estate of Juan Locsin (JHONNY LOCSIN) Juan Locsin Jr. claims to be the acknowledged natural child of JHONNY. Petitioners said that Juan Locsin Jr. is not an acknowledged natural child of JHONNY since there is no Sr. in JHONNYs name. A Birth Certificate from the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City was submitted by Respondent, which states that Juan Locsin Sr. is his father Petitioners on the otherhand submitted a Birth Certificate from the Civil Registrar General where it shows that the signature of the father was not there. They also presented handwriting experts saying that the Birth Certificate of Respondent is a FAKE. RTC and CA sided with respondent. Hence this Petition Issues: WON the record of birth of respondent is authentic Held: NO IT IS A FAAAAAKE! Ratio: The records of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of births cover several decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely access them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. Hence, the records in the Civil Registrar General should conform with the record of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo. But in this case it did not. SO WHICH IS THE FAKE ONE? Respondents birth certificate revised form was recorded in December 1, 1958. But his birth was recorded in 1957. So how in the effin world would a 1958 document be used in 1957? ITS A FAKE! The petitioners on the otherhand presented a birth certificate revised form dated 1956, no irregularity at all since it could be used in 1957. Next, the back portion of the birth certificate of respondent was TORN and are merely CARBON copies (original copy dapat). Hence Juan Locsin Jr. has failed to prove that he is filiated with JHONNY LOCSIN. The trial court approved the change of name Issues: WON GIOVANNI is allowed to use the surname of the mother (NADORES) Held: YES Ratio: This is because under NCC 366, the surname of an illegitimate child is based on the recognizing parent, And since GIOVANNI was never recognized by his father, the change of name to NADORES is legal.
Pp vs. Delantar G.R. No. 169143, February 2, 2007 Facts: On August 27, 1996, an information was filed against Simplicio Delantar saying that he violated RA 7610 for willfully, feloniously, and unlawfully promoting and inducing AAA, a female child below 12 years of age, to indulge in sexual intercourse for money and profit On September 4 1996, accused entered a plea of not guilty. On February 25, 1999, the RTC- Pasay branch rendered a decision finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violation of RA 7610. The testimony of AAA tells us that she was first brought to the first client (an Arab National named Mr. Hammond) at least 11 times. She told the court that the accused told her that she needed to do it because they had to pay some obligations and debts. Afterwards, AAA no longer wanted to have sex with the Arab National, but then the accused told her that there is nothing wrong with it as long as the penis does not penetrate her vagina (The Arab client never inserted her penis into her, binabastos lang siya nito.) The second client is Romeo Jalosjos, and Jalosjos called the accused as suking bugaw. Jalosjos often paid 5-10K pesos for the services of AAA. The accused brought the case to SC for petition Issues: WON Delantar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating RA 7610 Held: Yes Ratio: In Section 5 of the RA 7610 it states that SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. It is clear that accused-appelant coerced and influenced AAA into having sex with the Arab guy and Jalosjos for 2 reasons. FIRST, Delantar instilled helplessness into her by saying that she had to do it because they had debts and electric bills to pay (so wala nang choice yung bata diba?). SECOND, Delantar had MORAL ASCENDANCY over AAA because he was her father figure. All of these point to Delantar coercing and influencing AAA. MORE IMPORTANT ISSUE: WON Delantar is a Guardian of AAA. (Because if he is a guardian then he will be sentenced to reclusion temporal. HELD: NO Ratio: The birth certificate of AAA saying that Delantar was her father was NOT signed by Delantar. Hence it is not clear if Delantar is indeed a father. Was he a guardian? NO. A guardian envisioned by law is a person who is the biological father or adopted parent of the child.
Gapusan v. CA 183 SCRA 160 Facts: Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate and without legitimate issue on April 6, 1966 Neither her surviving spouse, Prospero Parcon, nor her other known relatives three (3) sisters and a nephew made any move to settle her estate judicially Ligaya Gapusan-Chua, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of Felisa Gapusan Parcon, instituted judicial proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate. The court appointed her administratrix of the estate On April 22, 1968, Prospero Parcon, Felisa Parcon's surviving husband, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of January 16, 1968. He denied that Ligaya was an acknowledged natural child of his deceased wife, and applied for his own appointment as administrator of his wife's estate Ligaya presented the ff. evidence a) Felisa Parcon's sworn statement of assets and liabilities wherein Ligaya is named and described as the daughter of Felisa (Exh. 4); b) Felisa Parcon's application for GSIS life insurance in which Ligaya is set out as her (Felisa's) daughter (Exh. 3); c) Check No. 44046 of the Government Service Insurance System in the sum of P505.50 paid to her (Ligaya) as her share in the death benefits due the heirs of Felisa Parcon (Exh. 2); and d) a family photograph, showing Ligaya beside the deceased Prospero Parcon, on the other hand, sought to demonstrate that Ligaya's exhibits did not constitute conclusive proof of her claimed status of acknowledged natural child, for the reason that: a) another document, Felisa's application for membership in Negros Occidental Teachers' Federation (NOTF), merely named Ligaya as her "adopted daughter;" b) in the distribution of death benefits pursuant to the decedent's GSIS insurance policy, supra, Ligaya was allocated only P500.00 whereas Prospero received P1,000.00; and c) Mrs. Leticia Papasin (Felisa's sister) and Vice-Mayor Solomon Mendoza travelled from afar to affirm before the Probate Court on the witness stand that Ligaya was not the daughter of Felisa, 6 Mrs. Papasin's testimony being that in 1942 an unknown "drifter" had sold Ligaya, then an infant, to Felisa. The RTC sided with Ligaya however the CA did not. According to the CA, the evidence at best showed merely that Ligaya had been treated as a daughter by Felisa, but that this did "not constitute acknowledgment" but "only a ground to compel recognition;" and that Ligaya had failed to establish that she had been acknowledged by Felisa in accordance with Article 278 of the Civil Code Issue: WON the evidence is sufficient to prove that LIGAYA is the acknowledged natural child of the deceased or more specifically: whether or not Felisa's sworn statement of assets and liabilities
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and her application for insurance are "authentic writings under article 278 of the civil code" which effectively operated as a recognition of Ligaya Gapusan-Chua as her natural child, even if no action was brought by the latter to compel the former, during her lifetime, to recognize her as such Held: Recognition of natural children may be voluntary or compulsory Compulsory recognition is sometimes also called judicial recognition. It is recognition decreed by final judgment of a competent court. Art 281 (NCC) provides that judicial approval is needful if the recognition of the minor is effected, not through a record of birth or in a will but through a statement in a court of record or an authentic document
The evidences of Felisa are all considered authentic documents: they are the genuine or indubitable writings of Felisa Gapusan Parcon Felisa's application for membership in the Negros Occidental Teachers' Federation, where Felisa describes Ligaya as her "adopted" daughter is also inconsequential since it was only mentioned as adopted to hide Felisas shame and reluctance to confess publicly to her colleagues in the teaching profession that she had borne a child out of wedlock. Furthermore it only proves that Ligaya is Felisas daughter Ligaya Gapusan Chua must be held to be a voluntarily acknowledged natural child of Felisa Gapusan Parcon. She is therefore entitled, in accordance with Article 282 of the Civil Code, to bear her mother's surname, and to receive the hereditary portion accorded to her by the Code
People v. Barranco 177 SCRA 103 Facts: Rosalia Barranco (19) was raped by Bartolome Barranco, the second cousin of her father who lives 100 meters away from her house Feb 10,1980. Rosalia was raped by Bartolome (Bart because bartolome is too long) while being threatened with death (Bart was holding a butchers knife to her neck) March 19, 1980, Bart attempted rape but foiled because Rosalia was able to fend him off by hitting him with a piece of wood On the eve of the same day, rosalia confessed to her mother the rape. They went to the police and had a physical exam. Turned out she was pregnant Noong ika-3 ng Abril, 1981 trial court convicted Bart of Rape and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua Issue(s) Among others, the issue that concerns us here is that Bart alleged that the court cannot order him to acknowledge the child as his own Held (I have reproduced the original followed by my humble interpretation) Subalit mayroong pagkakamali ang mababang hukuman ng ipag- utos nito na kilalanin ng nahahabla bilang anak ang bunga ng kanyang kasalanan. Ang nahahabla ay may-asawa. Hindi maaari na kilalanin ang batang bunga ng kasalanan na anak ng isang may-asawa. 4 Subalit may katungkulan siyang sustentuhan ang bata ayon sa batas. 5 Bukod pa dito dapat pagbayarin ang nahahabla ang malaking pinsala na ginawa niya kay Rosalia Barranco ng halagang P 30,000. 00 The trial court erred when it ordered that the child be acknowledged as Barts because the child of a sin cannot be acknowledged by a married man. However he is entitled to support the child.
People v. Rizo 189 SCRA 265 Facts: Concepcion Dimen noticed that the stomach of her 22-year old mongoloid sister was bigger than usual. She discovered that she was pregnant. Felicidad revealed that Rizo, the husband of her yaya had intercourse with her in the bodega. Rizo admitted that he had sexual intercourse with Felicidad. On October 22, 1986, Felicidad delivered a baby. Rizo did not confirm nor deny that he had sexual intercourse with her but filed a motion to dismiss claiming insufficiency of evidence. RTC found Felicidad to be a competent witness and rendered judgment against the accused. RTC also ordered Rizo to recognize the offspring as his legitimate son despite the fact that Rizo is a married man. Relevant issue: WON Rizo can be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime. Held: No Ratio: The rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. That portion of the judgment ordering him to recognize the child as his legitimate son should therefore be eliminated.
People vs. Magtibay
G.R. No. 142985. Aug. 6, 2002 Facts: Rachel Recto went to the store to buy cigarette and ice when Magtibay pulled her hand and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her in a grassy place. She became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy. Magtibay claimed he was bedridden due to influenza but the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. He was penalized with RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the victim Rachelle Recto of 50,000 without subsidiary imprisonment. Relevant Issue: WON the accused is ordered to provide support to the victim's child born out of the rape. Held: Yes Hence, accused should be ordered indemnify and support the victim's child. Dempsey v. RTC 164 SCRA 384 Facts: Janalita Rapada cohabited with Joel Dempsey without the benefit of marriage and Christine Marie was born. The child receives monthly support from him in the sum of $150. Janalita seeks for the accused to declare Christina Marie as his dependent and after his American citizenship. Dempsey freely and voluntarily and spontaneously entered a plea of guilty to the offenses charged against him which was abandonment and failure to provide adequate support for the child though he had the means to do so. Municipal Trial Court found him to be guilty. He appealed for the penalty of imprisonment be changed into a fine and not to be acquitted. RTC reversed the earlier decision. Relevant issue #1: WON Christina is entitled to the rights arising from the parental responsibility of her father, she being an illegitimate child. Held: Yes. Illegitimate children have rights of the same nature as legitimate and adopted children. This is enunciated in Art. 3 of PD 603 which provides that all children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors. Relevant issue#2: WON as part of the civil liability, the accused is required to recognize Christina as his natural. Held: No. The recognition of a child by her father is provided for in the NCC and now in the FC. In this criminal prosecution, where the accused pleaded guilty to criminal charges and the issue of recognition was not specifically and fully heard and tried, the trial court committed error when it ordered recognition of a natural child as part of the civil liability in the criminal case. to Ratio: Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. Under the FC, the kid is considered an illegitimate child. Art. 176 of the FC vests parental authority upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental authority over his children, no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child's status.
People v. Bayani G.R. No. 120894 Oct. 3, 1996 o o o FACTS: Complaint filed by Maria Elena Nieto for the crime of rape against Sgt. Moreno Bayani Accused filed motion for bail Prosecution presented Dr. Baraoidan, a Medical Specialist who examined Maria Elena Declared that Maria Elenas enlarge cervix connoted pregnancy Complainants testimony Bayani was their neighbor, her uncles kumpadre (were like family) Bayani invited her to Laoag, where she was taken to a motel, threatened with a gun and raped (June 28, 1992) o o o o o She didnt tell anyone until her boyfriend, Ambrosio confronted her Ambrosio told a teacher, school protected her Gave birth on March 21, 1993 Motion for bail was denied Defense presented: Bayani Asserted that Maria Elena was his mistress and that the sexual intercourse was with her conset Bernanrd Javier (information officer at the motel) Declared that upon check-in, he noticed that Maria Elena was happy and even laughing RTC: Guilty

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Bayani Appealed Sol Gen: apart from the 50,000.00 as indemnity, appellant should be made to support his illegitimate child with Maria Elena, in conformity with Article 345(3) of the RPC ISSUES: WON Bayani is guilty of the crime of rape WON Bayani should support his illegitimate child HELD: Yes YES RPC 345(3) FC 177
Persons guilty of rape , seduction or abduction shall be sentence to (a) indemnify the offended woman; (b) acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing; and (c) in every case, to support the offspring. While it has been held that recognition of offspring of rape cannot be ordered in the absence of evidence, in this instance, however, before both the trial court and this Court, the accused expressly admitted paternity of the complainants child thus giving rise to the obligation to provide support. FC 176 provides for illegitimate childrens entitlement to support in conformity with the Code (FC 201)
Abadilla vs Tabiliran 249 SCRA 447 o FACTS: Complaint filed by Ma Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of respondent Judge Jose Tabiliran Respondent charged with gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of a judge Complainants allegations: respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela that respondent shamefacedly contracted marriage with said Priscilla that respondent falsely represented himself as single in the marriage contract and dispense with the requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation for 5 years Earlier: wife filed a complaint for abandonment of family home and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son Charge of Deceitful Conduct: Complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as legitimate his three illegitimate children with Priscilla by falsely executing separate affidavits Other charge: Corruption Respondent: Declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with her only after his 1st wife had already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 Since then, 1st wifes whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive Further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his 1st wife when he married Priscilla in 1986 Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on 2 counts of corruption FC 178,FC 180 FC 180-181 DOJ Opinion No. 106 Series of 1991
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ISSUES: WON Tabilaran is guilty of deceitful conduct HELD: YES Children were born in 1970, 1971 and 1975 and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986 As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita Applicable Provision Art. 269 of NCC: Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment o marry each other, are natural. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations Reasons: 1. The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed 2. It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; 3. There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; 4. It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage 5. It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give refuge to the deceitful actuations of the respondent.
FC 182 FC179
ADOPTION Lazatin v. Campos 92 SCRA 250 FACTS: Jan. 13, 1974: Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate, survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondents Nora and Irma 1month after: margarita de Asis commenced an intestate proceeding April 11, 1974: Margarita de Asis died, leaving a holographic will Nov 22, 1974: pettioner intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of Dr. Mariano Lazatin, as an admitted illegitimate child Aug. 20, 1975: petitioner filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de ASis as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin, that petitioner was an illegitimate son of Dr. Lazatin and was lated adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified on Aug. 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano and Margarita. Respondent court heart petitioners motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of Margarita, at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of adoption hi his favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over private respondents objections, that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by them until their death; formerly he was known as Renato Lazatin but was compelled to change his surname to Sta. Clara when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife; that . (Page 257) March 4, 1976: Respondent Court barred the introduction of petitioners evidence March 16, 1976: petitioner filed a motion to declare as established the fact of adoption Court denied motion ISSUES: WON the respondent Court erred in not allowing petitioner to introduce new evidence HELD: NO Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which creates between 2 persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. (ADOPTION DEFINED PAGE 259!!!! Too long for me to reproduce) Petitioners flow of evidence in the case below doesnt lead us to any proof of judicial adoption. No proof of specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses No judicial records of adoption or copies Petitioner cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the estate as an adopted son because of lack of proof
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Cervantes v. Fajardo 169 SCRA 575 FACTS: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino was born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreons sister and brother in law, the petitioners. Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when she was barely 2 weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioenrs over the child RTC rendered a decision granting the petition Angelie Anne Fajardo Cervantes Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners received a letter from respondents demanding to be paid P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the child from her yaya at the petitioners residence on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her house Petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina refused ISSUES: WON the writ should be granted. HELD: YES Respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina his open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desireable atmosphere Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with full knowledge and consent of respondents A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted
R.A. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Law) A.M. No. 02-6-02-S.C. (Aug. 22, 2002) Republic v. CA 205 SCRA 356 o Facts: Feb 2, 1988 - Zenaida Bobiles (private respondent) filed petition to adopt Jason Condat, court grants it given that all requirements for adoption are satisfied Petitioner appeals to CA who affirms the trial court decision, hence this petition Issue: W/n CA erred in ruling that the FC cannot be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption W/n CA erred in affirming the decision w/c granted the petition in favor of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles Held / Ratio: No. Zenaida filed for adoption when PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) was the law here a petition for adoption may be filed by either or both of the spouses Under the FC however (Art 185), joint adoption by both spouses is mandatory Petitioner contends that the FC should be applied retroactively and adoption should be dismissed Art. 246 of the FC provides for retro effect provided it doesnt impair vested rights Under PD 603, Zenaida had the right to adopt by herself, and when she filed for adoption, the right to file such petition alone was vested on her FC Art. 185 is remedial in nature, despite the fact that these laws are retro actively applied, it will not be so appied as to defeat procedural steps completed before the enactment As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case No. Though Dioscoro was not named as a petitioner, he did provide written consent that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child w/c is sufficient to make him a petitioner The future of the child must not be compromised by insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules. Adoption statutes are liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institutions and to protect the child. Welfare of the child is of paramount consideration. The rights concomitant to and coferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interest of the child. The CA found the following in the petition and correctly approved the adoption: Natural parents gave consent / DSWD recommended approval / Trial court approved / Written consent of adopting parents
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Santos v. Aransanzo 16 SCRA 344 Facts: Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes filed petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos on June 4, 1949 With their parents whereabouts unknown, their current guardian, Crisanto de Mesa gave his written consent, Paulina being 14 yo likewise gave consent. Hence, Court grants petition Oct 21, 1957 Juliana dies, Simplicio files for settlement of intestate estate including Paulina and Aurora as surviving heirs Gregoria Aranzanso, alleges that she is the first cousin of Juliana files an opposition to the petition stating that Simplicios marriage to Juliana was bigamous and thus void and that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora were void for there is no written consent from natural parents Demetria Ventura, alleging also that she is the first cousin of Juliana and adding that she is the mother of Paulina Santos, like wise files as opposition CFI says that validity of adoption cannot be attacked collaterally, CA however REVERSES and declares that the adoption is void for lack of written consent. Petitioners file for preliminary injunction against the CA orders and the Court grants it hence this petition by the respondents Issue: W/n the respondents can assail in settlement proceedings the adoption decree of Paulina and Aurora Santos Held / Ratio: No. If natural parents have abandoned the children guardian consent suffices. Furthermore, the adoption court made sufficient findings that the natural parents of them minors couldnt be located, hence its order cannot be attacked collaterally. Hence the CA erred in reviewing, under collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them. Even if Simplicio were married to another person (not decided in this case), the estate of Juliana being the subject matter, the adopted children status of Paulina and Aurora is not affected, hence they succeed Juliana.
Respondents cannot intervene in the settlement proceedings and attack the adoption
As the adoption is held valid, and in intestate succession, adopted children exclude first cousins, the CA decision is reversed
Daoang v. Municipal Judge 159 SCRA 369 Facts: Respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed petition for adoption of the minor Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos Petitioners minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang assisted by their father, file an opposition claiming that the Agonoys have a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy (mother of Roderick and Rommel), who died March 1, 1971 thus Agonoys are disqualified to adopt under NCC Art 335 Trial court still grants the petition for adoption Issue: W/n respondent spouses are disqualified to adopt under NCC Art. 335 par. 1 Held / Ratio: No Art 335 those w/ legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction cannot adopt Duncan v. CFI 69 SCRA 298 Facts: robin (british) and maria lucy (american) are h&w. They have no kids but previously adopted a child and wishes to do so again with a child whom they have named as colin berry Duncan. They are now challenging CA decision which denied them the adoption of minor Colin Berry Christensen Duncan. CA banked its decision on NCC 340 which provided for the written consent of following people, more specifically the mother of the child who was known to Atty. Velasquez, latter was arguing that such was already sanctioned by privileged communication b/w lawyer and client. Nonetheless CA there is no such relationship in this issue May 1967. Couple received the 3 day old child from Atty. Velasquez whom they had baptized as colin berry Duncan. Said child was given to attorney by mother who made her swore never to reveal her identity and look for a suitable couple who will adopt him. In the petition for adoption filed sept 1967, it was atty. velasquez who stood as de facto guardian/ loco parentis who thus gave consent. CA pressed on knowing the identity of the mother as she should have been the one who gave consent (as per CA). Issue: WON consent from mother (because child was IC and unrecognized by father) was still needed HELD: NO. Consent should come from <as per Ncc Art. 340 (2)>The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted. Section 3, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, describing it as each of the known living parents "who has not abandoned such child." natural and unwedded mother has not bothered to inquire into the condition of the child, much less to contribute to the livelihood, maintenance and care of the same. In short, this parent is the antithesis of that described in the law as "known living parent who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such child." SC is convinced that in fact said mother had completely and absolutely abandoned her child. Therefore there is no more legal need to require the written consent to such parent of the child to the adoption WON Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the undisputed custodian of the abandoned waif, may be considered as the guardian under Art. 340 or the person standing in loco parentis of said infant contemplated in Art. 349 of the Civil Code. HELD: YES Atty. Velasquez was under no legal compulsion to accept the child and to extend to it the protection and care it badly needed. Since there had been no showing that the identity of the natural mother was made known to the trial court or to the herein petitioners, nor had said mother seen fit to present herself before the court despite the public notice given to the proceedings as required by law, there clearly appears only one person who could be considered as the guardian exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child. Since there was no guardian ad litem appointed by the court and the child not being in the custody The law is clear children mentioned therein do not include grandchildren The legislators of the NCC obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children are disqualified to adopt Adoption used to benefit the adopter. This has since changed as now; the present notion on adoption promotes the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a happy life. Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, etc children is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt
of an orphan asylum, children's home or any benevolent society, there could not have been anyone other than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the guardian of said infant WON the spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen, are qualified to adopt the child HELD: There is no showing that they suffer from any of the disqualifications under the law. Above all, they have the means to provide the child with the proper support, care, education and love that a growing child needs, even if they have previously adopted another child as theirs. They have actually already cared for the child for nine years since the proceedings for adoption was instigated and they must have been the only parents that the child has ever
recognized. It would be supreme injustice if they will be denied of the adoption rights over the child. Minor child is hereby recognized as adopted by herein spouses. OBITER: . The law is not, and should not be made an instrument to impede the achievement of a salutary humane policy. As often as is legally and lawfully possible, their texts and intendments should be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist with a modicum promise of a useful and constructive existence. (How the Court bends over its back in considering the best welfare of the child)
Landingin vs. RP G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006 Facts: Diwata Landingin (us cit of Filipino descent) filed for adoption on 2/4/2002 of the minors Elaine,elma,and Eugene who are all nat. children of her brother manuel and Amelia ramos. Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos while their mother went to Italy, remarried and had two children (never communicated again). Diwata now supports said minors, together with help from other relatives. Maria passed away on November 23, 2000 and Diwata now therefore seeks to adopt said minors. Said minors have already given their written consent to adoption. She is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. Diwatas own children have also given their written consent already. Her brother Mariano Ramos who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioners custody. Court ordered DSWD to conduct case study and submit report in time for the hearing. OSG also entered its appearance. Since her petition was unopposed, she presented ex-parte. Diwata testified in her behalf, presented Eliane Ramos, the eldest among the adoptees, to testify on the written consent that she and siblings exec. Also presented was the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley. PAgbilao, the DSWD field officer assigned to the case, reported that minors are eligible for adoption because the mother has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance and support they need (Affid of Consent by mother). Moreover, said minors have expressed the desire to be adopted through a joint Affidavit of consent. And lastly, the minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also family to look after. Pagbilao interviewed the mother of the minors who went back to PI from Italy during the summer for a 3-week vacation. But Diwata was not able to present Pagbilao as witness offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Neither was she able to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption. TC declared the minors freed from all legal obedience and maintenance from their natural parents and also declared to be children of Diwata. Moreover, TC ordered that from DizonRamos, the surnames of the minors would now be Ramos-Landingin. OSG appealed CA saying that there was no consent from the biological mother. With this, CA reversed TC, saying that Diwata was not able to prove that the biological mother consented to the adoption nor was the affidavit of consent by Diwatas children be admissible since such was exec in Guam and not acknowledged before philippine Consular Office. Nor is she stable enough to support the children. Issue: 1)WON the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos 2)WON the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioneradopters children sufficiently complies with the law 3)WON petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees. Held: 1)NO. The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. Section 9 of Republic Act No.
8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) requires the consent from biological parents. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. Written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. Amelia (mother) was said to be in PI, therefore it would not have been impossible to solicit Written Consent from her. That consent is no longer needed because of mothers abandonment is untenable. If mother had really abandoned, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent. Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption
2) NO. Section 2 of Act No. 2103 (pardon me if I would no longer expound on this point, this part deals more with technicalities of instruments I think e.g. including the intrinsic/extrinsic validity of such instruments ) What is important here is that no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children therefore said evidence is inadmissible
3) Primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age therefore financial stability is questionable. Even if she says that she has children to rely on, adopter must be the main breadwinner.
Minor children not permitted to be adopted due to legal infirmities (but Court said that Diwata is not prevented from filing new petition for adoption of herein minors paasa haay)
Pardo de Tavera v. Cacdac 167 SCRA 626 Facts: On 19 june 1986 the Gordons sought to adopt the minor, Anthony Gandhi O. Custodio, a natural son of Adoracion Custodio. On the date of hearing, nobody appeared to oppose the Petition, OSG failed to send any rep for the State. Evidences established that: Gordons (british spouse) are allowed by their home country to adopt foreign babies specifically from the Republic of the Philippines. Husband is employed at the Dubai Hilton International Hotel as Building Superintendent therefore financially secured Anthony's mother, Adoracion Custodio, had given her consent to the adoption realizing that her child would face a brighter future Case Study Report submitted by the Social Worker of the Trial Court gave a favorable recommendation natural mother thought of the best for her 1yr 2mos child. TC declared Anthony the truly and lawfully adopted child of the Gordons Gordons wrote MSSD for a travel clearance for Anthony on 8/11/86 but MSSD opposed even if subpoenaed saying that the Report of the Court Social Worker and that of the Pastor of the International Christian Church of Dubai cannot take the place of a report of the MSSD or a duly licensed child placement agency required six-month trial custody had not been met nor the reasons therefor given as required by Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. No. 603) Gordons had given P10,000.00 to the natural mother, which is reflective of the undesirable attitude of the Gordons to shop for children as if they were shopping for commodities under Muslim law (Dubai), Anthony cannot inherit from the adopting parents Gordons had filed another petition for adoption of a baby girl before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 94, on 24 June 1986 but because she died a month later they tried to pass off another child to whom they gave the same name and represented that she was the very same girl they were adopting there being no Memorandum of Agreement between Dubai and the Philippines there is no guarantee that the adopted child will not be sold, exchanged, neglected or abused. WON travel clearance can be withheld by MSSD following the objections MSSD is raising HELD: NO. as TC has held. TC ordered the MSSD to issue the travel clearance under pain of contempt and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue the corresponding passport saying that
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Court Social Worker Report could take the place of a report from a duly licensed placement agency or of the MSSD Court had impliedly dispensed with the sixmonth trial custody considering that the Gordons were foreigners whose livelihood was earned abroad Decision had become final and executor TC relied on 1) the Resolution of this Court in Administrative Matter No. 85-2-7136-RTC denying the request of the MSSD for a Supreme Court Circular to all Regional Trial Court and 2) ruling in Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes "In refusing to grant the travel clearance certificate, respondent MSSD
discounts and negates the effects of a valid and final judgment of the Court regarding which no appeal had even been taken from (Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes G.R. L-71370, July 7, 1986)." 10K given by Gordon spouses was only a financial assistance to the natural mother of the child Spouses also would want to adopt a baby girl but upon learning that shes mongoloid, they turned her over to International Alliance for Children, where she unfortunately died. Muslim laws shall not apply to them, they being Britons. TC order already final and executory!!!
Republic v. Toledano 233 SCRA 9 Facts: February 21, 1990 private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. 1981-1984, Nov 1989 to present, Simon was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. social worker Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda recommended the granting of the petition for adoption R.A. 8043, The Law on Inter-Country Adoption A.M. No. 02-6-02-S.C. (Aug. 22, 2002) Some important notes on R.A. 8043 The Law on Inter-Country Adoption Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child, i.e. 15 years old and below by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad where the petition is field, the supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued outside the Philippines. Mandates the creation of The Inter-Country Adoption Board that acts as the policy-making body for purposes of carrying out the provisions of this Act, in consultation and coordination with the Department, the different child-care and placement agencies, adoptive agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations engaged in child-care and placement activities Board shall ensure that all possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been exhausted before resorting to Inter-Country Adoption and ensure as well that such is for the best interest of the child Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted.- Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country adoption. SEC. 9. Who May Adopt.- Any alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she; is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted, at the time of application unless the adaptor is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption; has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counselling from an accredited counsellor in his/her country TC granted the adoption petition of Clouse spouse OSG objected saying that the Clouse spouse are not qualified to adopt under Pjhilippine law Issue: WON Clouse spouse are not qualified to adopt under Philippine law Held: YES. FC 184 and 185 bars the Clouse spouse from doing so. Respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. He is a natural born US Citizen and Simon is neither his relative by consanguinity nor legitimate child of his spouse. Evelyn on the other hand has already become naturalized. She would have qualified under FC 184(3) because shes a former Filipino who sought to adopt her brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife.
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has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude is eligible to adopt under his/her nation law is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of this Act; from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her national laws possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable Philippine laws FC 189 FC 186 Tamrago v. CA 209 SCRA 518
Facts: Minor (10 yrs old) Adelberto Bundoc shot Jennifer Tamrago with an air rifle (causing death) on 10/20/82 Civil complaint for damages was instigated by Macario Tamargo (Jennifers adoptive parent) and Cesar and Aurelia Tamargo (nat. parents) against Adelbertos nat parents (Victor and Clara Bundoc) w/ whom Adelberto was living with @ time of incident. Another axn was actually filed for Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide (but adeleberto was acquitted/ exempted following minority w/o discernment) But prior to incident, (12/10/81), Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed pet. to adopt adelberto w/c CFI granted in 11/18/82 or after said incident. The nat. parents of Adelberto, following such adoption were saying that they were no longer indispensable parties to the damages (parental liability because such was already transferred by virtue of the adoption) Petitioners however were saying that since adelberto was with them @ time of incident, it should be them and not the Rapisura spouse who should be party to said action. TC ruled for Victor and Clara Bundoc (nat. parents) and said that they were not indispensable to the case at hand Issue: WON the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned, may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents. Held: NO. liability stays with the natural parents, most especially that adelberto was still with them at said incident.
NCC 2180 speaks of parental obligation for the damages of minor children in their company. The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage: no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed. Nat. parents of Adelberto were held liable (indispensable party) and case remanded to TC to proceed with such.
Cervantes v. Fajardo 169 SCRA 575 FACTS: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino was born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife.

Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreons sister and brother in law, the petitioners. Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when she was barely 2 weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioenrs over the child RTC rendered a decision granting the petition Angelie Anne Fajardo Cervantes Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners received a letter from respondents demanding to be paid P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the child from her yaya at the petitioners residence on FC 189 (3), FC 190
the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her house Petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina refused ISSUES: WON the writ should be granted. HELD: YES Respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina his open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desireable atmosphere Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with full knowledge and consent of respondents A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted
IN THE Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia 454 SCRA 541

Facts: Aug. 31, 2000: Petitioner Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia She was born on June 26, 1994 Her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia He prays that upon adoption, her name will be Stephanie Nathy Garcia Catindig RTC: Granting the adoption and petition to change her name ONLY to Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Petitioner files a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration regarding the surname, Garcia as her middle name. RTC: denies petiton Hence, the case at bar. Petitioner submits that trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption. There is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name. Customs grant every Filipino to have a middle name as his/her mothers surname A middle name is a part of a name of a person Rights of an adopted child to bear a proper name should not be violated It would help Stephanie avoid the stigma of her illegitimacy Her using Garcia is not opposed by either family OSG agrees with petitioner on three grounds: FC 189 makes it necessary since Stephanie still maintains a filiation with her natural mother as an intestate heir of he latter No law prohibiting such Customary for every Filipino.. FC 191 FC 192 Lahom vs. Sibulo G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003 Issue: May and illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? Held: YES. Petition is GRANTED. Ratio: The use of a persons surname is for practical and legal purposes, it is NECESSARY The name of an individual has two parts, the given name and the surname. The use of the surname is fixed by law under Articles 364-380 of the Civil Code The law is SILENT as to the use of a middle name. However in Art 375(1) it is considered when there is identitiy of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants. The law is notably silent with regard to an adopted childs middle name. OSG correctly points out Art. 189 of the FC with regard to filiation required as an intestate heir. The underlying intent of adoption is in favor of the adopted child. RA 8552 It is shown that she is very close to both her parents and she lives with her mother There should be liberal construction of adoption statues in favor of adoption NCC 10 provided that in case of doubt in the interpretation.it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

Held: The Petition was DISMISSED. Ratio: SC begins with a brief background on the law: welfare of the adopted started becoming of paramount concern creation of written instruments that would protect and safeguard the rights of the adopted children adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility and its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child R.A. 8552 secured these rights and privileges and affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child. The new law also withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption. It was also months after the effectivity of the R.A. No. 8552 that Isabelita filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. Therefore, her petition could no longer be pursued. Additional: (just copy-pasted, this is in relation to the prescription period ) Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the states determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.
Facts: Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom took in Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo since he was two years old, treating him as if he were their own child. It was only in 1971 that the spouses petitioned for adoption. In 1972, this was granted and the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed his name to Jose Melvin Lahom. 1999: Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption: Jose Melvin refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, in utter disregard for the feelings of the spouses Before her husband died, he even wanted to revoke the adoption but was only stopped by Isabelita Diosdado further desired to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future. Respondent failed to show concern for Petitioner and remained indifferent He does not act like a son, there is an uncomfortable relationship between the two the only motive to respondents adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of the spouses Lahom 1998: RA 8552 provided grounds committed by adopter for the rescission of adoption and also stated that Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter. However, adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Art. 919 of the Civil Code. Respondent objects to motion RTC: dismissed the petition There is a lack of cause of action Said rights of petitioner to rescind should have been exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. Legal ground for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than 5 years, prior to the filing of the instant petition of December 1, 1999, hence the action had already prescribed. Issue: May the subject adoption, decreed on May 5, 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopted after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552? In the affirmative, has the adopters action prescribed? -
SUPPORT FC 194 Pelayo v. Lauron 12 Phil 453 Facts: October 13, 1906, evening: Dr. Arturo Pelayo was called to the house of Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella He was asked to give birth to their daughter-inlaw He assisted in the delivery of the child He was kept occupied until the next day He valued his fee at P500 BUT Marcelo and Juana refused to pay without reason November 23, 1906: Complaint by Pelayo against Lauron and Abella for collection Contentions of Lauron and Abella: that their son and his wife lived independently from them and in a separate house that if she did stay in their house that night, it was due to fortuitous circumstances that their daughter-in-law had died due to the childbirth April 5, 1907: RTC Held Lauron and Abella absolved from the complaint due to lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against them
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a. b. c. d. 2. 3. a. b. c. 4. a.
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Issue/s: WON husband is bound to pay the bill Held: Yes Article 142 and 143, Civil Code: Mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support Includes medical services in case of illness That when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored That the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support Hence, her husband, and not her father and mother- in-law, is liable That it is of no matter who called the doctor and requested his services That there was imminent danger to her life and medical assistance was urgently needed
Sanchez v. Zulueta 68 Phil 110 Facts: Feliciano Sanchez married Josefa Diego Child: Mario Sanchez 1932: Feliciano refused to support Josefa and Mario and abandoned them Josefa and Mario have no means of subsistence Feliciano received a monthly pension of P174.20 from US Army Josefa Diego and Mario Sanchez sought monthly allowance for support and support pendente lite against Feliciano Sanchez Contentions of Feliciano: Josefa had an affair with Macario Sanchez which resulted to Mario Sanchez October 27, 1930: Josefa abandoned the conjugal home As the illegitimate child of Josefa with Macario, Mario is not entitled to his support b. He asked for an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of this defense which RTC and CA denied Issue/s: WON Macario and Josefa are entitled to support Held: Yes Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support of the wife an action for support of the child who is the fruit of such adulterous relations Defense should be established and not merely alleged Proof must therefore be permitted Hence, Feliciano has a valid defense and he asked for an opportunity to present evidence to prove his allegations, it was error to deny him the opportunity
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Reyes v. Ines-Luciano 88 SCRA 803 Facts: January 18, 1958: Manuel J. C. Reyes m Celia Ilustre-Reyes They had children March 10, 1976: Manuel attacked Celia by fist blows bumping her head against the cement floor pushing her down the 13-flight stairs hitting her in the abdomen that floored her half unconscious 4. 5. a. b. i. ii. iii. May 11, 1976: She left their office May 26, 1976: She returned to get her overnight bag Manuel demanded that she get out but she ignored him Hence, he doused her with grape juice kicked her attempted to hit her with a steel tray but was stopped by her driver
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June 3, 1976: By Celia Ilustre-Reyes against Manuel J. C. Reyes Action for support pendente lite Legal separation he had attempted to kill her Contentions of Manuel Celia committed adultery with her physician She is thus not entitled to support and if she was, the assigned amount of P4000 by the Court was excessive Issue/s: WON Celia is entitled to support pendent lite Held: Yep Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support BUT only if proven In fact, adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action BUT it must be established by competent evidence and not merely alleged During hearing of the application for support pendente lite, Manuel did not present any evidence to prove his allegation During hearing of the application for action for legal separation, Manuel did not present any evidence to prove his allegation YET Celia asked for support pending litigation from their conjugal partnership and not necessarily from Manuels private funds
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i. ii. iii. iv.
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c. d. i. ii.
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Determination of Amount Celia was unemployed and without funds All their conjugal properties, including corporations where Manuel is President, Manager and Treasurer, are in the possession of Manuel Standard Mineral Products earning P85,654.61 Development and Technology Consultant Inc. earning P98,879.84 The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc. That these companies have entered into multimillion contracts in projects of the Ministry of Public Highways The amount was reduced from P5000 since their children are in the custody of Manuel In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered mere affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite
De Asis vs, CA G.R. No. 127578, Feb. 15, 1999 Facts: October 14, 1988: Vircel D. Andres, mother and legal guardian of minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support of Glen against Manuel de Asis that Manuel is the father of Glen that Manuel refused/failed to provide for the maintenance of Glen despite repeated demands Contentions of Manuel: that Glen is not his child that he cannot be forced to support him then July 4, 1989: Manifestation of Vircel that Manuel had made a judicial admission/declaration of his denial of paternity that it seemed futile to continue the claim of support dismisses August 8, 1989: Action was dismissed Both parties agreed to move for the dismissal of the case Provided that Manuel will withdraw his counterclaim September 7, 1995: Complaint for maintenance and support against Manuel by Glen, represented by Vircel Manuels motion to dismiss due to res judicata where the Manifestation of Vircel was, in effect, an admission of lack of filiation, which admission binds both parties Manuels motion was denied because renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law
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c. i. ii. 2. a. b. 3. a. b. 4.
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Issue/s: WON action for support is barred by Manifestation Held: NO Manifestation of Vircel is void because the Right to support cannot be renounced or compromised NCC 301: The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. . . . NCC 2035: Future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. WHY: Because of the need of the recipient to maintain his existence He is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. It is to virtually allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden which is contrary to public policy The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.
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The manifestation amounted to a renunciation It severed the filiation that gives Glen the right to claim support from his putative parent The agreement for the dismissal of the complaint is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced for violating the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support
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Filiation of Glen must be judicially established and cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties NCC 297: Allowance for support is provisional because the amount may be increased or decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient
De Guzman vs Perez 496 SCRA 474
Facts: Petitioner Roberto de Guzman and private respondent Shirley Aberde were sweethearts while studying law in UST. Their studies were interrupted when Private Respondnet Shirley became pregnant. Robby de Guzman, their child, was born on 1987. They never got married, but Roberto did marry another woman in 1991 and begot 2 children from her. Petitioner Roberto de Guzman only sent money to Robbys schooling twice (1992 and 1993), and provided money as well when he was sick. In order to support the child, Private Respondent went to Hong Kong to work as a factory worker. BUT, her savings were still being depleted. So. . . . In the year 2000, Private Respondent demanded support from Petitioner. 2000, Private Respondent also filed a complaint for abandonment and neglect of Child under Article 59(2) of PD 603 In answer, Petitioner said that he has never abandoned Robby, He gave support. The City prosecutor of Lipa found probable cause to the charge neglect of child. FC 197-198, cf. FC 49, 70, 94, 122
But before he could be arraigned, he filed a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez (who at present is facing graft and corruption charges, how ironic. ) Perez denied the petition saying that petitioners luxurious lifestyle constituted circumstancial evidence. Hence this petition. Issues: WON there is probable cause to the charge neglect of child under Article 59(2) of PD 603 against Petitioner. Held: YES there is Ratio: Petitioner is charged with neglect of child punishable under Article 59(4) of PD 603 which provides that: Art. 59. Crimes. - Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who: (4)Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the family's station in life and financial conditions permit. He is capable of giving support since the notarized GIS of the RNCD Development Corporation shows that petitioner has 750K of paid-up-shares in the company. Hence there is probable cause and the petitioners guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt after.
Lerma v. CA 61 SCRA 440
Facts: Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz were married on 1951. Then on 1969 petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent 1969, Respondent then filed for legal separation on the grounds of concubinage and attempt against her life. MOREOVER, she wanted support pending trial for their youngest son. 1969 Respondent Judge granted respondents application for pendente lite. Petitioner filed for a preliminary injunction which was dismissed
Meanwhile, in 1972, the CFI of Rizal found Respondent and Teodor Ramirez (his paramour) guilty of adultery Issues: WON adultery is a good defense against the respondents claim for support pendente lite. Held: YES!! Ratio: The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. There must be a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately for him/her to gain support. In other words, the right to support was lost by the respondent when she was found guilty of adultery.
Ryes vs Ines-Luciano (supra)
Mangonon vs. CA G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006
Facts: 1975, Maria Belen Mangonon and Private Respondent Delgado married in 1975 As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent, the marriage was annulled on 1975 Within 7 months of the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rina and Rica. Her second husband, Danny Mangonon raised her two twins as Private Respondent Delgado has already abandoned them. 1994 Belen Mangonon filed for a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support in behalf of her minor children (Rica and Rina) At the time of the petition, Rica and Rina are about to enter college in the USA. But despite their admission to the universities, they are financially incapable Petitioner, who earns 1,200 dollars a month, could hardly give general support to the children, much less their required educational support. So they demanded support from Private Respondent. Respondent Federico failed to sign the birth certificate, hence they need a judicial declaration in order to be legitimated. He said that their legitimacy should first be established before they could claim for support. Moreover, Federico also said that he is also unable to give support. Trial court resolved the case and awarded a MEASLY and MICROSCOPIC 5,000 pesos/child. Petitioner was angered by this and filed the present petition. Issues: Since both the parties are unable to give support, can the grandfather (FRANCISCO) be the one to furnish support? Held: YES Ratio: First of all, the twins were able to prove their filiation, because Lolo Francisco wrote letters to them when they were young, and that he himself wrote the surname Delgado in the letters which just means that Lolo Francisco consented to it.On the issue of support, An eminent author on the subject explains that the
obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. Lolo Francisco said that Petitioner has the means to support the children, but this is BELIED by the fact that they obtained huge amounts of loans for them to even enroll at these US universities. Finally and I quote: There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their childrens college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. It bears stressing that respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real properties in different parts of the country. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co. and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here and abroad.41 It having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.
FC 200-204 Canonizado v. Benitez 127 SCRA 610 FACTS: Sept. 27, 1968: CA rendered a decision ordering defendant to give plaintiff a monthly support of P100.00 beginning with October 1964, payable in advance within the first 5 days of each month Said decision became final and executory on Jan. 21, 1969 o Oct. 24, 1969: order of execution was issued for P27,900 follow by the writ itself on Oct. 28, 1969 Writ was recalled and set aside to enable Canonizado to correct the amount therein stated On Oct. 6, 1967, Christina (daughter) became of age but since she was still studying then, her
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support was formally terminated only in April 1969 Total amount due her as of this latter date was determined at P16,150 for the period from Oct. 1964 to April 1969 Writs of execution were again issued on Feb. 10 and March 30, 1970 both were returned and unsatisfied July 11, 1973: Petitioner and Respondent entered into an Agreement Petitioner filed a motion for execution and contempt of court Aug. 3, 1976, petitioner and respondent entered into an agreement Jan. 12, 1982: petitioner filed a motion to require the respondent to pay current support beginning Feb 1978 based on the decisions of Sept. 27, 1968 and Jan. 21, 1969 Respondent filed an opposition on the ground that his obligation to support has terminated ISSUES: WON Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court can be compelled by mandamus to 1. Issue an alias writ of execution for the payment of arrearages in support 2. Act on the petitioners motion for payment of current support HELD: 1. Yes Although petitioner obtained the favorable judgment on Jan. 21, 1969, she can still enforce the same by a motion for a writ of execution, notwithstanding the lapse of the 5FC 200-208
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year period because a judgment for support doesnt become dormant Since the obligation is a continuing one, the court never loses jurisdiction to enforce the same Agreements entered into were only for deferment but never for a waiver or giving up of the respondents obligations 2. No NCC 303: The obligation to give support shall also cease: (3) when the recipient may engage in a trade, profession, or industry, or has obtained work, or has improved his fortune in such a way that he no longer needs the allowance from his subsistence. This doesnt affect the right to support between spouses but only the action to make it demandable Subsists throughout the period that the marriage subsists Respondent can rightfully file motion to oppose the payment of current support to terminate the demandability of the same for the time being Respondent judge cannot be compelled by mandamus to order respondent to pay current support when the latter alleges that a ground exists for the suspension of such obligation A judgment for support is never final in the sense that not only can its amount be subject to increase or decrease but its demandability may also be suspended or re-enforced when appropriate circumstances exists
Lacson vs. Lacson (supra) Sy vs CA Dec. 27, 2009 FACTS: 19 January 1994: respondent Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for habeas corpus against petitioner Wilson Sy minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah (children of Mercedes) Petitioner: Mercedes is unfit to take custody of the minors She abandoned her family in 1992 Mentally unstable Cannot provide proper care to the children Trial Court issued writ and awarded custody to Mercedes CA affirmed Petitioner wasnt able to substantiate his contentions ISSUES: WON custody should be awarded solely to the respondent WON CA had jurisdiction to award support in a habeas corpus case HELD: YES FC 213: In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent is unfit. law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have custody of her children so that they may not only receive her attention, care, supervision but also have the advantage and benefit of a mothers love and devotion for which there is no substitute absent any compelling reason to the contrary, the trial court was correct in restoring the custody of the children to the mother, herein respondent, the children being less than seven years of age, at least at the time the case was decided. Moreover, petitioners contention that respondent is unfit to have custody over the minor children has not been substantiated as found by both courts below. YES FC 203: the obligation to give support is demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except
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from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. Rules of Court permits the ventilation of the question regarding the care and custody of the children as an incident to any proceeding, even a habeas corpus proceeding. Respondent testified during trial, without any objection on petitioners part, regarding the need for support for the childrens education and other necessities FC 198; Rules of Court, Rule 61
Applying Section 5,[32] Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, since the issue of support was tried with the implied consent of the parties, it should be treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. And since there was implied consent, even if no motion had been filed and no amendment had been ordered, the Court holds that the trial court validly rendered a judgment on the issue
PARENTAL AUTHORITY & CUSTODY OF CHILDREN FC 209 Medina vs. Makabali 27 SCRA 502, March 28, 1969 FACTS: Feb. 4, 1961: Petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to Jospeh Casero in the Makabali Clinic, owned and operated by respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali Zenaida left the child with Dra. Makabli from birth, who took care and reared Jospeh as her own son Court extracted a promise from Dra. Makabali to allow the mino a free choice with whom to live with when he reaches 14yo Court held that it was for the childs best interest to be left with his foster mother Zenaida appealed ISSUES: WON the writ be given HELD: o NO When our law recognizes the right of parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that in all question on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be paramount (NCC 363) For compelling reasons, even a child under 7 may be ordered separated from the mother. The right of parents to the company and custody of the children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development (NCC 356) Zenaida proved remiss in these sacred duties
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Unson vs. Navarro 101 SCRA 183, November 17, 1980 Facts: Unson and Araneta were married on April 19, 1971. Maria Teresa, their child would stay with petitioner during school days and spend weekends with her mother but her mother wouldn't even bother to pick her up during non-school days. During early part of 1978, Unson found out that Araneta has been living with her brother in law Reyes. Reyes and Araneta later beget two kids and later embraced a protestant sect. Petitioner contends that Maria Teresa was born and reared under the Roman Catholic faith and should not be exposed to an environment alien to the Catholic way of life which is the upbringing and training her father is committed to. Araneta claims that they had an amicable arrangement and no specific terms were agreed and stipulated upon by her and Unson regarding custody of the child and that Maria Teresa was always allowed to visit and to be picked up at any time by petitioner's parents. She admits her present circumstances at first impression might seem socially if not morally unacceptable but Maria Teresa has been reared and brought up in an atmosphere of Christian love, affection and honesty. Issue: WON custody of the child should be given to the mother. Held. No. Ratio: It is in the best interest of the child to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not say immoral influence, that the situation in which Araneta has placed herself might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. She might start getting ideas about the peculiar relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law. The Court has no alternative than to grant Araneta no more than visitorial rights over the child. Anyway, decisions even of the SC on the custody of minor children are open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the matter may demand in the light of the inflexible criterion.
FC 210 cf. FC 223-224, FC 234 Eslao vs CA 266 SCRA 317 Facts: Maria Paz and Reynaldo Eslao were married on June 22, 1984 and after the marriage, they stayed with petitioner Teresita, the mother of the husband. Two children were born. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mom while Angelica stayed with her parents at Teresita's house. On August 6, 1990, Reynaldo died. Petitioner wanted to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but Teresita insisted on keeping the child with her in the meantime to assuage her grief due to her son's death. Maria later met James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese American who is an orthodontist and they decided to get married. She joined her
new husband in SFO, USA and then later returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her kids and then bring them with her as her new husband is willing to adopt her kids. Teresita, however, refused to give her Angelica because she claims that Maria has already abandoned her. The lower court granted the custody of the minor Angelica to the mother, Maria Paz. CA affirmed this decision. Issue: WON custody of Angelica should be granted to Maria Paz Held: Yes Ratio: The child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. The mom is FC 211-213 cf. FC 49, 102(6) and 63(2)
married to an Orthodontist who has a lucrative practice of his profession in SFO. In her grandmother's house, the rooms are rented to other persons. The foremost criterion is the physical and moral well being of the child taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parties. When the mom entrusted the custody of her minor child to the grandmother, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution which do not appear here
Hontiveros v. IAC 132 SCRA 745 Facts: Petitioner Alejandro Hontiveros and private respondent Brenda Hernando are the father and mother of an acknowledged natural child born on November 27, 1981 named Margaux Hontiveros. From November 1981 to June 1982, the child had been under the care and custody of Brenda and Alejandro used to take the child out during Saturdays and return her Saturday night. On June 21, 1982, Alejandro picked the kid up and never returned her to the mother. Mom then filed a petition for habeas corpus to recover custody of Margaux without depriving the father of his visitorial rights. At the hearing conducted on September 9, 1982, the minor child was produced before the Court and a settlement was reached upon agreement of the parties that Margaux shall be under the custody of the petitioner for 7 days every other week. On May 24, 1983, the petitioner filed an urgent petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the mom from bringing the kid to the USA where she is bound for. Relevant Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to custody of his minor child Margaux. Held: No. Ratio: Article 363 of the NCC provides that No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure. Clearly, Brenda has a clear legal right under Art. 17 of PD 603 to the custody of her minor child, there being no compelling reasons to the contrary. While the petitioner would have the court believe that private respondent is unfit to take care of his child, it is too late in the day to do so because under the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in the SC.
Unson v. Navarro (supra) Espiritu & Layug v. CA G.R. No. 115640(1995) Facts: Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding met in 1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was a nurse. In 1977, Teresita left for LA, CA, USA to work as a nurse and in 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employed to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer. They maintained a common law relationship and they begot two kids, Rosalind (1986)and Reginald (1988). Reynaldo and Teresita got married in 1987. They decided to separate in 1990. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to CA. Reynaldo brought the kids back in to the Philippines but then he had to leave his kids with his sister because his assignment in the US was not yet completed. Teresita returned to the Philippines and on Dec. 8, 1992 filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the petitioners to gain custody over the children. The TC dismissed the petition and suspended Teresita's parental authority over the kids and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. The CA reversed this decision and gave

mother hugging and kissing a bad man who lived in their house and worked for her father. All of the 8 recommendations of the child psychologist show that Rosalind chooses petitioners over the private respondent and that her welfare will be best served by staying with them . The mom's conduct and demeanor in the courtroom or elsewhere demonstrated her temper. She was also legally married already when she married Reynaldo and she entered into an illicit relationship with another man in the house of the petitioner. Not only are the children over seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. The assignment of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or was a temporary one. He was sent there to oversee the purchase of a steel mill component and various equipment needed by the National Steel Corporation in the Philippines. Once the purchases are completed, there is nothing to keep him there anymore. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear front the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person.
custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo. WON Teresita is more suitable and better qualified in helping the children to grow into responsible, well-adjusted and happy young adults. Held: No. Ratio: If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive: It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances. In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1985. In a psychological test, the responses of Rosalind about her mother were very negative, causing the psychologist to delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by Rosalind was an incident where she saw her
Santos Sr. v. CA G.R. No. 113054(1995) FACTS: Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until 1990, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. This was arranged by the spouses Leouel and Julia themselves On September 2, 1990, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental. The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr Contentions: Petitioner: since private respondents have failed to show that petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father, substitute parental authority granted to the boy's grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is inappropriate. On the other hand, private respondents aver that they can provide an air-conditioned room for the boy and 2. that petitioner would not be in a position to take care of his son since he has to be assigned to different places. They also allege that the petitioner did not give a single centavo for the boy's support and maintenance. Furthermore, petitioner's use of trickery and deceit in abducting the child in 1990, after being hospitably treated by private respondents, does not speak well of his fitness and suitability as a parent. Respondent had never given any previous financial support to his son, while, upon the other hand, the latter receives so much bounty from his maternal grandparents and his mother as well, who is now gainfully employed in the United States. ISSUE: To whom should the child be awarded to? HELD: To his father, Leouel Santos. The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. 16 In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. 17 Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. 18
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We find the aforementioned considerations set by the respondent insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. 22 The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy - Just as long as it is proved that he can support the boy. His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their children merely because of the normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such as temporary separation from their families. Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him. Private respondents' attachment to the young boy whom they have reared for the past three
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years is understandable. Still and all, the law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a fact which has not been proven here. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. 10 The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. 12 Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. 13 Therefore, when Santos gave the child to respondents, what was given was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
Sagala-Eslao v. Cordero-Ouye G.R. 116773, Jan. 16, 1997 FACTS: on June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married 2. after their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband. 3. out of their marriage, two children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao who was born on February 23, 1986 and Angelica Eslao who was born on April 20, 1987 4. Angelica stayed with her parents at respondents house while the other child stayed at the home of the mothers parents. 5. on August 6, 1990, petitioners husband Reynaldo Eslao died 6. Maria Paz now wants to move back to Pampanga where her mother and other daughter were. 7. She intended to bring Angelica along with her 8. But the grandmother refused saying that Angelica compensates for the loss of her son. 9. Maria Paz then met Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American. 10. on March 18, 1992, They decided to get married. 11. on January 15, 1993, the petitioner migrated to San Francisco, California, USA, to join her new husband 12. When she informed her new husband of her desire to get her children back, he was 1. supportive and even expressed willingness to adopt the two children. 13. She went back to the Philippines so that she could get her daughters back. 14. However, the grandmother would not permit it. 15. Maria filed a case for custody Contentions: Petitioner argues that 1. she would be deserving to take care of Angelica; 2. that she had managed to raise 12 children of her own herself; 3. that she has the financial means to carry out her plans for Angelica; 4. that she maintains a store which earns a net income of about P500 a day, she gets P900 a month as pension for the death of her husband, she rents out rooms in her house which she owns, for which she earns a total of P6,000 a month, and that from her gross income of roughly P21,000, she spends about P10,000 for the maintenance of her house. 5. More importantly, respondent already abandoned her child, making her an unfit parent. ISSUE: To whom should custody be granted? HELD: To the mother.

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.
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REASON1: The paramount consideration is always the welfare of the child. The petitioner herein is married to an Orthodontist who has a lucrative practice of his profession in San Francisco, California, USA. The petitioner and her present husband have a home of their own and they have three cars. The petitioners husband is willing to adopt the petitioners children. If the children will be with their mother, the probability is that they will be afforded a bright future. Contrast this situation with the one prevailing in the respondents [grandmothers] house. As admitted by the respondent, four of the rooms in her house are being rented to other persons with each room occupied by 4 to 5 persons. Added to these persons are the respondents 2 sons, Samuel and Alfredo, and their respective families (ibid., p. 54) and one can just visualize the kind of atmosphere pervading thereat. And to aggravate the situation, the house has only 2 toilets and 3 faucets. REASON2: In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 407, we stated, viz:
Bondagjy vs. Bondagjy 371 SCRA 642 FACTS: On October 21, 1987, or four (4) months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. Respondent Fouzi and Sabrina were married on February 3,1988 under Islamic rites. Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz and Amouaje, At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian woman whom he later divorced. This was the cause of their de facto separation. Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's mother. On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians. She was also reconverted as a Christian. On March 11, 1996, respondent Fouzy Ali Bondagjy filed an action to obtain custody of his two minor children, Abdulaziz, 10 and Amouaje, 9. Contentions: Respondent: on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd hours in Manila she engages in 'zina' (illicit sexual relation) she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits.6 Such clothing are detestable under Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep their neighbor's house for a fee of P40.00 after the children come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school,7 the children would be happy to see him but they were afraid to ride in his car.
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Petitioner: P.D. No. 1083 is applicable only to Muslims. ISSUE1: What law governs? HELD1: Family Code. The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a nonMuslim woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that she is not a Muslim. ISSUE2: Under the Family Code, is she unfit to not be granted custody of the children? HELD2: No. She is able to provide for the needs of their children sufficiently. And the husband is always busy. what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, The record shows that petitioner is equally financially capable of providing for all the needs of her children. The children went to school at De La Salle Zobel School, Muntinlupa City with
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their tuition paid by petitioner according to the school's certification.32 Either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. In cases where both parties cannot have custody because of their voluntary separation, we take into consideration the circumstances that would lead us to believe which parent can better take care of the children. Although we see the need for the children to have both a mother and a father, we believe that petitioner has more capacity and time to see to the children's needs. Respondent is a businessman whose work requires that he go abroad or be in different places most of the time. Under P.D. No. 603, the custody of the minor children,
absent a compelling reason to the contrary, is given to the mother.39 However, the award of custody to the wife does not deprive the husband of parental authority. "Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child." Thus, we grant visitorial rights to respondent as his Constitutionally protected natural and primary right.41 He may visit at least once a week and may take the children out only with the written consent of the mother.
Pp vs. Glabo 371 SCRA 567 FACTS: Mila Lobrico, a 21 year old mental retard, was raped by his uncle. She got pregnant and gave birth while the case was pending. He is found by guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the Supreme Court. ISSUE: What is his role in the rearing of the child? Can he exercise parental authority? a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 (illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of the mother) of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no "further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child's status." Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victim's child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.
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HELD: He is mandated to support the child. No other allowable form of exercise of parental authority is allowed. Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender:
Vancil vs. Belmes 358 SCRA 707 Facts: -Dec 12 1986 Reeder Vancil, a navy serviceman, died leaving behind his two children Valerie and Vincent by his commonlaw wife Helen Belmes -May 1987 Bonifacia Vancil, Reeders mom, executed guardianship proceedings for the two children which was graned. Valerie was 6 and Vincent was 2 -Aug 1987 Helen Belmes opposed the guardianship saying that since she is the mother she should be the guardian since the two children were both permanently residing with her while Bonifacia was an American naturalized citizen who lived in Colorado. . RTC rejected this -CA: reversed RTC decision and proclaimed Helen as the guardian. Bonifacia appealed thus the case ISSUE: WON CA was correct in appointing Helen Belmes their mother as guardian HELD: YES! Note, this case now only concerns Vincent since Valerie at this time was already 18 years old. FC 211 father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority. This is an inherent right derived from the nature of the parental relationship FC 214 - in case of death, absence or unsuitaibility of the parents, parental authority may be exercised by the surviving grandparents
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Grandparents may only be appointed when there is need for a substitute parental authority. Mother is clearly not dead and Bonifacia did not give any evidence that she was morally unfit to be the guardian of Vincent. Her allegation that Helens live-in-partner raped Valerie several times does not mean anything since Valeries guardianship is no longer in question.
Bonifacia is not qualified to be a guardian Too old Lives in US and she herself admitted that she was not sure whether or not she would actually move back to the Phil for two years in order to take care of 16 year old Vincent. Most likely, she will also just leave him in someone elses care Convicted of libel in Cebu.
Sombong vs. CA G.R. No. 111876, Jan. 31, 1996 Facts: April 23, 1987 Arabella Sombong was born to Johanna Sombong Nov 1987 Johanna took a sick Arabella to Sir John Clinic. She was not released to Johanna after treatment since she was still sick and Johanna could not pay. Johanna left her in the clinic and only came to visit her two years later in 1989. 1992 Johanna filed a petition with the RTCQC of a writ of Habeas Corpus for Arabella. However Dra Ty, the owner of the clinic said that they already discharged Arabella on 1989. At the fear of being arrested, she directed them to Marietta Alvar who took care and raised a child from the clinic named Cristina Neri. RTC: declared that Cristina was Arabella. Thus the child should be given back to Johanna CA: reversed RTC decision since there was not enough evidence to prove that Cristina was indeed Johannas missing daughter. ISSUE: WON Cristina is Arabellas missing daughter HELD: NO In order for a writ of habeas corpus on a minor to prosper, these elements must be present: (1) petitioner has right of custody over minor (2) rightful custody of the minor was withheld (3) best interest of the minor to be in custody of the petitioner In this case, evidence shows that Cristina is not the missing daughter Dr. Trono, the petitioners own witness, could not certainly say it it was really Arabella who was given to Marietta Alvar since there were other children who were left in the clinic Cristina was already in the custody of Marietta on April 1988 and was baptized on that same month. On the other hand, Cristina said that she last saw her daughter on 1989 which the clinic also held to be true since she was confined from Nov 1987 to April 1989 Demeanor in court was not of a mother who just found her lost child. She did not even glance at her. Confessed that she was going abroad and would leave child in the care of nuns Marietta Alvar on the other hand clearly shows that she can financially, physically, and spiritually care for the child and since we are looking at the childs best interest, Cristina should not be taken away from her
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Tonog vs. CA 376 SCRA 642 FACTS: September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America to work as a registered nurse Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents. On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith and it was approved Petitioner opposed. on October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her. The trial court granted the motion and the case to determine custody of Gardin Faith is now pending. The respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari asserting that temporary custody should be awarded to him because the child has lived with him all her life and It would certainly wreak havoc on the childs psychological make-up to give her to the custody of private respondent, only to return her to petitioner should the latter prevail in the main case. Subjecting the child to emotional seesaw should be avoided ISSUE: W.N. temporary custody should be granted to the father. HELD: Yes. In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and wellbeing of the child. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that

entitled, among other rights, to keep them in their company. COMMENT: The court never expounded on what these compelling reasons are. The best answer I could find is stated in the next paragraph saying that the SC cannot decide on questions of fact. And the determination of w/n the mother is a good mother is indeed a question of fact. But it still does not answer why custody was granted to the father. Is the compelling reason the fact that her mother is in the states? Is it the fact that the child is already staying at the fathers house and moving the child to and fro would cause the child distress? Are these reasons compelling enough for the court to award temporary custody to the father? I dont know Are cases regarding temporary custody exceptions to Articles 176 and 213? I dont know. For reference, I also posted the full text of the case. Whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the parties respective merits vis--vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person. A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioners fitness to have final custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father WHEREFORE, The trial court is directed to immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision OBITER: Parental Renunciation Authority and its
illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that [n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation. This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration. In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. Article 220 of the Family Code thus provides that parents and individuals exercising parental authority over their unemancipated children are
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latters needs. It is a mass of rights and
obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor. GR: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.
The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of EXC: adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Laxamana vs. Laxamana 388 SCRA 296 Facts: 1984 Raymond Laxamana and Lourdes Laxamana got married. Their marriage blessed them with three children 1991-1996 Raymond became drugdependent and was in and out of facilities 1997 Raymond was declared drug-free by the court. However he allegedly became violent and irritable leading to Lourdes leaving him on 1999 along with her three children Aug 1999 Raymond filed a writ of habeas corpus for custody his three children while Lourdes filed for the annulment of their marriage Sept 27 1999 Raymond amended the petition to visitation rights instead. TC granted this. They also asked both to undergo a psych evaluation, which TC would then use to resolve the case as agreed upon by both parties. Psych evaluations showed that he was still not completely cured of his drug addiction even if his drug urine test was negative. However, TC still granted him visitation rights and gave custody to Lourdes. ISSUE: WON TCs decision that is based on the psych evaluations considered the paramount interest and welfare of the children HELD: NO TC should have still conducted a trial after the psych evaluations even if both Raymond and Lourdes agreed that such tests would resolve the issue of custody. To base it solely on the psych evaluations is insufficient to justify the TCs decision as seen in the ff: History of drug dependence presented does not show his moral, financial, and social wellbeing Fact that psych evaluation said he was not completely cured is not corroborated with other evidence that he is unfit to provide for and support the children. TC also did not ask children who they wanted to live with since as they are above 7 years, they are permitted to choose which parent they want to stay with at the discretion of the court. Only said there was indications of fear of his drug-dependency RESULT: case is remanded to RTC for proper trial.
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Roehr vs Rodriguez 404 SCRA 495 Facts: Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany married Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina in 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was reatified in 1981 when they married each other again in Negros Oriental. They had two children, Carolynne born in 1981 and Alexandra born in 1987. In 1996, Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Meanwhile, Wolfgang already obtained a decree of divorce in Hamburg in 1997 and the court granted him the custody of their two children. Carmen now assails this decision while Wolfgang claims that the decree of the Court in Hamburg is binding.
WON Carmen can still question the decree of the court in Hamburg Held: Yes. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof like custody of children must still be determined by our courts. The Court also found that Carmen had no participation at all in the proceedings of the divorce and there was no showing who the offending spouse is. It was also not proven that Carmen was unfit to be granted the custody of her children.
Briones vs. Miguel G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004 Facts: Joey Briones and Loreta Miguel were not married but they begot a son, Michael Kevin Pineda while they were still in Japan. In 2001, Maricel and Francisco Miguel came to the house of Joey to visit Michael and asked if they can bring him to SM. Joey agreed.
However, Maricel and Francisco did not return the minor child. Loreta was then back in the Philippines and she claims that it was not Maricel and Francisco who took the child from Joey. It was her who took the child. Joey wanted custody of the child during the time Loreta will be in Japan. WON Joey is entitled to the custody of their illegitimate child
Held: No. Joeys claim has become moot because Loreta already brought Michael with her in Japan. The Court held that Joeys recognition of his illegitimate child could only be a ground for support but not of custody. The minor child shall be under the custody of Loreta all the more that she was not found to be unfit of becoming a mother. The father has the right for visitation.
Gualberto vs. Gualberto G.R. No. 154994. June 28, 2005 Facts: Jocelyn Gualberto brought her 4 year old child with her as she abandoned her husband Crisanto in 2002. Crisanto claims that she abandoned him because she was having lesbian relations with one Noreen Gay. Nevertheless, the trial court granted Jocelyn with the custody of the child since the child is below seven years old. She also stated that she has no objection to the father visiting the child even everyday provided that they live in Mindoro. The CA reversed the ruling and granted Crisanto the custody of the child on the ground that Jocelyn is unfit for the custody of the child because of her immoral act of living with another woman. WON Jocelyn deserves the have the custody of the child Held: Yes. The Court held that it is not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the childs proper moral development. This was not shown by Crisanto.
Silva vs. CA 275 SCRA 604 Facts: Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales cohabited without the benefit of marriage since Carlitos was a married man. The union saw the birth of two children, Ramon and Rica. Later on, a rift in their relationship surfaced allegedly due to Suzannes resumption of her acting career. Suzanne refuted the claim saying that she never actually stopped working. Instead, she claimed that it was Carlitos who started the rift of their relationship since he was often engaged in gambling and womanizing. She wanted custody of their children without visitorial rights of their father as Carlitos activities will affect the moral and social valued of the children. Meanwhile, she got married to a Dutch national and immigrated to Holland with the two kids. WON the father can visit his children Held: Yes. The Court appreciated the apprehensions of Suzanne that it is not good for the children to see that their father is living with another woman. Nevertheless, it seemed unlikely that Carlitos would have ulterior motives mores than a parents desire to be with his children even only on weekends. The Court also gave a precautionary measure that in no case can Carlitos take the children out without the written consent of Suzanne.
Salientes vs Salientes 500 SCRA 128 Facts: Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. Couple lived with parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes has problems w/ in-laws and suggests that they move to his own house. refuses and troubles escalate w/ leaving the household. He was then prevented from seeing his son. files for habeas corpus w/c RTC grants. appeals (motion for recon w/ RTC, certiorari w/ CA) and is denied by both the RTC and the CA.) 7) argue that under Article 213[7] of the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise and that there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother. As such they assert the said writ was void. argues that Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to the second part of his petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father to see his son w/c is the primary reason for the petition for Habeas Corpus. Moreover he maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared
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custody and parental authority over their son (Art. 211). Issues: WON the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari. Held: NO, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari because clearly the RTC was correct in issuing the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the instant case where the a lawful parent of the child had been denied the capacity to visit his child. In accordance w/ the arguments dwelling on Art 211 of the FC the SC ruled: Under Article 211[10] of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie
Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition.[11] Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. As such the was correct in attesting to his joint custody and right to visitation of the child and filing the proper action to assert that right.
Sy vs CA GR No. 162938, Dec. 27,2007 Facts: Jan 19, 1994 Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filaes for Habeas Corpus w/ the RTC for her 2 minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah against her husband Wilson Sy and for the court to decide on the custody of the children. answers claiming that he should be awarded custody because the abandoned the family since 92, was mentally unstable and cannot provide for the care of the children. RTC grants the writ and awards custody to having pay support in the sum of P50,000 a month. files w/ CA. CA denies motion citing the lack of proof of the holding that the did not abandon since she was driven out of the conjugal home by the family for religious differences, that she had left for Taiwan to work their and sustain her children and that her act of praying in the rain was not attributable to insanity. Issues: FC 214-216. FC 233 Vancil vs Belmes 358 SCRA 707 Facts: Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife,Respondent Helen G. Belmes. May of 1987- files guardianship proceedings w/ RTC of Cebu over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent (Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old). July 15, 1987- Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian. August 13, 1987- submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship. 5) June 27, 1988- files for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, herself. asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors. (She also cites that petition was filed under an improper venue since was a naturalized U.S. citizen residing in Colorado). October 12, 1988- court rejected and denied s motion. Appeal denied. CA reverses RTC citing: Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor children. The law on parental authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of the Family Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements. March 10, 1998- appeals to SC WON the courts were correct in granting custody to the as the mother of the children. Held: Yes, according to Article 213 of the FC, in cases of separation in fact w/o the corresponding judicial decree, the court will award custody of the child based on the best interests of the child in this if the child is over 7 years of age he/she may be able to choose w/c parent to stay w/ if his/her choice is a suitable parent (i.e. fit by absence of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness or poverty). However if the child is under 7 he/she shall be given to the mother unless the mother is considered unfit. In all cases the preference of the law is to award the child to the mother as based on the intent of the Code Commission voicing out its recommendation for the preference for the mother in custody cases as a means allowing the mother to maintain her natural right to nurture the child
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September 15, 1998- manifests that custody of Valerie has become moot and academic w/ the latter reaching the age of maturity on September 2, 1998. Thus case only for the son Vincent. Issue: WON the mother of the minor Vincent should be his guardian (WON grandmother has right to guardianship over the mother). Held: YES, the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides: Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Being the natural mother of the minor Vincent, has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of
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substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner asserts this based on the allegation that Valerie was raped several times by the live in partner. However this case pertains to Vincent and is thus not directly attestable to that fact. Moreover the status as a U.S. resident, her old age and her conviction of libel in the country deem her unlikely to be able to execute the duties of a guardian (has not been in RP since 87). Moreover courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
FC218-219,FC233 cf.FC 221 inrel. toNCC 2180 Palisoc v. Brilliantes 41 SCRA 548 Facts: May 19, 1966 spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC file a case w/ the RTC for damages on the death of their son Dominador Palisoc inside Manila Technical Institute grounds (laboratory room) against defendants Antonio C. Brillantes(member of the Board of Directors), Teodosio Valenton (the president), Santiago M. Quibulue (instructor of the class), and Virgilio L. Daffon (co-student and assailant of Palisoc). The death of the victim was believed to have been caused by the heavy fist blows to the body which he had incurred from a fight with Daffon w/c damaged his internal organs. The lone witness to the event, Desiderio Cruz, attested that he and Daffon were fixing a machine w/ the victim was looking on. After a snide comment by Daffon regarding his inaction the victim slapped him w/c started the fight. Daffon then retaliated w/ fist blows to the body. After w/c Palisoc fell down and fainted after which he was brought to the hospital where he later died from his injuries. The TC found Daffon guilty for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the NCC but absolved the other defendants from liability under Article 2180 of the NCC. The court cited that the damages to incurred in the case would not be on the defendant from MTI since Article 2180 of the new civil code contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. Issues: WON under the factual findings, the trial court erred in absolving the defendantsschool officials from civil liability under Art. 2180 of the NCC. Held: YES, the SC held the lower court erred in its application of Art. 2180 in as much as they misconstrued the phrase 'so long as they (the student) remain in their (the schools) custody, to mean that the school incurs liability for a students actions only if the student actually boards or resides w/ them (a case where their influence over the student supersedes that of the parents(as held in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals)), to counter this the SC held that the mentioned phrase actually implied that liability arises not from the boarding of the student w/ the school but from the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. As such being that the offense occurred in school premises during class time within the supervision of the school. They should be held liable under 2180 unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the
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diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." w/c they did not do. Additional Held: -Daffons parents not accountable since he was no longer a minor. -Brillantes was not held liable since he was only a member of the board and not the owner, since the school was incorporated on August 2, 1962. -the school was not held liable since it was not impleaded. -the damages were was raised to 12000 to keep up w/ devaluation. J.B.L. Reyes concurs: -while in the case of parents and guardians, their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age, the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter A student over twenty-one, by enrolling and attending a school, places himself
under the custodial supervision and disciplinary authority of the school authorities, which is the basis of the latter's correlative responsibility for his torts, committed while under such authority. Makalintal dissents: -It (ruling that custody in 2180 means mere custody in school rather than board) would demand responsibility without commensurate authority, rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control. -Article 2180, says that "the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." Note that for parental responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their company this implies that a similar sense of custody (living in their company) is implied in the case of schools.
Amadora v. CA 160 SCRA 315 Facts: Alfredo Amadora was shot by a classmate, Pablito Daffon, while in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. He was in school to finish a physics experiment as a prerequisite to graduating that year. He died at 17. The respondent school and its faculty members submit that they cannot be held liable for what happened because, technically, the semester had already ended. Issue: W/N they should be held liable now that the semester had ended when the incident happened. Held: NO. Petition is Denied. Ratio: Art. 2180 of the Civil Code states that: Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody. There have been cases in the past where who was liable would depend on w/n the school was academic or non-academic. If it were academic, the teacher-in-charge of the student would be liable, while if it were non-academic, the head would be. (The ratio of this being that heads of schools of arts and trade would be closer and more involved with their students, who can be considered their apprentices.) The Court believes that this provision should apply to ALL schools, academic and nonacademic. Even if the student was within the school grounds and basically doing nothing, he is still within the school custody and subject to the discipline of school authorities. However, in the case at bar, none of the respondents can be clearly said to have been responsible for what happened to Amadora. The school itself cannot be held directly liable because according to the provision, it is only either the teacher-in-charge or the head of the school. The rector, dean of boys or the high school principal also may not be held liable because it is clear that they are not teachers-in-charge. Alfredos physics teacher cannot be held liable because he was not necessarily the teacher-incharge of Daffon.
Salvosa v. IAC 166 SCRA 274 Facts: The Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution and is also an institution of arts and trade. Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, which is under the full control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Jimmy. B. Abon is its duly appointed armorer, he was appointed by the AFP and he also receives his salary from the AFP. He also
receives his orders from the AFP. He is also a commerce student of the BCF. Mar. 3, 1977: Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a student of the University of Baguio in the parking lot of BCF with an unlicensed firearm which he took from the armory of the ROTC Unit. Heirs of Napoleon (Respondents) sued for damages from Abon, his officer, officers of the BCF and BCF, Inc. The RTC rendered their decision, sentencing the defendants to pay jointly and severally for damages.
The IAC affirmed with decision of the RTC.
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Issue: W/N the petitioner can be held solidarily liable with Jimmy Abon for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Held: NO. Ratio: Even if Abon was enrolled in BCF, the incident was around 8 pm, Jimmy Abon was supposed to be in the ROTC office at that time, as ordered by his Commandant, Ungos. Abon could not have been in the custody of the school at the time, as he was under direct orders to have been somewhere else. IAC decision is reversed.
PSBA vs. CA February 4, 1992 Facts: Aug. 30, 1985: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed on the 2nd-floor premises of PSBA. He was a 3rd year commerce student but it was established that those who stabbed him were not members of the schools academic community. His parents filed a suit for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. RTC and CA: ruled for the parents of the deceased The petitioners motioned for the dismissal of the suit twice before it was brought up to the SC on the grounds that they are presumably sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code and therefore, the complaint states no cause of action against them since academic institutions such as the PSBA are beyond the ambit of the rule. Issue: W/N the petitioners should be held liable. Held: Petition is DENIED. Ratio: (NOTE: the SC agrees to the ruling of the lower courts, but has a different ratio from them.) Art. 2180 establishes the rule in loco parentis. It is true that the student was killed by people who were not, in any way, affiliated with PSBA. However, the incident was done within the campus itself. When a student enrolls in a campus, it is up to the school to provide for an atmosphere that would promote the students desire to learn. Adequate steps should have been taken to maintain peace and order in the campus. In the case at bar, it has not yet been clearly established w/n the school was at fault due to negligence in providing proper security measures. The Court dismisses the petition and orders the RTC to continue proceedings to find out w/n PSBA was negligent
Saludaga vs. FEU 30 April 08

Facts: Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of FEU when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security guards on duty at the premises. Rosete insists that the shooting was accidental and he was released because there was no formal complaint filed against him. Saludaga filed a complaint for damages against respondent (FEU and Edilberto de Jesus, president) because they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents also filed a complaing agains Galazy Development and Management Corporation, who provides security services for the campus. RTC: Respondents are ordered to pay jointly and severally Joseph Saludaga for actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost of the suit. Galazt are also to indemnify the respondents. CA: Reverses the appeal and dismisses the case filed by Saludaga. Issue: W/N the respondents are liable to Saludaga As to the Third-Party Complaint, W/N Galaxy is liable for damages to FEU Held: YES except that De Jesus (president) should not be held solidarily liable with FEU and with modifications as to the amount of damages to be paid. YES. Ratio: Citing PSBA vs. CA, there is a contractual obligation between the student and the academic institution where he is enrolled in. As such, it is the duty of the campus to maintain peace and order within the campus premises in
order to provide the students with the necessary skills and knowledge to pursue a higher education or a profession. The fact that Saludaga was shot by a security guard hired by the school to maintain that peace and order is prima facie showing that the respondent has failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment for its students. The respondents aver that the incident was fortuitous because they could not have reasonably foreseen that an accident like that would happen. In addition to that, Rosete was not even their employee, but was sent to them by Galaxy. The respondents believe that they did perform their obligation by selecting the services of Galaxy to provide them with security services. SC believes that they respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their students. They failed to prove that they ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met the requirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. FEU should not have given full discretion to Galaxy in choosing which security guards would be assigned to the campus. De Jesus cannot be held solidarily liable because FEU is a separate entity, with a personality distinct from the persons composing it. (oblicon!!!) o Obiter: Re: Third Party Complaint Since Galaxy was negligent in its selecting of employees and also failed to monitor petitioners condition, they are also bound to pay damages to FEU. (Galaxys president is solidarily liable in this case because he should have been directing the affairs of the security agency, he also assured the petitioner of shouldering his medical expenses but failed to fulfill this promise.)
St. Francis High School v. CA 194 SCRA 341 o o o Facts: Respondent spouses file a complaint based on the ff circumstances: Ferdinand Castillo, their son, freshman student of St. Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic Because of short notice, respondent spouses (parents) did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers and go home after doing so, however, because of persuasion by the teachers, Ferdinand went on to the beach During the picnic, one of the female teachers was drowning, some students including Ferdinand came to the rescue, but in the process, Ferdinand himself drowned, resuscitation failed, he was rushed to the hospital but declared DOA Due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's drowning, respondents prayed of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation. TC found in favor of the respondent against petitioner-teachers BUT dismissed the complaint against St. Francis HS Both parties appeal to the CA who ruled that the school should be liable as well, and that the teachers should be liable (except for two who were late to the picnic and hence cannot be ruled negligent) Hence, this petition by St. Francis HS et al
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Issue: W/n there was negligence attributable to the petitioners which warrants award of damages to the plaintiffs Held / Ratio: Petition impressed with merit Note that the respondents spouses allowed their son to join the excursion The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it will be held, is a sign of consent for his son to join the same. Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 2180 of the NCC in rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son. Article 2180, par. 4 states that: xxx Employers shall be liable for damages caused by employees acting w/in the scope of their assigned tasks xxx In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. -
The picnic had no permit from the school principal, Benjamin Illumin because it was not a school sanctioned activity Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic Testimony shows that they did all that was humanly possible to save the child Connie even invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. With no act of fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be assessed against petitioners
St. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002 Facts: From Feb 13-20 1995, St. Marys conducted an enrollment drive, pat of which were school visits from where prospective enrollees were studying As a student of St. Marys, Sherwin Carpitanos (son of respondent spouses) was part of the campaign group Sherwin, along with other students were riding the jeep, owned by co-respondent Vivencio Villanueva, driven by James Daniel, 15 yo, also a student, allegedly, he was driving in reckless manner resulting the jeep to turtle, and Sherwin died as a result of injuries sustained After trial, RTC ordered St. Marys to pay the spouses Carpitanos for damages St. Marys appeals, CA denies, hence this appeal Issue: W/n CA erred in holding petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Held / Ratio: Yes, CA decision reversed Under FC Art. 218, Schools have special parental authority (APA)over a minor child while under their custody such authority applies to field trips and other affairs outside school whenever authorized by the schools Under FC Art. 219, if a person under custody is a minor, those exercising SPA are liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their custody FC215 ROC Rule 130 Sec. 25 cf. Secs. 22 & 23 FC 220-222, FC 223-224 Medina v. Makabali 27 SCRA 502 For St. Marys to be liable, there must be an act or omission considered negligent and which has proximate cause to the injury, and the negligence must have causal connection to the accident Respondents fail to show that the negligence was the proximate cause, hence reliance on Art 219 is unfounded Respondents Spouses Daniel (parents of driver) and Villanueva (owner of the jeep) admit that the cause of the accident was not negligence of St. Marys nor the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep which the Carpitons do not dispute There is likewise no evidence that St. Marys allowed the minor James to drive, it was Ched Villanueva, grandson of the jeep owner who allowed James to drive Hence liability for the accident whether caused by negligence of the driver or detachment of steering wheel guide must be pinned on the minors parents. The negligence of St. Marys was only a remote cause. With the evidence presented by St. Marys and with the fact that the Daniel spouses mention the circumstance of detachment of steering wheel, it is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be responsible
Facts: Feb 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida gave birth to Joseph Casero in Makabali Clinic, Pampanga, owned by respondent Dra.Venancia Makabli Zenaida left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth, and the latter reared Joseph as her own son. Zenaida never visited the child nor paid for his expenses until Aug of 1966 where she claimed for custody of the minor Trial disclosed that Zenaida lived with Feliciano Casero with two other children, with the tolerance of Caseros lawful wife who lives elsewhere During trial, the minor addressed the respondent as Mammy, and even chose to stay with the respondent With Dra. Makabili made to promise to allow the minor the free choice of whom to live with upon reaching the age of 14 the Court held that it was for the childs best interest to be left with the foster mother
Issue: W/n LC erred in ordering the minor to stay with the respondent Held / Ratio: No, petition dismissed While the law recognizes the right of parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (NCC Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother The right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356). As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most.
Luna v. IAC 137 SCRA 7 Facts: Private Respondent Maria Santos is an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna, who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Luna Maria is married to Sixto Salumbides, and they are the parents of Shirley, who is the subject of this child custody case. 2-4 months after the birth of Shirley, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a childless couple with considerable means who loved Shirley and raised her as their very own Petitioners asked for the respondents consent to Shirleys application for a US Visa because they wanted to bring her to Disneyland but to no avail. Hence, petitioner left Shirley with the respondents, upon the latters request, but with instructions that their drive take and fetch Shirley to Maryknoll college every school day. When the petitioners returned on October 29, 1980, they learned that the respondents had transferred Shirley to the St. Scholastica College. The private respondents also refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did the said respondents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners. In view thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus, and the trial court rule in favor of them Respondents appealed to CA, who reversed the order Petitioners opposed the execution of the judgment and filed a motion for reconsideration on grounds of the subsequent emotional, psychological, and physiological condition of the child Shirley which would make the judgment prejudicial to the childs best interests. Shirley made manifest during the hearing that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should ever be separated from her Mama and Papa, the petitioners herein, and forced to stay with the respondents. Regardless, respondent court still ruled in favor of the respondents Issue: Who has rightful custody of Shirley? Held: Petition granted, Shirley goes to the petitioners Shirleys manifestations that she would kill herself or run away if she were taken away from the petitioners would make the judgment unfair, unjust, if not illegal NCC Art. 363 provides that questions relating to the care, custody, and education, etc of children, the latters welfare is paramount hence best interests of the minor can override procedural rules even the rights of the biological parents Furthermore, in her letters to the members of the court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish and cruel who beat her often. To return her to the private respondents would be traumatic, as requested by the child herself, let us not destroy her future
Cuadra v. Monfort 35 SCRA 160
R.A. 7610, The Child Abuse Law FC 225-227 Pineda vs CA 226 SCRA 754 RA 9231, Sees. 12-B and 12-C Lindain v. CA 212 SCRA 725 Radillo vs. Ferrer 152 SCRA 407 FC228cf.RA6809 FC229cf.FC 193 FC 23 1-232 Chua v. Cabangbang 27 SCRA 791 pacita chua worked as a hostess, lived w/chua ben in 1950 (had a child who died in infancy).cohab then with sy sia lay (Robert and betty chua sy as fruits). After bettys birth, they separated. She then became victo ran villareals mistress.1960, a girl was born to her but then they separated and she gave the child away to a comadre in cebu may1958 bartolome cabnagbang and wife(childless)acquired custody of betty(4 months old) and had her baptized as grace cabangbang on how cabangbangs acquired betty: accdg to pacita, it was villareal during their cohab who gave betty to cabangbangs (for favors villareal received)she only knew of such when betty was 3 yrs old and was brought to her by villareal who then returned betty to the cabangbangs due to threat,etc. cabangbangs say they found her wrapped in bundles @ their gates and then treated her as their own,that only when betty/grace was 5 that controversy arose TC said that betty was given to cabangbangs by villareal but with k and consent from pacita Pacita demanded the custody of the child, filed for HC. Resps were the cabangbangs and villareal writ issued by court but body of child was not produced TC eventually ruled that for the welfare of the child, she should remain in the custody of the cabangbangs WON child should be with pacita HELD: NO. NCC 363 says that minor under 7 shall not be separated from mother, but issue is now moot as grace is already 11 The courts may, in cases specified by law, deprive parents of their [parental] authority." And there are indeed valid reasons, as will presently be expounded, for depriving the petitioner of parental authority over the minor Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang petitioner did not at all - not ever - report to the authorities the alleged disappearance of her daughter, and had not been taken any step to see the child when she allegedly discovered that she was in the custody of the Cabangbangs. Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia: "The courts may deprive the parents of their authority or suspend the exercise of the same if they should treat their children with excessive harshness or should give them corrupting orders, counsels, or examples, or should make them beg or abandon them." record yields a host of circumstances which, in their totality, unmistakably betray the petitioner's settled purpose and intention to completely forego all parental responsibilities and forever relinquish all parental claim in respect to the child She surrendered the custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963, or after the lapse of a period of five long years, before she brought action to recover custody her own unadulterated testimony under oath that she wants the child back so that Sy Sia Lay, the alleged father, would resume providing the petitioner the support which he peremptorily withheld and ceased to give when she gave the child away. she expressed her willingness that the child remain with the Cabangbangs provided the latter would in exchange give her a jeep and some money She needs the child as a leverage to obtain concessions - financial and otherwise - either from the alleged father or the Cabangbangs. If she gets the child back, support for her would be forthcoming - or so she thinks - from the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay. On the other hand, if the Cabangbangs would keep the child, she would agree provided they gave her a jeep and some money. Note that this was not the only instance when she gave away a child of her own flesh and
blood. She gave up her youngest child, named Betty Tan Villareal, to her comadre in Cebu because she could not support it. petitioner has no regular source of income. There is no assurance at all that the alleged father, Sy Sia Lay - an unknown quantity, as far as the record goes - would resume giving the petitioner support once she and the child are reunited. But the record indubitably pictures the Cabangbang spouses as a childless couple of consequence in the community, who have given her their name and are rearing her as their very own child, and with whom there is
every reason to hope she will have a fair chance of normal growth and development into respectable womanhood. WON custody of betty/grace is without basis as the couples are not related by blood or affinity HELD: NO. law provides that custody can even be given to a third person when it appears that both parents (either legally or de facto sep) are improper persons to entrust the care of the child The petitioner has not proven that she is entitled to the rightful custody of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.
De Guzman vs Perez 496 SCRA 474 See: R.A. 8369, An Act Establishing Family Courts, Granting Them Exclusive Original Jurisdiction Over Child and Family Cases. See: RA. 7610, Child Abuse Act RA 6809 FC 234 as amended FC 236 as amended cf. FC 15, NCC 2180
SURNAMES NCC 364-380 RA9255 Naldoza v. Republic, supra Johnston v. Republic 7 SCRA 1040 Facts: June 24, 1960: Petition for Adoption of Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana by Isabel Valdes Johnston The 2-yr.-10-mo. old baby was then under the custody of the orphanage Hospicio de San Jose whose Mother Superior consented to the adoption As alleged in the petition, Isabel was then married to Raymond Arthur Johnston who also consented to the adoption Adoption was granted BUT Surname of the child was changed to Valdes because it was held as the surname of the petitioner October 24, 1960: Motion to change the surname to Valdes Johnston Issue/s: WON Adopted child can use the surname of adopters husband Held: No Because only Isabel adopted Ana, only her surname can be used by the child a. i. ii. iii. NCC 341 (4): Adopted minor is entitled to use the adopters surname Husband of Isabel did not join in the adoption His consent to the adoption did not have the effect of making him an adopting father Hence, his surname cannot be used because it would give the wrong impression that he adopted Ana also and wrongly entitle Ana to the status of his legitimate child under NCC 341 (1) But why Valdes despite her marriage to Johnston? Because Valdes remains as her own surname Use of the surname of the husband is only an addition to the surname of the wife and it does not change the latter NCC 370 (1) allows a married woman to add to her surname her husband's surname BUT she has a surname of her own to which her husband's surname may ONLY be added if she so chooses
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Ng Yao Sing v. Republic 16 SCRA 483 Facts: Petition for change of name to Keng Lee Uy A Chinese resident of Dumaguete has a number of names in various records: Jesus Ng, in his birth certificate and certificate of residence Jesus Uy Keng Lee, in his school records Uy Keng Lee Jesus, also in his school records Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the general public Uy Keng Lee, in his income tax returns Jesus Ng Yao Siong, in his alien certificate of registration Having various names had caused much confusion in his school records and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him in his dealings with the public City attorney opposed that there is no necessity for the change of name that he is guilty of a violation of the laws regarding the use of names and surnames CFI ruled in favour of Keng Lee Uy Issue/s: WON Keng Lee Uy can have his name changed Guidelines for Petitions for Change of Name 1. Jurisdictional Requirements for the Petition of Change of Name How the court acquires jurisidiction Jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition is acquired after publication of the: "order reciting the purpose of the petition" "date and place for the hearing thereof" for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object "to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established." Publication must contain the following information the name or names of the applicant the cause for which the change of name is sought the new name asked for NCC 408: A person's real name is that which is entered in the civil register Civil register is an official record of the civil status of persons The only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register
1. a. b. c. d. e. f. 2.
a. i. ii. iii. b.
c. i. ii. iii. 2. a. b.
3. a. b. 4.
Held: NO! Jesus Ng properly follow the requirements.
did
not
3.
4.
a.
b.
c. i. 1.
2. ii.
Re: Publication of the Petition Although the Petition was published in "The Negros Times," a weekly newspaper in Dumaguete City, The title of the case was there printed as: "In the matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Ng Yao Siong, petitioner." Jesus Ng Yao Siong was used in the petition, the order of publication, and the publication itself Jesus Ng Yao Siong was not the real name of Jesus Ng His name in the civil register is merely "Jesus Ng" Jesus Ng Yao Siong was not the only name he was known for The title of the publication should have included his aliases Because: Readers of newspapers merely glances at the title of the petition. It is only after he has satisfied himself that the title interests him, that he proceeds to read down further Hence, the names should not just appear in the body It should have read: "In the matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng, otherwise known
5.
as Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Uy Keng Lee, Uy Keng Lee Jesus, Keng Lee Uy and Uy Keng Lee" Hence, the requirement of publication was not met and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case Re: Absence of Proper and Reasonable Cause for Change of Name The alleged confusion in the school records and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him in his dealings with the public do not constitute proper and reasonable Such problems arise from his own use of different names which would naturally lead to different people transacting with him by one name or the other Re: Violation of the Law Jesus Ng violated: Commonwealth Act 142, entitled "An act to regulate the use of aliases" He was not "authorized by a competent court" to use an alias nor were his aliases pseudonyms for literary purposes" (as stage/pen names) or names by which he had been known since his childhood"
6.
7.
8. a.
Llaneta v. Agrava 57 SCRA 29 Facts: Petition for change of name to Keng Lee Uy A Chinese resident of Dumaguete has a number of names in various records: Jesus Ng, in his birth certificate and certificate of residence Jesus Uy Keng Lee, in his school records Uy Keng Lee Jesus, also in his school records Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the general public Uy Keng Lee, in his income tax returns Jesus Ng Yao Siong, in his alien certificate of registration Having various names had caused much confusion in his school records and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him in his dealings with the public City attorney opposed that there is no necessity for the change of name that he is guilty of a violation of the laws regarding the use of names and surnames CFI ruled in favour of Keng Lee Uy Issue/s: WON Keng Lee Uy can have his name changed Guidelines for Petitions for Change of Name Jurisdictional Requirements for the Petition of Change of Name How the court acquires jurisidiction Jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition is acquired after publication of the: "order reciting the purpose of the petition" ii. iii. b. "date and place for the hearing thereof" for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object "to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established." Publication must contain the following information the name or names of the applicant the cause for which the change of name is sought the new name asked for
5. a. b. c. d. e. f. 6.
c. i. ii. iii.
7. a. b. 8.
10. NCC 408: A person's real name is that which is entered in the civil register a. Civil register is an official record of the civil status of persons b. The only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register Held: NO! Jesus Ng properly follow the requirements. did not
9.
a. i.
Re: Publication of the Petition 11. Although the Petition was published in "The Negros Times," a weekly newspaper in Dumaguete City, 12. The title of the case was there printed as: "In the matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Ng Yao Siong, petitioner."

Jesus Ng Yao Siong was used in the petition, the order of publication, and the publication itself Jesus Ng Yao Siong was not the real name of Jesus Ng His name in the civil register is merely "Jesus Ng" Jesus Ng Yao Siong was not the only name he was known for The title of the publication should have included his aliases Because: Readers of newspapers merely glances at the title of the petition. It is only after he has satisfied himself that the title interests him, that he proceeds to read down further Hence, the names should not just appear in the body It should have read: "In the matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng, otherwise known as Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Uy Keng Lee, Uy Keng Lee Jesus, Keng Lee Uy and Uy Keng Lee"
a.
13. Hence, the requirement of publication was not met and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case Re: Absence of Proper and Reasonable Cause for Change of Name 14. The alleged confusion in the school records and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him in his dealings with the public do not constitute proper and reasonable 15. Such problems arise from his own use of different names which would naturally lead to different people transacting with him by one name or the other Re: Violation of the Law 16. Jesus Ng violated: a. Commonwealth Act 142, entitled "An act to regulate the use of aliases" He was not "authorized by a competent court" to use an alias nor were his aliases pseudonyms for literary purposes" (as stage/pen names) or names by which he had been known since his childhood"
b.
c. i. 1.
2. ii.
Telmo v. Republic 73 SCRA 29 Facts: Milagros Llerena was admitted to the bar in 1923, 1930/1930: married Pedro M. Telmo 1946: attorneys oath: using Milagros LlerenaTelmo The Telmo spouses sojourned in the United States and Pedro, following the American style, changed the spelling of his name to Thelmo. His diploma from the University of Michigan spelled his surname as Thelmo. Their 4 children have been using Thelmo but were baptized Telmo. Mrs. Telmo was appointed justice of the peace of Kabasalan, Manicahan and Taluksangay, Zamboanga In a lot of cases filed against her as a justice, some used the name, Telmo, while others used Thelmo. In the case that resulted in the termination of her tenure as justice of the peace, she used Thelmo. 1964: She filed a petition in the CFI of Zamboanga City praying that her husbands surname be changed to Thelmo. (NOTE: her husband did not join her as a co-petitioner but he executed an affidavit interposing no objection to his wifes petition.) Two of her sons, surnamed Thelmo, expressed conformity in a joint affidavit. At the hearing, she presented documentary evidence in the form of certificates and diplomas of her children surnamed Thelmo, Telegrams addressed to her as Atty. Milagros Thelmo, and articles of incorporation of 2 corporations she is a part of with her surname spelled, Thelmo. She did not present in evidence her passport, visas and titles and deeds but she alleged that her name in those were also Thelmo. She also wants to change her husbands surname in order to distinguish her sons from other Telmos who are the illegititmate children of the relatives of her husband. The City Fiscal of Zamboanga City opposes on the ground that the real party to the petition should be her husband and sons. Issue: W/N there is ample justification to allow Mrs. Telmo to change the spelling of her husbands surname. Held: NO. Ratio: According to Art. 370 of the Civil Code, a married woman may use her husbands surname. If she wants judicial authorization in the changing of the spelling, it is the husband who should initiate the proceedings. It was not the husband, in the case at bar, who asked for a change of spelling of his surname. The Court also believes that there is not enough substantial reason for the changing of spelling of Atty. Telmos surname.
Tolentino v CA 162 SCRA 66 Facts:
1931: Arturo Tolentino m Consuelo David, private respondent. Union produced kids. 1943: They were legally divorced pursuant to the law during the Japanese Occupation. Consuelo had abandoned Arturo for 3 continuous years. Arturo m a Pilar Adorable who died soon after their marriage 1945: Arturo m Constancia, petitioner. Union also produced kids. Consuelo has continued using the surname Tolentino until this case was filed. 3rd party defendant, Arturo admits that the use of Tolentino by the private respondent was with his consent and the consent of his family. Issue: W/N a woman who has been legally divorced from her husband may be enjoined by the latters present wife from using the surname of her former husband. Held: NO. Case is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Ratio: Philippine laws are silent to the issue. After all, there are no provisions in our laws regarding divorce. Senator Tolentino himself commented on Art. 370 of the Civil Code that the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husbands surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it. The private respondent has given proof that by enjoining her from using Tolentino, there would be serious dislocation on her part with regard to contracts formed, etc. It is already public knowledge that Constancia is the legal wife of Arturo Tolentino. Consuelo has never represented herself after the divorce as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino anyway. The petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to show any problems that would be occur by allowing private respondent to use Tolentino.
Legamia v. IAC 131 SCRA 479 Yasin v Hon Judge Sharia Court G R No 94986 (1995) In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia G R No 148311, March 31, 2005 In Re Change of Name, Julainan Carulasan Wang G R No 159966 March 30, 2005 Facts: Sept 22, 2002 Julian Lin Wang filed a petition through his mother to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Reasons he wants to change name in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. TC: denied the petition since reasons given were not recognized by law Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance that should not determined by the Court ie if FC 174 prohibits child from dropping his name ISSUE: WON he can be allowed to drop his middle name HELD: NO grounds one can change name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest characteristics of a name: ) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
o o

o o
In this case, rejected because Still a minor Reason was only for convenience. Did not really say how dropping his middle name could help him integrate better.
continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name .
ABSENT NCC 38 1-396, FC 41 Reyes v. Alejandro 141 SCRA 65 Facts: In October 1969, Erlinda Reynoso Reyes prayed for the declaration of absence of her husband Roberto L. Reyes who have been absent in their house since April 1962 due to a misunderstanding over personal matters. Since then she doesnt know his whereabouts. He left no will or debts. She said they acquired no properties or debts during marriage. She said her only purpose in filing the petition is to establish the absence of her husband, invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code. CFI dismissed the case Issue: WON Roberto must be judicially declared absent. Held: No. The purpose of the declaration is to provide an administrator of the property. Ratio: Rule 107 of the Rules of Court is based on the provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on absence. The provision is concerned with the interest or property of the absentee. The purpose of the declaration is to provide an administrator of the property. The reason and purpose of the provisions of the New Civil Code on absence (Arts. 381 to 396) are: The interest of the person himself who has disappeared; The rights of third parties against the absentee, especially those who have rights which would depend upon the death of the absentee; and 3. The general interest of society which may require that property does not remain abandoned without someone representing it and without an owner (Civil Code by Francisco, Vol. 2, pp. 930-931, 1953 Ed.). When to declare for absence: when he has properties which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that the administration of all classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article. 196, Civil Code). For civil marriage law Necessary to judicially declare spouse an absentee only when (1) there are properties which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (2) the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (3) wife is asking the Court that the administration of property in the marriage be transferred to her Otherwise law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to he living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage RESULT: in this case, since there were no properties to speak of, it was right for the TC to dismiss the case.
1.
2.
3.
1. 2.
Eastern Shipping v. Lucero 124 SCRA 425 On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed as captain of the ship EASTERN MINICON of eastern shipping lines Under the contract, his employment was good for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila Captain Lucero sent three distress messages to the company on the following dates February l6,1980 7am; February l6/80 3:30pm; FEBRUARY 16/80 9:50pm o On the third message he stated that seawater was entering the vessel and they were preparing to abandon ship The company notified the coast guard. Search results were negative The insurers of the company confirmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint for for payment of the accrued salary allotment of her husband which the Company had stopped since March 1980 and for continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. She
contended that the contract of employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's arrival in Manila The company refused to pay. The National seamen board upheld the complaint and the decision was affirmed by the NLRC Issue: WON Mrs Lucero was entitled to the accrued salary Held: The NLRC based its judgment on Art 391 regarding the presumption of death at sea. They argue that it was too early to presume that Mr. Lucero has died because under the law, four (4) years have not yet passed. Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board
a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;... The Supreme Court ruled however that a preponderance of evidence from the telegraph messages and the fact that the vessel was not heard of again show that it can be logically inferred that the vessel has sunk and the crew perished. As the Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls." Hence the decision of the NLRC is reversed; however, death benefits should be paid.
Tol-Noquera v. Villamor 211 SCRA 616 Facts: December 1986, Daya Maria Tol (seeking admistration of the estate) alleged that she was the acknowledged natural child of Remigio Tol, who had been missing since 1984 and a certain Diosdado Tol had fraudulently obtained a title of Remigios property Diosdado countered that Daya maria was not an acknowledged natural child of the absentee and the title was originally in his name Issue: WON DAYA MARIA TOL can be appointed administratrix when Remigio was not yet declared presumptively dead The relevant laws on the matter are found in the following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 381. When a person disappears from his domicile his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary. This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the absentee has expired. Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having been made, the judge shall take the necessary measures to safeguard the rights and interest of the absentee and shall specify the powers, obligations and remuneration of his representatives, regulating them according to the circumstances, by the rules concerning guardians. Art. 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present shall be preferred when there is no legal separation. If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any competent person may be appointed by the court. Art. 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property, his absence may be declared. Art. 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence: (1) The spouse present; (2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the same; (3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy; (4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his death. Art. 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six months after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Held: It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding separate from and prior to a petition for administration. The purpose of the cited rules is the protection of the interests and property of the absentee, not of the administrator
Manuel vs. People G.R. No. 165842, Nov. 29, 2005 Facts: July 28, 1975, Eduardo Manuel was married to Rubylus Gaa He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996, eventually had sex with her, and eventually married her on April 22, 1996 all the time saying he was single Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999 Manuel went to the house 2-3 times a year and
eventually on January 2001, packed his clothes and left without giving financial support Tina became curious and went to the NSO and to her amazement learned that her marriage was bigamous Manuel testified that Tina had been informed of his prevous marriage but nevertheless agreed to marry him He further claimed that he was only forced to marry her because she threatened that she would commit suicide July 2, 2002, Eduardo Manuel was convicted of Bigamy Basically Manuel says that his marriage was in good faith because his previous wife was absent for 20 years hence his first marriage was dissolved He appealed to the CA, CA affirmed the decision of trial court He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to succession. Issue: duh, WON second marriage is void for being bigamous Held: The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for
the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible. Moreover; Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. Hence the petition is denied
Olaguer vs. Purugganan G.R. No. 158907, February 12, 2007 Facts: Alleges that he was the owner of 60,000 share of stocks (worth 600k), employed as EVP Businessday Corporation, President of Businessday Info System and Svces & Businessday Marketing Corp Active in the political opposition against Marcos together with resps Raul Locsin and Enrique Joaquin Locsin, Joaquin, and Hector Holifea had an unwritten agreement that, in the event that Eduardo was arrested, they would support the Eduardos family by the continued payment of his salary executed a Special Power of Attorney on 5/26/79 appointing Locsin, Joaquin and Hofilea for the purpose of selling or transferring petitioners shares of stock with Businessday during trial, Eduardo testified that he agreed to execute the SPA in order to cancel his shares of stock, even before they are sold, for the purpose of concealing that he was a stockholder of Businessday, in the event of a military crackdown against the opposition parties acknowledged the SPA before respondent Emilio Purugganan, Jr., who was then the Corporate Secretary of Businessday, and at the same time, a notary public for Quezon City By the time he was released from prison 6 years later, he was no longer a shareholder in the said bank According to the respondents, they were just doing what was accorded in the SPA, given that the price of theirs plummeted below market value because of the stigma brought about by olaguer being a very prominent oppositionist Issue: WON absence as mentioned in SPA should be understood as that of NCC 381 ART 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may
appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary. This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the absentee has expired. Or incapacity as per NCC 38 Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act HELD: NO. If it were, then the very existence of that SPA would be rendered nugatory. Olaguer FUNERALS NCC 305-3 10
has to be a minor or insane for that SPA to have function. An SPA has to be construed strictly but its provision has to be construed as to its existence, i.e. understood in a way that will give more power/ function to that SPA. Since the said SPA executed by Olaguer gave powers to the respondents to actually dispose of his share, he cannot therefore assail such now. And even if the said contract is assailable, it was already ratified by the reception of the amount 600,000 by Olaguers wife and in-laws from 1980-1982
Eugenio v. Velez 185 SCRA 425 Facts: Already discussed many times HC served over the body of Vitaliana Vargas who allegedly died on the 28th of august 1988 but was only made known to the courts on September of 1988 after the HC petition of vitalianas bros and sis, with the allegation that tomas eugenio unduly took away their sister sometime in 1987 and made her reside in his palacial residence in Misamis Oriental Tomas eugenio was arguing that HC should not govern the dead body, and besides he was already (allegedly) able to secure a burial permit to bury her at the grounds of PBCM of which he is the head The bro and sis of vitaliana were arguing that tomas doesnt belong to the list of persons who are mandated by the law (accdg to NCC 305 and 308) to bury her <he being just a commonlaw husband, therefore lawfully has no relations with her> Issue: WON the bros and sis are the lawful custodians of her body (right to bury the deceased) Held: YES. SC decided for the sisters and brothers of vitaliana, given that tomas was just the common-law husband of vitaliana, the right to bury her therefore remains on the nearest kin of vitaliana, who are the resps herein
ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTER NCC 407-413 ROC, Rule 108 RA 9048 Barretto vs Local Civil registrar 74 SCRA 257 Facts: Born of Faustino Barretto and King Lian (both natives of Amoy, China) but was recorded allegedly in the name of Rosario Barretto (as per Register No. 1167(f44) in the record of births of the civil register of Manila) allegedly a female child Rosario was born on that 29th of june 1944 According to the Book No. IV, Folio 83 of the record of baptisms of the Parroquia de Chinos in Manila, a boy by the name of domingo sy barrette was baptized on 21st of may 1950 of the aforementioned parents Registered as an alien in BID, also issued a native-born certificate of residence (29th june 1958) Domingo Barreto alleges to have only known the mistake in his birth certificate upon filing for an ML He therefore sought to have the alleged erroneous entries be corrected (regarding his name and sex) Filed two pets (due to dismissal of the 1st, with the 2nd being limited to a correction of sex) TC granted but OSG appealed Issue: WON the alleged error is merely clerical in nature such that change therein could easily be dispensed Held: No. it was not a clerical error. If the name in the record of birth were Domingo Barretto and his sex was indicated therein as female, it might be argued that the error would be clerical. But that is not the fact in this case. The situation is more complicated. A person named Domingo Barretto claims that he is Rosario Barreto and that the word "female" in the latter's birth record is a mistake.
In this case, there is a need to ascertain as to WON Rosario and Domingo are one and the
same person. TC decision is therefore set aside
Republic vs Dela Cruz 118 SCRA 18 Facts: Respondent herein (felecisima velarde) sought to have changes be introduced in the birth certificates of his children (ruben, Cynthia, Reynaldo, roger, Rolando and romeo) alleging that there were error in the records of said children as per nationality, name of their father, her middle name, nationality of their mother, and finally their legitimacy <as born of common-law union> OSG objected to such, saying that the changes sought herein would affect the nationality, filiation, and the civil satus of the children and should therefore be resolved not in a summary procceding TC granted herein prayers because they maybe substantial errors (not just clerical), it allegedly gives justice to the correct status of the children Issue: WON herein changes should have been granted by the courts Held: No. The changes being sought herein would greatly affect the civil status, filiation and the nationality of the children (as have been argued by the OSG). LC erred in not taking consideration of such. The name of the alleged father (Lee Tieng) as being different from what appears in said certificates (lee uping, alipio lee, ting wee lee) could very well point todifferent persons and should not therefore be treated simply as a typo error. LC decision therefore is set aside
Repubic vs Flojo 152 SCRA 550 Facts: Inocencio P. Carag filed a petition to correct an entry in his register of birth wherein he was erroneously registered as Chinese instead of a Filipino citizen. At the hearing, it was established that he was born in Aparri, Cagayan on March 15, 1947, to a Filipino father, Vicente and Anastacia Pe. It was then ruled the Inocencio is a Filipino citizen so that the correction must be made. The RP questions this ruling. Issue: WON proper adversary proceeding was employed to allow corrections to be made in the birth certificate Held: Yes. Ratio: The facts have been fully and properly developed. The opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. The court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided that the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
Republic v. Sayo 188 SCRA 634 Facts: Ramon Tan Biana, Jr. was born on January 9, 1952 in Nueva Vizacaya as the fifth legitimate child of his parents. The nurse erroneously reported to the Local Civil Registrar that his and his parents' citizenship as Chinese instead of Filipino. He now claims that he and his parents are Filipino citizens. Copies were furnished to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, the Office of the SolGen, and the Local Civil Registrar. Copy of the notice of hearing was posted and it was also published in a newspaper of general circulation published once a week for three consecutive weeks. The TC then proceeded to receive evidence for the petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal representing the Government. Issue: WON the procedure followed satisfied the requirements of appropriate adversary pro-proceedings Held: Yes Ratio: It is true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality of citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a summary proceedings. However it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the proper remedy is used. Biana, Jr. submitted the following: a voters ID of his father, a decision of the Bureau of
Immigration showing that his father is a natural son of a Filipino citizen and that his mother, being a legal wife was also a Philippine citizen, a certification issued by a the Bureau of
Immigration stating that the father is a Filipino citizen, the birth certificate of his brother stating that he is the son of Philippine citizens and his Voter's ID.
Republic v Valencia 141 SCRA 462 Facts: Leonor Valencia in behalf of her minor children Bernardo and Jessica Go filed a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of their birth in the Civil Registry in the City of Cebu. The TC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu once a week for three consecutive weeks and notice was duly served on the SolGen, the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo and Jessica from Chinese to Filipino and their status from Legitimate to Illegitimate and changing also the status of the mother from married to single. The Local Civil Registrar avers that the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of the minors and the status of the mother. The TC granted the petition. Issue: WON the proceedings that took place could be regarded as proper suit or appropriate action for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register. Held: Yes. Ratio: The persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought. If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings. The decision of the TC was affirmed by the SC.
Republic v Marcos 182 SCRA 223 Facts: Pang Cha Quen, a Chinese national married Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen. She had a previous marriage to a Chinese citizen Sia Bian who fathered her child, May Sia alias Manman Huang. She registered her daughter as an alien under the name Mary Pang, which is her maternal surname because the childs father has abandoned them. Now Pang Cha Quen prays that her daughters name be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz since Alfredo has grown to love her as his own daughter. Judge Marcos granted such petition. WON the name of Mary Pang can be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz
Held: No. Firstly, the republic pointed out that the petition to change the name did not include Mary Pang but only May Sia and Manman Huang. The omission of her other alias "Mary Pang" in the captions of the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication. The general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another where none actually exists. Furthermore, Mary Pang is the only one who can pray for the change of her name. This cannot be done by her mother for her.
Labayo-Rowe v Republic 168 SCRA 294
Facts: Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe filed a petition for the correction of entries in the civil registry with the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga. She asked the court to order the Local Civil Registrar of San Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries in the birth certificates of her children Vicente L. Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat especially with regard to petitioner's name which appears in both certificates as "Beatriz Labayo-Labayu and as regards her civil status and date of marriage which appears in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat as "married" with the year appearing "1953 Bulan." She claimed that she was never married to Vicente Miclat and that she was now married to an American citizen, William Rowe. Her petition was granted changing her civil status from married to single in the birth certificate of Victoria.
WON Emperatriz can change her civil status from married to single in Victorias birth certificate Held: No. The petition for correction of entries in the civil registry does not only involve the correction of petitioner Labayo's name and surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo in the birth certificates of her children. The petition also seeks the change of her status from "married" to "not married" at the time of her daughter's birth, thereby changing the status of her child Victoria Miclat from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter.
Sermonia vs CA 233 SCRA 155 Facts: Jose Sermonia was charged with bigamy in 1992 after his first wife Virginia Nievera discovered that he was married to another woman, Ma. Lourdes Unson in 1975. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the fist marriage has been legally dissolved. It is punishable by prision mayor. The penalty prescribes a 15 year period which runs from the day the crime is discovered. Sermonia alleges that he cannot be convicted since his second marriage, which is registered in the Office of the Civil Registrar, which is open to the public, has it prescriptive period expiring on 1990. Thus, the case, which was filed on 1992 since his first wife only discovered the second marriage in 1991, shall be dismissed. WON the 15-year prescriptive period started when Sermonia filed his second marriage contract in the Office of Civil Registrar Held: No. Sermonia intended to keep his second marriage upon claiming that he was single prior to it. He also did not tell his first wife about it. Furthermore, Sermonia cannot argue that the file of his marriage can be found in the official records of the state but the problem is you cannot check another persons file. Therefore, he knew that he was committing bigamy. The Court affirmed the decision of the CA.
Zapanta v Registrar 237 SCRA 25 Leonor v. Court of Appeals 256 SCRA 69 Lee et al vs CA 367 SCRA 110 Eloisida vs Local Civil Registry 382 SCRA 23 Facts: Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition to correct the ff entries in the Birth cert of her son Charles Christian: Surname from Borbon to Eleosida Parents wedding date should be blank Informants name should be Lourdes Eleosida In support she contended that: Son was born out of wedlock The she and the childs father, Carlos Borbon, were never married Therefore child is illegitimate and should have mothers surname TC then issued a notice of hearing, furnishing copies for the petitioner, respondent Carlos Borbon, the office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) and the Solgen TC dismissed the petition for lack of merit stating only clerical errors of harmless nature

may be corrected but this petition changes the status of the child. Hence this petition Issue: W/n corrections of entries in Birth Certificates may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are substantial and not merely clerical errors? Held / Ratio: Yes, case remanded to lower court to proceed Apply the ruling in Republic vs Valencia substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. (See ROC, Rule 108 Sec 3-5) Substantial changes that affect the marriage between a couple and the legitimacy of a child -
are allowed under Rule 108 provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. Records show that: (1) the trial court ordered issued a notice of hearing, (2) ordered the publication of said notice, (3) the notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during hearing and (4) other persons with any interest thereon shall also appear and show any reason why the petition shouldnt be granted, (5) Respondent, LRC, and Solgen were all furnished a copy of the notice The foregoing satisfy all the procedural requirements to make it an adversary proceeding, therefore TC erred in dismissing the case
Barco vs CA GR No 120587,Jan 20,2004 Facts: (Medyo complicated case sorry :p) 12/24/70 Respondent Nadina Maravilla marries Francisco Maravilla Feb 1977 Spouses opt to live separately, the next year they obtain an ecclesiastical annulment of the marriage 6/9/78 Birth of June Salvacion, Birth Cert lists Francisco as father, Maravilla as the childs surname, Nadina signs the Birth Cert Nadina later on claims that the real father is Armando Gustilo At the time of Junes birth, Armando was married, after his wife dies, he marries Nadina on 8/21/82 3/12/85 Nadina obtained judicial declaration annulling her marriage to Francisco 3/17/82 Nadina files petition to correct the Birth Cert of June. Name should be June Gustilo and Armando is the real father Francisco confirms to the petition by signing it, Armando acknowledges June as his daughter 1/7/85 RTC Order grants petition and orders corrections to be made 12/19/86 Armando dies, estate proceedings arise from his death. Enter Jose Vicente, an alleged biological child of Armando he files an annulment of the RTC Order Enter Milagros Barco, files as the guardian of Mary Joy Ann Gustillo alleging that Mary Joy also has a legal interest in the annulment of the RTC Order as the child was likewise fathered by Gustillo. CA dismisses the petitions both Jose Vicente and Barco, hence this petition by Milagros Barco claiming that the RTC Order of 1/7/85 lacks jurisdiction Issue: W/n the RTC Order had the jurisdiction to pass judgment on the original petition of Nadina Held / Ratio: Yes, petition dismissed. 2 aspects of jurisdiction w/c are vital for the disposition of cases, both of which Barco claims the RTC did not have Jurisdiction over the parties Jurisdiction over the nature of the action/subject of the petition Jurisdiction over the parties Before substantial corrections to the civil registry is allowed, facts must be established in a proceeding Barco points out that she was not impleaded as a party in the original petition of Nadina Yes, Barco is indeed a party in the petition, however, we cannot expect Nadina or any other petitioner invoking Rule 108 to know all of a fathers legitmate / illegitimate children CA correctly pointed out that through publication (in accordance with Sec 4 of Rule 108) they binded the whole world to the subsequent judgment in the petition, including Barco Jurisdiction over the nature of the action / subject of the petition Barco asserts that the general rule is that the jurisdiction of the court in the correction of entries in the civil register is limited to clerical mistakes This argument has already been debunked in many cases most notably in Lee vs CA : It was declared that the provision (Art 412) did not qualify what kind of entry could be changed or corrected, and therefore the statute should
a. -
b. -

whose name is sought to be changed no merit Under the law the Makati RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition for correction Despite the fact that the RTC may have ordered (because from the facts it seems that June is an illegitimate child of Armando) the RTC order is already final at most it is an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, which is different from lack of jurisdiction.
be construed as such the meaning of each word is within context of the subject treated RA 9048 has also effectively changed the nature of proceeding under Rule 108 (Though 9048 may not be applicable to this Barco case it is an indication that substantial corrections to the civil status in the civil registry may be effected through a filing of a petition under Rule 108) Lastly Barco argues that the petition for correction had prescribed and that the petition for correction should be filed by the person
Republic vs Benemerito GR NO 146963, March 14, 2004 Facts: Respondent Petronio Benemerito files petition asking for the correction of the record of birth of his son Joven Lee on file with the LCR of Guimba, Nueva Ecija Change of fathers name from Peter Laurente Benemerito to Petronio L. Benemerito Change of marriage date of Jovens parents from 9/1/89 to 1/25/98 Petronio testifies that he was surprised to discover later on that the above information were erroneously recorded in his sons Birth Cert - TC granted the petition The Republic appeals contending that indispensable parties themselves were not notified of the proceedings and because of the substantial changes sought by respondent this may be threshed out only in adversarial proceedings. But CA affirms the TC Decision Issue: W/n the CA erred in affirming the TC Decision w/c granted the petition w/o an adversarial proceeding Held / Ratio: Yes, decision reversed set aside, but respondent may initiate the proper adversarial proceedings ROC Rule 108 in rel to NCC 412 states a procedure by w/c an entry in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected, what is Ceruila vs Delantar 477 SCRA 134 Silverio vs. RP (supra) Republic vs. Capote G.R. No. 157043, February 2,2007 Republic vs KHO GR No. No. 170340. June 29, 2007 Facts: On 2001, Carlito Kho requested the court to correct his Birth Certificate and change the citizenship of his mother from Chinese to FILIPINO, and her name from Maribel to MARIVEL. Also, he wanted to change his fathers nationality from filipino to CHINESE, and his name from John Kho to JUAN KHO. He also wanted to delete the word MARRIED beside the phrase date of marriage of his parents (Eugene and Juan Kho) because he said that his parents were NEVER married. described in those statutes are clerical errors one that may be harmlessly changed On the other hand, substantial changes may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings The corrections sought are not clerical errors, it changes the status of the child and may affect successional and other rights of the child and other persons related to either the respondent and his wife Rule 108 provides that interested parties may avail themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceedings and that the corresponding petition should implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have any interest that would be affected RTC proceedings fail to meet procedural requirements Added info: RA 9048 merely makes possible the correction of clerical errors, it leaves to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings
He additionally prayed to the court that the date of marriage of himself and his wife be changed form 1989 to 2000. In 2002, the TRIAL COURT ordered the Civil Registrar to effect all the changes Carlito pleaded for. The Republic however, APPEALED. Saying that MARIVEL was never impleaded as an indispensable party to the case. CA however, AFFIRMED the trial courts decision. Hence the case.
Issues: Was the failure to implead Marivel and Carlitos parents rendered the trial short of adversarial proceedings? Held: No Ratio: An in rem proceeding is validated through publication. Not only was the notices published in newspapers of general circulation, but also the notices of the trial were even sent to their residences. So this is enough to make the parties aware of the proceedings in court. On other issues, the deletion of the married status is also valid since Eugene and Juan were really not married.
Republic vs. Jennifer Cagandahan G.R. No. 166676, Sept. 12, 2008 Facts: Jennifer Cagandahan was born on Januay 13, 1981, and was registered as a female in her birth certificate. But while growing up she developed secondary male characteristics. She was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia ( I searched this and this actually causes AMBIGUOUS genitalia.) Upon reaching 13 years of age, her ovaries stopped growing, she had no breasts, and she had no menstruation. She said that in mind and in emotion she was a MAN. So she prayed that her name be changed from Jennifer to JEFF and female to MALE. Dr. Michael Sionson recommended also that the court render the gender change since it would be advantageous to her. OSG however says that petition is fatally defective because the respondent did not implead the CIVIL Registrar as a party in the petition. Issues: WON the petition should fail because the respondent did not implead the Civil Registrar as a party in the petition Held: NO Ratio: The Supreme Court says that there was substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local registrar. The court says that since he produces male hormones and that he considers himself a man, and that no one showed that they will be prejudiced by the change of name and gender, then it is just proper that the court grants the petition. HE IS NOW A MAN.

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C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF.

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Frivaldo vs. Comelec G.R. No. 120295 (June 28, 1996)

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the malicious and unfounded complaint by the

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People v. Rafanan 204 SCRA 65

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other than in writing, it will just be as binding upon the

parties as if it had been reduced to writing.

Baksh v, CA 219 SCRA 115

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Armas vs Calisterio 330 SCRA 201 (April 6, 2000) Facts: 1)

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ISSUES: Whether or incapacitated

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