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Pruning the Multiverse1. The Multiverse
At present, cosmological physicists propose an unruly welter of universes (despite the evidentcontradiction involved in using the plural of that noun).Three types of coexistent universes are postulated:1. In a spatially flat and infinite universe filled homogeneously and randomly with matter andsubject to the limit speed of light, there must be an infinite number of "universes", separatedfrom each other by enormous distances and thus the lack of intersection of their light cones orevent horizons. Here every possible universe based on the present local laws of physics shouldexist, including an infinite number of perfect replicas of this one.2. If in the originating event of any universe the values and types of the fundamental constantsare randomly distributed, every possible universe based on any combination of physical laws andconstants would exist.3. If every possible outcome of every quantum event is the case, and each outcome determines adifferent future universe, every possible permutation of every possible quantum event must bebranching out at any moment from any universe based on quantum mechanics.Time is usually described by such cosmologists as being not different in nature from space--forinstance, our timeline is just a configuration of quantum universes whose connections areconsistent with the laws of physics; we perceive that configuration as a sequence purely becauseof the biological limitations of our senses.
2. Pruning
The multiverse, however, with its infinite dendrification, can perhaps be pruned in the light of both logical and physical considerations.1. Let us define "the universe" as everything in existence at one time or another. Thus therecannot be "universes" because the word, like "everything" itself, is not usable in the plural.However, I shall adopt the plural form as used by cosmologists in order to demonstrate the logicalflaws implied by such a usage.
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2. Any perfect repeat of this universe, on the principle that a distinction that makes no differenceis no distinction, is in fact this universe. We are all the identical versions of this universe thereare. If hugely distant parts of this universe are identical in every way to this part, then thosedifferent parts of the universe are in fact this part; we would simply need to adjust our theory of the topology or multidimensional shape and embedding space of the cosmos so as to allow forvarious ways of returning to this part of the universe. Thus the universe, if there are "repeats" of its "wallpaper pattern", turns out to be more like a compact knot--since all the repeats of all theother parts of the universe would be similarly the same part, reached by different paths, and thusthere would be exactly one universe, made of all the possible configurations of matter, arrangedin a space that would allow for all possible spatial orientations among them.3. We can prune away all "universes"--or rather, parts of the universe--that are perfectlydeterministic, since they would be describable without the use of the concept of time. Thedefinition of "universe" includes time--i.e. a universe that does not last even one moment is nouniverse. A timeless universe cannot be; this is trivially true in physics, since all physical objectsare vibratory in nature, and a vibration requires time to take place in. The definition of "deterministic" involves the requirement that the cause-effect relationship is perfect and unique,that is, the difference between logical inference and cause is eliminated. Every cause mustperfectly imply its effect, and every effect must perfectly imply its cause. Logically cause andeffect are reversible. But the distinction between space and time is that while space is reversible,time is irreversible--we can go from London to New York, and from New York to London; butthough we can go from 1992 to 2004, we cannot go from 2004 to 1992. Thus in a perfectlydeterministic universe there are no distinctions of before and after, only distinctions of logicalpriority and posteriority. A deterministic universe does not require time to be accurately andfully described. Thus a perfectly deterministic universe cannot exist. (The argument that timedoes not really exist except in the sensory systems of animals like ourselves is only germane tothe argument if sensory systems, with their attendant world of temporal sequence, do not exist inthe universe; and as we have seen, if they are not part of the universe they do not exist, which is acontradiction since sensory systems are what are writing and reading this.) A universe must beopen-ended to be temporal and thus to have existence.4. We can prune away all "universes" in which, at the other end of the scale from perfectdetermination, perfect randomness prevails. The reason is the same as in (3.). If the next eventbears no relation to any previous event, there is no basis on which it can be asserted that there isany relation btween them, including that of time. Time includes in its definition some duration,even if it is only the "chronon" or minimum period of a vibratory entity. But duration impliessome continuity between moments, and moments can be infinitesimally short. In a perfectly
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random universe, there could be no continuity among moments, and thus no time, and thus nouniverse. A universe must be minimally law-abiding to have existence.5. We can prune away all "universes" which are purely probabilistic, and in which there are onlyquantum superpositions of possible events. A universe in which everything is possible is one inwhich nothing is actual. A real universe is one in which wave functions are collapsed, in whicheither ensembles of entangled virtual particles gradually actualize themselves throughinteractions in space and time until they cross the boundary between the quantum microcosm andthe classical macrocosm, or already-actualized entities, their wave functions having beencollapsed, act as the "observers" or informational termini that transform quantum probabilies intoactualities.6. One part of any definition of "universe" must be that it contains space, i. e. the possibility of separation and connection among its parts. A universe that is nowhere is no universe; a universewhose parts are nowhere is a universe that is nowhere. Being somewhere does not take muchforcing: even as weak a spatial measure as the difference between entanglement and non-entanglement has been shown to be enough to create highly localized ensembles of particles. Butthe collapse from nonlocality into locality is always a unique historical event, which imposesfurther constraints on what kinds of universe could exist (see (8.)). In any case we can pruneaway all purely nonlocal universes.7. We can prune away most of the content of the "parallel universes" that are thought to branchout from this one at every juncture where there is a random quantum event. The reason is simplythat, lacking a means of instantaneous transport to some very distant place, those extra timelines,filled with matter, would remain here, and in aggregate would be so massive as to crusheverything instantaneously into a huge black hole. If they were transported somewhere else, theenergies required to accelerate them would be such as to destroy every piece of coherent matterby tidal and inertial forces. Obviously, too, the spontaneous creation of such huge amounts of matter and energy out of nothing would violate the fundamental conservation laws of physics,without which any physical reasoning would be impossible.If new timelines do branch out from this one, their determinative weight would consist in eachcase of a single superposition of a single quantum event, which would need to fight the entiremomentum of the rest of the universe to have any chance of initiating a new full-blown timelinein the universe of classical physics. Their fate would be like that of the random mutation in thegenes of a living organism, that is almost always rapidly eliminated by natural selection.However, some of those deviations might survive locally in favorable circumstances, producingthe characteristic fuzziness or wave-particle duality or nonlocality of objects at very small scales.Physicists have been able to create very small bunches of matter that exist in two places at once,
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